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## ***SALT II: THE BASIC ARGUMENTS***

### **INTRODUCTION**

The debate on the merits of SALT II has now been raging for more than two years. In this period of time, individuals and groups on both sides of the issue have written dozens of articles, delivered hundreds of speeches, and answered thousands of questions about SALT II. SALT II is not an easy subject to grasp. There are indeed many intricate technical considerations involved in the agreements. And yet, it is important that the American public attempt to acquaint itself with at least a basic knowledge of SALT II, because it is readily apparent that the final decision on the SALT agreements will have a decisive impact on the future course of the United States.

The purpose of this study is to simplify public consideration of some of the major issues of SALT II by aligning the arguments--for and against. Unfortunately, in the barrage of statements, speeches, and articles on SALT II, there has, up to this point, been little attempt made to set forth the opposing arguments in a readily comprehensible fashion. It is hoped that this study will help to remedy this situation.

Probably the most useful way to form a judgement about the utility of the SALT II agreements is on the basis of its net advantages and disadvantages. This is simply stated: "Are we better off with SALT II or without it?" The Carter Administration naturally argues that the United States is in a better position with the SALT II agreements in force, while leaders in opposition to the agreements argue instead that the country is better off without them. In both cases, the judgments are based upon a particular set of assumptions concerning the purposes of arms control and the reality of Soviet behavior. In the case of the Administration, some of the assumptions are: 1) the Soviet Union

shares with the United States a belief that the dangers of nuclear war make real strategic arms limitation an absolute and overriding necessity; 2) both countries have strategic forces which are essentially equal in power and therefore that marginal disparities in the components of these forces have no importance; 3) it is vitally important to keep the SALT process alive by signing the new agreements; and 4) the goodwill deriving from the SALT process will spill over into other areas of Soviet-American activity. In the case of the SALT II opponents, the assumptions are just the reverse: 1) the Soviet Union does not share our overriding interest in limiting strategic arms but has agreed to play along with us for purposes of its own; 2) the United States' strategic forces are becoming inferior to Soviet strategic forces and therefore that even seemingly marginal disparities in force components in the Soviet Union's favor tend to accelerate American strategic inferiority; 3) the SALT process is only as useful as the agreements that come from it; and 4) hopes that goodwill will spill over into other areas of Soviet-American contact are illusory, because detente is nothing but a temporary tactic used by the Soviet Union to acquire certain benefits from the West otherwise unobtainable. It is from such assumptions, often unstated in the speeches and articles on SALT, that both sides make their judgments about the value of the SALT II agreements.

The quotations used in this study were taken from a wide range of sources, including Administration speeches, anti-SALT articles, pamphlets, and congressional testimony. The complete description of the sources used is to be found at the end of the study. The intention in selecting the quotations was to find not only quotations on certain points of SALT II representative of each side's viewpoint, but also to find those quotations that were well-reasoned and persuasive.

### POLITICAL

- 1) The SALT II treaty will be the foundation for a more enduring political relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

#### Yes

"In addition to its role in maintaining the stability of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, SALT II is the foundation for a more enduring political relationship between two nations with awesome power." "SALT II The Reasons Why," U.S. Department of State.

#### No

"Such persons . . . assume that in engaging in negotiations, the Russians, like ourselves, are more anxious to agree than to disagree and are willing to make concessions in order to get agreement. They assume a commonality of interests and aims that does not exist. They

"We're trying to reach out a hand of friendship to past differences, and to provide for world peace." President Carter Remarks accepting the Martin Luther King, Jr. Non-violent Peace Prize.

"But carefully drawn SALT agreements . . . can accomplish a great deal. . . . They can contribute to a healthier political environment--an environment less freighted with suspicion and more conducive to further restraint." Defense Secretary Harold Brown, FY 1980 DOD Report.

"We have tried to evolve an agreement with the Soviet Union which would . . . lay a basis for increased friendship between us and the Soviet Union . . . ." President Carter, News Conference, 26 January 1979.

"The SALT process itself is important to the further development of U.S.-Soviet and overall East-West relations. SALT is the foundation for progress in establishing an enduring political relationship with the Soviets that reduces tensions, and sets important visible boundaries to our ideological, and political and military, competition." Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association.

seek camaraderie and tend to exude goodwill and assume that occasional beer hall type affability on the part of the Russians represents a similar proclivity on their side. They also find evidence of a 'new' Soviet approach that is characterized as 'serious and businesslike,' and hence sure to lead at long last to genuine cooperation." Foy Kohler, SALT II: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians.

