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REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE  
ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR  
THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY:  
BACKGROUND AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

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REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT  
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY: BACKGROUND AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (also referred to as the Murphy Commission, after its chairman, Robert Murphy) was established in 1972 by Congress with a mandate to "study and investigate the organization, methods of operation, and powers of all departments, agencies, independent establishments and instrumentalities...participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy" and to make recommendations for the improvement of the "governmental processes and programs in the formulation and implementation of such policy." The report of the Commission, which was issued on June 28, 1975, recommended "improvements not in the substance of our foreign policy, but in the means by which, in both the executive and legislative branches, that policy is made and implemented." The recommendations proposed by the Commission are, therefore, organizational and deal not only with the formal lines of authority between individuals and agencies within the Government and between the Government and the public sector, but also with the processes through which foreign policy decisions are made and resources -- people, information and analysis -- are utilized to make those decisions.

## II. Background and Policy Analysis

### A. Background

The establishment of a Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy was the result of a 1972 bipartisan proposal by Senators Fulbright and Aiken to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In Senate Report 92-754 to accompany S. 3526, the Committee expressed concern about the diminished coordination and control by the President and Congress in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and suggested that these organizational problems were the result of a proliferation of agencies, overlap of functions, and duplication of effort. The Foreign Relations Committee then proposed a high-level commission to study the most effective organization of government for the conduct of foreign policy.

The Senate adopted the Committee proposal, and the provision was subsequently accepted in conference (Conference Report 92-1145) and became public law on July 13, 1972 (P.L. 92-325).

A Commission of twelve members was appointed to conduct the two-year inquiry. Membership was evenly divided among the executive branch, the legislative branch and the public (a listing of members appears in Appendix A). During its two years of study, the Commission heard testimony from almost two hundred witnesses, sponsored an intensive research program, received comments from federal agencies and overseas posts and missions, and conducted a survey of the Members of Congress concerning the appropriate role for Congress in the foreign policy making process.

The Report of the Commission was issued June 28, 1975.

## B. Summary of Commission Study

In assessing the future of American foreign policy, the Murphy Commission identified two challenges expected to confront foreign policy-makers in the next few decades and argued that if the United States is to deal effectively with these challenges, substantial improvement in the existing organization and administration of foreign affairs will be necessary. According to their report, the most pervasive challenge to U.S. foreign policy will be the increasing interaction and interdependence of nations in areas of economic concern. Such global interdependence will occur in investment policy, international monetary issues, economic development and trade. Other global issues such as technological and environmental policy concerns will also generate increased interdependence, and, as a result, improved coordination between governments will become essential.

The Commission predicted that a second challenge to United States foreign policy will be the merger of foreign and domestic policy issues within the United States. The Commission recommended that better integrated and coordinated organizational structures be developed to meet both future challenges.

To this end, the Commission proposed a central coordinating role for the National Security Council (NSC), for the State Department, and for a Joint Committee on National Security in the Congress. These organizations should be structured to allow for debate and participation by all government agencies involved in any domestic or foreign affairs that could affect the conduct or objectives of U.S. foreign policy. For this reason, international economic policy, intelligence, and defense policy received particularly close scrutiny by the Commission. The Commission recommendations for a more integrated

foreign affairs community also included reforms in personnel systems and broader budget review procedures and programs to increase and make more effective use of foreign affairs expertise throughout the Government and from the public.

The majority of the Murphy Commission's recommendations dealt with the administration of foreign affairs within the executive branch. The Constitution confers the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy on the President. It is, therefore, essential that the President be assured of having a competent staff able to assess all issues with foreign policy implications. The NSC and State Department are assigned responsibility for this function. But as the scope of foreign policy broadens, it is imperative that to remain effective these structures receive more input from other agencies involved in foreign policy issues. Such intragovernmental coordination will become increasingly important with the growing complexity of global issues, the Commission maintained.

To maintain an integrated approach to foreign policy as the economic issues become more complex, the Commission proposed a central coordinating role for the State Department in economic policymaking with international implications. However, two Commission members, Senator Mansfield and Mrs. Engelhard did not concur with this recommendation according the State Department responsibility for the coordination of foreign economic issues. In appendices to the Commission report, they acknowledged the growing importance of economic issues to foreign policy decisions, but suggested that all aspects of economic policy remain under the responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury, whom they felt to be best qualified.

