


**ISRAEL-DIASPORA  
RELATIONS:  
A SURVEY OF AMERICAN  
JEWISH LEADERS**

**STEVEN M. COHEN**



ISRAEL-DIASPORA INSTITUTE

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY CAMPUS

RAMAT AVIV 69978, ISRAEL

TEL: (03) 427981, 417324



ISRAEL DIASPORA INSTITUTE

REPORT NO.8 JANUARY 1990

*Israel-Diaspora Relations:  
A Survey of American  
Jewish Leaders*

*Steven M. Cohen  
Professor of Sociology  
Queens College, CUNY  
December, 1989*

*Head of the Project, Dr. Fredelle Spiegel*

*A Publication of  
The Israel-Diaspora Institute*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgments	iv
Preface	1
Introduction: The Israel-Diaspora Relationship in Perspective	3
Summary of Findings	8
Background	11
The Survey and the Sample	14
The Limits of Survey Research	18
<b>FINDINGS</b>	
Jewish Leaders — Upscale and Active	20
Strong Ties with Israel	25
Largely Committed to Economic Aid to Israel	29
Approval of Criticism	33
Resistance to Involvement in Security Matters	39
Specific Israeli Causes	43
Resentment of the Ultra-Orthodox	48
Wary of the PLO	52
Wide Support for Territorial Compromise	54
Security Conditions	60
Wide Support for Israel Talking with the PLO	63
Concern over the Impact of the Occupation upon Israel	67
Moral Commitment	70
Doves over Hawks, but also Neutrality	71
Conclusion	73
<b>APPENDICES:</b>	
Does the Sample Represent Jewish Leaders?	76
Questionnaire and Frequencies	80
Cover Letters and Reminder Post Cards	101
SPSS-PC+ Computer Program	105

The Israel-Diaspora Institute is a unique partnership of Israeli and Diaspora Jews involved in developing action-oriented policies for a modern, democratic, pluralistic Jewish state.

By researching today's high-priority issues and evaluating policy options, the Institute tries to influence public opinion in general and Israel's decision-makers in particular.

The Institute brings together academics and practitioners in business, law, finance and politics in a think-tank modeled on the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institution. It is the only forum of its kind in the Jewish world.

**Israel-Diaspora Institute**  
P.O.B. 39331  
Tel Aviv, 61392, Israel  
Tel: (03) 427981, 417324

The project of which this survey forms a part has been financially supported by the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco and the American Jewish Committee.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research was conducted within the framework of the Israel Diaspora Institute project, "Options for Enhancing the Israel-Diaspora Relationship," directed by Dr. Fredelle Z. Spiegel. IDI President Dr. Arye Carmon, Prof. Bernard Reisman (Brandeis University), and Prof. Steven Spiegel (UCLA) serve as advisors to this project.

The data which is collected during this study will be recorded in the IDI Jewish Contemporary Archives, and will be available to bone fide researchers upon request.

The following agencies agreed to provide the researchers with the names and addresses of their key professional or lay leaders:

- American Jewish Congress
- American Jewish Committee
- Association for Israel Studies
- Central Conference of American Rabbis (Reform)
- Rabbinical Assembly (Conservative)
- Rabbinical Council of America (Orthodox)
- United Synagogue of America (Conservative)
- Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

The following organizations agreed to distribute questionnaires directly to their leadership:

- Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
- Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform)

The following organizations publish lists of leaders available in the public domain that were utilized for this research:

- Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
- Council of Jewish Federations
- National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

The assistance of all these agencies and individuals is gratefully acknowledged. The views and interpretations expressed in this report are solely the responsibility of the author.

## Preface

The 1980s have witnessed a number of important milestones in the relations between Israel and the Diaspora. Indeed, on the threshold of the 1990s, it could easily be asserted that these relationships are substantively different today than they were just a decade ago. The priorities on the so-called Jewish agenda have changed drastically. For example, who would have believed 10 months ago, let alone 10 years ago, that the Jewish world would experience the migration of hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews to Israel. However, beyond this, the 1980s has seen a very intensive transition in the nature of the Jewish leadership; from one directly affected by the trauma of the Holocaust and the glory of the founding of the State of Israel, to one dissociated from emotional events of such magnitude.

The 1980s exposed deep cracks in the unilateral support of Diaspora Jews for the State of Israel. The Lebanon War provided the first indication that pluralism within Israeli society and disagreement over fundamental issues would make inroads into the attitudes of Diaspora Jewish communities. It is only natural that the uprisings in the territories held by Israel (the intifada), would effect similar reactions. But, another factor should be taken into account and that is that for most of the 1980s Israel had a "two-headed" government. How to stand behind a non-existent, unilateral Israeli policy became a perplexing issue.

The process of transition on the threshold of the 1990s is not yet completed. As a matter of fact, at the IDI we believe that this forthcoming decade, more than crystallizing previously initiated modes in Israel-Diaspora relations, will provide a corridor into the 21st century. It is impossible to predict how this relationship will appear at the end of this process, but it is imperative that we guard it very carefully and seriously.

The IDI has undertaken to monitor this transition systematically. As a constructive "watch" on Israel-Diaspora relationships, it will endeavour to provide all those engaged and concerned with this relationship with relevant information and recommendations. This is the background which initiated the project whose first fruits are presented herewith. The initial phase of the project was perceived as pulse-taking of the truth as it existed then. This



booklet contains a very thorough presentation of a unique survey of the attitudes of the leadership of American Jewish organizations. It cannot, however, be separated from its "twin brother" — a series of meetings initiated by the IDI of focus groups in which major issues pertaining to Israel- Diaspora relations in the 1990s are being discussed.

A group of experts established by the IDI is attempting, in these focus groups, to clarify, together with the highest echelons of Jewish organizations and federations in North America, their perspectives of the options available for the future of the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora. Most important, the central issue in the focus groups' deliberations is linked with the organizational and institutional implications of these options. The paper delineating the various options was prepared by Prof. Steven Spiegel (UCLA), who is a member of the team of experts. Another member, Prof. Bernard Reisman (Brandeis University) leads the discussions in each of the focus groups. Dr. Fredelle Spiegel is the project's coordinator. Prof. Steven M. Cohen, who conducted the IDI's comprehensive survey, and who wrote the report herewith presented, is an active participant in this group of experts. They all have a share in this pioneering effort.

We hope to continue with this two-phased monitoring (survey and focus groups) in the years to come, and to provide the Jewish world with vital and relevant information and recommendations.

*Dr. Arye Carmon  
President IDI  
January 1990*

## **Introduction: The Israel-Diaspora Relationship in Perspective**

The press and media are filled with much talk about the changing Israel-Diaspora relationship. Many assume that as Israeli politics continue to be guided by the Likud party, and as American Jews remain within the liberal democratic tradition, the future will hold increased tensions between these two Jewish communities. Many analysts also contend that the Israel-Diaspora relationship will inevitably be weakened, and that progressively fewer American Jews will be interested in Israel's well-being. Yet, no one has studied the effect of these potential strains. Has the Israel- Diaspora relationship been weakened in the post-intifada era? Are American Jewish leaders no longer supporting an Israel that seems to be espousing policies that they do not favor? Are they taking independent actions that undermine Israel's policy decisions? Are American Jewish leaders turning away from Israel in frustration?

The Israel-Diaspora Institute has undertaken a project which seeks to answer these questions. Using the tools of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the Institute is measuring the strength and outlining the contours of the relationship between American Jews and Israel. The survey of American Jewish leaders conducted by Steven M. Cohen was designed by the Israel-Diaspora Institute as part of this project. The Institute is also undertaking a series of discussion groups throughout the United States and Israel in order to focus more fully on the Israel-Diaspora relationship.

This survey confirms that the leadership of the American Jewish community is both more politically liberal and more affiliated with a Jewish religious denomination than many other American Jews and certainly more than most Israeli citizens. Its significance, however, lies not in these findings, but rather in its quest to uncover the implications of these differences in the two communities for the Israeli-Diaspora relationship. While this survey confirms the strong support for Israel that we have come to expect from American Jewish leaders, the survey's importance lies in its asking these leaders if (and how) they are willing to impose their

politically liberal views on the Israeli polity. What do American Jewish leaders see as their role (if any) in Israel's development?

It seems clear that, if given the opportunity, these American Jewish leaders would like to see Israel become more like America, or, at least, what their vision of America is. The answers to almost all of the questions asked clearly indicate that, with the possible exception of the Orthodox, American Jewish leaders are strongly influenced by, and, indeed, are a part of, the American political culture. The group offers fairly consistent liberal views about religious, social and political questions. They are concerned about Israel's treatment of Arabs on the West Bank, Conservative and Reform Jews, and women. (Of course, when one realizes that 78% of these acknowledged Jewish leaders are men, one wonders how many changes would actually be instituted if American Jewish leaders had the opportunity to impose their standards on Israel.) They would like to see Israel enter negotiations about the future of the West Bank. They would like to oversee more closely the spending of their philanthropic contributions. In brief, they would be comfortable if Israel were composed of liberal democrats like themselves!

Yet, American Jewish leaders are willing to try to influence the Israeli polity in only some of the areas with which they express dissatisfaction. Significantly, two broad areas which relate to questions of Jewish identity, the "who is a Jew" controversy and concerns about immigrant absorption, are those where most American Jewish leaders see themselves appropriately playing a role in the Israeli decision-making process. Not surprisingly, two other areas which might be subsumed under the general category of liberal politics also command the positive response of American Jewish leaders. Half of those surveyed think it appropriate for American Jews to play a role in questions of Israeli electoral reform. By contrast, only twenty five percent of those surveyed think that American Jewish involvement in matters of Israeli security would be appropriate.

Thus, although American Jewish attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict may receive the most media attention, and the most survey research, the community's leaders are more reticent about involving themselves in these issues than in many others. Although they espouse a liberal conception of foreign policy (not

surprising in a group who voted 72% for Dukakis), dissatisfaction with specific Israeli policies has led neither to a cooling of the relationship nor to a significant desire to become involved in Israeli foreign policy decisions. These leaders do not advocate independent action that might encourage (or force) Israel to adopt different policies toward the PLO nor do they advocate financial support for particular Israeli political parties which might profess their own policy preferences.

Ironically, then, although many analysts of the American Jewish polity are anxious to discover the reaction of American Jews, and Jewish leadership, to the Arab-Israeli conflict because they assume that dissatisfaction with Israel's handling of the intifada leads to a distancing from Israel, and a weakening of the Israel-Diaspora relationship, this survey indicates the opposite.

There are several conventional explanations for American Jewish leaders' reticence to involve themselves in security matters in contrast to their willingness to engage in Israeli domestic problems. Many assume that these leaders separate issues of the physical survival of the State of Israel from issues which seem more related to Israel's material or spiritual well-being. Thus, where it might be considered appropriate to influence Israel on non-survival issues, it is not appropriate to try to do so on questions of security.

Moreover, American Jews' identification with moral issues has long been noticed; their concern with international affairs is more recent. Yet, the individuals who participated in this study were not undecided in their opinions about these foreign policy issues. They expressed equally strong opinions about Israel's security as about other questions.

Similarly, while American Jewish leaders may have strong opinions about Israel's foreign policy, their ambivalence, or even confusion, about specific policy questions limits their willingness to involve themselves more specifically in these matters. For example, when asked their opinions about Israel's dealing with the Palestinians, or about general questions regarding such broad concepts as the desirability of engaging in negotiations or in exchanging territories for peace, most American Jewish leaders answer in the expected liberal fashion. Yet, when asked about the PLO, and especially the possible role of the PLO in a settlement,

these leaders are far more cautious, unwilling to acknowledge the PLO as a neutral or even a necessary ingredient to be considered in discussions of Israel's future. Further, although many American Jewish leaders are ready to accept the possibility of a Palestinian state, the conditions that they insist on placing on this state are not ones that are readily accepted by the potential Arab partners in negotiations. While American Jewish leaders may differ with Israeli foreign policy, this survey indicated that they do not offer a complete policy in contrast to it.

These conventional explanations account for some of the differences in the responses to questions related to security matters. There is another reason, however, found within the American liberal tradition which sheds further light on the seeming contradiction between American Jewish leaders' views of their roles in domestic and foreign policy questions. It is accepted wisdom in the American liberal tradition to believe that a more liberal domestic state professes a more liberal foreign policy. (The recent reforms in the Soviet Union seem to confirm this view.) Thus, it is likely that American Jewish leaders assume that if they help Israel become a more liberal democracy, its foreign policy will follow suit. There is no need for American Jews to involve themselves directly in foreign policy matters if the impact of their influence in domestic affairs will be felt in foreign policy as well. American Jews, then, need not worry that they are compromising Israel's foreign policy-making. Leaders do not have to contend with charges that they are involving themselves in areas which are best left to those who live in the region. Rather, they have discovered a new and acceptable means of assuaging their concerns: alter Israel's society, polity and economy and its foreign policy will change.

American Jewish leaders' increasing desire to become engaged in Israel's domestic affairs can be seen either as an indication of their caution about foreign policy matters or as a response to their frustration with Israel's foreign policies. In either case, however, dissatisfaction with some Israeli policies has led not to a weakening of the Israel-Diaspora relationship, but rather to a strengthening of it. American Jewish leaders are more committed than ever to involving themselves in order to insure Israel's future. Rather than uncovering a progressive distancing between these two

Jewish communities, this survey confirms the desire for increasingly closer relationships.

This survey, then, uncovers the continuing strong support for Israel, the areas of concern about some of Israel's decisions, and, most importantly, the desire of American Jewish leadership to become even more fully involved with Israel's future. The Israel-Diaspora Institute is responding seriously to the challenges posed by this study and is seeking concrete ways of improving the Israel-Diaspora relationship in light of these findings. Through its consultations in the United States, it is seeking to discover more specific avenues of further cooperation between American Jews and Israel. New means for involvement are being discussed and explored. With similar consultations in Israel, the Institute seeks to discover what areas are of special concern to Israelis. Finally, the Institute plans to bring together both American Jewish leaders and Israelis to further develop ideas for a more meaningful relationship. This survey serves as a stimulating beginning for these discussions.

*Fredelle Z. Spiegel*  
*Project Director*

## SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS

1. The sample includes leaders from some of the most prominent philanthropic, religious, and community relations agencies in Jewish life. Included are major Jewish federations, the CJF board, the ADL, the AJCommittee, the AJCongress, and numerous others.

2. The leaders are socio-economically very up-scale (median income = \$140,000).

3. They are very active in communal Jewish life and more religiously observant than most Jews. Median UJA gift = \$4,000; only 10% are non-denominational; almost a third (31%) attend religious services weekly.

4. They are very committed to Israel. Most (62%) have been there in the last two years; almost all (84%) have visited at least three times; the vast majority (78%) identify as Zionists and as many (75%) have called an Israeli in the last year; most (55%) have seriously considered living in Israel; compared to American Jews, they exhibit far more knowledge of Israeli society. The vast majority (81%) believe that were it not for Israel there would be much less "vitality in American Jewish life."

5. They are also deeply committed to economic aid to Israel. Hardly any (7%) agree that that the U.S. Congress should slice aid by just a little bit to teach Israeli hard-liners a lesson; only a few (19%) have ever limited their UJA contribution because of disagreements with Israel.

6. They widely approve of friendly criticism of Israeli public policies and resoundingly reject arguments that such criticism is unhealthy.

7. They almost universally support the idea that American Jews should be involved in the "Who is a Jew" issue and in immigrant absorption in Israel.

8. They reject the idea that American Jews should become involved in Israeli decision-making on security matters. Whereas 88% approve of "involvement" in the "Who is a Jew" issue, 25% approve of "involvement" in Israeli security matters. In many ways, they want to preserve Israeli freedom of action in the diplomatic arena. Thus, the vast majority disapproves of the meeting of the five Jewish personalities with Arafat.

9. They are attracted to ideologically focused Israel-oriented causes. Among the more popular: Conservative and Reform institutions in Israel (71%); and (to a lesser extent) the New Israel Fund (40%), Friends of Peace Now (28%), and Orthodox Zionist institutions in Israel (25%). It may be quite significant that almost half believe, "Because of ... mismanagement, Israelis waste an excessive amount of philanthropic aid ..."