"Arms treaties with Moscow have been repeatedly oversold--by both Republican and Democratic Administrations--as the touchstone of good relations between the superpowers. We are promised, if SALT succeeds, a generation of peace; if it fails, we are threatened with a return of the Cold War and a ruinous arms race. The Soviets know better . . . . Moscow has always regarded SALT as a campaign rather than an objective. The Politburo utilizes arms talks . . . as part of its grand design to further alter the correlation of forces in its favor." Frank Barnett, Preface to The Fateful Ends And Shades Of SALT Past . . . Present . . . And Yet To Come?

"The Soviet Union understands that it has no choice other than to wage protracted conflict against the United States. . . . Objectively viewed, the United States is an enemy and there can be no recognition--save for reason of short-term tactical convenience--of legitimate American interests, nor can there be any acceptance of the notion that the two countries can negotiate (or even simply evolve towards) a stable relationship of power." Colin Gray, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

- 2) The ratification of the SALT II treaty will provide impetus for further SALT treaties--treaties which will embody significant reductions of strategic nuclear forces on both sides.

Yes

"And of course SALT II is the absolutely indispensable production for moving on to much deeper and more significant cuts in strategic armaments in SALT III." President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT II.

"Necessary strategic force modernization must and will move forward, just as the SALT process must and will move forward. In SALT III we will work for further reductions and qualitative limits." Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

No

"[T]hey . . . contend that the process opens up a prospect for SALT III, SALT IV, SALT V, and so on. . . . SALT II does make a start at controlling offensive nuclear arms. But is it a good start? It limits the wrong things. The limits are imprecisely defined. They are too high--they are so high as to have nothing to do with effective arms control. . . . With such a precedent what should we expect from SALT III? . . . Unless we promptly act to reverse current trends, the strategic power realities reflected in the SALT III negotiations will be even more unfavorable to us than those which have been reflected in the SALT II negotiations." Paul Nitze, "Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?"

- 3) Rejection of SALT II will harm future arms control efforts, perhaps irreparably.

Yes

"If the agreement were rejected : . . . The painstaking process of strategic arms control would be dealt a profound blow. The progress we have already made would be jeopardized. The prospect for further steps toward restraining strategic arms and limiting other aspects of military competition--including the spread of nuclear weapons--would be set back immeasurably. . . ." "SALT II The Reasons Why," U.S. Department of State.

No

"It is my opinion that they need this treaty more than we do. . . . It is my conviction that the treaty can and should be negotiated on an even-handed basis. It's not too late." Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, USA (Ret.), Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 12, 1979.

"We'll yell, scream, shout. We'll write nasty editorials in Pravda. We'll call you warmon-

"Without SALT, the long process of arms control--so central to building a safe world--would be dealt a crippling, and perhaps a fatal, blow." President Carter, Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

"But it would be the height of irresponsibility to ignore the possible consequences of a failure to ratify the treaty. These consequences would include: . . . vastly increased dangers of nuclear proliferation among other nations throughout the world. . . ." President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT II.

gers and all sorts of things. And ultimately we'll go back, and we'll talk to you because it's in both our interests to do so." Soviet Americanologist Georgii Arbatov, as quoted by Senator Jake Garn.

"In another version, withholding ratification of SALT II would impair or even wreck detente, with all its purported boons. More specifically, not to ratify SALT II would endanger further United States-Soviet cooperation in halting nuclear proliferation. In answer--the Soviet Union has solid reasons for opposing nuclear proliferation. That opposition, based on self-interest, is not likely to be renounced in pique over a stillborn SALT II pact. Anyway, the argument is topsyturvy, because the basic stimulus to nuclear proliferation is anxiety traceable to the palpable erosion of our relative strategic strength as discerned by the nations directly or indirectly protected by it in the past." Charles Burton Marshall, "Looking for Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock."

- 4) The SALT II agreements were the result of hard bargaining and compromises on both sides.