The Commission further advised involving other agencies in the foreign economic policy decisions by broadening the NSC to allow more debate on

economic issues, organizing several advisory boards with members drawn both from within the government and from the private sector to advise on economic policy matters, and requiring greater economic expertise in the Foreign Service and throughout the government.

The Commission also supported a broader role in the conduct of foreign economic policy for the Congress stating that:

The Commission believes that while the executive branch should continue to conduct our relations with other countries, both the Constitution and political realities require shared participation and responsibility by the executive and the legislative branches of government. The increasing importance of international economic policy and the right of Congress to regulate foreign commerce will make congressional/executive cooperation in foreign policymaking important in the future.

In its recommendations for improving congressional/executive relations, the Commission, therefore, stressed cooperation in the flow of information and communication between as well as within branches. Improved cooperation, the Commission reported, is particularly important with regard to executive agreements, emergency powers and executive privilege. To improve congressional participation in foreign affairs, the Commission study proposed a Joint Committee on National Security that would provide for Congress the type of policy review and oversight function now performed by the NSC for the executive branch. Through this Joint Committee, Congress would be able to coordinate any legislation having possible implications for foreign policy. Finally, the Commission proposed several means by which the internal organization and structure of the congressional committee system could become more responsive to the future challenges of American foreign policy.

The Commission recommendations for congressional/executive relations and internal restructuring of Congress to accord the legislative branch more

influence over the conduct of foreign policy drew considerable criticism from Senate Majority Leader and Commission member Mike Mansfield. In supplemental views to the report, he argued that the Commission concentrated its attention on the executive branch and did not fulfill its mandate to conduct a comprehensive study of all government bodies involved in foreign affairs. The recommendations for Congress, Senator Mansfield asserted, were inadequate and, in fact, the proposed Joint Committee on National Security could potentially decrease rather than increase the influence of the legislative branch in foreign affairs.

The principal Commission recommendations and the supplementary views and comments by Commission members are as follows:



C. Principal Commission Recommendations

1. Executive Office of The President

According to the Commission report, the President should be the only official with line responsibility in the White House. To fulfill this responsibility, he must be able to depend on competent staff, a structure of mechanisms and procedures to discharge his responsibilities, and a stronger performance by Cabinet departments. The Commission report recommended the following courses of action:

--The NSC strengthen its advisory role in domestic, foreign and international economic policymaking, and, in the future, the Assistant for National Security Affairs have no official responsibilities other than direction of the NSC.

--Cabinet departments share in relevant decision-making responsibility, and the Secretary of the Treasury assume a larger role in international economic policy and be accorded NSC membership.

--Consideration of international economic affairs in policy decisions be increased. In this report it was recommended that:

an International Economic Affairs Assistant be given direct access to the President and participate in the NSC;

a new Subcommittee on International Economic Policy function as a joint subcommittee of the NSC, the Domestic Council and the Economic Policy Board;

an International Economic Policy Advisory Board be established to provide policy advice from the private sector at the Presidential level;

a long-range international economic study group be organized by the Council of Economic Advisors; and

a Council on International Planning be created.

--Defense policy be coordinated with foreign policy: a National Review Committee to review the coordination of defense policy with foreign policy objectives be created in the NSC, and an Advisory Board on National Defense appointed.

## 2. Department of State

The Commission felt that the ever-widening range of global issues made central management by any one department impossible; but the Department of State should have the central role in the "critical process of policy development" and provide the necessary central coordination and leadership in the foreign affairs community.

According to the report the Department has three major functions:

- (1) "assessing the overseas impact of proposed U.S. decisions and injecting international considerations into the national policy process";
- (2) "formulating all U.S. policy having significant foreign implications";
- and (3) "fulfilling its responsibilities for the actual conduct of relations with other governments and international organizations."

The principal organizational changes proposed in the Commission study were as follows:

- There should be increased State Department participation in defense policy making, the position of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance should be abolished, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs should become the Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs.
- To encourage a more integrated approach to global environmental and resource interdependence in economic issues and in foreign policy, the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs should be broadened to include scientific, environmental, transportation, food and population, and the title of the position should be changed to Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs.
- Ambassadors should be given the primary responsibility in missions abroad and should have access to all communications between Washington and any agency represented at the post.
- In multilateral organizations, the Secretary of State should be responsible for the selection of the best qualified representatives, and such delegations should be multiagency in composition.
- As recommended by the recent report of the Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel), all

non-policy information and cultural activities should be placed under the jurisdiction of a new semi-autonomous Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, all policy information activities combined in a new State Department Office of Policy Information, and the Voice of America (VOA) established as an independent federal agency with a Board of Governors. Under this recommendation, VOA would be given a mandate to broadcast accurate and objective news with the State Department assuming responsibility for all programs presenting or explaining U.S. foreign policy issues.