10. They have strong denominational attachments (as Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform Jews) with respect to denominational conflicts within Israel. The vast majority would be upset with changes in "Who is a Jew" legislation favored by some Orthodox Israelis. The leaders sharply distinguish "ultra"-Orthodox Israelis (whom they view very unfavorably) from the Modern Orthodox.

11. Over three-quarters (78%) see the PLO as determined to destroy Israel. Although, in the leaders' view, Palestinians are not inherently violent, they will continue the intifada for years until they see progress toward statehood. Very few (25%) leaders believe the Israeli army can sharply lower the level of violence with "tougher actions."

12. Majorities favor the conditional offer of a Palestinian state in the context of a peace agreement and several security conditions. By 76% to 16%, they favor "territorial compromise ... for credible guarantees of peace." By 59% to 18%, they believe Israel should "offer the Palestinians the prospect of a de-militarized state in 15 years, after a gradual build-up of confidence on both sides."

13. The leaders view the following security conditions as essential or desirable for a peace agreement: 1) deployment of the IDF in the territories; 2) de-militarization of the Palestinians; 3) retention of Jewish settlements necessary for security; and 4) renunciation of Palestinian claims of a right to return to pre-1967 Israel.

14. A 73% to 20% majority believe Israel should talk to the PLO if it "recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism." A slim plurality (46% to 42%) believe that Israel should "offer to talk with the PLO with no pre-conditions on either side."

15. Most (63%) are worried about the impact of the intifada on Israel's democratic character and almost as many (60%) think Israel is not treating the Arabs in the territories fairly.



16. Vast majorities want American Jewish organizations to remain politically neutral, that is, not to tilt in either partisan direction, be it to Labor or Likud. At the same time, by margins of almost two-to-one, leaders report favorable impressions of Israeli doves, and unfavorable impressions of Israeli hawks. Many more would contribute to Peace Now (28%) than to Gush Emunim (9%).

## BACKGROUND : ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR JEWISH LEADERS

American Jews certainly maintain an extraordinarily close relationship with Israel. Support of Israel is the most important cause in so many sectors of American Jewish public life including its centralized philanthropic campaigns, its community relations agenda, and its political activities. One telling sign of the centrality of Israel to American Jews is the extraordinary amount of coverage of Israel-related matters found in almost every Anglo-Jewish publication.

Notwithstanding Israel's central place in the consciousness of American Jews and in the agenda of so many of their agencies, some scattered pieces of evidence suggest a change over the last few years in the texture of Israel-Diaspora relations, if not possibly what some might call outright distancing of American Jews from Israel. More American Jews are publicly expressing differences with official Israeli policies in Israel's pursuit of peace and security. The philanthropic campaigns, in which Israel figures so prominently, have largely stagnated (after adjusting for inflation). What's more, the share of federation dollars allocated to Israel has diminished perceptibly since the mid-1970's. American Jewish emigration to Israel (aliyah) has drifted downward since its heyday in 1968-72. And recent research on the American Jewish public has demonstrated a weaker attachment to Israel among younger Jews (Cohen 1987; 1989). These may be isolated trends, each explainable in its own terms; or they may be indicative of a long-term decline in American Jewish enthusiasm for Israel (Cohen 1988).

Several recent developments may also have contributed to a change in American Jews' attachment to Israel. These include:

- The outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 and numerous diplomatic developments in its wake.

- The "Who is a Jew" controversy, which peaked in the weeks following the Knesset elections in November 1988.

- The deep cleavages within the Israeli government and the advocacy of sharply conflicting approaches to Israel's security problems by both Israeli political leaders and American Jewish communal figures.



-A background of unsettling incidents over the last decade. These include the War in Lebanon and its aftermath; the election of Meir Kahane to the Knesset in 1984 (and his dis-qualification in 1988); the frequently violent secular- religious conflicts in the mid 1980's; and the Jonathan Pollard affair in 1987.

No one knows whether American Jews' passion for Israel is cooling or just maturing. In any event, even if the level of commitment and attachment to Israel remains undiminished, the perception of deep- seated change in the nature of American Jewish attitudes toward Israel has caused many rabbis, educators, communal professionals, and lay leaders to search for ways to fortify the Israel-Diaspora relationship in light of changing realities.

In a recently published paper prepared for the IDI, Prof. Steven Spiegel (1989), lays out several alternative, partially overlapping options available to an American Jewry confronted with far more complex questions in the Israel- Diaspora relationship than in the past. They include:

(1) Distancing from Israel: American Jewish life turns away from a focus on Israel and Israel experiences reduced Diaspora involvement.

(2) Unquestioned support: "American Jews . . . support whatever government is in power."

(3) Friendly criticism: American Jews point "out errors in Israeli public policy, especially in the foreign policy arena."

(4) Independent action: American "Jews take matters into their own hands," by pursuing independent initiatives with American officials and Palestinians.

(5) Intensified involvement: "American Jews become agenda-setters in Israel . . . in a concerted effort to deal with Israel's structural difficulties," making appropriate alliances with local Israeli groups.

The appeal of these options, how they need to be refined, and the sources of their support among American Jewish leaders are the sorts of issues addressed in this research. This study takes no position on the attractiveness of these five alternative approaches. Rather, it seeks to provide a better understanding of how current American Jewish leaders relate to each approach and to their derivative lines of action. In so doing, the research aims to help

Israeli and Jewish communal policy makers draw better inferences about how to fortify and enhance the ties that bind together the two most significant contemporary Jewish communities.

The research detailed below reports on a survey of some of the most influential and prominent leaders in American Jewish life. It addresses a number of specific research questions relevant to the over-arching theme of understanding current American Jewish attitudes toward Israel and the development of alternate ways of relating to Israel.

First, it asks, how leaders answer the following questions: Should American Jews remain deeply committed to Israel, or should they begin to dis-engage somewhat? Insofar as they remain involved, in which areas of Israeli life and decision-making do leaders believe they should involve themselves? Insofar as some of them may differ with leading Israelis, to what extent do American Jews believe they should express their dissenting views publicly, and on which issues, and in what ways? Most crucially, how far should American Jews interject themselves into the formulation of Israeli security policy or the conduct of diplomacy? Second, given the centrality of the Arab-Israel conflict, the research seeks to determine where American Jewish leaders stand on how Israel ought to pursue peace and security. How dangerous are the Palestinians and how committed are they to their uprising? How far should Israel go in accommodating Palestinian national aspirations? What are Israel's security requirements? Should Israel talk with the PLO? Third, throughout this report, one question serves as a backdrop to all the findings: how do the leaders differ from the American Jewish rank-and-file on these and related matters (where such comparisons are feasible)?

The current attitudes of American Jewish leaders (to be defined operationally below) on many issues important to Israel-Diaspora relations are not readily apparent. Not only do leaders differ among themselves (as we shall demonstrate); but predicting how they respond collectively to the questions posed above in the absence of solid data is a risky venture to say the least. It is to address this gap in our collective knowledge about the views of American Jewish leadership that the Israel-Diaspora Institute at Tel- Aviv University commissioned this study of American Jewish leaders.

## THE SURVEY AND THE SAMPLE

The respondents consisted of the key professionals and top lay leaders from some of the most influential organizations in American Jewish life. These were: American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Association for Israel Studies, Central Conference of American Rabbis (Reform), Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Council of Jewish Federations, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Rabbinical Assembly (Conservative), Rabbinical Council of America (Orthodox), United Synagogue of America (Conservative), Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform), the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, local philanthropic federations, and local Jewish community relations councils.

The distribution of the 780 returned questionnaires by agency of principal leadership affiliation is as follows:

	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	PERCENT OF SAMPLE
American Jewish Congress	21	3
American Jewish Committee	68	9
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith	52	7
Association for Israel Studies	52	7
Central Conference of American Rabbis (Reform)	23	3
Council of Jewish Federations and local federations	244	31

	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	PERCENT OF SAMPLE
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council and local Jewish community relations councils	93	12
Rabbinical Assembly (Conservative)	21	3
Rabbinical Council of America (Orthodox)	41	5
United Synagogue of America (Conservative)	58	7
Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform)	50	6
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America	32	4
Other	25	3

Aside from the small number of academics (represented by the Association for Israel Studies list), the respondents divided into roughly three equal thirds among religious leadership (rabbis and laity), defense agencies (professionals and lay leaders), and federations (local executives, local presidents, and CJF Board members). The specifically religious leadership, in turn, was divided almost equally among Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform segments (although the denominational distributions among the total population of leaders were different).

In October and November of 1989, the Washington office of Market Facts, Inc., administered a mail-back survey (see Appendix for the instrument and frequencies) to leaders of several American Jewish organizations and a sample of American Jewish academics concerned with the study of Israel. Of the 1310 individuals who were mailed questionnaires, 780 returned completed surveys. Prospective respondents received a survey and a follow-up post card a week later; three weeks after the first survey was sent, Market Facts sent a second copy of the survey and

another reminder post card to the non-respondents. (See the Appendix for copies of all these materials.)

The 60% response rate is unusually high for a mail-back survey. This high response indicates considerable motivation on the part of the respondents. No doubt, many leaders were keenly interested in the subject matter and were familiar with the considerable public interest in previous surveys of the American Jewish public on similar matters.

Several considerations suggest that the non-respondents' views collectively resembled those of the majority who did respond. A long line of research on response to mail-back questionnaires demonstrates that idiosyncratic factors, largely unrelated to the content of the survey, play a major role in determining who responds. Many people fail to respond because they dislike surveys, they misplace the questionnaire, or they simply neglect to make the time to sit down and answer the questions.

In this particular case, we know the response rates of different sample segments. The rates were higher for professionals than for lay leaders, in part owing to the fact that many surveys were sent to the leaders' agencies (where the professionals work) rather than to their homes. Since (as we detail below) professionals' views resemble those of the lay leaders in their agencies, the unequal response rates for professionals and volunteers had relatively little impact on the results. Since the UAHC and the ADL handled their own mailings, responses from these two agencies were lower than for the other agencies. These variations are partially offsetting (leaders of the UAHC and the ADL have somewhat differing viewpoints) and, in any event, the under-response from the two agencies had only a marginal effect on the final results for the total sample.

Clearly, several significant organizations were excluded from the list of heavily sampled agencies. The reason for these exclusions was that the roster of organizations participating in this study (limited for reasons of economy) was meant to provide only a sample of Jewish leadership, not the universe. It was also meant to be drawn from diverse sectors of activity with special relevance for the Israel-diaspora relationship.

(As an aside, the inclusion of the Association for Israel Studies may initially appear enigmatic; certainly this fledgling group in no

way qualifies as a significant and influential Jewish communal organization. Rather, its list was used as a convenient stand-in to represent the entire American Jewish academic world which, in various ways, certainly affects the American Jewish-Israel relationship. The Association includes those academics most active in writing and lecturing about Israel in the United States.)

Most of the participating organizations supplied lists of their top professionals and key volunteer leaders. As previously noted, two (ADL and the UAHC) preferred to mail the surveys directly to their leaders. The CJF lists are in the public domain. Recipients of the survey included all the members of the CJF national board, as well as the presidents and executive directors of Jewish federations in Jewish communities of so-called intermediate size (about 20,000 Jews) and larger. The presidents and executive directors of every organization belonging to the Conference of Presidents also received the questionnaire, as did the lay and professional directors of the community relations councils in larger Jewish communities.

All American Jewish organizations that we asked to co-operate with the study agreed to do so with the sole exception of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, certainly a very important and significant agency for mediating the Israel-Diaspora relationship. Despite our efforts to include AIPAC's professionals and Governing Council in our study, AIPAC was unable to actively cooperate with the study. As one of AIPAC's leading professionals explained in a telephone conversation, it is AIPAC's strict policy not to encourage studies of its professionals or lay leaders.

Although the AIPAC Governing Council as such failed to be included in this study, many leading members of this body found their way into the sample by virtue of their other leadership roles.

## THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND THE LIMITS OF SURVEY RESEARCH

A survey research questionnaire has several virtues. It can test public reaction to a large number and wide variety of discrete questions. It offers the possibility of generalizing to a larger universe and of systematically analyzing the relationships between and among attitudes and background characteristics. However, by its very nature, survey research tends to be limited in its ability to make very subtle and nuanced distinctions. Closed-ended, multiple-choice questions pre-determine both questions and answers, forcing respondents to think and respond in ways determined ahead of time by the researcher.

One other difficulty with survey research is that any question inevitably contains some degree of ambiguity. The meaning of the question may differ for different respondents, for the researcher, and for the reader.

There is no way to totally obviate these problems. Good analysis takes the inherent limits of survey research seriously. The interpretation of the findings presented below tries to avoid placing too much weight on the specific wording of individual questions. Rather, it looks at broad tendencies; it relies only upon clear trends in the data; and in coming to conclusions, it generally draws upon the answers to several questions simultaneously.

Interpretation of survey evidence is not pure science; but neither is it an act of imaginative creativity. The analysis below is certainly informed by "side knowledge," that is, a theoretical framework drawn from the professional literature, and two decades of experience systematically studying the American Jewish community. The presentation tries to separate data from interpretation to allow the reader to contend with the data in his or her own way.

Some survey questions replicated those asked repeatedly in earlier surveys of American Jews. However, most were designed specifically for this study to capitalize on the unique opportunities presented by a study of leaders. Questions for a leadership sample can presume more knowledge and sophistication than surveys of the rank-and-file.

Nevertheless, in constructing the instrument, we could not presume unlimited sophistication. That is, we could not ask respon-

dents for their reactions to innovative analyses and proposals available primarily in the professional literature on the Arab-Israel conflict. Most of the questions reflect statements or positions often articulated in conversations among the broad spectrum of Jewish leaders or in the magazines and newspapers they read.



## FINDINGS

### THE JEWISH LEADERS IN THIS SAMPLE — UPSCALE AND ACTIVE

In several important respects, the respondents in this sample exhibit all the characteristics one would expect of leaders in American society generally as well as leaders of Jewish organizations specifically. In other words, they are socio-economically very upscale and Jewishly highly active and involved.

Three quarters (77%) are male; their median age is about 54 years old; almost all are married; 70% have a professional or graduate degrees and all attended college; 38% earn \$150,000 a year or more while their median household income is about \$125,000 annually.

The leaders' geographic distribution very closely resembles the state-by-state distribution of American Jews as reported in the American Jewish Year Book, with two exceptions. Relative to the local indigenous Jewish population, there is an excess of leaders in the District of Columbia and its environs, and there are proportionally half as many leaders in this sample living in California as there are Jews residing in the state. Both deviations from the national distributions are understandable. As the nation's capital, Washington, D.C. attracts several headquarters and branch offices of national agencies, thereby raising the concentration of leaders, especially professionals. As a state very distant from the other centers of Jewish population (and a state with lower than average Jewish affiliation rates), California sends disproportionately fewer individuals to sit on national boards.

In many ways, these leaders are extensively involved in Jewish life, both communal and private. Fully 38% contribute \$5,000 or more to their local UJA/Federation campaign; the median gift is around \$4,000. (As an aside, the analysis calculated that UJA/Federation giving represents about 3% of these leaders' household incomes; among Federation leaders, the figure approaches 5%.) The leaders work for or serve on the executive boards of a wide variety of organizations, including federations, defense agencies, synagogue associations, and rabbinical groups. Moreover, several have multiple affiliations.

In many respects, leaders are more religiously traditional and Jewishly active than average American Jews. When compared with most population studies, this group contains larger numbers of Orthodox, Conservative and Reconstructionist Jews and far smaller numbers of non-denominational Jews. Almost one third (31%) attend religious services weekly, twice the national average. Four-fifths (81%) fast Yom Kippur; 40% maintain separate dishes for meat and dairy products in their homes, about twice the number found on most local Jewish population studies. In contrast with the Jewish public, hardly any leaders have Christmas trees and hardly any are married to non-Jews (however, 18% of their eldest children are inter-married). As many as 83% report that all of their three closest friends are Jews, significantly more than the three-fifths who so report among American Jews generally.

