



Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments

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Summary

Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the U.S. territory of Guam to increase deterrence and power projection for possible responses to crises and disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. Nonetheless, China has concerns about the defense buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. Guam's role has increased with plans to withdraw some U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea.

In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a "Roadmap" to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost \$10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Primary goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed the bilateral "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam" that reaffirmed the "Roadmap" of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion, including up to \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund \$3.18 billion plus about \$1 billion for a road.

However, in September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the ruling party. This political change raised uncertainty as Japan sought to re-negotiate the agreement, even while the United States sought its implementation. The dispute over the location on Okinawa of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma raised implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. In January 2010, Japan promised to decide by May on the location of the FRF. Then, North Korea's attack on South Korea's naval ship (*Cheonan*) in March, and China's deployment of its Navy near Okinawa which confronted Japan's forces in April, catalyzed Japan to resolve the dispute in favor of deterrence. On May 28, the Secretaries of Defense and State and their counterparts in Japan issued a "2+2" Joint Statement, in which they reaffirmed commitment to implement the 2006 Roadmap and the 2009 Agreement. In July, the Navy issued the final Environmental Impact Statement on the buildup on Guam, while planning to start construction by the end of FY2010. The Navy estimated that Guam's population would increase by a total of 30,190, including 8,552 Marines.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department's submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific, with a sense of Congress that expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost \$733 million. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy issues. On appropriations related to military construction on Guam, see CRS Report R40731, *Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations*.

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Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup

Guam is a U.S. territory long valued as strategically significant to U.S. forward deployments in the Western Pacific. In the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is about 2,400 miles west of California, and Guam is about 3,800 miles further west of Hawaii. Guam has two important U.S. military bases: Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base. The island, three times the size of Washington, DC, is home to about 171,000 residents. As the Defense Department has faced increased tension on the Korean peninsula and requirements to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pacific Command (PACOM), since 2000, has built up air and naval forces on Guam to boost U.S. deterrence and power projection in Asia. Concerns include crisis response, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate.

Visiting Guam in May 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Guam's buildup will be "one of the largest movements of military assets in decades" and will help to "maintain a robust military presence in a critical part of the world."¹ Under President Obama, Secretary Gates issued the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, in which the United States noted the importance of implementing the U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap of 2006 that will ensure the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a regional security hub. The QDR also announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, to integrate the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace forces of the Air Force and Navy to counter challenges to U.S. freedom of action, defeat adversaries with sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and improve power projection operations. Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III visited Guam in July and stressed Guam's value, saying "from bases here, our forces can ensure the security of our allies, quickly respond to disaster and humanitarian needs, safeguard the sea lanes that are so vital to the world economy, and address any military provocation."²

Force Relocations and Deployments from the U.S. Mainland

In 2000, the press reported that the Air Force wanted to base elements of an Air Expeditionary Force in Guam and had sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to broaden the range of U.S. options for possible contingencies involving North Korea. As PACOM's Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched cruise missiles on Guam for the first time in August 2000. The Air Force moved precision munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint Standoff Weapons.³ In early 2001, the Navy announced that it would station up to three nuclear attack submarines at Guam, in order to shorten the transit time compared to traveling from homeports in Hawaii or California to the western Pacific and to shorten deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based at Guam arrived in October 2002. In July 2007, the *USS Buffalo* joined *USS Houston* and *USS City of Corpus Christi* as the three forward-deployed nuclear-power attack submarines (SSN) permanently based at Guam. In 2010,

¹ Donna Miles, "Gates Views Growth Under Way in Guam," *American Forces Press Service*, May 30, 2008.

² Quoted by *American Forces Press Service*, July 27, 2010.