--The Bureau of International Organization Affairs should be reconstituted as a Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and its policymaking functions should be transferred to functional bureaus directed by Under Secretaries.

--The office of Inspector General for Foreign Assistance should be abolished, and its analytic functions should be assumed by a Bureau for Food, Population and Development Affairs.

### 3. Conduct of Foreign Policy

#### a. International Economic Policy

A major theme throughout the Commission Report was the increasing interdependency between the economy of the United States and the economies of other nations. The Commission recommendations were designed to create a framework "to make international economic policy responsive to domestic and foreign policy considerations." While the President is ultimately responsible for the integration of these issues, the Commission offered a number of measures to assist in fulfilling this responsibility:

--Foreign Service Officers with economic backgrounds be given top-level positions and there be a more active interchange program for middle-grade personnel with economic expertise.

--AID continue to administer bilateral foreign assistance and the Treasury Department retain responsibility for U.S. participation in international development institutions.

--A Board of East-West Foreign Trade be created to provide trade policy guidance.

--The Office of the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations be transferred to the State Department.

(See also recommendations for the Executive Office)

#### b. Defense Policy

In the opinion of the Murphy Commission, defense policy should be

"an instrument of U.S. foreign policy" and "assure the security of the U.S. and its allies against aggression." According to the Report of the Commission, the Department of Defense is the main operating agency for military affairs and must carry out the President's overall military policy objectives, while the State Department is responsible for all political-military issues. To this end, the Commission recommended that:

- A National Security Review Committee of the NSC be established under the direction of the President and his National Security Assistant. The Committee would annually review short and long-range defense policies, programs and budgets to assure their integration with the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.
- An Advisory Board on National Defense comprised of knowledgeable private citizens be created.
- The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) be strengthened and upgraded. The Director of the ACDA be a member of the NSC, the proposed National Security Review Committee, and the proposed NSC Arms Transfer and Security Assistance Committee.
- The State Department make structural and personnel changes in order to deal effectively with political-military issues; a Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs directed by an Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs be established; this Bureau as well as the regional bureaus in State be upgraded to fulfill the requirement that State assist the White House in national security policy and "face the Pentagon from a much stronger position."
- The defense budget process be improved.

c. Intelligence

The Murphy Commission considered the maintenance of intelligence capabilities at a high level of competence and integrity to be essential to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the national security. The Commission listed three criteria for an intelligence community under a democratic form of government: (1) "to provide accurate information and competent analyses concerning the issues of greatest concern to policymakers; (2) to avoid unnecessary

costs and duplications; and (3) to function in a manner which commands public confidence." The Commission report recommended several changes in the organization of the intelligence community to improve management and oversight of foreign intelligence activities. These recommendations, however, dealt almost entirely with the CIA, and no recommendations were offered for the organization of intelligence functions in the Department of Defense, which receives the largest portion of the intelligence budget. It was simply recommended that, as an agent of the overall priorities established by the proposed Director of Foreign Intelligence and the Intelligence Committee of the NSC, the Secretary of Defense should improve his analytic capabilities and management resources. Other Commission recommendations proposed that:

- The Central Intelligence Agency be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA) with clear jurisdiction over foreign intelligence activities. The FIA director should be the President's principal intelligence advisor with community-wide responsibility.
- To improve oversight of all intelligence activities, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board be strengthened and enlarged to include sources from outside the intelligence community and be reviewed by each incoming President to assure his personal confidence in the Board. In this suggestion, the Commission concurs with the Rockefeller Commission Report recommendations.
- In the executive branch, the National Security Council Intelligence Committee be strengthened to provide a forum for the debate of all intelligence policy, and the review procedures of the 40 Committee, a body of the NSC which must approve covert actions and all other high risk operations, be increased to assure more effective oversight of intelligence activities.
- In Congress a Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security be created not only to oversee but also to review the activities of the entire intelligence community.
- Comprehensive community-wide planning and budgeting be continued and expanded. The Commission recommended that "Perspectives for Intelligence" be a multi-year plan revised annually and reviewed by both the U.S. Intelligence Board, a board representing all major U.S. agencies with intelligence responsibilities, and the Intelligence Committee of the NSC.