The childhood Jewish background of the leaders was more intensive than that of most Jews. One-sixth had attended a day school or yeshiva as their main form of Jewish education, and hardly any claimed no formal Jewish schooling (as compared with about three times as many among the rank-and-file). As many as 23% had been to Israel as teen-agers or young adults, and 68% had belonged to a Jewish youth group, and 34% had attended a camp sponsored by a Jewish agency or movement. (These results certainly suggest that day schools, Israel travel, youth groups, and Jewish summer camp may have a powerful and enduring impact upon Jewish involvement as an adult. The high rates with which leaders report these experiences, although not absolute proof, provide strong presumptive evidence that these intensive Jewish youth experiences are effective instruments of Jewish socialization.)

Compared to American Jews — a group with a deserved reputation for liberal inclinations and Democratic Party attachments — leaders are even more politically liberal and slightly more attached to the Democratic Party.

In short, for readers having some familiarity with American Jewish leaders, there are no surprises here. Their characteristics are as one would expect, lending credibility to the sample. The leaders are upscale, highly active in both the public and private



spheres in Jewish life, have strong Jewish backgrounds, and lean politically in the liberal direction.

### **Background Characteristics**

#### **Demographic Characteristics**

##### **Sex:**

77% MALE  
23% FEMALE

##### **Age:**

LT 40: 14%  
40-9: 26%  
50-9: 27%  
60-9: 23%  
70+: 11%

##### **Marital status:**

91% MARRIED  
4% SEPARATED OR DIVORCED  
3% WIDOWED  
3% NEVER MARRIED

##### **Educational attainment:**

70% PROFESSIONAL OR GRADUATE DEGREE  
23% COLLEGE DEGREE  
7% SOME COLLEGE

##### **Household income:**

38% \$150,000+  
20% \$100,000-\$149,999  
16% \$75,000-99,999  
20% \$50,000-74,999  
7% \$30,000-49,999

### **Jewish Communal Involvement**

Household contribution to the UJA/Federation in 1988:

38% \$5,000+  
27% \$1000-4,999  
12% \$500  
14% \$100-499  
10% \$ 0-99

Works as a Jewish communal professional 42%

Jewish communal lay leader or academic 58%

### **Current Jewish Identity**

Identifies as:

14% ORTHODOX  
41% CONSERVATIVE  
4% RECONSTRUCTIONIST  
31% REFORM  
10% JUST JEWISH

Frequency of religious services attendance:

31% EVERY WEEK  
23% 1-3 TIMES A MONTH  
25% 5-10 TIMES A YEAR  
17% 1-4 TIMES A YEAR  
3% NEVER

Fasts Yom Kippur in 1988 81%

Uses separate dishes at home for meat & dairy products 40%

Has a Christmas tree 4%

Spouse is Jewish 97%

Oldest married child's spouse is Jewish 82%

Three closest friends are Jewish 83%

### Jewish Background as a Youngster

Main type of Jewish education received as a child:

- 17% Yeshiva or Day School
- 49% Hebrew School or other part-time Jewish school
- 22% Sunday School
- 7% Private tutoring or other
- 5% None

Was in Israel when 13-22 years old: 23%

As a teen-ager, belonged to a Jewish youth group: 68%

Attended a Jewish-sponsored summer sleep-away camp?: 34%

### Political Background

1988 Presidential vote:

- 71% DUKAKIS
- 27% BUSH
- 2% DIDN'T VOTE

Thinks of self as:

- 13% REPUBLICAN
- 69% DEMOCRAT
- 18% INDEPENDENT

Usual stand on political issues:

- 47% LIBERAL
- 43% MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD
- 10% CONSERVATIVE

## STRONG TIES WITH ISRAEL — THE REJECTION OF DISTANCING

The extent of the leaders' contact and communication with Israel and Israelis is truly remarkable. Fully 99% of this sample have been to Israel; in fact, almost all (84%) have been there three times or more. A clear majority have visited Israel within the last two years, and 41% were there in the first ten months of 1989. As many as 64% regularly read the Jerusalem Post (as compared with just 7% of American Jews generally). Three-quarters made a telephone call to someone in Israel during the last year (as compared with just 10% of the American Jewish public). About half of their Jewish volunteer activities are focused around Israel "to a great extent," and nearly 90% say that their activities are Israel-centered at least "to some extent." Over three-quarters (78%) feel "very close" to Israel.

Clearly, by any definition of Israel commitment, this a group deeply and broadly committed to Israel. One would be hard put to find another collection of Diaspora Jews as deeply committed to Israel as this sample of Jewish leaders.

Not only are they in frequent contact with Israel and Israelis, but they appear fairly knowledgeable as well. One indication of their familiarity with Israel comes in their answers to several questions about Israeli society. The leaders found the questions relatively easy, providing correct answers over 80% of the time as opposed to just 30% or so among samples of American Jews generally.

The leaders also express a Zionist commitment far more widespread than that found among the American Jewish rank-and-file. Over three-quarters of the leaders identify as Zionists as compared with less than a quarter of the Jewish public; most have "seriously considered living in Israel," more than three times as many as among American Jews. By more than a four-to-one margin they agree that "were it not for Israel, there would be much less dynamism and vitality in American Jewish life." Overwhelmingly they reject the anti-Zionist claim that American Jewish life "is more authentically and positively Jewish than Jewish life in Israel."

The responses to these questions on Israel involvement and commitment certainly imply that leaders would not respond favorably

to suggestions that American Jewry dis-engage from Israel. By extension, we may infer that scattered signs of distancing by some American Jews (especially young people) are not taken as a directive to leaders to dis-engage as well. Rather, alienation from Israel is seen by most leaders as a problem to be addressed and not a direction to be followed.

### Israel: Wide Contact and Deep Commitment

	<b>Number of times in Israel:</b>
84%	3+ TIMES
15%	ONCE OR TWICE
1%	NEVER
	<b>Last time in Israel:</b>
41%	1989
21%	1988
23%	1985-7
15%	1965-84
1%	NEVER
Regularly reads the Jerusalem Post or other Israeli newspaper	64%
In the last year, made a telephone call to someone in Israel	75%

### To what extent are your Jewish volunteer activities focused around Israel?

48%	TO A GREAT EXTENT
39%	TO SOME EXTENT
10%	A LITTLE
3%	NOT AT ALL
1%	NOT SURE

### How close do you feel to Israel?

78%	VERY CLOSE
19%	FAIRLY CLOSE
2%	FAIRLY DISTANT
0%	VERY DISTANT
1%	NOT SURE

### Knowledge of Israeli Society

<i>As far as you know (without checking with others)</i>	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Can Conservative & Reform rabbis officially marry couples in Israel?	7	89	4
Do Arab Israeli & Jewish Israeli children generally go to the same schools?	11	83	7
Is David Levy a leader of the Likud Party?	78	5	18
Do Israelis elect their Knesset members within geographic districts?	7	84	9

**Zionist Commitment**

Consider self a Zionist	77%
Seriously considered living in Israel	54%

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Were it not for Israel, there would be much less dynamism and vitality in American Jewish life	81	17	3
Jewish life in America is more authentically & positively than Jewish life in Israel	10	81	9

**LARGELY COMMITTED TO ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL**

Further evidence of the rejection of distancing is found in a variety of questions pertaining to financial assistance for Israel. Although, as we shall see, leaders divide on several foreign policy questions, they are united in their commitment to economic and philanthropic aid to Israel. The questionnaire posed a number of questions specifically directed at detecting and eliciting discomfort with economic or philanthropic support of Israel. For the most part, the results indicate a firm and unshakable commitment to maintaining this support.

We tested reactions to a position advocated by Israel's enemies and some far left elements in Israel and American Jewry: "The U.S. Congress should cut aid to Israel by a little bit just so the hard-line Israelis will understand that American support for Israel has its limits." Only 7% of the sample accepted this idea and the vast majority (89%) rejected it. We also examined a more respectable position, one, in fact, advanced by several Israel free-market economists: "In the long run, American Jews' philanthropic support undermines Israel's economic vitality and independence." Here too, the statement met with massive rejection (only 12% agreed; 82% disagreed).

Almost every close observer of American Jewry can recount stories of how Israeli policies toward the Palestinians or the "Who is a Jew" controversy brought someone they know to cancel or curtail their annual gift to the local UJA/Federation campaign. We wanted to know whether these leaders themselves had ever "decided not to increase your gift to the UJA" because they were chagrined by some aspect of Israel. In response, 19% say they have felt this strongly at some point in the last decade, whereas 80% deny ever having curtailed their gift over differences with Israel.

Other evidence of American Jewish leaders' commitment to defending Israel's aid is found in the 72% who would contribute to AIPAC, if asked. Of all Israel-oriented charities offered, AIPAC is the most popular. Support for AIPAC correlates with attitudes toward aid. Those strongly committed to such aid are also more likely to respond positively to AIPAC's fund-raising appeals.



Apparently, leaders perceive part of AIPAC's value as assuring the continued flow of economic aid to Israel.

Notwithstanding all this evidence of philanthropic commitment (not surprising in a sample whose median gift to the UJA is \$4,000), there is some evidence on the other side of the ledger. One issue is the interpretation of the minorities who have, in fact, limited their UJA gift or who would reject a fund-raising appeal from AIPAC. Are these small numbers simply random noise or are they indicative of something deeper? That 18% to 28% of senior American Jewish leaders answer key questions on aid to Israel in ways indicating less than total support for such aid may be revealing of some substantively significant counter-trend worthy of attention.

The second piece of disquieting evidence comes in answers to the question on how to allocate communal philanthropic dollars. By way of background, every organized Jewish community must decide how to allocate its charitable contributions between local needs (such as old age homes, family services, Jewish community centers, Jewish day schools, etc.) and overseas. Although Israeli social services comprise only about half the overseas budget, symbolically, Israel looms larger in the thinking about how much to send overseas. Since the mid-1970s, the percentage of federation dollars allocated for overseas needs has eroded, while that devoted to local needs has risen commensurately.

We asked the leaders how they would like to see their communities' split changed, if at all. Half wanted no change; but of those who would want a change, many more wanted to allocate more funds to local needs than who wanted to shift money overseas (31% versus 13%). Among the federation leaders alone, almost two-thirds favored keeping the split unchanged; of the rest, those favoring more local allocations outnumbered those favoring increasing the overseas' share by more than a three-to-one margin. Clearly, opposition to changing the split garners the most support. At the other extreme, there is very little support for increasing the overseas' share of the federation dollar. Given the opportunity to modify the formula, those seeking to keep more federation dollars in the community would have a clear numeric advantage over those seeking more support for Israel and other overseas' causes.

The third sign of reservations about aid to Israel is found in the large number (nearly half) who believe that Israel wastes an "excessive" amount of aid it receives from American Jews. As noted later in this report, the widespread lack of confidence in the efficacy of Jewish philanthropic funds may well constitute a significant problem, at least in terms of public image if not other ways as well, for organized Jewish philanthropy dedicated to Israel.

The major lesson to be drawn from this set of findings is that Jewish leaders place a high value on the funds for Israel that they raise or advocate. They take Israel's economic needs in the social service, economic and military areas very seriously. From whatever we can see, support for various forms of aid is broad and deep, further indicating that dis-engagement from Israel is, for most of these leaders, an unavailable option. At the same time, the weaker commitment to economic aid to Israel among a minority of leaders may constitute a significant issue.

#### Commitment to Economic and Philanthropic Aid to Israel

	AGREE/ YES	DIS- AGREE/ NO	NOT SURE
The U.S. Congress should cut aid to Israel by a little bit just so the hard-line Israelis will understand that American support for Israel has its limits	7	89	4
In the long run, American Jews' philanthropic support undermines Israel's economic vitality and independence	12	82	6
In the last decade, have you ever been so troubled by some aspect of Israel that you decided not to increase your gift to the UJA?	19	80	2
If asked, would contribute to AIPAC	72	19	9



*In your own community, would you want to see more Federation dollars devoted to local needs or more devoted to overseas (largely Israel-oriented) needs?*

49%	Keep the local/overseas split the same as now
31%	More locally
13%	More overseas
7%	Not sure

## APPROVAL OF PUBLIC (BUT FRIENDLY) CRITICISM – THE REJECTION OF UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT

Although most American Jewish leaders are committed to supporting Israel and staying intimately involved in Israel-oriented activities, they are also very far from demanding uniform and unquestioning adherence to official Israeli policies. Rather, in answers to several questions, large majorities support the right of American Jews to criticize Israeli policies and reject the most commonly voiced arguments against such criticism.

As I observed in the 1989 survey of American Jews:

Particularly since the late 1970s, prominent American Jews have publicly objected to one or another aspect of Israeli foreign policy. This public criticism has on occasion provoked a bitter debate among both thinkers and Jewish organizational leaders. Proponents of criticism make several arguments. They claim that open criticism provides Israelis with a perspective on American Jews and the U.S. government that otherwise would have little impact on Israeli policymakers. If certain policies cannot be “sold” to American Jews, they will encounter even stiffer resistance among American foreign policy elites. The advocates of criticism also claim that their criticism lends American Jewry credibility when its representatives lobby on Israel’s behalf with U.S. officials. An occasionally critical American Jewry can be taken more seriously than a community given to knee-jerk support for everything Israel does. Finally, the defenders of criticism also claim that the criticism is a necessary part of a healthy involvement of American Jewry with the Jewish State. Only those indifferent to Israel would have nothing to say by way of criticism or support. Opponents of public criticism, in turn, argue that the critics, living as they do in the physical security of the United States, lack the moral standing to comment on the life and death issues confronting Israelis. They also contend that criticism detracts from the image of world Jewish unity that, they claim, is so important for influencing the American government.

Criticism of Israeli government policies by American Jews varies in several ways. Some of it comes from the political right, but undoubtedly more is lodged by dovish segments of American Jewry. Some criticism takes place within the confines of the Jewish press and community, but some appears in the pages of *The New York Times*. Much of it is offered by those who profess a deep pro-Israel attachment, but some of it arises from individuals who make no claim to prior Jewish, Zionist, or pro-Israel involvement. The sharply divergent varieties of public criticism make interpretation of the questionnaire data presented below somewhat ambiguous. "Criticism of Israel" may mean one thing to one respondent and something quite different to another. (Cohen 1989: 44).

With this cautionary note in mind, we can proceed to examine the findings. A majority of American Jewish leaders support the right to openly criticize Israeli policies. The survey offered the statement, "American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel." Fully 57% reject this statement (thereby supporting the right to criticize) and 38% agree with it. (Although leaders clearly support the right to criticize, they are slightly less supportive than are American Jews generally in recent surveys. Leaders, more than the larger public, feel a greater sense of allegiance to official communal positions.)

Evidence that the fear of the misuse of criticism by Israel's enemies plays a prominent role in leaders' hesitations about criticism is found in the responses to another question. The survey offered the statement, "Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues and Jewish community centers." As many as 82% endorse this view against only 14% who disagree. In other words, far fewer leaders object to this form of criticism than who object (in the previously reported results) to public criticism without the proviso that it take place on Jewish premises. Even leaders who believe American Jews should not criticize Israeli policies publicly support the policy of inviting them to speak in synagogues and Jewish community centers. They may feel a commitment to free speech within the confines of organized Jewry, or they may believe it to be simply

more prudent to keep dissent within the Jewish family rather than forcing it outside.

To American Jewish leaders, Israel is indeed a family matter. Criticism of Israel, in their view, ideally ought to be handled within the Jewish family. Accordingly, the more internal the source or context of criticism, the more is it acceptable. To take two contrasting examples, a rabbi speaking critically of Israeli policies to synagogue officers would be more favorably received by Jewish leaders than a Jewishly unaffiliated academician saying the same things on an American college campus with the press in attendance.

Previous surveys have demonstrated wide American Jewish support for the right to criticize Israeli government policies. More hawkish observers have argued that these surveys merely tap into a civil libertarian strain within the American Jewish consciousness. In their view, respondents can believe Jews have a right to criticize even if they think that criticism is bad for Israeli security. The survey instrument tested several arguments for and against public criticism. Without exception, majorities (ranging from slim to vast) reject the frequently voiced objections to criticism, some of which refer to its political impact and some of which refer to the character and loyalty of the critics.

