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Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations

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Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations

SUMMARY

In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement they negotiated in Dayton, OH. The following day the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1031 authorized for one year the multilateral NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) under the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII. On December 12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) until June 1998. In March 1998, the NATO allies agreed that SFOR will remain in Bosnia until significant progress has been made in the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

During 1996, the United States stationed about 16,500 troops in Bosnia, and roughly 6,000 support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. All NATO nations contributed personnel, along with 18 non-NATO nations, for an IFOR total of about 54,000 troops. SFOR is now a smaller force of about 23,000 troops. The U.S. contingent has been reduced to 4,250 in Bosnia, and with 1,000 additional support personnel in Italy, Hungary, and Croatia.

SFOR continues the mission of monitoring and enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords, e.g., demilitarized

zones and weapon cantonment. These efforts have been credited a success. With SFOR's duration now dependent upon progress in implementing the Dayton Accords, NATO commanders can be expected to lend greater assistance to civilian authorities, local and international, in their efforts to create a stable political environment. In the last year SFOR has stepped up efforts to detain war crimes suspects, provided logistical support for internationally monitored elections, and provided limited assistance for refugee resettlement. SFOR now has a paramilitary police unit – the Multi-national Special Unit (MSU) – with about 800 personnel from Italy and Argentina to respond to civil disturbances. NATO HQ has suggested that a second MSU be created, as SFOR continues the trend towards lighter military forces.

Contrary to some initial expectations when NATO deployed to Bosnia, the IFOR/SFOR operations have been notably free of hostile casualties. U.S. forces have sustained only one hostile fatality, a soldier who picked up an unexploded munition.

From FY1992 through FY2001, approximately \$11.59 billion has been appropriated for Bosnia-related operations.

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The U.S. Army is “informally” studying the possibility of establishing a permanent headquarters for Balkan operations, and considering a change to individual personnel rather than unit rotation. These actions are being taken in anticipation of long-term U.S. deployment in the region. (Inside the Pentagon, 10/26/00, p.1) At the same time, USAF Gen Joseph Ralston, the new NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) is considering creating a joint subordinate headquarters to oversee both the Bosnia and Kosovo peace-keeping operations. Currently, the SFOR and KFOR commanders report independently, and directly, to the SACEUR..

SFOR has continued to reduce its size, now totaling about 19,300 troops. U.S. troops in Bosnia have dropped from a high of 15,000+ during the initial NATO deployment to a current strength of about 4,300, approximately 22% of the total force. An additional 1,000 U.S. personnel remain in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy in support of operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo.

*DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for SFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. Six of the eight 6-month long rotations will be commanded by National Guard Divisions, and four will include Army Reserve units. (See, **IFOR/SFOR Force Components**, below.)*

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

U.S. Military Operations

U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR)

IFOR/SFOR Mission. While steadfastly refusing to contribute ground forces to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the Clinton Administration, beginning in February 1993, maintained a commitment to provide them to oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1994 peace negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton OH, Administration officials began to lay out their rationale and initial planning for U.S. participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) for Bosnia. Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces was necessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. ground force participation a condition of their accepting any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation was necessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. President Clinton subsequently emphasized a moral responsibility to aid in ending the savagery of the Bosnian conflict.

On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. In brief, the military elements of the agreement, in addition to establishing IFOR and granting it full authority and freedom of movement to enforce the agreement, calls for: 1) withdrawal of forces behind cease-fire lines within 30 days, with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) of four kilometers; 2) withdrawal of heavy weapons and personnel to barracks; 3)

provision of information on personnel, weaponry, and landmines; 4) arms reduction negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). All these objectives have been completed, with the exception of the arms reduction process which the OSCE continues to oversee.

