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STATE OF  
**WORLD  
CONFLICT**  
REPORT



A Publication of  
*the International Negotiation Network*



Conflict Resolution Program

The Carter Center



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This is the third edition of the *State of the World Conflict Report* in a series that includes editions published for 1991-92 and 1994-95.

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# PREFACE

The 1995-96 *State of World Conflict Report* provides maps, demographics, and statistical information on the 25 locations where 30 major armed conflicts were waged in 1995 and narrative summaries for these conflicts through mid-1996.

These figures represent a decline from 1994-95, when 33 major armed conflicts were waged in 27 locations, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Conflict locations are designated by the internationally recognized borders of a state. In some cases, countries are involved in more than one conflict, which accounts for the larger number of conflicts than conflict locations.

Discussion of world conflicts depends on the manner in which “conflict” is defined. As in the first two editions of the *State of World Conflict Report*, we employ here the definition for a “major armed conflict” used by Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen of SIPRI as follows:

**Major Armed Conflict:** prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict.<sup>1</sup>

All major armed conflicts for 1995 were armed civil or intrastate conflicts, as opposed to those between states. SIPRI notes, however, that “in 1995 there were brief armed conflicts between states, e.g., that between Ecuador and Peru, which did not fulfill the criteria for major armed conflicts.”<sup>2</sup> Other conflicts do not appear because they also fail to meet the above definition. These include armed combat that did not involve government forces, as well as lower-level combat, which would be considered “minor” armed conflict. Efforts were made to detail some of these cases in the narrative summaries for each conflict location or in the feature articles that appear throughout this publication. Many of the summaries and articles were contributed by experts in the field, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect positions held by The Carter Center, its staff, or members of its International Negotiation Network.

For statistical data, efforts were made to supply the most current information available. Those instances where no figures were available are indicated with “na.” In all cases, statistical information is provided for the government of the country listed rather than for opposition or rebel groups, unless otherwise specified. Consequently, figures listed in some statistical categories, such as “Total Deaths,” are frequently lower than the true total. At times, these numbers vary greatly, such as in Sudan, where we employ SIPRI’s total of 37,000 to 40,000 for the entire length of the conflict, while some press reports indicate that more than 1.5 million people have died since 1983.

In the category labeled “The Conflict,” the term “Incompatibility” refers to the notion that the conflicts are contests for control of either government (type of political system, a change of central government, or a change in its composition) or territory (control of territory, secession, or autonomy).<sup>3</sup>

Data on arms flows provided by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database represent “trend-indicator values” for major conventional weapons imports and should be used as an indicator of the volume in numbers and capacity of weapons transfers rather than as real flows of money. Thus, these figures should be used to measure a trend over years or between countries rather than for comparisons of official statistics on imports or exports.<sup>4</sup>

The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) measures the distance a country has to go to attain the UNDP’s 1995 *Human Development Report* goals in life expectancy, educational attainment, and income indicators on a 1.000 scale. The nearer a country’s HDI total is to 1.000, the closer it is to attaining these goals.

The *State of World Conflict Report* strives to be neutral and unbiased in its reporting. In choosing how to list each conflict, we employ the name recognized by the United Nations. It must be noted, however, that while Myanmar is the official name for the state of Burma, we have chosen to list both names in recognition of the dispute between the majority of the population and the ruling military council on the status of that country’s name. Also, we list “Russia(Chechnya)” to denote that the major armed conflict in the country of Russia has been waged in the republic of Chechnya, and data pertaining to this conflict relates specifically to the region rather than the country as a whole. Finally, for the purpose of continuity, we follow SIPRI in listing “Central and South America” on our regional page, yet include information on countries traditionally labeled as “Latin America” or the “Caribbean” when relevant.

<sup>1</sup> Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, “Major Armed Conflicts,” SIPRI Yearbook 1996: *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Project Database, 1996.

# THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION NETWORK

by Harry G. Barnes Jr.

Harry Barnes, former U.S. ambassador to Chile, India, and Romania, is the director of the Conflict Resolution and Human Rights programs at The Carter Center.

The *State of World Conflict Report* is a product of The Carter Center's International Negotiation Network (INN) designed to inform governments, international and nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions, the media, and the general public about the status of the world's major armed struggles in the hope of lending insights toward their peaceful resolution. In this issue, we are pleased to present topical feature articles by INN members Andrew Young, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Brian Urquhart, plus a candid interview on peacemaking with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter.

In 1987, President Carter founded the INN as a flexible, informal network of eminent persons, conflict resolution practitioners, Nobel Peace laureates, and former heads of state dedicated to resolving international conflicts through peaceful means. Since then, the INN has coordinated third-party assistance, provided expert analysis and advice, and convened consultations and international conferences in an effort to resolve conflicts in the Baltics, Ethiopia, Korea, Liberia, Sudan, and other areas.

The 1992 INN conference drew more than 200 guests from 40 countries and 150 organizations to The Carter Center to focus

attention on conflicts in Myanmar/Burma, Cyprus, Angola, Liberia, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and Afghanistan. The following year, 200 representatives from governmental, intergovernmental (IGO), and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations met to examine conflict resolution strategies for the

Caucasus, Macedonia, Kosovo, Zaire, Myanmar/Burma, and Haiti. In 1994, INN members and guests explored the relationship between governments, IGOs, and NGOs in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Myanmar/Burma, Haiti, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Zaire.

Last year, the INN meeting focused on possible roles for itself and others in Iraq, the Korean Peninsula, and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa (particularly Zaire and Burundi). This gathering contributed, in part, to subsequent heads-of-state summits in Cairo and Tunis, which made bold strides

toward lessening the suffering in this devastated region of Africa. During the latter part of 1996, the INN began examining its performance over the past decade with an eye toward improving its effectiveness in the decade to come.

INN members remain actively engaged in various peacemak-



ing efforts, and the 1995-96 edition of the *State of World Conflict Report* highlights some of their recent achievements. In addition to work on major armed conflict locations, members have made other contributions, including:

**Burundi:** where INN member Kumar Rupesinghe helped establish International Alert's presence in early 1995 to support the emergence of bipartisan groups working for peace at the elite and grassroots levels; to strengthen the national debate process; to encourage dialogue between conflicting parties; and to facilitate moderate reform of major institutions. INN members Desmond Tutu and President Carter co-facilitated a heads-of-state summit in Cairo in November 1995, focusing on the crisis in Burundi and Rwanda.

**Cuba:** where President Carter and INN member Robert Pastor have worked for several years to promote dialogue between government officials and various institutions in Cuba and the United States. Last May, Pastor met with President Fidel Castro and other Cuban government officials.

**Estonia:** where INN members Vamik Volkan and Harold Saunders, in collaboration with Joyce Neu, associate director of The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, have established a process of sustained dialogue in Estonia to reduce tension between ethnic Russians and Estonians.

**Greece-Macedonia:** where INN member Cyrus Vance has been chairing the U.N. mediation team in negotiations between Greece and Macedonia in an effort to prevent the renewal of hostilities in the region. Vance convened talks this February as part of the New York Interim Accord signed in September 1995 between Athens and Skopje.

**Haiti:** where President Carter, U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, and INN member Dr. Robert Pastor returned in February 1995 to assess that country's progress five months after they successfully negotiated President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's peaceful return to power. The visit focused on the transfer of authority from U.S.-led troops to U.N. forces and on Haiti's preparations for elections.

**Horn of Africa:** where new INN member Eileen Babbitt and her staff at the U.S. Institute of Peace have been working with USAID and the U.S. State Department on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The project includes conducting training programs in conflict analysis and resolution, with a goal of creating greater food security for the region.

**South Africa:** where INN member Desmond Tutu was appointed by President Nelson Mandela in January to chair the 17-member Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Its mandate includes investigating political crimes committed under apartheid which is pivotal to the success of reconciliation in South Africa.

The continual request by people at war for INN members to help in the search for peaceful, democratic, and mutually beneficial ways of ending these conflicts testifies to the need for their ongoing work. We hope that you will share with us your comments and suggestions about the *State of World Conflict Report*. We believe that through communication, information, and increased knowledge about conflicts, we can all play a role in trying to resolve them.

# MEMBERS OF THE INN

**Jimmy Carter**—former President of the United States; Founder and Chair, The Carter Center

**Oscar Arias Sánchez**—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; former President of Costa Rica; Founder, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress

**Eileen Babbitt\***—Director of Education and Training, United States Institute of Peace

**Tahseen Basheer**—former Egyptian ambassador; former Permanent Representative to the League of Arab States

**Javier Pérez de Cuéllar**—former United Nations Secretary-General

**Hans Dietrich Genscher**—former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

**Tommy Koh**—Professor, former Singapore Ambassador to the United States

**Christopher Mitchell**—Professor, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

**Olusegun Obasanjo**—former President of Nigeria; Founder and Chair, Africa Leadership Forum

**Lisbet Palme**—Director, Swedish Committee for UNICEF

**Robert Pastor**—Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center; Professor of Political Science, Emory University

**Shridath Ramphal**—former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations; Co-Chair, Commission on Global Governance

**Barnett Rubin\***—Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

**Kumar Rupesinghe**—Secretary-General, International Alert

**Harold Saunders**—former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; Director, International Programs, Kettering Foundation

**Marie-Angélique Savané**—Director, Africa Division, U.N. Population Fund

**Desmond Tutu**—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; President, All Africa Conference of Churches

**Brian Urquhart**—former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping; The Ford Foundation

**William Ury**—Associate Director, Program on Negotiation, Harvard University

**Cyrus Vance**—former U.S. Secretary of State; U.N. Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

**Vamik Volkan**—Director, Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction, University of Virginia

**Peter Wallensteen**—Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University


**Elie Wiesel**—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; Professor, Boston University

**Andrew Young**—former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; Co-Chair, Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games

**I. William Zartman\***—Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization & Conflict Resolution, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

## OBASANJO'S PLIGHT

The INN has joined the international community in calling for the release of one of its members, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, from a Nigerian prison. Obasanjo was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment after the military administration of Gen. Sani Abacha accused him of planning an alleged coup. The only former military leader of Nigeria to hand over power to a democratically elected government, Obasanjo has fought for the end of apartheid in South Africa and was instrumental in helping to free President Nelson Mandela from jail. He has participated in peace missions to Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, and other African states. In an April 1996 letter to President Carter, Obasanjo's wife expressed increased concern about her husband's failing health, inhumane treatment, and lack of access to friends and family. We publish this edition of the *State of World Conflict Report* noting that another year has passed with no change in Olusegun Obasanjo's status and encourage all those concerned to press the Nigerian government for his release.



Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, addresses fellow INN members at the annual INN consultation at The Carter Center in April 1994, prior to being arrested in March 1995. (Photograph by Billy Howard)

\* New INN members

# INTRODUCTION

by Andrew Young

Former ambassador Andrew Young is chairman and CEO of Law International Inc. and co-chairman of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG). He was a top aide to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Young left the U.S. Congress in 1977 to serve as the Carter-appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He was mayor of Atlanta from 1981-89.

This year, the world celebrated the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympiad. Consider this vision of a world at peace: The opening ceremonies in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Stadium, where more than 10,000 athletes from 197 countries gathered to demonstrate the highest ideals—teamwork, sportsmanship, and recognition of personal achievement. All invited countries participated, free of the ideological and political restraints that prevented many from attending in years past. For 16 days in July and August the world came together to honor those striving to surmount universal standards of excellence. Our hearts reached out to the hurdler who stumbled just before the finish line, the marathon runner who shook off fatigue, the Paralympian who rose above all expectations. We saw, for a brief moment, the potential all of us have to better ourselves and our world.

In ancient Greece, nations at war set a time during which all conflicts were temporarily halted so athletes and spectators could travel to and from the Games. Centuries later, hope endures that the brief peace achieved in the spirit of competition will extend beyond the walls of the stadium to embrace all peoples in all nations. Count Henri de Baillet Latour, one of the pioneers of the modern Olympic movement, recognized the connection between

the Olympic ideal and the quest for a truly peaceful world community. He spoke the following words to the Organizing Committee of the Games of the XIth Olympiad:

*"May the young athletes of the whole world come, through the Olympiad, to know and recognize its greatness and practical value, and may endeavors germinate to make an end of hate, to eliminate misunderstanding, and to contribute in association with all men of good will to the restoration of harmony among the peoples."*

The restoration of harmony described by Count Latour has been the focus of Olympic Aid, a United Nations-led effort to provide health care and educational tools to children in war-torn countries. Far away from the flag-waving and television cameras, many of those athletes who visited Atlanta returned to countries ravaged by war. Mil-



INN member and ACOG co-chair Andrew Young carries the Olympic torch June 30, 1996, across the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Ala., site of a violent civil rights march 31 years earlier. (Photograph by Rich Mahan)

lions of war-affected and displaced people are engaged, not in athletic competitions, but in a desperate struggle to survive the destruction of intrastate conflict. The 1995-96 *State of World Conflict Report* highlights this disparity between the reality of war and the peaceful ideal of the Olympic dream.

Millions of innocent civilians continue to be killed, raped, maimed, displaced, and traumatized by war. In 1995 alone,

between 30,000 and 60,000 military personnel and civilians were killed. Another 15 million people now live as refugees, forced to flee their homes as a result of armed conflicts. The human costs of these government and opposition war-machines do not end with lives and refugees. UNICEF notes in its 1996 *State of the World's Children Report* that in addition to the 2 million children killed by war in the past decade, entire generations of children in war-affected countries will grow up shell-shocked and demoralized. The horrible effects of war on children is one of the topics covered in this publication.

This past year saw major violence erupt in the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya and in Sierra Leone. The breakdown of a cease-fire in Sri Lanka and an escalation of violence between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population added to the human suffering around the globe. Most disturbing, in all of these and the many other armed conflicts, civilians keep being used as military targets and objects of great human rights abuse. Meanwhile, in Burma, the ruling military council continued to stifle the voices of democracy, including that of Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, who has focused world attention on her country's plight since her release from six years of house arrest.

There is, however, reason for hope. Forty-three months of fighting ended in Bosnia and Herzegovina last year with the negotiation of the Dayton Peace Accords in November, paving the way for reconstruction to begin. In the Middle East, implementation of the 1994 peace agreement between the Israeli government and Palestinians continued despite the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzakh Rabin in November 1995.

Sadly, these steps in the long road toward lasting peace are less visible in Africa. Violence in the Great Lakes region of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire, as well as Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and other countries continues to deplete the continent of many of its rich resources and human capital. Solving the problems of Africa must

involve a recognition of its economic and social potential and the adoption of a decidedly nonpaternalistic view that includes facilitation of regional solutions to crises. Cooperation among regional and international bodies, including nongovernmental organizations, has become a necessity when seeking solutions to the complex and all too frequently tragic conflicts.

As we begin the second 100-year chapter in the Olympic saga, we must embrace its higher ideals and begin taking responsibility



Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (from left) joins then Burundian President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Tunisian President Zine Lel Abedine Ben Ali, Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, and former Malian President Amadou Touré at the March 1996 heads-of-state summit in Tunis, Tunisia, to address the conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa. (Photograph by the Tunisian government)

for the world around us. The time has come to find the shortest and most humane path toward the end of global suffering, poverty, malnutrition, maiming, trauma, and the hopelessness caused by war and human rights abuse. I hope the information contained in these pages provides some insight into the costs of conflict and the avenues for peace available to all of us, if we choose to follow them.

# UNITED NATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS

by Brian Urquhart

Sir Brian Urquhart has been a scholar-in-residence in the International Affairs Program at The Ford Foundation since 1986. Prior to this he served in the United Nations Secretariat as under-secretary general for special political affairs and was one of the principal political advisors to the secretary-general.

The 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995 was not only a disillusioning but an alarming affair. Behind routine celebratory speeches by heads of state there was little substance and even less enthusiasm. The basic questions about international organization that need to be answered if the world organization is to be reformed virtually were ignored. Very little real interest was manifested in redefining, renewing, and empowering the United Nations. Instead, the talk was about cutting back and reducing.

Fifty years without a world war seems to have bred, in some influential quarters at least, a contagious anti-internationalism with strong ostrich-like and flat-earth overtones. This fashion finds a perfect target in the United Nations. In five years we have gone from President Bush's New World Order of "dynamic multilateralism" and the U.N. "renaissance" to an extraordinary loss of confidence in, and respect for, the United Nations.

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In those five years its member states have loaded the organization down with the debris of the Cold War, and much else besides, without providing the resources, the authority, or the staying power to deal properly with such immense and complex problems. The use of the United Nations as a fig leaf

and a scapegoat has led to a fashion for turning away from it as a peacekeeper in favor of as-yet-undesignated "coalitions of the willing," rather than building, in the world organization, the new changes and the infrastructure needed to tackle contemporary outbursts of violence.

Five years ago the trend was strikingly different. Because virtually no one had anticipated the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, very little thought had been given to the realities of a post-Cold War world. The initial euphoria spawned a number of unrealistic beliefs, including the conviction that the United Nations would begin to function as originally intended. A number of events supported this belief. The organization presided over the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the independence of Namibia. It took over, with considerable success, the pacification of Cambodia, El Salvador, and other Cold War proxy-battle sites such as Mozambique. The U.N. Security Council mobilized the world against Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and authorized the U.S.-led Desert Storm. Apartheid in South Africa, long a target of the United Nations, miraculously came to an end, and majority rule emerged under a U.N.-monitored election.

## U.N.'s Expanding Responsibilities

These and other successes led to an extraordinary expansion of U.N. responsibilities and operations—operations that were increasingly over-mandated and under-resourced. During this enthusiastic interlude, governments were slow to realize that the primary task of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security had changed fundamentally in nature and direction. Dealing with international

conflicts had given way almost completely to trying to control intrastate conflicts and humanitarian disasters.

Before the implications of these changes had become clear, the United Nations was committed in Bosnia, Somalia,



This Kenyan soldier is one of thousands provided by U.N.-member nations to peacekeeping operations around the world. The scope and objectives of these operations have often come under fire. (Photograph by the United Nations)

Rwanda, Haiti, and several other places in situations with which it could not possibly deal effectively, either with its well-tried peacekeeping techniques, or within the limitations imposed by its member states in matters both of jurisdiction and financing. Although the media and the public seem to

expect the United Nations to act as the public sector of a supportive world community, it is, in fact, still very much a restricted intergovernmental institution with minimal authority, resources, or infrastructure.

The result has been a disillusionment and a downgrading of the United Nations as exaggerated and foolish as the euphoria of the post-Cold War period. Although only four of the 17 operations launched since 1990 have had serious setbacks, the organization's stock has never been lower, and it is now frequently ignored altogether in vital matters of peace and security.

The main emphasis at U.N. headquarters is on downsizing and cost-cutting, masquerading as "reform," and dealing with a "financial crisis" which is, in fact, an ideological and political crisis, especially as far as the United States is concerned.

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In many parts of the world, there is now a strong antipathy to, and distrust of, governments, multilateralism, and international institutions. The United Nations is a prime target for such thinking, especially in Washington. There is no doubt that the United Nations, in its 52nd year, needs radical restructuring, streamlining, and reorienting. It needs to be realigned with the realities of half a century of technological, political, and social revolution. Its member states, however, show little sign of undertaking this effort, preferring the easier course of denouncing the organization's administration and its alleged wastefulness and bureaucratic speed.

## Fundamental Questions

The questions to be faced are relatively simple, but fundamental. Is the United Nations supposed to be an international system for maintaining peace, security, human rights, and human welfare? Or is it simply a dumping ground for problems that governments either cannot, or will not, take on themselves? Is the United Nations predominantly a moral and legal organization, the guardian and executor of its charter principles, and of the norms, conventions, and treaties it

has sponsored? Or is it primarily a political organization—a screen, safety net, and fig leaf—through which its members can save face and disentangle themselves from impossible situations, often without much regard for principle or treaty obligation? Is it to be guided by law or by the caprices of its major powers? Is it a purely intergovernmental organization, or should civil society and the private sector play an increasing role in its proceedings?

These are only a few of the questions that should provide the magnetic pull for a process of genuine reform. Unfortunately, in the present parochial and neo-isolationist climate, governments seem to have little or no inclination to discuss them. Thus, the endlessly invoked need for reform is an arid, limited process dictated more by political and ideological forces than by the desire to make a vital investment in the future. The concept of the world organization was Franklin Roosevelt's great legacy. It is going through cold and stormy times in a period where governments apparently feel less threatened by world disaster than at any time since 1945.

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An Afghani man and boy support each other as they learn to walk with artificial limbs in a Red Cross hospital in Kabul. UNICEF and other agencies provide medical and food aid for these and other victims of war. (Photograph by UNICEF/5526/John Isaac)

An isolationist mood prevails in addition to a singular lack of sense either of history or of the possibilities, both good and bad, of the future. This is, I believe, a dangerous, and quite possibly disastrous, tendency. A new generation of international leadership, both realistic and visionary, is desperately needed.

# PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY: LESSONS LEARNED

by Kumar Rupesinghe

Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe is secretary-general of International Alert, an international NGO established in 1985 that seeks to contribute to the resolution of internal conflict by promoting peace and conciliation through dialogue. Earlier, he served as deputy director and director of the Program on Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Dr. Rupesinghe has written and edited numerous books and articles in the fields of development and conflict.

In 1992, in the wake of the Gulf War, and just three years after the demise of the Soviet empire, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published *An Agenda for Peace*, a framework for the United Nations' role in future international security matters. With the East-West standoff at an end, Boutros-Ghali wrote that the United Nations had emerged as the "central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace."<sup>1</sup> His vision of a new international security system was founded on the principles of preventive diplomacy, defined as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."<sup>2</sup>

If the Gulf War had created

an impression of world powers willing to set aside their differences and fight against a perceived common enemy, then the ineptitude over Bosnia was a sharp reminder of the realities of world politics. By 1995, and the aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda, the reluctance of member states to commit personnel and resources to mil-

itary operations under the auspices of the United Nations had become evident. In *A Supplement to Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that the United Nations had neither the power, nor the means to tackle these crises. Peace enforcement has tended to overshadow many other methods of preventive diplomacy, such as mediation, negotiations, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

It was also clear that the threat of nuclear war to global security had been replaced by a more realistic threat of intrastate conflicts. Conflicts rooted in disputes over resources, identity, and power, often left suppressed and unresolved, gradually were emerging and sometimes exploding onto the world stage. In reality, though, the U.N. organization was not at fault. The end of the Cold War caught the international community off guard—on the one hand assess-

ing the benefits of the changes, while on the other unable to predict the effects. There was no comprehensive framework through which *internal* conflicts could be resolved.

The concept of preventive diplomacy had, in the meantime, come into vogue throughout the international community. Among inter-



Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and First Lady Rosalynn Carter attend a memorial service in November 1995 at a genocide site in Rwanda. (Photograph by The Carter Center)



INN member Desmond Tutu (center), President of the All Africa Conference of Churches, joins David Kpomakper of the Liberian National Transitional Government in July 1994 to urge prevention of future conflict in Liberia. (Photograph by Richard Joseph)

governmental bodies such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the principles of conflict prevention and early warning were welcomed not only as means aimed at preventing violence but as methods that would prove to be more cost-effective than military measures. Yet, a study published in February 1996<sup>3</sup> reveals the lack of commitment and concrete application of these principles by a range of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In effect, the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention are barely distinguishable and are often interchanged.

### The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

I would like to suggest here that conflict prevention and conflict resolution must now be explored through a broader range of nonmilitary and nonstate systems. Already nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, and The Carter Center are active in developmental, humanitarian, and human rights issues. As “unofficial organizations,” they

have the advantage of building trust and confidence between two sides and using their resources to work toward negotiation. With no strategic or political motivations, NGOs have greater flexibility than IGOs in responding to the needs of people. It is therefore time to draw on the experience and potential of these agencies to contribute to peacebuilding for the future.

Official diplomatic maneuvers are often circumscribed by political interests, a lack of trust concerning the intentions of the mediator, short-term domestic considerations, and an unwillingness to address the depth and complexity of social and economic problems that are caused by internal conflicts. Second-track approaches, such as the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East, stand a greater chance of success if they are intended to complement official negotiations but cannot focus on all areas of concern that have affected the causes and duration of the conflict. Nongovernmental or unofficial diplomacy may be effective in creating dialogue but does not have the necessary resources or political leverage to bring about change. Yet the combined force of these approaches can address the fundamental issues and still bring the necessary political momentum.

However, the extended involvement of the nongovernmental sector should not undermine the importance of the moral authority of the United Nations as a global organization and its wide technical capacity and expertise. The problems the world faces today require solutions that the United Nations cannot meet alone. The United Nations can often provide the strategic framework for preventive diplomacy. At the very least, a better form of partnership is needed at every level between U.N. bodies, governments, NGOs, and regional citizen-based organizations. Drug trafficking and international terrorism demonstrate the willingness of governments in every part of the world to collaborate with each other in preventive action. The need is for this cohesion to move onto additional areas of concern.

### Multi-Track Diplomacy

Multi-track diplomacy,<sup>4</sup> defined as the application of peace-making from different vantage points within a multicentered network, reflects the different levels and variety of factors which need to be addressed. The involvement of multiple actors at every level of a conflict is intended first to bring greater accountability and adherence to human rights and humanitarian law by all sides, and second to ensure that all those affected by and involved in a conflict are given the opportunity to voice their concerns. In Mozambique, for example, the involvement of the Italian government, the Vatican, the community of Sant' Egidio, local churches, the British-based company Lonrho, the United Nations, and the American government ensured that simultaneous and complementary negotiating streams took place.

The strategic aim in the coming years must be to create an umbrella of concern that involves the participation of the whole international community. By this I mean that through multiple and complementary action it is possible to generate international political will to resolve such conflicts. Just as interstate diplomacy alone cannot successfully address deep socioeconomic issues, neither can NGOs alone generate international political action. The combination of the two forces, however, can bear fruit. In addition, working at a variety of levels ensures that if negotiations fail at one level, it does not necessarily result in

a failure of the entire peace process. Whenever there is this umbrella of concern, the greater the likelihood exists of reducing tension and resolving differences. In essence, it is the notion of burden-sharing and strategic alliances that has already proven successful in the campaign against landmines, torture, and environmental destruction. Preventive diplomacy is a means of drawing upon the entire potential of civil societies around the world to transform the handling of "conflict systems" from a reactive one to a preventive one.

### Conclusion

It is ironic that throughout the Cold War, the United States, the USSR, and regional powers overtly and covertly intervened in the internal affairs of other states and referred to their actions as "helping democracy" or "bringing freedom." Now, however, when assistance and concern are needed to bring freedom and peace, U.N. member states declare "their deepest concerns" but are unwilling to intervene.

It is not argued that prevention of further violence or the resolution of an ongoing conflict be attempted for purely altruistic reasons. Sociopolitical stability offers opportunities for economic growth and investment, whereas continued insecurity leads to refugee flows and the destabilization of entire regions. Nor is it argued that conflict prevention as discussed above is a quick solution to the world's problems; rather it is a long-term approach requiring long-term financial, technical, and personnel support. The signing of a peace agreement does not bring peace. Peace in internal conflict can only come through a process that involves the very people who were at war with each other. It is they who need to reconcile their differences and reconstruct their lives. Military peace enforcement is a particular tool, not a panacea.

<sup>1</sup> B. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 7.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>3</sup> J.G. Sicama, ed., *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organizations* (Clingdael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> L. Diamond and J. McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy* (West Hartford, Conn. Kumarian Press, 1993), 1. This term is also defined as "the web of interconnected parts (activities, individuals, institutions, communities) that operate together...for a common goal; a world at peace."

# MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS

Countries in red depict the 25 locations where 30 major armed conflicts occurred in 1995. These figures represent a decrease from 1994, when 33 major armed conflicts were waged in 27 locations. Major armed conflicts listed in 1994 in Rwanda, the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Georgia, and Azerbaijan were removed from the list for 1995, while conflicts in Russia (Chechnya) and Sierra Leone were added.


Battle-Related Deaths in 1995	
Conflict Location	Estimated Number Killed
Russia (Chechnya)	10,000-40,000
Sri Lanka	5,000+
Turkey	4,000+
Algeria	3,000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	800-2,000
Afghanistan	1,000+
Angola	500-1,500
Colombia	1,000+
Sudan	1,000
Croatia	500-1,000
India	500+
Myanmar/Burma	500+
Sierra Leone	500+
Tajikistan	500+
Somalia	200-500
Peru	500-
Israel	250
Guatemala	200-
Philippines	100-
Indonesia	50-
Bangladesh	25-
Cambodia	•
Iran	•
Iraq	•
Liberia	•

+ greater than

- less than


• no reliable figures were given in the sources consulted

Source: "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," Appendix 1A, SIPRI Yearbook 1996. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24-30.