Yes

"First, and most important, the SALT II treaty is not an agreement based on trust. It stands on its own merits based on common interest, expressed in hard bargaining and compromises." Presidential Adviser Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Remarks at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee

No

"The Soviets, needless to say, have not been oblivious to the propensity of their American opposites to show such concern for their sensitivities and of the opportunities this provides them. They have increasingly staked out extreme demands and stuck doggedly to them and waited for the U.S. to decide

of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

"They are tough bargainers; we are, too. . . . I think their positions, along with ours, have been adequately hard. We have negotiated very firmly, and there has been a steady progress." President Carter, News Conference, 26 January 1979.

upon the concessions necessary for a 'breakthrough.' The U.S. response has been to constantly shift positions in attempts to accommodate to Soviet intransigence. In other words, the Soviets have capitalized on our concern to reach agreement by inducing us to accept propositions, which, by any measure of prudence, we ought to have treated as unnegotiable on our own part." Foy Kohler, SALT II: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians.

"Several points emerge. The first is a difference of approach to the negotiations. The purposes of the two sides were discrepant from the outset. We wished for equal limitations designed to diminish the impact of nuclear weapons upon world politics. The Soviet side viewed the negotiations as an engagement between adversaries. The Soviet task was to achieve the right to that nuclear predominance which we appeared willing to relinquish." Paul Nitze, "Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?"

- 5) Rejection of SALT II will lend support to hard-line members of the Soviet elite by demonstrating to the Soviets that the United States is not prepared to sign a serious arms control agreement.

Yes

"It is a delusion to believe that rejection of a SALT treaty would somehow induce the Soviet Union to exercise new restraints in troubled areas.

The actual effect or [sic] rejecting such a treaty might be precisely the opposite. The most intransigent [sic] and

No

"There have been at least five periods of peaceful coexistence since the Bolshevik seizure of power, one in each decade of the Soviet state'. Each was hailed in the West as ushering in a new era of reconciliation and as signifying the long-awaited final change in Soviet

hostile elements of a Soviet political power structure would certainly be encouraged and strengthened by our rejection of a SALT agreement." President Carter, Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

"I shall only say that the consequences of a failure to ratify the agreement will be very grave and dangerous for both countries. Our people, apart from other things, would have to conclude that one cannot do serious business with the Americans at all." Georgii Arbatov, "The Soviets On SALT."

purposes. Each ended abruptly with a new period of intransigence, which was generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet hard-liners rather than to the dynamics of the system." Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy.

"It is quite probable that the composition of Politburo factions changes considerably from issue to issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that Brezhnev would, or could, be ousted by a coalition of hard-liners on grounds that he is insufficiently 'tough.' For, in a sense, all members of the hierarchy are hard-liners; the Soviet milieu is hardly conducive to liberal politics." J. Judson Mitchell, "The Soviet Succession: Who, And What, Will Follow Brezhnev?"

- 6) Senate rejection of SALT II will give the United States the reputation of being a warmonger nation.

Yes

"We are struggling to have the image in the nonaligned countries of a nation that's admirable and which has, as our present policy, the implementation of principles and ideals on which our country was founded in its initial days.

All of these efforts, which have been shared not only by me but by every President since President Eisenhower, would be endangered if we now reject this treaty. We would be looked upon as a warmonger, not as a peaceloving nation by many other people of the world." President Carter, Remarks at a White House Breakfast for the American Retail Federation.

No

"[T]he Soviets have made a near art of utilizing extremist-type arguments of American SALT proponents to influence U.S. decisions. Americans are endlessly quoted to saddle the U.S. with unique responsibility for achieving agreement, and for the dire consequences that will presumably follow failure. Thus, President Carter's assertion that the U.S. will be branded as a 'warmonger' if the Senate fails to ratify SALT II is being continually cited by Soviet spokesmen, as are his remarks about damage to U.S.-Soviet relations and the danger to world peace." Foy Kohler, SALT II: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians.

ECONOMIC

- 1) The United States will have to spend considerably less on its strategic weapons programs with SALT II than without it.

Yes

"With or without SALT II we must modernize and strengthen our strategic forces--and we are doing so. SALT II makes this task easier, surer and less expensive. . . .

Without the SALT treaty, we would be forced to spend extra billions each year in a dangerous nuclear arms race." President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT II.

