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MEETING THE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD

INTRODUCTION

As tensions mount fiercely between Washington and Tehran over their myriad of accumulating disagreements, radical Iranian leaders launch a ballistic missile, tipped with highly deadly chemicals, at New York City.

Determined to fulfill their vow to drive Israel into the sea, radical Arab leaders, perhaps in control of Iraq or Syria, launch a couple of ballistic missiles, carrying primitive nuclear warheads, at Tel Aviv.

Finding himself increasingly isolated diplomatically, Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi vows to show the world that he is still to be reckoned with and launches a ballistic missile, armed with toxic biological compounds, at Washington.

Such nightmares no longer are the stuff of B-grade made-for-TV movies. By the end of the century they probably will be reality, exposing the United States and its allies and friends to terrifying new threats. Many Third World countries long have had the ability to fabricate crude nuclear weapons. And in their marathon war, Iran and Iraq demonstrated that Third World nations can obtain or manufacture and use chemical weapons.

Very Serious Threat. Now Third World states are beginning to learn how to build the ballistic missiles that can deliver these deadly payloads over enormous distances. According to Central Intelligence Agency Director

William Webster, some fifteen Third World countries are developing ballistic missiles and could deploy them by the end of the century.¹ For good reason, therefore, did 81 percent of respondents tell pollsters in July and August 1988 that the spread of nuclear weapons to the Third World poses an extremely serious or very serious threat to U.S. security.²

The spread of ballistic missiles also poses a threat to regional stability. Nowhere are the serious implications of missile proliferation more evident than in the Middle East. Both Iraq and Syria now possess both ballistic missiles and chemical munitions. Israel is particularly threatened by these missiles. If the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars had been fought with missiles now in the possession of Syria, both wars would have been far more destructive and civilian casualties would have been far higher. Israel could not then nor can it now defend itself against such a missile attack from Syria.

Inadequate Control Policy. Earlier this decade the West tried to deal with the proliferation of ballistic missiles through arms control measures to limit Third World access to ballistic missiles, missile components, and technologies. The U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany sponsored the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987. It is an export control policy to prevent the proliferation of missile components or technologies for ballistic missiles that can carry a 1,100-pound payload 185 miles or more. Any country that participates in the MTCR legally cannot export missiles, their major components and production equipment, and technology. The MTCR is good as far as it goes. By itself, however, it is unlikely to stop the threat of missile proliferation.

To meet this threat, the U.S. must go beyond the MTCR arms control approach. What the U.S. and its allies need is to develop and deploy defenses against those missiles. Such missile defenses would reduce the threat of attack from even those Third World countries that refuse to sign or abide by arms control agreements.

Danger to U.S. Allies. Despite two years' efforts to control the spread of ballistic missiles through the MTCR, more countries in the Third World continue to obtain these weapons. The fifteen Third World countries that currently have ballistic missiles (including countries that have obtained missiles from outside) are: Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, South Korea, and South Yemen.

At this time, of course, it is mainly America's allies that are directly threatened by Third World missiles. Yet, this is certain to change as the missile ranges lengthen. To address this approaching danger, the U.S. needs a comprehensive policy that should include:

1 This statement was made by Mr. Webster before the Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, California, March 30, 1989. Webster made similar statements on other occasions. This figure excludes missiles Third World countries obtain from outside sources.

2 *Americans Talk Security, National Survey No. 8* (Boston: Marttila & Kiley, 1988), p. 56.

◆ ◆ **Developing ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. against ballistic missile attacks.**

◆ ◆ **Continuing to develop missile defenses in cooperation with key allies.**

The U.S. is working with its European allies and Israel to build and deploy defenses against the tactical missiles already possessed by a number of Third World countries.

◆ ◆ **Formulating an export policy that makes cheap and less sophisticated missile defenses available to allies facing a threat from hostile neighbors possessing ballistic missiles.**

The U.S. traditionally has provided less expensive and sophisticated military equipment to allies so that they can protect themselves against armed, hostile neighbors. Exporting ballistic missile defenses will allow these allies to defend themselves against ballistic missiles.

