

*The International Negotiation Network: A New Method of Approaching
Some Very Old Problems*

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INN Africa Journal

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Before dawn the aircraft lifted above the serene countryside surrounding Nairobi and flew north above the great Rift Valley leaving the rich green hill country of Kenya and entering Sudanese airspace. Landing in Khartoum that day for the third time in as many weeks, our mission was the same as it would be later in the day in Addis Ababa: meet with the head of state and urge him to further the cause of peace, famine relief, and human rights in his country.

Back in Nairobi we had been working with negotiating teams on efforts to conclude preliminary negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, while we were preparing to begin negotiations between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. Leaving our mediation support team and the warring parties in Kenya, today's shuttle between the capitals of these three countries would mean on-board breakfast, lunch and dinner, and an intense schedule for President and Mrs. Carter and for us. In some ways our trip was a welcome interlude from the minute-by-minute frustrations of nudging the parties to agreement. On the other hand, the flights over the parched Sudanese landscape and the rich farm lands of Ethiopia served to emphasize the senseless starvation and the suffering on the ground.

Landing again in Nairobi that evening after 10 o'clock, we prepared ourselves for the day ahead. Hardly pausing to savor the agreements we had received from Presidents el-Bashir and Mengistu regarding famine relief, we prepared for the eighteenth day of peace-seeking and the tedious formulations of keeping the parties at the table and working to end the suffering we had just flown over. Departing the aircraft, there was again the feeling of somber responsibility as well as the excitement of our task.

Peace is a process, conceived in the mind and felt by the heart.

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Introduction

Atlanta, Georgia

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For several years The Carter Center of Emory University's (CCEU) Conflict Resolution Program has been engaged in developing an International Negotiation Network (INN) to alleviate the tremendous suffering resulting from intranational conflicts. Our efforts have led to the convening of direct negotiation

between warring parties engaged in prolonged conflicts. We have been involved in activities advancing free elections and elections monitoring where such efforts have helped to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power in previously conflict-burdened countries. We have been involved in quiet, back-channel linkages of disputing parties and resources available to them. Some of our efforts have received widespread media coverage. However, the vast majority of our work has not been widely known.

In this analysis paper we attempt to explain the development of the INN concept, analyze some of the tools employed by the INN that have broader implications for the field of conflict resolution, and explore the potential application of these methods to the spectrum of armed conflicts. For purposes of analyzing the tools of conflict resolution utilized by the INN, we focus principally on the negotiations we have convened between the Government of The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). In the final analysis we failed to achieve our ultimate goal in the PDRE/EPLF negotiations - a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, our attempt did succeed in accomplishing a number of lesser goals. These accomplishments are discussed in the conclusion of this paper. It is worth noting here, however, that our efforts were successful in stopping, for a period of more than ten months, the fighting among the disputants in the longest running war in Africa, in helping to draw the world's attention to the region, and in creating an expectation of success with the disputants in the areas of famine relief, human rights, and a peace process. We were able to wed the highly visible convening power of eminent persons with alternative conflict resolution approaches, techniques, and meeting processes.

In this paper we attempt to document what we did, where we failed, and where we succeeded. It serves as a beginning assessment of what we learned. While we did not end the PDRE/EPLF conflict, what we set in motion may be more

important, in the long run, than a single solution to a particular conflict. If we can succeed in developing an international network that draws a larger number of eminent persons into close association for the purpose of making war the least acceptable means of resolving conflicts, rather than the method of first resort, we can have an impact at a systemic level.

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To those listed above and the others whom we have surely overlooked, we are deeply grateful. Our principal thanks go, however, to former President Jimmy Carter and Rosalynn Carter for having the vision and the drive to develop The

Carter Center and the International Negotiation Network and for giving us the opportunity to play a role in that development.

A Word About Terminology

In this paper we discuss a particular mediation initiative conducted by the INN concerning a discrete dispute. However, mediation is but one form of third-party intervention. Since the meaning of mediation itself became a subject for negotiation in these talks, we felt it would be useful at the outset to provide some definitional framework for the terminology used herein.

"Mediation is only one form, albeit the most common one, of third-party intervention. It is not a single process or one discrete activity; it is instead a continuous set of related activities involving actors, decisions, and situations. Mediation encompasses a spectrum of behavior that ranges from the very passive (e.g. providing good offices) to the highly active (e.g. putting pressure on the disputants). The nature, form, and intensity of mediation in a particular dispute is determined by a number of factors, including the nature of the dispute, the nature of the mediator, and various other cultural and contextual variables. In this paper we define mediation broadly as a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Berkovitch, 1991)."

At times the form the mediation takes may be facilitative, resulting from the parties' willingness to jointly solve their problems. In this approach, the mediation team, often composed of behavioral scientists, provides non-evaluative process suggestions on approaches to the issues that the parties might undertake. Emphasis is usually given to separating the person from the problem and

focusing on interests, not positions. Every effort is made to air grievances and encourage the disputants to share their perspectives of reality with the other side (Fisher & Ury, 1981).

Increasingly, the technique of joint problem solving has become popular as the field of conflict resolution has moved away from "settlement technologies." Settlement technologies have been associated with tough negotiating and win-lose outcomes. Problem-solving approaches are more often associated with win-win goals and jointly developed outcomes. (Burton, 1984, 1987, 1990). Problem-solving approaches have been tried with mixed results in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Somalia, the Middle East, and other areas.

In a single-text negotiation a third party manages the development of a single working document that reflects the agreements of the parties on the issues and the interests they hold. The principal feature of this approach is a dovetailing of the interests of the parties. To achieve this result, the third party asks for clarification of the interests, not hard positions. The third party prepares a draft to which no one is immediately committed. The third party works with both parties to gather criticisms of the draft, not concessions. The third party incorporates the criticisms into the draft and moves between the parties asking for more criticisms. The final product is a document from which all the parties' major objections have been eliminated and one which tends to be acceptable as an agreement for their future conduct (Carter, 1982).

Our efforts in the PDRE/EPLF negotiations were to mediate the conflict, using at times a facilitative approach, a joint problem-solving strategy, a bargaining strategy and often a single negotiating text. Our approach was multitracked and multiphased, as we discuss more fully in the section entitled "The Mediation Approach."

We did not succeed in bringing a negotiated solution to the Eritrean/Ethiopian conflict. However, as Elbert Hubbard said in 1927, "There is no failure except in no longer trying." We believe there are lessons to be learned from this failed attempt.

Closing the Mediation Gap: The Development of the INN

In 1987 Jimmy Carter asked the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Commonwealth of Nations to join him and a small group at The Carter Center of Emory University (CCEU) for a three-day working session. In frank and far-reaching discussions, the participants shared their concerns about what they perceived to be major shortcomings in international dispute resolution systems. They explored the limitations in their organizational charters that prohibited their involvement in internal affairs of member nations, as well as the reluctance of governments even to acknowledge the existence of revolutionary groups within nations they recognize diplomatically. These constraints on governments and regional or international organizations results in the vast majority of conflicts being beyond the reach of existing dispute-resolution systems. The working group developed a consensus that there was an emerging need for more "venturesomeness" on the part of world leaders to solve conflicts through alternatives to the use of force. The conclusion was that a new approach was needed to deal with the kind of conflict that most frequently occurs today.

As we began to examine the total number of existing armed conflicts, several important trends emerged. With the notable exception of the recent Persian Gulf war, the nature of war has changed dramatically since the end of World War II. What we have typically seen over the past 45 years are not all-out wars between nations, but rather a pattern of internal conflicts confined to the boundaries of sovereign nations. Today's war is typically civil in nature, most often started by rebels who either want to 1) secede from the union, 2) have some greater degree

of autonomy, 3) have greater participation as minorities in the way their government is run, or 4) have greater access to economic resources within their country.

However, when the United Nations and other regional or international peacemaking organizations were developed, they were designed within the context of the then-existing experience with wars. The governments that created these organizations were willing for them to become involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping between nations but not *within* nations. Serious restrictions were placed on the powers of such organizations when the nature of the conflict was intranational. As an example, Article Two, Section Seven of the United Nations' Charter prohibits its involvement in the internal affairs of member nations. Employees of the United Nations working within member countries are expressly forbidden to gather political information about those countries.

When the charter limitations of the international or regional organizations are combined with the general reluctance of governments to interfere in the internal affairs of friendly nations, what emerges is a significant mediation gap. There are more than 100 currently existing armed conflicts and wars within national boundaries. Thirty-two of these are considered major, defined as having battle-related deaths in excess of 1,000. For the millions of disputing parties caught up in these conflicts, there is virtually nowhere to turn when they need assistance in finding peaceful means of resolving the problems. Some of the wars have raged for decades. Some have been fought intermittently with long periods of relative tranquility followed by outbreaks of hostility. Since 1945 all but two of the wars that have been fought have occurred in developing nations. Civilian deaths account for about three-fourths of the casualties in all the wars combined (SIPRI Yearbook, 1990).

These intranational conflicts incur great costs, not simply military costs in terms of lives lost, although this alone would be significant, but costs that include: 1)

impeding development, 2) causing excessive childhood morbidity and mortality, 3) creating massive refugee and displaced populations, 4) spreading disease, 5) devastating the environment, and 6) causing recurring famine. They also have the potential to spill over into international conflicts and even to escalate regionwide.

CCEU launched the INN for the dual purposes of 1) finding non-military means of reducing armed conflicts - closing the mediation gap - and 2) helping to prevent the escalation of lesser-scale conflicts into armed ones; focusing in both instances on intranational arenas. The INN was conceived to function as a network linking various resources available at many levels of operations internationally, avoiding duplication of efforts, and, rather than competing with existing organizations, working collaboratively with them to more effectively address the most intractable kinds of conflicts. Its mission was not to look for easy victories that might be tracked on a score card, but to focus on the most horrendous conflicts in terms of human suffering or lives lost. From its inception, it has worked in consultation with world leaders and in collaboration with entities such as Harvard's Program on Negotiation, Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research, and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. The INN Secretariat is based at CCEU and is itself a model for the Network, with Secretariat staff drawn from the Center, Harvard's Program on Negotiation, and Pangaea International, Inc. Members of the INN Secretariat are the co-authors of this article, in addition to William L. Ury, director of the Nuclear Negotiation Project at Harvard.

For the past several years the INN has worked to identify the areas of greatest need, inform the world community of its existence, convene mediation initiatives, research and analyze conflict situations and document its approaches, monitor elections, perform human rights interventions, and spotlight certain conflicts that had slipped to the back burner of public awareness.

The model for our interventions in mediation initiatives is that INN Secretariat members scan the existing conflicts, looking for those that are appropriate for an intervention or might be moved toward readiness. In consultation with President Carter, the Secretariat convenes academic studies of conflicts so chosen. Top experts are identified to consult with a potential mediation team and design an overall strategy for managing a mediation process.

Over the course of the past three years, the Secretariat has actively monitored some 25 of the existing armed conflicts. Mediations have been convened in two. Back-channel interventions have been undertaken in eight others as well. In addition, the Secretariat has assisted numerous parties in identifying resources available to them through organizations other than the INN.

More recently, we have evolved an INN Council, which comprises world leaders from South Africa, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Costa Rica, Senegal, Nigeria, and the United States. Working collaboratively, the Council members maximize INN access to world leaders and conflicts, but more importantly, use their collective influence to advance the proposition that war is no longer acceptable as a means of resolving disputes.

We have seen various nodes in the network grow from the twenty or so persons attending the initial INN working session in 1987 to more than 400 individuals and organizations in 47 countries. As we move into a new stage of development, we are cognizant of how far we have come in so short a time and how much farther still we need to go.

Our experiences in the conflict between the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), and a revolutionary group called the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) present an opportunity for a case analysis to illustrate our approaches and techniques.

The PDRE/EPLF Negotiations

(Authors' note: As this report is going to press, there have been major military advances made by the revolutionary groups in Ethiopia. Mengistu Haile-Mariam; the self-imposed military head of state, resigned after more than a decade of harsh, one-man rule, and fled to Zimbabwe. Members of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an umbrella organization of several of the many revolutionary groups, succeeded in taking the capital city of Addis Ababa and began to organize a transitional government. This move indicates that for the first time in almost 30 years of fighting, a military solution may present a viable end to the conflict. At the inaugural conference convened by all the major political factions to discuss the formation of a transitional government, it was agreed that Eritrea had the right to an internationally supervised referendum on independence, which would be held within two years. However, it remains to be seen whether the ethnic groups and political factions will be able to work collaboratively in the long term. While an end may finally be in sight, at press time the conflict was by no means resolved. The section that follows recounts events as they existed at the time of our intervention in 1989-90.)

"The Forgotten War" is a label that has been applied to the conflict between the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). It is the longest running war in Africa's history and yet it is obscure, relatively unknown except by scholars and relief workers.

Ethiopia is at once the poorest country in the world and one of the oldest governments, dating back over 3,000 years. It has a proud history and a claim to being one of the earliest cradles of Christianity. If it has been governed long, it has not always been governed well. Its past has been marked by a loose confederation, more like a monarchy with numerous autonomous kingdoms than like a homogeneous, centrally administered government. The region known as Eritrea has historically been a part of that confederation, and part of the history of Ethiopia includes pride in its national leaders who have come from Eritrea. (See Map of Ethiopia/Eritrea attached as Appendix No.1).

From the late 1880s until 1941, Eritrea was colonized by Italy. During the colonial period, the region of Eritrea began to develop in ways different from those of other parts of Ethiopia. Trade and commerce brought prosperity to Eritrea that exceeded that of Ethiopia. Customs and traditions of the colonial rulers were introduced that changed many of the practices of the indigenous population. The 1889 treaty of Wuchale between Italy and Ethiopia established the borders of Eritrea as they exist today. That treaty was a concession of the Eritrean territory to the Italians in exchange for their agreement not to colonize other parts of Ethiopia. Following the period of Italian colonial rule, Eritrea was administered by Great Britain. That administration was terminated in 1950 by UN Resolution 390-A(V), which declared that Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia.