**Peters Projection:** Throughout the *State of the World Conflict Report*, we use the Peters Projection (below), which shows countries in actual proportion to their relative size. Based on the work of the German historian Arno Peters, this map provides a helpful corrective to the distortions of traditional maps, such as the Mercator Projection, which presents the world to the advantage of European and colonial powers. Countries of the Northern Hemisphere tradition-

ally are shown to be one-third larger than those of the South, yet the North is actually half the size of the South. By dividing the surface of the world into 100 longitudinal fields of equal width and 100 latitudinal fields of equal height, the Peters Projection displays the accurate relative sizes of land masses and provides us with a more realistic world view. It should be noted that no single projection is universally accepted as precisely depicting features of the earth.



# PREVIOUS MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS

Five of the 33 major armed conflicts detailed in the 1994-95 *State of World Conflict Report* no longer met the definition in 1995-96. Cease-fire agreements led to suspension of hostilities in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces), Georgia, Rwanda, and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). These and other developments were responsible for an overall decline in major armed conflicts to a post-Cold War low of 30 and the omission of these conflict locations from the 1995-96 *State of World Conflict Report*.

It should be noted, however, that renewed hostilities broke out in the United Kingdom in 1996, and remained a possibility in the other four countries, where all had failed to reach peace agreements. The mid-1996 status of the five conflicts are examined below:

**Azerbaijan:** Fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, where 90 percent of the population is Armenian, ended after the warring parties signed a May 1994 cease-fire. More than 7,000 individuals perished in the struggle before talks facilitated by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) succeeded in curtailing the conflict. That cease-fire remained in effect despite stalled mediation efforts of the OSCE and Russia.


**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** U.S.-led negotiations resulted in a February 1994 cease-fire between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces. The "Washington Agreement," signed one month later, established a federation between the two groups. Although implementation of the federal accord proved difficult and relations between Bosnian and Croat leaders remained strained, the agreement succeeded in ending one of the many conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

**Georgia:** A cease-fire signed in May 1994 led to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces and a U.N. observer mission (UNOMIG), bringing an end to fighting between Georgian government troops and separatist forces in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. More than 3,000 people died, and up to 300,000 individuals fled the northwest region during a single year of fighting. While the 3,000 Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) succeeded in preventing further military action, little progress was made with regard to the repatriation of refugees.



**Rwanda:** The wave of genocide that struck Rwanda in mid-1994, leaving between 500,000 and 1 million people dead, ended in July of that year when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized control of most of the country. More than 2 million Hutus fled to neighboring Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi, fearing vengeance from the new government. Prospects for a permanent peace seemed fragile, however, as the previous government and its troops responsible for the genocide escaped the country along with the many civilian refugees.


**United Kingdom:** In September 1994, British authorities and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) agreed to a cease-fire in the conflict over control of Northern Ireland. The fighting, which began in 1969, left more than 3,000 people dead. Renewed IRA bombings in Great Britain, including London bombings in February and June 1996, shattered the cease-fire and threatened to derail the overall peace process between the British government and republican separatists.



CONFFLICT REGION:

# AFRICA

ALGERIA  
ANGOLA  
LIBERIA  
SIERRA LEONE  
SOMALIA  
SUDAN



**A**fica has seen a steady decline in major armed conflicts—from 10 in 1991 to seven in each of the years between 1992-94 to six in 1995. Nevertheless, as of mid-1996, some of the world's most volatile areas included Algeria, Somalia, and southern Sudan. Major armed conflicts abated for a time in Liberia and Rwanda, yet these countries, as well as Burundi, Nigeria, and several others, remained potential flash points for future strife. On a positive note, the U.S. Committee

for Refugees cited a decrease in total refugees for all African countries over the past year, although 30 nations still produced or hosted large numbers of displaced people. While Africa received 35 percent of the world's total development assistance last year, debt for the continent remained 1.15 times that of its gross domestic product. UNICEF reported that life expectancy in Africa was again the lowest in the world, yet under-5 mortality rates continued to decline as they have since 1960.

“THE TIME FOR THE  
HEALING OF THE  
WOUNDS HAS COME.  
THE MOMENT TO  
BRIDGE THE CHASMS  
THAT DIVIDE US HAS  
COME. THE TIME TO  
BUILD IS UPON US.”



Nobel laureate Nelson Mandela at his inauguration as president of the Democratic Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, May 10, 1994

Human Development Indicators			
Country	% access to safe water (1990-95)	Total adult literacy rate (% in 1990)	Population growth rate (1980-94)
Algeria	79	55	2.7
Angola	32	42	3.0
Liberia	46	34	3.2
Sierra Leone	34	27	2.2
Somalia	37*	24	2.2
Sudan	60	40	2.7
<b>Africa Conflict Countries Average</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>37.0</b>	<b>2.67**</b>
<b>Overall Africa Average</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>48.8</b>	<b>2.87</b>


\* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

\*\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-89.

Arms Flows						
Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Algeria	384	561	38	20	175	166
Angola	748	0	0	57	57	1
Liberia	4	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	1	7
Somalia	10	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	6	21	0	0	0	3

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.



\* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Source: © Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1996, *Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Report 1995*, A54-56. Reproduced by permission of the OECD.

### Under-5 Mortality Rates

African countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

Rank	Country	Rate
1	Niger	320
2	Angola	292
3	Sierra Leone	284
4	Mozambique	277
6	Guinea-Bissau	231
7	Guinea	223
8	Malawi	221
9	Liberia	217
10	Mali	214
11	Gambia	213
12	Somalia	211
13	Zambia	203
14	Chad	202
15	Eritrea	200
16	Ethiopia	200
17	Mauritania	199
19	Nigeria	191
20	Zaire	186
38	Sudan	122
61	Algeria	65

### Conflict Countries

Average	198.5*
Africa Average	156.9
Sub-Saharan Africa Average	171.0
Northern Africa Average	76.6

\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-81.

# ALGERIA

BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 919,595 sq. mi.  
(2,381,741 sq. km.)

Population: 27,965,000

System of Government:  
Provisional Military

Languages:  
Arabic  
Berber dialects  
French

Ethnic Divisions:  
Arab-Berber 99%  
Other 1%

Religions:  
Sunni Muslim 99%  
Christian &  
Jewish 1%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*  
© 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L.  
96-S-107, 71.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$48.3 billion

GDP per capita:\*

U.S. \$6,000

External debt:\*

U.S. \$29.5 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.732

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance*  
1995-96 (London: by Permission of  
Oxford University Press, 1995),  
128; UNDP, *Human Development Report* 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

Civil war has raged across Algeria since the cancellation of Algeria's first multiparty general elections at the beginning of 1992, although outbreaks of violence occurred throughout the 1980s and during preparations for elections in 1991. Current totals of fatalities are usually given at 40,000-50,000, although figures as high as 60,000 are credible. The Islamic Protest movement rose to a peak level of popularity in the local elections of 1990 because of popular dissatisfaction with the regime and an absence of other channels to express political protest.

The current near-civil war broke out when the military took over to prevent an electoral shift from the ruling secular single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), to a religious single party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The present government banned the FIS, arrested its leaders, and declared a state of emergency, leaving the Islamic movement in the hands of its militant wing. Since then, Islamic terrorist groups, including the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) associated with the FIS, the more radical Islamic Armed Group (GIA), and a scattering of personal bandit bands, have waged a violent campaign to overthrow the government.

The military has responded with counter-terror, regaining the upper hand after 1995, particularly in many rural areas, but still unable to reduce terrorist attacks in the cities and in the countryside around the capital. Rigid government control of the media and terrorist attacks against journalists prevent accurate information, despite the heroism of many Algerian journalists (see article opposite page).

In an effort to bring the violence under control and to create a political middle between the warring extremes, eight parties and other organizations, including the FLN and the FIS, met in Rome under



the aegis of the Sant Egidio community in September 1994 and January 1995, and issued a platform rejecting violence and calling for the replacement of the government by a sovereign national conference and national elections. The government rejected this proposal and instead seized the initiative, holding presidential elections in November 1995. The elections were free and fair, relatively uninterrupted by violence, and marked a revolutionary event in the process of democratization—the first time ever that the Arab world has seen a competitive multi-candidate election for the presidency.

*The elections were free and fair, relatively uninterrupted by violence, and marked a revolutionary event in the process of democratization—the first time ever that the Arab world has seen a competitive multi-candidate election for the presidency.*

Turnout was about 75 percent of the electorate, significantly higher than that of 1990 and 1991, and the incumbent, former Gen. Liamine Zeroual, was elected by 62 percent of the vote, slightly less than

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1954

FLN forms, initiates war of independence against colonizer France

1962

One million die before France grants independence; Ben Bella forms first government

1965

Col. Boumediene deposes Ben Bella, sets up military government

the total vote at the beginning of the decade. The second candidate was Cheikh Nahnah of the Hamas Party, who received 25 percent of the vote, about the same as the FIS' vote in the earlier elections.

Unfortunately, the government has tended to take this vote as a sign of victory in the civil war rather than a basis for reconciliation among the parties. It has once again called for dialogue and plans new general elections in early 1996, but its range of contacts has been limited, although economic reforms are finally in place.

*Dr. I. William Zartman, a member of the INN, is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Algeria vs. FIS* vs. GIA	150,000 na na
Deaths in 1995: greater than 3,000		
Total Deaths: 25,000-45,000		

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut, "Jibat al-Inqath" (Islamic Salvation Front)

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)

\*The Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut, AIS) is considered to be the armed wing of the FIS. There are also several other armed Islamic groups under the FIS military command.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 28.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 67

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	92
DPT	72
polio	72
measles	65

% population with access to health services: 98

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## ALGERIA DEADLY SPOT FOR JOURNALISTS

NEW YORK, Jan. 25 (Reuters)—For the second consecutive year, Algeria remains the most dangerous place in the world for journalists, a press freedom group said Thursday.

The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists said that 24 of the 51 journalists killed last year died in Algeria. Russia came in a distant second with seven deaths, Brazil third with four and Colombia fourth with three.

"Algeria continues to be by far the most dangerous country for journalists. The campaign of terror against local reporters constitutes the single most serious threat against journalists anywhere in the world and it should be vigorously condemned by everyone who values press freedom," said Kati Marton, the committee's chairwoman.

Since May 1993, when Islamic rebels began targeting local reporters and editors, 52 journalists have been assassinated in Algeria—the largest number the committee has recorded in any country in the last 10 years.

"Six confirmed deaths—one each in Azerbaijan, Burundi, Croatia and Somalia and two in Chechnya—were combat casualties. The other 45 cases, including the 24 in Algeria, all appear to have been homicides," the committee said.

Mohamed Medati, a 39-year-old journalist working for the government-controlled newspaper El Moudjahid was shot dead by gunmen, thought to be Muslim militants, near his home in Algiers on Jan. 9 this year.

The editor of the French-language newspaper L'Indépendant Guitoun Noureddine was seriously wounded in a militant attack outside the daily office in central Algiers five days later.

Khaled Aboulkacem, aged 30 and working as a researcher at L'Indépendant, was killed in the same attack blamed by the authorities on Muslim fundamentalist gunmen.

Reuters, Jan. 25, 1996

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 1,249

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 44

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:	Russia/USSR	143
	Egypt	19
	France	4

1990-95:	Russia/USSR	143
	China	112
	Egypt	80

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 265. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1976

Referendum frames constitution based on socialism and Islamic law

1989

New constitution allows for multiparty elections

1990

FIS wins first local elections, threatens FLN power-hold

1992

Military regime seizes power, cancels elections, dissolves FIS; mass unrest ensues

# ANGOLA

BY LIZ MCCLINTOCK

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 481,354 sq. mi.  
(1,246,700 sq. km.)

Population: 10,690,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Portuguese  
Indigenous

Ethnic Divisions:  
Ovimbundu 37%  
Mbundu 25%  
Kongo 13%  
Mulatto 2%  
European 1%  
Other 22%

Religions:  
Animist 47%  
Roman Catholic 38%  
Protestant 15%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 73.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$ 5.9 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$1,000

External debt:\*  
U.S. \$10.9 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.291

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 234; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Since a U.N.-brokered cease-fire agreement in November 1994, Angola's two warring parties—the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—have attempted to bring peace to a country torn apart by 35 years of continuous fighting. Implementation of the Nov. 20, 1994, Lusaka Protocol has been a slow and uneven process, producing an environment of neither war nor peace in this southern African nation.

The peace process is currently overseen by the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world. Headed by U.N. Special Representative (UNSR) Alioune Blondin Maitre Beye, the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was established on Feb. 9, 1995, and consists of 6,500 U.N. soldiers and 500 military observers. Beye is also responsible for chairing the Joint Commission, which is the forum in which all issues concerning the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol are addressed. Although optimism about the peace process is growing in the Angolan capital of Luanda, many obstacles remain.

*Although optimism about the peace process is growing in the Angolan capital of Luanda, many obstacles remain.*

Limits on civilian freedom of movement, both physical and political, hinder the peace efforts at the grassroots level. Angola remains one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, and, in the provinces, MPLA and UNITA forces still tightly control the interaction of civilians under their authority. The human rights records of both MPLA and UNITA



forces are dismal, and despite the presence of a U.N. human rights mission, very little has been done to curb abuses. Sporadic fighting continues in the diamond-rich provinces of Lunda-Sul and Lunda-Norte, as UNITA, government troops, and diamond companies fight to control these resources. In the northernmost enclave of Cabinda, where 60 percent of Angola's oil is produced, the government faces a secessionist movement led by three armed factions of the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC). Finally, Angola remains heavily dependent on humanitarian aid from the international community, and efforts to control rampant inflation (3,000 percent per year) have met with little success.

While conditions in Angola remain tense, progress has been made in the peace process on several fronts. As of June 1996, 10 of the 15 proposed quartering sites were operational, and UNITA has nearly finished quartering 50,000 of its soldiers, honoring a UNITA pledge made to UNSR Beye in May 1996. (The quartering

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1951

Angola becomes full overseas province of Portugal

1961

War of independence from Portugal begins

1975

Angola gains independence; civil war erupts

sites serve as the temporary homes for UNITA soldiers and their families who are being demobilized in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.) In addition, 15 UNITA officers have taken their positions in the newly created Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) as the UNITA military force is dismantled. The demobilization of the quartered soldiers was scheduled to begin in August 1996, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will take responsibility for preparing soldiers to reintegrate into civilian life.

Angola continues to face many challenges as it begins its transition from war to peace. However, the strengthening of Angola's nascent indigenous NGO community and the resumption of trade across former battle lines are hopeful signs that Angola will overcome the horrors of 35 years of conflict and create a better future for its children.

*Liz McClintock is a consultant with the Conflict Management Group (CMG) in Boston, Mass., and has recently returned from Angola, where CMG is training leaders at all levels of Angolan society in negotiation, facilitation, and conflict management skills.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Angola vs. UNITA	100,000 60,000
Deaths in 1995: 500-1,500		
Total Deaths: greater than 40,000 (military) greater than 100,000 (civilian)*		

UNITA: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

\*An estimated 1.5 million war-related deaths (military and civilian) from 1975, of which approximately 50 percent since the war restarted in October 1992.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26.

**1976**

MPLA takes over government, banishes UNITA to countryside

**1988**

U.S. and USSR mediate preliminary settlement between MPLA and UNITA


**1991**

Parties sign peace accords; cease-fire begins

**1992**

UNITA defeated in first multiparty elections, fighting resumes

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 46

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	48
DPT	27
polio	28
measles	44

% population with access to health services: 30\*

\* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 501



"AS A RESULT OF UNCONTROLLED MINELAYING, THERE ARE CURRENTLY 25,000 AMPUTEES IN CAMBODIA, 20,000 IN ANGOLA AND UP TO 30,000 IN AFGHANISTAN."

*Populations in Danger 1995*, A Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) Report, 1995

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 46

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995: Poland 1

1990-95: Russia/USSR 800  
Bulgaria 21  
Poland 17

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

"IT IS ESTIMATED THAT, IN THE PERIOD OF CONFLICT FROM 1980 TO 1988, ANGOLA LOST 330,000 CHILDREN AND MOZAMBIQUE 490,000 TO WAR-RELATED CAUSES."

UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *Arms Trade Database*, 1996.

# LIBERIA

BY JOSH LINCOLN

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 38,250 sq. mi.  
(99,067 sq. km.)

Population: 2,771,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
English  
Indigenous

Ethnic Divisions:  
Indigenous African 95%  
Descendants of freed American slaves 5%

Religions:  
Animist 70%  
Muslim 20%  
Christian 10%

Source: From World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 142.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)\*  
U.S. \$1.4 billion

GDP per capita:\*

U.S. \$1,000

External debt:\*

U.S. \$1.9 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.325

\*1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, Military Balance 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 247; UNDP, Human Development Report 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Thirteen peace agreements and more than six years after faction leader Charles Taylor's armed insurrection against President Samuel K. Doe's government, Liberia is no closer to peace. Of a pre-war population of 2.5 million, the country's human toll now stands at an estimated 150,000 deaths, one million internally displaced civilians, and an additional 750,000 refugees in neighboring states. In addition, the conflict, which is fundamentally a contest for power and control with ethnic undertones, has given rise to some of the worst looting, banditry, rape, torture, and mass killings on the African continent.

The outlook remains grim: over the past year, the hopeful expectations generated by the Abuja Agreement of August 1995—brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—were dashed by the resumption of factional fighting in the capital of Monrovia in April 1996. While the redeployment of the ECOWAS peacekeeping forces (ECOMOG) in Monrovia has since returned some peace and security to the city's streets, factional fighting continues in the west and southeast of the country. Finally, regional governments, NGOs, and the international community as a whole are increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress.

Fighting continued throughout the first half of 1995 between various factions in the southeast (Sinoe and Rivercess counties) and in the west (Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties), with repeated civilian massacres. The populations of Monrovia and the port city of Buchanan swelled to more than four times their pre-war levels, and several tens of thousands of additional refugees fled to neighboring Guinea and the Côte d'Ivoire. The malnutrition rate for children rose to 42 percent



in some areas, and an outbreak of cholera claimed up to 500 lives.

The peace process faltered in early 1995 over the composition and membership of a transitional Council of State, an executive body composed of the major faction leaders. However, a series of meetings paved the way for the Aug. 19, 1995, Abuja Agreement. Abuja created a compromise sixth seat on the Council of State, which began work in September. The agreement also called on ECOMOG to deploy into faction areas and, in cooperation with an expanded U.N. observer force (UNOMIL), to disarm the factions.

A lack of funding for ECOMOG delayed both deployment and disarmament and laid the ground for the fighting that finally broke out on April 6, 1996, when troops from Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Al-Haji Kromah's United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO-K) tried to arrest ethnic Krahn faction leader Roosevelt Johnson in Monrovia. ECOMOG peacekeepers redeployed in Monrovia after seven

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1944

William Tubman elected president;  
Americo-Liberian rule consolidated

1971

President Tubman dies, succeeded  
by William Tolbert

1980

Master-Sgt. Samuel Doe assumes  
power in bloody coup

weeks of fighting, returning the city but not the countryside to relative stability.

Since the April wave of plundering, relief agencies and other NGOs have grown wary about returning to Liberia. On the diplomatic front, Ghana, the current ECOWAS chair, has continued its mediating role to improve the immediate security situation and try and restart the peace-process. Regional leaders, NGOs, and others in the international community are coming to the consensus that elections for a transitional government based on proportional representation may be the only available path to reconstruction.

*Josh Lincoln is a Ph.D. candidate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and was a summer 1996 intern in The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, where he worked on the Liberia Project.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Liberia, ECOMOG vs. NPFL*	7,000 10,000
Deaths in 1995: na**		
Total Deaths: 1989-92: 20,000***		

ECOMOG: the ECOWAS (Economic Organization of West African States) Monitoring Group


NPFL: National Patriotic Front for Liberia

\*In August 1995, seven armed factions in Liberia (including the NPFL) signed a peace agreement, and their leaders formed a transitional Council of State. Elections were scheduled for August 1996.

\*\*No figures for battle-related deaths are available. War-related deaths (military and civilian) are estimated at 10,000-15,000 in 1995. Total war-related deaths are estimated at 150,000.

\*\*\*Note: this figure includes the fighting in 1990-91 (incurring 15,000 deaths) in which more than the two parties listed above participated.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.



## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 55

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	84
DPT	43
polio	45
measles	44

% population with access to health services: 39

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 34

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 19

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:  
Imports not listed from 1991-95

1990-95:  
United Arab Emirates Zambia 2 2

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 268. SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

1989

Charles Taylor and NPFL invade from Côte D'Ivoire, topple Doe regime

1990

ECOMOG peacekeepers establish presence; Doe killed

1993

Cotonou Accord brings temporary cessation of hostilities

1995

Abuja Accord establishes transitional council of state; factional fighting erupts again

# SIERRA LEONE

BY JOHN LANGLOIS

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 27,925 sq. mi.  
(72,325 sq. km.)

Population: 4,690,000

System of Government:  
Transitional Military

Languages:  
English  
Krio  
Mende  
Temne  
Indigenous

Ethnic Divisions:  
Temne 30%  
Mende 30%  
Other 40%

Religions:  
Muslim 30%  
Animist 30%  
Christian 10%  
Other 30%

Source: From World Facts and Maps,  
Concise International Review © 1996  
by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107,  
183.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$809 million

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$750

External debt:\*

U.S. \$1.51 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.221

\*1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 247. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Five years of civil conflict came to an apparent end with the presidential run-off election victory of Ahmad Tejan Kaba on March 15, 1996. The election became possible when Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who had waged war against Sierra Leone government forces since early 1991, agreed to a cease-fire and an election. Sankoh did not run in the election but has begun to participate in negotiations with Kaba's government, establishing working groups to negotiate frameworks for a global peace accord, disarmament and demobilization, and the reintegration of government and RUF forces. In 1991, the RUF began launching attacks in eastern and southern Sierra Leone employing hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to capture territory and control diamond mining areas.

*In 1991, the RUF began launching attacks in eastern and southern Sierra Leone employing hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to capture territory and control diamond mining areas.*

Thought to be only a small and easily contained force, the RUF became stronger and began attacks in the north and west. The government strengthened its military position by inviting troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assist in its anti-rebel efforts and by increasing the size of the army of Sierra Leone.

In 1992, a coup against President James Momoh replaced the government with the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), headed by Capt. Valentine Strasser. The NPRC increased the armed forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF) to more than 10,000 through 1994. In 1994, the NPRC further sought to strengthen



its military capability by hiring former British Army Gurkhas. Their service proved less than satisfactory, and in 1995 the NPRC contracted with Executive Outcomes, a South African firm which had provided mercenary services to the government of Angola and UNITA. Executive Outcomes focused its efforts on clearing rebel forces from the mining districts but proved unable to defeat the RUF through early 1996.

Instability in Liberia contributed to the start of the war in Sierra Leone. Soldiers of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, began border incursions into Sierra Leone with the intent of disrupting Sierra Leone's participation in ECOMOG, the West African regional force engaged against the NPFL in Liberia. The NPFL gave support to Foday Sankoh's RUF, which emerged as an independent Sierra Leone-based guerrilla movement.

The government and ECOMOG contacted and supported refugee Liberian Mandingo and Krahn communities living in Sierra Leone following NPFL victories in Liberia in 1990. Elements of these com-

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1951

New constitution introduced

1961

Britain grants independence

1967

Military assumes control of government, returns power to civilians

munities formed the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which attacked the NPFL in Sierra Leone and Liberia from bases in Sierra Leone. The NPFL was forced to retreat into Liberia, and the RUF began to operate on its own and focused on controlling the diamond-rich region district of Kono and the provincial towns of Bo and Kenema.

The conflict in Sierra Leone has resulted in terrible civilian hardships. RUF and government forces have frequently targeted towns and villages, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. Fighting has forced even more to flee their homes. The total number of internally displaced and refugee Sierra Leoneans is estimated to be 2.1 million, or 47 percent of the country's total population of 4.47 million people. However, with the March elections having apparently succeeded, and negotiations under way for a permanent peace, Sierra Leoneans may be returning to their homes soon.

*John Langlois has been the director of The Carter Center's office in Liberia since May 1995. He holds a master's degree in international development from American University and served in Liberia as a Peace Corps volunteer from 1985-87.*


The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Sierra Leone vs. RUF	5,000-6,000 2,000
Deaths in 1995: greater than 500		
Total Deaths: 3,000*		

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

\* Approximately 30,000 war-related deaths since 1991.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 46

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	60
DPT	43
polio	43
measles	46

% population with access to health services: 38

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 35

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 8


Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:	Belarus	7
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1990-95:	Belarus	7
	Slovakia	1

\* Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.



1971

1981

1991

1992

Dr. Stevens becomes first president under new republican constitution

Political opposition and corruption scandals result in state of emergency

Government begins fighting new revolutionary movement, RUF

Capt. Strasser, military junta stage coup, promise elections but suspend legislature

# SOMALIA

BY KEN MENKHAUS

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 246,201 sq. mi.  
(637,657 sq. km.)

Population: 7,187,000

System of Government:  
None

Languages:  
Arabic  
Somali  
English  
Italian

Ethnic Divisions:  
Somali 85%  
Bantu na  
Other na

Religion:  
Sunni Muslim

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 187.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$864 million

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$830

External debt:  
U.S. \$2.54 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.246

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 255. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Five years after the overthrow of Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia remains plagued by widespread armed conflict and without a recognized government. In 1991-92, southern Somalia was devastated by factional warfare over control of the government, key cities, riverine areas, and humanitarian relief supplies. That conflict pitted the Somali National Alliance (SNA), led by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed, against a loose coalition known as the "Group of 12," nominally headed by Ali Mahdi of the United Somali Congress (USC).

Heavy fighting and banditry between the SNA and USC destroyed most of the capital Mogadishu, while recurrent battles in the countryside between the SNA and Darod clan militias triggered a massive famine in southern Somalia. Only the northeast and northwest regions of Somalia were spared. An estimated 300,000 Somalis lost their lives to famine and 30,000 to war in 1991-92. To end the famine, 37,000 multinational troops were deployed in the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May 1993. Its successor, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM II), was given an expansive mandate to facilitate national reconciliation, reconstruction, and disarmament.

*To end the famine, 37,000 multinational troops were deployed in the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May 1993.*

Despite a national peace accord signed in March 1993 and dozens of subsequent peace initiatives, national reconciliation was never achieved. The U.N. operation was derailed when it became embroiled in protracted hostilities with Aideed's militia; when it



withdrew from Somalia in March 1995, it left behind a country still divided and without a central government.

Since March 1995, the nature of armed conflict in Somalia has shifted, with as many outbreaks of violence within clans and factions as between them. Triggered by struggles over leadership, scarce resources, and valued real estate, these hostilities have tended to be localized and sporadic, but have yielded hundreds of casualties.

Much of the fighting has occurred in Mogadishu, where hostilities broke out in March and April 1995 between rival Hawiye subclans scrambling to occupy strategic locations vacated by departing U.N. forces. A split between Aideed and his former financial backer, Osman Atto, led to heavy intermittent fighting between their rival subclans in south Mogadishu since July 1995. Aideed's militia also fought Ali Mahdi's USC along the city's "Green Line" for control of the airport and seaport, both of which were shut down in October 1995. [Gen. Aideed died Aug. 1, 1996, after suffering gun wounds in a battle in Mogadishu, and was replaced as head of the SNA by his 33-year-old son, Hussein Mohammed Farah Aideed.—Editor]

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1950

Italian Somaliland placed under U.N. trusteeship

1960

Italian and British Somalilands merge, Somali Republic gains independence

1969

Maj. Gen. Siad Barre stages coup, takes over Shermake government

Armed conflicts have flared in the Somali countryside too. The most significant include the military occupation of the city of Baidoa by Aideed's SNA forces, which have encountered armed resistance from inhabitants; SNA forays along the Jubba river against rival militias; a "banana war" in the Shabelle valley, between rival Hawiye subclans, over control of banana exports; and protracted armed conflict in the northwest, between the forces of the self-proclaimed government of "Somaliland" and rival clan militias.

Collectively, these conflicts are creating famine conditions in some regions and threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war. In the aftermath of the failed U.N. peace operation, modest efforts to reconcile Somali factions have been made by the Organization for African Unity, Ethiopia, and the factions themselves, but with no success.