³ Thomas Ricks, "For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront," *Washington Post*, May 26, 2000; "Inside the Ring," *Washington Times*, August 25, 2000; Robert Burns, "Air Force Plan Could Place Bombers Closer to Targets," *Seattle Times*, November 30, 2000.

the *USS Oklahoma City* was scheduled to replace the *USS City of Corpus Christi* at Guam. The three submarines based at Guam formed part of the Navy's deployment of 31 of 53 (or 59%) of attack submarines in the Pacific (a greater presence than that in the Atlantic) by the end of 2009. Moreover, in mid-2010, three Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN), *USS Michigan*, *USS Ohio*, and *USS Florida*, showed their presence in the Asian-Pacific region and used Guam to support their operations.⁴

In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for basing aircraft in Guam. In addition to munition stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly requested F-22 stealth fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk reconnaissance drones.⁵ In March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was activated at Guam's Andersen Air Force Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed temporarily on a rotational basis from air bases in Texas and Louisiana as U.S. forces prepared for war against Iraq. Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air Force began continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this build-up, the first B-52 bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen arrived in February 2004.⁶ In April 2005, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said that B-2 stealth bombers started to fly out of Andersen. In April 2005, F-15 fighters temporarily deployed to Andersen from Idaho. An Air Force official said in 2006 that the Air Force planned to station KC-135 tankers on Guam. In May 2007, the Air Force announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters to Guam for four months. In the summer of 2008, several F-22 fighters, based in Alaska since 2007, began deployments to Guam. Also, Andersen Air Force Base planned to have four to six Global Hawks for an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Strike Task Force by 2009. However, in March 2007, the Navy decided not to homeport the aircraft carrier *USS Carl Vinson* at Guam. Nonetheless, by 2009, the Navy had a plan for a transient berth in Apra Harbor to support an aircraft carrier for up to three weeks at least twice a year.⁷

U.S. Force Relocations from Japan and South Korea

In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed "Roadmap" to broaden military cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provides for the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Approximately 7,000 marines will remain on Okinawa. The cost of

⁴ Christian Bohmfalk, "Navy Decides to Homeport Up to Three Attack Submarines in Guam," *Inside the Navy*, January 29, 2001; Nathan Hodge, "Navy Basing Subs in Guam," *Defense Week*, October 1, 2002; *Navy Newsstand*, July 12, 2007; Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, December 4, 2009; *South China Morning Post*, July 4, 2010.

⁵ Jim Wolf, "U.S. General Urges Warplanes Be Sent to Guam," *Reuters*, August 23, 2002.

⁶ PACOM, "B-1Bs, B-52Hs Arrive in Guam," March 6, 2003; Robert Burns, "Air Force Wants to Put Fighters and Bombers Back on Guam in Pacific," *AP*, January 13, 2004; Michael Sirak, "U.S. Considers Bomber Presence on Guam," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 21, 2004; PACOM, "Bomber Deployment to Guam," February 2, 2004; "Bombers Arrive At Andersen," *AFN*; Katie Worth, "B-52 Bombers Arrive," *Pacific Daily News*, February 23, 2004.

⁷ Martin Matishak, "Hester: Air Force to Bolster Presence in Asia-Pacific Region," *Inside the Air Force*, April 29, 2005; Natalie Quinata, "Fighter Squadron Arrives on Guam," *Pacific Daily News*, April 30, 2005; Gregg Kakesako, "U.S. Military to Beef Up Its Presence on Guam," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 21, 2006; "United States to Deploy 18 F-16s to Guam," *Reuters News*, May 24, 2007; Frank Whitman, "No Big Changes at Andersen Right Away, New 36th Wing Commander Says," *Stars and Stripes*, November 18, 2006; Nelson Daranciang, "Senators Hope Naval Presence Will Grow," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 31, 2007; Audrey McAvoy, "Air Force to Deploy Alaska-based F-22 Raptors to Guam," *AP*, May 21, 2008, quoting the Commander of Pacific Air Forces, General Carrol Chandler; Navy Secretary Donald Winter, Report on Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam, September 15, 2008; "Rear Admiral Addresses Business Leaders on Guam's Military Importance," *KUAM*, February 25, 2009.

the relocation is estimated at \$10.27 billion. Of this amount, Japan pledged to contribute \$6.09 billion, including direct financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam.⁸

Visiting South Korea in June 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that U.S. troops there would remain at about 28,000, instead of carrying out the plan of 2004 to restructure U.S. forces by reducing troop strength from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. U.S. officials indicated that further withdrawals of Army forces would be possible, primarily to support the requirements of the Army and Marine Corps in the active theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force planned to relocate expeditionary combat support units from South Korea and Japan to consolidate them on Guam.