Thus, 75% reject the idea that "public criticism of Israeli government policies ... threatens Israel's survival," and 74% disagree that American Jewish critics "are naive at best or traitors at worst." Even more (79%) reject the idea that they owe the Israeli government unquestioning support. This number disagrees with the statement that, "American Jews should fully support whatever Israeli government is in power and its policies." In fact, more than a two-to-one majority accepts an argument frequently offered by advocates of public criticism: "American Jews will be more effective in promoting U.S.- Israeli relations if they were seen as sometimes critical of Israel rather than as always giving Israeli leaders their unquestioned support."

Now, although the objections to criticism cited immediately above paraphrase many objections to criticism heard in Jewish communal meetings, some may regard them as excessively harsh, thereby producing an artificially low rate of objections to criticism. In light of this consideration, we offered a more neutrally worded

negative assessment of criticism. But even this mild critique of public criticism produced results in favor of those who support criticism of Israeli policies. The statement read, "Public criticism of Israeli government policies by American Jews weakens the ability of American Jewish organizations to defend Israel." More respondents support this statement than any other objection to criticism; nevertheless, those disagreeing (thereby defending criticism) form a narrow majority.

Those who accept, approve or endorse public Jewish criticism of Israeli policies are also likely to be more sympathetic to American efforts to convince Israelis to adopt a more conciliatory posture to the peace process. A 48% to 36% plurality approve of "suggestions by U.S. officials for Israelis to be more conciliatory to the Palestinians." The answers to this question correlated more closely with the questions on public criticism than with any other group of items, including those pertaining to acceptance of a Palestinian state. In other words, support for criticizing Israel is distinct from one's position on Israel's security policies, although the two attitude domains are certainly related. That is, what one believes about how Israel should deal with the Palestinians is an attitude empirically separate and apart from what one thinks about criticizing Israeli policies or welcoming American officials' suggestions. However, those who favor more conciliatory policies also tend to more often endorse the right to criticize Israeli policies and to approve of American efforts to persuade Israel to change its stances.

Although significantly more leaders approve of American "suggestions" for a softening of Israel's position than who disapprove, this finding must be taken as evidence of American Jewish leaders' support for maintaining Israel's freedom of action (about which, see more below). The phrasing of the question (i.e., "suggestions") is, indeed, the mildest version one could imagine. In all likelihood, had the question spoken of "pressure," many more would have disapproved. Seen in the light of other questions on this study, it seems fair to say that of the many American Jewish leaders who may privately hope that Israel will adopt more conciliatory foreign policies, few would want American officials to pressure Israel to do so.

As we see immediately below, the principle of non-interference in security matters and non-intervention in internal decision-making is a clear and important theme running through all the findings. Leaders may have strong views on how Israel should conduct its foreign policy and they may even vigorously defend the right of others to criticize that policy, but they think it inappropriate for themselves to exert pressure on Israel or to allow others (e.g., American officials) to do so as well.

### Views on Criticizing Israeli Government Policies

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel	38	57	5
Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues & Jewish community centers	82	14	5
Public criticism of Israeli government policies by American Jews threatens Israel's survival	21	75	4
American Jewish activists who are often so-called "friendly critics" of Israeli government policies are naive at best or traitors at worst	21	74	5
American Jews should fully support whatever Israel government is in power and its policies	17	79	3

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
American Jews will be more effective in promoting U.S.-Israeli relations if they were seen as sometimes critical of Israel rather than as always giving Israeli leaders their unquestioning support	64	29	6
Public criticism of Israeli government policies by American Jews weakens the ability of American Jewish organizations to defend Israel	43	51	5
	AP- PROVE	DISAP- PROVE	NOT SURE
Approve of suggestions by U.S. officials for Israelis to be more conciliatory to the Palestinians?	48	36	17

## RESISTANCE TO INVOLVEMENT IN SECURITY MATTERS — THE REJECTION OF INDEPENDENT ACTION

Regardless of what they may think about Israel's approach to its search for peace and security, the vast majority of American Jewish leaders reject the propriety of American Jews intervening in Israel's internal decision-making in this delicate area. Their objection to involvement in this sphere stands in sharp contrast to their willingness to intrude themselves in other areas.

Support for this generalization derives from the answers to a question asking respondents whether they approve or disapprove "of expert American Jewish lay and professional leaders being involved in" five specific areas of Israeli life. (Note that the question speaks of "being involved" rather than "intervening"; presumably, approval for intervention — a far more controversial act than involvement — would be even lower than the more neutral involvement.) The leaders sharply distinguish among the five areas of Israel policy making.

In two areas, vast majorities support involvement by American Jewish experts. These are: the "Who is a Jew" issue and absorption of immigrants. Well over 80% approve of involvement here. In these two areas, American Jews feel they have a direct stake and moral claim to involvement. The "Who is a Jew" issue is one where American Jews saw some Orthodox Israelis trying to use the symbolic power of the Israeli government to de-legitimize their rabbis if not their way of practicing Judaism (for more details, see the separate section below). Leaders feel free to express themselves on the immigrant absorption issue in part because they help raise American Jewish philanthropic funds to support social services in this area.

In late 1988, American Jewish communal leaders intervened forcefully in Israel's coalition negotiations to prevent changes in "Who is a Jew" legislation sought by many Orthodox religious parties. Some observers believe that organized American Jewry actually influenced the make-up of the ruling coalition. Almost all would agree that the scope and forcefulness of the intervention was unprecedented. Some theorized that the American Jewish

intervention in late 1988 would serve to legitimate and facilitate intervention in other areas.

Slim majorities approve of American Jewish involvement in Israelis' treatment of Palestinian protesters or of the discussions surrounding electoral reform in Israel. Apparently, some leaders (a minority to be sure) believe these areas are too delicate or too internal to Israel to legitimate their involvement, or they may feel too ignorant of the key aspects of some of these issues. On the other hand, that a majority believe that American Jews should be "involved" in Israel's "treatment of Palestinian protesters" (what "involved" means is unclear, to say the least) suggests that most leaders are generally not prepared to remain totally silent on all matters pertaining to the Arab- Israel conflict.

It is significant that only a small number (25%) approve of American Jewish leaders "being involved" in Israeli security policies. And this is not the only occasion on the survey where respondents largely rejected involvement in Israeli security policies. The figure cited above is close to the number (19%) who approve of the five Jews meeting PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat, and slightly below the one third who approve of American Jewish communal leaders meeting with PLO moderates.

To elaborate, most Jewish leaders approve and seem to encourage talks between Israelis and PLO officials. Nevertheless, they take quite a dim view of American Jews conducting such talks. The questionnaire asked whether respondents approved of talks between various types of individuals and PLO moderates. Not only do the leaders approve of talks involving Israeli officials (as noted earlier), but clear and convincing majorities feel the same way about American diplomats and Israeli academics. However, majorities disapprove of talks with PLO moderates by American Jewish academics and by American Jewish communal leaders.

The questionnaire also asked about a specific encounter between American Jews and the PLO: the meeting in Stockholm in November 1988 between Yassir Arafat and five American Jews. The sample resoundingly disapproved of this meeting by almost a four-to-one majority.

These results re-affirm the conclusion that the leaders generally reject the idea that they can intervene in the conduct of diplomacy in ways which may be seen as pre-empting Israeli freedom of

action. Even if they feel free to privately dissent (as we will see), or to publicly criticize (as we have seen), they feel reluctant to operate to change the conduct of Israeli policy insofar as it is defined as pertaining to security.

### Views on American Jewish Involvement in Aspects of Israeli Life

*Do you approve or disapprove of expert American Jewish lay & professional leaders being involved in the following areas of Israeli life?*

	AP- PROVE	DISAP- PROVE	NOT SURE
The "Who is a Jew?" issue	88	11	0
Immigrant absorption in Israel	84	12	4
Israelis' treatment of Palestinian protesters	53	39	9
Electoral reform/adopting a constitution in Israel	50	40	9
Israeli security policies	25	67	8



**Views on American Jews (and Others)  
Talking with the PLO**

*Do you approve or disapprove of the following sorts of parties having private discussions with those PLO officials who are often viewed as "moderates"?*

	AP- PROVE	DISAP- PROVE	NOT SURE
Israeli government officials	74	20	5
American diplomats	63	29	8
Israeli academics	57	35	8
American Jewish academics	38	53	8
American Jewish communal leaders	33	59	8
The meeting in Stockholm between five American Jews and Yassir Arafat	19	73	9

**ENDORSEMENT OF SPECIFIC ISRAELI  
CAUSES — A BASIS FOR INTENSIFIED  
INVOLVEMENT**

The survey findings provide evidence, albeit limited, of the readiness of American Jewish leaders to align themselves with specific groups and communities in Israel that reflect their particular social values. The evidence comes in the form of responses to the question that asked whether the leaders would contribute to a variety of Israeli charities if asked to do so. The list included several descriptions of charities that have a particular political or religious purpose (e.g., Friends of Peace Now or Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel).

Now, in each of these cases, we would expect only part of the sample to be receptive to charitable appeals. Thus, the true measure of whether American Jewish leaders will ally with specific Israeli groups is the extent to which specific American Jewish constituencies say they will support those groups. In other words, will American Jewish hawks contribute to Gush Emunim; will American Jewish doves support Peace Now; and so forth? Owing to the principle of non-intervention, American Jews with particular religious or political convictions could very easily think it inappropriate to support such groups, even if they agree with their purpose. In fact, as we shall see, the appeal of these ideologically charged charities within appropriate constituencies of American Jews is broad indeed. Apparently, the principle of non-intervention in no way precludes an interest in supporting those Israeli non-party groups that advance one's vision of Israeli society.

For purposes of analysis, we defined potential constituencies for each charity. For the Friends of Gush Emunim, the constituency was defined as the Orthodox. The Peace Now constituency was defined as those who believe Israel should "offer to talk with the PLO with no conditions on either side" (almost half the sample). The potential supporters of the New Israel Fund were those who believed that at least two of the following three groups are being unfairly treated in Israel: Israeli Arabs, women, Conservative and Reform Jews. (Of the New Israel Fund's five major programs, three are concerned with the relations between each of these

groups and the larger society). The potential constituency for “the Conservative or Reform Movements in Israel” are Conservative and Reform Jews in the sample. The potential constituency for “Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel” was defined as Orthodox Jews in the sample.

In each case we examine the extent to which members of each potential constituency is prepared to support the charity which ostensibly expresses the values of that constituency. Sharp differences between the responses of those inside and outside the boundaries of the constituencies would attest to a readiness for American Jews to support the ideological cause of their choice. In other words, we are measuring their readiness to engage in an intensified form of involvement with a sharper focus than that provided by more consensual causes such as the United Jewish Appeal, AIPAC, or The Hebrew University. (Methodologically, the very crude nature of the definition of constituency boundaries militates against uncovering differences in readiness to contribute; in other words, the method is weighted against confirming the hypothesis.)

With respect to Gush Emunim, Peace Now, and the New Israel Fund, about half their respective constituencies would support these organizations while far smaller proportions outside the constituencies say they would respond positively to an appeal for funds. For the two types of charities defined in denominational terms, almost all of those in the appropriate denomination respond favorably; at the same time, almost all those outside the denomination reject the charity. In other words, almost all Orthodox Jewish leaders support (or say they would support) Orthodox charities in Israel, while the vast majority of the non-Orthodox would not; similarly, Conservative and Reform Jewish leaders are very sympathetic to their denominations’ causes in Israel, while the Orthodox generally are not.

### Attractiveness of Alternative Israeli-Oriented Philanthropies

Philanthropy	Constituency	Would Contribute
Gush Emunim	Orthodox	48
	Others	2
Peace Now	“Doves” (= favor PLO talks now)	45
	Others	13
New Israel Fund	See Israel as unfair to minorities	54
	Others	22
Zionist Orthodox Institutions	Orthodox	92
	Others	14
Cons & Reform Movements in Israel	Conservative and Reform	85
	Orthodox	13

The very presence of these sharp statistical differences suggests the potential for some fractionalization of the American Jewish philanthropic community, a process that has apparently advanced over the last decade. Although leaders are certainly committed to causes such as the UJA and AIPAC that largely bridge denominational and political differences, they are also very much interested in supporting charities with a narrower ideological focus as well. If so, then the potential for what Steven Spiegel has termed “intensified involvement,” is indeed substantial.

The survey may have uncovered one additional reason that these American Jewish leaders seem so responsive to more ideologically focused, Israel-oriented charities. By 47% to 31%, they agreed with this statement: “Because of infighting and mismanagement, Israelis waste an excessive amount of philanthropic aid they receive from American Jews.” The statement is a ringing indictment of Israeli efficiency. Its endorsement by so many leaders is all the more striking in light of the leaders’ strong commitment both to Israel and to philanthropic aid to Israel. Significantly, a

forthcoming study of rabbis and communal workers finds similar sentiments (Cohen and Bubis, forthcoming). That leaders share this view is not too surprising. After all, Israelis themselves commonly take a very dim view of the Jewish Agency for Israel, the recipient and manager of U.J.A. funds in Israel. By virtue of their familiarity with Israelis and the Jewish Agency, leaders more than other American Jews may have acquired critical views of the Agency and how it manages philanthropic funds.

The widespread sense that UJA/federation funds are wasted excessively when they arrive in Israel presents a very serious image problem for the centralized philanthropic campaigns, one which the more specialized campaigns may be deriving some benefit. If the senior professional and lay leaders of American Jewry lack confidence in the efficacy of their philanthropy, they cannot fail to lag in their efforts to raise sorely needed campaign funds for Israel. As noted earlier, this finding suggests the need for UJA leaders to address what may be a very serious public relations problem in their own midst and among their fellow leaders in other spheres of Jewish communal life.

The questionnaire asked leaders a rather complicated question regarding the balance between American and Israeli decision-making over philanthropic aid in Israel. A clear majority (62%) prefer that "American Jews and Israelis ... exercise roughly equal influence over the management of philanthropic funds." The rest were almost evenly divided between a preference for "Israeli alone" to decide on how to spend the money (17%) and a preference for American Jews exerting "more influence" (22%) in this area. Clearly the question reveals an interest in involvement, in mutuality, and in partnership with the Israelis in the philanthropic enterprise. But it may also indicate a lack of confidence in the Israeli ability to handle American philanthropic funds on their own. What is clear is that over four-fifths of the leaders want American Jews to have an influence on the disposition of charitable monies in Israel that is at least equal to that of Israeli decision-makers.

One question uncovered widespread support for the unconventional use of Jewish philanthropy through conventional channels (the UJA). By 74% to 16%, the leaders approve of the use of Project Renewal funds for social services in Israeli Arab towns. The large endorsement of this innovation in Jewish philanthropic

services may suggest an interest on the part of federation donors to utilize their funds to support the types of causes featured by some of the non-conventional Israel-oriented charities.

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Because of infighting & mismanagement, Israelis waste an excessive amount of philanthropic aid they receive from American Jews	47	1	21

*With respect to the philanthropic aid American Jews provide Israel, which of the following general approaches do you find most appealing?*

- 17 For the most part, Israelis alone should decide where & how to spend the money they receive from American Jews. After all, Israelis are in the best position to make such decisions.
- 22 American Jews should exert more influence than Israelis on where & how their philanthropic donations are spent, especially in those areas where American Jews have greater technical & managerial expertise than Israelis.
- 62 American Jews & Israelis should should exercise roughly equal influence over the management of philanthropic funds.

	APPROVE	DISAP- PROVE	NOT SURE
Use of some of UJA's Project Renewal funds to aid social services located in Israeli Arab towns	74	16	9

## “WHO IS A JEW” — DEEP RESENTMENT OF THE ISRAELI ULTRA- ORTHODOX

As noted above, one area where Jewish leaders may be mobilized is in support of their specific denominational positions in Israel. Their identification with Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform institutions in Israel was undoubtedly sharpened and elevated by the “Who is a Jew” controversy that took place just one year ago.