However, many of the people living in Eritrea no longer saw themselves as Ethiopians, but as Eritreans. They petitioned the United Nations for the right to self-determination, to let the people choose by a referendum whether they would form a new nation called Eritrea or would become part of Ethiopia. These claims went unheard as the United States sponsored a United Nations resolution to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. When Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie ignored the terms of the United Nations federation order, which had left Eritrea largely autonomous, and began dealing with Eritrea as if it were not different from other

parts of Ethiopia, a resistance movement was born. That movement has evolved over time into the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

For almost three decades the Eritreans have waged a guerrilla campaign against the armies of Ethiopia. Their military efforts have been marked by the seizure of Ethiopian supplies and equipment and the control of many portions of Eritrea by the revolutionary forces.

Ethiopia, which has had problems on several military fronts, spends over 70 percent of its budget for military needs. It maintains the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa, with a troop strength of over 300,000. Recently, Ethiopia has resorted to forceful conscription of teenaged boys, aged 14 and over, to continue its military operations.

The losses on both sides have been staggering. The children of Eritrea go to school, when they can, in caves underground. For three generations the Eritreans have known only a steady onslaught of bombing raids, death, and destruction. Eritreans do not routinely go outside in daylight hours. Their days are spent underground, moving under the cover of darkness.

While the world watched in horror in 1984-85, a deadly famine struck Ethiopia. Repeated television news broadcasts included film footage of children with distended stomachs and eyes covered with flies waiting in refugee camps for food supplies to be delivered. Today Ethiopia finds itself in the midst of another drought and famine that is predicted to exceed the casualty figures of the last one. Estimates are that four to five million people are at risk. Yet the international relief efforts that could be available to the people are seriously hampered by conflict, since most of the potential victims live in combat areas. The tragic fact about the famine is that it is principally man-made; the crop failures are brought about by the combination of recurrent drought and the sustained conflict.

When one asks the EPLF what are the three most important issues that must be resolved to attain peace, the answer is self-determination, self-determination, self-determination. Conversely, when the PDRE is questioned about the principle behind its decades-long fight against the EPLF, the justification is national unity and sovereignty. These are the positions of the parties and, at first glance, they would seem to be about one hundred and eighty degrees apart.

Yet in September 1989, under the auspices of the INN, representatives of the EPLF and the PDRE sat together to attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement to their differences. The parties placed only three requirements on the peace process: 1) that it be conducted by a neutral third party, 2) that the talks be made public, and 3) that no preconditions be set by either side. Under these ground rules, the two sides spent two weeks together at The Carter Center of Emory University (CCEU) in Atlanta, Georgia. Convened by former President Carter, the parties worked on preliminary agreements that would provide the framework for substantive talks.

In November and December of 1989, the parties met for a second round of preliminary negotiations in Nairobi, Kenya. Again under the leadership of President Carter, they worked for over a week on the remaining preliminary issues. At the end of the Nairobi peace talks, both sides had signed agreements on 14 procedural matters.

Conflict Analysis

The INN began its concentration on the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict almost a full year before it initially convened the parties. In a working session held in the fall of 1988, a small group of scholars who monitor conflicts were asked to assist in developing a short list of "hot spots," i.e., conflicts that were at or near the boiling point and were not being mediated by either international organizations or governments. Ethiopia/Eritrea topped the list.

Following the working session, the INN Secretariat began an analysis of the historical, political, sociological, and economic aspects of the conflict. We found that many analyses were written with a clear bias for one side or the other. So an effort also was made to read an even amount of biased reports to better understand the perceptions the parties had about themselves and each other. We conducted a number of preliminary interviews with scholars, policy analysts, and relief organizations to gain insights into the cultural differences of the parties. We also began talking to persons engaged in Track One, or official governmental diplomacy, to understand what efforts were being or had been made to reconcile the differences and where they had succeeded or failed.

As we became more familiar with the various aspects of the conflict and began to develop an appreciation of the past efforts, we convened several highly targeted briefing sessions where a small number of experts met with our mediation team and gave us their advice on how to approach the parties, frame the issues, and conduct the mediation initiative. These were held at The Carter Center, in New York, and in Washington, D.C.

We also met U.S.-based representatives of the EPLF as well as ex-patriate Ethiopian government officials. We learned firsthand from these meetings what the parties would expect of our efforts and how to avoid certain past mistakes. One of the preliminary thresholds for INN involvement in conflicts is that all major parties must invite our efforts. This invitation would not be readily extended by the Eritrean and Ethiopian parties; given the protracted nature of their conflict, as well as their prior bad experiences with mediation attempts. These negative factors were further complicated by difficulties in communication, especially with the EPLF group. For these reasons, in conjunction with a trip to the Horn of Africa concerning famine relief, human rights, and agricultural reform, we met directly with the leadership of both sides to explore their interest in a mediation

effort, as well as to address questions they might have about us or our approaches.

Fact Finding

Our first trip to the region took place during the spring of 1989. We initially traveled to Khartoum, Sudan, where we met with the Secretary-General of the EPLF, Isaias Afwerki, and top members of the EPLF leadership. President Carter explained his desire to assist the parties if they wanted to attempt to resolve their issues in a non-military way and a number of possible approaches that might be taken. The EPLF expressed its general interest and agreed to meet with us again after we had met with President Mengistu. While in Khartoum, we also met with the leadership of another Ethiopian resistance movement, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), who sought not to secede, but to topple the Mengistu government. The TPLF were involved in parallel negotiations with the PDRE, which were being mediated by Italian government officials. Subsequently, the TPLF kept us informed about their progress both militarily and at the negotiation table, and we were able to use that information in our efforts with the EPLF and the PDRE.

Our next stop was Addis Ababa, where similar discussions were held with President Mengistu. We then returned to Khartoum and held a second set of meetings with the EPLF leadership. Both sides expressed a commitment to a mediation process but were concerned about public perceptions of who had made the first overture to end the conflict. President Mengistu wanted to claim that the peace process had been instigated by his government. He immediately issued a press release that asserted that the process was begun in response to an initiative by the Dergue. Both sides were desirous that the international community be informed about their negotiations, and so a public announcement was made by President Carter that both sides sought peace and that the parties would begin direct talks.

One of the initial conclusions drawn as a result of our trip to the region in 1989 was that the conflict was virtually intractable. The parties had been at war for nearly 30 years, and each generation of fighters seemed more committed than the previous generation to either the right of self-determination or national sovereignty. At one level our strategy was to devise and implement steps to transform the members of the negotiation teams from warriors into problem solvers. We were trying to improve the odds that the conflict could be handled with less violence. We knew how difficult this task would be but took every step we could, nonetheless, to create an environment where this transformation could occur. At another level, we realized that because the parties were so entrenched, our best role might be to create a process that would be used by the parties for their own purposes but which would result in a temporary cessation of the fighting, saving lives in the short term, and hope that changing circumstances would lead to long-term options for peace.

A recent review of empirical trends in mediation in international relations illustrates the mathematical odds against our success. In an examination of 284 attempted mediations occurring between 1945-89 in 79 international conflicts, a settlement was reached in only 5 percent of the conflicts and a ceasefire in only 8 percent. Eighty-six percent of the mediation efforts failed in conflicts involving fatalities in excess of 100,000 lives (Berkovitch, 1991). In the most common outcome (50%) the mediation had no discernible effect. One of the reasons the INN chose this particular conflict over dozens of others that might have been selected, was that it was a difficult one with great loss of lives over decades of fighting. We knew our chances of success were minimal, but we attempted to implement a plan designed to alter the odds.

We saw our principal INN mission in this mediation effort as being fourfold: to be a catalyst, to create conditions for progress to occur, to get an agreement for an extended cease-fire, and to act where governments and regional organizations

had been unable to act. We began by trying to understand the positions of the parties, as well as their interests and needs. President Carter was successful in initiating a dialogue between the parties and in holding them to the table. We also began efforts to refocus the world's attention on the region and to position others to continue with the parties.

First, we focused on those factors where we could have influence or bring to bear pressure on the parties. We devised a multitrack, multiphased approach which called for simultaneously conducting a bargaining strategy, a single-text negotiating approach, and a joint problem-solving strategy. As will be explained later, the bargaining strategy helped hold the parties in the negotiating process, while the single-text negotiating approach was designed to build agreements between the parties. The joint problem-solving strategy was useful in devising options for both sides.

The Setting

While the first round of talks was set to begin in Atlanta, much work had to be done, not only to prepare substantively and procedurally for the negotiations, but to create an environment that was both neutral and conducive to a peaceful outcome. We began with the meeting room itself.

Our research had shown that previous negotiation efforts between these parties had taken place in a hotel environment with speechmaking, tables for note taking, and other traditional meeting room accoutrements. These talks had ended in an impasse. One of our initial strategies was to create a fresh environment that would perhaps contribute to a better outcome.

We began by removing all the furnishings from a small conference room at The Carter Center. When it was bare to the walls, we began to create a special environment. We placed a large rug on the floor, over the industrial carpeting,

and brought in sofas and overstuffed chairs instead of standard conference room seating. We also added table lamps, plants, and small coffee tables. We turned off the overhead, high-intensity lights and used only the lamps and natural sunlight. As a less than subtle touch, we placed a white sculpture of doves on a pedestal in one corner of the room and hung a painting of the signing of the Middle East peace accords at Camp David on a nearby wall.

Our efforts to create a living-room like environment in Atlanta were continued during the second round of talks in Nairobi. However, Kenyan President Moi's government not only provided a living room but the rest of a house to boot, making available a private estate that the Kenyan government renovated for our use. They also topped our initial efforts in the area of "subliminal messages," since they commissioned a special painting for the "peace house." It showed two hands extended in a handshake, with a dove of peace hovering above them, captioned: "Come and Get It." The parties had to pass this painting each morning as they arrived for the sessions. It was prominently displayed as one entered the front door of the "peace house."

In previous negotiations there had been allegations that one side had publicly misrepresented offers that had been made at the negotiating table. A high level of suspicion existed that statements would be taken out of context or used for propaganda advantage. Due to these prior bad experiences, the parties insisted that the INN negotiations be "on the record" and that a tape recording be made of the discussions. At the insistence of the negotiating parties, the negotiating room was wired for sound both in Atlanta and in Nairobi, but only the smallest microphones were used and they were placed unobtrusively on the coffee tables, so as not to distract the mind or the eye. The recording took place in a remote location. Parties were given almost daily copy of the previous day's talks. Although either side was free to make a public disclosure of the transcripts, both agreed not to do so, provided the negotiations were proceeding in good faith.

Office facilities were provided to the parties on location at The Carter Center. Carter Center staff, who were briefed on their roles as neutrals, were careful to provide space of equal size to both parties and clerical support for their office needs.

The negotiating room was set up in the shape of a horseshoe, with the parties on opposite ends of the long sides. President and Mrs. Carter and the authors of this report were in the bend of the "U". There seemed to be a reduced level of tension in the negotiating room; the parties were able to see and hear each other clearly. President Carter not only served as the mediator/moderator of their talks, but was literally a physical buffer as well.

The delegations were limited to seven official delegates per side, with additional chairs provided if the parties needed staff in the room. Since it would have been very difficult to have a discussion with 14 opinions about any given topic, and there was not always consensus within delegations and certainly not consensus between delegations, an agreement was made that the chairman of each delegation would speak for the entire delegation. Should there be a need for someone else to comment, the chairman could yield the floor to a member of his delegation.

Our discussions were slow due to language barriers. The PDRE insisted on speaking Amharic. The EPLF used Arabic. We understood only English. It was agreed that English would be the official language of the negotiating sessions. We used interpreters to provide simultaneous translations. This laborious process of three-way communication was perhaps culturally important, maybe politically necessary, but not required as a practical matter, since almost all the parties understood English. Each also understood both Amharic and Arabic but went through the language orchestration to make their respective points that Amharic is the language of the ruling class of Ethiopia and that the Eritreans are

culturally different from Ethiopians. We considered it a breakthrough each time they became so engaged in their discussions that they dropped their insistence on Amharic and Arabic and began speaking directly to each other in English.

Agenda

One of our initial objectives in the Atlanta round of talks was to get an agreement on the agenda itself. The parties had to decide what their discussions would cover before they would be willing to proceed beyond the phase of introductions. Following an opening press conference, we retired to the Zaban room to face the first negotiating challenge, setting the agenda. A list of 14 topics was first generated without any value being attributed to any topic. This was simply a comprehensive listing of all topics to be discussed, in what was seen as preliminary rounds of negotiations, to set the stage for later substantive talks. When it became apparent that it would not easily be determined in which order the topics should be covered, President Carter suggested we take a recess, have the chairmen designate one person per side to work with the authors, and try to resolve the question of ranking the items in an informal way. We had placed the agenda items on post-it paper on a larger piece of blank paper. We asked that the two representatives simply try to agree by placing the post-its in their preferred order and see where there was overlap. In a matter of only 15 or 20 minutes the representatives came to an agreed ranking of the agenda, with the items to be discussed first as those where there was likely to be agreement between the delegations. They also agreed to combine two of the original items into a single category. At the end of the break the two chairmen made slight modifications to the ranking, and the agreement was finalized. The finality was signified by our placing tape over the post-its so they could no longer be moved and then immediately producing a typed agenda taken from the post-it listing. This visual symbol of their first step toward resolution of their three-decade conflict, the white chart with 14 yellow post-its taped in place, was left in the Zaban room throughout the next two weeks. Soon the parties would agree on

much more than the order of the agenda, but for now at least there was agreement that the agenda would comprise the items shown below in the order listed.