On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) told *Reuters* that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that the goals remain to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014. Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan would provide \$6.09 billion, including up to \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund \$3.18 billion plus about \$1 billion for a road. Under the agreement, about 8,000 personnel from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.

In addition to Japan’s financial contribution, the relocation to Guam would be dependent upon Japan’s progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In the “Roadmap,” the United States and Japan agreed to replace the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located in another, less populated area of Okinawa (at Camp Schwab). The FRF would be part of an interconnected package that includes relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, and consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa.

In April 2009, the lower house of Japan’s parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State welcomed the Diet’s ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents.

However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became Prime Minister. This political change raised uncertainty when Japan sought to re-negotiate the agreement even as the United States sought its implementation. The DPJ had called for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on the local people and environment. (On U.S. discussions with Japan and its domestic dispute over Futenma, see CRS Report RL33436, *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*.) In Tokyo on

⁸ Karl Eiselberg, “Finalized U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Masks Some Deeper Concerns in Security Alliance,” *Daily Report*, May 5, 2006; Linda Sieg, “U.S.-Japan Security Overhaul Gives Tokyo Bigger Role,” *Reuters*, May 16, 2006.

October 21, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stressed to Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa the importance of implementing the agreement by "moving forward expeditiously on the roadmap as agreed." Gates said at a news conference that "without the [FRF], there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and return of land in Okinawa." But by the time of President Obama's visit on November 13, 2009, the two leaders could only announce a "working group" to discuss differences. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the agreement's "implementation," but Japan sought to "review" the agreement. Still, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said on December 8 that Japan would earmark about US\$535 million in the 2010 budget for the transfer of U.S. marines to Guam. At a meeting in Honolulu on January 12, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed moving on the implementation of the agreement but also acknowledged that the alliance had lots of other business to conduct. She expressed an expectation of a decision on the FRF by May, after Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada conveyed Hatoyama's promise to decide by that time. Visiting Tokyo on January 15, Senator Daniel Inouye said Hatoyama reiterated this promise to decide by May.

Meanwhile, on May 20, 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, announced that an international investigation found that an attack on March 26 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, sank the ROK's naval ship, *Cheonan*, and killed 46 sailors. President Obama condemned that "act of aggression." The crisis provoked by the DPRK catalyzed Japan's resolution of the dispute over the realignment.

Moreover, in April, Japan said that China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed ships and submarines near Japan's southern islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and dangerously confronted Japan's surveillance forces, including pointing guns from a PLAN destroyer at Japan's maritime patrol plane and flying a helicopter in close approach to Japan's destroyer in at least two incidents. The next month, China's maritime survey ship approached and chased away Japan's Coast Guard survey ship in the East China Sea, demanding that Japan's ship stop its surveys. While the crisis with the DPRK involved an attack that sank the ROK's ship and killed its sailors, the PLA's aggressiveness did not result in conflict at that time. Nonetheless, later in July, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson testified to Congress that both the actions by North Korea and China (the PLAN's deployment of a Surface Action Group near Okinawa) prompted Japan's recognition of vital U.S. deterrence.⁹

On May 28, 2010, in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton along with their counterparts in Japan issued a "2+2" Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. Thus, Japan reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2006 Roadmap and 2009 Agreement on relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. The following month, Japan's new Prime Minister Naoto Kan affirmed the bilateral agreement. The two countries are to decide on details concerning Okinawa by August. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy reportedly has questioned the completion of the relocation of Marines to Guam by 2014.¹⁰

⁹ Before a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2010.