◆ ◆ **Expanding the coverage of the MTCR.**

By inducing such countries as China and the Soviet Union to participate in the effort to control the spread of ballistic missiles and missile technology, the MTCR will become more effective and could evolve into a treaty limiting missile proliferation similar to the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

◆ ◆ **“Globalizing” the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, to eliminate all ballistic missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles.**

The U.S. and the Soviet Union already have agreed to destroy their missiles with these ranges. These two countries should start pressing other countries to eliminate their missiles with the same ranges.

THE GROWING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT FROM THE THIRD WORLD

Missiles now possessed by Third World countries vary from the 30-mile-range, U.S.-built *Honest John* deployed by South Korea, to the 1,350-mile-range, Chinese-built CSS-2 now deployed by Saudi Arabia and set to be delivered to Syria. No Third World countries yet possess missiles of the 3,400 mile range or more required to strike the territory of the U.S. from most places in the Third World. Third World missiles have payloads ranging from the 200 pounds of the Israeli *Jericho II* to the 2,000 pounds of the Indian *Agni*.

Most of these weapons can carry conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads. Conventionally armed missiles, for example, were fired by Iran and Iraq at each other in the 1988 “War of the Cities,” devastating blocks of urban areas in both countries. In the case of chemical weapons, the effects would be much more widespread. Example: a Soviet-built SCUD-B ballistic

missile armed with a chemical warhead could cause fatalities over one square mile.³ Even a missile with only 10 percent of the payload capacity of a Soviet SCUD-B missile, armed with chemical agents, could kill over 32,000 people in New York, if it could reach the U.S.⁴ Nuclear-armed missiles would be the most deadly. A Soviet 75-mile-range SS-21 ballistic missile can carry a 300 kiloton warhead, which is ten times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. While most Third World ballistic missiles are armed with conventional warheads, chemical and eventually nuclear attacks cannot be ruled out. Several of those countries trying to acquire ballistic missiles either possess or are attempting to obtain nuclear or chemical weapons. These include India and Pakistan in the case of nuclear weapons, and Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria in the case of chemical weapons.

While ballistic missiles could be armed with deadly biological agents, such missiles are not the most effective means of delivering these agents. A small amount of a biological agent, for example, could be more easily and cheaply delivered by covert operatives into public water supplies. Also, it is easier for Third World nations to develop chemical agents than biological agents. Nevertheless, it is possible that Third World countries could develop biological weapons.

The Threat to the U.S.

Since no Third World country now deploys intercontinental ballistic missiles, the immediate threat to the territory of the U.S. is limited. If a Third World country were to obtain such missiles in the future, it most likely would attack the U.S. by striking a densely populated urban center. A handful of missiles thus would kill millions of people. To transform this threat to reality, Third World countries need only to extend the ranges of the missiles they are developing and arm them with nuclear or chemical warheads.

America's policies to deter Soviet attack would not necessarily deter Third World countries. The threat of retaliation may not trouble a leader like Libya's Muammar Qadhafi. He and others like him may view an attack on the U.S. as a way to demonstrate their "anti-Western" credentials, or a means to "retaliate" against the U.S. for past grievances, real or imagined, or just to heighten their prestige at home and among other radical leaders. Relying exclusively on offensive retaliatory forces could prove insufficient to prevent a devastating missile attack on select areas of the U.S. by a Third World leader.

Increasing Range and Accuracy. The invulnerability of the U.S. to a Third World missile attack is shrinking as missile ranges increase. The Indians test

3 U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, *A Threat to America: Ballistic Missiles From Developing Countries*, April 19, 1989, p. 4.