To enforce the military provisions of the Dayton agreements, NATO sent 54,000 ground troops, the Intervention Force or IFOR, which involved approximately 54,000 ground troops in Bosnia proper, and lasted until December 20, 1996. The smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) assumed IFOR's missions at that time, NATO's members decided that SFOR should not have a date certain for ending its presence in Bosnia. Rather, its departure will be tied to successful accomplishment of Dayton Peace Accord provisions. Though the operations are being carried out with U.N. Security Council authorization, there is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations.

SFOR's mission, as defined by NATO HQ, is "to provide a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for civil implementation plans." To accomplish this mission, NATO has identified key military and supporting tasks, as follows. Key military tasks are:

- ! Maintain a deterrent military presence.
- ! Prevent major hostilities or removal of weapons from cantonment.
- ! Operate the Joint Military Committees
- ! Contribute to a secure environment for civil organizations to carry out their responsibilities. Ensure force protection and freedom of movement.
- ! Ensure compliance with the cease-fire and the demilitarized Zone of Separation.
- ! Monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Accords.
- ! Enforce the rules and procedures covering Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace.

Among key supporting tasks, to be undertaken within the capabilities and at the discretion of SFOR, are:

- ! Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the High Commissioner.
- ! Support the implementation of the arbitration decision concerning the contested Brcko Corridor. Support the conduct of elections and installation of elected officials.
- ! Support the return of displaced persons, but not forcibly return them or guard specific locations. Support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Police Task Force.

IFOR's "supporting" tasks have been a greater focus for SFOR operations, given that the military provisions of the Dayton Accords continue to be observed. The International War Crimes Tribunal requested and received protection for its investigators and for suspected war crimes sites. SFOR also agreed to detain suspected war criminals, if encountered, but until late 1997 declined to participate in pursuit operations. This refusal to take more effective action to apprehend suspected war criminals led to continued criticism from the War

Crimes Tribunal and human rights advocates. Those who favor action have stressed the importance of supporting the International War Crimes Tribunal and the destabilizing influence of Karadzic and other Serb and Croat extremists. Others believe that action would undermine SFOR's stance of neutrality and could spark violence against its troops. Within U.S. military circles the political costs of the failed search and capture missions in Somalia have may have contributed to a reluctance to undertake such missions without clear political support. On July 10, 1997, in an abrupt departure from previous policy, British Special Air Service troops staged two raids, arresting one indicted war criminal, and killing another when he opened fire. Since that time, SFOR has played a more active role in detaining indicted suspects, and additional detentions and voluntary surrenders (perhaps encouraged by NATO's greater involvement) have resulted in over half of those indicted for war crimes currently being in custody. Former Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic, however, remain at large. Reportedly one operation to seize Karadzic was aborted owing to concerns over potential casualties and security leaks within the French headquarters overseeing the Serbian areas of Bosnia. Gen. Mladic is reported no longer in Bosnia, having fled to the Serbian capital Belgrade.

Civil violence and arson in refugee resettlement areas led to criticism of NATO's unwillingness to assume greater policing responsibilities. SFOR has dispatched troops to troubled areas, but continues to emphasize its primary mission of overseeing implementation of the military aspects of the settlement. Critics maintained that unless civil violence was deterred or rapidly quelled and refugee resettlement rapidly accelerated, trust in the overall peace settlement would not develop. SFOR troops have sometimes acted forcefully in Serbian areas of Bosnia, moving to reduce the power of extremists. British and U.S. troops have seized police stations and turned them over to moderate government officials. There are still, however, some complaints that violence against resettling refugees receives too little attention from SFOR HQ. These pressures are indicative of those that SFOR and its successor will continue to be under to dedicate resources to the many civilian undertakings that complement the military aspects of the peace agreement.

In response to this criticism, the United States proposed the creation of an armed international police force to assist in peaceful refugee resettlement. The NATO allies agreed to the creation of an 800 strong paramilitary police unit under NATO command. Italy and Argentina have provided most of the personnel for this Multipurpose Special Unit.. Not intended to replace local police, this force will serve as an emergency response team for civil disturbances.