*Dr. Ken Menkhaus is associate professor of political science at Davidson College. In 1993-94, he served as special political advisor to the U.N. Operation in Somalia and in 1994-95 was visiting professor at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. He is the author of several articles on Somalia, including a recent assessment of conflict management in Somalia in the Spring 1996 issue of International Peacekeeping.*


The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Somalia* vs. USC faction (Aideed)	10,000 10,000
Deaths in 1995: 200-500		
Total Deaths: na		

USC: United Somali Congress

\*Taken to be the USC faction (Mahdi).

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 47

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	48
DPT	23
polio	23
measles	35

% population with access to health services: 27\*

\*Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

"THE PENTAGON IS NOW DANCING IN THE RUINS OF YUGOSLAVIA, AND SOMALIA HAS SLIPPED BACK INTO ITS PRE-INTERVENTION STATELESS STATE. THERE IS ALMOST NO EVIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS WERE EVER THERE, LITTLE TRACE OF THE \$4 BILLION THAT WAS SPENT."



Michael Maren, "Somalia: Whose Failure?"  
*Current History*, May 1996

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): na

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): na

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:  
Imports not listed from 1991-95

1990-95:  
Libya 10

\* Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 268; SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1977

1988

1991

1994

11-year war with Ethiopia begins

Ethiopian war ends; SNM rebels launch civil war

Military coalition overthrows Barre; SNM declares independent Somaliland

United States withdraws five months after 18 Americans killed; U.N. force leaves following year

# SUDAN

BY FRANCIS M. DENG

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 967,500 sq. mi.  
(2,505,813 sq. km.)

Population: 25,840,000

System of Government:  
Provisional Military  
(March 1996 elections)

Languages:  
Arabic  
Nubian  
Indigenous

Ethnic Divisions:  
Black 52%  
Arab 39%  
Beja 6%  
Other 3%

Religions:  
Sunni Muslim 70%  
Indigenous 25%  
Christian 5%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 190.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$8.6 billion

GDP per capita:\*

U.S. \$1,100

External debt:\*

U.S. \$16.8 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.379

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 257. UNDP, *Human Development Report* 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Sudan has been torn by civil conflict since 1955, with a decade of precarious peace from 1972 to 1983. Although the conflict is complex, the war has largely been between successive governments in Khartoum, dominated by the Arab-Muslim North, and rebel movements in the more indigenously African South, whose leadership is predominantly Christian. During the first phase of the war, from 1955 to 1972, the objective of the southern liberation struggle was secession from the north.

With the resumption of hostilities in 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A), although southern-based, embraced elements from the north, especially in the non-Arab regions of the Nuba and the Ingassana bordering the south. Commensurately, the SPLM/A postulated the liberation of the whole country from Arab-Islamic domination. This objective threatens to transform the Arab-Muslim dominated identity of the Sudan, and the north has reacted by imposing a radical Arab-Islamic fundamentalist agenda. On June 30, 1989, the Islamic fundamentalists or revivalists, as they prefer to be known, seized power through a military coup and have since tightened their Arab-Islamic grip. The SPLM/A has since reactivated a call for self-determination for the south and for marginalized regions of the north.

Since hostilities resumed in 1983, numerous peace initiatives have been undertaken by various mediators from the African continent and the international community, all of which have ended with no appreciable success. Perhaps the most sustained has been the peace initiative undertaken since 1993 by a committee of four member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was recently renamed Intergovernmental



Authority on Development (IGAD). The four contributing states—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda—work together under the chairmanship of President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya. In 1994, IGADD adopted a Declaration of Principles (DOP) as a basis for negotiations, which included recognizing the right of self-determination and freedom of religion for the south. Since these principles were not acceptable to the Sudanese government, talks stalled.

The IGADD mediation effort was further compromised by the deterioration of relations between Sudan and two members of the mediation committee, Eritrea and Uganda, which, accusing the Islamist regime in Khartoum of spreading its religious agenda regionally and endangering its national security, broke relations with Sudan. Relations with Ethiopia also deteriorated following the assassination attempt against President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in June 1995 by Egyptian Islamic terrorists allegedly connected with the Sudan government.

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1955	1962	1972
North and south begin fighting; Britain grants independence following year	Fighting escalates into full-scale civil war	Government, southern rebels sign Addis Ababa Accord ending war

Regional response to the regime became linked to international concern with terrorism. In January 1996, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution demanding that Sudan hand over the terrorists within 90 days. With the expiration of the deadline, Sudan became threatened with the imposition of severe sanctions. Egypt, however, opposed tough sanctions on the Sudan, fearing a Southern rebel movement that could impose a political solution detrimental to the unity of the country. Since the terrorist profile of the regime is disconnected from its domestic policies, the international community remains only marginally concerned about the war in the south and the cause of democracy and human rights in the country as a whole.

*Dr. Francis Mading Deng is a senior fellow and head of the Africa Project in the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Program. He is also the representative of the U.N. secretary-general on internally displaced persons. He is a former Sudanese ambassador to Canada, Scandinavian countries, and the United States, and was Sudan's minister of state for foreign affairs for five years.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Sudan vs. SPLA (Garang faction)	81,000 30,000-50,000
Deaths in 1995: 1,000		
Total Deaths: 37,000-40,000 (military)*		

SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army

\* Figure for 1991. As noted, this figure concerns military deaths. Many reliable sources indicate that more than 1.5 million have died since 1983 as a result of the war, either from military activity, famine, or disease.

Source: M. Sollenberg and P. Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

1983


Addis Accord abrogated,  
John Garang's SPLA resumes war  
with government

1988

Gen. al-Bashir, backed by  
Turabi's Islamic party, topples  
al-Mahdi government

1993

IGADD members attempt  
peace talks as war  
casualties top 1 million



## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 53

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	78
DPT	69
polio	70
measles	76

% population with access to health services: 70

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 298

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 11

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995: Kyrgyzstan 3

1990-95: China 11  
Yugoslavia 10\*\*  
Egypt 6

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

\*\* All deliveries were made in 1991, before the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 268. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

# FOCUS: GREAT LAKES

by Sara Tindall

As we go to press in early December 1996, the situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa remains in a state of flux. Roughly 500,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda from Zaire, and the international community, led by Canada, is considering sending a multinational force to assist another 700,000 refugees in eastern Zaire cut off from aid by the latest fighting. Meanwhile, the political climate in Burundi remains unstable, and neighboring countries continue to impose sanctions against the Buyoya regime.

The Great Lakes region in Africa, including the countries of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire, has been wracked with violence for many years. The most recent round of conflict ensued with the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected leader of Burundi, in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda sparked by the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. The conflict in Burundi has cost some 100,000 lives, and between 500,000 to 1 million people died in the Rwandan genocide. In addition, as of mid-1996, some 1.7 million Rwandan refugees and 200,000 Burundi refugees remained in Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire, destabilizing these countries.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center have had a longstanding interest in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire. Several meetings of the International Negotiation Network (INN) and expert roundtables at the Center have focused on Burundi and Zaire from both a conflict prevention and democratization perspective. By the summer of 1995, there was growing concern that international efforts to bring stability to the region and invigorate the repatriation process were proving ineffective.

In September 1995 meetings in Africa and Europe, Uganda President Yoweri Museveni, Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, Kenya President Daniel arap Moi, and Ethiopia Prime Minister (and Organization of African Unity [OAU] President) Meles Zenawi discussed with President Carter means to seek a regional solution to the continuing crises in the Great Lakes. As a follow-up to these discussions, at an Oct. 22, 1995, press conference in New York, Presidents Museveni, Mobutu, and Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania (who was not present), with the agreement of Presidents Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda and Sylvestre Ntibantunganya of Burundi, invited President Carter, INN member Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to act as facilitators for a summit meeting of the Great Lakes heads of state. The co-conveners also requested that The Carter Center organize the event.

## A Historic Meeting

President and Mrs. Carter, along with Carter Center staff, traveled to the Great Lakes region from Nov. 18-23, 1995, on a fact-finding mission and to prepare further for the forthcoming summit, which was held in Cairo, Egypt, Nov. 27-29. The Cairo Summit brought together for the first time the heads of state from the Great Lakes countries most directly affected by the crises, at their own initiation, to discuss means of solving common problems. Presidents Mobutu, Museveni, Bizimungu, and Ntibantunganya attended, and newly elected Tanzanian President Benjamin William Mkapa was represented by a high-level special envoy. At the request of the heads of state, no outside organizations were invited to the summit, led by President Carter and Archbishop Tutu. The private nature

of the meeting promoted frank examination of the highly sensitive issues facing the region, resulting in the signing of the "Cairo Declaration on the Great Lakes Region" on Nov. 29. All parties pledged to take "joint concrete actions to advance peace, justice, reconciliation, stability, and development in the region" through specific steps that would encourage repatriation to Rwanda and improve stability in Burundi. These pledges included actions to prevent cross-border incursions, arms flows, and military training; remove and neutralize intimidation in the refugee camps; improve the judicial systems in Rwanda and Burundi; and several others.

Following the Cairo Summit, Zaire began to return military equipment to Rwanda, and Rwanda conducted several high-level visits to refugee camps and began to alleviate conditions in its prisons and rebuild its justice system. Meanwhile, Zaire and Tanzania began removing intimidators from the camps, and the International Tribunal handed down its first indictments of genocide perpetrators. Former Presidents Nyerere and Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali traveled through the region on several occasions, and the regional heads of state consulted with one another, but more work was needed.

## Reassessing the Situation

A second summit was held March 16-18, 1996, in Tunis, Tunisia. The five heads of state, along with former Presidents Carter, Nyerere, and Touré, assessed progress made toward fulfilling the commitments made in Cairo and further actions to be taken. The Tunis Declaration added greater detail to the Cairo plan, called for pledged funds for targeted initiatives, and elicited commitments from Burundi on positive steps to end violence and widen political dialogue.

Following the Tunis summit, President Nyerere convened representatives of the major Burundian political parties, FRODEBU and UPRONA, in Mwanza, Tanzania, in April, May, and June to examine key issues that impede the resolution of Burundi's problems. In May 1996, Gen. Touré and President Carter met in Atlanta to share ideas on what steps were needed to move the Great Lakes process forward. At the end of June, the heads of state in the region met under the leadership of Tanzanian President Mkapa to find ways to stem the still-growing violence in Rwanda.


Despite these efforts, many problems remained in the Great Lakes region midway through 1996: rates of Rwandan repatriation had slowed to a crawl; incursions from the camps into Rwanda continued unabated; and Burundi was spiraling further into violence and chaos. The heads-of-state initiative had made progress, however, in creating a climate in which the countries in the region might address and resolve the urgent crises facing the Great Lakes.

Sara Tindall, program coordinator in The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, focuses on the Great Lakes region, Burma, and Korea. Tindall participated in the Cairo and Tunis summits and traveled to Rwanda with the World Bank in June 1996.

CONFlict REGION:

# ASIA

AFGHANISTAN  
BANGLADESH  
CAMBODIA  
INDIA  
INDONESIA  
MYANMAR/BURMA  
PHILIPPINES  
SRI LANKA  
TAJIKISTAN



1 square inch = 395,000 square miles  
1 square centimeter = 159,000 square kilometers

**Refugees:** These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

**IDPs:** Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

**RLS:** Persons in "refugee-like situations" are those who may fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries, and thus who may be refugees, but who are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey, 1996*, Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

na: Figures not available for given country

\* Sources vary widely in numbers reported

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey, 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

**A**sia's nine major armed conflicts in 1995 represented the highest total for all regions for the fourth straight year. While the level of violence increased dramatically in Sri Lanka, and countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Tajikistan continued to suffer, most conflicts in the region were at a lower level than for other regions. In India, conflict resumed in the Punjab after a short hiatus, but fighting was minimal. Also promising were the negotiations and cease-fires attempted in the Philippines, Myanmar/Burma, and other countries. On the down side, more than 38,000 Vietnamese refugees remained in asylum in other countries. Malnutrition continued to plague the region, yet increased economic growth contributed to general improvements in under-5 mortality, life expectancy, and immunization rates.

Human Development Indicators			
Country	% access to safe water (1990-95)	Total adult literacy rate (% in 1990)	Population growth rate (1980-94)
Afghanistan	12	27	1.2
Bangladesh	97	35	2.1
Cambodia	36	35	3.1
India	81	48	2.1
Indonesia	62	82	1.8
Myanmar/Burma	38	81	2.1
Philippines	85	94	2.2
Sri Lanka	53	89	1.4
Tajikistan	na	98*	2.9
Asia Conflict Countries Average	58.0	65.4	2.10**
Overall Asia Average	66.6	72.7	1.97
South Asia Average	61.3	42.0	2.10
East Asia & Pacific Average	66.7	79.4	1.97

\* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

\*\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children* 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-89.

Arms Flows						
Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Afghanistan	2,466	1,212	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	161	155	528	29	91	118
Cambodia	76	0	0	0	44	30
India	1,621	1,799	1,419	724	444	773
Indonesia	250	144	69	370	827	926
Myanmar/Burma	174	249	38	358	0	310
Philippines	22	24	51	96	201	54
Sri Lanka	2	119	15	32	4	43

No imports of major conventional weapons were recorded for Tajikistan for 1991-95.

Source: SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

## Under-5 Mortality Rates

Asian countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

Rank	Country	Rate
5	Afghanistan	257
18	Bhutan	193
22	Cambodia	177
33	Laos, PDR	138
34	Pakistan	137
39	India	119
40	Nepal	118
41	Bangladesh	117
44	Indonesia	111
48	Myanmar/Burma	109
50	Papua New Guinea	95
52	Turkmenistan	87
53	Tajikistan	81
56	Mongolia	76
62	Uzbekistan	64
65	Philippines	57
69	Kyrgyzstan	56
76	Kazakhstan	48
77	Viet Nam	46
79	China	43
111	Sri Lanka	19


Conflict Countries Average	116.3*
Overall Asia Average	80.8
South Asia Average	137.1
East Asia & Pacific Average	63.4

\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by unicef, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children* 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-81.

## Aid Flows

Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC)\* countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab countries to developing countries and territories (U.S. \$ million for 1994).



\* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Source: © Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1996, *Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Report 1995*, A54-56. Reproduced by permission of the OECD.



Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel laureate,  
Aug. 31, 1995

# AFGHANISTAN

BY BARNETT R. RUBIN

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 251,826 sq. mi.  
(652,225 sq. km.)

Population: 19,715,000

System of Government:  
Islamic Republic

Languages:  
Dari  
Pashto  
Uzbek

Ethnic Divisions:  
Pathan 38%  
Tajik 25%  
Hazara 19%  
Uzbek 6%  
Other 12%

Religions:  
Sunni Muslim 84%  
Shiite Muslim 15%  
Other 1%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 70.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
na

GDP per capita:  
U.S. \$1,000

External debt, 1993 estimated:  
U.S. \$2.5 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.228

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: CIA, "Economic Profile," *Handbook of International Economic Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 10; IISS, *Military Balance 1995-96* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 155. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Since the fall of ex-Communist President Najibullah in April 1992, Afghanistan has suffered from a new civil war. When the USSR dissolved and the Communist regime fell, the Islamic groups (*mujahidin*) that had fought him and the Soviet Army could not agree on a successor government. Former *mujahidin* and army factions devastated the capital, Kabul, as they fought for power.

There have been four main combatants, the first being the predominantly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), led by "President" Burhanuddin Rabbani and military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, which controls northeast Afghanistan and the capital, and therefore claims to be the government, which has been aided by Russia, India, and Iran. The second combatant has been the predominantly Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, supported by Pakistan, which attacked Kabul. A third combatant has been the Shia Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party), supported by Iran, which controlled part of Kabul and central Afghanistan. And finally, the fourth combatant has been a faction of the ex-Communist army and administration based in Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, led by Uzbek Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, supported by Uzbekistan.

In the fall of 1994, the Taliban, or Islamic students' movement, burst on the scene in Qandahar and in a few months' time took control of southern Afghanistan with Pakistani support, supplanting Hikmatyar as the Pashtun besiegers of Tajik-controlled Kabul. Alliances among these groups have shifted continually. Since January 1994, all groups have opposed Rabbani's "government."

In March 1995, Massoud had repulsed the Taliban's assault on Kabul and appeared to be consolidating. This effectively ended the effort by U.N. envoy Mahmoud Mestiri to convince Rabbani to resign in favor of a "broad-based" government. For the first time in years, no rockets fell on the capital, and displaced people



started to return. This trend was reversed in September, when the Taliban quickly overran Herat, expelling Jamiat commander Ismail Khan. Herat failed to resist, exposing breaks in Ismail Khan's ranks and his rivalry with Massoud. Fortified by this victory and by Pakistani aid, the Taliban soon were at the gates of Kabul, which they began rocketing again in October, as Mestiri returned to Afghanistan.

*In the fall of 1994, the Taliban, or Islamic students' movement, burst on the scene in Qandahar and in a few months' time took control of southern Afghanistan with Pakistani support, supplanting Hikmatyar as the Pashtun besiegers of Tajik-controlled Kabul.*

Iran and Russia reacted to the Taliban advance, which they saw as a Pakistani threat, by pouring aid into the Kabul regime, which held firm. Civilians have contin-

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953

Lt.-Gen. Daoud becomes prime minister, initiates modernization plans

1963

Daoud resigns; new PM Yusuf introduces more democratic constitution

1973

Gen. Daoud overthrows King Zahir Shah, sets up new republic

ued to die in intermittent rocket and bomb attacks from both sides. Mestiri failed to make progress and resigned on May 29. Hikmatyar, abandoned by Pakistan and lacking a base, allied himself with Rabbani again at the end of May, but this had little military significance. The United States raised its diplomatic profile in 1996, calling on all states in the region not to aid Afghan factions and on Afghans to cooperate with the United Nations.

*Dr. Barnett R. Rubin, a member of the INN, is director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State and The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. He has taught political science on the faculties of Yale and Columbia Universities and was a fellow of the United States Institute of Peace.*

"AFGHANISTAN HAS PRODUCED MORE REFUGEES THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE COUNTRY. MORE THAN 2.7 MILLION AFGHANS—OVER 12 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL 1993 POPULATION—WERE RESIDING WITHIN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AT THE END OF 1995."



UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees 1995*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Afghanistan vs. Hezbi-Islami, vs. Hizbi-Wahdat, vs. Jumbishi-Milli-ye Islami	na na na na
Deaths in 1995: greater than 1,000		
Total Deaths: greater than 1,500		

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26.

**1978**

PDPA stages Marxist coup, kills Daoud, establishes single-party state

**1979**

USSR invades to support PDPA against the Islamic mujahideen

**1989**

USSR withdraws troops; mujahideen establish government-in-exile

**1992**

Mujahideen invade Kabul; Soviet-installed regime collapses

## GUERRILLAS TAKE AFGHAN CAPITAL

KABUL, Afghanistan, Sept. 27 (AP)— Fundamentalist Islamic rebels captured Kabul Friday, swarming through the ruined capital, promising to impose strict Islamic rule and hanging a former president in one of their first acts of retribution.

The rebels, members of the Taliban militia, which has slowly seized two-thirds of the country, met little resistance as they moved into Kabul overnight. Government troops loyal to President Burhanuddin Rabbani, along with hundreds of civilians and foreign aid workers, had abandoned the city on Thursday.

The capture of the capital climaxed two days of fighting on the city's eastern edge that had left hundreds dead, according to the Red Cross. It also ended an offensive that began 15 days ago with the taking of Jalalabad, to the east.

The Taliban roamed through the presidential palace today, rifling through stocks of uniforms and weapons and leaving trucks piled with missile launchers parked outside the gate.

Earlier they had swept through the nearly deserted streets in pickup trucks, tanks and battered cars, all flying the white Taliban flag, and set up checkpoints outside government buildings and at intersections.

"Afghanistan is the common house of all Afghans," the Taliban said, announcing their victory on Kabul radio.

In one of their first acts Friday, the Taliban removed a former president, Najibullah, from the United Nations compound where he had lived since his Communist regime was overthrown in 1992. The rebels then shot him in the head and hanged his beaten and bloated body from a tower.

*The New York Times*, Sept. 28, 1996

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 43

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	44
DPT	18
polio	18
measles	40

% population with access to health services: 29

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): na

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): na

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995: Imports not listed from 1992-95

1990-95: Russia/USSR 3,660\*\* Saudi Arabia 18

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

\*\* Deliveries from Saudi Arabia are to rebel forces.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994." *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

# BANGLADESH

BY SHAUN GILL

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 55,598 sq. mi.  
(143,998 sq. km.)

Population: 119,370,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Bangla  
English

Ethnic Divisions:  
Bengali 98%  
Other 2%

Religions:  
Muslim 83%  
Hindu 16%  
Other 1%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*. © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 79.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)\*  
U.S. \$25.8 billion

GDP per capita:  
U.S. \$1,300

External debt, 1993 estimated:  
U.S. \$15.4 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.364

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 156. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

The past year witnessed little change in the low-level guerrilla conflict that has plagued the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region of Bangladesh since the early 1970s. Comprising some 10 percent of Bangladesh and covering an area of more than 5,000 square miles, the CHT is the ancestral home to 12 recognized tribal populations representing Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian communities. Strife continues to plague the region as the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS) and its military wing, Shanti Bahini (SB), maintain their armed struggle against the government in Dhaka.

In 1972, one year after Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan, tribal elements in the CHT formed the JSS in response to numerous outstanding grievances, including compensation for a 1963 hydroelectric project that displaced more than 100,000 indigenous people from their ancestral lands and government settlement policies that opened the CHT to successive waves of Bengali settlers from the plains. In 1973, the JSS created the SB to forcefully agitate for tribal rights and counter the influx of Bengali settlers into the region.

Led by Shantu Larma, and his brother, Manobendra (who was later assassinated by a rival faction within the JSS/SB), the SB initiated a fierce guerrilla campaign against Muslim settlers in the CHT. By 1980, the conflict had developed into a full-scale guerrilla war between the SB and government police and military forces, empowered with extrajudicial authority to engage the SB's 3,000 to 5,000 guerrilla cadres.

During the 1980s, the Bangladesh government made several attempts to negotiate with the SB, including a general amnesty for militants, the creation of three semi-autonomous hill districts, and the extension of limited control to the JSS over future Muslim settlements in the region. Despite these overtures, the SB continued to agitate for greater autonomy, demanding



the withdrawal of government troops and the removal of all nontribals from the CHT. Fighting intensified throughout the remainder of the decade, ultimately forcing some 60,000 tribal refugees to flee the Chittagong Hill Tract into India.

*Fighting intensified throughout the remainder of the decade, ultimately forcing some 60,000 tribal refugees to flee the Chittagong Hill Tract into India.*

In 1992, the SB signed a cease-fire accord and agreed to enter into negotiations with the government in Dhaka. Despite numerous rounds of peace talks since 1992, no permanent settlement has yet been reached. There was at least one major incident in the CHT in 1995, in which a tribal student council clashed with Bengali settlers and police in Bandarban. Unofficially, violence between the SB, nontribal settlers, and government

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947

India, Pakistan gain independence from Britain; partition leads to war

1952

Pakistani government declares Urdu official language; riots break out in East Pakistan

1971

East Pakistan declares independence as Bangladesh following Pakistani civil war

forces continues sporadically. Indicative of the situation is the fact that 1995 saw little repatriation of CHT refugees who had fled to India to escape the fighting.

The Bangladesh government continues to talk with the JSS/SB, and most recently both sides agreed to extend the cease-fire until March 1996, after which talks between the two groups were scheduled to resume. However, given the political instability in Dhaka over the past six months, and the June 1996 elections that resulted in a change of government, it remains to be seen what direction the cease-fire and future peace talks will take in 1996.

*Shaun Gill is deputy director of the India Program and external affairs officer for South Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.*

## A FRESH START?

"The elections held in Bangladesh on June 12 put an end to two years of political agitation, strikes and demonstrations...but it will take more than six weeks to convince most people that Bangladesh's cycle of political instability has really been broken."

*The Economist, Aug. 3, 1996*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Bangladesh vs. JSS/SB	115,500 2,000-5,000
Deaths in 1995: less than 25		
Total Deaths: (since 1975) 3,000-5,000		

JSS/SB: Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Coordination Association/Shanti Bahini [Peace Force])

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26.

**1974**

CHT residents launch guerrilla war against police and Muslim settlers

**1982**

Gen. Ershad assumes power in bloodless coup


**1989**

Government offers limited autonomy in CHT region to JSS

**1990**

Gen. Ershad declares state of emergency, resigns office, placed under arrest

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 55

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	95
DPT	94
polio	94
measles	95

% population with access to health services: 45

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 462

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 4

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:	Russia/USSR	57	**
	Czechoslovakia	40	
	Ukraine	14	

1990-95:	China	353	
	Pakistan	185	
	Russia/USSR	121	



GORDON FAIRCLOUGH REPORTING ON CONDITIONS IN BANGLADESH, WHERE UNEMPLOYMENT NEARS 35 PERCENT AND POSSIBLY AS MANY AS 15 MILLION CHILDREN ARE FORCED TO WORK

"Child Labor: It Isn't Black and White," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 7, 1996

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices  
\*\* SIPRI lists Czechoslovakia for the purpose of its database, but notes the 1993 split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

# CAMBODIA

BY ROBERT P. MYERS JR.

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 69,898 sq. mi.  
(181,035 sq. km.)

Population: 9,713,000

System of Government:  
Monarchy

Languages:  
Khmer  
French

Ethnic Divisions:  
Khmer 90%  
Vietnamese 5%  
Other 5%

Religions:  
Buddhist 95%  
Other 5%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 89-90.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$2.6 billion

GDP per capita:†  
U.S. \$590

External debt, 1993 estimated:  
U.S. \$124 million

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.337

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 175. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Historically, Cambodia has experienced both internal strife and external interference, particularly from more powerful neighbors. After Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to pursue a policy of neutrality became inextricably caught up in the crosscurrents of the Cold War. By the mid-1960s, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas were using the eastern region of Cambodia to attack South Vietnam.

With the collapse of the U.S-backed, right-wing regime of Gen. Lon Nol, in power from 1970-75, a reign of terror ensued from 1975-78. The Khmer Rouge rule under Pol Pot was scarred by an estimated 1 to 3 million deaths. During this period, Democratic Kampuchea was involved in serious border clashes with Vietnam and became a pawn in the Sino-Soviet dispute, with China backing Pol Pot and the Soviets supporting Vietnam.

In late 1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia, overthrowing Pol Pot. The Vietnamese occupation of the 1980s, combined with the weakness of the Vietnam-supported Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime, fueled anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Convinced that they could not win a decisive military victory and facing a deteriorating economic situation at home, the Vietnamese began to seek a way out of Cambodia; in September 1989, they unilaterally withdrew their troops.

Informal peace talks began in Jakarta in July 1988, which led to a comprehensive peace agreement signed in October 1991 in Paris. The Paris Accords established the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to work with the interim Supreme National Council headed by Prince Sihanouk. Subsequently, the United Nations



embarked upon its most complex and costly (nearly \$2 billion) peacekeeping effort. While encountering serious difficulties in implementing imperfectly drafted accords, UNTAC successfully resettled nearly all displaced persons and prepared Cambodia for democratic elections.

*Despite nearly four decades of undemocratic rule, civil strife, and external interventions, Cambodia appears to be making some progress, thanks in large part to massive economic assistance from the international community.*

In May 1993, 89 percent of all eligible voters participated in free and fair multiparty elections, despite Khmer Rouge efforts to keep the approximately 6 percent of the population in their area of control from voting. The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooper-

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953

Cambodia gains independence from France

1969

U.S. bombings help depose Prince Sihanouk, install Lt.-Gen. Lon Nol in power

1975

Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge take over Cambodia after United States withdraws from Vietnam

ative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) won 45 percent of the vote and, facing threats from the runner-up Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) to divide the country, formed a coalition with FUNCINPEC leader Prince Ranariddh as first prime minister and CCP leader Hun Sen as second prime minister. Sihanouk was named king.

Despite nearly four decades of undemocratic rule, civil strife, and external interventions, Cambodia appears to be making some progress, thanks in large part to massive economic assistance from the international community. Yet, chronic problems such as political dissension, corruption, violence, and administrative inadequacies persist, thereby clouding the future of the fledgling and fragile Royal Cambodian Government (RCG), especially because of growing policy and personality differences between the co-prime ministers as the nation moves toward local and national elections in 1997 and 1998, respectively.

The Khmer Rouge continue to pose a real, albeit diminished, military threat to the RCG. In May 1996, there were reports that Pol Pot was critically ill and Sihanouk predicted that when Pol Pot dies, the Khmer Rouge will disintegrate. For the moment, the Khmer Rouge appear to be playing a waiting game, hoping that harsh economic times and a possible split in the coalition will create a political opening for them.