For more comprehensive budget review, the Intelligence Community (IC) Staff of the director could use this multi-year plan to prepare an annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget. Such a comprehensive budget would assist the OMB, the intelligence community and the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security in determining the budgetary requirements of the agencies and departments of the intelligence community.

--The Defense Department improve the analytic capabilities and management of its defense intelligence activities.

d. Public Opinion and Humanitarian Considerations

The important role of public opinion in foreign policy making should be recognized and the interchange of views with the public encouraged. The Commission also recommended increased consideration of human rights by upgrading the Office of Humanitarian Affairs, creating an Advisory Committee on Human Rights to the Secretary of State, and giving the U.S. Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission a broader mandate.

e. Planning and Budgeting

To assure a coherent policy, the Commission recommended a Council on International Planning, a periodic Presidential "State of the World Report" and better provisions for objective long-range planning input through reports by organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences and an Advisory Committee to the State Department policy planning staff.

The Commission also expected the importance of budgetary issues in foreign affairs to grow and recommended that:

--Closer relations between the State Department, NSC, and OMB be developed and the procedures for assessing the cross-agency budgeting impact of foreign commitments be improved.

--The two foreign relations committees be represented on the budget committees in Congress to encourage better foreign/domestic policy coordination.

--The Congressional appropriations and authorization process be combined through "program committees."

--Any budget decisions with implications for the President's foreign policy objectives be reviewed by a key presidential foreign policy advisor.

f. Personnel

Although "people are the most important ingredient in making foreign policy," in the opinion of the Commission, attention to personnel management and executive development in the foreign affairs community has been neglected. The executive and particularly the legislative branch must initiate necessary reforms of the personnel system. To this end, the Commission suggested an Under Secretary of State for Management to oversee a modern professional personnel management mechanism, a foreign service career development program, a professional personnel system, and an Executive Development Program. The establishment of a Foreign Affairs Executive Service was also proposed to allow State to draw on the expertise demonstrated by executives in other agencies. The Commission recommended that the Foreign Service should concentrate on the development of personnel in functional specialties as should AID and the proposed Information and Cultural Agency (ICA). The Foreign Service Institute should be expanded to service the entire foreign affairs community.

4. Congress

a. Executive/Congressional Relations

The Commission expressed the belief that it is imperative and vital to the security of the nation that Congress and the executive resolve foreign policy issues through "shared participation and responsibility." Although the Commission felt that the executive branch must conduct U.S. relations with

other countries, Congress and the executive share important responsibilities in foreign affairs: war powers, the appointive process, and treaty powers. Congress holds the sole power to regulate foreign commerce, an increasingly important responsibility. The Commission offered the following recommendations:

- In an attempt to eliminate further possible disputes between branches, all existing formal states of national emergency should be terminated and executive privilege be invoked only by the President personally.
- To ensure that the flow of information within the government be as free as possible, all unnecessary classification procedures should be terminated.
- Finally, Congress should exercise more effective review and oversight through report-back requirements for executive testimony and reports and thus encourage more executive/legislative cooperation.

b. Congressional Organization and Procedures

The Commission Report concluded that it is necessary that the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have broad jurisdictional flexibility on foreign policy issues, particularly in the consideration of economic questions that may have implications for foreign policy. It expressed general approval of the Senate's jurisdictional responsibilities, but proposed a review of the Senate subcommittee system. The Commission was more critical of the House and recommended that the House Banking and Currency Committee and the International Relations Committee have concurrent legislative oversight of international financial organizations and that the International Relations Committee broaden its oversight functions of trade policy issues. The Commission Report endorsed



the full utilization of subcommittees and joint hearings to coordinate congressional action in the foreign policy field. To ensure coordination of all aspects of foreign policy and to improve consultation with the executive branch on foreign policy issues, the Commission proposed the creation of a Joint Committee on National Security.

The Commission felt that more evaluation and review of major programs and policy were necessary. The report of the Commission recommended that:

- There be a central congressional repository for written reports supplied to Congress by executive agencies, and a system of security classification be developed by the Joint Committee on National Security.
- A part of the Congressional Research Service focus steadily on issues to which Congress as a whole accords high priority, under the guidance of the Joint Committee on Government Operations.
- There be improved reporting procedures on international programs in which the United States participates.
- There be more travel by teams of Members to review international programs, and a reporting procedure for these trips be encouraged.
- Public awareness of Congressional activities be increased via televised hearings.