Duration of NATO Bosnia Operations. In late 1996, the lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction among the ethnic factions, including within the Muslim-Croat Federation, led to the widespread belief that some NATO military force would be required beyond IFOR's December 20, 1996 mandate. These concerns led NATO's political leaders to authorize the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December, 1996, to last until June 1998. By the end of 1997, there was little optimism that Bosnia would have a viable national state or economy by that time. This generally accepted assessment was supported by GAO reports: *Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals*, GAO/NSAID-97-132, May 1997, and its update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997). Fragile government institutions and continued ethnic antagonisms lead most observers to believe that an international military force of substantial size will be necessary in Bosnia for perhaps years, if further internecine warfare is to be averted. Some,

such the former High Representative Carl Bildt, have suggested the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Bosnia because they believe the region's conflict to be the single greatest threat to contemporary European security, and hence should be a long-term NATO concern. While not accepting this position, in March 1998, NATO foreign ministers re-authorized SFOR, and tied the duration of its deployment to the achievement of specified benchmarks of success in implementing the Dayton Accords.

NATO's decision to extend its presence in Bosnia without specifying a withdrawal date, and President Clinton's commitment of U.S. troops to this effort has led to concern over the potential length of Bosnia operations. For both IFOR and SFOR, political concern over a potentially limitless duration led to establishing so-called "deadlines" for withdrawal. However, as each deadline has approached, the lack of progress toward political stability in Bosnia raised fears that withdrawal would result in renewed warfare, and consequently NATO has approved the continuation of operations. While establishing specific withdrawal dates may have allayed some concerns, it may also have permitted those opposed to the Dayton Accords to believe the NATO commitment to their enforcement to be limited, and the resumption of armed conflict need only be postponed rather than abandoned. NATO leaders now hope that tying withdrawal to demonstrable political and administrative progress will encourage more widespread cooperation in implementing the Accords. Those who endorse an extended SFOR believe that a return to ethnic warfare in Bosnia holds greater dangers for U.S. security interests than the prospect of continued U.S. deployments in the region. They also point out that Bosnia is type of mission for which NATO is supposedly shaping its forces after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the inability or unwillingness to bring a lasting peace to Bosnia would bring NATO's credibility into question.

At the same time, some have called for the United States to press for the withdrawal of its troops, and to encourage the European NATO allies to assume for responsibility for Bosnia operations, with the U.S. supplying intelligence, logistical, and support — but no ground troops. They believe that this is in keeping the European allies' desire to create a stronger "European Security and Defense Identity" (ESDI). European NATO allies have been adamant, however, that they will continue an extended deployment in Bosnia, *only* if U.S. ground forces remain a part of the operation. Some of those opposing extended operations in Bosnia question whether the Dayton Accords are, in fact, a workable basis for Bosnia's future, and suggest they are rather a settlement internationally imposed with little indigenous support. There is a wide-spread concern in Congress, as indicated in the FY1999 authorizing legislation (H.R. 3616, see below), about the United States being drawn into a military commitment without a foreseeable end.

The FY1999 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) contains several "sense of the Congress" provisions, and establishes extensive reporting requirements for both the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding Bosnia operations. Among these provisions are:

- ! A sense of the Congress that: 1) U.S. ground forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to allow the U.S. to withdraw its ground forces; 2) a NATO-led force, without U.S. ground troops, might be suitable for continued operations, and the United States might supply intelligence and logistical support, and a "ready reserve force in the region". Semiannual presidential reports providing: 1) the expected duration of deployment; 2) the percentage of

Dayton Accord “benchmarks” achieved and the time for completion of those remaining; 3) the status of the paramilitary police force; 4) a detailed discussion of the specific missions undertaken by U.S. forces, including cost estimates and an assessment of the risks involved; 5) a joint assessment by the Secretaries of Defense and State of the planning for European assumption of SFOR operations.