4 *Ibid.*

fired their *Agni* missile May 22, 1989, which has a range of almost 1,500 miles and carries a payload of 2,000 pounds.⁵ The Saudis possess and the Syrians are scheduled to acquire the CSS-2 missile, which has a range of some 1,350 miles and payload of 1,650 pounds. In both instances these missiles have vastly greater ranges and payloads than anything these countries possessed earlier. Intercontinental- range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) may not be far off for Third World countries.

Accuracy is also likely to improve as Third World countries are obtaining more sophisticated guidance systems from outside military powers. And the raw number of Third World missiles will also grow. The greater their number, the more serious the threat to the U.S. and its allies.

The Threat to Regional Stability

The immediate threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation is to U.S. allies. Possession of ballistic missiles by hostile Third World countries could alter the balance of power in such important regions as Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. As long as ballistic missiles continue to proliferate throughout the Third World, with no corresponding means of defense, increased regional instability is inevitable.

Israel faces the most immediate threat. Eight Middle East countries hostile to Israel have ballistic missiles: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and South Yemen.⁶ Most of their ballistic missiles come from the Soviet Union and include such systems as the *Frog-7*, the SCUD-B, and the SS-21. Many of these missiles can reach Israeli territory easily if fired from Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq. Some of Iraq's and Syria's missiles could be armed with chemical warheads. To protect itself against this, Israel, is working with the U.S. to develop a missile defense system called *Arrow*. It may be ready for deployment sometime in the 1990s.

Pakistan is threatened by India's missile program. The Indian *Agni* missile, with its almost 1,500 mile range, can strike anywhere in Pakistan. While India denies that it intends to arm the missile with nuclear warheads, India does have a proven nuclear weapons capability. It therefore must be assumed that the *Agni* is a nuclear system.

5 Richard M. Weintraub, "India Tests Mid-Range 'Agni' Missile," *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1989.

6 W. Seth Carus, *Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988), pp. 11-12.

DEFENDING U.S. TERRITORY AGAINST THIRD WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILES

To defend itself against the Third World missile threat, the U.S. would need only a limited deployment of missile defenses. One option, being considered by the Pentagon, is called the Limited Protection System (LPS).⁷ While not yet a fully defined concept, LPS is generally thought to consist of 100 interceptor missiles based at the Grand Forks, North Dakota, site allowed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

If deployed, LPS, could intercept and destroy up to 100 re-entry vehicles launched at the U.S. Such a system thus could defend the U.S. against the relatively limited number of missiles and missile warheads (tens as opposed to thousands) that could be launched by a Third World country. While the U.S. surely would retaliate with overwhelming force to an attack on its territory, this would not restore the American lives or property destroyed by the attack. This could be done only by a system that shields the U.S. from the attack.

Shielding the U.S. Such a shield could consist of up to several hundred ground-based missiles capable of intercepting incoming enemy missiles outside and inside the atmosphere. The High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI) is a ground-based weapon that could destroy ballistic missile re-entry vehicles after they enter the atmosphere by colliding with them. The Exoatmospheric Re-entry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS) is also ground based and could destroy incoming re-entry vehicles outside the atmosphere.

These weapons are being developed in the Strategic Defense Initiative program. They could be supported by the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS), a space-based sensor system, and the Ground Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS) and the Ground-Based Radar (GBR) — ground-based surveillance systems that detect warheads and help direct the interceptor missiles to their targets.

The single-site defense system, consisting of 100 interceptors and supporting sensors and battle management systems, would cost approximately \$10 billion and could be fully operational in 1997.⁸ Adding two more sites of 100 interceptors each is estimated to cost \$6 billion more.⁹ These additional sites would provide near complete coverage of U.S. territory. A Grand Forks, North Dakota, site could not protect the coastal areas of the U.S. This would require basing 100 interceptors on each coast.

⁷ This system is sometimes called an Accidental Launch Protection System, or ALPS. This was suggested by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia when he spoke before the Arms Control Association in January 1988.

⁸ Statement of W.C. Loomis of Lockheed Corporation, *A Case for Deployment of Ground-Based Exoatmospheric Interceptors for Active Strategic Defense*, given at Washington, D.C., March 10, 1989, p. 8.