*Robert P. Myers Jr. spent 1995-96 as a diplomat-in-residence with The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program. A career foreign service officer, he has served among other posts as coordinator for ethnic minorities affairs in Saigon; chief of refugee affairs in Bangkok; U.S. consul general in Belfast, Northern Ireland; and the State Department's first dispute resolution specialist.*

"THE KHMER ROUGE HAD FAR AND AWAY THE WORST HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, HAVING PRESIDED OVER THE DEATHS OF SOME 1 MILLION CAMBODIANS DURING ITS 1975-78 GOVERNMENT; DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS THE PARTY HAS NOT RENOUNCED ITS PAST PRACTICES AND CONTINUED TO COMMIT SERIOUS ABUSES."



*The Lost Agenda*, edited by Cynthia Brown  
for Human Rights Watch, 1993

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 51

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	78
DPT	53
polio	54
measles	53

% population with access to health services: 53

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children* 1996, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 59

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 6

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:	Czechoslovakia	30	**
	Ukraine	14	
1990-95:	Russia/USSR	58	**
	Czechoslovakia	46	***
	China	18	

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

\*\*SIPRI lists "Czechoslovakia" for the purpose of its database but notes the 1993 split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

\*\*\* Deliveries from China are to rebel forces.

Source: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Cambodia vs. PDK	130,000 5,000-10,000
Deaths in 1995: na		
Total Deaths: greater than 25,000*		

PDK: Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)

\* Regarding battle-related deaths in 1979-89, not only involving the government and PDK, the only figure available is from official Vietnamese sources, indicating that 25,300 Vietnamese soldiers died in Cambodia. An estimated figure for the period 1979-89, based on various sources, is greater than 50,000, and for 1989 greater than 1,000. The figures for 1990, 1991, and 1992 were lower.

Source: M. Sollenberg and P. Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26.

### 1978

Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows Pol Pot after his regime kills 2 million

### 1989

Vietnam withdraws from Cambodia

### 1992

Following peace treaty, U.N. peacekeepers deploy; Sihanouk returns to throne

### 1994

Banned Khmer Rouge steps up campaign of terror in countryside

# INDIA

BY AMITABH MATTOO

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 1,237,062 sq. mi.  
(3,203,975 sq. km.)

Population: 909,150,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:\*

- Hindi
- English
- Telugu
- Bengali
- Indigenous

Ethnic Divisions:

Khmer	72%
Vietnamese	25%
Other	3%

Religions:

Hindu	80%
Muslim	11%
Christian	2%
Sikh	2%
Other	5%

\*There are 16 official languages in India.

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 127-8.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$270.2 billion

GDP per capita:  
U.S. \$1,300

External debt, 1993 estimated:  
U.S. \$90.5 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.439

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 175. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

During the last year, two conflicts continued to cause political instability in India: the insurgency in the northern province of Kashmir and the ethnic conflict in the state of Assam in the northeast. In contrast, the trouble-prone state of Punjab was relatively calm.

In Kashmir, Indian security forces were still engaged in attempts to quell the militant insurgency, which has claimed more than 20,000 lives since 1990. The militants are demanding independence or accession to Pakistan. June 1996 parliamentary elections and the possibility of local elections in late 1996 have raised hopes of the return of popular government to the province after six years of direct rule from New Delhi. But Kashmir will continue to remain a troubled area even if the security forces succeed in combatting the insurgency. Resentment at New Delhi's policies is intense and widespread, and the large-scale human rights violations by Indian security forces over the last six years have further estranged the people from India. Punjab's Sikh Separatists are fighting a losing battle with very little popular support left in the state for an independent Sikh nation, Khalistan.

*Punjab's Sikh Separatists are fighting a losing battle with very little popular support left in the state for an independent Sikh nation, Khalistan.*

Only stray incidents of violence are reported, and the average level of violence in Punjab today is no higher than most states in India. In 1995, one separatist group did succeed in assassinating Punjab's chief minister, Beant Singh, but this was clearly the last gasp of a dying militant campaign. The most significant symbol of Punjab's return to mainstream politics was the 1996 parliamentary election, in which even earlier disaffected Sikh groups participated actively. New Delhi's two-pronged, carrots-



and-sticks policy seems to have worked in Punjab.

On the periphery, and less written about, India's northeast has been a festering sore for at least the last three decades. While ethnic clashes or anti-India protests continued in many of the states in the northeast, it was Assam which was at the center of the most violent clashes. In the western part of the state, members of the Bodo ethnic group attacked rival Muslims, then Santhals. These attacks were inspired by the Bodo Security Force, an insurgent group demanding independence of Western Assam. More than 200 people are believed to have been killed in these attacks in 1996 alone, and nearly 200,000 people have been displaced. The Santhals, too, have now retaliated and more than 300 villages have been destroyed in the clashes.

Dr. Amitabh Mattoo is associate professor in the Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament at the Jawaharlal Nehru University School of International Studies in New Delhi, India.

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947

India gains independence from Britain, goes to war with Pakistan

1962

India annexes Goa, Daman, and Diu; brief war with China ensues

1965

India and Pakistan fight second war over Kashmir

## FOCUS: CONFLICT IN THE KASHMIR

BY LEO E. ROSE


Ongoing conflict between Indian security forces and militant groups based in the Kashmir Valley continued to mid-1996 at about the same intensity but with some significant changes in the composition and objectives of the Kashmiri militant factions and in the strategies pursued by the Government of India (GOI). Disagreements between the pro-Pakistan factions and those that demanded an independent Kashmir became even more strident, but with the pro-independence factions gaining the upper hand in most areas of the Valley.

The pro-Pakistan factions, headed mainly by non-Kashmiri militants who were pro-Islamic veterans of the Afghanistan War, became increasingly antagonistic to the Kashmiri public's more moderate views. Thus in 1995-96, former Kashmiri militants organized, with the support of the Indian army, "Village Defense Forces." These forces opposed both the pro-Pak and the pro-independence factions.

GOI policies also underwent major change in 1995-96. There is still virtual unanimity among Indians that India should not make any concessions on Kashmir's status as an integral part of the Indian Union. The March 1996 GOI decision, however, to hold May parliamentary elections in Kashmir as well as Kashmir State Assembly elections later in the year, reflected broad support by all but some of the most fundamentalist Hindu organizations on the "broader autonomy" issue. Allegations that the May elections were not fully "free and fair" have some substance. However, the Kashmir Valley people were determined to restart a political process; approximately one-third participated in the elections, despite the threats of several militant factions against anyone who voted. The question now is whether New Delhi is willing to enter discussions with an assortment of Kashmiri factions on the relevant issue—Kashmir's status in the Indian Union.

Dr. Leo E. Rose is editor of *Asian Survey* and professor emeritus of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He has worked on both the Indian and Pakistani side of Jammu and Kashmir since the 1960s.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of India vs. Kashmir insurgents** vs. Sikh insurgents*** vs. ULFA vs. BdSF	1,145,000 na na na na
Deaths in 1995: greater than 500*		
Total Deaths: greater than 37,000*		

BdSF: Bodo Security Force

ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam

\*Only the Kashmir and Sikh conflict. Of the total deaths, approximately 25,000 were killed in the Sikh conflict and at least 12,000 in the Kashmir conflict.

\*\*Several groups are active, several of the most important being the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the Hizbe-Mujahideen, and the Harkat-ul-Ansar.

\*\*\*Several Sikh groups exist; however, in 1995 only a few were active, i.e. the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF).

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 60

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	96
DPT	91
polio	91
measles	86

% population with access to health services: 85

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 7,321

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 8

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:  
Russia/USSR 440  
UK 112  
Netherlands 71

1990-95:  
Russia/USSR 4,664  
UK 625  
Netherlands 426

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1971

Support for Bangladesh leads to new war with Pakistan in Kashmir

1988

Pakistani-supported Muslim militants launch Kashmir insulation

1990

500,000 Indian troops wage war on dissidents, Pakistani forces

1994

Government rejects own plan to hold elections in Jammu, Kashmir

# INDONESIA

BY JAMES CLAD

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 752,410 sq. mi.  
(193,680,000 sq. km.)

Population: 193,680,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Bahsa Indonesia  
(Malay)  
English  
Dutch  
Indigenous

Ethnic Divisions:  
Javanese 45%  
Sundanese 14%  
Madurese 8%  
Coastal Malay 8%  
Other 25%

Religions:  
Muslim 87%  
Protestant 6%  
Catholic 3%  
Hindu 2%  
Other 2%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 128-9.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
\$154.8 billion

GDP per capita:  
U.S. \$3,500

External debt:  
U.S. \$90.5 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.637

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 179; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.



In the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, the “Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor” (known by its Portuguese acronym Fretilin) has waged a campaign for independence against the Indonesian authorities, who occupied the territory after Dec. 7, 1975, after the Marxist-influenced Fretilin declared independence nine days earlier. The nature of the East Timor conflict has altered since the Indonesian invasion more than 20 years ago, with ethnic and religious divisions (most East Timorese profess Roman Catholic Christianity) exacerbating the conflict.

From a preinvasion population of more than 600,000 people, the loss of life occurring in the first decade after the Indonesian invasion may have been as high as 200,000, with famine and disease inflicting high mortality on Timorese civilians herded into holding camps during 1975-79. In 1976, Jakarta annexed East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province; 20 years later, riots and repression continue.

Indonesian counterinsurgency efforts have been rewarded with sporadic success, the most recent being

the capture and imprisonment of Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao in 1992, and that of second-in-command Ma ‘Huno in April 1993. From 1975-89, Jakarta had closed the new province to all outsiders; it did so again in November 1994 after East Timorese students entered the U.S. Embassy compound in Jakarta to protest Indonesian policy at the time of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bogor, which was attended by 18 Asia-Pacific heads of government including U.S. President Bill Clinton. The Jakarta protest commemorated the killing by Indonesian troops of an estimated 180 civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor's capital.

*Indonesian repression includes the use of civilian thugs against the resistance, “disappearances,” and extrajudicial killings.*

Indonesian repression includes the use of civilian thugs against the resistance, “disappearances,” and extrajudicial killings. But despite high per capita develop-

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1945

Netherlands, Japan grant independence; Dr. Sukarno becomes first president

1949

West Timor joins Indonesia

1963

Dutch transfers Irian Jaya region to Indonesia

ment spending and the molding of literate younger generations in Indonesian language schools, the separatist struggle refuses to expire.

International support for the resistance comes from Western human rights groups, former Portuguese colonies, Timorese emigre settlements in Australia and Western Europe, and from Portugal itself, which refuses to accept the incorporation of East Timor as final or legitimate and wants a referendum in the territory. U.N. human rights agencies periodically criticize Indonesia for abuses in East Timor, and the U.N. General Assembly does not accept that an act of legitimate decolonization has occurred. Since July 1995, a so-called "All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue," involving pro- and anti-Indonesian Timorese, and promoted by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has been fitfully under way.

*Dr. James Clad is professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Georgetown University and an adjunct fellow at the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, D.C. From 1990-93 he served as a senior associate in Asian investment, trade, political research, and commentary at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has written numerous books and articles on Southeast Asia.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Indonesia vs. Fretilin	276,000 200
Deaths in 1995: less than 50		
Total Deaths: 15,000-16,000 (military)		

Fretelin: Frente Revolucionária Timorense de Libertaçao e Independência (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.

1966

Lt.-Gen. Suharto takes power, forces Sukarno to resign

1975

Fretelin faction wins civil war in East Timor; Indonesia invades, annexes East Timor


1989

Indonesia opens East Timor to outsiders but denies independence

1992

Government arrests Fretelin leader Gusmao; repression continues in East Timor

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 62

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	100
DPT	94
polio	93
measles	92

% population with access to health services: 80

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 85.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 2,256

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 11

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:  
FRG/Germany 733  
UK 193

1990-95:  
FRG/Germany 1,949  
UK 301  
USA 271

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.



"THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAS RULED INDONESIA FOR 30 YEARS, IS RESPONDING TO UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL CHALLENGES WITH ILL-JUDGED REPRESSION."

THE ECONOMIST, "IF INDONESIA ERUPTS," AUG. 3, 1996—ONE WEEK AFTER AT LEAST TWO PEOPLE WERE KILLED, AS MANY AS 100 INJURED, AND 200 MORE JAILED WHEN INDONESIA'S WORST RIOTING IN 22 YEARS BROKE OUT IN JAKARTA FOLLOWING A POLICE AND GOVERNMENT-BACKED CIVILIAN RAID ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF OUSTED OPPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI TO EVICT HER SUPPORTERS

# MYANMAR/BURMA

BY JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 216,228 sq. mi.  
(676,577 sq. km.)

Population: 44,675,000

System of Government:  
Provisional Military

Languages:  
Burmese  
Indigenous

### Ethnic Divisions:

Bamar	69%
Shan	9%
Kayin	6%
Rakhine	5%
Other	11%

Religions:	
Buddhist	89%
Muslim	4%
Christian	4%
Other	3%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*. © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 159.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$13.8 billion

GDP per capita:†  
U.S. \$860

External debt:‡  
U.S. \$5.2 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.457

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 175. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

Since the Burma Communist Party (BCP) revolted against the government three months after independence in 1948, warfare between the state and ethnic opposition groups has continued. While the BCP fought to replace the democratic government, several minorities fought either for greater autonomy and power in their states or to secede from the Union of Burma. After nearly five decades, neither the democratic government nor the military dictatorships, which seized power in 1962, have been able to end civil war.

For the past eight years, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has sought to end internal warfare by fighting and negotiating. SLORC uses military pressure, primarily against civilian members of opposition ethnic groups, or cease-fires to get its enemies to halt their wars. Under SLORC's cease-fire terms, the opposition is allowed to keep its weapons, continue administering its areas and pursuing its economic activity; in exchange, they agree to stop fighting against the state.

*For the past eight years, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has sought to end internal warfare by fighting and negotiating.*

The cease-fires do not address political issues; these, SLORC declares, can only be addressed after a new constitution is adopted and a new government is in place. The first cease-fires were made in 1989 with the ethnic cadres of the BCP, who after revolting against the party, formed their own groups and accepted negotiations.

By March 1996, 15 cease-fires were signed. All but one are holding; the Karen National Progressive Party, which signed in March 1995, resumed fighting shortly after agreeing because the army violated its terms. The two remain at war.



The Karen National Union (KNU) also remains at war, even after its 1995 setbacks. Following SLORC success in splitting the Buddhist and Christian KNU members, the former, organized as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO), led attacks in January 1995 against KNU headquarters at Manerplaw. The defenders retreated across the border to Thailand or into the surrounding countryside. The DKBO, together with SLORC, continued attacks against Karen refugee camps in Thailand, thereby threatening Thai villagers and undermining Thai authority on its own territory. Throughout the year, sporadic fighting continued between the KNU and SLORC. At the same time, inconclusive talks between the two took place. The KNU rejects the cease-fire formula and demands instead that talks include discussion of politics, civil war, and national peace and reconciliation; SLORC is unwilling to alter its terms.

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947

Britain grants independence; U Nu becomes first prime minister

1962

Gen. Ne Win deposes U Nu, suspends constitution, establishes authoritarian control

1973

National referendum establishes new democratic constitution

One other group remains at war, the Shan State Army (SSA). It is the successor to the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa, the international drug dealer. On Dec. 29, 1995, he entered into a special agreement with SLORC, which transformed his army into a regional militia under its command. His action followed desertions from the MTA by Shans who felt he had abandoned their cause in favor of narcotics. The SSA has 8,000 former MTA officers and men who fight under the banner of the Shan State Progressive Party.

In December 1995, the U.N. General Assembly passed a Burma resolution calling on the secretary-general to help the Burmese achieve national reconciliation; as in 1994, when a similar resolution was adopted, SLORC rejected it on the grounds that it was interference in internal affairs. With fighting continuing, cease-fires capable of breaking down, and rejection of international help in ending the civil wars, there is no peace in Burma.

*Dr. Josef Silverstein is professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Myanmar vs. KNU vs. MTA	286,000 4,000 10,000-20,000
Deaths in 1995: greater than 500		
Total Deaths: (from 1948-50) 8,000 (from 1981-88) 5,000-8,500 (from 1993-94) greater than 1,000*		

KNU: Karen National Union

MTA: Mong Tai Army, which was formed in 1987; it is unclear, however, when the demand for independence was stated.

\* This figure includes deaths only in the Shan conflict.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.

1988

1990

1992

1995


SLORC takes power in bloody civil war, suppresses mass democratic uprisings

SLORC ignores results of democratic elections, maintains power

Thailand pressures SLORC to negotiate cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups

Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi released from six years of house arrest

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 57

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	83
DPT	77
polio	77
measles	77

% population with access to health services: 60

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 415

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 9

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*


1995: China 310

1990-95: China 1,035  
Poland 47 \*\*  
Yugoslavia 42

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

\*\* All deliveries ended in 1992 before the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: By Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.



# PHILIPPINES

BY TERESITA QUINTOS DELES

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 115,831 sq. mi.  
(300,000 sq. km.)

Population: 67,910,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
English  
Pilipino  
Tagalog

Ethnic Divisions:  
Christian 92%  
Malay 4%  
Muslim Malay 2%  
Chinese 2%  
Other 2%

Religions:  
Roman Catholic 83%  
Protestant 9%  
Muslim 5%  
Buddhist and others 3%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 172.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$63.88 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$2,600

External debt:\*  
U.S. \$36.5 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.667

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 175. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

Internal political and armed conflict continues to be a central feature of current Philippine reality. Political violence in the Philippines is rooted in the basic structures of economic exploitation and political exclusion that are a legacy of its colonial history. During the period of martial law and the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship from 1972-86, political violence developed into brutal state policy, on the one hand, and widespread, organized, armed opposition, on the other.

A major party to the armed conflict since its founding in 1969 has been the New People's Army (NPA), constituting the armed component of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and its political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF). The NPA reached its peak of more than 25,000 guerrilla fighters in 1976-78. Peace talks with the Communist rebels initiated by President Corazon Aquino shortly after she assumed power in 1986 did not prosper.

*Peace talks with the Communist rebels initiated by President Corazon Aquino shortly after she assumed power in 1986 did not prosper.*

After being elected into office in 1992, President Fidel Ramos launched a process for resuming peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and all armed opposition groups, including the NDF/CPP/NPA as represented by its leadership based in Utrecht, Netherlands. (The GRP has held separate peace talks with the Moro National Liberation Front and the military rebels.)

Exploratory talks between the GRP and the NDF between 1992 and 1995 resulted in two important joint agreements: the Hague Joint Declaration, signed Sept. 1, 1992, and the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), signed Feb. 24, 1995.



On the basis of these two agreements, the formal phase of the talks was scheduled to begin in June 1995.

Following two brief postponements, formal talks opened June 26, 1995, in Brussels, Belgium. Within a day, however, the government panel suspended the talks over the imprisoned Sotero Llamas, who had been arrested by government troops in May 1995 and whom the NDF insisted was one of their political consultants in the peace talks and was thus protected under the terms of the JASIG. This triggered the surfacing of other problems arising from unclarified provisions of the JASIG, resulting in suspension of talks throughout 1995 and the first half of 1996.

Informal discussions, were, however, reopened between the two parties. Formal talks reopened in June and included agenda items such as clarification of the framework, the principles to guide further substantive discussions, and the start of substantive discussions on reciprocal working committees on human rights and international humanitarian law. The latter constituted the first substantive topic under the Hague Declaration

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1946

U.S. grants independence;  
Manuel Roxas becomes first president

1965

Ferdinand Marcos elected president

1969

New People's Army (NPA) begins  
fight for power, land reform

and were intended to move the negotiations from procedural issues to the substantive agenda of the talks.


While the GRP claims that the NPA has decreased 16 percent in troop strength since 1987 and has gone from a high of 8,496 barangays (villages) under NPA influence in 1986 to 445 barangays in 1995, the CPP firmly denies government claims of its dwindling numbers and asserted in its statement on the 27th Founding Anniversary of the NPA (March 29, 1996) that "the personnel and arms of the NPA are increasing."

A church-related NGO, the Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities (ECDFC), makes the observation in the November-December 1995 issue of its newsletter that "military operations, aimed at curbing the insurgency problem and at protecting and safeguarding so-called development projects under the government's Philippines 2000 banner, continued amidst government-initiated peace talks, and remained a major source of displacement incidents in 1995."

Within the last few years, national democratic forces have been troubled by internal debate and dissension. In 1993, after a year of intense inner-party struggle, the CPP split into two or more factions, more popularly referred to locally under the "reaffirm-reject" labels. The Utrecht-based leadership firmly declares its "absolute leadership" over the NPA. Local peace advocates have been pursuing "citizens' third-party participation" in the peace talks and submitted proposals to the two contending panels in 1991 and then again in 1995 for a "citizens' panel" to sit directly in the talks. This is still subject to discussion by the two parties.

*Teresita Quintos Deles is executive director of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute. She was the founding convenor of the Coalition for Peace and currently serves as the secretary-general of the National Peace Conference. She served as the convenor of the International Consultation on Women as Peacemakers, held in May-June 1995 in the Philippines.*

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of the Philippines vs. NPA	106,500 8,000
Deaths in 1995: less than 100		
Total Deaths: 21,000-25,000*		

NPA: New People's Army

\* Official military sources claim that 6,500 civilians were killed during 1985-91.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.

"**SUCCESSIVE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MEET THE TWO TOP RESPONSIBILITIES OF ANY STATE: SECURING THE BORDERS AGAINST OUTSIDE INTRUDERS, AND PROTECTING THE PUBLIC AGAINST CRIME AND ANARCHY.**"



*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 29, 1996

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 66

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	89
DPT	86
polio	88
measles	87

% population with access to health services: 76

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 855

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 13

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:	South Korea	22
	USA	17
	UK	14

1990-95:	USA	336
	Italy	48
	UK	33

\*Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

1973

Marcos establishes new constitution, suspends it under martial law

1986

Corazon Aquino becomes president, puts down pro-Marcos coup attempt

1990

NPA declares limited cease-fire, resumes fighting following year

1992

U.S. forces withdraw; President Ramos offers amnesty to NPA, other dissidents

# SRI LANKA

BY DONNA HICKS

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 24,962 sq. mi.  
(64,652 sq. km.)

Population: 18,240,000

System of Government:  
Socialist Republic

Languages:  
English  
Sinhala  
Tamil

Ethnic Divisions:  
Sinhalese 74%  
Ceylon Tamil 10%  
Moor 7%  
Indian Tamil 6%  
Other 3%

Religions:  
Buddhist 69%  
Hindu 15%  
Muslim 8%  
Christian 8%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 189-90.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$10.9 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$3,200

External debt:\*  
U.S. \$7.2 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.704

\* 1994 estimated


Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 164. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been fighting for a separate Tamil state consisting of northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka since 1983. Following the assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993, the LTTE increased its attacks on Sri Lankan forces. With the August 1994 election of a moderate president, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, the government's gestures, including the partial lifting of an economic embargo against LTTE-controlled areas, led to preliminary peace talks with the LTTE in October 1994.

After the LTTE and the new Sri Lankan government (People's Alliance) agreed to a cessation of hostilities in November 1994, there was much hope that the decade-long civil war might be nearing an end. Formal peace began in late January 1995 when an official delegation from the government was sent to Jaffna to meet with the LTTE and begin discussions on unresolved issues at the core of the conflict. The government agreed to lift the embargo in the LTTE-held areas in the north, although the LTTE claimed there was little actual compliance on the part of the government.

*After the LTTE and the new Sri Lankan government (People's Alliance) agreed to a cessation of hostilities in November 1994, there was much hope that the decade-long civil war might be nearing an end.*

On April 19, 1995, the five-month cessation of hostilities ended when four LTTE suicide bombers blew up two navy vessels in Trincomalee Harbor in the eastern part of the island, resulting in many deaths. Pressure built for a military response by the government even as the president went forward with plans to release and implement a peace pack-



age offering political reforms and devolution to all sections of the country. In July and September, major military offensives, launched by government forces in the Jaffna area, resulted in the loss of civilian lives and produced some 400,000-500,000 refugees. In January 1996, the retaliatory suicide bombing by the LTTE of the financial center in Colombo caused nearly 100 civilian deaths. At mid-year, there appeared to be little hope for resumption of peace talks in the near future.

On April 19, 1996, the government extended a countrywide state of emergency and launched Riviresa II, a major military offensive in the Jaffna peninsula. The offensive resulted in the government takeover of Jaffna and adjoining areas, expelling the LTTE from its home and headquarters. Efforts were under way in early July by the government for the return of the refugees to Jaffna. Defense Ministry sources reported that during the past year, as a result of the conflict, more than 6,300 people were killed, including more than 1,000 civilians.

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1948	1956	1971
Britain grants independence; UNP party forms first coalition government	SLFP party wins elections	Government suppresses JVP uprising


Amid continued fighting, the LTTE renewed its call for third-party mediated talks with the government. In the midst of its military offensive, the government, expressed reluctance to re-enter bilateral talks with the LTTE. As of mid-1996, Tamil, Muslim, and Sinhalese civilians suffered displacement, violence, and the threat of violence as clashes between the government and LTTE continued.

*Dr. Donna Hicks is the deputy director of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.*

## INN ACTION

International Alert, a London-based NGO, has worked to develop a strong will for peace throughout the various sectors of Sri Lankan society. Steps include collaborating with the National Peace Council, training prominent journalists on the reporting of conflict, and training teachers in conflict resolution in conjunction with Colombo University. International Alert has also worked to build strong channels of communication between the warring parties in Sri Lanka and with parliamentarians from all parties to identify the strategies for peace. INN member Kumar Rupesinghe, secretary-general of International Alert, helped establish the Common Ground Media Project in Sri Lanka in August 1995. The project included a series of 10 nationally televised programs that presented two opposing viewpoints on a variety of issues. The debates, facilitated by trained mediators, explored areas of agreement between people from different walks of life and from different ethnic backgrounds in Sri Lanka.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 72

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	86
DPT	88
polio	88
measles	84

% population with access to health services: 93\*

\* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81, 85.

"THE LATEST MILITARY OFFENSIVE HAS COST THE GOVERNMENT DEARLY IN ECONOMIC TERMS. DEFENSE SPENDING, WHICH ROSE TO \$600 MILLION IN 1995, WILL RISE EVEN FURTHER, TO \$775 MILLION IN 1996."



Kalpana Isaac, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Divide," *Current History*, April 1996

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 504

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 28

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995: Ukraine 43

1990-95: China 115  
Ukraine 47  
Russia/USSR 21

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Sri Lanka vs. LTTE	126,000 6,000-10,000
Deaths in 1995: greater than 5,000		
Total Deaths: greater than 32,000		

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.

1983

LTTE begins fight for separate Tamil state

1987

Indian troops sent to monitor cease-fire between government and LTTE

1990

Indian troops withdraw; clashes resume

1993

President Premadasa assassinated; LTTE-government fighting kills 2,000

# TAJIKISTAN

BY HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 55,251 sq. mi.  
(143,100 sq. km.)

Population: 6,073,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Tajik  
Uzbek  
Russian

Ethnic Divisions:  
Tajik 62%  
Uzbek 24%  
Russian 8%  
Other 6%

Religions:  
Sunni Muslim 80%  
Shiite Muslim 5%  
Other 15%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 195.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$2.2 billion

GDP per capita:  
U.S. \$1,400

External debt, 1993 estimated:  
U.S. \$45.1 million

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.643

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 165. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

Tajikistan, the poorest of the former Soviet republics, declared independence in August 1991 but was unprepared both politically and economically. In 1992 and early 1993, this country of 5.5 million experienced a vicious internal conflict resulting in deaths with estimates ranging from 25,000 to 200,000 victims and an estimated one-in-seven fleeing their homes.

The battle lines were drawn in complex ways—between clan-based regional power centers aspiring to rule, between traditional-minded leaders bred in the Communist system and new democrats, between militant Islamists and the government. In April 1994, an emissary of the U.N. secretary-general launched negotiations between the government and the opposition—a coalition of secular democratic and national forces and both political and military Islamists.

*The battle lines were drawn in complex ways—between clan-based regional power centers aspiring to rule, between traditional-minded leaders bred in the Communist system and new democrats, between militant Islamists and the government.*

The negotiations continued haltingly through March 1996, having produced several cease-fires and some agreement on the direction of national reconciliation but no comprehensive peace agreement. A protocol signed in August 1995 set an agenda for the peace talks. But participants in nonofficial dialogue agreed that the primary obstacle to peace was the absence of an under-



standing on sharing power across regions, political movements, and nationalities. The narrowly based negotiating teams in the official peace process are locked in a struggle for power, and the negotiations remained deadlocked as of mid-1996. Citizens began to call for a broadening of both negotiating teams.