The bargaining among Israeli politicians over the “Who is a Jew” issue in November and December of 1988 provoked an unprecedented response on the part of American Jewish leaders. Heads of national organizations in every major sphere of activity and from almost all ideological persuasions except for the more traditional Orthodox announced their opposition to proposed changes in Israeli legislation. Most organizations sent their top leaders to Israel to lobby against the proposed amendments. Almost all passed resolutions and sent letters condemning the initiative by Orthodox religious parties in Israel that would, in effect, withdraw Israeli government recognition of conversions to Judaism supervised by non-Orthodox rabbis in the Diaspora.

The survey data indicate that a year later, leaders persist in feeling strongly about the “Who is a Jew” issue and in resenting certain Israeli Orthodox elements for their role in the controversy. The questionnaire asked, “If Israel changed its ‘Who is a Jew’ law to recognize only Orthodox conversions, how would you feel?” Fully 78% answer, “very upset,” the most intense response, and another 7% say they would be “somewhat upset.” Only 10% (almost all of whom are Orthodox) answer “not upset” and 4% “a little upset.” In comparison with results from a survey of the Jewish public in January 1989, the opposition among the leaders to changing the “Who is a Jew” legislation is somewhat more widespread than that of the public. In both cases, the Orthodox and non-Orthodox split on the issue.

The survey of the Jewish public found that more were privately critical of Orthodox Israelis’ role in the “Who is a Jew” controversy than they were of Israel’s handling of the intifada. The same generalization is true of Jewish leaders. Almost all (92%) said they had spoken critically with their close friends or family members

about the “Who is a Jew” issue, somewhat more than had privately criticized the response to the intifada.

We cannot tell whether the controversy in late 1988 provoked resentment against the rigorously Orthodox in Israel, perception of unfair treatment of Conservative and Reform Jews in Israel, and a strong identification with Conservative and Reform institutions in Israel; but we do know that all these sentiments currently are found widely among the leaders. Needless to say, they are far more prevalent among non-Orthodox than Orthodox leaders.

The survey asked leaders for their impressions of “so-called ‘ultra’-Orthodox Israelis.” (Since we could not be sure that all respondents would be familiar with the term Haredi Orthodox, we were obliged to use the less complimentary, but widely understood, “ultra”-Orthodox.) Their responses were almost uniformly unfavorable. Three-quarters (74%) answer “very unfavorable,” and another 18% check “somewhat unfavorable,” yielding a total of 92% with negative images of ultra-Orthodox Israelis. The leaders sharply distinguish “ultra-” from Modern Orthodox Israelis where the balance is 69% with favorable images against only 25% with unfavorable images.

The question that asked about the treatment of various Israeli minority groups also included a reference to “Conservative and Reform Jews in Israel.” Not surprisingly (in light of the results noted above), 76% view their treatment as unfair; just 22% say they are being treated fairly.

As we noted earlier, the vast majority of non-Orthodox leaders would contribute to the Conservative and Reform movements in Israel if asked, and the vast majority of Orthodox leaders would support Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel. Since there are so many more non-Orthodox than Orthodox leaders, potential support for the Israeli Conservative and Reform movements is almost three times as large as that for Israeli Zionist Orthodox institutions.

Taken together, these findings indicate the emergence of what may be called, “denominational partisanship.” The denominational differences among American Jewish leaders, especially the line dividing the Orthodox from all the rest, are expressed in sentimental and political terms in the Israeli context. For now, the denominational conflicts in Israel are at a low ebb. But should they

flare up again, it seems fair to infer that we can anticipate considerable involvement by American Jewish leadership. Under such circumstances, most American Jewish leaders will align with non-Orthodox elements in Israel and vigorously oppose the Haredi and most traditional Orthodox political parties.

**Views on "Who is a Jew" and Denominational Issues**

*If Israel changed its "Who is a Jew" law to recognize only Orthodox conversions, how would you feel?*

78%	VERY UPSET
7%	SOMEWHAT UPSET
4%	A LITTLE UPSET
10%	NOT UPSET
1%	NOT SURE

*Over the last 2 years, in conversation with any of your close friends or family members, have you spoken critically of Orthodox Israelis' attempt to change the "Who is a Jew" law?*

YES	91
NO	8

*What is your impression of each of the following Israeli groups?*

	VERY FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE	NOT SURE
So-called "ultra"-Orthodox Israelis	1	5	18	74	1
Modern Orthodox Israelis	23	46	21	4	7
			FAIRLY	UNFAIRLY	NOT SURE
How fairly are Conservative and Reform Jews being treated in Israel?			22	76	1
<i>If asked, would contribute to . . .</i>			YES	NO	NOT SURE
The Conservative or Reform Movements in Israel			71	23	7
Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel			25	67	8
Non-Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel			13	78	9



## ATTITUDES TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

The views of American Jewish leaders on the Arab-Israel conflict are, of course, critical to understanding the current texture and future prospects of Israel-Diaspora relations. In much of the remainder of this report, we examine these views in considerable detail.

### WARY OF THE PLO AND THE INTIFADA

Fundamental to so many other attitudes on the conflict is the image of the enemy. How American Jews (and for that matter Israelis) view the Palestinians and the PLO heavily influences their views on what policies Israel ought to adopt in its search for peace and security.

An overwhelming majority of American Jewish leaders believes that, "The PLO is determined to destroy Israel." At the same time, they are convinced (and afraid) that, "Unless Palestinians see progress toward statehood, they probably will continue the intifada for years" (a three-to-one majority agreed). At the same time, almost all reject the idea that "The Palestinians are basically a violent people." By inference, the leaders see the intifada as deriving from Palestinians' drive for a state rather than as a consequence of an innate predisposition toward violence.

The leaders also believe that the Israeli army is incapable of thoroughly and permanently suppressing the intifada. A 61% to 25% majority rejects the proposition, "If the Israeli army would take tougher actions, it could sharply lower the level of Palestinian violence." In short, in the respondents' view, the PLO is dangerous, and the intifada is potentially ever-lasting and intensifying.

As we shall see below, these views lend a certain urgency to American Jewish leaders' understanding of the conflict. They, like many Israelis of all shades of political opinion, see perpetuation of the status quo as dangerous to Israel. Accordingly, many believe Israel needs to take some actions to bring an end to the seemingly perpetual intifada. Unfortunately (many might argue), military

means alone are inadequate to achieving this highly desirable goal.

### Views of Palestinian Threat

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
The PLO is determined to destroy Israel	78	10	12
Unless Palestinians see progress toward statehood, they probably will continue the intifada for years	68	18	13
Palestinian Arabs are a basically violent people	13	77	10
If the Israeli army would take tougher actions, it could sharply lower the level of Palestinian violence	25	61	15

## WIDE SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE AND FOR A DE- MILITARIZED PALESTINIAN STATE (IN TIME)

Among the policy ideas the questionnaire examined were suggestions from leaders in various camps within Israel. By large majorities, the sample rejects several ideas advanced by some members of the Israeli political right-wing. By majorities of over seven-to-one, the leaders object to forcibly deporting many more Palestinians, annexing the West Bank, and expanding current settlements in Judea and Samaria.

In contrast, in various ways, majorities of varying proportions think Israel should offer eventual statehood to the Palestinians in the context (and only in the context) of security guarantees to Israel. Consistent with this view, a majority believes a Palestinian state is inevitable. In all questions that probed their reactions to offering such a state, majorities repeatedly endorsed such a concept. The level of support varies with the wording of the question; but even at its low point, majority acceptance of the offer of Palestinian statehood — with suitable security guarantees — is quite solid. (To be clear, when we use the words “support” or “endorse,” we do not mean to imply that the majority is necessarily happy with the prospect of a Palestinian state or accepts all the political and moral arguments advanced by the PLO for Palestinian self-determination. Rather, the survey questions speak of Israel’s policy options.)

Among the questions eliciting the narrowest support for statehood is one which asked respondents to react to the idea of “exclusion of any form of Palestinian statehood, even with a peace treaty and security arrangements acceptable to the IDF.” A 54% majority thought that exclusion was undesirable or unacceptable (in other words, they thought a state might be desirable); 11% were unsure; and only 36% thought it was at least desirable to exclude Palestinian statehood. In fact, a mere 13% thought exclusion of this form of statehood was “essential” to a peace arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians. In other words, in the view of the other 87% of American Jewish leaders, Israel need not rule

out Palestinian statehood so long as numerous security conditions (see below) are in place.

Far more support for territorial concessions by Israel emerges in responses to another statement. By a margin of almost five to one, the sample endorses the idea that, “Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace.” The margin of support here is far greater than that found among the American Jewish public where, in 1989, a 38% to 30% plurality endorsed “territorial compromise,” a virtual campaign slogan of Israel’s Labor party. This survey question is so attractive to so many leaders because it makes no explicit reference to statehood, speaks of peace guarantees, refers to Arabs rather than the PLO. (In surveys of the American public, respondents react more favorably to the words “Arabs” or “Palestinians” than to “PLO.”) Moreover, it contains the vague expression, “territorial compromise,” a term that can refer to several outcomes including a state, a confederation with Jordan and Israel, and ceding some territories to the Jordanians.

### Views on Palestinian Statehood and Other Ways of Settling the Arab-Israel Conflict

*Within the next few years, do you think that Israel should . . .*

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Forcibly deport many more Palestinians out of Judea & Samaria?	9	78	13
Expand current settlements in Judea & Samaria?	12	78	11
Formally annex the West Bank?	10	78	12
Offer the Palestinians the prospect of de-militarized state in 15 years, after a gradual build-up of confidence on both sides?	59	18	22

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Declare its unalterable opposition to any form of Palestinian statehood (except, perhaps in Jordan)?	25	64	11
	AGREE	DIS-AGREE	NOT SURE
Sooner or later there will be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza	51	22	27
Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in the West Bank & Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace	76	16	8
Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank & Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel	53	35	12
	DESIR-ABLE*	UNDESIR-ABLE**	NOT SURE
Arab sovereignty in the territories, accompanied by adjustments in the pre-1967 borders in ways favorable to Israel	67	20	13
Exclusion of any form of Palestinian statehood, even with a peace treaty & security arrangements acceptable to the IDF	36	54	11

\* or Essential (see Appendix)  
 \*\* or Unacceptable (see Appendix)

The results from the two questions cited above suggest that somewhere between 54% and 76% of American Jewish leaders in this sample think Israel should offer the Palestinians some form of withdrawal from the territories, and somewhere between 16% and 34% oppose territorial compromise, let alone Palestinian statehood.

With regard to the acceptability of offering statehood to the Palestinians, one survey question is particularly on target. It asks whether Israel should "offer the Palestinians the prospect of a demilitarized state in 15 years, after a gradual build-up of confidence on both sides." More than a three-to-one majority (59% to 18%) endorse this idea. Obviously, the critical elements here that make the state palatable are its de-militarized character and the long time it will take to evolve (15 years). American Jewish leaders' rejection of some Israeli leaders' rejection of Palestinian statehood is clear in the answers to another question. By a solid majority of 64% to 25%, the leaders reject the idea that Israel should, "Declare its unalterable opposition to any form of Palestinian statehood ... " With various provisos in mind, it seems fair to conclude that the sample overwhelmingly endorses the notion of offering Palestinians a form of circumscribed statehood.

The ten items reported in the adjoining table were combined into a single scale representing views about a permanent settlement to the conflict. Those scoring high on the scale were most repeatedly positive about offering statehood and most often opposed to annexation, deportation, and expanding Jewish settlements. Those scoring low had the opposite points of view.

By presenting the mean score of this scale for each of the major agencies represented in this study, we can get a reasonable idea of their approximate placement on the hawk-dove spectrum. When doing so, we find that all organizations, except for the two Orthodox groups are somewhat closely arrayed on a continuum that ranges from the academics and Reform rabbis (CCAR) on the left to the ADL and Conservative lay leaders (of the United Synagogue) on the center-right. The Federation leaders score exactly at the center (the mean of this distribution), and the other defense agencies as well as the Conservative rabbis are left of center. The two Orthodox groups, though, stand far off to the hawkish right. They are more distant from the Federation leaders

on the right than the academics are distant from Federation leaders on the left.

In a sense, the generally hawkish Orthodox are more isolated from the mainstream community than are the dovish academics. The academic doves are politically proximate to many Jewish communal leaders, including the Reform and Conservative rabbis as well as leaders from defense agencies other than ADL. The Orthodox, though, have views on the Arab-Israel conflict far different (i.e., more hawkish) than those generally shared by Jewish leaders in other communal agencies. Undoubtedly they even find the ADL, an agency with a reputation for politically conservative tendencies, far too dovish and compromising for their tastes.

### Hawk-Dove Index on Settling Arab-Israel Conflict by Agency

Total Sample	64
Academics	85
CCAR (Reform)	82
UAHC (Reform)	74
AJCommittee	74
AJCongress	69
CRCs & NJCRAC	69
Miscellaneous	63
RA (Conservative)	62
Federations & CJF	64
ADL	60
United Synagogue (Conservative)	61
UOJCA (Orthodox)	32
RCA (Orthodox)	34



## IF THERE IS EVER TO BE A STATE, MANY SECURITY CONDITIONS ARE ESSENTIAL

Whereas a majority accepts the inevitability of a Palestinian state, an even larger majority demands that any settlement of the conflict provide Israel with the security conditions needed to counter grave threats to Israel posed by the PLO and the state it may conceivably rule. Thus, even those respondents who in some way favor the offer of an eventual Palestinian state do so on the condition that the settlement encompass a large number of security provisions.

Wherever the questionnaire mentioned a security provision, the vast majority of leaders endorsed it. At bare minimum, they would want any settlement to incorporate at least four elements: (1) total de-militarization of the Palestinians; (2) retention of those Jewish settlements considered (presumably by Israeli military leaders) important for Israeli security; (3) the ability of the IDF to function wherever it wants in the territories; (4) renunciation of Palestinian refugee claims to return to parts of pre-1967 Israel. Four-fifths or more see each of these conditions as at least desirable; in each case, about half see them as absolutely essential.

The formidable role of concern for Israel's security in the thinking of American Jewish leaders emerges in their answers to the question on the retention of settlements that are just religiously or historically important, but that are unimportant for Israeli security. More respondents view retention of these settlements as at least desirable than who think they are undesirable (52% versus 41%). However, of the slim majority favoring retention of these sorts of settlements, very few (11%) see them as essential. This small figure is far less than the number who see Palestinian de-militarization and the three other security measures noted above as essential. In other words, respondents make a sharp distinction between the essential security-oriented settlements and the desirable religiously important settlements. (In fact, in Israel, many religious doves say that retention of religiously important settlements is, in effect, "desirable." But, they argue, it is foolhardy to insist on this condition as an essential feature of a peace settlement.) Although in the context of a peace

agreement, most leaders would prefer to retain the historically important settlements, we should not lose sight of their vast opposition to expanding current settlements. As we noted earlier, a lopsided 78% to 12% majority reject the idea of Israel expanding current settlements.

It is fair to conclude that American Jewish leaders are frightened by the destructive designs of the PLO. Although they may appear sympathetic to an eventual Palestinian state that evolves after years of confidence-building, there is a near-consensus that such a state must be constrained so as to prevent it from threatening to destroy Israel. As a result, almost all leaders insist on each of several security provisions included in the survey instrument and (we can readily presume) would as heartily endorse several others that we failed to include owing to lack of space on the questionnaire.

### Views on Security Conditions for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace

*In your view, are each of the following elements essential, desirable, undesirable or unacceptable in a peace arrangement between Israel & the Palestinians?*

	ESSEN- TIAL	DESIR- ABLE	UN- DESIR- ABLE	UN- ACCEPT- ABLE	NOT SURE
Total de-militarization of the Palestinians	56	37	3	1	3
Renunciation of Palestinian refugee claims to return to parts of pre-1967 Israel	55	27	7	7	4
The ability of the Israel Defense Forces to deploy troops and equipment wherever it wants in the territories	49	34	11	2	4

	ESSEN- TIAL	DESIR- ABLE	UN- DESIR- ABLE	UN- ACCEPT- ABLE	NOT SURE
Retention of those Jewish settlements considered important for Israeli security	46	40	8	2	4
Retention of Jewish settlements that are important for religious & historical reasons, even if they're not important for Israeli security	11	41	30	11	8
Exclusion of any form of Palestinian statehood, even with a peace treaty & security arrangements acceptable to the IDF	13	23	36	18	11

## WIDE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL TALKING WITH THE PLO

Several survey questions tried to assess leaders' attitudes toward Israel talking with the PLO. Although the results vary from one question to another, in all cases, a majority support the idea of Israel talking to the PLO.