¹⁰ *Yomiuri*, July 23, 2010.

Concerns and Issues for Congress

Rationales

One rationale for the military build-up on Guam is its status as a U.S. territory. Thus, the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003 and expressed support for building up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings.¹¹ In contrast, the United States had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in 1992, and countries like South Korea could restrict the use of U.S. forces based there. U.S. forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over nuclear powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised doubts about their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and China.

Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can “surge” to the Asian theater. He stressed “flexibility,” saying “we need to have forces ready to react,” and we must have built-in flexibility” to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).¹² In 2004, the Navy held “Summer Pulse 04,” its first exercise to increase readiness to “surge” operations in response to a crisis or emergency. In June 2006, PACOM held the “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam.

A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of distance.” PACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones, and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where the United States has alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The United States also has concerns in Asia about threats to peace and stability in the East China Sea, South China Sea and over terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises, and security for sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca. Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to five hours.¹³ Moreover, **Table 1** presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to Manila in East Asia, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego.

¹¹ James Brooke, “Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,” *New York Times*, April 7, 2004.

¹² Richard Halloran, “Guam Seen as Pivotal U.S. Base,” *Washington Times*, March 11, 2006.

¹³ Donna Miles, “Gates Views Massive Growth Under Way in Guam,” *AFPS*, May 30, 2008.

Table I. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time

To Manila, from:	Statute miles	Days at 20 knots	Days at 30 knots
Guam	1,724	3.1	2.1
Honolulu	5,482	9.9	6.6
Seattle	6,853	12.4	8.3
San Diego	7,595	13.8	9.2

Notes: Sailing distances in statute miles were calculated using nautical miles reported by “Distances Between Ports,” 2001, published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Also, 1 nautical mile equals 1.15 statute miles, and 1 knot equals 1.15 mph.

Concerns

As U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its infrastructure has been of concern to some policymakers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns about the impact of additional deployments on its infrastructure, including utilities, roads, and water supplies. Guam’s location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of protection for U.S. forces and assets against typhoons. In the fall of 2006, PACOM officials briefed Guam on some aspects of an undisclosed draft plan for military expansion, the Integrated Military Development Plan, with possible military projects worth a total of about \$15 billion.¹⁴ In addition, Guam’s size and remoteness and conditions raised more questions about hosting and educating military dependents, training on Guam and with other units in Asia, Hawaii, or the west coast, and costs and time for extended logistical support and travel. Addressing another concern, a former commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged in 2007 that Guam’s buildup include more than infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.¹⁵ In 2009, Wallace Gregson became Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

Guam’s higher military profile could increase its potential as an American target for terrorists and adversaries during a possible conflict. China is believed to have deployed ballistic missiles that could target Guam. In addition, in 2008 North Korea started to deploy its intermediate range ballistic missile (Taepodong-X) with a range of about 1,860 miles that could reach Guam, according to South Korea’s 2008 Defense White Paper.¹⁶ Any such vulnerabilities could raise Guam’s requirements for both counterterrorism and missile defense measures.

Moreover, some say that Guam is still too distant from flash points in the Asia and advocate closer cooperation with countries such as Singapore, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan.¹⁷ Building up the U.S. presence in those countries could enhance alliances or partnerships, increase interoperability, and reduce costs for the United States.

In July 2010, the U.S. Navy’s Joint Guam Program Office issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on implications of the defense buildup on Guam.¹⁸ The detailed study estimated a

¹⁴ *KUAM News*, September 12, 2006; *Pacific Daily News*, September 13, 2006; *Stars and Stripes*, September 17, 2006.

¹⁵ W. C. “Chip” Gregson, “New Thinking Needed on Pacific Frontier,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, December 7, 2007.