1. Publicity
2. Working Languages
3. Records
4. Places (Venue) in general
5. Chairmanship
6. Secretariat
7. Observer(s) and Role(s)
8. Rules of Procedures
9. Time and Place of Next Talks (originally two items)
10. Agenda for Next Talks, if necessary
11. Agenda for Main Talks
12. Make-up of Delegation at Main Talks
13. Joint Communique in Atlanta

From September 7, the first day of the Atlanta round of talks, until September 19, when the final communique was issued in Atlanta, the parties met almost every day, from nine to five, with private sessions either with President Carter and Rosalynn Carter, or with the authors, in between formal negotiating sessions. Although there were many tensions, there was never a time when any side walked out of the talks. On the thirteenth day of their first round of talks, they signed agreements on nine agenda items, leaving the questions of chairmanship, secretariat, and observers for the next round of talks. (The time and place for the next talks was combined with the agenda for next talks for purposes of the final agreements in Atlanta.)

The process by which these agreements were reached employed not only mediation tools but computer assistance as well. The authors would listen to the discussions between the parties, trying to find areas of agreement on each point of discussion. When there were areas of common ground, they would be immediately reduced to writing. These handwritten draft agreements were sent out of the negotiating room to be input to the computer. The computer-printed drafts were then returned to the negotiating room, distributed to the parties, read

and edited. The computer drafts became single negotiating texts, with the parties focused on improving the drafts to be acceptable to all. As the final draft was prepared, it was initialed by the chairmen of the delegations and added to the previous agreements to form part of the final communique.

President Carter also used the computer as an aid in the negotiations process, particularly as we neared the point of the final communique in the Atlanta round of talks. Often he would gather one side or another in his private office, around his personal computer screen, and use their assistance to produce a draft of a proposal on a point at issue. They would edit, looking over his shoulder, and their edited product would then be presented privately to the other side, again using the computer screen, to achieve consensus. This is something of a variation on the single negotiating text approach, but the coupling of the computer with a skilled mediator alleviated the need for clerical support and the usual delay occasioned by writing the agreements after the discussion.

Throughout the process, the parties evidenced quite different negotiating postures. In the early phases of the Atlanta round of talks, the EPLF's strategy seemed to be one of wanting to directly confront the other side and demand explanations for why certain atrocities had been committed. Over time this evolved to a practice of making a structured presentation for self-determination for Eritrea, appealing in this instance to the chair, President Carter, as if a ruling were expected to be forthcoming. Their delegation appeared to be frustrated that the chair was not able to issue a mandated settlement of the matter. It seemed at times as if they were more oriented toward a traditional legal proceeding than a mediated settlement.

Members of the EPLF delegation spoke freely, even contradicting each other at times. The chairman of the EPLF delegation was one of the most reserved members of the delegation. Conversely, the PDRE delegation was tightly

controlled. They even brought their own satellite dish and radio equipment to enable them to communicate directly with President Mengistu during the breaks. The EPLF benefitted from the presence in Atlanta of Isaias Afwerki, their Secretary General. Although he was not at the negotiating table, he was available to their delegation for consultation. The demeanor of the PDRE delegation was formal, more diplomatic, and more polished. It was apparent that they moved ahead only after consultation with President Mengistu, whereas the EPLF appeared to have a rough game plan conceived in advance. The EPLF also had position papers on almost every subject, many of which were clearly prepared in advance.

Initial Agreements

The points of agreement between the EPLF and the PDRE delegations by the end of the Atlanta talks are as follows:

I. Agreement Regarding Publicity

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning publicity during the peace process:

1. Every party has an absolute right of freedom of speech.
2. Notwithstanding the right of freedom of speech, the parties agree that so long as the peace process is proceeding in a positive fashion and the parties have confidence in the process, then the parties will only make constructive statements to the press concerning the peace process.
3. Each party has the right to demand that a joint communique be issued publicly at any time during the peace process. The parties will work together in good faith to try to reach agreement on the terms of said communique. If either side feels the communique is not satisfactory, it is free to issue its own statement.

II. Agreement Regarding Working Languages

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning working languages during the peace process:

1. During the negotiating sessions the parties may speak in the language of their choice including Amharic, Arabic, or others. Their statements shall be interpreted into English.
2. The official record of the peace process will be maintained in English, including the transcripts of the parties' statements and all written agreements.

III. Agreement Regarding Official Records

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning official records during the peace process:

1. All records of negotiating sessions will be maintained on magnetic tapes.
2. The originals of the records will be maintained by the chairman or the co-chairmen.
3. True copies of all recordings will be given to each of the negotiating parties as soon as possible, preferably at the end of each day.
4. Transcripts of all negotiating sessions will be maintained and made available to each party.

IV. Agreement Regarding Venue

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning the venue during the peace process:

1. Negotiating sessions will be held in rotation in Khartoum (Sudan), Cairo (Egypt), Sana'a (Yemen Arab Republic), Nairobi (Kenya), Arusha (Tanzania), and Harare (Zimbabwe).
2. The location of each specific negotiating session will be made by mutual agreement of the parties.

V. Agreement Regarding the Rules of Procedure

The representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that the chairman or co-chairmen will set the rules of procedure for the peace process which will be mutually acceptable to the parties. In this decision they will look to the rules of international organizations.

VI. Agreement Regarding the Time, Place and Agenda of the Next Talks

1. The representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that the chairman or co-chairmen may choose the venue for the next talks from among the list of countries of venue.
2. The time of the next talks will be November 18, 1989 in Nairobi, Kenya.
3. These talks will be scheduled to resolve points of disagreement between the parties remaining from the Atlanta negotiating session.

VII. Agreement Regarding the Agenda for the Main Talks

The representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that the agenda for the next talks will be as follows:

1. Opening statements by the chairman or co-chairmen.
2. Welcoming remarks by the head of state of the host country.
3. Opening statements by the chairmen of both negotiating teams.
4. Approval of agreements reached in the preliminary talks.
5. Resolution of issues of disagreement in the Atlanta talks.
6. Adoption of agenda for main talks.
7. Final Communique.
8. Closing ceremony.

VIII. Agreement Regarding Delegations

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that delegations for future talks will consist of more than 12 on each side. Identity of the negotiating teams will be exchanged in advance, at least two weeks prior to the convening of each negotiating session. Each side may change membership in its negotiating team after prior notice to the chairman or co-chairmen.

Chairmanship, Observers, and Secretariat

What was agreed to in the first round of negotiations was significant. What was left for further negotiations proved to be problematic. While the parties were able to resolve procedural issues related to timing of their meetings, locations, rules of procedure, etc., they could not agree on three critical issues: who would chair the negotiations, who would be invited to be observers, and who would serve as the secretariat or staff of the peace process. Underlying each of these three separate issues was the important question of the roles played by the chairman, the observers and the secretariat.

The question of the chairmanship of the peace process was a politically sensitive issue. We were dealing with one party that included an African head of state, President Mengistu, who had serious political concerns about the perception that a white American - President Carter - was trying to resolve an internal problem in his country. The potential for embarrassment to President Mengistu was great if somehow we should blunder. The potential for embarrassment was also great if somehow we should find a solution. For these reasons, and more, the PDRE took the strong position that there should be an equal and permanent co-chairman, together with President Carter. Initially the PDRE proposed President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and later former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The role of the African co-chairman would make it easier to allow President Mengistu a face-saving way out should he need to make concessions to the EPLF. Also, it served his need to keep the lid on an "internal" problem.

President Mugabe was quickly eliminated as being unacceptable, as well as probably unavailable, due to his current tenure in office. The discussion thereafter focused on Julius Nyerere.

Perhaps in part because President Nyerere was acceptable to the PDRE as a co-chairman, he was unacceptable to the EPLF as an equal and permanent co-chairman. Their reluctance was based in part on their lack of personal knowledge of President Nyerere, and in general on their unwillingness to trust their fate to other African heads of state who might see President Mengistu as an ally or peer. President Nyerere had been one of the founding fathers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and had sponsored the resolution that adopted the colonial boundaries as the permanent national boundaries within the continent. His action in part was based on the war between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region. Because of his general commitment to the principle of preserving the existing national boundaries, President Nyerere was seen by the EPLF as opposing them on the ultimate question to be mediated. Also, the long-standing opposition within the OAU to the creation of any new African nations was seen to mitigate against an equal African co-chairman. The EPLF proposal was that the negotiations be conducted under the aegis of the INN, with President Carter as chairman. They would accept a rotating co-chairman, as an honorary figure, who would change each time the venue of the talks was changed. Alternatively, they would accept President Nyerere as President Carter's designated representative. President Carter was caught in the middle of the chairmanship question and decided that his own role in the continuation of the negotiations would depend on the selection of a suitable African co-chairman. He was unwilling to commit to serving in the substantive negotiations until the decision on the chairmanship had been made. It was also recognized that no African leader would be willing to serve unless he was satisfied with the procedural agreements made by the parties and knew that he was acceptable to both sides. It was envisioned that we

might go through a process of approaching several leaders before one would be found that was both willing to serve and acceptable to the parties.

The observer question was even thornier. The parties were coming at the issue from opposite poles. The PDRE felt the war was an internal matter, almost a private matter, in fact, and that there should be no, or very few, outsiders involved as observers. Moreover, they felt the observers should be limited to governments, not regional or international organizations.

Conversely, the EPLF, who for decades had been trying to internationalize the Eritrean question, felt there should be a large number of observers. In our earliest discussions with them, they suggested as many as 11 governments in addition to the OAU and the Arab League playing roles of observers. Initially, they did not feel that the United Nations was appropriate to include as an observer; later that opinion would change and would become a major obstacle in the Nairobi talks.

President Carter's compromise offer was that there be seven observers initially, with others chosen later. He suggested that each side choose two without restrictions and without expression of reservation by the other side. Three more would be chosen by mutual agreement. Additional countries might be represented by observers provided there was mutual agreement by both sides. By the end of the Atlanta talks the EPLF were willing to accept this formulation provided the observers could also serve as mediators. The PDRE accepted the formulation provided they could express reservations about the unrestricted choices of the other side and that the role of the observer would be limited to that of witness. We had made progress in Atlanta on this question, but obviously were still not able to get a mutually acceptable agreement.

The secretariat question seemed to be the least trouble-some one to resolve as we left the Atlanta talks. The EPLF wanted the staff of the secretariat to come

from The Carter Center, the OAU, and Sudan, members of which would serve in official capacities as representatives of their government or regional organizations. Moreover, they wanted the secretariat to perform mediation roles in addition to the co-chairmen and the observers. Conversely, the PDRE insisted that the co-chairmen choose the secretariat and that they serve only in their individual capacities, not as representatives of any regional or international organizations.

President Carter offered a compromise position that could resolve the question of the role of observers and staff. It recognized that in addition to the co-chairmen, others would be needed to serve as mediators. Observers and members of the secretariat who had already been approved by both sides would be the most likely choices. But once chosen, the mediators would continue to serve so long as they were mutually agreeable to both sides.

One of the surprising developments in the Atlanta talks was the amount of time we spent on the simple question of mediation. We thought we could take for granted the role of mediation in the process and that it was generally understood what that role was. However, the EPLF had their own notion of what was meant by the term mediation and about the way the role would evolve. What seemed to us to be a totally unmanageable process - with potentially 20 or 30 mediators who would come from the co-chairs, the observers, and the secretariat - seemed to them to present the best hope for a fair and acceptable outcome. At one point Webster's Dictionary was even brought into the negotiating room and the definition of "mediation" was read to advance the notion that mediators cannot impose settlements on parties.

This issues perhaps best illustrated the cultural differences between the PDRE and the EPLF delegations. The PDRE delegates had, for the most part, been educated in European nations and travelled widely in diplomatic or governmental

posts, and they seemed comfortable with generally accepted definitions of mediation, chairmanship, and observers. The EPLF delegates were less well educated, less well traveled, and far more distrustful of anything that was "generally understood." They had been fighting against the "establishment" for three generations and were not going to accept easily any principle that might impede their ability to get a favorable agreement on self-determination.

Although complete agreement was obviously not reached in Atlanta, both sides agreed to continue the effort. President Carter was authorized by the parties to set the time and place for the second round of preliminary negotiations, and he chose Nairobi, beginning on November 18. In the meantime, the two sides were asked to seek agreement on the remaining issues, to propose their list of observers and to agree on an African leader to serve with President Carter. The Atlanta talks concluded with a highly publicized press conference, at the parties' request, in which their signed agreements on the procedural matters was reported. A summary of their progress and the areas remaining to be resolved was given in the form of a communique from President Carter. (Attached as Appendix No. 3).

On to Nairobi

We had only 60 days from the adjournment of the first round of talks until the commencement of the second round. In that period, there was much ground work to be done. We had concerns about a number of issues including whether the Kenyan government would be able to accommodate our logistical needs; whether the potential observers would be able to accept an invitation to serve or if procedural or political constraints would prohibit their acceptance; whether President Nyerere would be willing to join us as co-chairman if the parties would agree to his serving; and what processes we might employ, given our experience in Atlanta, that could resolve the remaining issues and move the parties to substantive talks. One of our principal objectives was to remove all possible

barriers that would impede the parties from making the transition from preliminary negotiations to substantive negotiations as quickly as possible.

The 60-day interim was a whirlwind of activity. Every potential observer that was mentioned by either party was contacted to see whether they would be willing to serve if finally chosen. President Nyerere was contacted, again preliminarily, to see if he would be available. Several weeks were spent in Nairobi negotiating with the Kenyan government for all the logistical support that would be needed. We worked with World Bank and development officials to begin to develop a package of incentives that might be used at the bargaining table to induce concessions from the parties. Finally, a series of brainstorming sessions was held with academic advisors to the INN for process ideas for the conclusion of the preliminary negotiations as well as the substantive ones to follow. The fact that we were able to complete all the tasks in the allotted time is attributable to the outstanding contribution of the Kenyans, who, at great expense, literally remodeled the "peace house" for our use, and to the United State Department, which went to great lengths to facilitate our travel arrangements, visas, and ground contacts.