⁹ Interview with Bill Haney, Program Manager for the Ground Surveillance and Tracking System at McDonnell Douglas Corporation, July 17, 1989.

PROTECTING U.S. ALLIES AGAINST THE THIRD WORLD MISSILE THREAT

Many of America's allies already fall well within the range of Third World missile forces. For example, Libya launched two Soviet-built SCUD-B missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa on April 15, 1986, bringing Italy to a state of war alert for the first time since World War II.¹⁰

Working with Allies. There are two ways to address the threat to U.S. allies. The first is for Washington to work with these allies to build missile defenses, as it is doing with Israel in the *Arrow* program. The second is for America alone to build an inexpensive missile defense system to be exported selectively to its allies. The U.S. is working to provide its NATO allies with such defenses. In fact, corporations located in several of these allied countries are participating in these SDI programs. This participation has facilitated agreements between the U.S. and Britain, Italy, Japan, and West Germany that allow these corporations to bid on SDI projects. Much of the research performed by these foreign corporations is focused on developing defenses against tactical missiles (missiles with ranges less than 300 miles).¹¹

Three tactical missiles being developed by the U.S. are candidates for a tactical missile defense system.

The first is the U.S. *Patriot* surface-to-air missile. It was designed initially to provide a defense against attacks by aircraft but has been upgraded to intercept and destroy enemy missiles. The *Patriot* system consists of a single-stage missile with a high explosive warhead and relies on an advanced (integrated phased-array) radar for guidance that can switch its focus from one target to the next at great speeds. The *Patriot* was tested successfully in 1986 against a *Lance* surface-to-surface tactical missile.¹² The *Patriot* system is deployed by the U.S. Army and has been made available to several NATO allies and Japan. In fiscal 1989, the Army is to purchase 815 of the missiles for about \$780 million.¹³

Not Insignificant Defense. The *Patriot* system cannot destroy its targets completely, which means that areas in the vicinity of an intercept could be exposed to the radiation or chemicals of a partially destroyed ballistic missile. But the *Patriot* can still prevent enemy missiles from hitting their targets. While the U.S. and its allies research more effective missile defense systems,

10 Loren Jenkins, "Attack on Island Prompts War Alert," *Washington Post*, April 17, 1986.

11 The United States has signed memoranda of understanding with: Britain, Israel, Italy, Japan and West Germany. Allied firms have research contracts with the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization that cover theater defense architecture, propulsion systems, millimeter-wave radar systems, and sensor systems, just to name several. For a more complete description of allied involvement in the SDI program see: *1989 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1989), pp. B-1 to B-6.

12 *Jane's Weapon Systems 1987-88* (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd., 1987), pp. 184-85.

13 *Report of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), p. 83.

the *Patriot* could provide an imperfect, though not insignificant, defense until the more advanced interceptor systems being developed under the SDI program are ready for deployment.

The second tactical missile defense system is the Extended-Range Interceptor (ERINT) missile. Under development by the U.S. Army, ERINT is a surface-to-air interceptor missile that could destroy tactical missiles by colliding with them at low altitudes. ERINT is derived from the Flexible Light-weight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE) tests that the Army conducted between 1984 and 1986. FLAGE was an experimental interceptor missile that used ground radars to track the target, predict the intercept point, and launch the FLAGE missile to destroy it. An additional FLAGE test flight successfully intercepted and destroyed a *Lance* short-range, surface-to-surface missile in 1987.¹⁴

Improving on *Patriot*. The ERINT system consists of a ground-based tracking radar that detects and tracks enemy missiles, a ground-based fire control system that directs the missile, a *Patriot* surface-to-air missile radar, and an on-board millimeter radar, which operates at very high frequencies. The ERINT could be launched from *Patriot* surface-to-air missile canisters. Improving on *Patriot*, ERINT's "hit-to-kill" capability is likely to destroy ballistic missiles completely. Thus, residual radiation or chemicals would not likely remain after a successful intercept, which would provide a more effective defense against nuclear or chemically-armed missiles.