¹⁶ Sam Kim, “N. Korea Deploys Medium-Range Missiles, Bolsters Special Forces,” *Yonhap*, Seoul, February 23, 2009.

¹⁷ Thomas Donnelly, “Rebasing, Revisited,” American Enterprise Institute, December 2004.

¹⁸ Joint Guam Program Office, “Final Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation,” public release on July 29, 2010. This followed the Draft Environment Impact Statement issued in November 2009.

higher population increase than the move of 8,000 marines to Guam. A total of 8,552 Marines plus 630 Army soldiers would form the 9,182 permanent military personnel to relocate to Guam. The total military population on Guam would increase by 30,190 (including 9,182 permanent military personnel, 9,950 dependents, 9,222 transient military personnel, and 1,836 civilian workers). In addition, construction workers and others would mean a total increase in population of about 79,000 at the peak in 2014.

The study also found that Guam cannot accommodate all training for the relocated marines, and the nearby island of Tinian (100 miles away) would help to provide land for their training. There would be a challenge for sustaining operational readiness in training while limiting the time and expense to travel to train. The study found that “the training ranges currently planned for Guam and Tinian only replicate existing individual-skills training capabilities on Okinawa and do not provide for all requisite collective, combined arms, live and maneuver training the Marine Corps forces must meet to sustain core competencies. As with Marine Corps forces currently in Okinawa who must now travel to mainland Japan, other partner nations, and the U.S. to accomplish this requisite core competency training, the Marine Corps forces relocating from Okinawa to Guam would also have to use alternate locations to accomplish requisite core competency training.” In addition, the Navy would need a new deep-draft wharf at Apra Harbor to support a transient aircraft carrier. Third, the Army would relocate about 600 military personnel to establish and operate an Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF).

Alliances

The Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, parts of which were reported in October 2006, indicated that U.S. Army units withdrawn from South Korea were not likely to be stationed on Guam.¹⁹ The Pentagon’s restructuring plan reportedly intended to maintain U.S. air power in South Korea, particularly the three squadrons of F-16 fighters based at Osan Air Base. An emphasis on U.S. offshore forces in South Korean security could affect decisions regarding the mix of U.S. forces based on Guam and rotated into Guam from other bases. This might especially be true of heavy bombers, which the Air Force rotates into Guam from bases in the United States. Concerns about maintaining deterrence after U.S. reductions of ground forces might lead PACOM to increase exercises of heavy bombers and/or aircraft carrier strike groups near Korea.²⁰

Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. concerns involved possible conflict between China and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu islands by China) in the East China Sea. The United States administered the islands after World War II and turned them over to Japanese administration in 1972. Clinton and Bush Administration officials stated that the Senkakus fall under the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance.²¹ In September 2005, the PLA Navy deployed five naval ships to the disputed area in the East China Sea with competing territorial and oil claims. For training, Guam has provided valuable and less constrained airspace and bombing ranges for the air forces of Japan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia.

¹⁹ Murayama Kohei, “U.S. to Triple Troops in Guam, but No Earlier Than 2010 for Marines,” *Kyodo*, October 3, 2006.

²⁰ Bill Gertz, “More Muscle, With Eye on China,” *Washington Times*, April 20, 2006; Robert Burns, “U.S. Air Power in East Asia Has Grown,” *Associated Press*, October 11, 2006.

²¹ “U.S.-Japan Treaty Covers Disputed Isles,” *Reuters*, November 28, 1996; and Yoichi Funabashi, “Maintain the Armitage Doctrine Quietly,” *Asahi Shimbun*, February 2, 2004.