Periodic violence continued to result from clashes between Afghanistan-based Islamic groups and Russian and Tajikistani border forces, as well as from guerrilla action within the country. Individual security within the country remained uncertain with periodic kidnappings generating a sense of daily danger.

By March 1995, a constitution had been approved in a popular referendum and a new president and parliament elected, albeit with much of the opposition in exile, many Tajikistanis still displaced from their homes, and a government that tightly controlled the nominating process and limited open elections. Despite the general judgment that the elections did not meet international standards, the opposition decided to accept the elected government as setting the framework within which peace had to be negotiated. Some opposition parties and

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953

Stalin dies; top party and government posts increasingly given to non-Russians

1964

Khrushchev dismissed; Brezhnev becomes Soviet leader

1970

Russian repression fosters growth of Islamic influence and violence

papers remained banned, and the economy continued to deteriorate. The government remained narrowly based in one southern region—the Kulyab.

Since the beginning of 1996, leaders of three significant regional uprisings demanded dismissal of officials imposed by the government from the Kulyab where the government's power base lies. In each case, the government conceded. These uprisings and a spiraling public disillusionment with both the government and the opposition negotiating teams provide strong evidence of rising popular pressure for broadening participation both in the government and in the peace process.

*Harold H. Saunders, INN member and director of International Affairs at the Kettering Foundation, co-chairs the Inter-Tajik Dialogue within the framework of the Dartmouth Conference. A nonofficial group of citizens from different factions, the Dialogue met 16 times between March 1993 and June 1996. Saunders was a member of the National Security Council staff, flew on the Kissinger shuttles in the Middle East, and was assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs during negotiation of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Tajikistan, CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan/ CIS Border Troops* vs. United Tajik Opposition**	2,000-3,000 25,000 na
Deaths in 1995: greater than 500		
Total Deaths: 20,000-50,000		

\*The CIS operation includes Russian border guards and peacekeeping troops with minor reinforcements from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

\*\*The major groups constituting the United Tajik Opposition (formerly the Popular Democratic Army) are the Islamic Resistance Movement, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and the Rastakhez People's Movement.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.



## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 70

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	69
DPT	82
polio	74
measles	97

% population with access to health services: na

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 66

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 11

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

Imports of major conventional weapons not listed from 1991-95

"NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT, THE OPPOSITION OR THE PEOPLE... ARE LIKELY TO FORGET THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1992. ESTIMATES OF THE DEAD DURING THIS PERIOD RANGE FROM 20,000 TO 100,000 [AND] ALMOST A FIFTH OF THE POPULATION OF MORE THAN 5 MILLION WERE FORCED FROM THEIR HOMES."



Bruce Pannier, "A Familiar Voice Demands Peace in Tajikistan," Open Media Research Institute, June 19, 1996

\*Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1978

Anti-Russian riots and violence erupt over Soviet-Afghan intervention

1985

USSR leader Gorbachev initiates anti-corruption reform campaign

1992

Pro-communist Russian-backed troops deploy, halt civil war that kills over 25,000

1994

Cease-fire ends renewed fighting; 16,000 killed despite CIS presence

# FOCUS: LANDMINES

by Ian Markus Jefferson

The extent of the present landmine crisis would be difficult to overstate. In comparison to the total number of mines planted around the world (85 to 110 million) and their annual proliferation rate (2 to 5 million), the United Nations' 1994 efforts in mine clearance, which destroyed about 100,000 of the deadly devices, seem almost insignificant. As the prevalence of mines has grown and improvements in technology have made them easier to deploy, more difficult to detect, and cheaper to produce, recent changes in the nature of warfare have also contributed to the increased threat that mines pose to innocent individuals.

With conflicts increasingly being waged internally and entire countries becoming battlefields, fighting has, inevitably, begun to affect civilians directly. Inexpensive mines, a vital weapon to many cash-starved military forces, are frequently placed in areas of high civilian concentration. Even more hideous, the resurgence of ethnic conflict has transformed civilians into actual targets in some areas.

The resultant toll in human suffering is staggering. Landmines kill or maim more than 26,000 people a year, 90 percent of whom are civilians. In a country such as Cambodia, where at least one mine exists for each of its 8 million inhabitants, one in every 236 individuals has had a limb amputated (in the United States, the ratio is one in every 22,000).

To make matters worse, victims often do not receive proper medical treatment for their injuries, as the majority of the most heavily mined countries are in the developing world.

## The Drive for an International Ban

The idea of a comprehensive ban on landmines stems from the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions—a series of refinements to humanitarian law designed to minimize suffering in war. A Landmines Protocol was added to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to restrict the use of such weapons. Proponents of the international movement to ban landmines have asserted that those guidelines outlined by the Additional Protocols and the CCW condemn the indiscriminate and brutal nature of such weapons as landmines and demand restrictions intended to protect civilians. Further, many point to international bans on chemical and biological weapons, also enacted due to the inherent inhumaneness of such implements of war, as precedent for similar legislation on landmines.

The number of individuals and organizations behind the campaign for a comprehensive ban has grown substantially in recent

years; even the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is not an advocacy organization, announced its support in 1995. This increase in attention and pressure has made the landmines issue a top priority in global politics. In July 1995, the United Nations convened a three-day conference on the subject and secured nearly \$20 million for a mine-clearing fund. INN member Cyrus Vance, former U.S. secretary of state and head of the U.S. delegation to the meeting, insisted that while the political will did not yet exist for a global ban, measures designed to reduce, control, and eventually eliminate the problem should be enacted. Many of the participants in the U.N. landmine conference looked to an upcoming review of the CCW as the best means of achieving such goals. Yet, three rounds of CCW talks

(held in September 1995 and in January and May 1996) produced nothing more than a new set of restrictions on the use of landmines. In light of such failure, proponents of an outright ban have asserted that only their approach can succeed.


## The Need for U.S. Leadership

The United States has played a mixed role in the campaign against landmines. Since 1992, when Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) passed through Congress a U.S. moratorium on the export of landmines, more than 20 countries have followed suit with similar moratoria of

their own. After President Bill Clinton first announced in a September 1994 speech that the eventual elimination of all landmines had become a top U.S. goal, the U.N. General Assembly passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution echoing this stance.

Yet, America has failed to take the lead on the complete banning of landmine use. Thus, as Sen. Leahy has long insisted, U.S. leadership on the issue of landmines remains vital. Although a comprehensive ban would be nearly impossible to monitor, and many countries would refuse to agree to such a pact, it would represent an effective means of at least limiting the threat of landmines to civilian populations. While the international community did not, until recently, attempt to enforce the ban on chemical and biological weapons, the use of these abhorrent weapons has been rare. There are few weapons more devastating and malevolent than landmines. An international ban on the use of these weapons is long overdue.



Ian Jefferson, an intern in The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program during the 1996 Spring and Summer semesters, is expected to graduate from Emory University in May 1997.



# CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

CONFlict REGION:

COLOMBIA  
GUATEMALA  
PERU




### GUATEMALA

IDPs: 200,000  
Refugees: 34,150  
Mexico: 32,000  
Belize: 2,150  
RLS:  
Mexico: 50,000-100,000



### COLOMBIA

IDPs: 600,000  
Refugees: 100  
Ecuador: 100  
RLS:  
Venezuela: 30,000\*  
Ecuador: 6,000\*



### PERU

IDPs: 480,000  
Refugees: 450  
Bolivia: 350  
Chile: 100

**Refugees:** These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

**IDPs:** Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

**RLS:** Persons in "refugee-like situations" are those who may fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries, and thus who may be refugees, but who are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1996, Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

1 square inch = 395,000 square miles  
1 square centimeter = 159,000 square kilometers

na: Figures not available for given country

\* Sources vary widely in numbers reported

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

**C**entral and South America maintained a relatively low level of strife, with only three major armed conflicts waged for the fourth straight year—two less than occurred in 1990. Despite brief interstate disputes, such as the conflict between Ecuador and Peru, the overall level of violence in the region continued to decline. Among the major armed conflicts, negotiations were attempted in Colombia and Guatemala but not in Peru. The Peruvian government's vigorous attack against guerrilla forces, however,

helped keep battle-related deaths in that country to less than 500. Turning to the region as a whole, Official Development Assistance (ODA) remained at an annual rate of roughly \$10 billion, while economic growth and private investment increased from 1992 to 1994. Meanwhile, under-5 mortality rates continued to be the lowest in the developing world, having dropped from 15 percent in 1960 to just 5 percent by 1993.

"HUMAN SECURITY IS A MATTER OF HUMAN DIGNITY. IT IS A CHILD WHO DOES NOT DIE, A DISEASE THAT DID NOT SPREAD, AN ETHNIC TENSION THAT DID NOT EXPLODE, A DISSIDENT WHO WAS NOT SILENCED, A HUMAN SPIRIT THAT WAS NOT CRUSHED."



Dr. Oscar Arias,  
Nobel laureate, Dec. 15, 1995

Human Development Indicators			
Country	% access to safe water (1990-95)	Total adult literacy rate (% in 1990)	Population growth rate (1980-94)
Colombia	79	55	2.7
Guatemala	32	42	3.0
Peru	46	34	3.2
Conflict Countries Average	52.3	43.7	2.30*
Overall Latin American and Caribbean Average	72.0	82.1	2.02

\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-81.

Arms Flows						
Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Colombia	17	30	22	59	78	74
Peru	102	63	124	92	60	0

No imports of major conventional weapons were recorded for Guatemala for 1990-95.

Source: SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

Aid Flows		
Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab countries to developing countries and territories (U.S. \$ million for 1994).		
Colombia		127
Guatemala		224
Peru		416
Total Latin American & Caribbean	\$	5,710

\* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which includes 26 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Source: © Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1996, *Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee*. Report 1995, A54-56. Reproduced by permission of the OECD.

### Under-5 Mortality Rates

*Latin American and Caribbean countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.*

Rank	Country	Rate
37	Haiti	127
45	Bolivia	110
58	Guatemala	70
60	Nicaragua	68
63	Brazil	61
64	Peru	58
66	Ecuador	57
67	El Salvador	56
72	Honduras	54
78	Dominican Republic	45
85	Paraguay	34
95	Argentina	27
100	Venezuela	24
105	Uruguay	21
108	Panama	20
109	Trinidad & Tobago	20
112	Colombia	19
115	Costa Rica	16
116	Chile	15
122	Jamaica	13

Conflict Countries Average 49.0\*  
Overall Latin American and Caribbean Average 44.0

\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-81.

# COLOMBIA

BY BECKY CASTLE

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 440,831 sq. mi.  
(1,141,748 sq. km.)

Population: 34,870,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Language:  
Spanish

Ethnic Divisions:	
Mestizo	58%
White	20%
Mulatto	14%
Black	4%
Other	4%

Religions:	
Roman Catholic	95%
Other	5%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 79.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$52.4 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$6,600

External debt:  
U.S. \$19.1 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.836

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 128; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 155.

Although allegations that President Ernesto Samper knowingly accepted money from drug cartels to finance his 1994 winning presidential campaign dominated Colombian news in 1995-96, the kidnappings, extortion, assassinations, and armed strikes of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) shared the headlines.

Some of the more sensational activities included FARC's murder of 16 former People's Liberation Army (EPL) members for reintegrating into society, the assassination of two U.S. missionaries, the killings of the former governor of Cesar Department and a former conservative presidential candidate, and the murder of five mayors in Antioquia Department in the first five months of 1996. Although the rural Antioquia and Uraba Departments continue to be a focal point for guerrilla violence, in October 1995 FARC's urban arm outlined plans to increase its presence in Bogota.

For the last three decades, since the inception of the ELN and FARC in the mid-1960s, the Colombian government has struggled to end the guerrilla movements. Although the Colombian government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB), a group which often acts as a FARC and ELN clearinghouse for negotiations with the government, have not held peace talks since César Gaviria's government and the CGSB suspended talks in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in 1992, the past year was characterized by several attempts to establish the setting for a peace agreement.

In early June 1995, with the help of Costa Rican mediation, President Samper's commissioner for peace, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, and the CGSB agreed that peace talks should begin soon and that



the initial point for their further negotiation should include the "humanization of the conflict." Negotiations stalled, however, with the assassination of two U.S. missionaries by FARC in late June 1995 and the ELN's refusal to negotiate with the government while it still offered rewards for information leading to guerrilla arrests.

*For the last three decades, since the inception of the ELN and FARC in the mid-1960s, the Colombian government has struggled to end the guerrilla movements.*

The Costa Rican government again facilitated negotiations in late March 1996. By the end of April, however, both sides were disenchanted with the prospect of peace talks. The CGSB was threatening not to engage in discussions with Samper because of his lack of moral stature and his govern-

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1949

Period of La Violencia lawlessness claims 280,000 lives over next decade

1953

Gen. Rojas overthrows civilian President Gomez

1957

Five-man military junta deposes Rojas

ment's expressed indignation at the increased violence, in particular FARC's execution and burning of 16 peasants in May.

While both FARC and ELN have Marxist roots, both movements have taken on a "capitalist" dimension in recent years. Several Colombian government agencies conducted a joint study on guerrilla businesses and calculated that the CGSB had revenues of 490 billion pesos (about U.S. \$580 million) and profits of 432 billion pesos (about U.S. \$510 million), exceeding the profits of Colombia's largest legal company. The largest sources of guerrilla income are from the poppy industry and drug trafficking, followed by kidnapping and extortion. The guerrillas purportedly engage in these "business" activities to finance their movements, but it is estimated that they now have sufficient funds to run for 20 years even with no further "business activity."

Becky Castle joined The Carter Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program as program coordinator in February 1996. Prior to working at the Center, Castle promoted Northern Ireland in the Southeastern United States and in 1993 worked in Costa Rica as a Rotary Fellow for Fundación Mujer, an NGO which provides training and loans to small businesses.

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Colombia vs. FARC vs. ELN	146,400 5,700 2,500
Deaths in 1995: less than 1,000		
Total Deaths: na*		

FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

\*In the past three decades the civil wars of Colombia have claimed a total of some 30,000 lives.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.

1970

ANAPO challenges election results; M-19 group launches guerrilla warfare

1979

United States, Colombia sign extradition treaty


1984

National state of emergency called amid political, drug-related violence

1991

FARC, ELN launch guerrilla attacks against government

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 69

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	99
DPT	91
polio	95
measles	87

% population with access to health services: 60

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81, 85.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 1,178

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 34

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:  
USA 29  
Spain 28  
Canada 17

1990-95:  
USA 128  
Russia/USSR 48  
Spain 35

\* Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: By Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 265. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.



Linda Diebel of *The Toronto Star* in *World Press Review*, October 1996

# GUATEMALA

BY DAVID CARROLL

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 42,042 sq. mi.  
(108,889 sq. km.)

Population: 10,420,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Language:  
Spanish  
Amerindian

Ethnic Divisions:  
Ladino 56%  
(or Mestizo—  
mixed Indian  
and European  
ancestry)  
Amerindian 44%

Religions:  
Roman  
Catholic  
Protestant  
Tribal  
Religionist

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*  
© 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L.  
96-S-107, 121.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$11.7 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$3,800

External debt:\*  
U.S. \$3.1 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.591

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance*  
1995-96 (London: by Permission of  
Oxford University Press, 1995),  
128; UNDP, *Human Development Report* 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

The civil conflict that has raged in Guatemala since the 1960s has claimed 150,000 lives and 45,000 missing in fighting between the government and the four revolutionary guerrilla groups that comprise the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The conflict reached its height in the early 1980s when the military regime of Gen. Rios Montt began a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, displacing hundreds of thousands of peasants, and implementing a system of civilian patrols (PACs). Over the years, thousands of deaths, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have been linked to the government and armed death squads.

Although the conflict continues, 1995-96 has seen slow but continued progress in the peace negotiations that first began in 1990. With the support of a U.N. mission (MINUGUA), the Group of Friends countries, the Guatemalan Civil Society Assembly, and others, agreements were reached on several of the major issues on the agenda: human rights, indigenous identity and rights, and resettlement of refugees. Significant progress was also made on socio-economic issues and land tenure/agrarian reform.

*Over the years, thousands of deaths, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have been linked to the government and armed death squads.*

Nevertheless, the government of President Ramiro de Leon Carpio, the former human rights ombudsman who came to power in June 1993 after ex-President Jorge Serrano's attempted auto-coup, remained severely constrained by the military and was unable to curb human rights abuses. A U.N. report in late 1995 concluded that the human rights situation was actually worsening. The most



dramatic incident was the October 1995 massacre in Xamán in which 11 Indian villagers were killed and 30 wounded by an army patrol, an event which threatened the peace negotiations and the elections in November 1995.

In August 1995, the URNG declared a cease-fire for the November elections, and for the first time ever encouraged its supporters to participate in the process and to vote for the leftist New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG). In the January 1996 run-off, Alvaro Arzú of the National Advancement Party (PAN) defeated Alfonso Portillo, the candidate of Rios Montt's Guatemalan Republican Party (FRG). Although abstentionism remained a serious problem, with Indian communities facing many obstacles to participate, the FDNG emerged as an important third force, winning six seats in the 80-seat Congress.

President Arzú moved quickly to resume peace talks, and an agreement was signed in May 1996 on socio-economic issues and land tenure/agrarian reform. Constitutional reform, the role of the military, and demobilization, including issues such as amnesty and the dissolution of the PACs, still require negotiated settlements.

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1954

U.S.-sponsored military coup deposes civilian government

1963

Col. Azurdia suspends constitution, dissolves legislature

1967

URNG launches guerrilla campaign against military government

Overall, the climate for the peace process is positive. Despite continued opposition to peace accords, the hard-line military factions and the conservative agrarian elite are being checked by moderate military and political leaders and by the growing strength of civil society.

*Dr. David Carroll is associate director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center, where he has worked extensively on democratization and development projects and has participated in the program's election-monitoring missions in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States.*

## GOVERNMENT, REBELS SIGN PACT

MEXICO CITY, Sept. 19 (UPI)—The Guatemalan government and leftist rebels signed an agreement in Mexico City Thursday cementing the role of the army after the country's civil war, one of the most controversial issues in the country's peace process.


"This is the agreement that lays the groundwork for reconciliation and for the development of Guatemala," Guatemalan President Alvaro Arzú said in a recorded message played during the signing ceremony at the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

Rolando Moran, of the rebel Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, said the accord decided the last of the "vital issues" in the U.N.-moderated negotiation process to end 35 years of civil conflict in Guatemala.

Guatemalan Defense Minister Gen. Julio Balconi said Sunday that under the agreements, the armed forces would reduce their number of 43,000 regular troops by 33 percent during a period between six and 12 months.

*United Press International, Sept. 19, 1996*

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*,  
(London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

"GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TAKEN A BIG STEP TOWARD ENDING THE LONGEST CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WHICH HAS COST MORE THAN 120,000 LIVES."

*World Press Review, July 1996*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Guatemala vs. URNG	44,200 800-1,100
Deaths in 1995: less than 200		
Total Deaths: less than 2,800 (military) less than 43,500 (civilian)		

URNG: Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalecta (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity). URNG is a coalition of three main groups: Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), and Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA).

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 65

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	70
DPT	71
polio	73
measles	66

% population with access to health services: 34

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 123

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): na

Top major conventional weapons exporters:<sup>\*</sup>

Imports not listed from 1986-95

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: By Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 265. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1974

1985

1987

1993

MLN leader Gen. Garcia takes power amid right-wing violence against government

Return to civilian government

Government holds first peace talks with URNG

President Serrano goes into exile following failed coup against his government

# PERU

BY KIRK GREGERSEU

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 496,225 sq. mi.  
(1,285,216 sq. km.)

Population: 23,095,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Language:  
Quechua  
Spanish  
Aymara

Ethnic Divisions:  
Amerindian 45%  
Mestizo 37%  
White 15%  
Other 3%

Religion:  
Roman Catholic

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*  
© 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L.  
96-S-107, 171.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$41.8 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$3,800

External debt:\*  
U.S. \$21 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.709

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 223; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

During the 1980s, Peru experienced a dramatic wave of violence instigated by the country's principal insurgency movements—the Shining Path, which took up arms in 1980, and the Tupac Amaro Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which started its campaign against the Peruvian government in 1984. Fueled primarily by the violent attacks of the Maoist-based Shining Path, internal conflict cost the country an estimated 26,000 lives and \$20 billion between 1980 and 1992.

Frustrated with deteriorating political and economic conditions, Peruvians elected political outsider Alberto Fujimori to power in 1990. Two years into his presidency, Fujimori dissolved the Congress and courts, called a state of emergency, and granted Peruvian security forces unchecked authority to counter the activities of the Shining Path and the MRTA. Hardline measures implemented by the government devastated both groups and led to the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman and much of the group's central committee. Fujimori's aggressive approach also led to countless human rights abuses and a general bypass of due process.

Although the number and intensity of attacks have decreased significantly since Fujimori began his campaign against terrorism, some killings, bombings, and propaganda actions—primarily on the part of the Shining Path—have continued through 1995 and 1996.

The Shining Path has maintained its influence in several key interior regions, including the coca-producing Upper Huallaga Valley and Ayacucho, the birthplace of the movement. However, during the April 1995 presidential and November 1995 municipal contests, the group remained largely quiet.



*Although the number and intensity of attacks have decreased significantly since Fujimori began his campaign against terrorism, some killings, bombings, and propaganda actions—primarily on the part of the Shining Path—have continued through 1995 and 1996.*

The government continued its vigorous assault on the leftist guerrillas during 1995 and 1996. In December 1995, anti-terrorist police raided an MRTA stronghold in Lima, capturing the group's second in command. This blow and convictions of more than 150 suspected MRTA guerrillas by Peruvian military tribunals during 1995 and early 1996 have extinguished the movement. The use of anonymous military courts to convict suspected members of the MRTA and Shining Path, plus a controversial

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1950

Gen. Odria elected president

1962

Gen. Godoy takes power in military coup

1968


Military government adopts socialist Inca Plan for economic and social development

amnesty for members of the Peruvian security forces accused of human rights violations, continues to prompt strong criticism—including recent charges from the Organization of American States Human Rights Commission—about the government's dismal human rights record and policy of military impunity.

*Kirk Gregerseu is program officer for Latin America and the Caribbean with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Washington, D.C. He has worked on NDI programs in Peru, Guyana, Mexico, and Nicaragua. He is a graduate of Tufts University and a former Fulbright scholar to Costa Rica.*

## COUNCIL PROMOTES DEMOCRACY, PEACE IN AMERICAS

Fernando Belaunde Terry, president of Peru from 1963-68 and 1980-85, is one of 27 current and former heads of government from throughout the Americas who belong to the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government. Established in November 1986 at a meeting chaired by former U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, the Council's goals are to reinforce democracy in the Americas, promote multilateral efforts to resolve conflict in the Western Hemisphere, and advance regional economic cooperation. A pioneer in mediating and observing elections, the Council or its representatives have observed 14 elections in nine countries, including Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guyana, Suriname, the United States, Paraguay, and Mexico. Chaired by President Carter and based in the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center, the Council also has worked to resolve the property problem in Nicaragua and the Ecuador-Peru territorial dispute among other issues.



"SHINING PATH HAS BEEN FAIRLY DORMANT SINCE THE ARREST OF ABIMAEI GUZMAN, WHOM FOLLOWERS CALLED THE DIRECT SUCCESSOR OF MARX, LENIN, AND MAO—IN OTHER WORDS, GOD INCARNATE...MRTA IS A MANY-HEADED HYDRA, AND IT WILL NOT DIE EACH TIME ONE OF ITS LEADERS FALLS."

Fernando Rospigliosi, *Caretas de Lima*, in *World Press Review*, March 1996

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Peru vs. Sendero Luminoso vs. MRTA	115,000 3,000 500
Deaths in 1995: less than 500*		
Total Deaths: greater than 28,000		

Sendero Luminoso: Shining Path

MRTA: Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)

\* Of the reported deaths in 1995, fewer than 50 occurred between the government of Peru and the MRTA.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," *SIPRI Yearbook 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 66

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	91
DPT	87
polio	87
measles	75

% population with access to health services: 75\*

\* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 730

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 31

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995: Imports not listed for 1995

1990-95: Nicaragua 152  
Russia/USSR 128  
Ukraine 56

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 267. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1980

Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path forms, joins others fighting Belaunde government

1984

Rebel group MRTA begins violent power struggle

1990

Alberto Fujimori elected on reform platform, cracks down on Shining Path

1992

Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman captured, receives life sentence

# FOCUS: CHILDREN AND WAR

by Shara Frase

"The weather is growing very cold now. No longer can you hear the singing of the birds, only the sound of children crying for a lost mother or father, a brother or a sister. We are children without a country and without hope." —Dunja, age 14, from *I Dream of Peace*. (*UNICEF/Harper Collins, 1994*)

War is a devastating force whose impact on civilians is far greater than on the armies of the warring parties themselves. UNICEF notes in *The State of the World's Children 1996* that civilians accounted for approximately 14 percent of war-time deaths in World War I, 70 percent in World War II, and by 1990, the total had reached almost 90 percent. Among these civilians are millions of children, who have always suffered in times of war but who have increasingly come under fire in recent years as more conflicts take place within nations rather than between them.

In the post-Cold War conflict, battles are fought not in the skies above or across distant borders, but in towns and villages. The weapons of choice are not always the high-tech missiles of Desert Storm but light and cheap guns, inexpensive landmines and mortars, even rocks and machetes. These realities place the noncombatant, and especially the child, in the middle of the fighting, used more and more not only as targets but as shields, weapons, recruits, and hostages in ethnic and other civil wars.

## Easy Targets

More than 2 million children have been killed in the last decade by war, and indirect effects of war such as famine and malnutrition are responsible for millions more child deaths. Those who escape death by bullets, bombs, or starvation face other horrible fates. Child victims of war include 4 to 5 million disabled, more than 1 million orphaned or separated from their parents, and some 10 million psychologically traumatized. Children represent more than half of the 53 million people who have been forced to flee their homes from war.

Military commanders have deliberately targeted children in war. There are reports of landmines being disguised as toys and planted near schools and playgrounds where children find them. In ethnic wars, enemy groups attempt to justify the mass slaughter of children, such as the 300,000 killed in Rwanda in 1994, by viewing children as the potential future enemy. Conscription of children as young as 10 has been reported in some countries in Africa. In 1988, some 200,000 children fought in wars, and recently, thousands of children under 16 have fought in wars in as many as 25 countries. Light and efficient weapons can easily turn inexperienced children into killers: A child of 10 can strip and reassemble an AK-47 rifle, which can cost as little as \$6 in West Africa. Child soldiers have been forced to kill members of their own families and walk ahead of advancing armies as human shields.

The prominent disregard for human life during wartime extends readily and easily to include children in all its aspects. Children are more susceptible to disease and malnutrition, and children die in large numbers without access to food and medicine. Shortages of these supplies are frequently the result of delays in humanitarian relief convoys or flights held up by insecurity, mined roads, and government or rebel intransigence. Small hands quickly lose skir-

mishes in refugee camps over food. Landmines that might merely incapacitate an adult can kill or severely maim small children.

The consequence of this lack of concern for child welfare in war is the creation of an adult who potentially knows only paths to violence and has only disregard for human life. As INN member and Swedish Committee for UNICEF President Lisbet Palme said in the 1991-92 *State of World Conflict Report*, "The suffering of children in war—through death, injury, trauma, disruption of education, and a drop in basic health—bleeds the country's future. This human suffering has an impact on a war-stricken society for many generations to come."

## Protecting the Unprotected


The international community has begun to address the needs of the child in wartime. The 1990 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child recognized the precarious and unprotected status of the child and accepted a universal standard for the child's basic human rights, including the right to survival and development as well as protection from abuse and neglect. The Convention also explicitly condemns involvement of children under 15 in hostilities and prohibits recruitment of children under age 15.

Only six countries have yet to ratify the Convention—including the United States, which has passed but not ratified it—making it the most widely accepted international document ever. The challenge now is to bridge the gap between acceptance and implementation—a step made even more difficult in wartime. Nevertheless, the Convention is a vehicle for the exercise of children's rights, and is an important step toward protecting children from the impact of war.

Recognizing the need to build on the Convention, UNICEF announced in *The State of the World's Children 1996* an Anti-War Agenda, which outlines a series of recommendations designed to promote the welfare of the child and the child's family. The challenge is now for governments and NGOs to take direct responsibility for the protection of children in war by putting into practice the articles of the Convention and the recommendations of the Anti-War Agenda.

States party to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols and to the Convention on the Rights of the Child have a responsibility to respect international law and encourage the spread of humane practices which consider the well-being of the child in wartime. Only then can the rhetoric of these agreements translate into reality for the hundreds of thousands of children affected by armed conflict each year.