Three-quarters approve of Israeli government officials conducting private discussions with those PLO officials who are often viewed as "moderates." In any event, the broad approval of such meetings does not necessarily indicate endorsement of their wisdom. One may grant approval of Israelis taking a certain action simply out of deference to their right to make their own decisions regarding their future and their security.

However, answers to two other questions suggest that most leaders think that Israel may be well-advised to talk with the PLO. By a 73% to 20% majority, the leaders endorse a replication of what has been known in Israel as the "Yariv- Shemtov" formula for PLO-Israel negotiations: "If the PLO recognized Israel and renounces terrorism, Israel should be willing to talk with the PLO."

Now, clearly many respondents believe that the PLO has failed to meet the requirements for a dialogue with Israel. Nevertheless, a slim plurality believe that under present circumstances Israel should "offer to talk with the PLO with no pre-conditions on either side."

Willingness to endorse Israeli talks with the PLO is tied, in part, to one's image of the PLO's conciliatory posture. As noted earlier, the vast majority are convinced that the PLO seeks the destruction of Israel. Almost all those who disagree or are unsure of this menacing characterization support talks with the PLO.

Some indication of the ambiguity of images regarding the PLO is found in responses to the following item: "The PLO may dream of more, but it is ready to settle for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza." The sample divided evenly on this statement. At the same time, leaders tend to think that a real peace may be possible. Half reject the proposition that, "You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel," and only 33% endorse this view. The answers to these two questions suggest that, in the

aggregate, leaders are divided on whether Israel's enemies are worthy negotiating partners. (Indeed, the same question has divided Israelis for decades.) Obviously, those who think the PLO can settle for a mini-state and who would trust the Arabs to make a real peace are the ones most prepared to endorse immediate, unconditional negotiations with the PLO.

Drawing upon the foregoing, we infer that the majority who support Israel-PLO negotiations harbor a melange of views about the intentions of the PLO. Most proponents of negotiations, though not all, think the PLO wants to destroy Israel. At the same time, most within the vast majority who favor talks believe the PLO will settle for less than Israel's destruction in negotiations, and that the Arabs can be trusted to conclude a real peace with Israel.

In their public debates, Jewish hawks and doves — both in the United States and Israel — implicitly recognize that images of the Arabs and the Palestinians exert a powerful influence upon the readiness to compromise. Hawks regularly try to highlight the uncompromising, rejectionist, and menacing features of Israel's enemies; doves, for their part, regularly try to focus attention on moderate Arab leaders and pronouncements. Both sides engage in debates over the intentions of the PLO, the sincerity of its professions of moderation, and its ability to control more extreme Palestinian elements. The results presented here show why the outcome of that debate is so crucial to the resolution of the larger debate concerning the wisdom of alternate Israeli approaches to its search for peace and security.

The ambiguity and ambivalence regarding the PLO is evident in responses to a question about the PLO role in governing Palestinians upon conclusion of a peace arrangement. Most leaders (57%) prefer to exclude "the PLO from any role in the governance of the Palestinians in the territories." Only 35% think it undesirable or unacceptable to keep out the PLO. The reasons for and against such a proposition have been expressed in numerous speeches and publications of Israeli and American Jewish analysts and leaders. Those who have opposed a PLO role in governance think that the PLO would foment terrorism, promote irredentism, and encourage neighboring Arab states to complete the second stage of a two-stage process to destroy Israel.

Those on the other side have seen the inclusion of the PLO as an unavoidable necessity and often propose that the PLO in power may serve as a potential stabilizing influence in any comprehensive peace arrangement.

Support in the sample for excluding the PLO from any role in governance in the territories, is far less widespread than support for the four conditions noted earlier (i.e., de-militarization; freedom of deployment for the IDF; retentions of certain settlements; and renunciation of the so-called Palestinian right of return to pre-1967 Israel). Jewish leaders at the statistical center of the political spectrum would prefer to exclude the PLO from governing the territories; but they are not prepared to insist on its exclusion to the extent that they would insist on de-militarization and other security conditions.

### Views on Israel Talking with the PLO

*Do you approve or disapprove of Israeli government officials having private discussions with those PLO officials who are often viewed as "moderates"?*

	APPROVE 74	DISAPPROVE 20	NOT SURE 5	
		DIS- AGREE/ YES	DIS- AGREE/ NO	NOT SURE
If the PLO recognizes Israel & renounces terrorism, Israel should be willing to talk with the PLO		73	20	6
The PLO may dream of more, but it is ready to settle for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza		42	42	17
You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel		33	50	17
Should Israel offer to talk with the PLO with no pre-conditions on either side?		46	42	11
		DESIR- ABLE*	UNDESIR- ABLE**	NOT SURE
Exclusion of the PLO from any role in the governance of the Palestinians in the territories		57	35	9

\* or Essential (see Appendix)

\*\* or Unacceptable (see Appendix)

### CONCERNS OVER THE IMPACT OF THE OCCUPATION UPON ISRAEL

Previous surveys of the American Jewish public provide evidence of their confidence in Israel's ability to withstand corrosive effects of the intifada and, to a lesser extent, in Israel's ability to treat Arabs fairly despite more than four decades of confrontation and violent conflict. Apparently, in these areas, the American Jewish leaders are far less sanguine than the Jewish public. By a majority of more than two-to-one, the leaders believe that, "Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character," a response indicating far more anxiety about Israel's future than among the Jewish public at large where only a minority expresses such views.

Concerns about Israel's character correlate strongly with implicit criticism of Israel's current performance with respect to its treatment of Arabs. Since the founding of the State of Israel, its leaders have gone to great lengths to project their country as treating Arab minorities in a fair and decent manner, notwithstanding the ongoing conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and notwithstanding Israel's *raison d'être* as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Since the Six Day War, most Israelis have also claimed that they have been extraordinarily fair in their treatment of the Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Most Israelis view the occupation as an unavoidable necessity. Except for times of civic unrest (e.g. during the last two years), the occupation also has been seen by many Israelis as relatively benign. Many note that the Israeli occupation permits the Palestinian Arab population greater freedom, security, and economic opportunities than any other in historic memory.

The instrument asked whether various groups in Israel were fairly treated. Although 54% think that Israeli Arabs are treated fairly, almost as many (44%) think they are being treated unfairly. Perception of unfair treatment mounts when we shift to the Arabs on the West Bank. Here, just 36% say the Arabs in the territories are being treated fairly, but 59% think the opposite.

The finding that most Jewish leaders think Israel is being unfair to the Arabs on the West is remarkable in two respects. It is remarkable precisely because who these respondents are — they



are senior American Jewish communal leaders with extensive ties and deep commitment to Israel. It is also remarkable in light of the leaders' resentment of criticism of Israel by "outsiders." As noted earlier, few leaders object to Jewish critics expressing their views within Israeli or Jewish communal circles. At the same time, there is no doubt that many more (probably a vast majority) feel uncomfortable, if not angry, at non-Jews accusing Israel of treating the Arabs in the territories unfairly. In other words, just as members of a family feel comfortable saying things about each other that they would not want others to over-hear let alone utter, so too do American Jewish leaders object to others (i.e., Gentiles or Jews lacking pro-Israel credentials) commenting unfavorably about Israeli treatment of Arabs, even if the leaders might privately accept the factual validity of the comments.

Although many leaders may regard treatment of Arabs in Israel or the territories as unfair, they may also regard it as the inevitable consequence of the conflict. Indeed, most would probably defend Israel's record of democracy in light of the decades of violent confrontation; in fact, they often argue, no democracy has performed as well under conditions of such prolonged stress and mortal danger. Nevertheless, while credibly defending Israel's record, it is clear that leaders harbor concerns about how the intifada and the conflict generally may be damaging Israel's humanitarian character and its ability to deal fairly with its principal minority group.

### Views on Israel's Democratic Character

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic & humanitarian character	67	29	8

*In your view, how fairly is each of the following groups being treated in Israel?*

	FAIRLY	UN-FAIRLY	NOT SURE
Israeli Arabs	54	44	3
Arabs on the West Bank	36	59	4
Women	29	63	8
Conservative & Reform Jews	22	76	1

*Over the last 2 years, in conversation with any of your close friends or family members, have you spoken critically of Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising?*

77%

## THE MORAL COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN JEWS

The analysis uncovered an ancillary finding. As many as 77% affirmed that they have privately criticized "Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising." The large number is testimony to the distress felt by American Jewish leaders over the response to the intifada. As one might expect, as in Israel, private critics of Israel's response are found among more dovish and more hawkish American Jews, although the more dovish respondents were more likely to say that they had criticized Israel privately.

Answers to this question on private criticism correlated most closely with the cluster of items relating to Israel's democratic character and its treatment of Arabs. The correlations imply that private criticism of Israel is not so much related to second-guessing diplomatic or military decisions, but is more related to concerns over the moral implications of Israel's actions and situation. This finding supports (but certainly does not establish) an admittedly speculative observation. If one can characterize discussions about Israeli policies as focusing either on moral questions or security issues, it may be fair to say that American Jews' conversations about the Israel-Arab conflict focus more on the morality of the matter. Their writings and speeches frequently focus on who is more or less just rather than on the more technical details of policy formulation.

Other findings scattered throughout the survey also testify to what may be regarded as the moralism of American Jews, a feature consistent with a major American political tradition and consistent with an important aspect of American Judaism (see Liebman and Cohen 1990). The questions on the fairness of treatment of several minority groups in Israel — including women and non-Orthodox Jews, as well as Arabs — uncovered large proportions who, in effect, accused Israel of not being fair. The finding is notable especially because this sample is so strongly pro-Israel and so intimately familiar with Israel and Israeli society. The readiness of American Jewish leaders to criticize Israel for being unfair is consistent with the inference that they readily apply moral standards in judging Israeli society, Israeli policies, and other actors in the Arab-Israel conflict.

## LEADERS PREFER ISRAELI DOVES OVER HAWKS, BUT MOST INSIST ON STUDIED NEUTRALITY AS WELL

Consistent with their acceptance of the need to offer a Palestinian state and their support of Israel talking with the PLO, American Jewish leaders identify far more strongly with the left of the Israeli political spectrum than with the right.

More than twice as many leaders reported favorable as opposed to unfavorable impressions of doves. Their impressions of hawks were almost the reverse. Whereas 59% reported unfavorable images of Israeli hawks as contrasted with just 32% holding favorable impressions.

The pattern continues with respect to prospective financial contributions to several Israel-oriented charities. The responses to a question asking whether the leaders would support alternative causes demonstrate that support of Israeli political movements is not particularly popular. Proportions indicating hypothetical support for parties and movements of both the left and right trail well behind the numbers willing to support for AIPAC, Conservative and Reform institutions in Israel and The Hebrew University. The low ranking may derive from their aversion to American Jewish intervention in internal Israeli political decision-making. Among the small number who would donate to Israeli political movements, supporters of the left vastly outnumber supporters of the right (by margins of about three- or four-to-one). Whereas only 9% would donate to Gush Emunim, 28% would support Peace Now; whereas just 6% would support the Likud's next election campaign, as many as 20% would donate to the Labor Party.

But just because the leaders side with Israeli doves, that does not mean that they want their communal institutions to take sides in the internal Israeli conflict over who should lead the Jewish State and in which direction. When asked whether American Jewish organizations, "in representing Israel," should lean to one Israeli party or another, the most popular answer (endorsed by 49%) was to "strike an even balance between the positions of Likud and Labor." The next most popular answer was "not sure."

Only a small fraction wanted American Jewish organizations to lean in a particular direction. Of the very few with such a view, many more favor a Labor (14%) to a Likud (3%) tilt. Nevertheless, the clear preference is for no tilt whatsoever.

The results here are emblematic of a major theme running through almost all the findings. When asked to choose, American Jewish leaders prefer Israeli doves to hawks. But, for the most part, they prefer to limit their involvement in internal Israeli decision-making, policy formulation, and choice of leadership. Instead, for the many American Jewish of one preference or another, studied neutrality is still the favored policy.

### Identification with Israeli Political Movements

#### *Impressions of ...*

	FAVORABLE	UN- FAVORABLE	NOT SURE
Israeli "doves"	65	26	9
Israeli "hawks"	32	59	9

#### *If you were asked, would you contribute to the following causes?*

Friends of Peace Now	28
The Labor Party's next election campaign	20
Friends of Gush Emunim	9
The Likud Party's next election campaign	6

#### *In representing Israel, it is best for American Jewish organizations to ...*

49%	Strike an even balance between the positions of Likud & Labor
14%	Tilt in the direction of Labor
3%	Tilt in the direction of Likud
34%	Not sure, other

## CONCLUSIONS

The emergence of differences between some American Jewish leaders and some Israelis over important matters (such as "Who is a Jew" and the Arab-Israel conflict) raises the possibility that leaders will feel the need to re-think how they are going to relate to Israel. The survey findings suggest (and only suggest) the directions many of them will take.

The rich, deep, and numerous connections of American Jewish leaders with Israel make it extremely unlikely that many will see distancing from Israel as a realistic option. Their commitment to the "marriage" of American Jewry with Israel seems both strong and secure, in both good times and bad.

However, leaders reject the idea that their partnership with Israel demands unquestioned loyalty to Israel's leaders and to their policies. Most feel that friendly criticism is healthy, useful, and certainly legitimate.

At the same time, leaders are very wary of limiting Israeli freedom of action in the security domain. While they feel comfortable in being "involved" in such matters as "Who is a Jew" and immigrant re-settlement, most regard security concerns as something for Israelis to handle on their own. Although they would not necessarily ostracize American Jews who take independent initiatives to meet with Palestinian leaders, most think such activities are inappropriate.

But — to add one more qualification — leaders feel attracted to specific ideological movements and charitable causes in Israel. Unusually large numbers are attracted to supporting their own denominations' activities in Israel (although we have no idea of the depth of their interest). Significant portions are ready to support movements that reflect their political or social values as well. Hence, there is the pre-condition for ideologically focused mobilization. In this regard it is worth noting that feelings about the "Who is a Jew" issue still run high. Should denominational conflicts re-emerge in the Israeli political arena, the leaders demonstrate a strong predisposition to weigh in against the Orthodox religious parties.

The centrality of the Arab-Israel conflict to American Jewish thinking on Israel required that this study assess leaders' attitudes

toward the conflict. It goes without saying that leaders are supremely interested in a resolution of the conflict. They view the Palestinians and the PLO as menacing threats with the ability to perpetuate the conflict for years to come. As a result, they feel a great sense of urgency for Israel to advance diplomatic initiatives.

If asked for their opinion (as the survey did), most leaders prefer that Israel offer the Palestinians a possibility of a state after an extended period of confidence-building. In the leaders' view, such an eventuality would require extensive security provisions to ensure Israel's safety. If asked, a majority would prefer that Israel talk with the PLO. In light of these views, it is not surprising that leaders feel more sympathy for Israeli doves than Israeli hawks. They may view the world and Arabs as somewhat less hostile than does the Jewish public, but those with a more antagonistic view of Gentiles generally and of Arabs specifically tend to reject conciliatory policies. On all these issues, those leaders from Orthodox agencies take a far more hawkish posture than the rest of American Jewish leadership (even the Orthodox leaders in non-Orthodox settings).

The exact shape and texture of Israel-Diaspora relations will, of course, depend upon the evolution of major events. However, two generalizations about the directions senior Jewish leaders will take seem relatively safe to venture: They will remain committed to close ties with Israel and they will remain anxious about Israel's search for peace and security. How specifically leaders will play out these two imperatives is, of course, impossible to predict confidently.

## References

Steven M. Cohen. 1987. "Ties and Tensions: The 1986 Survey of American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis." N.Y.: American Jewish Committee.