"First, SALT will not reduce current defense expenditures. It will enable us to spend less than we would in the absence of an agreement. With a SALT agreement, expenditures on strategic nuclear forces are likely to rise from 20 to 40 percent in the coming years; without SALT, the same expenditures would rise 50 to 60 percent." Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director Leslie Gelb, Speech before the San Diego World Affairs Council.

"Furthermore, with SALT, it would be significantly less expensive (perhaps as much as \$30 billion less expensive over the next decade) for the United States to maintain that balance than without a SALT II agreement." Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association.

"The cost for the United States to maintain the strategic balance would be less under agreed SALT II limits than if

No

"As for the claim that a SALT II treaty will reduce the cost of our defense programs, General George M. Seignious II, the new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said on December 13 that the SALT II agreement, as it seemed likely to emerge, coupled with the further development of the Soviet nuclear arsenal made possible by the agreement, 'is going to require additional money to modernize the strategic systems we have.' . . .

[B]y establishing certain quantitative limits, the treaty would shift Soviet efforts to the quest for qualitative superiority. The effort to match qualitative improvements, based on active research and the development of new technologies, is hardly more economical than the repetitive manufacture of old-model weapons.

Yet the proponents of SALT II claim that the failure to . . . ratify the treaty would add as much as \$100 billion to our defense budgets over a five-year period. Those figures of extra costs . . . if the Senate refuses to consent to the treaty, are just as fanciful as President Nixon's claims [at the time of SALT I] that he had ended the cold war and achieved 'detente.'" Eugene Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II."

"Despite the dire predictions of some that the nonapproval of SALT would require a massive crash program of American



those limits were not in force. . . . Cost estimates of illustrative forces which the United States might deploy in response--so as to maintain the strategic balance in the face of such a Soviet buildup--range between \$60 and \$80 billion in FY 79 dollars for the period FY 1980 through FY 1985. . . . With SALT, currently planned U.S. forces will cost about \$50 billion for the same period. . . . Thus, an additional \$10 to \$30 billion could be incurred over the next five years, in addition to expansions already planned." Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 23, 1979.

spending on strategic systems, this is in fact not the case. All that would be required to maintain the strategic balance, including the survivability of all three legs of the triad, would be to pursue the same prudent program that was in effect until the Carter cut-backs in 1977. . . . Despite the wild claims of some administration spokesmen, these programs can be carried out within the constraints of a three percent real growth budget, using the base line of the FY-1977 budget submission. All these systems can be deployed while keeping the defense budget below six percent of the GNP." John Lehman, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

#### MILITARY

- 1) The SALT II treaty will reduce the risks of nuclear war and enhance strategic stability.

#### Yes

"First and foremost, SALT II will contribute to our security. By imposing important limits on the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, SALT II will reduce the risk of nuclear war." "SALT II The Reasons Why," U.S. Department of State.

"A SALT agreement, of course, cannot substitute for wise diplomacy or a strong defense, nor will it end the danger of nuclear war. But it will certainly reduce that danger." President Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1979.

"The emerging SALT II agreement will mean greater stability and

#### No

"The claim that a SALT II agreement would be politically stabilizing, . . . is just as empty [of logic as the idea that a bad agreement with the Soviets is better than no agreement at all]. We have had the Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with the Soviet Union--SALT I--since 1972. Far from stabilizing world politics, the Interim Agreement has been an important structural feature of the most turbulent and dangerous period of the cold war (the period ironically known as 'détente')." Eugene Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II."

"The parity that the United States thought it was endorsing

predictability in the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union." Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan, Remarks at the Department of State.

"For a SALT agreement is a fundamental element of strategic and political stability in a turbulent world--stability which can provide the necessary political basis for us to contain contain the kinds of crises that we face today, and to prevent their growing into a terrible nuclear confrontation." President Carter, Remarks at a Special Convocation of the Georgia Institute of Technology.

in 1972 with SALT was a parity that, in and of itself, would contribute to stability. In practice, the SALT I package contributed to instability rather than to stability." Colin Gray, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

"I believe SALT II, as now envisaged, will not reduce the risks of war. On the contrary, it can increase the risks of war if it reinforces the judgment that we are militarily stronger than the USSR at a time when we are not. War and defeat can arise from just such gross misjudgments of relative military capabilities by the weaker of two opposing powers." Paul Nitze, "Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?"

- 2) The new SALT treaty slows and even reverses the Soviet Union's strategic momentum.