- ! A detailed report from the Secretary of Defense on the effect of Bosnia operations on the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, with particular attention to Southwest Asia and Korea.

The Administration submitted the latest semi-annual report to Congress on May 12, and noted that NATO military authorities are evaluating SFOR needs, and will decide whether additional troop reductions are advisable. In keeping with the alliance policy of not providing a date certain for withdrawal, no estimate of SFOR’s projected duration was made. The DOD report on the effect of Bosnia operations on the ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars was submitted to Congress in classified form only.

Costs. Each nation contributing to IFOR/SFOR bears the cost of its own deployment and operations. This summary covers DOD’s incremental costs incurred since U.S. troops deployed to Bosnia in December 1995. Prior to IFOR/SFOR, DOD carried out air support and maritime intercept operations in conjunction with U.N. peace-keeping efforts and the U.N. arms embargo. FY1996 saw the introduction of U.S. ground forces into Bosnia, and the consequent increase in incremental costs reflected in Table 1. The term “incremental costs” refers to those costs over and above those of normal day-to-day peacetime operations.

These costs have been covered through a combination of DOD annual budget appropriations, supplemental appropriations, transfers between budget accounts, and re-programmings within DOD Operations & Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts. To remain within the limits of the balanced budget agreement, the supplemental appropriations have been largely offset by reductions in other elements of the DOD budget (e.g. National Reconnaissance Office excess funds, savings from inflation overestimates). The Administration requested that the FY1998/FY1999 funding for Bosnia be “emergency” appropriations, which under the balanced budget agreement would raise the cap on both defense spending and total discretionary spending. The Administration justified this on the grounds that Bosnia costs were not included in the calculations for the balanced budget agreement. For the previous three years, however, Congress had directed that the costs of military operations in Bosnia be provided within the annual caps for defense spending. Departing from this position, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act granted the emergency appropriations status. It capped spending of FY1999 funds for Bosnia operations at \$1,858,600,000, thus prohibiting DOD from exceeding Administration-projected expenditures without congressional action. The FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277) provided the Administration’s full supplemental request for Bosnia operations as an emergency appropriation.

Table 1. DOD Incremental Cost of Bosnia Operations
(In \$millions)

	SFOR/IFOR	Other Bosnia-Related Operations*	Total
FY1992		5.8	5.8
FY1993		138.8	138.8
FY1994		292.0	292.0
FY1995		347.4	347.4
FY1996	2,231.7	288.3	2,520.0
FY1997	2,087.5	195.0	2,282.5
FY1998	1,792.8	169.9	1,962.7
FY1999	1,382.5	155.4	1,537.9
FY2000 (07/31/00)	1,017.8	83.5	1,101.3
FY2001 (appropriated)	1,400.0	N/A	1,400.0
Total	9,912.3	1,676.1	11,588.4

Source: Department of Defense

* Other Bosnia-related Operations include: *Able Sentry* (Macedonia preventative deployment), *Deny Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Forge* (air support), *Sharp Guard* (maritime intercept), and *Provide Promise* (humanitarian relief).

IFOR/SFOR Force Components. The U.S. original IFOR contingent was built around 13,000 personnel from the 1st Armored Division from Germany, while SFOR's core element has rotated every six months, primarily among elements of the 1st Armored Division, 1st Mechanized Infantry Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division, and the 10th Mountain Division, augmented by several thousand combat support troops from the United States and Europe. Starting in the summer of 2000, National Guard units will lead the next three rotations. The units scheduled to deploy are: 48th Infantry Division of Texas, the 28th Infantry Division of Pennsylvania, and the 29th Infantry of Virginia. The total number of U.S. personnel deployed during in IFOR averaged about 16,500, while the current SFOR contingent in Bosnia is about 4,300. In addition, there are support personnel in Croatia and Hungary. U.S. forces are headquartered in the Tuzla area in eastern Bosnia. British forces are headquartered in central Bosnia at Gornii Vakuf, and French forces in Mostar. Other national contingents are subordinated to these three major commands, all of which serve under NATO LANDCENT commander, who is based in Sarajevo. The full Stabilization Force (SFOR/Operation Joint Forge) numbers about 19,300 troops.

DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for SFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. Six of the eight 6-month long rotations will be commanded by

National Guard Divisions, and all will include National Guard and/or Army Reserve units. National Guard units will come from Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, South Carolina, and Texas. The parent units involved are listed below. Those without state National Guard designations are active duty units. Additional National Guard Brigades will be assigned for the later deployments from April 2003 onward.

04/01-10/01 – 3rd Infantry Division, 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia NG), 39th Infantry Brigade (Arkansas NG)

10/01-04/02 – 29th Infantry Division (Virginia NG), 155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi NG), 49th Armored Division (Texas NG)

04/02-10/02 – 25th Infantry Division, 116th Cavalry Brigade (Idaho NG), 76th Infantry Brigade (Indiana NG), 34th Infantry Division (Minnesota NG)

10/02-04/03 – 28th Infantry (Pennsylvania NG), 218th Infantry Brigade (South Carolina NG)

04/03-10/03 – 35th Infantry Division (Kansas NG)

10/03-04/04 – 34th Infantry Division (Minnesota NG)

04/04-10/04 – 38th Infantry Division (Indiana NG)

10/04-04/05 – 42nd Infantry Division (New York NG)

Table 2 provides a comparative breakout of national ground force contributions to both IFOR and SFOR. All IFOR participants are contributing troops to SFOR. Most have reduced their contingent's size. The largest contributors remain the United States and the United Kingdom. France has reduced its forces by about two-thirds. Germany has reduced its over all contingent by half, but for the first time has deployed forces into Bosnia.

Table 2. Comparative Bosnia-Herzegovina IFOR/SFOR Deployments

	IFOR March 4, 1996	SFOR June 28, 2000
Albania	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Argentina	---	1 paramilitary police company (100)
Australia		1 infantry platoon (50)
Austria	1 transport company	1 transport platoon (50)
Belgium	1 transport company (300)	1 transport company (50)
Bulgaria	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Canada	1 armored reconnaissance squadron 1 engineer battalion (1,000)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (900)
Czech Republic	1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 engineer company	1 mechanized infantry battalion (400)
Denmark	1 mechanized infantry battalion (800)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (300)
Egypt	1 mechanized infantry battalion	---

	IFOR March 4, 1996	SFOR June 28, 2000
Estonia	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Finland	1 engineer battalion	1 engineer company (100)
France	4 mechanized infantry battalions 1 mechanized artillery battalion 1 engineer battalion 1 helicopter squadron 1 reconnaissance squadron (10,000)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (2,400)
Germany	No troops deployed in Bosnia; IFOR support units located in Croatia (4,000)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (2,050)
Greece	1 transport battalion (1,000)	1 transport company (100)
Hungary	1 engineer battalion	1 engineer battalion (200)
Ireland	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Italy	1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 armored company 1 mechanized artillery battery (2,100)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,550)
Latvia	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Lithuania	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Luxembourg	1 transport company	---
Malaysia	1 mechanized infantry battalion	---
Morocco	1 mechanized infantry battalion (650)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (300)
Netherlands	1 mechanized infantry battalion (2,000)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (1,000)
New Zealand	---	1 infantry platoon (50)
Norway	1 logistics battalion	1 logistics battalion (50)
Poland	1 airborne infantry battalion	1 airborne infantry battalion (200)
Portugal	1 airborne battalion (900)	1 infantry battalion (323)
Romania	1 engineer battalion	1 engineer battalion (100)
Russia	2 airborne infantry battalions	1 airborne brigade (1,200)
Spain	2 mechanized infantry battalions	1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,100)