Steven M. Cohen. 1988. "Are American and Israeli Jews Drifting Apart?" N.Y.: American Jewish Committee.

Steven M. Cohen. 1989. "Ties and Tensions: An Update — The 1989 Survey of American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis." N.Y.: American Jewish Committee.

Steven M. Cohen and Gerald Bubis. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Denominationalism: Attitudes Toward Israel Among Rabbis and Jewish Communal Professionals." *Journal of Jewish Political Studies*. Jerusalem.

Charles S. Liebman and Steven M. Cohen. 1990. *Two Worlds of Judaism: The Israeli and American Experiences*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Steven L. Spiegel. Spring, 1989. "Pick a Strategy." *Tel Aviv: Israeli Democracy*, pp. 27-31.



## APPENDICES:

### DOES THE SAMPLE ADEQUATELY REPRESENT JEWISH LEADERSHIP?

Any sample of American Jewish leadership faces enormous conceptual and operational difficulties. The attempt to survey Jewish leaders raises such intractable questions as which leaders of which organizations should be included in the sample, and to what extent. What is the appropriate balance between professionals and lay leaders; between different religious denominations; between philanthropic, defense, Zionist, and religious organizations; between national and local leaders; and, ultimately, between specific agencies?

Fortunately, the results indicate that the particular mix of professionals and lay leaders, or of agencies and functional sectors is not all that important. Stating matters simply, the final results would not have differed significantly had the sample been constructed in a somewhat different fashion. As we shall see, with the exception of the Orthodox, American Jews display a broad consensus about the most important issues pertaining to the relationship with Israel. Hence, the inclusion of somewhat more or fewer professionals or lay people, or representatives of one or another functional area of Jewish life, or of particular agencies would have had little statistical impact on the findings.

To elaborate, in preliminary analyses we learned that professionals and leaders from within the same organizations collectively share similar views. ADL professionals resemble ADL leaders; federation executive directors, as a group, think like their presidents and CJF board members; and so forth. On the whole, professionals and lay leaders in the same agencies share almost identical views on what Israel should offer the Palestinians, on the adverse impact of the occupation on Israel, on disapproval of American Jews talking to the PLO, and on numerous other issues.

The only systematic attitudinal differences between lay and professional leaders are minor in size and are restricted to three areas: Fewer professionals (a rubric that includes rabbis as well as communal agency professionals) advocate talks with the PLO,

approve of American Jewish criticism of Israel, and support the non-Orthodox position of religious pluralism in Israel.

Although the attitudes of professionals and laity are similar, their Jewish background and demographic characteristics are not. Relative to lay leaders, the professionals have somewhat more contact with Israelis, are more committed Zionists, know more about Israel, had far stronger ties with Israel in their youth, attend synagogue more frequently, are somewhat more religiously traditional, are more highly educated, and earn far lower incomes. In short, professionals and lay leaders differ in terms of who they are, rather than in what they think.

Since the differences between agencies were somewhat substantial, the results indeed are affected by the choice of participating communal agencies as well as the number of respondents associated with each agency. These choices raise the question whether different sorts of agencies or a different mix of numbers of respondents linked to particular agencies would yield different results.

For example, the sample gives approximately equal weight to leaders of the American Jewish Committee (9%) and the ADL (7%). Is this a fair and accurate representation from these agencies? Are they really of almost equal influence and is the influence of each equivalent to approximately 7-9% of American Jewish leaders? Obviously, no answer to these questions would satisfy all fair-minded observers. Instead, the defense of the mix of agencies has to be made on statistical grounds. Strange as it may seem, even rather large changes in the representation of most agencies' leaders would have only a slight impact on the statistical results, that is, on the frequency distributions and the correlations between variables.

This point is well-illustrated by use of an index that combines forty-one items measuring various "hawk-dove" attitudes toward the Arab-Israel conflict. Items refer to such familiar and important issues as criticizing Israeli policies, talking with the PLO, insistence on security guarantees, and ideas of how to resolve the conflict ranging from transfer and annexation to Palestinian statehood. The index ranges from 0 (for total hawk) to 100 (for total dove). It is of some interest that relatively minor differences separate the mean scores for all the groups ranging from the

academics on the dovish left to ADL and the Conservative lay leaders (i.e., United Synagogue) who are, statistically, barely to the so-called right of the overall mean. The leaders of Orthodox organizations have views far to the hawkish right of all the other agencies in the study.

#### Index of 41 Hawk-Dove Items by Agency

Total Sample	59
Academics	80
CCAR (Reform)	73
UAHC (Reform)	71
AJCommittee	70
AJCongress	63
CRCs & NJCRAC	62
Miscellaneous	58
RA (Conservative)	55
Federations & CJF	57
ADL	54
United Synagogue (Conservative)	52
UOJCA (Orthodox)	29
RCA (Orthodox)	26

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the sample as a whole and the federation leaders alone respond in a similar fashion on almost all the important issues. This inference is demonstrated by the fact that the federation leaders' mean score and that of the entire sample are almost identical. The one difference between federation leaders and others is that federation leaders contain fewer respondents with more extreme views; however, the typical federation leader closely resembles the typical respondent in this survey.

As mentioned briefly earlier, the only reasonable change in sample construction that might have had a perceivable impact on the final results is a change in the distribution of Orthodox communal leaders. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, leaders of Orthodox organizations are far more hawkish than other American Jewish leaders. (Orthodox leaders in non-Or-

thodox contexts — such as federations — have views just slightly to the hawkish side of the center). The Orthodox comprise 14% of all respondents, and the UOJCA and RCA comprise just 9% of the leaders in this sample.

To be clear, there is no doubt as to the reasonable accuracy of Orthodox representation among the leaders of non-denominational organizations such as the federations or the defense agencies. Rather, what could be a matter of some dispute is whether Orthodox rabbis and congregational leaders exercise only 9% of the combined influence of American Jewry in defining the Israel-Diaspora relationship, a murky concept at best. The American Orthodox community on the Israel-Diaspora relationship may indeed exert more influence than the 9-14% suggested by their numbers in this sample. But their influence derives from channels and institutional arrangements that are constructed outside the multi-denominational organized community studied in this survey.

To restate and summarize: Certainly, the composition of this sample is in some respects arbitrary; but so is the construction of any sample of leaders of any society or community. Fortunately, the decisions as to how to construct the sample had relatively little impact on the final results. Almost any other conceivable and reasonable decision (with the possible exception of sharply increasing or decreasing the representation of the Orthodox from Orthodox organizations) would have produced results virtually identical with those reported above.

## THE TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDY OF AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS

*Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?*

	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Jews are widely disliked by Gentile Americans	1	16	59	17	7
American Jews could one day face severe antisemitic persecution	6	45	32	9	8
I feel I can live a fuller Jewish life in Israel than in the US	14	30	36	15	5
Were it not for Israel, there would be much less dynamism & vitality in American Jewish life	35	46	13	4	3
It is fundamentally unhealthy for American Jewish religious & cultural life for American Jews to be so heavily focused on another society, even Israel	6	18	45	28	4

	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Jewish life in America is more authentically & positively than Jewish life in Israel	1	9	51	30	9
American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel	13	25	39	18	6
Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues and Jewish community centers	25	57	10	4	5
American Jews should fully support whatever Israel government is in power and its policies	4	13	48	31	4

	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
American Jews will be more effective in promoting U.S.-Israeli relations if they were seen as sometimes critical of Israel rather than as always giving Israeli leaders their unquestioning support	17	47	24	5	6
Public criticism of Israeli government policies by American Jews weakens the ability of American Jewish organizations to defend Israel	10	33	40	11	5
Public criticism of Israeli government policies by American Jews threatens Israel's survival	5	16	51	24	4

	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
American Jewish activists who are often so-called "friendly critics" of Israeli government policies are naive at best or traitors at worst	19	45	29	5	3
Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic & humanitarian character	24	39	23	6	9
The PLO is determined to destroy Israel	42	36	9	1	12
The PLO may dream of more, but it is ready to settle for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza	5	37	26	16	17
You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel	26	42	6	17	9
Palestinian Arabs are a basically violent people	2	10	63	14	11

	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Sooner or later, there will be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza	7	44	17	4	27
Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank & Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel	12	41	28	7	13
If the PLO recognizes Israel & renounces terrorism, Israel should be willing to talk with the PLO	17	56	16	4	7
If Israel agrees to talk with the PLO, that will lead to a Palestinian state	4	30	35	3	28
Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in the West Bank & Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace	22	54	11	5	9

	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Unless Palestinians see progress toward statehood, they probably will continue the intifada for years	11	57	17	1	14
If the Israeli army would take tougher actions, it could sharply lower the level of Palestinian violence	5	20	41	20	15
The U.S. Congress should cut aid to Israel by a little bit just so the hard-line Israelis will understand that American support for Israel has its limits	3	4	43	46	4
In the long run, American Jews' philanthropic support undermines Israel's economic vitality and independence	2	10	49	33	6



	AGREE STRONG- LY	AGREE	DIS- AGREE STRONG- LY	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
Because of infighting & mismanagement, Israelis waste an excessive amount of philanthropic aid they receive from American Jews	10	37	25	6	21

*With respect to the philanthropic aid American Jews provide Israel, which of the following general approaches do you find most appealing?*

- 17 For the most part, Israelis alone should decide where & how to spend the money they receive from American Jews. After all, Israelis are in the best position to make such decisions.
- 22 American Jews should exert more influence than Israelis on where & how their philanthropic donations are spent, especially in those areas where American Jews have greater technical & managerial expertise than Israelis.
- 62 American Jews & Israelis should exercise roughly equal influence over the management of philanthropic funds.

*If you were asked, would you contribute to the following causes?*

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Friends of The Hebrew University	68	17	16
Friends of Gush Emunim	9	83	9
Friends of Peace Now	28	57	16
The Likud Party's next election campaign	6	88	7
The Labor Party's next election campaign	20	67	13
The New Israel Fund	40	34	26
The Conservative or Reform Movements in Israel	71	23	7
Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel	25	67	8
Non-Zionist Orthodox institutions in Israel	13	78	8
AIPAC	72	19	9

*In your own community, would you want to see more Federation dollars devoted to local needs or more devoted to overseas (largely Israel-oriented) needs?*

- 31 More locally
- 13 More overseas
- 49 Keep the local/overseas split the same as now
- 7 Not sure

*To what extent are your Jewish volunteer activities focused around Israel?*

48	TO A GREAT EXTENT
39	TO SOME EXTENT
10	A LITTLE
3	NOT AT ALL
1	NOT SURE

*In representing Israel, it is best for American Jewish organizations to ...*

49	Strike an even balance between the positions of Likud & Labor
3	Tilt in the direction of Likud
14	Tilt in the direction of Labor
34	Not sure, other

*Do you approve or disapprove of expert American Jewish lay & professional leaders being involved in the following areas of Israeli life?*

	APPROVE	DIS- APPROVE	NOT SURE
The "Who is a Jew?" issue	88	11	0
Israeli security policies	25	67	8
Israelis' treatment of Palestinian protesters	53	39	9
Immigrant absorption in Israel	84	12	4
Electoral reform/adopting a constitution in Israel	50	40	9

*Do you approve or disapprove of the following sorts of parties having private discussions with those PLO officials who are often viewed as "moderates"?*

	APPROVE	DIS- APPROVE	NOT SURE
American diplomats	63	29	8
Israeli academics	57	35	8
Israeli government officials	74	20	5
American Jewish academics	38	53	8
American Jewish communal leaders	33	59	8

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Have you ever seriously considered living in Israel?	55	44	2
Do you consider yourself a Zionist?	78	15	7
Do you regularly read the Jerusalem Post or other Israeli newspaper?	64	35	1
In the last year, did you make a telephone call to someone in Israel?	75	25	0
Over the last 2 years, in conversation with any of your close friends or family members, have you spoken critically of Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising?	77	22	2
Over the last 2 years, in conversation with any of your close friends or family members, have you spoken critically of Orthodox Israelis' attempt to change the "Who is a Jew" law?	91	8	1
In the last decade, have you ever been so troubled by some aspect of Israel that you decided not to increase your gift to the UJA?	18	80	2

*If Israel changed its "Who is a Jew" law to recognize only Orthodox conversions, how would you feel?*

78	VERY UPSET
7	SOMEWHAT UPSET
4	A LITTLE UPSET
10	NOT UPSET
1	NOT SURE

*How close do you feel to Israel?*

78	VERY CLOSE
19	FAIRLY CLOSE
2	FAIRLY DISTANT
0	VERY DISTANT
1	NOT SURE

*Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions:*

	APPROVE	DIS- APPROVE	NOT SURE
The meeting in Stockholm between five American Jews and Yassir Arafat	19	73	9
The growth of the New Israel Fund	45	22	33
Suggestions by U.S. officials for Israelis to be more conciliatory to the Palestinians	48	36	17
Efforts by Israel to prevent Soviet Jews from emigrating to the U.S. rather than Israel	41	44	15
Decisions by some American Jewish leaders to deny aid to Soviet Jews so that they will go to Israel instead of the U.S.	62	14	24
Use of some of UJA's Project Renewal funds to aid social services located in Israeli Arab towns	74	16	10

## ISRAELI LEADERS &amp; GROUPS

*What is your impression of each of the following Israeli groups?*

	VERY FAVOR- ABLE	SOME- WHAT FAVOR- ABLE	SOME- WHAT UNFAV- ORABLE	VERY UNFAV- ORABLE	NOT SURE
So-called "ultra"- Orthodox Israelis	1	5	18	74	1
Modern Orthodox Israelis	23	46	21	4	7
Israeli "doves"	18	47	19	7	9
Israeli "hawks"	4	28	37	22	9

*In your view, how fairly is each of the following groups being treated in Israel?*

	VERY FAIRLY	SOME- WHAT FAIRLY	SOME- WHAT UN- FAIRLY	VERY UN- FAIRLY	NOT SURE
Israeli Arabs	13	41	36	8	3
Arabs on the West Bank	5	31	38	21	4
Jewish settlers in Judea & Samaria	44	38	9	1	7
Conservative & Reform Jews	6	16	40	36	2
Women	8	21	41	22	8

## ISRAELI FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

*In your view, are each of the following elements essential, desirable, undesirable or unacceptable in a peace arrangement between Israel & the Palestinians?*

	ESSEN- TIAL	DESIR- ABLE	UN- DESIR- ABLE	UN- ACCEPT- ABLE	NOT SURE
The ability of the Israel Defense Forces deploy troops and equipment wherever it wants in the territories	49	34	11	2	4
Total de-militarization of the Palestinians	56	37	3	1	3
Retention of those Jewish settlements considered important for Israeli security	46	40	8	2	4
Retention of Jewish settlements that are important for religious & historical reasons, even if they're not important for Israeli security	11	41	30	11	8
Renunciation of Palestinian refugee claims to return to parts of pre-1967 Israel	55	27	7	7	5

	ESSEN- TIAL	DESIR- ABLE	UN- DESIR- ABLE	UN- ACCEPT- ABLE	NOT SURE
Exclusion of any form of Palestinian statehood, even with a peace treaty & security arrangements acceptable to the IDF	13	23	36	18	11

*Within the next few years, do you think that Israel should . . .*

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Forcibly deport many more Palestinians out of Judea & Samaria?	9	78	13
Formally annex the West Bank?	10	78	12
Declare its unalterable opposition to any form of Palestinian statehood (except, perhaps in Jordan)?	25	64	11
Offer the Palestinians the prospect of de-militarized state in 15 years, after a gradual build-up of confidence on both sides?	59	18	22
Expand current settlements in Judea & Samaria?	12	78	11

*If you were an Israeli voting in the 1988 elections in Israel, for which party would you have voted?*

62	Labor (or one of its allies)
12	Likud (or one of its allies)
8	A religious party
18	Not sure, another party



## FACTS ABOUT ISRAEL

*As far as you know (without checking with others) . . .*

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Can Conservative & Reform rabbis officially marry couples in Israel?	7	89	4
Do Arab Israeli & Jewish Israeli children generally go to the same schools?	11	83	7
Is David Levy a leader of the Likud Party?	78	5	18
Do Israelis elect their Knesset members within geographic districts?	7	84	9