The third system that could provide U.S. allies with a defense against ballistic missiles is the *Arrow* missile, which the U.S. and Israel are developing together; the U.S. is providing 80 percent of the \$150 million cost of the program and Israel 20 percent. *Arrow*, like the other two American systems, is a surface-to-air interceptor missile. A series of three flight tests of the system are scheduled to take place in Israel starting next year. The *Arrow* program could be a model for U.S. production agreements with other allies for defenses against a ballistic missile attack.

ARMS CONTROL: A MEANS FOR CONTROLLING BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD

The proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile technology throughout the Third World is prompting a chorus of demands to control missile technology. Jeff Bingaman, the New Mexico Democrat who chairs the Senate Defense Industry and Technology Subcommittee, wrote on March 29, 1989, "Not enough is being done to stop the spread of these fearful weapons [ballistic missiles]."¹⁵ Vice President Dan Quayle in a speech on June 29, 1989,

14 U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command "Fact Sheet," June 1989.

15 Jeff Bingaman, "New Threat: Poison-Tipped Missiles," *The New York Times*, March 29, 1989.

declared: "I have been actively committed to strengthening this regime [MTCR] since my years in the Senate, and I remain so."¹⁶

While arms control cannot stem the spread of ballistic missiles in the Third World, it can make it more difficult for countries to obtain missiles and missile technology and provide political incentives for them not to acquire such weapons. When coupled with ballistic missile defenses, arms control can be made even more effective. Defenses against ballistic missiles would diminish the military utility of missiles, which could create more incentives for Third World countries to participate in an agreement to stop the proliferation of missiles.

Limiting Access to Missile Technology. The first approach to slow the spread of ballistic missiles is to limit access to the technology that Third World countries need to develop and deploy such missiles. An arms control agreement limiting access to sensitive technologies would be similar to the multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970 and now has some 140 participating countries.

The second approach is to ban possession of certain classes of missiles, such as those of intermediate range. Such an agreement would be like arms control agreements pursued by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, such as the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The U.S., along with its allies, is already trying to control the spread of missile technology through the Missile Technology Control Regime. While still in its embryonic stage, the MTCR has been marginally effective in delaying a number of missile projects in the Third World.¹⁷ The major shortcoming of MTCR is that neither mainland China nor the Soviet Union is involved. Since both are major exporters of missiles, no agreement to stem the spread of ballistic missiles can be effective without their participation.

Modest Contribution. The U.S. and other MTCR nations should invite all nations to negotiate an agreement to stop the spread of ballistic missiles; such an agreement would be similar to the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would require countries that do not have ballistic missiles to pledge that they will not obtain them and that countries that do possess such weapons pledge not to export missiles, missile components or sensitive technologies to countries that do not participate in the agreement. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while not perfect, has been moderately successful in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and channeling nuclear development programs in the Third World toward peaceful purposes. A future ballistic missile non-proliferation treaty could make the same sort of modest contribution.

¹⁶ Speech to the American Defense Preparedness Association on June 29, 1989, p. 10.

¹⁷ Statement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, Jim E. Hinds, before the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, May 2, 1989, p. 4.

Banning Classes of Missiles. The second approach for controlling the spread of ballistic missiles is to pursue global agreements to ban entire classes of missiles, which are normally classified according to range. Former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Kenneth Adelman this April proposed "globalizing" the INF Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.¹⁸ He argues that the idea could be raised at the Committee on Disarmament (a 40-nation panel that deals with disarmament) together by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The result could be a multilateral agreement to ban the development or deployment of missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles, which includes several types of missiles already either possessed or under development by some Third World countries, including the Saudi CSS-2 and the Argentine *Condor 2* ballistic missiles.

