

A New U.S. Policy Paradigm Toward Iran

RAND RESEARCH AREAS
 THE ARTS
 CHILD POLICY
 CIVIL JUSTICE
 EDUCATION
 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
 NATIONAL SECURITY
 POPULATION AND AGING
 PUBLIC SAFETY
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 SUBSTANCE ABUSE
 TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
 TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
 WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

Iranian power projection and regional ambitions are among the most pressing foreign policy challenges that the United States faces. U.S. observers have noted with alarm Iran's new assertiveness on the Middle Eastern stage, its buildup of conventional military capability, and its apparently inexorable drive for nuclear energy in defiance of international criticism. The challenges posed by the Islamic Republic are especially acute from the perspective of the U.S. Air Force: Airpower will likely be the military instrument of first resort to project U.S. power into Iran's unstable neighborhood, reassure allies, and dissuade Iran from aggression or adventurism.

Iran Is Dangerous, But Not Omnipotent

To accurately gauge future strategic challenges from Iran, RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) sought to assess the *motivations* of the Islamic Republic, not just its *capabilities*. In an analysis grounded in the observation that, although Iranian power projection is marked by strengths, it also has serious *liabilities* and *limitations*, the study assessed four critical areas—the Iranian regime's perception of itself as a regional and even global power, Iran's conventional military buildup and aspirations for asymmetric warfare, its support to Islamist militant groups, and its appeal to Arab public opinion.

The study concluded that the Islamic Republic does not seek territorial aggrandizement or even, despite its rhetoric, the forcible imposition of its revolutionary ideology onto neighboring states. Instead, it feeds off existing grievances with the status quo, particularly in the Arab world. Ideology and bravado frequently mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik—the qualities that define “normal” state behavior.

Moreover, there are significant barriers and buffers to Iran's strategic reach, stemming from regional geopolitics and from Iran's limited conventional military capacity, diplomatic isolation, and past strategic missteps. Similarly, ten-

Recommendations:

The United States should consider a new approach to Iran that integrates elements of engagement and containment:

- Continue strengthening international sanctions and other financial pressures targeted on the nuclear issue, but avoid unilateral measures that are not likely to generate broad international support.
- Pursue bilateral dialogues related to areas of common interest, such as instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking, natural disaster relief, refugees, and other humanitarian crises.
- Issue unambiguous statements about U.S. interests and intentions in the region, particularly regarding Iraq.
- Engage in efforts to build a multilateral regional security framework that is simultaneously inclusive of Iran and sensitive to the needs of U.S. friends and allies in the region.

This product is part of the RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented summaries of published, peer-reviewed documents.

Headquarters Campus
 1776 Main Street
 P.O. Box 2138
 Santa Monica, California
 90407-2138
 TEL 310.393.0411
 FAX 310.393.4818

© RAND 2009

www.rand.org

sions between the regime and Iranian society—segments of which have grown disenchanted with the Islamic Republic's revolutionary ideals—can also act as a constraint on Iranian external behavior.

Inclusive Multilateralism Is a More Promising Strategy Than Containment

Given this assessment of Iran's motivations and capabilities, traditional containment options may actually create further opportunities for Tehran to amplify its influence in the Arab world. A more useful strategy is one that exploits existing checks on Iran's power and influence. These include the gap between its aspiration for asymmetric-warfare capabilities and the reality of


its rather limited conventional forces, disagreements between Iran and its militant “proxies” (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), and the potential for sharp decline in the opinion of Iran among the Arab public. Early in his administration, President Obama made conciliatory statements to Iran and indicated a willingness to join multilateral dialogues with Iran on Afghanistan and the nuclear issue. Building on these gestures, the United States should consider a new approach to Iran that integrates elements of engagement and containment:

- Continue strengthening international sanctions and other financial pressures targeted on the nuclear issue, but avoid unilateral measures that are not likely to generate broad international support.
- Pursue bilateral dialogues related to areas of common interest, such as instability in Iraq and Afghanistan,

narcotics trafficking, natural disaster relief, refugees, and other humanitarian crises.

- Issue unambiguous statements about U.S. interests and intentions in the region, particularly regarding Iraq.
- Engage in efforts to build a multilateral regional security framework that is simultaneously inclusive of Iran and sensitive to the needs of U.S. friends and allies in the region.

An inclusive multilateral security structure in the Persian Gulf region—perhaps modeled on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—would contribute more to regional stability over the long run than would continuing to rely solely on competitive, balance-of-power strategies designed to isolate Iran. ■



This research brief describes work done for RAND Project AIR FORCE and documented in *Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East*, by Frederic Wehrey, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, and Jennifer Li, MG-781-AF, 2009, 230 pp., ISBN: 978-0-8330-4554-6 (available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG781/>). This research brief was written by Robert A. Guffey. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. RAND® is a registered trademark.

RAND Offices

Santa Monica, CA • Washington, DC • Pittsburgh, PA • New Orleans, LA/Jackson, MS • Boston, MA • Doha, QA • Cambridge, UK • Brussels, BE



PROJECT AIR FORCE

THE ARTS
CHILD POLICY
CIVIL JUSTICE
EDUCATION
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY
POPULATION AND AGING
PUBLIC SAFETY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.

This product is part of the RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peer-reviewed documents or of a body of published work.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

Support RAND

[Browse Books & Publications](#)

[Make a charitable contribution](#)

For More Information

Visit RAND at www.rand.org

Explore [RAND Project AIR FORCE](#)

[View document details](#)

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see [RAND Permissions](#).