Shara Frase served as a temporary research assistant in The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, where she helped produce the 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report and monitored the civil conflict in Sudan.




CONFlict REGION:  
**EUROPE**

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CROATIA

RUSSIA (CHECHNYA)



### BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

IDPs:	1,300,000
Refugees:	905,500*
Former Yugoslavia:	465,400*
Serbia/Montenegro:	250,000
Croatia:	184,400
Slovenia:	24,000*
Macedonia:	7,000
Europe:	440,100
Germany:	320,000*
Other European states:	120,100*

### RUSSIA (CHECHNYA)

IDPs:	na
Refugees:	40,100-40,600*
Russia:	33,800
Kazakhstan:	5,000-5,500
Ukraine:	1,300
Kyrgyzstan:	na

**Refugees:** These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

**IDPs:** Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

1 square inch = 213,000 square miles

1 square centimeter = 86,000 square kilometers

na: Figures not available for given country

\* Sources vary widely in numbers reported

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey*, 1996  
(Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

**E**urope experienced another decline in major armed conflicts, falling from five in 1994 to just three last year. By the end of 1995, fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia had come to an end with the signing of the Dayton peace accords, and the only major armed strife on the continent was the sporadic fighting between Russia and rebel forces in Chechnya. Although the U.S. Committee for Refugees reported that the number of asylum applicants in Europe decreased for the third consecutive year, hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people from Bosnia remained scattered throughout Europe, Central Asia, and within the

former Yugoslavia. The fighting in Chechnya was by far the most brutal of the past year, killing as many as 40,000 people—more than twice that of any other conflict. On the positive side, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics received the largest increase in development aid, and assistance to the former Yugoslav states rose from virtually nothing to approximately \$2 billion per year between 1992 and 1994. Deterioration in the health and welfare of Eastern Europeans, however, led to a rise in child mortality rates in Albania, Russia, and the Ukraine, and in the latter two countries the life expectancy of males dropped by five years between 1989 and 1993.

### Cost of Conflict

European countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all European countries for 1994 defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Some figures may have been rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

Rank	Country	%GDP
1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	69.2
2	Federal Rep. of Yugoslavia	23.1
3	Croatia	10.2
4	Russia	9.6*
5	Azerbaijan	8.7
6	Greece	5.7
7	Cyprus	5.4
8	Lithuania	3.9
9	Estonia	3.8
	Latvia	3.8
	Moldova	3.8
12	United Kingdom	3.4
13	France	3.3
14	Turkey	3.2
15	Armenia	3.1
	Norway	3.1
17	Romania	2.9
18	Albania	2.7
Total NATO Europe		2.4
Total Other Europe		6.1
United States		4.3
Canada		1.7

\* Figures provided for Russia as a whole rather than for Chechnya specifically.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 264-265.

### CONTINENTAL CONTRIBUTION

Fighting in the Balkans has engulfed Europe like no other warfare since the end of World War II. By the beginning of 1995, military personnel involved in the conflict totaled roughly 40,000. Listed below are total contributions from European and other countries as of Nov. 30, 1994:

Country	Police	Troops	Observers
Belgium	na	1,038	6
Czech Republic	na	971	37
Denmark	45	1,230	14
Finland	10	463	12
France	41	4,493	11
Ireland	20	na	9
Lithuania	na	na	32
Netherlands	10	1,803	48
Norway	31	826	39
Poland	29	1,109	30
Portugal	39	na	12
Russia	36	1,464	22
Slovak Republic	na	582	na
Spain	na	1,267	19
Sweden	35	1,212	19
Switzerland	6	na	6
United Kingdom	na	3,405	19
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>38,130</b>	<b>680</b>

Other major contributors (Troop totals only):

Jordan (3,367); Pakistan (3,017); Canada (2,091); Malaysia (1,550); Turkey (1,464); Bangladesh (1,235); Ukraine (1,147); Kenya (967); Nepal (899); Argentina (854); United States (748); Egypt (427); New Zealand (249); Indonesia (220)

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include infantry, logistics, engineering, medical, staff, and other personnel.

Source: UNPROFOR website [http://ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unprofor\\_un.html](http://ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unprofor_un.html)

### Under-5 Mortality Rates

European countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

Rank	Country	Rate
74	Azerbaijan	51
80	Albania	41
83	Moldova	36
88	Armenia	32
89	Macedonia	32
91	Russia	31*
93	Romania	29
94	Georgia	27
97	Latvia	26
98	Ukraine	25
101	Estonia	23
102	Yugoslavia	23
104	Belarus	21
107	Lithuania	20
110	Bulgaria	19
113	Bosnia and Herzegovina	17
114	Poland	16
117	Slovakia	15
119	Croatia	14

Conflict Countries Average 20.7\*\*  
 Overall European Average 17.2  
 East European Average 24.1  
 West European Average 7.8

\* Figures provided for entire Russian Federation rather than Chechnya specifically.

\*\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-81.

"THERE LIES BEFORE US, IF WE CHOOSE, CONTINUAL PROGRESS IN HAPPINESS, KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM. SHALL WE, INSTEAD, CHOOSE DEATH, BECAUSE WE CANNOT FORGET OUR QUARRELS?"



—Bertrand Russell, founder of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, a nuclear disarmament advocacy organization which received the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize

# BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BY SUSAN WOODWARD

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 19,741 sq. mi.  
(51,129 sq. km.)

Population: 4,481,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Language: \*  
Serbo-Croatian

Ethnic Divisions:  
Muslim 44%  
Serb 31%  
Croat 17%  
Other 8%

Religions:  
Muslim 40%  
Orthodox 31%  
Roman Catholic 15%  
Other 14%

\* Major languages are also now identified as Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian.

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*  
© 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L.  
96-S-107, 85.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): \*  
na

GDP per capita: \*  
U.S. \$1,000-3,000

External debt: \*  
na

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
na

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: CIA, "Economic Profile,"  
*Handbook of International Economic Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 10. IISS, *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 79.

In November 1995, American-led negotiations ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a cease-fire agreement, the Dayton (Paris) accords. In December, a NATO-led, multinational force (IFOR) launched Operation Joint Endeavor to replace the United Nations humanitarian operation (UNPROFOR) and to assist the parties in implementing their agreement and to move toward peace.

The war that began in March 1992 was a direct result of the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia into nation-states, based on the claims of self-determination for the majority nation of each republic, beginning with Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. In Bosnia there was no majority nation, but three constituent nations—Muslims, Serbs, and Croats—represented by national parties in a coalition government after the elections of November 1990. Their disagreements over whether to become independent (which Serbs opposed) and whether the state should be integral (favored by Muslims) or confederal (which Croats required) were pre-empted by international action.

A European Community-required Feb. 18, 1992 referendum on independence and U.S. insistence on recognition (April 6-7, 1992) pre-empted European Union negotiations on a plan for ethnic cantonization of the republic. The Bosnian Serb party (SDS), aided by the Yugoslav National Army, chose separation and the expulsion by force or terror of all non-Serbs from areas they claimed.

The Bosnian Croat party (HDZ), aided by the Croatian Army, rapidly integrated contiguous territories into neighboring Croatia and moved to purify and separate areas of central Bosnia shared with Muslims. The rump Bosnian presidency and Bosnian Muslim party (SDA) fought on two fronts for survival and the creation of a new state.



Eight peace plans later—with more than half of the pre-war population of 4.4 million living as refugees or displaced to create ethnically pure regions, more than 100,000 dead, and a country in near total ruin—the Dayton accords divided the country into two entities, a federation of Croats and Muslims (created by an agreement signed in Washington in March 1994) and a Serb Republic.

*The Dayton accords divided the country into two entities, a federation of Croats and Muslims and a Serb Republic.*

In the first six months of 1995, IFOR successfully separated warring parties, destroyed or cordoned heavy weapons, and oversaw demobilization. In the spring of 1996, an international civilian operation

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1944

Tito creates Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of six Yugoslav republics

1954

Yugoslavia guarantees freedom of religion

1968

Bosnian Central Committee confirms Muslims as distinct nation

coordinated by High Representative Carl Bildt, including the European Union, the OSCE, the World Bank, a U.N. police force, the UNHCR, and many others, began a process of economic reconstruction, reconciliation, repatriation of refugees, and reintegration. Elections held on Sept. 14, 1996, aimed to create common institutions for the two entities and three nations. Whether the cease-fire will hold and turn into lasting peace will depend on the Dayton process of implementation and international assistance over the next three to five years.

*Dr. Susan Woodward is a senior fellow with The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.*

## BOSNIAN ELECTIONS HELD

SARAJEVO, Sept. 19 (Reuters) — Election organizers said Wednesday that Bosnia's Muslim president, Alija Izetbegovic, had narrowly defeated his Serb nationalist rival, Momcilo Krajsnik, to head a new collective presidency.

The collective presidency will be made up of one representative from each of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia. The Croatian seat was won by a nationalist, Kresimir Zubak.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which supervised the elections last Saturday, said a completed count gave Mr. Izetbegovic 729,034 votes, Mr. Krajsnik 690,373 and Mr. Zubak 342,077.

"It appears clear that President Izetbegovic will serve as the new president of the presidency," said Robert Frowick, the American diplomat who oversaw the elections for the organization. Reporting on turnout, Mr. Frowick said nearly 1.3 million people voted for candidates in the Muslim-Croat Federation and 1.02 million in the Serb Republic.

Reuters, Sept. 19, 1996



## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: **72**

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	24
DPT	38
polio	45
measles	48

% population with access to health services: **na**

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81, 85.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): **878**

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): **204**

Top major conventional weapons exporters:  
Imports of major conventional weapons were not recorded for 1992-95.

\* SIPRI notes, however, that in spite of an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia countries, "there are indications, in some cases even concrete proof, that at least Croatia and Bosnia received major conventional weapons in spite of the embargoes."

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties*	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia vs. Serbian Republic, Serbian Irregulars	110,000-130,000 75,000-85,000
Deaths in 1995: 800-2,000		
Total Deaths: 25,000-55,000		

\*Fighting between the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat Defense Council (or Bosnian HVO), the armed forces of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is not included because neither of these parties is the government of an internationally recognized state.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, Arms Trade Database, 1996.

**1974**

New Yugoslav constitution recognizes Muslims as separate constituency

**1980**

Tito dies; nationalism re-emerges within republics

**1989**

Serbian leader Milosevic ignites Serb nationalism with Battle of Kosovo speech

**1992**

Bosnia declares independence; war with Croatian and Yugoslav armies begins

# CROATIA

BY ANTHONY BORDEN

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 21,829 sq. mi.  
(56,538 sq. km.)

Population: 4,801,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Language:  
Serbo-Croatian

Ethnic Divisions:  
Croat 78%  
Serb 12%  
Muslim 1%  
Other 9%

Religions:  
Roman Catholic 77%  
Orthodox 11%  
Muslim 1%  
Other 11%

Source: From World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 99.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$ 11.0 billion

GDP per capita:\*

U.S. \$5,200

External debt:\*

U.S. \$3.0 billion

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, Military Balance 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 81.

As conflict continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue that sparked the wars of Yugoslav succession in 1991—the status of the Serb minority within Croatia—remained no closer to settlement. A cease-fire from 1992, monitored by a U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), had separated the Croatian forces from those of the rebel Serbs and ended violent conflict, which had caused the death of more than 10,000 and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. But the conflicting positions—Croatia's demand for territorial sovereignty versus the desire of the "Serbian Republic of Krajina" for independence and unification with other Serbian-controlled lands—did not soften. With no progress being made toward the reintegration of the territory or the return of refugees, Croatia threatened repeatedly to expel the U.N. peacekeepers.

*With no progress being made toward the reintegration of the territory or the return of refugees, Croatia threatened repeatedly to expel the U.N. peacekeepers.*

The renegotiation of the U.N. mandate in March 1995 reduced the U.N. deployment from 18,000 to 5,000 and shifted the focus from patrolling between the parties to monitoring Croatia's international

The Economic Impact of Conflict				
Croatia's Gross Domestic Product (U.S. \$ billion)				
1990	1991	1992	1993*	1994*
17.8	14.1	12.3	10.6	11.0

\* Estimated

Sources: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Report to the Board of Trustees, Carnegie Corporation of New York, April 11, 1996, Chart 4. IISS, The Military Balance 1995-96 (Oxford: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 81.



borders with Serbia and Bosnia. It thus opened the way for the military assaults that would, in a matter of hours, crush the four-year-long Serb rebellion.

With the international presence out of the way, Croatia staged two blitzkrieg attacks, achieving the total collapse of the Serbian entity, as well as the single largest population movement of the war, as the majority of Serbs fled. In Operation Flash, on May 1-3, 1995, the Croatian military secured the U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) Sector West in western Slavonia. While controversy remained over alleged human rights abuses by Croatian troops, Serb forces elsewhere shelled the capital of Zagreb, an incident for which the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has indicted the Croatian Serb leadership.

Radicalizing the Serbs, the operation only emboldened the Croats, who on Aug. 4 launched a stunning attack on the Sectors North and South, including the rebel capital of Knin. Within five days, Zagreb announced

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1946

Tito incorporates Croatia into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1960

Anti-Communist sentiments rise; Croatian nationalist movement begins

1971

Tito opposes Croatian nationalism, purges Communist organizations


that it was in complete control of the territory. An estimated 180,000 Serbs fled across the border to Serb-held territory in Bosnia and on to Serbia, where some were resettled in the disputed province of Kosovo. In this case, widespread accusations of systematic burning and looting of houses and sustained attacks on civilians—a process known in Bosnia as “ethnic cleansing”—could not be easily denied.

Yet the action was declared by U.S. President Bill Clinton to offer “a moment of real promise” for peace in the region. Destroying the Serb stronghold in Croatia, the attacks thus substantially weakened the strategic position of the Bosnian Serbs. They also served to underscore the potential benefits of “diplomacy backed by force,” which the U.S. government would pursue in the steps leading up to the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia. But in expelling the bulk of the remaining Serbs in Croatia, they also confirmed the approach, fundamentally accepted by the western powers, of achieving settlement through ethnic apartheid. Subsequent internal crackdowns by Zagreb confirmed that the results meant ominous prospects for the process of democratization in Croatia.

A critical component of the Dayton negotiations in November 1995 was the status of the remaining Serb-held territory in Croatia, that of eastern Slavonia on the Serbian border. A point of potential renewed conflict, the issue was finally resolved through a separate agreement on a two-year U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), after which Croatia sovereignty is to be restored. As the international implementation began in Bosnia in early 1996, the Eastern Slavonia administration began slow but positive steps. Bosnian Croats bitterly contended that during the Dayton talks Zagreb had aban-

doned significant Croat-held territory in Bosnia in its determination to win back Eastern Slavonia. But this only confirmed, toward the close of war as at the beginning, the clear interrelationship of all the Balkan conflicts.

*Anthony Borden is director of the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting and editor of its magazine, War Report.*



The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Croatia vs. Serbian Republic of Krajina, Serbian Irregulars	100,000-110,000 35,000-50,000
Deaths in 1995: 500-1,000		
Total Deaths: 6,000-10,000*		

\*This includes the fighting during 1991 in which more than just the two parties participated.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, “Major Armed Conflicts, 1995,” SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 71

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	92
DPT	85
polio	85
measles	90

% population with access to health services: na

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81, 85.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. \$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 1,089

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 229

Top major conventional weapons exporters:  
Imports of major conventional weapons were not listed in 1991-95.

\*SIPRI notes, however, that in spite of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslav countries, “there are indications, in some cases even concrete proof, that at least Croatia and Bosnia received major conventional weapons in spite of the embargoes.”

Sources: IISS, “International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994,” *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 264. SIPRI, *Arms Trade Database*, 1996.

**1980**

Tito's death fuels Croat demands for greater autonomy

**1990**

Ethnic Serbs declare autonomy for the Krajina; Croatia holds free elections

**1991**

Croatia declares independence, begins war against Serb, Bosnian forces

**1995**

Serbs driven from Krajina; Dayton agreement ends 43 months of fighting

# RUSSIA (CHECHNYA)

BY STEPHEN JONES

## DEMOGRAPHICS

[Note: The following information is for the Russian republic of Chechnya only.]

Area: 7,350 sq. mi.  
(19,300 sq. km.)

Population: 1,308,000\*

System of Government:  
Provisional Council

Languages:  
Chechen  
Ingush  
Russian  
Batsbi

Ethnic Divisions:\*\*  
Chechen &  
Ingush 71%  
Russian 23%  
Armenian 1%  
Ukrainian 1%  
Other 4%

Religion:  
Sunni Muslim

\* January 1992  
\*\* 1989 census

Source: *Statesman's Yearbook*  
1995-96 (New York: St. Martin's Press), 381.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS\*

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): na

GDP per capita: na

External debt: na

Human Development Index (HDI): na

\* Various sources provide information for Russia as a whole, but not specifically for Chechnya.

Fighting in the Russian republic of Chechnya, which by the spring of 1996 had led to an estimated 30,000 mostly civilian deaths and 437,000 refugees, represented the deadliest conflict in the world during 1995-96. The origins of the confrontation can be traced to a national referendum, held soon after Air Force Gen. Dzhokhar Dudyayev became president of the Republic of Chechnya in October 1991 and declared the republic independent.

In June 1992, Chechnya formally split from the Republic of Chechen-Ingushetiya. A Moscow-backed Chechen opposition, which declared itself the Chechen government in August 1991, tried unsuccessfully to capture the capital city of Grozny three months after its emergence. On Dec. 11, 1994, frustrated by the three-year standoff with Dudyayev, Russia launched a massive military intervention. The Russian troops soon proved poorly prepared, requiring more than two months to capture Grozny, which finally fell in March 1995.

There were no serious peace talks until May 1995, when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supervised unproductive negotiations between Dudyayev's representatives, the Russian government, and the Moscow-backed Chechen Government of National Salvation led by Salambek Khadzhiev. In June 1995, Chechen commander Shamil Basayev led a raid on the Russian town of Budennovsk and took more than 100 hostages. The crisis was brought to an end by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who promised to remove Russian troops from Chechnya. On July 30, a cease-fire that stipulated the disarming of Chechen forces and the withdrawal of Russian troops was signed, but the question of Chechnya's future status was not resolved and fighting continued.

Doku Zavgayev replaced Khadzhiev as head of the pro-Moscow government in October 1995 and then claimed victory in a questionable election held two months later.



In January 1996, there was a further hostage crisis in Kizlyar and Pervomaisko, located on the intranational border between Chechnya and the republic of Dagestan. The conflict spread beyond Russia's borders when a Turkish ship was taken hostage by Chechen sympathizers in the Turkish port of Trebizon that same month.

After fighting in the Chechen republic intensified between January and March 1996, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, partly to avoid losing the upcoming presidential election in Russia, launched a March 31 peace plan. It consisted of an immediate cease-fire, accompanied by the gradual withdrawal of most of Russia's 41,000 troops and the disarming of Chechen volunteers; a forum of all political forces to prepare for free and democratic elections to a new Chechen parliament; and a resolution of the status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation. While Yeltsin ruled out any independent Chechnya outside Russia, he did promise maximum autonomy.

The Yeltsin plan echoed a similar peace proposal put forward in mid-February by Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaimiev. Dudyayev, however, greeted Yeltsin's proposal skeptically, and before peace talks could be

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1944

Stalin dissolves Chechen autonomous republic, deports Chechens; one-third die

1957

Khrushchev allows Chechens to return; most walk back to Chechnya

1964

Brezhnev becomes Soviet leader, launches campaign against dissidents

scheduled, 73 Russian soldiers were killed in an April 16 ambush by Chechen forces. Within a few days, on April 21, a Russian helicopter killed Dудаев himself.

Dудаев was replaced by Vice President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, considered a hardliner and skeptical of negotiations with the Russian government. The situation was further complicated by the influential but varied voices of the Chechen field commanders. Nevertheless, Yandarbiev traveled to Moscow on May 27 for peace talks brokered by the OSCE, and a cease-fire to begin May 31 was initiated.

Yeltsin visited Chechnya at the end of May and a project on power-sharing was drawn up. Armistice talks between both sides began June 3 in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetiya, to detail the peace agreement, and two protocols were signed June 10—one on the withdrawal of Russian troops by late August and the surrender of weapons by Chechen militants; the second on the release of all hostages and prisoners of war.

*Dr. Stephen Jones is associate professor of Russian and Eurasian studies at Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. Dr. Jones is a specialist in Caucasian affairs and has written more than 40 articles and book chapters on the subject.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Russia vs. Republic of Chechnya	1,500,000 12,000-20,000
Deaths in 1995: 10,000-40,000		
Total Deaths: 10,000-40,000		

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.

## HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN CHECHNYA: ACCESS DENIED

*Little data is available on the health and humanitarian situation in Chechnya, because few organizations have been allowed access to the region. As of late February 1996, Russia was still permitting only three international organizations to operate inside Chechnya: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The United Nations is relatively absent from Chechnya, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintained a small operation in the region. Increased Russian military activity in Chechnya prevented many humanitarian agencies from gaining access to the civilian victims of the war, and some organizations considered withdrawing. In an April 1996 inter-agency appeal to donors, the United Nations reported a total of 147,000 displaced persons in nearby Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Daghestan. The number of displaced persons inside Chechnya was unknown.*

In April 1996, the Humanitarianism and War Project of Brown University's Watson Institute made site visits to a number of towns inside Chechnya. A report from their investigation included the following observations:

- "Normal life throughout most of Chechnya has ceased, with appallingly insecure conditions continuing to prevail in most urban and many rural areas. Infrastructure such as waterworks and the health system have been heavily damaged."
- "With increased military activity, humanitarian agencies have expended virtually all available options in their efforts to provide protection to the civilian population."
- "Russian forces continue to target civilian areas with excessive and indiscriminate force."

Gregory Hansen and Robert Seely, "Chechnya Case Study: Interim Report," Humanitarianism and War Project, Brown University, April 1996

**INN ACTION**

INN member William Ury, associate director of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard University, participated in the second Hague conference on resolving conflicts in the former Soviet Union in March 1996. The private dialogue group, organized by Harvard's Conflict Management Group (CMG), brought together leaders from Russia and the former Soviet republics, including representatives of Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dудаев and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Roundtable members suggested that moderation in leadership was a major factor in preventing the type of armed conflict that has ravaged Chechnya.

**1979**

Soviet troops invade Afghanistan

**1989**

Soviet authorities appoint native Chechen administrators to govern Chechnya

**1991**

Gen. Dудаев overthrows Chechnya's Communist government, declares independence

**1994**

Fighting erupts among Chechen factions; Russian troops invade

# FOCUS: WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

by Kirk Wolcott

The war crimes trials that took place at the end of World War II—from Nov. 20, 1945, to Oct. 1, 1946, in Nuremberg and from May 3, 1946, to Oct. 4, 1948, in Tokyo—decreed that the world would no longer tolerate acts of genocide. Yet, less than 50 years later, the international community found itself forced to take a stand again after vicious drives for power in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda resulted in the ethnically motivated slaughter and expulsion of millions of innocent people.

Bringing the guilty to trial has proven to be no easy task. Many of the accused war criminals in the former Yugoslavia—unlike those found guilty in Germany and Japan, whose fate lay at the hands of the Allied nations that had defeated them—remained at-large when the Dayton peace agreement was signed in November 1995 and refused to stand trial. To take them forcibly risked the return of mass bloodshed. In Rwanda, lack of a functioning judicial system has hampered efforts to prosecute those responsible for the 1994 genocide massacres. Complicating matters, more than 75,000 individuals suspected of committing genocide were placed in custody, forcing the prosecutors and the world-at-large to ask the critical question: At what cost is justice served?

## Former Yugoslavia

In May 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 827, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the first international body for the prosecution of war crimes since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The tribunal was granted jurisdiction over individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Judge Antonio Cassese of Italy was appointed president of the tribunal. Judge Richard Goldstone of South Africa was selected as the chief prosecutor, later succeeded by Judge Louise Arbour of Canada. The tribunal was created with the following structural components:

- two trial chambers, each with three judges and one appeals chamber with five judges;
- no police force of its own;
- a maximum sentencing of life in prison and no authority to try suspects in absentia; and
- trials with no juries, but defendants could challenge a conviction before the separate panel of five appeals judges.

The tribunal began its first trial May 7, 1996, with Dusan Tadic, a Bosnian Serb cafe owner and karate instructor, charged with killing, torturing, and raping Muslims and Croats at prison camps in northwest Bosnia in 1992. His trial was expected to last several months, with more than 100 witnesses being called.

On June 27, 1996, the Tribunal announced the indictment of eight Bosnian Serb military and police officers for the rape of Muslim

women, marking the first time sexual assault was treated separately as a war crime. Those indictments brought the total number to 75—54 Bosnian Serbs, 18 Croats, and three Muslims. Only seven of the indictees, however, were being held due to the reluctance of foreign peacekeeping troops in Bosnia to arrest war criminals.

The two most prominent suspects indicted, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, were charged with genocide and crimes against humanity in connection with the siege of Sarajevo and their part in the killing of more than 6,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica. Midway through 1996, they remained at-large, despite numerous public appearances, and their status threatened peace in Bosnia.

## Rwanda


On April 6, 1994, the fatal downing of an aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntayamira ignited one of the most expeditious acts of genocide in modern history. In the days that followed, about 20,000 people, primarily from the minority Tutsi ethnic group, were killed by members of the majority Hutus. The next three months saw the slaughter of roughly 800,000 individuals. Over a four-day period in mid-July 1994, more than 1 million people were forced to flee Rwanda into neighboring Zaire.

Four months later, on Nov. 8, the Security Council passed Resolution 995, which established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The Rules of Procedure and Evidence established by the Yugoslav tribunal were adopted by the ICTR.

The Rwandan tribunal, which began operation in June 1995, quickly encountered a series of obstacles. First, it was difficult to sort out who exactly was responsible for the 500,000 to 1 million killings of 1994. Little physical evidence existed, so most cases were built around eyewitness testimony alone, risking false accusations. Many of the worst offenders, including some of the architects of the genocide, had fled the country. The tribunal was short on funds and personnel, with many of the Rwandan judges and prosecutors killed during the ethnic carnage of 1994. As of July 1996, only three suspects were held by the tribunal, and not one person had stood trial.

Kirk Wolcott, program coordinator in The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, served as editor of the 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report.

Philip Gourevitch, "Justice in Exile," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1996.  
Stefanie Grant, "Rwanda: The Other Tribunal," *Tribunal*, No. 2 January/February 1996 (London: Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 1996), 4.  
Andrew Kelly, "First War Crimes Tribunal in 50 Years Opens," Reuters, May 7, 1996.  
"Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Key Facts," Reuters, May 7, 1996.



CONFlict REGION:

# MIDDLE EAST

IRAN

IRAQ

ISRAEL

TURKEY

## TURKEY

IDPs: 2,000,000  
Refugees: 15,000  
Iraq: 15,000

## IRAQ

IDPs: 1,000,000  
Refugees: 622,900\*  
Iran: 599,000\*  
Saudi Arabia: 13,200  
Jordan: 6,500  
Turkey: 3,000\*  
Pakistan: 1,200

## IRAN

IDPs: na  
Refugees: 49,500  
Iraq: 39,200  
Turkey: 10,000  
Pakistan: 300

## ISRAEL

IDPs: na  
Palestinian Refugees:  
3,286,100\*

Jordan: 1,288,200  
Gaza Strip: 683,600  
West Bank: 517,400  
Lebanon: 346,200  
Syria: 337,300  
Iraq: 60,000  
Other: 53,400

RLS:  
Jordan: 700,000  
Egypt: 100,000  
Lebanon: 50,000

1 square inch = 213,000 square miles  
1 square centimeter = 86,000 square kilometers

na: Figures not available for given country

\* Sources vary widely in numbers reported

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey, 1996*  
(Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

**Refugees:** These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

**IDPs:** Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

**RLS:** Persons in "refugee-like situations" are those who may fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries, and thus who may be refugees, but who are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey, 1996*, Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

**M**iddle East major armed conflicts remained in the same four locations over the past year. In Iraq, fighting between Saddam Hussein's government and Kurdish factions in March 1995 led to the return of a conflict that had been active in 1993 but dormant in 1994. Conflict in the Middle East was waged at a relatively low level of intensity, except for in Turkey, where ongoing fighting between the Turkish government and the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) resulted in more than 4,000 deaths. Iran also continued to struggle

against a Kurdish rebellion force. Meanwhile, world attention focused squarely on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In January 1996, PLO leader Yasser Arafat won a landslide victory in the Palestinian elections, yet Israel's shelling of southern Lebanon later in the year and its election of a hard-line prime minister threw the fragile peace process into doubt. As for the region as a whole, despite a recent decline in overall military spending, the Middle East continued to spend more on defense as a proportion of gross domestic product than any other area in the world.