While the State Department employees were supportive, they were by no means intrusive. We did not allow them to sit in on our private discussions with the parties, nor did they attempt to sway our agendas or influence our decisions. We also benefitted from the assistance of President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, who used his country's influence with the Ethiopian government to persuade them of the need to reach a mediated settlement of the conflict. Throughout the peace process we called on President Gorbachev to assist us, and in each instance he was cooperative.

Our discussions with the potential observers revealed a general willingness on their part to serve. However, there were two exceptions. Both the United Nations and the United Kingdom responded that they would be unable to accept an

invitation to send an observer. The reluctance on the part of the United Nations is explained by their general principle against involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. An exception could be made if they were invited in by both parties. That did not appear to be a likely outcome of the negotiations, however, particularly if the parties maintained their positions on the issue that they had advanced in Atlanta.

The Nairobi Talks

In Nairobi, as in Atlanta, the meeting was convened by a press conference. Consistent with their past practice, each delegation used the public ceremony to make disparaging remarks about the other party and to voice their own political agendas. In Atlanta, once the press had departed, we settled down to business without acrimony. Nairobi, however, was an entirely different story.

The responses of the potential observers had been communicated to the parties prior to the inception of the Nairobi talks. Both sides knew going into the discussions that neither the United Nations nor the United Kingdom would be able to accept an invitation to serve.

In the very first session of the Nairobi talks the EPLF announced a take-it-or-leave-it package offer on the remaining three issues. Their offer was not divisible. For the first time, but not for the last, they made it clear that they were willing to walk away from the talks if their offer was not accepted. In its simplest form, the offer was to allow the chairmen to choose the secretariat, to accept President Nyerere as the co-chairman, and to give two formulas for selecting the observers. Under either formulation the EPLF would be able to name the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity as an observer.

Unlike Atlanta, where most of the negotiations were with both parties together "on the record," in Nairobi we spent the vast majority of time meeting separately with the two delegations. Since all our negotiations occurred at the "peace house," with separate offices for ourselves and the delegations on the second

floor of the house, what developed was a series of meetings with one side or the other coming into President Carter's office to talk, or gathering around the computer screen to draft or edit a proposal. We often found ourselves walking the very short distance from one end of the hall to the other to meet alternately with the delegations. There were very few times when all the parties gathered in the formal negotiating room downstairs where the tape recording equipment was set to record their discussions. However, we did take our meals jointly in the common dining room. On several days the parties only saw each other at the dining table, rather than the negotiating table.

We were trying to move both sides away from their initial positions toward some middle ground that met their needs. The PDRE was being asked to accept the general proposition that observers could come from regional or international organizations. This was a bitter pill. As a lesser proposition, they had to be convinced to allow the EPLF to name certain observers without their agreement, or without their expressing any objection. While this did not require them to violate their long-held position that the Eritrean issue was a private matter for Ethiopians to resolve, it did ask them to stand silent and allow the EPLF to exercise an unfettered right of choice. A significant part of the incentive for their ultimate concession was the willingness on the part of the EPLF to accede to the PDRE choice of President Nyerere as the co-chairman of the peace process. The PDRE knew, as did the EPLF, that the United Nations would be unable to accept any observer invitation, so the reality seemed to be that they would open the conflict to the purview of the Organization of African Unity, or perhaps the Arab League, or the All African Council of Churches, if an agreement were reached to extend the potential observers to organizations, not merely governments.

We were also trying to move the EPLF away from their insistence that observers, secretariat members, and others would mediate. What in Atlanta had seemed

like a misunderstanding of the meaning of mediation, in Nairobi appeared to be a clear strategy to put in place a process that would conceivably allow the United Nations to mediate the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This strategy made sense, given the history of the United Nations' involvement in the issue in the past.

It was the United Nations that originally federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1950. Unlike the rest of the continent, when the Italian colonial period in Eritrea was ended, the people were not declared a sovereign nation, rather they were joined with Ethiopia in a United Nations resolution that was sponsored by the United States. While the original intent was that Eritrea would be a largely autonomous region, this intent was immediately ignored and ultimately abrogated by Emperor Haile Selassie. In spite of the fact that the United Nations resolution reserved the right to revisit the issue should problems develop with the federation, this reservation of jurisdiction was never activated. In subsequent years, when Eritreans appealed to the United Nations, the response was that it was an internal problem for Ethiopians to resolve.

The formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 on the premise of maintaining then-existing national boundaries seemed to seal forever the fate of the EPLF on the ultimate issue. The maneuvering in Nairobi may have been part of an overall strategy on the part of the EPLF to finally have its "day in court" and to set itself up for the court to be either the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity, since it had become clear in Atlanta that President Carter was not going to be making rulings on their substantive issues. This would certainly explain their willingness to concede both of the other remaining issues and also explain why they insisted on resolving the question of who would *serve* as observers before negotiating the *role* of observers. It also explains why they made their offer an indivisible package. It was take-it-or-leave-it time.

Repeatedly, the EPLF stated its intention to quit the peace process if their formulation was not accepted.

In the midst of all the negotiations over the terms of the final three issues, President Carter was concerned about the procedure for notifying the observers without offending any of them and without having it appear that any of the unilateral choices were unwelcomed by the party not selecting them. He drafted a procedure for notifying the observers and distributed this written proposal to both sides. No objection was expressed by either party to the proposed notification plan. President Carter stated in writing that it was very important for all potential observers to assume that they were the unanimous choice of both parties. For this reason, he asked the parties to present their unrestricted choices to him privately and in writing. He would contact all the selected observers informing them that they were being invited by both sides. If any of them could not serve, President Carter would notify the parties so that a substitute could be chosen. The procedure would be highly confidential, so that no substitute observer would know they had been a second choice. Again, in this written memo he informed the parties that although any government or organization might be chosen for their unrestricted observers, he had been informed that neither the United Nations nor the United Kingdom would be able to serve.

The Nairobi Agreement

The Nairobi round of talks continued through the Thanks-giving season. We had anticipated missing the celebration with our families, but planned to use the occasion to share our cultural traditions with the parties. We even tucked sage for turkey and spices for pumpkin pies into our suitcases to ensure that the meal would be traditional. The staff of the Nairobi Serena Hotel managed to conjure up a Thanksgiving feast that was spectacular. We had seven or eight turkeys, with all the trimmings. But the hotel management, with their own sense of flair, served the birds dramatically. They turned out all the lights in our private dining room

and rolled the turkeys in separately on trolleys with sparklers emitting brightly colored fireworks attached to each trolley. It was like Thanksgiving and the Fourth of July rolled into one celebration. The meal was served family style, so at each table, which included our staff as well as members of each delegation and Secret Service agents, one person carved the turkey and everyone served each others' plates. It was a brief time when we all put aside our differences and shared stories or memories of our families.

This meal was preceded by negotiating sessions that morning and a private meeting with the EPLF in our hotel rooms that evening. The following day, we got agreement from both parties on the remaining substantive issues. Their agreement was the following:

Chairmanship

There shall be two co-chairmen for the main peace talks. The two sides have agreed that President Carter and President Nyerere will serve as co-chairmen.

Observers

There shall be seven observers in the main talks. Each side shall choose two observers without restriction and without expression of reservation by the other side. Three of the venue countries will be invited by mutual consent. In addition, others shall be invited as mutually agreed.

Secretariat

The co-chairmen will choose the Secretariat. Members of the Secretariat will provide supportive professional, administrative, and technical services as directed by the co-chairmen.

When the time came for the selection of the seven observers, the EPLF chose the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity as its two unrestricted choices. The PDRE selected Zimbabwe and Senegal. Together they chose Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania as their mutual choices.

The EPLF felt strongly about the principle of unfettered choice. They were frequently reminded by President Carter that the choice of the United Nations would be futile, as they had already been told it could not serve.

President Carter, acting pursuant to his previous written instructions to the parties, immediately dispatched cables to the embassies of the selected governmental observers. The observers were told that the government of Ethiopia *and* the Eritrean People's Liberation Front had respectfully invited them to serve as observers in the main peace talks. President Carter telephoned the Secretaries General of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to issue their invitations, as they had no representatives in Nairobi. An early response was requested, so that we could complete our deliberations.

However, it was already Friday afternoon in Kenya when the agreements were reached, and the observers were not able to respond in some instances without official action being taken. On Saturday morning the EPLF accused the PDRE of interfering with their freedom of choice and of undertaking to orchestrate the declination by the United Nations. They also accused President Carter of acting in bad faith in not wanting to involve the United Nations in the issue. Their chairman announced that they were withdrawing from the negotiations.

President Carter reminded the EPLF of his written memorandum to the parties outlining in advance the procedure he would follow in notifying observers. He also told them that they had known since the first day of the Nairobi talks that neither the United Nations nor the United Kingdom would be able to accept an observer invitation. He offered to allow them to use his private airplane to fly to New York that weekend to discuss the observer issue with the United Nations' Secretary General and test the veracity of his statements. He also offered to withdraw from the peace process if the EPLF no longer had confidence in him. At this point, the EPLF's complaint seemed to be that the PDRE was trying to take credit for having accepted the observers without restrictions, but instead the PDRE acceptance came only after they knew the United Nations would not come. The EPLF wanted to resolve the difficulty on Saturday, so an agreement was made to convene the parties on the record, announce the agreements that had been reached, name the seven observers that had been chosen, and note that all seven had been invited and that five had responded. The EPLF wanted to further name the five who had responded and give their responses. However, the PDRE wanted to postpone naming the seven until Monday, since one of their unrestricted choices had not responded. President Carter ruled that under the circumstances he would wait to name the observers until Monday.

It was on the following day, Sunday, November 27, that the INN team shuttled from Nairobi to Khartoum and Addis Ababa to work on peace, famine, and human rights. (The *INN Journal* entry, which is the first page of this paper, reflects the welcome break for the mediation team from the difficulty and tension of the talks.)

Over the weekend it was reported that the EPLF's radio news station had broadcast the entire text of the parties' agreement, as well as the listing of selected observers with the designation of those chosen by the EPLF as well as

those chosen by the PDRE. There was no way at this point to keep observers from knowing that they were not the unanimous choice of both sides.

Over the course of several days we received the official responses from the seven selected observers. Six said yes. The United Nations said no. The response from the United Nations' Secretary General was the following:

"It has always been standard policy for the United Nations to refrain from involvement in any disputes other than those between member nations. Only on a few rare occasions, after through debate in the U.N. General Assembly and an affirmative vote in the U.N. Security Council (which requires unanimity among the permanent members voting), have we ever departed from this policy. Therefore, the United Nations must refrain from serving as an observer or in any other official capacity in the peace negotiations between the government of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. I wish the two parties every success in their striving for peace."

The Nairobi talks ended as did the Atlanta talks, with a press conference. In Nairobi, there was a great deal of animosity expressed by the EPLF delegation against the PDRE and even criticism of President Carter on the handling the observer question. However, both sides reiterated their commitment to the peace process in spite of obviously hard feelings. The scheduling of the first round of substantive talks was left open.

An End to the Peace Process

We were informed by the EPLF that they would be ready to negotiate as soon as all seven selected observers had accepted the invitations, in effect a Catch-22. By choosing an observer whom they knew would regret the invitation and then using that observer's absence as a justification for not returning to the negotiations, the EPLF was able to completely halt the peace process.

In the ensuing months, we undertook many efforts to have the United Nations reverse its decision on the observer question. These included direct communications with the Secretary General as well as with President Mengistu. The issue was complicated by the public release of the formula for selecting the observers. If there had previously been any doubt that only one side had chosen a particular observer, it was forever removed by the EPLF radio broadcast. This action was self-defeating since the United Nations was then clearly shown not to have been invited by the PDRE, making it almost impossible for them to intercede.

However, the military situation was shifting in favor of the EPLF and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Throughout our peace process, while there had been a defacto cease-fire between the PDRE and the EPLF, the TPLF forces had continued their inexorable military move toward Addis. Perhaps the positive reports about the peace process, combined with the TPLF military gains, undermined the Ethiopian military's resolve to continue the fighting. Perhaps the defacto cease-fire that had existed with the EPLF during the negotiations caused them to let down their guard. It may be that the existing famine simply weakened their ability to resist. At any rate, the army began gradually to lose ground, and the Eritrean rebels launched a reinvigorated assault in areas surrounding Asmara and Massawa in early February 1990.

On June 4, 1990, we received a communication from President Mengistu authorizing us to extend an invitation to the United Nations on behalf of the Ethiopian government to serve as an observer. The United Nations reversed its earlier decision, based on the Mengistu invitation, and announced that it would be present at the talks as an observer. We also were able to work out arrangements with President Nyerere to serve as co-chairman.

The co-chairmen notified the parties that since all barriers to the peace process had finally been removed, the first round of substantive talks would begin in Nairobi on July 6.

However, the EPLF informed the co-chairmen on June 11, 1990 that they were withdrawing from the peace process. Their appeal now was to the United Nations to conduct a referendum in Eritrea as the only means for a just and peaceful solution.

In a public announcement of the EPLF's withdrawal from the peace process, Presidents Carter and Nyerere called the decision a tragedy. "Both sides have been given every opportunity to participate in a forum to resolve this conflict peacefully." They called on the armed forces to declare a unilateral cease-fire throughout the north in order to facilitate the delivery of relief aid to drought-and famine-stricken areas. "Perhaps the most tragic aspect of this turn of events is that some three million people may simply starve to death if relief supplies cannot be delivered." (See Appendix No. 6.)

The military operations by the EPLF and the newly formed EPRDF, an umbrella organization that included the former TPLF group, were renewed with vigor. The armies of President Mengistu began to suffer one crushing blow after another. The EPRDF pushed closer and closer to Addis Ababa and the EPLF mounted a steady trek toward Asmara and the port of Massawa.