## POLITICAL BACKGROUND

*In the 1988 Presidential election, did you vote for Dukakis, Bush, someone else, or did you not vote?*

71 DUKAKIS  
27 BUSH  
2 DIDN'T VOTE

*You usually think of yourself as a:*

13 REPUBLICAN  
69 DEMOCRAT  
18 INDEPENDENT

*Your usual stand on political issues:*

47 LIBERAL  
43 MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD  
10 CONSERVATIVE

## JEWISH BACKGROUND & IDENTITY

*What is the main type of Jewish education you received as a child? (SELECT ONE ONLY)*

5 None  
22 Sunday School  
49 Hebrew School or other part-time Jewish school  
17 Yeshiva or Day School  
4 Private tutoring  
3 Any other type

*Of your 3 closest friends, how many are Jewish?*

0: 1%  
1: 2%  
2: 14%  
3: 83%

*You think of yourself as . . .*

14 ORTHODOX  
41 CONSERVATIVE  
4 RECONSTRUCTIONIST  
31 REFORM  
10 JUST JEWISH

*How often do you attend religious services?*

3 NEVER  
17 1-4 TIMES A YEAR  
25 5-10 TIMES A YEAR  
10 ONCE A MONTH  
13 2-3 TIMES A MONTH  
31 EVERY WEEK

*About how much did you & your household contribute to the UJA/Federation in 1988?*

5 \$0  
 1 \$1-24  
 4 \$25-99  
 14 \$100-499  
 12 \$500  
 27 \$1000-4,999  
 38 \$5,000+

*Have you been to Israel?*

1 NEVER  
 7 YES, ONCE  
 8 YES, TWICE  
 84 YES, 3+ TIMES

*(IF YES) When were you there last?*

NEVER: 1  
 1965-84: 15  
 1985-7: 23  
 1988: 21  
 1989: 41

*IF YES) Were you there when you were 13-22 years old?*

23 YES  
 77 NO

	YES	NO
When you were a teen-ager, did you ever belong to a youth group sponsored by a synagogue, temple, Zionist movement, B'nai B'rith or the Jewish Community Center?	68	32
Did you ever attend a summer sleep-away camp sponsored by the Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Zionist, or Yiddishist movements?	66	34
Did you fast Yom Kippur in 1988?	81	19
Do you use separate dishes at home for meat & dairy products?	40	60
Did you have a Christmas tree in 1988?	4	96
(IF YOU ARE MARRIED) Is your spouse Jewish?	97	3
(IF CHILD MARRIED) Is your oldest married child's spouse Jewish?	82	18
Do you work as a professional for a synagogue, temple, pro-Israel organization, federation, or other Jewish communal organization?	42	58

**PERSONAL BACKGROUND***You are:*

77 MALE  
23 FEMALE

*Your age:*

LT 40: 14  
40-9: 26  
50-9: 27  
60-9: 23  
70+: 11

*Marital status:*

3 NEVER MARRIED  
91 MARRIED  
4 SEPARATED OR DIVORCED  
3 WIDOWED

*Your educational attainment:*

0 HIGH SCHOOL  
7 SOME COLLEGE  
23 COLLEGE DEGREE  
70 PROFESSIONAL OR GRADUATE DEGREE

*Your household income:*

1 Under \$30,000  
6 \$30,000-49,999  
20 \$50,000-74,999  
16 \$75,000-99,999  
20 \$100,000-\$149,999  
38 \$150,000+

**FIRST COVER LETTER**

Department of Sociology  
Queens College, CUNY  
Flushing, N.Y. 11367  
September 27, 1989

Dear friend,

Over the last few years, American Jewish policy makers have been debating how the American Jewish community ought to relate to Israel. Do American Jews have a right to publicly criticize Israeli policies? Even if they have that right, is it helpful for them to do so? Do they have a right to try to influence internal Israeli policies? Should they lend support to one Israeli movement, party or group over another? And on what issues, if any, ought they voice their concerns or exercise their influence? On "Who is a Jew?" On philanthropic and social service issues? On security matters?

To further enlighten serious discussion of these matters, the Israel- Diaspora Institute at Tel-Aviv University commissioned this study of American Jewish leaders. In this study, "leaders" refer to a select sample of lay volunteers, rabbis, and professionals who hold critical leadership positions in some of the most important and influential organizations in American Jewish life. The sample also includes intellectual leaders, defined as those who have recently published books or articles on Israel or its relationship with American Jews. You are part of that select sample, and as such, your participation in this study is vital to its success.

You may be familiar with my earlier surveys of the American Jewish rank-and-file that I conducted for the American Jewish Committee. The enclosed questionnaire contains several items that appeared on those earlier surveys. However, you will also note that this study asks far more detailed and sophisticated questions than I can ask of the wider Jewish public. I know you will find the questionnaire stimulating and enjoyable to complete.

The Israel-Diaspora Institute will publish, publicize and circulate the report I shall write based upon the findings. As is customary, I promise you that your own personal answers will remain completely confidential and will be used only in aggregate form

together with the other responses to the survey. If you would like a summary of the report when it is completed, please enclose your name and address on a separate card or paper when you return the questionnaire. (Please do not write your name and address on the questionnaire.)

Should you have any comments or questions, write me at the Queens College address above, or give me a call at home (203-389-9475) on Tuesdays, Thursdays, or Fridays (before Shabbes), or Mondays and Wednesdays at Queens College (718-520-7089).

I thank you in advance for your co-operation in what may be the most important and influential study of American Jewish public opinion to date.

Sincerely yours,  
Steven M. Cohen  
Professor of Sociology  
Queens College, CUNY

### FIRST REMINDER POST CARD

Last week I sent you a questionnaire seeking your opinions about many crucial aspects of American Jews' relationship with Israel.

If you have already completed and returned it, please accept my sincere thanks. If not, please do so today by mailing it in the business reply envelope you should have received or directly to: Market Facts, Inc. 1010 Lake Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60301.

If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got misplaced, please call Vickie Driver of Market Facts at 1-800-323-0258 and she will get another in the mail to you today. If you have any questions about the study, call me at home (203-389-9475).

Sincerely,  
Prof. Steven M. Cohen

### SECOND COVER LETTER

Department of Sociology  
Queens College, CUNY  
Flushing, N.Y. 11367  
October 26, 1989

Dear friend,

About three weeks ago I wrote to you seeking your opinions on how the American Jewish community ought to relate to Israel. As of today, we have not yet received your completed questionnaire.

The Israel-Diaspora Institute of Tel-Aviv University undertook this study because of the belief that the opinions of American Jewish leaders ought to be taken into account more systematically in the formation of American Jewish public policy.

I am writing to you again because of the significance each questionnaire has to the usefulness of this study. Your name was selected from among lay volunteers, rabbis, and professionals who hold critical leadership positions in the most important and influential organizations in American Jewish life. The sample also includes intellectual leaders, defined as those who have recently published books or articles on Israel or its relationship with American Jews.

In order for the results of this study to be truly representative of the opinions of all sectors of American Jewish leadership, it is essential that each person in the sample return his or her questionnaire.

In the event that your questionnaire has been misplaced, I have enclosed a replacement. Please complete the questionnaire and return it in the return envelope enclosed. Should that be misplaced, simply send the questionnaire to: Market Facts, Inc., P.O. Box 4602, North Suburban, Il. 60197-9801.

Should you have any comments or questions, please write me at the Queens College address above, or give me a call at home (203-389-9475) on Tuesdays, Thursday or Fridays (before Shabbes,

EDT), or at Queens College (718-520-7089) on Mondays and Wednesdays.

Sincerely yours,  
Steven M. Cohen  
Professor of Sociology  
Queens College, CUNY

P.S. A number of people have called to ask when results will be available. I hope to have preliminary tabulations sometime next month. In addition, several people have asked whether they may reproduce the questionnaire for educational purposes; please feel free to do so, but do return the completed original blue form as soon as possible.

## SECOND REMINDER POST CARD

A few days ago I mailed you a second (and final) copy of the survey on American Jews' relationship with Israel. If you have already returned it, please accept my gratitude. If not, I urge you to mail me the completed questionnaire as soon as possible. In the next few days, I will conclude the data collection and proceed to the analysis. Thus, if your views are to count in the results, your replies are needed very shortly. Your participation in this study is vital to providing accurate portrayals of American Jewish leaders and of the organization(s) in which you are most active. Should you have any questions, call me at home (203-389-9475) or at my office (718-520-7089). Call Vickie Driver of Market Facts at 1-800-323-0258 to receive another copy of the questionnaire. Again, thank you for your participation.

Steven M. Cohen  
Professor of Sociology  
Queens College, CUNY

## TECHNICAL INFORMATION:

### THE SPSS-PC + COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO ANALYZE THE DATA

[For the researcher's convenience, we provide the following program.]

```
data list file='lead3.dat' fixed
/group 1-2 disliked persecut fuller vitality unhlthy authntic
publicly speak fullsupp unquestn weakens threaten naive
erodedem plodest plosettl trustar violent plostate homeland
talkplo talklead comprom intifada idftough apactilt distance
cutaid undrmine wasteaid decide$ hebrewu$ gush$ peace$
likud$ labor$ nifund$ consref$ z_orth$ nonzion$ aipac$
howsplit isrfocus lik_labr whosajew security protestr absorptn
elctoral diplomat isacadem isofficl amjacad amjldrs aliyah zionist
jerpost callisr critint critwho
cut_uja feel_who closeisr sweden nif_grow uspresur stopsovj
12-78 /denyaid aidarabs ultraort mod_orth isrdoes isrhawks is-
rarabs wb_arabs settlers con_refj isrwomen deploy de_milit
setl_sec setl_his refugees no_state no_plo ar_sovrn deport
annex_wb nvrstate state_15 talk_now expand isrparty canmarry
sameschl d_levy kneset presvote party_id politics jew_ed jfriends
denom attend uja_gave visitisr 12-50 last_isr 51-52 teen_isr
youth_gp jew_camp yk_fast two_dish xmastree spouse_j kids_spj
work_pro 53-61 jew_org 62-63 sex 64 age 65-66 zip_3 67-69
marital ed income 72-74.
if (visitisr eq 1)lastisr=60.
recode disliked to wasteaid (5=0)(1=3)(2=2)(3=-2)(4=-3)/
isrfocus closeisr (1=5)(2=4)(3=2)(4=1)(5=3)/ howsplit
(1=0)(2=1)(3=.5)(4=.51)/whosajew to cut_uja sweden to
aidarabs hebrewu$ to aipac$ canmarry to kneset youth_gp to
work_pro deport to expand (1=1)(3=.5)(2=0)/ ultraort to
isrhawks (4=-3)(3=-2)(1=3)(2=2)(5=0)/ israrabs to isrwomen
(5=3)(3=4)(4=5)/deploy to ar_sovrn (5=3)(3=4)(4=5)/
last_isr (low thru 84=0)(85 86 87=1)(88=2)(89=3)/ uja_gave
(1=0)(2=10)(3=60)(4=300)(5=750)(6=3000)(7=8000)/ income
(1=25)(2=40)(3=62)(4=87)(5=125)(6=200)/ lik_labr
(1=2.49)(4=2.51)/ isrparty (3=2.01)(4=1.5).
```

```

value labels disliked to wastead 3 'agr str' 2 'agree' 0 'not s' -2
'disagr'-3 'disag str'/
whosajew to cut_uja sweden to aidarabs hebrewu$ to aipac$
canmarry to knesset youth_gp to work_pro deport to expand 1
'yes' 0 'no'/ ultraort to isrhawks -3 'very unf' 2 'some unf' 0 'not s'
2 'some fav' 3 'very fav'/
israrabs to isrwomen 1 'very f' 2 'some f' 3 'not s' 4 'some f' 5
'very f'/howsplit 0 'locally' 1 'overseas'/ isrfocus 5 'great ext' 4
'some ext' 2 'little' 1 'not at all' 3 'not sure'/ lik_labr 1 'even' 2
'likud' 3 'labor' 4 'not s'/ feel_who 1 'very upset' 2 'some up' 3 'litl
up' 4 'not up' 5 'not sure'/ closeisr 5 'very close' 4 'fairly' 3 'not s'
2 'fairly distant' 1 'very dist' /last_isr 0 'pre-1985' 1 '1985-7' 2 '1988'
3 '1989'.
compute group2=group.
recode jew_org (6=1)(1=3)(2=5)(3=7)(7
8=9)(14=11)(10=13)(13=14)(9=16)(12=17)
(5=19)(else=21)/group2 (16 17=1)(5 6=3)(2=5)(3=6)
(22=7)(4=8)(7=9)(8 18=10)(14=11)(11=13)(15 13=14)(10
=16)(21=17)(12=17)(9=19)(20=20)(eke=21).
if (group eq 17 and work_pro eq 1)group2=2.
if (group eq 22 and work_pro eq 1)group2=8.
if (group eq 20 and jew_org lt 20)group2=jew_org.
if (group2 eq 21 and jew_org lt 21)group2=jew_org.
if (group2 eq 9 and (jew_org eq 3 or jew_org eq 5 or jew_org
eq 7))group2=jew_org.
compute group3=group2.
recode group3 (2=1)(6=5)(8=7)(10=9).
compute groups=group3.
recode groups (1=9)(3=5)(5=3)(7=10)(9=6)(11=13)(13=12)
(14=11)(16=7)(17=4)(19=2)(20=1)(21=8).
value labels group2 group3 jew_org 1 'fed' 2 'fed exec' 3 'ajcong'
5 'ajcomm' 6 'ajcomm pro' 7 'adl' 8 'adl pro' 9 'crc' 10 'crc pro' 11
'uojca' 13 'rca' 14 'usa' 16 'ra' 17 'uahc' 19 'ccar' 20 'academics' 21
'misc'/ groups 1 'academics' 2 'ccar' 3 'ajcommittee' 8 'misc' 4
'uahc' 5 'ajcongress' 7 'ra' 6 'crc & njcrc' 9 'federation' 11 'united
syn' 10 'adl' 12 'rca' 13 'uojca'.
compute xcontact=(visitisr+callisr+jerpost+last_isr-2)/7.
compute xzionism = (fuller+vitality+isrfocus+aliyah+
closeisr+zionist -authntic+4)/25.

```

```

count xknow=canmarry sameschl knesset (0) d_levy(1).
compute xknow=xknow/4.
compute xcomprom=(plostate+homeland+comprom+
no_state+state_15 - expand-annex_wb-nvrstate-deport-
ar_sovrn+uspresur+17)/32.
compute xrelax=(deploy+setl_sec+setl_his-plodest-
idftough+3)/24. compute
xtalk=(isofficl+plosetl+talkplo+no_plo+talk_now+intifa
da+8)/24. compute xcritok=(unquestn-publicly-fullsupp-
weakens- threaten- naive+speak+protestr+21)/43.
compute xdovesok=(peace$-gush$-likud$ +labor$+lik_labr-
isrparty+isrdoves-isrhawks+8)/18.
compute xantisem=(disliked+persecut+6)/12.
compute total = (xcomprom+xrelax+xtalk+xarab-
mis+xcritok+xdovesok)/6.
compute xclusiv=(feel_who+ultraort-critwho-con_
refj+z_orth$ + nonzion$-whosajew-consref$+10)/18.
compute xsovjews=(stopsovj+denyaid)/2.
compute ujainc=uja_gave/income.
recode attend (1=0)(2=3)(3=7)(4=12)(5=18)(6=50).

```



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Steven M. Cohen is Professor of Sociology at Queens College, CUNY. He has served as a Visiting Professor at Brandeis University, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Yale University, and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

His books include: *American Modernity and Jewish Identity* (Tavistock, 1983); *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?* (Indiana University Press, 1988); *Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in the United States* (with Samuel C. Heilman, University of Chicago Press, 1989); and *Two Worlds of Judaism: The Israeli and American Experiences* (with Charles S. Liebman, Yale University Press, 1990). He has also conducted numerous public opinion surveys of American Jews and several population studies of local Jewish communities.

**Design and Production by  
Alfil Publishing Ltd.  
97 Allenby Street  
Tel Aviv, Israel  
03-292612; 280456**