	IFOR March 4, 1996	SFOR June 28, 2000
Sweden	1 mechanized infantry battalion	1 mechanized infantry platoon (50)
Turkey	1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 armored company (1,200)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,050)
Ukraine	1 helicopter company	---
United Kingdom	2 mechanized infantry battalions 1 mechanized armored battalion 1 armored reconnaissance company 1 artillery battalion 1 helicopter battalion 1 signal regiment (13,000)	1 armoured battle group (1,100)
United States	2 mechanized infantry battalions 2 armored battalions 2 reconnaissance battalions 1 airborne battalion 2 mechanized artillery battalions 1 engineer brigade 1 air defense battalion 2 psy- ops companies (16,500)	1 infantry brigade -reinforced (4,300)

Source: Department of Defense

Arms Control and Military Assistance

Believing that the Bosnian Serb advantage in weaponry was a major contributing factor to the initial outbreak of hostilities, the Administration is seeking to establish a relative military parity in the region. Preferably this would be achieved through arms reduction, but the United States also led effort to bolster the Bosnian-Croat Federation through military aid and training, believing arms control efforts to be only a partial solution.

On January 26, 1996, the Muslim, Croat, and Serb factions in Bosnia and the governments of Croatia, and Serbia signed an agreement, negotiated under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), stipulating a wide range of confidence-building measures they will undertake, including: exchanges of military information, restrictions on weapons and troop deployments, notification of troop movements/exercises, and establishment of a verification regime. Confidential data exchanges on military forces have taken place between the factions, and OSCE inspections are on-going.

The Dayton Agreement (Annex 1B, Article IV) also called for the signatories to begin negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to limit weapons, and to begin negotiations on voluntary reductions of military manpower. These negotiations were held between the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia, and Bosnia- Hercegovina, with manpower and equipment allocations

for Bosnia-Herzegovina divided between the Bosnian-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. An agreement was signed on June 11 1996, with weapons reductions to include tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and attack helicopters. The agreement, using the current equipment levels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the “baseline”, assigns the following upper limits on equipment categories: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — 75% baseline; Croatia — 30% baseline; Bosnia-Herzegovina — 30% baseline, to be divided on a 2 to 1 ratio between the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

In funding the military assistance program for the Croat-Bosnian Federation, Congress required presidential certification that all “foreign forces” have left Bosnia in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. In this instance, “foreign forces” referred essentially to the Muslim irregular troops, primarily from Iran, who had assisted the Bosnian Muslim army. Viewed as extremists, these forces have been considered a potential threat to IFOR personnel in general, and U.S. forces particularly. On June 26 1997, President Clinton provided certification that all foreign forces had withdrawn from Bosnia. IFOR officials, however, believe that several hundred Muslim irregulars still remain, having been granted citizenship by the Bosnian Muslim government to avoid the designation “foreign forces”.

With presidential certification regarding “foreign forces” and the July passage of the Bosnian Croatian-Muslim Federation legislation creating a joint ministry of defense, the way was cleared for U.S. military assistance to the federation. The U.S. transfer, valued at about \$100 million, included 46,000 M-16 rifles, 840 light antitank weapons, 1,000 M-60 machine guns, 80 armored personnel carriers, 45 M-60 tanks, 15 utility helicopters, and 6,592 tactical radios/telephones. (Department of Defense, July 7, 1996).

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25

On May 3, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) No. 25. This document was the subject of intense and protracted interagency review. Although PDD 25 is a classified document, the White House has released an unclassified summary. The document provides guidelines for deciding which U.N. peacekeeping operations the United States should support politically and for deciding whether U.S. armed forces should participate. Consequently, it provides insight on the kinds of issues the Administration may be addressing with both Congress and the United Nations regarding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia.