The gloomy forecast by the former presidents placed the EPLF/PDRE conflict squarely in the statistical dilemma of most wars. In the 1980s about three-fourths of the deaths in all wars were civilian casualties. But the deaths represent only a fraction of the human losses. Those seriously injured may be a number several times larger. Material losses are immeasurable in terms of lost income and trade,

wrecked homes, schools, depressed living conditions, and demoralized lives (Sivard, 1990).

What separates the people of Eritrea and the Ethiopian Government are important issues. What binds them together are no less important issues. Irrespective of the political nature of their future relationship, they will continue to live side by side. They share a need to have their children fed, vaccinated, and educated. They need to keep their citizens safe and their citizens need to have some means of economic survival. The only access to the Red Sea is through Eritrea. Whether the ultimate political solution is the creation of a new state, or a confederation, or some form of autonomy, both the Eritreans and Ethiopians will need access to the ports on the Red Sea and will need the ability to trade with other nations using those ports. Both sides need to be able to convert their large military expenditures to the development of their natural resources and the meeting of the basic survival needs of their citizens. The military offensive that was begun anew in mid-1990 offers no promise of meeting these needs.

Although it did mark the end of the negotiations initiative by the INN, the renewed fighting did not end our commitment to either the parties or the region. Indeed, we have maintained a line of communication with both the PDRE and the EPLF, as well as the EPRDF. The INN stands ready to renew its assistance to the parties should they desire our help. One conceivable role the INN may play in the future is to organize an internationally monitored election process. The Carter Center could draw on its experience in monitoring elections in Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, and other countries to assist the myriad Ethiopian/Eritrean parties in ending their differences with the ballot box rather than the military.

The Mediation Approach

As mentioned earlier, our efforts in the EPLF/PDRE mediation initiative took the form of an integrated, multitrack, multiphased process. Given the nature of the

conflict, its complexity, duration, intensity, and low statistical probability of success, we chose this approach to set in play a number of parallel paths toward a peaceful resolution. The strategy was that if a barrier was encountered on any one path, a detour would be available around it that would keep the negotiations in progress and still achieve the desired result. All of the tracks we pursued fall into the category of processes normally referred to as "Track Two Diplomacy," that is private, nongovernmental diplomatic efforts.

There were four tracks to our approach. Track One was the formal track. This is the one that has been described as being "on the record." It is the decision-making track wherein we work directly with the parties, and it is managed by the chairman of the peace process, in this case, President Carter. Track Two was the informal working relations track. Here we worked with the U.S. and Soviet governments, other interested nations, and regional and international organizations to influence the negotiating parties. In this manner, external levers could be coordinated and barriers to the negotiations occurring on Track One could be removed. Track Three involved joint working groups such as the World Bank and development agencies. This track was designed to create a stream of decidable questions on interim measures such as procedures for the negotiations, or specific issues like the terms of a cease-fire agreement, famine relief, problems of ethnicity, use of the ports, etc. Track Three was the least developed track due to the abandonment of the peace process. Had we reached the level of substantive negotiations, this track could have been one of our most important efforts. Track Four was the academic analysis track. This one dealt with long term interests and ways to meet them, including models for constitutional reform and developmental assistance. This model would evolve proposals which would include joint gains for the parties that might create a more positive environment in Track One.

Additionally, our approach to the conflict had five identifiable phases. They were:

Phase I

Test viability of third party role.

Phase II

Secure commitment from the parties.

Phase III

Negotiate procedural issues.

Phase IV

Negotiate substantive issues.

Phase V

Develop external incentives/levers.

Each of these phases contained sub-phases, of course, for which the mediation team and their advisors developed strategies, logistics, and staffing.

Within the four tracks, we conducted at least three different strategies or approaches, a bargaining strategy, a managed negotiating text strategy, and a joint problem-solving strategy. President Carter proved to be masterful in managing these strategies and approaches and in moving easily between them.


The Bargaining Strategy

The bargaining strategy involved the use of President Carter as a master negotiator. His intellect, training as a engineer, and quick grasp of the issues enabled him to bring not only the obvious political clout to the table, but also a formidable ability to move the parties through his personal skills as a negotiator. These negotiation skills enabled him to deal effectively with the individual delegations, as well as function between the delegations as a mediator. It is very difficult to be an effective mediator without being a good negotiator. President Carter possesses both talents. He used bargaining strategies with the parties to keep them at the table and to move them toward agreements they had previously been unwilling or unable to make.

For example, their mutual desire to have the fullest public disclosure of the talks became a bargaining strategy. President Carter used his obligation to go to the media with progress reports as a means of inducing agreements. Neither side wanted to be presented to the public as being recalcitrant. This fear of being blamed for the failure of the talks at times caused both sides to be more conciliatory than they might otherwise have been. In the end, the EPLF was more interested in a military victory than in public condemnation.

INN Track Activity by Phase

This chart plots the level of track activity by phase of the mediation effort. Note that the joint working groups are more active in the later phases, and the academic analysis track is more active early and late. Informal working relations are important in all phases.



The lever of world opinion was used in several ways to keep the parties at the table. The parties perceived that President Carter had the ability and the inclination to go directly to the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union and suggest specific moves that would affect them. President Carter also had the ability to go around the chairmen of each delegation and deal directly with either President Mengistu or Secretary General Afwerki. When an impasse was reached, a bypass strategy would be employed. At times we were dealing with several simultaneous bargaining strategies being played out in different

layers: on one level, the two delegations would be at the table in face-to-face discussions; on another level, President Carter would be on the phone to their bosses; on yet another level, media briefings would be made periodically to give progress reports and bring political leverage to bear on the process; and, on a final level, contacts would be made with other governments, who would then weigh in with the parties. It was difficult at times to know at what level the "real" negotiations were occurring.

The Single Negotiating Text Strategy

In order to evolve a final set of agreements between the parties we found it necessary in Nairobi to work under circumstances different from those in Atlanta. As previously mentioned, we were far more often working with a single delegation or its chairman than with all parties together in formal sessions. The Nairobi sessions were managed by President Carter's use of a single negotiating text as the principal means of seeking agreement. The meetings most often occurred in President Carter's small office in the back of the second floor of the "peace house." A draft document, which we believed might be acceptable, would be shown to either the chairman alone or with a few members of his delegation. Our mediation team would wait in silence as the parties read the draft document. The delegation chairman would then raise points about which side had given the most ground and what was or was not acceptable. President Carter would ask what improvements could be made to his draft language, telling the parties how close to agreement he believed they were. The chairman would reiterate his concerns and his uneasiness. Often President Carter would remove the draft agreement and then compose a new draft based on statements made by the party. When the document had been printed, it would be shown to the chairman and the dance would start anew.

Often, while we waited for the printer to process the new draft, we engaged in conversations about the progress of the talks, developments in Ethiopia and

Eritrea, famine issues, or issues personal to the chairmen or the delegations. When language was found acceptable to one side, that entire delegation would gather behind closed doors in their private offices with their chairman to fully discuss the implications of the proposal. At times our mediation team would be invited into these caucuses to clarify a point or hear their feedback.

After we had evolved a text that was acceptable to one side or the other, the momentum shifted to the other party. And in a fashion similar to that described above, the dance of negotiation would begin again, with a new partner.

Joint Problem-Solving Strategy

The joint problem-solving strategy was employed less in the negotiating room than in private sessions and off-the-record discussions. In his role as an elder statesman, President Carter attempted to move the parties, particularly President Mengistu and Secretary General Afwerki, to a new vision of how peace could come to their region. In communicating with President Mengistu, President Carter would evidence his personal commitment to Ethiopia and his sensitivity to the position held by President Mengistu as a head of state. This peer-level identity enabled President Carter to suggest solutions to President Mengistu that would not be received as well as they come from a less powerful source. His personal interactions with President Mengistu resulting from direct talks and an unprecedented six-hour dinner in his private residence enabled President Carter to develop the kind of relationship with President Mengistu that allowed him to advocate that he call for democratic elections. It gave him the opportunity to encourage President Mengistu to see himself as the great president for peace. President Carter conveyed an understanding only possible by a respected peer and challenged President Mengistu to end the fighting and jointly develop acceptable (face-saving) scenarios for the resolution.

With Secretary General Afwerki, President Carter principally played the role of an elder advisor. He cautioned the younger leader and encouraged him. The approach was one of offering friendly, fatherly advice to someone seen as a rising leader.

In Atlanta and in Nairobi we spent considerable time with the members of the delegations developing personal relationships and trust. Hours were spent in private discussions about possible options and strategies that might be successful and in jointly planning ways to achieve solutions that met the interests they were trying to protect. Sometimes these sessions were carried out while sitting on the floor with our shoes off, having a late-night beer with one side or the other. Other times such discussions would come after a shared tennis match or a joint meal.

Our approach was that the three of us, the two delegations and the mediation team, had a shared problem that needed to be solved. We were all partners in that process of problem solving. The greatest degree of mutual trust and respect that could be developed would contribute to the effectiveness of reaching our goal. President Carter would often say to one chairman or another, "Mr._____, I am only trying to help you get what you tell me you want." And, in fact, he was doing precisely that.


Track Two of our approach was the informal working relations track. In many ways we saw this as being one of our most effective levers or strategies. It was on this track that we took the issues out of the negotiating room to external players who could influence the process. Principally, these external players fell into two categories, the media and governments. The media played an important role in this process, precisely because each party wanted to make a public case for its efforts and each wanted to take credit for pursuing peace. Normally, our efforts are undertaken in much lower profiled ways. However, because the

parties desired to begin and end each negotiating session with a press conference, the media itself became a lever to influence their behavior. They wanted President Carter, as a neutral third party, to report to the world about their efforts. This gave him the ability to lay blame on any party who was not being constructive. While his public communiques were always cast in the most positive light possible, he often privately used the media lever as a strong tool. Neither the government of Ethiopia nor the EPLF could afford to have someone they had invited in to help them end the war calling a press conference to say that they were not sincere. Each depended on favorable public opinion for maintaining their rather precarious economic and political positions.

The media were also helpful in explaining the INN concept and introducing it to a larger public audience than had previously been aware of its existence. Nairobi is a media center for much of Africa, and ready access to virtually all the major media networks gave the INN high visibility. We used these opportunities with the media to discuss the mediation gap and the new approach to resolving internal conflicts and to send a message to parties engaged in such conflicts that we were willing to work with them. The media message must have been successful, because we have seen a deluge of requests for INN assistance since the EPLF/PDRE negotiations.

Mediation Approach

INN Mediation Effort Between the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Front and the
Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia



The other governments were also an important external lever. We knew, going into the negotiations, that the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, Sweden, Sudan, and Norway all had great interest in the resolution of this conflict. Additionally, the countries chosen by the parties as venue locations for future talks were interested external players. So we used our time in Nairobi to meet with the ambassadorial community and to brief them on our progress or our setbacks and to ask their governments' assistance in moving the parties toward a settlement. The Soviets might be asked to help influence President Mengistu or the Swedes or Italians to work with Secretary General Afwerki. Sometimes the diplomatic briefings were done with a group of ambassadors, other times they were one-on-one. We were pleased with the responses received and felt that the external governments were acting in constructive ways.

Track Three and Track Four, wherein we employed joint working groups and academic analyses, were not used to their fullest extent due to the abandonment of the peace process by the EPLF. We had established working relationships

with development agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others to assist the parties in working out the details related to cease-fire agreements, famine relief, development of the ports, etc. However, the involvement of these groups would only become operational in the substantive phase of the process. This phase was never reached.

The academic advisors were used preliminarily, as discussed herein, to inform our thinking about the issues and the potential process approaches. They also would have played a role in developing constitutional models and in elections monitoring had we been able to move the parties to that phase of involvement.

Factors for Success

The approaches and strategies discussed on previous pages are employed at various times in many negotiations. However, we believe there are some characteristics of the INN approach that are unique and critical to its success. These include: 1) the use of eminent persons as conveners, 2) immediate access to leaders and to data, and 3) the ability to borrow infrastructure support without the usual attendant organizational encumbrances.

The role of the eminent person is perhaps the single most important characteristic of the INN model. As a former head of state, President Carter has access to virtually anyone in the world. When he makes phone calls, the other party accepts them. When he needs assistance, academics, political leaders, grass roots leaders, and others respond. When he gives a press conference, the media cover it in high-profile ways. He has the ability to persuade conflicting parties to go to the negotiating table. These attributes, of course, are not unique to President Carter, but are present with a great number of eminent persons. However, we realize the role of any individual is limited by his or her own mortality and acceptability to the parties. We are designing a system of conflict management that will have permanence. For these reasons, the INN has

expanded its original concept of using a single eminent person to convene a series of mediations to developing a cadre of such eminent persons who might conduct a larger number of interventions or use their combined influence to transform political thinking on a global level. Because any single eminent person may not be well suited to a mediation task due to personal or political considerations, we have evolved a list of such persons from a number of countries with a great variety of backgrounds. Now the task becomes one of matching the right eminent person to the needs of the parties in conflict and coordinating a number of interventions in various regions.

Another important characteristic of the INN model is the immediate access to leaders and to data. With President Carter at the helm of the INN, we are able to have direct contact with heads of state, ambassadors, political party leaders, religious leaders, and many others who can influence mediation initiatives as well as affect global opinions. We are also able to draw into our efforts persons with the necessary data to undergird our initiatives. We cannot possibly maintain a staff large enough to track all existing conflicts or to monitor large troop movements or anticipate where the next level of ethnic or political violence will erupt. However, we can work in collaboration with other institutions and individual scholars who have research agendas compatible with our own. This access to data from a number of sources also enables us to avoid our own cultural filters. When we receive, for example, a report from Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research that updates us on the 32 existing major wars, we are able to cross reference that data against a number of other such reports available to us, as well as with the parties themselves. The constant inflow of data to our staff enables us to act with the parties in timely ways.