Yes

"The SALT II agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition, and by helping to define future threats that we might face, SALT II will make our defense planning much more effective." President Carter, Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

"SALT Two will be a major brake on the momentum of strategic arms competition." Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Address before the Royal Institute for International Affairs.

"It is in our interest because it slows--even reverses--the momentum of the Soviet strategic arms buildup." President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT II.

No

"Because the treaty does not actually put a brake on the momentum of the massive Soviet buildup, the United States will for the first time not be able to maintain essential equivalence or nuclear parity." Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, USA (Ret.), Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 12, 1979.

"What we have gained from these concessions has been a series of relatively unimportant adjustments in what otherwise would have been the Soviet program for deployments over the next six years, in part, balanced by even less significant adjustments in our programs for future deployments. In essence, most of the negoti-

"And it will slow the momentum of Soviet strategic programs, thus reducing the threats we would otherwise face." Secretary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979.

ating process has been one of trading marginal adjustments to their large strategic program versus marginal adjustments to our much smaller one." Paul Nitze, "Considerations Bearing On The Merits Of An Agreement."

"For the Soviet Union to sign on for a SALT regime, that regime either has to be relatively innocuous in terms of its very probable impact on Soviet programs, while being likely to encourage 'progressive forces' in the West in their struggle against Pentagon militarism and the like, or it has to be a severe regime endorsed reluctantly only because it is the least undesirable alternative." Colin Gray, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

- 3) The SALT II agreements will impose important limits on the strategic nuclear forces of both sides.

Yes

"SALT II goes beyond SALT I, in all these provisions, by setting equal ceilings for the categories of weapons it covers. . . . This negotiated principle of equality will require an actual reduction in the Soviet Union's intercontinental forces. They will have to eliminate more than 250 systems, and the importance of this step should not be underestimated. It may well be the forerunner of more substantial and significant reductions by both sides." Presidential Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Remarks at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

"With the treaty, both sides will be limited, through 1985,

No

"Under the terms of the SALT II agreement, both side are to reduce their overall forces to 2,250 weapons by the end of 1981. It will be noted that bookkeeping tricks aside, the United States is already below that ceiling. The Soviet Union, however, will have to eliminate some 250 weapons. The administration claims that this is a very important provision of the agreement. In fact, the Soviet weapons to be withdrawn consist of rather primitive ballistic missiles, comparable to U.S. Minuteman I ICBM's (unilaterally withdrawn a decade ago) and Mya-4 jet bombers built in the 1950's which are now quite decrepit. The Russians will certainly not lose any real military options: they have plenty of high-grade

to an equal overall number of long-range bombers and systems for launching long-range missiles. The agreed total--2,250 --is lower than the present Soviet level and above our present level. Therefore, to comply with the treaty, the Soviets will have to destroy or dismantle about 10% of their systems. These will be the first agreed reductions in the history of nuclear arms." Secretary of State Vance, Statement before the Council on World Affairs, St. Louis, Missouri.

"But SALT II is a clear and valuable, though limited, step toward curtailing the numbers and types of weapons that can be added by either side, and even towards reducing--by some measures--the number of weapon systems that the Soviet Union already has on hand." Defense Secretary Brown, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 23, 1979.

missile capability in their large new ICBM's, and to replace the antique Mya-4's they have brand-new Backfire bombers, which have artificially been excluded from the SALT II ceilings." Edward Luttwak, "Ten Questions about SALT II."

"The fourth casualty has been true reductions. Although the number of Soviet launchers will decline from around 2,500 to 2,250 during the term of the treaty, the more significant indices of nuclear power will rise dramatically on the Soviet side, and to a lesser extent on our side as well. From the beginning of 1978 to the end of 1985, the number of Soviet warheads will have doubled; ours will have increased by a half. The area destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons will have increased by a half; ours by a quarter. The capability of their weapons to knock out hardened targets, such as missile silos, will have increased tenfold; even if our cruise missile, still under development, fulfill present expectations, our capability will have increased fourfold." Paul Nitze, "Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?"

- 4) Rejection of SALT II will lead to a new surge in the strategic arms race.

Yes

"If the agreement were rejected: There could be a dangerous and wasteful new surge in the strategic arms race. We would have to keep pace, at a cost of tens of billions of additional dollars and with the added risk that accompanies an intense military buildup."