Briefly, PDD 25 sets out seven criteria to aid in determining whether U.S. forces should participate in a peacekeeping operation: 1) participation will advance U.S. interests; (2) risks to U.S. personnel are “acceptable”; (3) personnel and funding are available; (4) U.S. participation is necessary for success; (5) the roles, objectives, and duration of participation for U.S. forces are clear; (6) public and congressional support exists or “can be mustered”; and (7) command and control arrangements are acceptable. If the operation presents the “likelihood” of combat, the PDD calls for this to be reflected in the operational planning along with the commitment of sufficient force and a provision for periodic reevaluation of the operation.

PDD 25 also addresses the issue of executive-congressional relations with regard to peacekeeping operations. In general, it calls for regularized consultation and briefings and an annual written report. It also suggests that the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) be

amended to (1) include a “consultative mechanism” and (2) eliminate the provision requiring withdrawal of U.S. troops within 60 days unless authorized by Congress. Within Congress, however, there appears to be little current interest in opening the War Powers Resolution for amendment. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB81050, *War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance*.)

LEGISLATION

P.L. 106-65, S. 1059

An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Committee on Armed Services ordered to be reported an original measure in lieu of S. 974 (S.Rept. 106-50) May 13, 1999. Passed Senate with amendments by yeay-nay vote of 92-3 (Record Vote No. 154) May 27, 1999. Message on Senate action sent to House June 7, 1999. On June 14, House struck all after the enacting clause and inserted in lieu thereof the provisions of a similar measure, H.R. 1401, which passed without objection. Conference report (H.Rept. 106-301) filed August 6, and agreed to by House September 15, and by Senate September 22. Signed into law (P.L. 106-65) October 5, 1999.

P.L. 106-79, H.R. 2651

A bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes. On July 20, Committee on Appropriations reported an original measure (H.Rept. 106-244). On July 21, passed House (379-45). On July 28, Senate struck all after the enacting clause and substituted the language of S. 1122, amended, which passed by unanimous consent. On October 8, conference report (H.Rept 106-371) filed. On October 13, House agreed to conference report (372-55), and Senate concurred October 14. Signed into law October 25, 1999.

P.L. 106-259, H.R. 4576

An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes. Reported to House on June 6, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-644). Passed the House on June 7, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 241). Passed the Senate on June 13, as amended, 95-3 (Record Vote No. 127). House-Senate Conference report was filed on July 17 (H.Rept. 106-754), and was agreed to by the House on July 19, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 413), and the Senate on July 27th, 91-9 (Record Vote 230). Signed into law August 9, 2000.

P.L. 106-259, H.R. 4576

An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes. Reported to House on June 6, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-644). Passed the House on June 7, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 241). Passed the Senate on June 13, as amended, 95-3 (Record Vote No. 127). House-Senate Conference report was filed on July 17 (H.Rept. 106-754), and was agreed to by the House on July 19, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 413). On July 27, the Senate agreed to the conference report (91-9. Record Vote Number: 230) Signed into law August 9, 2000.

H.R. 4205 (Spence)

An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Introduced April 4, 2000, and referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported from Committee on May 12 (H.Rept. 106-616). Passed the House, as amended, May 18 (353-63; Roll No. 208). Received in the Senate May 22, 2000. On July 13, the Senate struck all after the enacting clause and substituted the language of S. 2549 as amended, and passed H.R. 4205 as amended, 97-3 (Roll Call vote 179). Conference requested on July 17, 2000. Conferees filed H.Rept. 106-945 on October 6. The House agreed to the conference report on October 11 (382 - 31 Roll no. 522), as did the Senate on October 12 (90 - 3. Record Vote Number: 275). Presented to the President on October 19, 2000.

S. 2549 (Warner)

An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Committee on Armed Services reported an original measure (S.Rept. 106-292) May 22, 2000. Considered by the Senate June 7-July 13; incorporated as amended, into H.R. 4205 on July 13.

S. 2593 (Stevens)

An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes. The Committee on Appropriations reported an original measure May 18, 2000 (S.Rept. 106-298). On June 8, the Senate incorporated this measure in H.R. 4576 as an amendment.