We have also been able to evolve a method of borrowing the infrastructure of necessary support institutions without the encumbrances that usually hinder them. For example, we have worked very closely with the United Nations' Office

for Research and Collection of Information. This is the conflict-monitoring organ within the United Nations. Direct contact with the head of the department enables us to learn about potential conflict situations without being limited by the usual constraints imposed on the United Nations in terms of interventions in internal political affairs. In a similar way, we have been able to use the United States' State Department, and other governments' foreign ministries to obtain political briefings or to assist with ground transportation or cabling of information without allowing their respective bureaucracies to impede our efforts.

Lessons Learned

Whether a conflict is domestic or international, if it is deeply rooted there are some common needs the parties have in order to find acceptable solutions. Just getting the parties to the table and holding them there is a difficult task. Many of these needs relate more to process than to the content of the negotiations. For example, in the PDRE/EPLF negotiations, private forums, joint problem-solving approaches, external players, internally created solutions, neutral meeting sites and meeting processes, gains for both sides, and fair third parties were all important factors.

In the EPLF/PDRE negotiations, we blended private forums with public statements. Some analysts who have criticized our approach do so with merit to their arguments. More often than not, exploratory peace talks seem to be most fruitful without the spotlight effect and constant posturing caused by the presence of the media. However, in our efforts we found the parties unwilling to engage in negotiations without a media presence.

Initially, the PDRE did not take the EPLF seriously. The government considered them "bandits" and were very hesitant to lend any legitimacy to their cause by meeting with them. Conversely, the EPLF were extremely distrustful of the government and did not want to climb into the arena of negotiations without new

rules. The interest of the press in the peace talks served ultimately as a strong incentive for both parties to show good faith in staying in the peace process. The EPLF wanted international recognition above all else, because it lent support to their claim for autonomy or independence. The PDRE perceived that they could not afford to receive negative media coverage by being portrayed as not participating in the peace process. The threat of going to the media with an announcement that the talks had broken down was an incentive for the parties to stay at the table and off the battlefield. Periodic press conferences gave the mediation team interim deadlines against which to drive progress in the talks. Managing the balance of private forums and access to the media was a difficult task for our team. Without the leverage of media coverage, however, it would have been more difficult to engage the parties, hold them to the table, or involve the resources of other nations and international organizations.

The pattern that emerged in the EPLF/PDRE conflict of public posturing versus private problem solving is common to so many conflicts. When the parties are speaking for public consumption, the opinions they state are often divisive. They revert to patterns of posturing and even name calling. Yet both parties need a face-saving way out. In order to make the concessions necessary to end the conflict, they need new options that either enable them to claim that their actions are in keeping with previously espoused principles or justify abandoning the old party lines without losing face. These options are difficult to identify when the parties insist on trying their case in the media. In each round of the EPLF/PDRE negotiations, we faced having to do damage control after the press conferences, due to the parties use of the media for name calling.

If an early agreement can be reached to have totally private negotiations, or at a minimum, an agreement not to make public statements during the negotiating sessions, progress can be achieved more readily. As a corollary, any public announcement that talks are beginning or are entering new phases, or that

agreements have been reached, etc., should be made jointly so that one side or another is not seen as taking all the credit when the continued progress depends on both.

In these negotiations, as in so many others, the parties became entrapped in a situation that escalated beyond the point where it made sense to continue in the present course. In spite of passing the point of diminishing returns, it is very difficult for the parties to make changes in their old patterns of conduct. Thirty years of unsuccessful military campaigns leave the PDRE/EPLF parties, even reluctantly, in the position of being joint problem solvers. They are both affected by disease, famine, drought, and the devastation of their environment by the constant fighting. When their attention can be directed toward solving joint problems, rather than continuing to deal with each other adversarially, they can begin to work their way out of the trap.

External players have a clear role to play, particularly in deeply rooted conflicts. This may be due to face-saving considerations, or it may be simply that the parties have been caught up in the conflict for so long, they don't know how to deal with each other except as adversaries. External players can serve as guarantors, managers of process, or inventors of solutions. It is easier for a party to make a concession to a trusted friend, as a means of ending the conflict, than to the long-hated adversary. It was often surprising to us, in the role of third party, how much agreement existed between the parties as well as how minuscule differences could become paramount in the negotiations. Third parties cannot assume what weight or value the parties will place on their issues.

The direct participation of the parties themselves in designing their own solutions is also important. Psychological studies have shown that parties often remain in conflict due to feelings of powerlessness over their destinies. When the parties are involved in the design of their solutions, they are empowered to resolve their

own problems. This approach is especially important when there is great disparity between the parties, as it places the party of lesser power on a more equal footing with the party of greater power. Third parties will rarely be able to create a solution that will be as acceptable as one coming from the participants. Semantics are very important. Cultural differences may make solutions that were acceptable in one conflict unworkable in another. Those who "own" the conflict will know the best approaches to ending it. Moreover, there will be less resistance to solutions that come from the parties than from those that are seen as being imposed on them.

It is also important to create for the parties an environment of trust that is conducive to their negotiations. For the PDRE/EPLF The Carter Center was initially seen as such a neutral meeting site. Great care was taken to provide equal accommodations to both sides, from their hotel rooms to their office spaces. Moreover, the set-up of the negotiating room itself was designed to be neutral and conducive to a collaborative working environment. As the negotiations moved to Nairobi, the same care was taken to ensure the neutrality of that meeting site. Parties need to feel secure and comfortable in their negotiating space. No party should have the upper hand in the locus of the meetings.

Gains need to be created for all parties that are seen by them as being greater than the costs of staying engaged in the conflict. Our efforts to develop such gains for the EPLF/PDRE parties never reached fruition, since the process was abandoned before they were fully developed. However, our efforts included working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as large donors to develop a kind of peace dividend, a major development package that could be introduced when there was a peaceful solution to the conflict. These kinds of win/win outcomes can be tied to the negotiations. When that occurs, the parties will see a direct benefit attributable to a specific agreement.

The parties can also be involved in the design and implementation of the joint gains. Again, this will empower them as well as enable them to work their way out of conflict traps. It is important that both sides leave the negotiations as winners. The creation of gains for both sides will greatly assist the parties in dealing with public opinion back home. The desire of the public for peace can be a strong incentive in moving recalcitrant leaders to the table or towards solutions once there.

The assistance of a third party can confer many benefits on the disputing parties, ranging from facilitation, to organization, to implementation of agreements. Often the role of the third party is one of balancing the equities between the parties. The presence of the third party can ensure that each side is given an opportunity to be heard and that the statements are treated with respect and dignity. When that third party is an eminent person, there is also an unspoken ability to be a whistle blower, to let the world know if one side or the other is not acting fairly. The ability to report to the world community keeps the parties from acting in ways they might otherwise choose. What is most important is that the third party be acceptable to all and that the role be played with great attention to its neutrality and fairness. It is also important that there be a clear understanding of the role of any third party, whether it be as mediator, as observer, or some other capacity. It is very important that there be a process for communicating with all sides in a conflict. The constraints placed on our international organizations that prohibit them from even meeting with revolutionary groups within member countries is a great inhibitor to peace. Governments' reluctance to acknowledge the existence of such groups is another barrier. A means must be evolved to enable these discussions to occur in order to understand why so many conflicts continue unabated. The best solution would allow such talks to take place privately, so as not to embarrass or threaten the government involved nor allow the revolutionary groups to use the process as a media ploy. In the meantime, the method of

"Track Two Diplomacy" will continue to assist in bridging some of the communications barriers.

Lastly, these particular negotiations were assisted by many applications of technology. The one we have focused on principally in this paper is the use of computer technology to enhance the bargaining process. The computers became such an integral part of our efforts that at one point they were described as being "lap top negotiations." We found that the computer screen itself became a means of deflecting parties' animosity away from each other and toward a common objective - editing the text of a potential agreement that was being shown in draft form on the screen. The immediate print-out of that edited text had a quality of finality that seemed to seal the deal on the spot. We were mindful that at times the computer was also a barrier, however, as certain of the delegates were obviously less comfortable with technology than others. So we had to maintain a balance between more traditional mediation methods and the high-tech variety. However, the computer technology was invaluable to our staff, who were faced with producing daily copy of the transcripts and with keeping adequate notes about the peace process as it was evolving. Often as we travelled on the plane, staff, as well as President and Mrs. Carter, would be using their lap tops to record minutes of discussions and prepare correspondence. Given the distance from home, the jet lag, and the extremely long hours, the use of the computer as a tool enabled us to be far more productive and supportive of the needs of the parties.

We had the use of a number of support technologies as well. In Atlanta, of course, there was an array of office technologies available for our use as well as the parties. Not only did they have ready phone access in the normal manner, but the PDRE party had its own satellite dish, and radio communications were established directly with Addis Ababa. The Carter Center provided facsimile machines, telex machines, copiers, and clerical support to the delegations. We

took a large amount of support technology with us to Nairobi and borrowed others from the Kenyan government to create the level of support that had been available in Atlanta.

It was not possible in Nairobi to have access to facsimile machines, but when we needed to communicate immediately with outside interests, as in the selection of observers, we had access to the cable capacity of the local American Embassy. We were guarded in our use of this United States government support, and made a full disclosure to the parties, so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. One area of technological shortcoming was in the use of computer modelling. There were many times when we wished we could have used computer programming to show the parties how a superordinate goal strategy might have transformed their thinking about the issues. With the right software, a model could have been presented that might have given them a larger vision of what peace could mean to the region. Our frustration over this lack of technology has led us to begin to develop additional computer technological support for the INN. A team of experts at MIT is currently evolving a multipart program that will assist us not only in actively tracking existing disputes, but in forecasting problem areas for timely interventions and in using modelling to develop scenarios for solutions.

Conclusion

In the final analysis we failed in achieving our ultimate goal - a peaceful solution to the conflict between the PDRE and the EPLF. However, our attempt did succeed in accomplishing a few lesser goals. These included:

1. Causing the parties to begin negotiating in the longest running war in Africa.
2. Stopping the fighting among the disputants for a period of more than ten months, while a defacto cease-fire was in existence during the peace process.
3. Obtaining several break-throughs in the area of famine relief in Sudan and increasing the level of support and access to areas of Ethiopia and Sudan.
4. Legitimizing the supportive role that third parties can play in assisting disputing parties to begin peace talks and framing the issues.
5. Wedding the highly visible convening power of eminent persons with alternative conflict resolution approaches, techniques, and meeting processes.

6. Helping to draw world attention to the region and creating an expectation of success specifically with these disputants in the areas of famine relief, human rights, and a peace process.
7. Helping achieve a new level of parity among the parties, which enabled them to consider alternatives to fighting to manage their differences.
8. Catalyzing the involvement of other nations and drawing those nations into more active roles in the peacemaking process.
9. Increasing the visibility of the INN and the potential role it can play in helping parties caught in the mediation gap.
10. Testing and exploring a variety of approaches and substantially enhancing a growing network of self-starting and committed resources directed toward peace.

While we did not resolve the PDRE/EPLF conflict, what we set in motion may be more important, in the long run, than a single solution to a particular conflict. If we can succeed in developing an international network that draws a larger number of eminent persons into close association for the purpose of making war the least acceptable means of resolving conflicts, rather than the method of first resort, we can have an impact at a systemic level. While the INN will continue to coordinate mediation initiatives in specific conflicts, it will increasingly work at the global level to create political will, to increase public awareness, and to make significant social and political change. With so many existing internal armed conflicts and wars and so many millions of people suffering from them, our greatest challenge may be in allocating scarce resources to unlimited needs.

Disputants and regional and international leaders must work together to remove the psychological and economic barriers to peace. A cadre of eminent persons cannot always convince politicians and soldiers to lay down their arms or embrace the warring opposition, but they can contribute to creating environments and the political will to jointly devise new approaches to old conflicts. As leaders such as President Carter and other eminent persons begin to work collaboratively on these issues, we may see not only the peaceful resolution of specific conflicts, but changes in the international political tolerance for war. If we judge from the increasing numbers of requests for INN assistance, there is one clearly evolving trend: the parties caught in the mediation gap are increasingly looking for more peaceful ways to resolve their differences. With

such opportunity comes an implied obligation to better support disputants and the institutions who work with them.


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Appendix

1. Map of Ethiopia/Eritrea
2. EPLF/PDRE Agreements, September 19, 1989
3. Jimmy Carter Final Communique, September 19, 1989
4. PDRE/EPLF Agreements, November 28, 1989
5. Jimmy Carter Final Communique, November 28, 1989
6. Carter Center Press Release, June 14, 1990
7. Assorted Press Clippings



September 19, 1989

The following are the agreements reached between the representatives of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in their first round of preliminary negotiations held at the Carter Center of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, from September 7 to September 19, 1989.

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's negotiation team was chaired by Dr. Ashagre Yigletu and included Bilillign Mandefro, Tibebu Bekele, Merid Bekele and Fisseha Yimer.

The Eritrean People's Liberation Front negotiation team was chaired by Al-Amin Mohamed Saiyed and included Haile Wolde Tensae, Mahmud Ahmed Sherifo, Ahmed Haji Ali and Michael Ghebreguns.

These agreements were reached in the presence of Former President Jimmy Carter who convened and chaired the first round of preliminary negotiations.

I. Agreement Regarding Publicity

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning publicity during the peace process:

1. Every party has an absolute right of freedom of speech.
2. Notwithstanding the right of freedom of speech, the parties agree that so long as the peace process is proceeding in a positive fashion and the parties have confidence in the process, then the parties will only make constructive statements to the press concerning the peace process.
3. Each party has the right to demand that a joint communique be issued publicly at any time during the peace process. The parties will work together in good faith to try to reach agreement on the terms of said communique. If either side feels the communique is not satisfactory, it is free to issue its own statement.