No

"According to the recently submitted CIA report to the Joint Economic Committee of the Senate, Soviet defense spending, which has been increasing by about four to five percent a year since 1967, will continue to take between 11 and 13 percent of the GNP of the Soviet

"SALT II The Reasons Why,"  
U.S. Department of State.

"Without SALT, the Soviets will be unconstrained and capable of--and probably committed to--an enormous further build-up.

Without SALT, there would have to be a much sharper rise in our own defense spending, at the expense of other necessary programs for our people." President Carter, Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

". . . SALT II will limit to 1,200 the number of launchers of MIRVed strategic ballistic missiles the Soviets are allowed to deploy. We estimate that they could have as many as 500 more than this in 1985 without this limit.

". . . SALT II will limit to 820 the number of Soviet launchers of MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles. We estimate that without this limit they could have more than 1100 by 1985, and these are their most threatening weapons." ACDA Director George Seignious, Speech before the Conference on U.S. Security and the Soviet Challenge, Richmond, Virginia.

"[T]he fact is that in the absence of the SALT II treaty, the Soviets would not only keep these weapons [the 250 scheduled for dismantling], they could add far more new and modern systems. Based on their past experiences, they could be expected to acquire several entirely new types of strategic land-based missiles by 1985; the treaty holds them to one. Our best estimates are that they could have 3,000 launchers by 1985--750 more than they

Union with or without a SALT agreement. In other words, with the current level of Soviet strategic spending approximately three times that of the United States, the Soviets are permitted by SALT II to do all that their high and growing level of spending would permit them to do in any case. Far from the alarmist projections put forward by administration spokesmen, the principal difference between Soviet actions under SALT and in the absence of SALT would seem to be their retention in the force of some 200-300 older SS-7 and 8 missiles that would be dismantled to meet the SALT ceilings. Their level of MIRVed ICBMs would probably not exceed 900, and their number of MIRVed SLBMs would almost certainly not be able to exceed some 300 missiles. In summary, the increment of threat deployed by the Soviets without SALT is small." John Lehman, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

"The Soviets are already at or very near maximum levels of armament development and deployment, using at least 15% of their gross national product and spending \$50 billion more per year than the U.S. on military hardware. CIA estimates on Soviet military spending confirm that no element of the SALT II treaty will slow down the Russian effort. The Soviets have been driving for a war-winning military supremacy over the United States and have agreed to nothing in SALT II which would slow down that drive. It is doubtful that the Soviets could significantly increase their efforts without doing intolerable damage to their economy." "20 Questions

will be permitted with the treaty. And they could have several thousand more individual weapons than the treaty would allow." Secretary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979.

About SALT II," The Coalition for Peace Through Strength.

"The simplistic answer that 'without SALT a return to the arms race may impose an intolerable cost' will not bear scrutiny. The Russians are already on the near edge of mobilization for war, spending 40% more than we do for arms, from a GNP roughly half our own. In brief, Moscow is near to her weapons peak right now, while we have been resting on a lower plateau. But for not more than an added 1.5% of the GNP for U.S. defense--a percentage less than we spent in Eisenhower's day--we could procure the means to shield the nation from a first strike, a more important goal than inducing Brezhnev to initial more paper." Frank Barnett, Preface from The Fateful Ends And Shades Of SALT.

- 5) SALT II will allow the United States to continue the planned development of all needed new strategic weapon systems.

Yes

"SALT II preserves our options to build the forces we need to maintain our strategic balance." President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT II.

"SALT II will permit the necessary modernization of each of these three forces:

This fall we will begin fitting our Poseidon submarines with the longer range Trident I missile. By the middle of 1981, the first of our new Trident submarines, the U.S.S. Ohio, will be deployed. . . .

We are enhancing the effectiveness of our B-52 bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. . . .

No

"What is more significant is that the agreement, coupled with the Carter defense programs [i.e., cancellation of the B-1 bomber], virtually assures the disappearance of the manned penetrating leg of the American triad in the period shortly following the term of the agreements. The air-launched cruise missile was conceived as an implement to extend the life of the B-52 force and, when deployed on approximately 250 of them, to provide a counter to increasing Soviet air defense, and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the penetrating force of 240 B-1 bombers. With the provisions contained in SALT II

The President has decided to proceed with a new land-based missile, the M-X, which will deliver more warheads with greater accuracy than our existing Minuteman missiles.