"IN THAT MOMENT OF GREAT TENSION JUST BEFORE THE FINGER PULLS THE TRIGGER, JUST BEFORE THE FUSE BEGINS TO BURN; IN THE TERRIBLE QUIET OF THE MOMENT, THERE IS STILL TIME TO WONDER, TO WONDER ALONE: IS IT REALLY IMPERATIVE TO ACT? IS THERE NO OTHER CHOICE? NO OTHER WAY?"



Yitzhak Rabin, upon acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway, Dec. 10, 1994



Human Development Indicators			
Country	% access to safe water (1990-95)	Total adult literacy rate (% in 1990)	Population growth rate (1980-94)
Iran	84	62	3.7
Iraq	44	52	3.0
Israel	na	92*	2.4
Turkey	80	79	2.2
Conflict Countries Average	69.3	71.3	2.83**
Overall Middle East Average	30.7	73.6	3.07

\* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

\*\* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-89.

Arms Flows						
Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Iran	777	703	283	1,295	528	187
Iraq	643	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	29	1,309	1,096	585	976	327
Turkey	801	954	1,639	2,288	2,089	1,127

Source: SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

#### Under-5 Mortality Rates


Middle East countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

Rank	Country	Rate
57	Iraq	71
70	Turkey	55
75	Iran	51
81	Lebanon	40
82	Syria	38
84	Saudi Arabia	36
96	Oman	27
99	Jordan	25
106	United Arab Emirates	20
121	Kuwait	14
131	Israel	9
Conflict Countries Average		46.5
Overall Middle East Average		35.1

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80-81.

#### Aid Flows

Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC)\* countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab countries to developing countries and territories (U.S. \$ million for 1994).



\* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Source: © Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1996, *Development Cooperation Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Report 1995*, A54-56. Reproduced by permission of the OECD.

# IRAN

BY SEAN MAYBERRY

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 632,457 sq. mi.  
(1,638,057 sq. km.)

Population: 63,810,000

System of Government:  
Islamic Republic

Languages:  
Farsi  
Turkish dialects  
Kurdish

Ethnic Divisions:  
Persian 51%  
Azeri 24%  
Kurdish 7%  
Other 18%

Religions:  
Shiite Muslim 95%  
Sunni Muslim 4%  
Other 1%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*  
© 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L.  
96-S-107, 129.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$59.8 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$4,800

External debt:  
U.S. \$20.0 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.770

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance*  
1995-96 (London: by Permission of  
Oxford University Press, 1995),  
133. UNDP, *Human Development Report* 1995 (New York: Oxford  
University Press, 1995), 156.



The Government of Iran presently faces armed opposition by two militant groups, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Both groups have battled the Iranian government since the 1970s. The Mujahideen group is opposed to the present government in Tehran and wishes to install the wife of its leader as the new president. The KDPI, alternatively, is fighting for a separate Kurdish homeland in northwestern Iran. Violent clashes between the Iranians and the two opposition groups have resulted in more than 800 deaths since 1991.

The Mujahideen currently have more than 100,000 followers and are based in neighboring Iraq, with camps on the Iran-Iraq border and headquarters located in Baghdad. The several-thousand-strong military arm of the Mujahideen, the National Liberation Army (NLA), includes nearly 40 percent women and is well-trained and heavily armed.

Iraq has continually refused to restrict Mujahideen activities in its confines and in 1995 rejected an Iranian request to extradite the Mujahideen leader to Iran. As a result and through early 1996, Iranian government forces continued to violate Iraqi ground and airspace in a series of armed attacks on Mujahideen camps. In more covert missions, Iran has also attacked the Mujahideen headquarters in the Iraqi capital.

The KDPI is also based in Iraq and maintains a number of armed units. Since 1992, however,

the KDPI has not engaged in any significant military activity against Iran. Regardless, Iranian forces have continued their campaign against the KDPI, including shelling KDPI camps along the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Iran border into 1995. Despite this, the KDPI has not resumed military activity and remains in close contact with other Iranian opposition groups in the hopes of finding a political solution to the present turmoil.

*The Mujahideen currently have more than 100,000 followers and are based in neighboring Iraq, with camps on the Iran-Iraq border and headquarters located in Baghdad. The several-thousand-strong military arm of the Mujahideen, the National Liberation Army (NLA), includes nearly 40 percent women and is well-trained and heavily armed.*

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1951

Parliament approves nationalization of petroleum industry

1961

Shah sponsors "White Revolution" of political, economic, social reforms

1975

Algiers Accord ends Iranian support for Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq


In 1995, Iran began to broker peace talks between two Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The talks specifically excluded the KDPI, however, and Iran pressured the PUK to drop its support for the KDPI during the talks.

Aside from launching covert military strikes against these two groups, the Iranian government has also worked through early 1996 to systematically neutralize specific individuals. Iranian agents assassinated several members of both the Mujahideen and the KDPI in Iraq and in other countries. In addition, numerous KDPI prisoners have been executed in Iranian prisons. As of mid-1996, there were no efforts to end these conflict situations peacefully.

*Sean Mayberry, a graduate student in the MBA program at Emory University, was a Carter Center graduate assistant in the Conflict Resolution Program. A U.S. foreign service officer since 1988, he was last assigned to Nairobi, Kenya.*

Defense Expenditure and Manpower Comparisons									
Defense Expenditure					Numbers in Armed Forces				
% GDP		\$ per capita (1993 constant prices)		x1,000	1985		1994		
Iran	36.0	3.8	419	37	305	513			
Iraq	25.9	14.6	1,064	132	520	382			
Israel	21.2	9.5	1,568	1,230	142	172			
Kuwait	9.1	12.2	1,380	2,019	12	17			
Mideast	12.2	6.7	711	443	2,531	2,860			
U.S.	6.5	4.3	1,418	1,074	2,152	1,651			
Canada	2.2	1.9	405	329	83	78			

Source: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 265.




The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government	Government of Iran vs. Mujahideen e-Khalqna	513,000* na
Territory	vs. KDPI	8,000
Deaths in 1995: na		
Total Deaths: na		

KDPI: Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran

\*Including the Revolutionary Guard

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.



## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 67

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	100
DPT	95
polio	95
measles	97

% population with access to health services: 80

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 2,237

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 37

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:	Poland	165
	Ukraine	17
	North Korea	5

1990-95:	Russia/USSR	2,044
	China	896
	North Korea	390

\* Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

**1979**

**1988**

**1989**

**1991**

Shah flees; Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims Islamic republic, takes U.S. hostages

Iran, Iraq sign cease-fire after eight years of war

Khomeini dies; Rafsanjani elected president

Irqi refugees flood Iran during Gulf War; Mujahideen e-Khalq, KDPI rebel

# IRAQ

BY KIRK WOLCOTT

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 169,235 sq. mi.  
(438,317 sq. km.)

Population: 20,250,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Arabic  
Kurdish  
Assyrian  
Armenian

Ethnic Divisions:  
Arab 75-80%  
Kurdish 15-20%  
Turkoman,  
Assyrian,  
and other 5%

Religions:  
Shiite Muslim 60-65%  
Sunni Muslim 32-37%  
Christian and other 3%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review* © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 130.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$18.5 billion

GDP per capita: \*  
na

External debt: \*  
U.S. \$90 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.617

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 135. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

Since its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Government of Iraq has suffered the consequences both in international and domestic affairs. President Saddam Hussein's aim of making Iraq a regional superpower has been upset by war, an economy crippled by the toughest U.N. sanctions in history, defections by key political figures, and rebellious internal struggles.

Following the end of the Gulf War in February 1991, Shi'ite Muslims and disaffected soldiers mounted a rebellion, reportedly taking control of Basra and other southern Iraqi cities. The revolt, led by the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), was quickly crushed by troops loyal to Saddam. The Iraqi government instigated a program to deplete vital marshland water supplies in the south and has continued a series of repressive policies aimed at quashing Shi'ite aspirations for an autonomous state.

*President Saddam Hussein's aim of making Iraq a regional superpower has been upset by war, an economy crippled by the toughest U.N. sanctions in history, defections by key political figures, and rebellious internal struggles.*

In the north, ethnic Kurds have sought autonomy since the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) launched a rebellion in 1961. Armed conflict between Saddam's ruling Ba'th government and the main Kurdish opposition party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led in 1984 to the death of more than 100,000 people and left 300,000 Kurds homeless. Saddam's forces brutally put down another uprising in the summer of 1991. Fearing genocide, nearly 2 million Kurds fled into Turkey and Iran, returning only after government troops were withdrawn. Kurdish elections in May 1992 established



a self-governing authority in the region, protected from Saddam's forces by U.S.-led "no-fly zones," but the Kurdish factions soon turned their forces against each other.

Fighting between troops loyal to KDP leader Masoud Barzani and PUK leader Jalal Talabani continued in 1996, despite a series of peace talks, including efforts by a U.S. delegation in April. Meanwhile, distribution of humanitarian aid to the Kurds became one of several stumbling blocks to Saddam's regime exporting oil under U.N. Security Council Resolution 986. This resolution would permit Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil over six months under strictly controlled conditions to buy humanitarian supplies for its people. Much of the population, especially young children, faced danger from malnutrition and disease due to a combination of Saddam's policies and comprehensive trade sanctions imposed by the Security Council in 1991. The sanctions cannot be lifted until Iraq meets several conditions regarding Kuwait and eliminates its own weapons of mass destruction.

It was not until late May 1996 that Iraq, still protesting violations against its sovereignty, agreed

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947

Ba'th party forms

1958

Gen. Kassem overthrows British-installed Iraqi monarchy

1961

Kassem claims Kuwait as part of Iraq; Kurds revolt in north

to the “oil-for-food” deal. Economic sanctions remained in place, however, as Iraq continued to withhold information about its chemical and biological weapons supplies and hindered on-site investigations by U.N. weapons inspectors. Speculation that Saddam’s regime might be in jeopardy surfaced after his sons-in-law, brothers Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel al-Majid and Col. Saddam Kamel al-Majid, fled to Jordan in August 1995 with the president’s two daughters. Upon their return to Iraq in January 1996, the brothers, both high-ranking officials of Saddam’s “inner circle,” were slain along with their father and another brother. In March, Naza Khazraji, one of Iraq’s top Gulf War generals, also defected to Jordan, where he reportedly joined a group opposed to Saddam.

Kirk Wolcott is program coordinator in the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center, where he focuses primarily on the former Yugoslavia, international economic sanctions, and the Middle East. A former newspaper journalist, he received a master’s degree in international communication from American University in Washington, D.C.

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Government Territory	Government of Iraq vs. SAIRI* vs. PUK	350,000- 400,000 10,000** na***
Deaths in 1995: na		
Total Deaths: na		

SAIRI: Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

\* Most of the Shia rebels belong to this group.

\*\* Total strength of Shia rebels.

\*\*\* PUK troop strength is possibly some 10,000-12,000.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, “Major Armed Conflicts, 1995,” SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 25.

The Economic Impact of Conflict					
Iraq's Gross Domestic Product (U.S. \$ billion)					
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993*	1994*
66	32	28	2	18	18.5

\* Estimated totals

Sources: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Report to the Board of Trustees, Carnegie Corporation of New York*, April 11, 1996, Chart 4. IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 134.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 66

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	90
DPT	67
polio	67
measles	98

% population with access to health services: 93

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

## RECENT U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IMPOSED ON IRAQ

- 1060 (June 12, 1996) on Iraq’s refusal to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission
- 1051 (March 27, 1996) on approval of the mechanism for monitoring Iraqi imports and exports, pursuant to Security Council resolutions and decisions 715 (1991)
- 986 (April 14, 1995) on authorization to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people
- 949 (Oct. 15, 1994) demanding that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions
- 899 (March 4, 1994) on compensation payments to the Iraqi private citizens whose assets remained on Kuwaiti territory following the demarcation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait

Source: UN website, <http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/iopcode.p>

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 2,628

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 132

Top major conventional weapons exporters:<sup>\*</sup>

1995:  
Imports not listed from 1991-95

1990-95:  
Russia/USSR 533  
France 99  
FRG/  
Germany 11

\* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, “International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994,” *The Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 265. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.

1968

1980

1988

1991

Ba'th party comes to power, establishes Communist-style one-party state

Saddam Hussein begins eight-year war with Iran

U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 outlines Iraq-Iran cease-fire

Gulf War forces drive Iraq from Kuwait; Saddam puts down Kurd, Shi'ah rebellions

# ISRAEL

BY KENNETH STEIN

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 8,019 sq. mi.  
(420,770 sq. km.)

Population: 5,059,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Hebrew  
Arabic

Ethnic Divisions:  
Jewish 83%  
Arab and other 17%

Religions:  
Jewish 82%  
Muslim 14%  
Christian 2%  
Druze 2%

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*  
© 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L.  
96-S-107, 132.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$71.1 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$15,000

External debt:  
U.S. \$42 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.907

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 136. UNDP, *Human Development Report* 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 155.

Despite terrorism and acts of violence, portions of the Arab-Israeli conflict continue to be resolved. Building on the November 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the September 1993 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israel Declaration of Principles (DOP), and the October 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, correct and at times even warm relationships began replacing absolute reductionism and strife.

By signing the September 1995 agreement for the implementation of the DOP, Israel and the PLO further operationalized their guarded association. Israeli military withdrawal from major Arab cities and virtually all Arab villages in the West Bank gave Yasser Arafat's Palestinian National Authority (PNA) control over one-third of the West Bank territory and 90 percent of the Palestinian population. As also prescribed by the DOP, in January 1996, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank elected an 88-member council and Ra'ees (chairman or president). Israel and the PLO carried out their commitments despite the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin the previous November by an Israeli law student, regular closure of the borders between Israel and Palestinian territories, and the killing of a Palestinian committed to thwarting PLO-Israeli negotiations.

Meanwhile, the PLO made a verbal commitment to amend its National Charter by removing those articles, words, and phrases that were contradictory to the spirit and intent of the PLO-Israeli mutual recognition of September 1993. Final status talks commenced in May 1996 on sensitive matters of Jewish settlements, Jerusalem borders, water, and other issues. Throughout the time period, the PNA struggled to obtain international funding to provide



investment, jobs, and support for the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian populations. Secular and militantly religious Palestinian opponents to the recognition of Israel continued to attack Arafat and Israelis for reaching their series of understandings.

Syrian and Israeli ambassadors in Washington carried on a dialogue aimed at narrowing differences on major issues: access to water sources, the nature of peace, the pace and degree of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and security matters. Those talks continued under U.S. auspices in late 1995 until broken off in early 1996. Israeli-Lebanese talks were held in abeyance pending progress on Syrian-Israeli discussions. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to and through the Middle East to narrow Syrian-Israeli differences and to keep other Arab capitals

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1948

State of Israel comes into existence,  
begins war with Arab League

1956

Suez War breaks out; Israel temporarily occupies Gaza, Sinai; UNEF established

1967

Israel wins Six Day War with Syria, Egypt, Jordan; occupies West Bank, Golan, Gaza

informed of the status of negotiations.

Israel's diplomatic relations with Oman, Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, and other Muslim states grew, despite Arab fears that Israel's successful economy might overwhelm those of lesser developed Arab states. In the aftermath of four bombing incidents in Israel, Egypt hosted a conference in March 1996 where Arab, European, and North African states joined Israel, the United States, and Russia to confront Middle Eastern terrorism. Finally, via a very narrow margin, the May 1996 Israeli elections witnessed the return of a Likud-led government to power, placing the burden of responsibility for upholding Israel's agreements with its Arab neighbors upon a different political orientation in Israel society.

*Dr. Kenneth Stein is director of the Middle East Studies Program at Emory University. He accompanied the joint National Democratic Institute-Carter Center delegation to the January 1996 Palestinian elections.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Israel vs. PLO groups* vs. Non-PLO groups**	170,000-180,000 na na
Deaths in 1995: 250		
Total Deaths: (since 1948) 12,500		

DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine


PLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

\* The PLO is an umbrella organization; armed action is carried out by member organizations. Although Al-Fatah, the largest group within the PLO, did not use armed force in 1995, other groups (DFLP and PLP) which reject the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Agreement), did. These groups opposed PLO leadership but were still part of the PLO in 1995.

\*\* Examples are Hamas, PLP-General Command, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 25.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 76

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	na
DPT	92
polio	93
measles	95

% population with access to health services: na

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81, 85.

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million)  
(1993 constant prices): 6,543

1994 per capita  
(1993 constant prices): 1,230

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*


1995:  
USA 325  
Russia/USSR 2\*\*

1990-95:  
USA 4,265  
FRG/  
Germany 55  
Russia/USSR 2\*\*

\* Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

\*\* Deliveries from Russia/USSR are to PLO police forces in Gaza.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 265. SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.



1973

1979

1987

1993

Yom Kippur War erupts; Egypt reoccupies Sinai; warring parties sign cease-fire

Israel and Egypt sign Camp David Agreement

Palestinian Intifada begins

Oslo process leads to Israeli-Jordanian Agreement

# TURKEY

BY ROBERT OLSON

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 300,948 sq. mi.  
(779,452 sq. km.)

Population: 62,030,000

System of Government:  
Republic

Languages:  
Turkish  
Kurdish  
Arabic

Ethnic Divisions:  
Turkish 80%  
Kurdish 20%

Religion:  
Muslim

Source: From *World Facts and Maps, Concise International Review*. © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 200.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):\*  
U.S. \$170.2 billion

GDP per capita:\*  
U.S. \$4,500

External debt:  
U.S. \$64.8 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:  
0.792

\* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance* 1995-96 (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 62. UNDP, *Human Development Report 1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.



In 1995 and early 1996, the 12-year war between the Turkish government and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) against the Kurdish nationalist guerrilla force known as the Partiya Kararen Kurdistan (PKK), or Workers Movement of Kurdistan, continued unabated. The PKK forces, estimated at 20,000-30,000 regular fighters, faced more than 300,000 TAF buttressed by 67,000 Village Guards, Kurdish militias fighting with government forces. The war commenced in 1984 and by early 1996 had resulted in more than 21,000 deaths of mostly Kurds, hundreds of which occurred by assassination. The war has also resulted in the destruction of more than 2,600 villages, most of them Kurdish, by TAF. Some 2 to 3 million people have fled, with emigration heaviest from the southeast region of Turkey, which is predominantly Kurdish.

Fighting escalated dramatically after the Gulf War in 1991 as Turkish and PKK forces fought in and over the "safe haven" created by the Allied forces in northern Iraq. In March 1995, Turkey sent 35,000 troops into northern Iraq against the PKK, and in July 1995, Turkey made another 3,000-5,000-troop commando incursion. In March 1996, Turkey staged another 2,000-3,000 commando-led incursion. In late March and in April 1996, TAF launched its spring offensive against PKK

forces in Turkey and northern Iraq.

In spring 1996, the conflict spread to areas outside of the southeastern region to include the province of Sivas, located in the middle of Anatolia, some 75 to 110 miles from the Black Sea. The fighting in Sivas represented a significant expansion of the armed conflict. Throughout 1995 and early 1996, the Turkish air force bombed almost daily PKK bases in

Turkey and northern Iraq, furthering the devastation.

The PKK receives arms and support from Syria (PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan has headquarters in the Syrian controlled Biq'a valley in Lebanon), Iraq, Iran, probably Russia, European sources, Kurdish workers in Europe, and a host of international arms dealers. Turkey receives ample weapon systems, military, and economic aid from the European Union (EU) and the United States. In the last decade, Turkey has received \$15 billion in military aid and grants from the EU and United States—\$7 to \$8 billion from the U.S. alone.

Dissent against the war in Turkey is not tolerated. Since 1991, some 460 Turkish writers and intellectuals opposed to the war have been incarcerated or indicted on one charge or another, while more than 40 Kurdish journalists and writers have been assassinated by government operatives. In 1995, Yassar Kemal, the Turkish-Kurdish author who has several times been nominated for the Nobel prize in literature, was indicted on charges of sedition for opposing the government's war against the Kurds.

While there have been seeming occasions for earnest negotiations to end the war—notably in 1993 when the PKK announced a three-month unilateral ceasefire, and in December 1995 when the PKK again

## CONFLICT TIMELINE

1946

President Inonu introduces reforms, multiparty system

1950

Opposition party DP wins first free elections

1960

Gen. Gursel leads military coup, announces new constitution

declared a three-month cease-fire—as of March 1996, there had been no official government response. The Turkish armed forces who dictate policy on the “Kurdish Question” have vetoed any negotiations to discuss a political solution, favoring a military victory. The latter seems unlikely as the 12-year-old conflict has created immense and, potentially, irreconcilable differences between the two conflicting nationalisms.

In fall 1995, the PKK forces commenced an armed struggle with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in northern Iraq led by Ma'sud Barzani. By March 1996, the KDP had not been able to expel the PKK from northern Iraq. PKK forces in northern Iraq solidified their presence by forging closer relations with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, an opponent of Barzani. The possibility of an emerging alliance between the PKK and PUK could mean that the Turkish government’s struggle against the PKK in 1996 may entail fighting the PUK forces in northern Iraq as well as the PKK forces, while KDP forces remain aligned with the TAF.

*Dr. Robert Olson is professor of Middle East and Islamic history and a University Research Professor at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Ky.*

The Conflict		
Incompatibility	Warring Parties	Troop Strength
Territory	Government of Turkey vs. PKK	500,000 10,000-12,000
Deaths in 1995: greater than 4,000		
Total Deaths: greater than 17,000		

PKK: Partiya Kararen Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers Party, or Apucus

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, “Major Armed Conflicts, 1995,” SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 25.

1974

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forms; Turkey invades north Cyprus

1984

PKK launches guerrilla campaign to establish independent Kurdistan


1992

Government raids PKK military bases in northern Iraq

1993

Tansu Ciller becomes prime minister; 3,000 killed in Kurdish struggle

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)



Source:  
UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

## HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 66

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	72
DPT	81
polio	81
measles	76

% population with access to health services: na

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

“THE WAR PROBABLY COSTS TURKEY AROUND \$7 BILLION A YEAR AND TIES DOWN NEARLY THREE-QUARTERS OF NATO’S SECOND-BIGGEST ARMY, OVER 500,000 STONG.”

*The Economist*, May 11, 1996

## DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.\$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 5,242

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 86

Top major conventional weapons exporters:\*

1995:  
FRG/Germany 480  
USA 406  
France 126

1990-95:  
USA 6,560  
FRG/Germany 1,636  
Russia/USSR 198

\* Trend-indicators; U.S. \$ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, “International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994,” *The Military Balance 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 264. SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database*, 1996.



# AN INTERVIEW WITH JIMMY AND ROSALYNN CARTER

This past year was another challenging and rewarding one for The Carter Center and President and Mrs. Carter. Among other achievements, The Carter Center and its partners convened two heads-of-state summits on the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi and monitored the Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Conflict Resolution Program staff members spoke with the former president and first lady in June 1996 about their approach to conflict resolution, their collaboration with others, and the state of world conflict today.

*You have chosen to intervene in many of the conflicts that have stymied the international community. What gives you the courage or the confidence to take on these conflicts?*

**President Carter:** Well, I don't feel that it requires courage, because I don't have anything to risk. I believe that a major purpose of The Carter Center is to fill vacuums—when it is obvious that no international organization or government has been able to resolve a specific crisis, then naturally that gives us the opportunity to act.

**Mrs. Carter:** One thing that is unique about The Carter Center is that we look for situations that need help, where others have not been successful or are not involved.

*Could you give some examples?*

**President Carter:** The most vivid examples are the two that occurred in 1994. One involved North Korea. We were facing a possible war on the Korean Peninsula—the Chinese thought so, I thought so, and the commanding general of the U.S. forces in South Korea thought so. Had the U.N. Security Council gone through with the resolution branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and branding their revered leader a criminal, North Korea told us they were prepared to go to war. This was a perfect example of a vacuum to be filled. The U.S. government refused to have any direct communications with the leaders in Pyongyang, the United Nations was unable to do so, but The Carter Center was free to go in at the invitation of then-North Korean President Kim Il Sung and the approval of the White House.

Later on that year, with the Haitian crisis, 30,000 troops were marshaled and poised to invade Haiti, which, I think, would have

been very costly in Haitian lives. At the last minute, we got permission from the White House to go in. When our efforts are approved by Washington, and we see a real need to resolve a crisis, it doesn't require courage because we feel that we are welcome, and we might



Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Palestinian President Yasir Arafat (far right) answer questions from journalists in Gaza City, Israel, during The Carter Center-National Democratic Institute (NDI) election observer mission in January 1996. (Photograph by Billy Howard)

potentially be successful. These are the kinds of issues where we find ourselves filling a need when others either will not or cannot.

**Mrs. Carter:** We have opportunities that a lot of other people don't have. We get to know the leaders in the countries—sometimes revolutionaries as well—when we are there because of health and agriculture programs or other Carter Center programs. Also, one main factor is that people trust Jimmy largely because of his

human rights policy when he was in the White House. He tried to be fair, and he had the reputation of being fair and caring for people. That makes a lot of difference in the way people accept and trust him and think he will be even-handed if a conflict occurs.

*Do you agree with this, President Carter?*

**President Carter:** Yes, but I think you must look at The Carter Center independent of me. Concerning North Korea, for example, we not only had information from the U.S. government, much of which was erroneous, but we also had information from CNN and evidence from Billy Graham and others who had actually been there. The reservoir of material that The Carter Center staff develops in preparation for this kind of trip is a precious possession for us.

When I was asked to participate in the Great Lakes region, we did not have to start from scratch. All I had to do was turn to the staff that we have developed here, and within a few days I had a definitive report on what to do. When the door opened up for me in Haiti, I only had two days to prepare. I didn't have to spend a month getting ready because what we derived from the International Negotiation Network and other sources gave me as good a briefing as I could have received as president.

It is always a team effort that makes possible the things that we accomplish. In monitoring elections, we work side by side with the National Democratic Institute and others. Because of The Carter Center's nonpartisan, nongovernmental status, we can reach into the inner circles of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. We can turn to individuals such as Sen. Sam Nunn, Gen. Colin Powell, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former Malian President Amadou Touré, and others to join us in these efforts.

*Turning to the mediation process itself, before meeting with the parties to a conflict, what type of information is critical to you?*

**President Carter:** Obviously, I need to know the history of the conflict or crisis: what caused it, what has been attempted in the past, the geographical disputes for territory, whether there are ethnic divisions, struggles for political power, what alliances the antagonists have with outside forces that might be influencing them, and the political orientation and psychological characteristics of the leaders on both sides. Then, I try to ascertain what there is that both sides have in common. It's always surprising

and gratifying when you analyze all the issues and see that the overwhelming portion of the issues is shared. Maybe they both want peace, or they both want stature within the international community. There is a lot of commonality.

Then, I identify the issues that are still in contention—the ones that divide the two parties. My basic approach, as far back as Camp David, is to type up my vision of a final agreement before we meet. I try to envision what would be a reasonable solution, and I type it up knowing that it is going to be modified. Then I go back and forth between the two antagonists and modify the proposed agreement as necessary. I try to make sure that every time either side makes a concession, they know that the benefits are greater than what they give up. And obviously, realizing that, in the end both sides must win. I always am absolutely honest with both sides. I don't tell one side one thing and the other side something different. That is why I use a single document, so that both antagonists have exactly the same words with which they deal. I also try to form a personal relationship with both sides. During Camp David, I signed photographs for Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's grandchildren. You have to have some way to let people relate to you, let them save face, and let them feel confident they are not going to be betrayed. But you also must be tenacious and keep on plugging away.

*Returning to you, Mrs. Carter, how do you view your role in the mediation process?*

**Mrs. Carter:** I sit in on all the discussions and take notes, which are important for Jimmy. Sometimes it takes a while to get the official transcripts, but I've got my notes right there for him to see.



Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter function as a team within the framework of The Carter Center. During a November 1995 trip to the Great Lakes region of Rwanda and Burundi, they talk with a woman who escaped the genocide massacres. (Photograph by the Carter Center)

**President Carter:** Rosalynn does more than that. She's in the room, and the ostensible purpose is that she is taking notes. Of course, quite often, the leaders don't want anyone else in the room. They want to deal with me personally. But Rosalynn is kind of an extension of me. Afterwards, she and I confer. She knows as much about the issues as I do...