The shortcomings of such an agreement are similar to those of non-proliferation agreements. Countries cannot be forced to join nor even to comply with the agreement if they join. India, for example, has stated that it will not agree to drop its *Agni* program. Also, verifying compliance with the agreement is likely to be difficult. An effective verification program would require access to weapons plants and laboratories not normally open to outsiders.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE MISSILE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

Combining ballistic missile defenses with prudent arms control initiatives is the most promising way to counter the spread of ballistic missiles throughout the Third World. Defenses will reduce the likelihood of a successful Third World missile attack on the U.S. directly. Also, they will decrease the likelihood that missiles will be employed in Third World conflicts. Arms control agreements could slow the spread of sensitive technology and provide inducements to halt the further spread of these weapons.

By limiting the scale of the threat, arms control could make the missile defense more effective. This two-track approach requires the that U.S.:

◆ ◆ **Develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses to protect U.S. territory against a missile attack from any quarter, including the Third World.**

It would be inappropriate for the U.S. to deploy defenses dedicated solely to protecting its territory against a Third World missile attack. The Soviet Union remains the most significant threat to U.S. security and must be the most important consideration for those designing missile defenses to protect U.S. territory. Still, a SDI deployment could be made to address the Third World threat as a first step toward more comprehensive defenses. Such an SDI deployment could locate Exoatmospheric Re-entry Interceptor

¹⁸ Ken Adelman, "Curing Missile Measles," *The Washington Times*, April 17, 1989.

Subsystem (ERIS) and High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI) missiles in three sites around the country for about \$16 billion.

◆ ◆ **Continue to develop and deploy tactical missile defenses in cooperation with allies, as now is being done with Israel.**

The U.S. is now developing three systems that provide a defense against tactical ballistic missiles: *Patriot*, ERINT, and *Arrow*. These systems are designed to intercept and destroy the types of missiles possessed in the greatest number by Third World powers, including the *Frog-7*, the SCUD-B, and the SS-21. SDI budget cuts now contemplated by the House of Representatives threaten some, if not all, of these programs. These development programs should continue and the systems deployed as soon as possible.

◆ ◆ **Formulate an export policy that will make cheap and less sophisticated missile defenses available to allies threatened by hostile neighbors.**

As the *Patriot*, ERINT, and *Arrow* programs progress, the U.S. should provide these systems to select allies. This means determining whether the technology involved could advance Soviet military efforts if it fell into Soviet hands and also involves reducing the costs of such systems so that allies can afford them. Such an export policy would provide U.S. allies with the means to defend themselves against the threat of a ballistic missile attack if arms control efforts fail.

◆ ◆ **Expand the MTCR to include other countries.**

Eventually, an expanded Missile Technology Control Regime could provide the foundation for a multilateral treaty to stop missile proliferation, similar to the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which limits the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the achievement of such a treaty is likely to be years away, the increased security and stability that could result will make it worth the effort.

◆ ◆ **Apply the restrictions imposed on the U.S. and the Soviet Union by the INF Treaty to other countries.**

The broadening of the INF Treaty, if fully enforced, could eliminate completely missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles. The U.S. and the Soviet Union could cooperate in this effort. While arms control, including effort to broaden the MTCR and the INF Treaty, can play an important role in slowing and even stopping the proliferation of ballistic missiles, it cannot do the job alone. Arms control will work best when coupled with missile defenses.

◆ ◆ ◆

The threat to the U.S. and its allies by the proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout the Third World is growing. The U.S. needs to develop a policy for addressing this threat that is comprehensive and realistic. This means pursuing arms control negotiations to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and

missile technologies. More essential, it means developing the missile defenses needed if the arms control process fails.

Through the Strategic Defense Initiative program the U.S. is developing a defense against ballistic missiles for itself and its allies. The U.S. need not wait until it faces a serious crisis in the Third World or finds its own citizens endangered because a hostile Third World country threatens to use ballistic missiles. The U.S. should start to take steps now by pursuing realistic arms control initiatives and developing missile defenses.

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