Indeed, SALT II allows us to move ahead with each of these necessary modernization programs." Secretary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979.

"SALT II, while forestalling this unproductive numbers race, will leave us the flexibility to carry out the important qualitative programs to deal with the challenges the treaty will not eliminate. We can develop, test, and deploy each of our planned programs--cruise missiles, Trident, MX--in the fashion, and on the schedule, that we have planned. Apart from putting some distinguishing features on our ALCM's and cruise missile carriers (to aid counting under SALT), we will not be forced by SALT II to alter our strategic programs, which we need to balance Soviet programs that are allowed in SALT II and that are, in large measure, already in place." Defense Secretary Brown, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979.

limiting the number to 120 of B-52s able to be equipped with these ALCMs, the air-launched cruise missile force ceases to be an effective threat against projected Soviet air defenses.

By accepting the Soviet demand that sea-launched cruise missiles be limited to a straight-line distance of 325 nautical miles, the SALT agreements also preclude with one blow two very promising and inexpensive options. First, with the Carter policy of severely paring the Navy to a level of about 400 ships, the ability to do even a much-reduced mission of sea control would be greatly enhanced by a long-range antiship cruise missile. Such an option is prohibited by these agreements. Second, the valuable option of using sea-launched cruise missiles for theater nuclear deterrence in the European flanks and in the Pacific is similarly prohibited. . . .

By accepting the Soviet demand to prohibit deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) beyond a range of 325 nautical miles, the Protocol excludes the very valuable option of relieving the 600-odd fighter-bombers now assigned to the nuclear strike role in Europe. . . . Conventional precision attack roles for the GLCM also are prohibited by the Protocol." John Lehman, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

"The administration claims that the SALT II Protocol limits only the deployment of CM's [cruise missiles] and only until the end of 1981; it also claims that ground-launched and sea-launched CM's could not have been deployed within that

time anyway. That result was of course contrived by manipulating the scheduling of the CM program: we could have had CM's by 1980, given the will to acquire them." Edward Luttwak, "Ten Questions about SALT II."

- 6) The SALT II agreements will preserve and enhance the security of our Allies.

Yes

"Allied security will also be preserved and enhanced by the SALT TWO agreement. The U.S. has consulted closely with the NATO allies throughout the course of the negotiations, and has taken into account allied security concerns in its negotiating positions." "The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," U.S. Department of State.

"We have assured our Allies that their interests will be fully met by this treaty. The best evidence of the success of our continual efforts to work with our Allies on SALT II can be seen in their response: strong support for this treaty by Allied leaders, including public statements at Guadeloupe by Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Callaghan, and President Giscard." Presidential Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Remarks at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

"America's allies fully support the SALT II treaty. Just as our partners look to us for leadership in strengthening the military position of our alliances--which we are doing--they also expect and want us to lead in the quest for greater secur-

No

"Whenever it appears that in pursuit of the United States' own security, the Americans may have sacrificed a direct European interest, the Europeans find themselves in a difficult dilemma which they approach in varied styles. Typically, the German or British preference is to adapt to the American view, on the grounds both that the Americans may understand the technicalities better and that, in any case, allied solidarity, or at least the appearance of it, generally outweighs specific defense policy decisions in the deterrent balance. The French style is notoriously different, tending to emphasize differences of opinion as renewed justification for an independent course of action." Laurence Martin, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

"Having gained a measure of superiority over the United States in strategic nuclear capability, it was inevitable that the USSR should attempt to achieve a similar advantage in what has become known as Eurostrategic nuclear capability . . . in which nuclear delivery systems based in the Soviet Union pose a strategic nuclear threat to European hard and soft targets. This is precise-



ity and stability through arms control. . . .

Our allies had specific interests and concerns in connection with SALT II. The questions they raised were related to specific points, not to the enterprise as a whole. And in each case we have developed mutually acceptable solutions. . . .