China

China's civilian and military commentators commonly have suspected that the U.S. defense build-up on Guam partly has been aimed at China, which has threatened to use the People's Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. U.S. policy on helping Taiwan's self-defense is governed not by a defense treaty but by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8. Some concerns about the PLA's accelerated modernization since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 also have expanded beyond a focus on Taiwan to include PLA preparations for possible conflicts with the United States, Japan, and others. In Southeast Asia, China claims much of the South China Sea as well as the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in that sea as its "sovereign territory." The PLA has increased attention to Guam and has been building up its submarine force (both nuclear-powered and diesel-electric). In November 2004, the PLA Navy sent a Han-class nuclear attack submarine to waters off Guam before intruding into Japan's territorial water.²² In 2007, PACOM Commander Admiral Timothy Keating visited Guam and acknowledged that its defense buildup was partly due to concerns about tension over Taiwan and deterrence of North Korea. At the same time, he stressed U.S. transparency, saying the buildup was not "under the cover of darkness."²³

Under President Obama, the QDR issued in February 2010 announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, as noted above. The QDR's discussion of that concept did not name China. Nevertheless, some analysts discussed Air-Sea Battle as a way to counter the PLA's rising capabilities in anti-access and area-denial (to prevent U.S. forces from entering into a theater of operations and to prevent U.S. freedom of action in an area under an adversary's control).²⁴ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in March 2010 that the implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared security challenges, including the threat posed by North Korea and uncertainty posed by the PLA's "rapid" modernization. Testifying to Congress in the same month, PACOM Commander Admiral Robert Willard cited the PLA Air Force's fighters and air defense systems for U.S. deployment of F-22 fighters in the Pacific, including at Guam's Andersen Air Force Base.²⁵

Still, a policy challenge has been to deter any aggression by China as well as to assure it that a U.S. goal is cooperation with this rising power as a "responsible stakeholder." The Commander of Pacific Air Forces said in May 2005 that the PLA's modernization gave him "pause for interest" but did not make a difference in significant force redeployment.²⁶ Also, in 2006, Guam became a focal point for improving military-to-military relations with China. To blunt charges that Guam's build-up targeted China, PACOM's Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the U.S. "Valiant Shield" exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June 2006. The PLA Navy sent a Deputy Chief of Staff and specialist in submarine operations to lead the observers, who also boarded an aircraft carrier and visited Guam's air and naval bases. Two C-17 transport aircraft flew supplies from Guam to China for earthquake relief in May 2008.

²² *Kyodo World Service*, November 16, 2004.

²³ Audrey McAvoy, "U.S. Pacific Commander Says Taiwan is Factor in Guam Buildup," *AP*, April 15, 2007.

²⁴ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept," May 18, 2010; Bruce Rolfson, "Air Force-Navy Team May Counter China Threat," *Navy Times*, May 23, 2010.

²⁵ Testimonies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, March 17, 2010; and Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2010.

²⁶ General Paul Hester, interview with *Inside the Air Force*, May 6, 2005.

Major Legislation

In July 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report (S.Rept. 109-286) on the Military Construction and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act, which expressed concerns about a construction program on Guam estimated to cost \$10.3 billion (with Japan paying 60%) and expectations of a master plan for Guam from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (that became P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007), the Appropriations Committees decided against a Senate provision that would have required the Defense Secretary to submit the master plan by December 29, 2007 and provided more time for a report by September 15, 2008. In response, the Navy Secretary reported on planning for Guam, with initiatives for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Also, he reported that the Pentagon was developing the Guam Joint Military Master Plan.²⁷ The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (that became P.L. 110-417 on October 14, 2008), *inter alia*, authorized a total of about \$180 million for Guam's military construction projects, established a Treasury account for all contributions for military realignment and relocations, and required the Defense Secretary to report on military construction projects by February 15 of each year.

On May 7, 2009, days before Japan's Diet ratified the relocation agreement with the United States, Defense Secretary Gates submitted the proposed defense budget for FY2010. As part of the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested \$378 million to start construction in Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. This amount would contribute to the total U.S. cost of \$4.18 billion for the relocation.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (H.R. 2647, enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department's submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific, with a sense of Congress that expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost \$733 million. (On appropriations related to military construction on Guam, see CRS Report R40731, *Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations*.)

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²⁷ Donald Winter, "Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam," September 15, 2008.