**Mrs. Carter:** I read all the briefings he gets.

**President Carter:** (laughing) ... and she tells me what to do.

**Mrs. Carter:** If I think he's pressing too hard, I'll pass him a note and say—

**President Carter:** —“back off.” That's the part she likes the best. Sometimes you achieve a real breakthrough by building personal relationships. We would never have succeeded in Haiti if we had not gone to meet Haitian leader Gen. Raoul Cedras' wife. And I don't think we would have had any breakthrough in North Korea unless we had gone out on a boat for five or six hours with Kim Il Sung and



Rosalynn Carter (from left), Gen. Colin Powell, President Jimmy Carter, and Sen. Sam Nunn return to Haiti in February 1995 to assess progress on preparations for parliamentary and municipal elections. (Photograph by The Carter Center)

his wife. While public opinion is still against Rosalynn and my being fairly close to Zaire President Mobutu and his wife and his daughter, these kinds of personal connections are very important.

*Looking toward the future, what are your primary conflict resolution goals for The Carter Center in the coming years?*

**Mrs. Carter:** We would like to have peace in Liberia and an election and stabilized political situations in Burundi and Rwanda.

**President Carter:** A successful election in Zaire. Peace in Sudan. These are areas in which we are already deeply involved. And we'll help in the Middle East when called upon; I think that our role in the January 1996 Palestinian elections was very important.


*What areas are you watching with concern?*

**President Carter:** Those that we just mentioned. We obviously have been concerned about Burma, but we never have been able to get approval for The Carter Center to come in. We're concerned about Cuba. There again, we will monitor the situation, but we haven't entered directly because the opportunities are not there yet. We are poised, and once we get—even if at the last minute—an opportunity to move, we can move in a hurry based on the previous work we have done.

*A final question: What gives you hope about the state of world conflict?*

**President Carter:** One of the things we have accomplished in the Great Lakes is that we have refocused world attention on it, though that is still not enough. In fact, the U.S. government has become directly involved as a result of what The Carter Center and others have done there. They just weren't interested until we began to raise the visibility of this crisis. So, one of the things that gives me hope for the future is at least the possibility that there will be a more constant and effective melding of official and non-governmental organizations, as is the case now in some countries, such as Norway. And I would hope that in the future the United Nations and the U.S. government, when they can't successfully resolve a crisis on their own, will naturally turn to NGOs—not particularly as partners, but as a second or sometimes a primary channel. That's a hope I have, but it hasn't been realized yet.

**Mrs. Carter:** Also, despite always hearing in the news about all the bad things going on around the world, when we travel to see the progress of our projects, in Africa for instance, we see many good things happening, too. People getting better health care, being able to grow their own food—those things that can prevent war. Seeing those things happening now in so many of the countries gives us hope that they might spread to those places where the conflicts are now.



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 Peace & Change  
 Political Psychology  
 Security Dialogue

# INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The following is a list of selected regional and international organizations related to governance, democratization, development, diplomatic relations, economics, and security. Member nations of these organizations often are involved in the prevention or resolution of inter- and intrastate conflicts. Debate continues as to how to effectively use the organizational capacities of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in conflict prevention and management. Organizations such as the United Nations have been active in such practices for some time. Other groups, such as the Organization of African Unity, are still exploring ways to facilitate an end to wars in their regions. This information was effective as of March 1996.

## African Development Bank (ADB)

Established in 1963, the Bank began operations in July 1966 with the aim of financing economic and social development in African countries. 52 members.

**Headquarters:** 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire

**Secretary-General:** Hedi Meliane

## Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Created through the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and to increase the stability of the South East Asian region. 7 members.

**Headquarters:** 70a Jalan Sisingamanagaraja, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia

**Address:** P.O. Box 2072, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia

**Secretary-General:** Ajit Singh (Malaysia)

## Commonwealth of Nations (CW)

A free association of sovereign independent states with no charter, treaty, or constitution, first defined by the Imperial Conference of 1926 to include a group of "autonomous Communities within the British Empire," the modern Commonwealth was born in 1949. 51 members.

**Headquarters:** Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London, SW1Y 5HX, UK

**Secretary-General:** Chief E. Chukwuemekwa (Emeka) Anyaoku (Nigeria)

## Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Established by the 1975 Treaty of Lagos

with the object of promoting trade, co-operation, and self-reliance in West Africa. 16 members.

**Headquarters:** Secretariat Building, Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria

**Executive Secretary:** Edouard E. Benjamin (Guinea)

## European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

Founded in 1990 to contribute to the progress and economic reconstruction of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and put into practice the principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a market economy. 57 members.

**Headquarters:** One Exchange Square, 175 Bishopsgate, London EC2A 2EH, England

**President:** Jacques de Larosière (France)

## European Union (EU)

The European Economic Community (EEC) was formally changed to the European Community (effective November 1993). The new Treaty established a European Union (EU), which aimed to increase intergovernmental cooperation in economic and monetary affairs; establish a common foreign and security policy; and introduce cooperation in justice and home affairs.

**EC Headquarters:** 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049, Brussels, Belgium

**President:** Jacques Santer (Luxembourg)

## Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Founded in 1959 to promote the individual and collective development of region-

al developing member countries through the financing of economic and social development projects and the provision of technical assistance. 46 members.

**Headquarters:** 1300 New York Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20577, USA

**President:** Enrique V. Iglesias (Uruguay)

## Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Founded in 1968 by six drought-affected states to coordinate measures to combat the effects of drought and desertification.

**Address:** BP 2653, Djibouti

**Executive Secretary:** Dr. David S. Muduuli (Uganda)

## International Olympic Committee (IOC)

Founded in 1894 to ensure the regular celebration of the Olympic Games.

**Headquarters:** Château de Vidy, 1007 Lausanne, Switzerland

**President:** Juan Antonio Samaranch (Spain)

## International Organization for Migration

Founded in 1951 to meet immigration and emigration needs and to move refugees, displaced persons, and others in need of international migration services.

**Headquarters:** 17 route des Morillons, Case postale 71, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland

**Director General:** James Purcell Jr. (USA)

## League of Arab States

A covenant establishing the Arab League was signed in Cairo on March

22, 1945. 22 members (including the Palestinian Liberation Organization)  
**Headquarters:** Arab League Building, Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt  
**Address:** P.O. Box 11642, Cairo, Egypt  
**Secretary-General:** Dr. Ahmed Esmat Abd al-Meguid (Egypt)

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The Atlantic Alliance was established as a defensive political and military alliance of independent countries to provide common security for its members. It links the security of North America to that of Europe. NATO transformed its structures and policies following the London (1990), Rome (1991), and Brussels (1994) Summits to meet the new security challenge in Europe. 16 members, with 25 countries associated through the Partnership for Peace.  
**Headquarters:** B-1110 Brussels, Belgium  
**Secretary-General:** Dr. Javier Solana Madariaga (Spain)

### Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Established to promote economic and social welfare throughout the OECD area by assisting its members in the formulation of supporting policies and stimulating its members' efforts in favor of developing countries. 25 members.  
**Headquarters:** 2, rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France  
**Secretary-General:** Jean-Claude Paye (France)

### Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act laid out 10 principles of human rights, self-determination, and inter-relations of participant states. In 1990, member states institutionalized the OSCE through the Charter of Paris, which sets out principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and lays down the bases for east-west cooperation. 53 participating states.  
**Headquarters:** Kärntnerring 5-7, Vienna

1010, Austria  
**Chairman-in-Office:** Flavio Cotti (Switzerland)  
**Address:** P.O. Box 20062, Prinsessegracht 22, 2514 AP The Hague, Netherlands  
**High Commissioner:** Max van der Stoel (Netherlands)

### Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Chief objectives are to further African unity and solidarity; coordinate political, economic, cultural, health, scientific, and defense policies; and eliminate colonialism in Africa. In 1991, member countries signed a treaty to create an Africa-wide economic community by the year 2000, and in 1993, they adopted a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. 53 members.  
**Headquarters:** P.O. Box 3243 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
**Secretary-General:** Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania)

### Organization of American States (OAS)

Chief purposes include strengthening peace and security of the continent; promoting representative democracy, with respect for nonintervention; and preventing possible causes of difficulties and ensuring the pacific settlement of disputes among member states. 18 members.  
**Headquarters:** 17th St. and Constitution Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, USA  
**Secretary-General:** César Gavíria Trujillo (Colombia)

### Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Principal aims include unifying the petroleum policies of member countries and determining the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. 12 members.

**Headquarters:** Obere Donaustrasse 93, 1020 Vienna, Austria  
**Secretary-General:** Amar Mekhloufi (Algeria)

### United Nations (U.N.)

Founded in 1945 to maintain international peace and security and to develop international cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems. Intergovernmental agencies related to the U.N. include: International Atomic Energy Agency, International Labor Organization, UNESCO, World Health Organization, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. 185 member states.

**Headquarters:** United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017, USA

**Secretary-General:** Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt)

### United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Established in 1946 by the U.N. General Assembly to meet the emergency needs of children in postwar Europe and China. Through its extensive field network in developing countries, UNICEF undertakes in coordination with governments, local communities, and other aid organizations, programs in health, nutrition, education, water and sanitation, the environment, women in development, and other fields of importance to children. U.N. member states.

**Headquarters:** 3 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA

**Executive Director:** Carol Bellamy (USA)

### United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

UNHCR seeks to ensure that refugees and asylum-seekers are protected against forcible return, that they receive asylum, and that they are treated according to internationally recognized standards. 207 field offices in 115 countries.

**Headquarters:** CP 2500, 1212 Geneva 2 depot, Switzerland

**High Commissioner:** Sadako Ogata (Japan)

Source: *Europa World Yearbook 1996* (London: Europa Publications, 1996), Vol. I, 3-296.

# ACADEMIC PROGRAMS

The following is a list of several of the colleges and universities around the world that provide undergraduate and/or graduate studies programs in conflict resolution and peace studies. All World Wide Web sites on the Internet begin with "http://"

**The American University, School of International Service**—International Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Program, Washington, D.C. 20016; **Phone:** (202) 885-1622

**Antioch University**—The McGregor School Office of Admissions, 800 Livermore St., Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387; **Phone:** (513) 767-6325; **Website:** 192.131.123.121:125:/macr/

**Australian National University**—Research School of Pacific Studies, G.P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2601, Australia; **Phone:** (61) 6-259-3098

**Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution**—Rochusplatz 1, A-7461 Stadtschlaining, Austria; **Phone:** (43) 3355-2498

**Bethel College and Theological Seminary**—Global Studies Program, 3900 Bethel Drive, St. Paul, Minn. 55112-6999; **Phone:** (612) 638-6400

**Carleton University**—Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Paterson Hall, 2A55 OH, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada; **Phone:** (613) 788-6655

**The Catholic University of America**—School of Religious Studies, Washington, D.C. 20064; **Phone:** (202) 319-5700

**Catholic University of Leuven**—Center for Peace Research Department, Politieke Wetenschappen, Van Evenstraat 2B, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; **Phone:** (32) 16-28-32-41

**Colgate University**—Peace Studies Program, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, N.Y. 13346-1398; **Phone:** (315) 824-7806

**Conrad Grebel College**—Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G6, Canada; **Phone:** (519) 885-0220, ext. 261

**Cornell University**—Peace Studies Program, 130 Uris Hall, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7601; **Phone:** (607) 255-6484

**Columbia University**—International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Box 53, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027; **Phone:** (212) 678-3289; **Website:** www.tc.columbia.edu/~iccr/

**Earlham College**—Peace and Global Studies Program, Richmond, Ind. 47374-4095; **Phone:** (317) 983-1305

**Eastern Mennonite University**—Conflict Analysis and Transformation Program, Harrisonburg, Va. 22801; **Phone:** (540) 432-1449

**Fresno Pacific College**—Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies, 1717 S. Chestnut Ave., Fresno, Calif. 93702; **Phone:** (209) 455-5840 or (800) 909-8677; **E-mail:** pacs@fresno.edu

**Gallaudet University**—Department of Communication Arts, 800 Florida Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; **Phone:** (202) 993-1300

**George Mason University**—Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, Va. 22030-4444; **Phone:** (703) 993-1300; **Website:** web.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR/

**Georgetown University**—Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 301 Intercultural Center, Washington, D.C. 20057; **Phone:** (202) 687-5696

**George Washington University**—Elliot School of International Affairs, Graduate Admissions, Stuart Hall, Room 107, 2013 G. St., Washington, D.C. 20052; **Phone:** (202) 994-7050; Undergraduate Admissions, 2121 I. St., Washington D.C. 20052; **Phone:** (202) 994-6040

**Hampshire College**—Peace and World Security Studies Program, 893 West St., Amherst, Mass. 01002; **Phone:** (413) 549-4600

**Harvard University**—Program on Negotiation, 513 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138; **Phone:** (617) 495-1684; **Website:** www.harvard.edu/vine/providers/program\_on\_negotiation/

**Irish School of Ecumenics**—Center for Peace Studies, Milltown Park, Dublin 6; **Phone:** +353 1 260 1144

**Johns Hopkins University**—Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20035-1983; **Phone:** (202) 663-5700

**Lancaster University**—Department of Politics and International Relations, Cartmel College, Lancaster LA1 4YL, United Kingdom; **Phone:** (044) 0524 594266 or (044) 031 225 2639; **E-mail:** M.Bradley@lancaster.ac.uk

**MacQuaire University**—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Sydney 2109, Australia

**Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management**—Program on Modeling for Negotiation Management, Cambridge, Mass. 02139; **Phone:** (617) 253-2659; **Website:** www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/PMNM.html

**Mount Vernon College School of Business**—Communication and Policy Studies Program, 2100 Fowhall Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007; **Phone:** (202) 625-4558

**Nova Southeastern University**—Department of Dispute Resolution, 3301 College Ave., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 33314; **Website:** [www.nova.edu/CWIS/centers/ssss/index.html](http://www.nova.edu/CWIS/centers/ssss/index.html)

**School of International Training**—Kipling Road, P.O. Box 676, Brattleboro, Vt. 05302-0676; **Phone:** (802) 257-7751

**Stanford University**—Center for International Security and Arms Control, 320 Galvez St.; Stanford, Calif. 94305-6165; **Phone:** (415) 723-9625

**St. Bonaventure**—Justice, Peace, and Conflict Studies, Box 107, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 14778; **Phone (voice):** (716) 375-2212 or 2041; **E-mail:** [bgan@sbu.edu](mailto:bgan@sbu.edu)

**Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs**—Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, 410 Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210; **Phone:** (315) 443-2367

**Tufts University**—Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass. 02155; **Phone:** (617) 627-3700; **Website:** [www.tufts.edu/fletcher](http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher)

**Universitat Jaume I**—Research Group Project: Philosophy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Departament d'Humanitats, Castello de la Plana, Campus Cra. Borriol, 12080 Castello, Espanya; **Phone:** 34-(9)64-34 57 00 (ext. 3466) or 34-(9)64-34 57 04; **E-mail:** [martguz@hum.ubi.es](mailto:martguz@hum.ubi.es).

**University of Akron**—Center for Peace Studies, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325-6201; **Phone:** (216) 972-6513

**University of Bradford**—Department of Peace Studies, Bradford, West Yorkshire, England BD7 1DP; **Phone:** (44) 12-743-85235

**University of California, Berkeley**—Peace and Conflict Studies, Division of Undergraduate and Interdisciplinary Studies, 301 Campbell Hall, Berkeley, Calif. 94720; **Phone:** (510) 642-6000

**University of California, Irvine**—Global Peace and Conflict Studies, Social Science Tower 418, Irvine, Calif. 92717; **Phone:** (714) 824-6410

**University of California, San Diego**—Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Mail Code 0518, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, Calif. 92093-0518; **Phone:** (619) 534-3352

**University of Cambridge**—Global Security Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Free School Lane, Cambridge, United Kingdom; **E-mail:** [gsp.cam.ac.uk/gsp.html](mailto:gsp.cam.ac.uk/gsp.html)

**University of Colorado, Boulder**—Peace and Conflict Studies **Website:** [csf.Colorado.EDU:80/peace/](http://csf.Colorado.EDU:80/peace/); The University of Colorado maintains a directory of academic peace and conflict studies programs at [csf.Colorado.EDU:80/peace/academic.html](http://csf.Colorado.EDU:80/peace/academic.html)

**University of Hawaii**—Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 2424 Maile Way, Porteus Hall 717, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822; **Phone:** (808) 956-7427; **Website:** [www2.hawaii.edu/uhip/](http://www2.hawaii.edu/uhip/)

**University of Idaho**—The Martin Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Moscow, Idaho 83844-3229; **E-mail:** [vincentj@uidaho.edu](mailto:vincentj@uidaho.edu)

**University of Lancaster**—Richardson Institute for Peace Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster LA1 4YI, United Kingdom; **Phone:** (44) 05-246-5201

**University of Lubumbashi**—Centre d'Etudes Politiques d'Afrique Centrale (CEPAC); P.O. Box 1825 Lubumbashi, Zaire

**University of Massachusetts, Boston**—The Graduate Programs in Dispute Resolution, 100 Morrissey Blvd., Boston, Mass. 02125-3393; **Phone:** (617) 287-7421

**University of Notre Dame**—Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, P.O. Box 639, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556-0639; **Phone:** (219) 631-6970; **E-mail:** [kroc-admissions.1@nd.edu](mailto:kroc-admissions.1@nd.edu)

**University of Saint Thomas**—Justice and Peace Studies Program, 2115 Summit Ave., Saint Paul, Minn. 55105-1096; **Phone:** (612) 962-5325; **E-mail:** [DWSMITH@STTHOMAS.EDU](mailto:DWSMITH@STTHOMAS.EDU)

**University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee**—Certificate Program in Peace Studies, Department of Educational Policy & Community Studies, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, Wis. 53201; **Phone:** (414) 229-4724; **E-mail:** [imh@csd4.csd.uwm.edu](mailto:imh@csd4.csd.uwm.edu)

**University for Peace**—P.O. Box 199-1250, Escazu, Costa Rica; **Phone:** (506) 49-10-72 and 49-15-11

**Uppsala University**—Department for Peace and Conflict Research, Box 514, S-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden; **Phone:** (46) 18-23-49

**Villanova University**—The Center for Peace and Justice Villanova, Pa. 19085; **Phone:** (610) 519-4499

# U.S.-BASED CONFLICT RESOLUTION ORGANIZATIONS

Listed below are membership organizations involved in conflict resolution that provide information, referrals, and literature on mediation, negotiation, and arbitration training and practice. For a listing of international organizations involved with international conflict resolution, The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program annually publishes the *International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution*.

## Academy of Family Mediators

355 Tyrol W., 1500 S. Hwy. 100, Golden Valley, Minn. 55416; **Phone:** (612) 525-8670; **E-mail:** office@igc.apc.org  
Supports professional family (especially divorce and custody) mediation and public awareness and education of family mediation services.

**The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution**  
1800 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-5802; **Phone:** (202) 331-2258;  
The Standing Committee acts as a resource center for citizens, attorneys, bar leaders, and judiciary and also holds workshops and assists in the introduction of alternatives to court programs. It publishes the *Dispute Resolution* newsletter.

## American Arbitration Association

140 W. 51st St., New York, N.Y. 10020-1203; **Phone:** (212) 484-4100; Thirty-five regional offices with a pool of 54,000 trained mediators/arbitrators who can assist on a wide variety of topics.

**Children's Creative Response to Conflict**  
Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. 10960;  
**Phone:** (914) 358-4601; **E-mail:** fornatl@igc.apc.org; Provides conflict resolution skills to those who work with young people. Twenty branches provide various programs including mediation, bias awareness training, and conflict resolution.

**Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED)**  
George Mason University, 4400 University, Fairfax, Va. 22030; **Phone:** (202) 273-4485; **E-mail:** copred@igc.apc.org; COPRED is a community of educators, activists, and researchers working on alternatives to violence and war.

## Council of Better Business Bureaus—ADR Division

4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 800, Arlington, Va. 22203; **Phone:** (800) 334-2406;  
The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Division of the BBB provides training in arbitration and mediation.

## CONFLICTNET

18 De Boom St., San Francisco, Calif. 94107; **Phone:** (415) 442-0220;  
**E-mail:** jrhelie@igc.apc.org; The computer network, CONFLICTNET, assists in the facilitation of information and resource exchange in conflict resolution through computer access.

## Conflict Resolution Center International

2205 E. Carson St., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15203-2107; **Phone:** (412) 481-5559;  
**E-mail:** crci@igc.apc.org; A resource center that maintains an international database of interveners, trainers, and consultants to match those needing such services with service providers.

## Educators for Social Responsibility

23 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138; **Phone:** (617) 492-1764; An international organization of educators who help students to understand conflict and acquire personal conflict resolution skills and social responsibility.

## National Association for Community Mediation

1726 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-4502; **Phone:** (202) 467-6226;  
Supports the maintenance and growth of community-based mediation programs and encourages the development and sharing of resources in the dispute resolution field.

## National Association for Mediation in Education (NAME)

205 Hampshire UMASS, Amherst,

Mass. 01003; **Phone:** (413) 545-2462;  
**E-mail:** name@igc.apc.org; A national and international clearinghouse for conflict resolution information, which provides resources, technical assistance, and training.

## National Institute for Dispute Resolution

1726 M St. N.W., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036-4502; **Phone:** (202) 466-4764; **E-mail:** nldr@igc.apc.org;  
Promotes development of fair, effective, and efficient conflict resolution. Publishes *NIDR News* and *Forum*.

## National Peace Foundation

1835 K St. N.W., Suite 610, Washington, D.C. 20006; **Phone:** (202) 233-1770; **E-mail:** npifnatl@igc.apc.org;  
Promotes peace and conflict resolution, from the community to international, and publishes *Peace Reporter*. Provides conflict resolution training programs in former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe.

## Program for Community Problem Solving

915 15th St. N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005; **Phone:** (202) 783-2961; Publishes *Directory of Consultants Helping Communities Collaborate*. Geared for state and local officials, government staff, and community leaders to locate conflict resolution service providers for public policy problems.

## Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR)

815 15th St. N.W., Suite 530, Washington, D.C. 20005; **Phone:** (202) 783-7277; **Website:** <http://www.igc.apc.org/spidr/>  
SPIDR seeks greater acceptance of the dispute resolution process and to enhance the standards of practice in the field of dispute resolution.

# WORLD WIDE WEB (WWW) SITES

Unless otherwise indicated, all WWW addresses begin with <http://>

## General Information

### Children and War:

[www.intac.com/PubService/  
human\\_rights/CHILDREN](http://www.intac.com/PubService/human_rights/CHILDREN)

### DiploNet

[www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/  
DiploNet.html](http://www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/DiploNet.html)

### The Global Democracy Network

[www.gdn.org](http://www.gdn.org)

### Human Rights Watch gopher menu

<gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:5000/11/int/hrw>

### The International Affairs Network (IANWeb) Resources

[www.pitt.edu/~ian/ianres.html](http://www.pitt.edu/~ian/ianres.html)

Peace and Conflict Resolution site:  
[www.pitt.edu/~ian/resource/conflict.htm](http://www.pitt.edu/~ian/resource/conflict.htm)

### MAP International

[map.org](http://map.org)

### National Public Radio Online

[www.npr.org](http://www.npr.org)

### The New York Times

[www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com)

### OneWorld News Service

[www.oneworld.org](http://www.oneworld.org)

### Peace and Security Integrated Internet Resource Guide

[www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/](http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/)

### The Progressive Directory

(Includes ConflictNet and PeaceNet among its information resources)  
[www.igc.apc.org](http://www.igc.apc.org)

### University of Michigan Documents Center

[www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/  
Documents.center/index.html](http://www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/Documents.center/index.html)

## Nongovernmental Organizations

### CARE

[www.care.org](http://www.care.org)

### The Carter Center

[www.emory.edu/CARTER\\_CENTER](http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER)

### Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

[www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org)

### Commission on Global Governance

[www.cgg.ch](http://www.cgg.ch)

### Foundation for Global Community

[www.globalcommunity.org](http://www.globalcommunity.org)

### InterAction

[www.interaction.org](http://www.interaction.org)

InterAction gopher menu:  
<gopher://gopher.vita.org:70/11/intl/inetres>

### International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

[www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)

### The Institute for War and Peace Reporting

[www.demon.co.uk/iwpr.htm](http://www.demon.co.uk/iwpr.htm)

### Medecins sans Frontieres

[www.tiac.net/users/dwbs](http://www.tiac.net/users/dwbs)

### National Peace Corps Association

[www.vita.org/nPCA](http://www.vita.org/nPCA)

### The Nobel Foundation

[www.nobel.se](http://www.nobel.se)

### Project Ploughshares

[waterv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough](http://waterv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough)

### Refugees International

[www.clark.net/pub/ri/ri.html](http://www.clark.net/pub/ri/ri.html)

### Soros Foundation

[www.soros.org](http://www.soros.org)

### Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

[www.sipri.se](http://www.sipri.se)

### U.S. Committee for Refugees

[www.irsu\\_uscr.org/uscr/uscrindx.htm](http://www.irsu_uscr.org/uscr/uscrindx.htm)

### U.S. Institute of Peace

[witloof.sjsu.edu/peace/conflict.html](http://witloof.sjsu.edu/peace/conflict.html)

## Intergovernmental Organizations

### The European Community

Humanitarian Office (ECHO)

[www.cec.lu/en/comm/echo.html](http://www.cec.lu/en/comm/echo.html)

### WWW Virtual Library United Nations Information Services

[www.undcp.or.at/unlinks.html#rights](http://www.undcp.or.at/unlinks.html#rights)

### The United Nations Web Server

[www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

### United Nations Information Services

[www.un.or.at/unlinks.html](http://www.un.or.at/unlinks.html)

### United Nations International Computing Center (ICC)

[www.unicc.org/](http://www.unicc.org/)

### The World Bank

[www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

## Regional Listings

### Africa

For many countries in Africa, try  
[www.sas.upenn.edu/African\\_Studies/  
Country\\_Specific](http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific); For various countries and cities, try [www.city.net](http://www.city.net)

### Africa Online

[www.africaonline.com/](http://www.africaonline.com/)

### Balkan Monitor

[users.aol.com/Balkanlust/monitor.html](http://users.aol.com/Balkanlust/monitor.html)

### Baltics Online

[www.viabalt.ee](http://www.viabalt.ee)

### Country Pages

[www.yahoo.com/Politics/Countries](http://www.yahoo.com/Politics/Countries)

### Greater Horn Information Exchange

[www.usaid.gov/HORN/](http://www.usaid.gov/HORN/)

### Latin American Network Information Center (LANIC)

[info.lanic.utexas.edu/](http://info.lanic.utexas.edu/)

### Political Database of the Americas

[www.georgetown.edu/LatAmerPolitical/  
home.html](http://www.georgetown.edu/LatAmerPolitical/home.html)

### U.S. Department of State

[dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html)

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
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# ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER



*The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre park near downtown Atlanta. (Photograph by Paul Dingman)*

The Carter Center brings people and resources together to resolve conflicts; promote democracy; fight disease, hunger, and poverty; and protect and promote human rights worldwide. It is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center undertakes action-oriented programs in cooperation with world leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in at least 65 countries.

The Center's programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, other NGOs, and partners in the United States and abroad. Private donations from individu-

als, foundations, corporations, and multilateral development assistance programs support the Center's work.

The Center is located in a 35-acre park just two miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular interconnected pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center's program staff. The complex includes the nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins The Carter Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and is open to the public. The Center and Library are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

More information about The Carter Center, including Center publications, press releases, and speeches, is available on the Internet's World Wide Web. The Carter Center site is at: [http://www.emory.edu/CARTER\\_CENTER](http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER)

# 10 THINGS YOU CAN DO FOR PEACE



1. Write your Congressional representative advocating a reduction of arms traffic, including Congressional action to halt arms sales to developing nations, and support an international ban on landmines.
2. Lobby your political leaders to fund conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms as much as they do military readiness.
3. Be trained as a third-party mediator or facilitator—encourage the teaching of these skills in local schools and churches or start a peer mediation program in your school.
4. Monitor international developments and stay informed on your own government's human rights and democratization practices.
5. Educate yourself about other cultures and cultural values and try to meet people of different backgrounds, religions, languages, and ethnicity.
6. Learn to talk through conflicts as a way of solving them rather than resort to fighting.
7. Speak to local civic organizations about the need to eliminate war as a method of resolving conflicts.
8. Foster local peace or conflict resolution essay contests in schools or write to newspapers advocating for peace.
9. Take responsibility. Try to help others in conflict or in difficult situations.
10. Write to us at the Conflict Resolution Program of The Carter Center and give us feedback on the 1995-96 *State of World Conflict Report*.

Send your ideas to *State of World Conflict Report* IDEAS c/o International Negotiation Network  
The Carter Center, One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway, Atlanta, Ga. 30307 Fax: (404) 420-3862