Thus, the NATO allies have endorsed the SALT II treaty on two levels:

They are convinced that it preserves all essential defense options, to sustain deterrence in Europe; and

They believe the treaty serves a necessary role in the overall East-West political and strategic relationship." Secretary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 10, 1979.

ly what Moscow has now achieved, while NATO watches with growing apprehension, but little sign that positive action will be taken to redress the imbalance: indeed, the ban on cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 km and the inhibition on the transfer of cruise missile technology apparently agreed in SALT II places further obstacles in the way of doing so." Stewart Manual, SALT II: The Eurostrategic Imbalance.

"Any such European fears about the deterioration of the American relative strategic nuclear capability are exacerbated to the extent that SALT contributes to direct deterioration in the theatre balance. There are, in fact, a number of such contributions, although it would be going too far to say that none of the unfavorable consequences would have ensued in the absence of an explicit agreement. Tolerating the Soviet Backfire bomber so long as it is not deployed in an anti-United States mode--that is, so long as it is deployed against areas bordering the Warsaw Pact--is only the most explicit instance of going beyond merely neglecting threats to allies to actually diverting them in that direction, behavior of which Stalin suspected Chamberlain in 1939.

At least equally unsatisfactory from the European point of view is the treatment of the cruise missile in SALT II. On this issue Europe is caught two ways. Restriction on the deployment of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) classifies it as a system subject to noncircumvention understandings. A moratorium on deployment of other forms of cruise

missiles capable of more than short, tactical ranges, threatens to deprive NATO of a very attractive option for a medium to intermediate range system for interdiction or retaliation within the European theatre." Laurence Martin, "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy."

- 7) SALT II will enhance the United States' ability to compete with the Soviet Union around the world.

Yes

"SALT will not stop our ability to compete around the world with the Soviets. In fact, SALT will enhance it. For example, would we be better able to meet the Soviet challenge to NATO, or in Africa and Asia, without SALT II--while spending even larger sums on nuclear, rather than conventional forces?" ACDA Director George Seignious, Speech before the Conference on U.S. Security and the Soviet Challenge, Richmond, Virginia.

No

"To some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, the last and key judgment in this chain of reasoning--that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences--comes as a shock. . . .

It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect international politics and diplomacy from the underlying real power balances. The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence--military, economic, or political--rest." Paul Nitze, "Considerations Bearing On The Merits Of An Agreement."

"My principal worry is not only this growing vulnerability of our land-based forces--though this must be remedied--but the growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based forces. The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will continually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset

the Soviet capacity for regional intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in Soviet theater nuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which immeasurably extends the reach and preponderance of Soviet conventional power." Henry Kissinger, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, August 2, 1979.

8) The SALT II agreements will be adequately verifiable.

Yes

"As I have said many times, SALT II is not based on trust. Compliance will be assured by our own nation's means of verification, including extremely sophisticated satellites, powerful electronic systems, and a vast intelligence network. Were the Soviet Union to take the enormous risk of trying to violate the treaty in any way that might affect the strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively." President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT II.

"The SALT II agreement is adequately verifiable. We are confident we can detect any violation by the Soviets which would pose a significant military risk or adversely affect the strategic balance.

In SALT we don't rely on trust. Trust is not a basis for national survival. We verify Soviet compliance with the provisions of the agreement by using our diverse, powerful, and sophisticated intelligence capabilities." ACDA Director George Seignious, Statement before the Senate Foreign

No

"This long-standing intelligence imbalance has become worse of late. We have lost critical observation facilities in Iran, and some of our most important satellite systems have been fatally compromised. . . . Beyond that, we have virtually eliminated the CIA's ability to collect intelligence overseas by covert means.

We can still identify and count large, fixed objects of classic form such as uncamouflaged ICBM silos. Beyond that, everything is a matter of relative uncertainty and claims to the contrary are either dishonest or ill-informed. Stansfield Turner, the director of Central Intelligence, did his honorable duty when he testified before Congress that the SALT II agreements could not be verified reliably at the present time, and that it would take five years to acquire the necessary capabilities." Edward Luttwak, "Ten Questions about SALT II."

"The SALT II agreements, as signed at Vienna, are not sufficiently precise to give an adequate base for [interpreting

Relations Committee, July 10, 1979.

what the agreements permit or do not permit]. . . .

In the absence of reasonably precise definitions of what is to be limited and how it is to be limited, the very foundation on which compliance would rest is lacking." Paul Nitze, Statement before the Senate Intelligence Committee, July 30, 1979.

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