II. Agreement Regarding Working Languages

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning working languages during the peace process:

1. During the negotiating sessions the parties may speak in the language of their choice including Amharic, Arabic or others. Their statements shall be interpreted into English.
2. The official records of the peace process will be maintained in English, including the transcripts of the parties' statements and all written agreements.

III. Agreement Regarding Official Records

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning official records during the peace process:

1. All records of all negotiating sessions will be maintained on magnetic tape.
2. The originals of the records will be maintained by the chairman or co-chairmen.
3. True copies of all recordings will be given to each of the negotiating parties as soon as possible, preferably at the end of each day.
4. Transcripts of all negotiating sessions will be maintained and made available to each party.

IV. Agreement Regarding Venue

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree to the following principles concerning the venue during the peace process:

Negotiating sessions will be held in rotation in Khartoum (Sudan), Cairo (Egypt), Sana's (Yemen Arab Republic), Nairobi (Kenya), Arusha (Tanzania) and Harare (Zimbabwe).

The location of each specific negotiating session will be made by mutual agreement of the parties.

V. Agreement Regarding the Rules of Procedure

The representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that the chairman or co-chairmen will set the rules of procedure for the peace process which will be mutually acceptable to the parties. In this decision, they will look to the rules of international organizations.

VI, VII. Agreement Regarding the Time, Place and Agenda of the Next Talks

The representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that the chairman or co-chairmen may choose the venue for the next talks from among the agreed list of countries of venue.

The time of the next talks will be November 18, 1989 in Nairobi, Kenya.

These talks will be scheduled to resolve points of disagreement between the parties remaining from the Atlanta negotiating session.

VIII. Agreement Regarding the Agenda for the Main Talks

The representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that the agenda for the next talks will be as follows:

1. Opening statements by the chairman or co-chairmen.
2. Welcoming remarks by the head-of-state of the host country.
3. Opening statements by the chairmen of both negotiating teams.
4. Approval of agreements reached in the preliminary talks.
5. Resolution of issues of disagreement in the Atlanta talks.
6. Adoption of agenda for main talks.
7. Final communique.
8. Closing ceremony.

IX. Agreement Regarding Delegations

Both the representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agree that delegations for future talks will consist of not more than twelve on each side. Identity of the negotiating teams will be exchanged in advance, at least two weeks prior to the convening of each negotiating session. Each side may change membership in its negotiating team after prior notice to the chairman or co-chairmen.

Dr. Ashagre Yigletu

Accepted on behalf of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Mr. Al-Amin Mohamed Saiyed

Accepted on behalf of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front

This agreement, consisting of nine provisions, was signed in my presence on the day of September, 1989.

Tesfai Ghermazien and Amare Tekle also represented the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

September 19, 1989

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The delegations of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front have conducted several days of constructive and productive discussions. In accordance with our agreement to make a complete public record, the exact language of these agreements is being made available to the press. A summary is given below:

1. Both sides have demonstrated that there is a genuine commitment to the peace process and a determination to continue the effort to a successful conclusion.
2. Notwithstanding the absolute right of freedom of speech, the parties will endeavor to make only constructive statements to the press or public so long as the peace process is proceeding in a positive fashion.
3. Both sides may use Amharic, Arabic, or other languages of their choice, to be translated into English, the working language.
4. A complete record of the proceedings will be kept, and both sides will be furnished with copies of magnetic tape recordings, plus a written transcript of the discussions in English as soon as possible. Following each negotiating session or round of talks, these transcripts may be made public by either side.
5. For future negotiating sessions, as in Atlanta, there will be no pre-conditions, the public will be kept informed, and there will be full-time third party participation.
6. Sites for negotiating sessions in rotation will be Nairobi, Khartoum, Sana'a, Cairo, Arusha, and Harare. The chairman/co-chairmen will select the venue for each negotiating session after consulting with the two sides.
7. Observers will be invited to attend meetings. There is some disagreement on the selection and role of observers, as will be explained later.
8. Chairman/Co-chairmen will be chosen by the negotiating parties, whose duties will be to arrange meetings and schedules, to open and close meetings, to chair the meetings, to rule on points of order, and to assure that meetings are conducted smoothly and properly. These duties will be performed without prejudice or partiality, and with the approval of the negotiating parties.
9. On each agenda item, each side will present its initial views in writing to the other side. Then there will be a thorough discussion of the issue until agreement is reached. If the two sides cannot agree, then co-chairmen shall use their good offices to mediate disagreements by putting forward proposals for consideration by the negotiating parties.

There are remaining disagreements on the chairmanship and mediation which will be explained later.

10. A staff or secretariat will be necessary to assist the chairman/co-chairmen in the peace process. Members of the staff will be proposed by the chairman/co-chairmen and approved by the negotiating parties. Either negotiating party may propose members of the secretariat to be considered by the chairmen for service. There are remaining disagreements that will be explained later.
11. Rules of procedure will be as suggested by the chairman/co-chairmen and secretariat, with the approval of both negotiating parties.
12. Delegations for future talks will consist of not more than twelve on each side. Identity of the negotiating teams will be exchanged in advance, at least two weeks prior to the convening of each negotiating session. Each side may change membership in its negotiating team after prior notice to the co-chairmen and the other side.
13. The agenda for the main talks will be as follows:
 - a. Opening statement by the co-chairmen.
 - b. Welcoming remarks by the Head of State in the host country.
 - c. Opening statements by the chairmen of both negotiating teams.
 - d. Approval of agreements reached in the preliminary talks
 - e. The resolution of issues of disagreement in the Atlanta talks.
 - f. Adoption of agenda for main talks. Initial proposals are to be given in writing by both sides.
 - g. Final communique.
 - h. Closing ceremony.

Chairmanship:

We have agreed on duties and functions of the chairman/co-chairmen. These are the points in dispute: One of the chairmen must be an African leader of one of the countries of venue. The parties have not reached agreement on who that co-chairman will be.

The position of the EPLF is that "The chairman shall be President Carter. The co-chairman shall be designated by the chairman from among the heads of state of the venue countries on rotation basis. They, in return, can designate persons of their own choice."

The position of the Ethiopian government is that there be two equal and permanent co-chairmen, one of whom will be an African leader of one of the countries of venue.

My own role in the continuation of these negotiations will depend on the selection of a suitable African chairman. I am unwilling to serve until the decision on the African leader has been made. No African leader will be willing to serve unless he is satisfied with our agreements in Atlanta and knows that he is acceptable to both sides. If either of the original choices is unable to serve, others will be chosen, by mutual consent of the negotiating parties.

Observers:

My latest compromise proposal is as follows: "Initially, there will be seven observers, and others will be invited to attend. Of the seven, each side may choose two observers without restriction and without the expression of reservations by the other side. Three others will be invited by mutual agreement. Additional countries may be represented by observers, with mutual agreement by the two sides."

The EPLF accepts with the understanding that there will be no expression or reservation regarding the unrestricted choices and that the observers may serve as mediators.

The Ethiopian government accepts with the understanding that reservations may be expressed regarding the unrestricted choices and that the observers will serve as witnesses. Secretariat:

There are questions concerning the source of the staff and their role as mediators.

The EPLF insists that the Carter Center, the OAU, and Sudan will provide members of the secretariat and that the last named members will officially represent the OAU and Sudan.

The Ethiopian side insists that the co-chairmen will choose the staff or secretariat and that these serve in their individual capacities.

Concerning the role of observers and staff, my compromise proposal for consideration by both sides is: "In addition to the co-chairmen, others will be needed to serve as mediators. Observers and members of the secretariat who have already been approved by both sides will be the most likely choices. Once chosen, mediators will continue to serve so long as they are mutually acceptable to both sides.

Although complete agreement has not been reached on all issues in these preliminary talks in Atlanta, both sides have agreed to continue this effort. I have been authorized to set the time and place for the next talks. My preference is that these peace efforts be recessed until November 18, at which time we reconvene in Nairobi, Kenya. In the meantime, the two sides will be asked to seek agreement on the remaining issues, to propose their list of observers, and to agree on an African leader to serve with me in the main talks.

- Jimmy Carter -

FINAL AGREEMENT

In the presence of Chairman Jimmy Carter, the following agreements were reached between representatives of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in their second round of negotiations held in Nairobi, Kenya, from November 20 to November 28, 1989.

CHAIRMANSHIP

There shall be two co-chairmen for the main peace talks. The two sides have agreed that President Carter and President Nyerere will serve as co-chairmen.

OBSERVERS

There shall be seven observers in the main talks. Each side shall choose two observers without restriction and without expression of reservation by the other side. Three of the venue countries will be invited by mutual consent. In addition, others shall be invited as mutually agreed.

In accordance with the above paragraph, the two parties have selected the seven observers, namely, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Tanzania, Sudan, and Kenya, in the following manner: the EPLF have chosen the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity; the PDRE have chosen Zimbabwe and Senegal; by mutual consent, both parties have chosen Tanzania, Kenya, and Sudan. On behalf of the two parties, invitations have been sent by the chairman to each of the seven selected observers.

SECRETARIAT

The co-chairmen will choose the Secretariat. Members of the Secretariat will provide supportive professional, administrative, and technical services as directed by the co-chairmen.

OTHER ISSUES

After obtaining mutual consent by both sides, the co-chairmen will set the time and venue for the main talks.

Ashagre Yigletu

Head of the delegation of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia

Al-Amin Mohamed Said

Head of the delegation of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front

Jimmy Carter, Chairman

Witnessed, 28 November, 1989

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The delegations of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front have conducted several days of constructive and productive discussions. They have reached complete agreement on all the outstanding issues, and will now prepare for further peace talks to be held as early as possible next year.

In accordance with our agreement to make a complete public record; the exact language of the signed agreement is given below:

(beginning of text)

In the presence of Chairman Jimmy Carter, the following agreements were reached between representatives of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in their second round of negotiations held in Nairobi, Kenya, from November 20 to November 28, 1989.

CHAIRMANSHIP

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SECRETARIAT

The co-chairmen will choose the Secretariat. Members of the Secretariat will provide supportive professional, administrative, and technical services as directed by the co-chairmen.

OTHER ISSUES

After obtaining mutual consent from both sides, the co-chairmen will set the time and place for the main talks.

(end of text)

Additional comments by the Chairman:

Both sides have extended an invitation to President Nyerere to serve with me as co-chairman in the main talks. We have not yet received his response.

President Julius Nyerere and I, as co-chairmen, will arrange meetings and schedules, open and close meetings, chair the meetings, rule on points of order, and assure that the meetings are conducted smoothly and properly. On each agenda item, each side will be expected to present its initial views in writing to the other side. Then there will be a thorough discussion of the issue until agreement is reached. If the two sides cannot agree, the co-chairmen shall use their good offices to mediate disagreements by putting forward proposals for consideration by the negotiating parties.

Observers shall witness all negotiating sessions without directly participating in the discussions. They may offer advice to either side between sessions. If the two sides cannot agree on an issue with the help of the co-chairmen, the observers may be called upon to assist in putting forward proposals for consideration by the negotiating parties.

After the selection process was completed, I, as Chairman, was directed by both parties to send invitations to each of the seven selected observers.

Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, the Organization of African Unity, Zimbabwe, and Senegal have accepted the invitation to serve as observers. It is expected that other observers will be selected in the future by common consent of the two sides.

It is expected that both sides will submit working papers at the commencement of the main talks. These working papers will comprise the agenda.

The two sides also discussed possible good will actions, including how to minimize suffering because of the drought. The Chairman will use his good offices to assist in this effort.

It has also been suggested that in the main talks each negotiating team consist of not more than seven official members.

These negotiations have at times been very difficult, but the persistence, wisdom, and desire for accommodation demonstrated by both sides have finally prevailed. We look forward to the main talks, and pray that they will bring peace to the area.

Jimmy Carter
Chairman

Nairobi, Kenya
29 November 1989

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

June 14, 1990

Contact: Carrie Harmon
Director, Public Information
404/420-5107

**EPLF WITHDRAWS FROM PEACE TALKS; CARTER, NYERERE CALL FOR
UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE**

ATLANTA, GA....Former Presidents Jimmy Carter of the U.S. and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania announced today that the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has withdrawn from the negotiations aimed to resolve the nearly 30-year-old conflict with the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. According to the former presidents, the EPLF has decided to pursue a military option instead of working toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

This decision, which was communicated to Presidents Carter and Nyerere on June 11 by Isaias Afwerki, Secretary General of the EPLF, comes in spite of the fact that the United Nations had recently agreed to meet Eritrean demands by serving as an international observer at the peace talks. The EPLF had cited the UN's earlier decision not to serve as an observer as justification for refusing to renew the negotiations that were adjourned in Nairobi, Kenya last December. At that meeting, it was agreed that President Carter and President Nyerere would serve as co-chairs of the ongoing negotiations, and that three observers of the peace process would be chosen by mutual agreement by the two parties. It was also agreed that two additional observers would be chosen by each side without restrictions and without expression of reservation by the other party. The three observers chosen by mutual consent were Tanzania, Kenya, and Sudan. The

Ethiopian government chose Senegal and Zimbabwe, and the EPLF chose the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The United Nations has limited ability to become involved in internal conflicts within sovereign nations. Only this week, the UN felt able to circumvent that prohibition when President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia personally asked that the organization accept the invitation of the EPLF to serve as an observer. "Both sides have been given every opportunity to participate in a forum to resolve this conflict peacefully. It is a tragedy that this opportunity is being lost," said President Nyerere.

Presidents Carter and Nyerere called on the EPLF and the Ethiopian military forces to declare a unilateral ceasefire throughout the north, including the port city of Massawa and the regional capital Asmara, in order to facilitate the delivery of relief aid to drought and famine stricken areas in the northern provinces. "Perhaps the most tragic aspect of this turn of events is that some three million people may simply starve to death if relief supplies cannot be delivered," said President Carter.

Preliminary peace talks between the Government of Ethiopia and the EPLF were initiated by President Carter at The Carter Center in Atlanta last September. The peace talks continued two months later in Nairobi, where both sides agreed to a series of ground rules that were to guide future talks. An attempt to renew the talks in April 1990 was fruitless; the EPLF responded that they could not attend such a meeting to discuss substantive issues without the presence of a UN observer.

Beginning in April 1989 and continuing throughout the preliminary sessions, a de facto ceasefire was observed. In February 1990, however, the EPLF launched a new military offensive at Massawa, renewing a bitter round of fighting that has continued almost unabated since then. Delivery of relief supplies to the drought-

stricken areas has been interrupted, and casualties have been heavy in fighting to control the port of Massawa as well as the city of Asmara.

FEATURES

Carter: The man and his mission

By GRAY PHOMBEAH

News Features Editor

IN a morning falling like a lover's kiss, Jimmy Carter plays tennis with his wife Rosalynn before dashing to chair the second round of peace talks between Addis Ababa and the Eritrean rebels.

And with every serve and volley, a ray for peace for the Ethiopian victims of the 28-year-old civil war seems to drop from the veils of the gentle morning.

Bathed in the Nairobi sun and shielded by secret service men, the former US President and the former First Lady, both in tennis fashion-wear, begin a new day and a peace mission on the tarmacked court at Utalii Sports Club.

A morning drizzle the previous day washed away their tennis date at the Nairobi Club and forced the ex-White House couple to take shelter at their Serena Hotel's gym for a morning work-out of weightlifting and cycling. "What's the score?" shouts the only reporter around who has been watching the one-hour-and-five minutes match from a distance and could only pick up words like "aah" and "ooh" from the fenced court.

"It's a secret," replies Jimmy Carter with the famous toothy grin from Plains, Georgia - perhaps in reflection of the secrecy that has surrounded the Nairobi talks.

Nearly a decade since he and Rosalynn left the White House, Jimmy is greyer and his once cherubic face is etched with deep lines.

He sports braces around his left leg for a knee injury he suffered last year in a skiing accident in Colorado.

The talks have been going on fine" says the former peanut farmer before secret service men whisk him away in a three-car convoy for a simple breakfast of coffee and orange juice and later to another session of the talks in a private residential house.

Last Monday, he tossed aside the hearty helping of the popular Serena breakfast buffet and stuck to the same sip of coffee and juice after jogging with his wife, and then stepped out to join President Moi for the opening of the second round of a mediation process that began in Atlanta two months ago.

While back home, the telegenic Reagans behave as if the torch was never passed to the Bushes, Jimmy Carter has discovered that there is life after the White House as he helps to end a war that has claimed the lives of 250,000 people in the Horn of Africa.

There is no sign of the surprise rise of an obscure state governor to the White House as he emerges from his hotel room in a grey checked jacket and open collar, carrying his portable VDT.

Smiling, Rosalynn falls in step with him as he blazes the trail of the best after-office record for public service among all ex-American presidents, right to the heart of Africa.

In the public glare of the city under the sun or in the privacy of their State Suite, the Carters display the joys and challenges of retirement in sharp contrast to the Reagans with the dollars in their eyes.

Room service supervisor, 38-year-old Jonathan Kang'ethe found them cuddled together on the carpet as they watched the evening VoK telecast when he served them shrimp salad for dinner last week.

"Mrs Carter placed the order herself by telephone," remembers Kang'ethe. "She was very polite."

But in Los Angeles, the Reagans cash in on retirement as they live in a £1.5 million house bought by their "first" friends who still regard them as the President and the First Lady.

While the Carters work in a gutted, dusty slum building in New York without even a roof over their heads, Nancy Reagan's Hollywood fans pay her £20,000 at a time to be at their parties. Guests at her fund-raisers would pay up to £16,000 just to be seated near her.

As Carter spent his time in a small farming community in Africa helping farmers to use improved seeds, fertiliser and other new farming methods, the Reagans were saying their farewell to the White House and hello to a future of rich opportunity.

Nancy's autobiography is set to bag £1.4 million. Ronny's two-book deal is worth up to £3.4 million. Carter set up his International Negotiation Network in Pursuit World Peace as Reagan rubbed shoulders with Hollywood's power brokers, financiers and a galaxy of movie stars during his 78th birthday party in February. The man from Georgia patiently steered the negotiations between Ethiopians and Eritreans in Atlanta as the failed actor pocketed £1.3 million on his Japanese lecture tour after he recovered from brain surgery.

The uncaring image of the Reagans, created by Nancy's fashion excesses and Ronald's cowboy policies, still continue into their glamorous retirement.

In contrast, Jimmy and Rosalynn arrived in Nairobi with the burden of world peace on their back.

Carter has been tip-toeing around vowed enemies for the groundwork of a peace deal that will end the bloodshed and destruction that has also created 800,000 refugees in a country three times the size of California.

After five days of preliminary talks, the prayers of 50 million farmers and herdsman for peace appeared to be answered as the parties chose former Tanzanian President, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, as co-chairman on Thursday. And the prospects of full-scale negotiations, probably early next year, appeared bright.

Away from the Nairobi talks, staffers at the Serena Hotel have been basking in the Carters' limelight, laced with simplicity and an ordinary lifestyle.

The couple turned their back to the comfort of their suite and walked downstairs to sample the international lunch buffet, soon after arrival last Sunday.

They marvelled at the freshness and presentation of the cuisine, says Chef John Macharia, before settling for smoked chicken, rib of beef and salad.

Another evening saw the Carters at Madhari Grill. They ordered escargots for starters and had red snapper fillets for the main dish, congratulating the 39-year-old chef, a father of three, for such "fresh fish that you can feel the flavour of the sea".

"They have demanded no special treatment or privilege since they arrived here," says general manager Peter Mbugua. "They have been polite and social to everyone."

On Thursday, the Carters threw a Thanksgiving party for 45 guests. Seven stuffed turkeys weighing 50 kgs graced the classic American feast in the Southern manner the ex-White House couple would have wanted it back home. Between reading and writing books, repairing the roof of a house in the slums of some big American city and sharing a moment with an African farmer, the couple's future peace agenda include bringing the Ethiopians and the Tigre People Liberation Front (TPLF) to the round table and initiating a peace dialogue between China and Tibet.

At 65, age rests easily on Jimmy Carter's shoulders with his almost flawless handling of the tennis racket on a sun-kissed court in Nairobi. Backed by his wife, he shares the ugliness as well as the loveliness of life with fellow mankind - outside the Oval Office.

Eritrean Talks Are Resumed, With the 2 Sides Squabbling

Ethiopian rebels and Government officials met yesterday for a second round of peace talks and accused each other hindering the ending of civil war. Former President Jimmy Carter, serving as an observer at the talks, said that both sides were "sincere and dedicated" in their efforts to achieve peace. He is shown with Ashagre Yigletu, center, the Government's chief delegate, and al-Arnin Mohamed Saiyed, the rebels' chief delegate.

But the Ethiopian Government accused the guerrillas of intensifying "anti-peace propaganda," and the rebel Eritrean People's Liberation Front said the Government was conducting a campaign of "outright blackmail to impede the progress under way."

Carter Gives Ethiopian Negotiators a Taste of Peace

By Elizabeth Kurylo

Staff Writer

NAIROBI, Kenya - When Joan Grayson packed her bags to follow Jimmy Carter on a peace mission to Africa, she knew she would miss Thanksgiving at home in Atlanta. So she took along pumpkin pie spice and poultry seasoning, just in case the chef in Nairobi needed help in the kitchen.

"I've always cooked Thanksgiving dinner for my family, and I wanted to have a part of it here," the Carter staff member said. "There was a little room in my suitcase and I had the spices in my cupboard. So I just tucked them in." She and other Carter staffers tasted the results of her prudent planning Thursday when they sat down to a traditional Thanksgiving feast, complete with pumpkin pie.

The five-course meal was shared by Secret Service agents, Kenyan government officials, U.S. Embassy representatives and warring parties from Ethiopia, who took a break from four days of peace talks, which Mr. Carter is mediating. Before carrying one of six Kenyan turkeys, Mr. Carter explained the holiday and prayed for peace.

"For more than 300 years, the citizens of our nation have paused one time each year on Thanksgiving Day to give thanks to God for the blessings that he's given to us - survival, life, food, freedom peace," Mr. Carter said.

"I think it's very appropriate that we Americans invite our friends from the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, who are searching for peace, to join us today in a spirit of Thanksgiving to God."

Carter aide Dayle E. Powell, who began planning the dinner a month ago, described it as a "bonding experience" for both negotiating teams.

"There is something that comes from the experience of breaking bread together," Mr. Powell said. "The parties have a lot to be grateful for. They have shown a genuine commitment to peace."

As the plate-passing began, conversation turned to such Thanksgiving traditions as football games and naps.

Ethiopian and Eritrean negotiators, whose leaders have been fighting for 28 years, sat side by side, joking about schooldays and childhood memories. At least for a few hours, they put aside bitter differences that led to Africa's longest war and the loss of nearly 1 million lives.

"This is a special occasion," said Ethiopian negotiator Tibabu Bekela. "In our search for peace, [this dinner] does have a special meaning."

EPLF negotiator Ahmed Haji Ali agreed. "It was fantastic," he said.

For most Carter aides, it was the first Thanksgiving away from families and friends.

"It is difficult not being home," said Bill Spencer, a conflict resolution expert who is helping Mr. Carter on the peace talks. His wife and 6-year-old son live in Boston. "One time when I called home, I got an answering machine and it was my own voice."

Carter staffer Sue Palmer planned to call home to Vermont, where her family was having a reunion.

It was the first time in 10 years that Secret Service agents assigned to the Carters have missed a big holiday at home, said William H. Bush, special agent in charge of the detail.

"It's the first time that we've been away on Thanksgiving with President Carter since he left the White House," said Mr. Bush, assigned to Mr. Carter since 1979. "It's tough in a situation like this when most everyone would like to be home. But it's part of the job."

He said dinner was a surprise and made everyone a little less homesick. The dinner was served at a Nairobi hotel. Chef John Macharia Kariuki used recipes from "A James Beard Thanksgiving" and "Thanksgiving in the Southern Manner."

Mr. Kariuki and 15 assistants studied for three days, tested each dish and began cooking at 8 a.m. Thursday. "It was excellent ... a real success," he said while the plates were being cleared. "I knew nothing could go wrong."

Some Carter staffers had to forget about taking a nap and return to work. After four days of negotiations, the parties agreed Thursday on the chairmanship and secretariat for substantive talks, but no details were given.

"I cannot comment at this time on what has been decided," said Carter Center spokeswoman Carrie Harmon. "We're not prepared to disclose the content of the agreement."

The final issue in this round is the selection of observers, and negotiations will resume today, Ms. Harmon said.

If the parties resolve the final issue, she said, it's possible they could begin discussing the agenda for more substantive talks.

Rebels reject Carter-led peace talks on Ethiopia

By Elizabeth Kurylo

Staff writer

Eritrean rebels, who last fall agreed to talks on ending Ethiopia's civil war, have withdrawn just weeks before they were to begin in Nairobi, Kenya, though a main obstacle has been resolved, former President Jimmy Carter said Wednesday. The main demand of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was that the United Nations be an observer at any substantive talks. Last week, the United Nations agreed to participate, Mr. Carter said.

On Monday, "We were informed by the Eritreans that they refuse to go back to the peace table," said Mr. Carter, who brought the sides together at the Carter Presidential Center in September.

EPLF spokesmen could not be reached for comment.

Mr. Carter renewed efforts to resume the talks two weeks ago after President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev called for an international conference under U.N. auspices to end the 29-year-old war.

"We were making plans to convene the peace talks in Nairobi," Mr. Carter said. When asked whether the EPLF anticipates a military victory over the Marxist government of President Mengistu Haile Mariam rather than a negotiated settlement, Mr. Carter replied, "I would guess that they would."

EPLF rebels "haven't been enthusiastic about peace talks since last November," said Mr. Carter, who held one round of talks at the Carter Center and mediated a second round in Nairobi in November.

Both sides agreed in Nairobi to begin the main talks "as soon as possible," with Mr. Carter and Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, as co-chairmen. But a snag developed over whether the United Nations would participate. Then in

February, the EPLF attacked and captured the port of Massawa, the main entry for famine relief supplies.

The main talks had been tentatively set to begin July 6 in Nairobi and end July 19, said Dayle E. Powell, director of the Carter Center's conflict resolution program.

About the Authors

Dayle E. Spencer and William J. Spencer are members of the International Negotiation Network's (INN) Secretariat. They have worked collaboratively with former President Jimmy Carter for a number of years to develop the INN, as well as to help resolve conflicts ranging from disputes in the United States tobacco industry to those in Northern Ireland, Sudan, Ethiopia, Burma, Liberia and more. Ms. Spencer is additionally a Carter Center fellow and director of the Conflict Resolution Program. She serves as a senior lecturer at Emory University's Law School, and is an associate professor at Emory as well as a fellow of the Emory Institute for Women's Studies. She is a frequent analyst on national news broadcasts. She has authored many articles and book chapters and lectures widely internationally. She formerly served as an assistant United States attorney for the Northern District of Alabama.

Mr. Spencer is the managing director of Pangaea International, Inc., an evolving transnational network of leaders and organizations concerned with conflict resolution, economic cooperation, and other aspects of social change. Pangaea provides consulting advice to businesses and international organizations. For ten years he was managing partner of Interaction Associates, a management consulting and training firm. He previously served as staff director of the federal commission that developed legislation resulting in the creation of the United States Institute of Peace. For three years he was executive director of the National Peace Academy Campaign.