D. Supplemental Comments to the Commission Recommendations by Four Commission Members.  
The Honorable Mike Mansfield

Senator Mike Mansfield argued in supplemental remarks to the report that the Commission did not fulfill its mandate to conduct a comprehensive study of all government agencies involved in foreign policy, and instead concentrated its efforts on the executive branch with only a cursory examination of the role of the legislative branch in foreign policy. The Senator then voiced

strong opposition to a Joint Committee on National Security. Such a new committee, he contended, might not only decrease the authority and power of existing standing committees, but could become a "super-committee" and fall under the influence of the executive branch, thus actually reducing congressional authority.

The Senator agreed with the Commission that a restructuring of the intelligence community is necessary, but he proposed that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence undertake the investigation of intelligence activities and that a Joint or Senate Committee on Intelligence with extensive oversight powers eventually be created. He offered several recommendations for the intelligence community: abolish the Defense Intelligence Agency, reduce the National Security Agency in size, and discontinue the practice of naming a military officer to the position of CIA director or deputy director.

Mansfield then supported the supplemental remarks by Commissioner Englehard on the need to strengthen the departments and the Cabinet and to divide economic responsibility between State and Treasury.

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller expressed dissatisfaction that the Commission did not attempt to project future U.S. foreign policy objectives and evaluate organizational mechanisms in terms of those objectives. He argued that the proposals for congressional/executive relations do not adequately solve the need for mutual cooperation, and commented that "greater cooperation by the Executive must be matched by a sense of responsibility and

trust" by Congress. Furthermore, Mr. Rockefeller cautioned against Commission proposals that would impede the President's ability to review all conflicting views on questions of national interest.

With regard to an intelligence service, the Vice President supported the present system whereby presidential policy guidance on intelligence is provided by an Assistant for National Security Affairs who chairs the National Security Council on Intelligence. Mr. Rockefeller advised further study of the USIA, expressed disagreement with the Commission recommendations for defense budgeting, and urged a review of energy policy.

Enclosures from Attorney General Edward H. Levi and Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia on executive privilege and executive agreements accompanied his remarks.

The Honorable William S. Broomfield

Congressman Broomfield voiced opposition to the proposed reorganization of USIA functions and the establishment of VOA as an autonomous agency. In his supplemental remarks, he supported the present status of USIA and VOA, but proposed that Cultural Affairs be transferred to the Agency. He favored the creation of a Joint Committee on National Security but would assign responsibility for intelligence oversight to a separate Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight. In a final recommendation, the Congressman suggested that the mandate and performance of the Defense Intelligence Agency be reevaluated.

Mrs. Charles Engelhard

In supplementary remarks, Mrs. Engelhard commended the Commission for its examination and recommendations dealing with State Department personnel management and gave support to the proposed Foreign Affairs Executive Service. Her remarks expressed general satisfaction with the final report published by Commission, but she raised objections to several specific recommendations.

Joining with Senator Mansfield, she opposed the Commission recommendation that the State Department be delegated primary responsibility for foreign economic policy--only the Treasury Department should devote full time to economic policy in its broad domestic and foreign aspects and the Secretary of the Treasury should be the President's principal Cabinet advisor on economic policy. Both Commission members supported the Commission efforts to strengthen the executive departments and the Cabinet.

Mrs. Engelhard and Senator Mansfield also found the Commission analysis of "multilateral diplomacy" to be misleading and argued for realistic participation in international organizations that would reflect the diversity of views among U.S. officials. Too much State Department authority relative to other departments, Mrs. Engelhard asserted, would result in an unnatural conformity of views.

Mrs. Engelhard expressed concern that the Commission had failed to pose the right questions with regard to congressional participation in the foreign policy making process, but she supported the Commission recommendation to create a Joint Committee for National Security in Congress.

## APPENDIX A

**MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION**

ROBERT D. MURPHY, <i>Chairman</i> <i>Honorary Chairman, Corning</i> <i>Glass International</i>	JAMES B. PEARSON, <i>Vice</i> <i>Chairman</i> <i>United States Senate</i>
DAVID M. ABSHIRE <i>Chairman, Center of Strategic</i> <i>and International Studies,</i> <i>Georgetown University</i>	WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD* <i>U.S. House of Representatives</i>
ANNE ARMSTRONG** <i>Counsel to the President, The</i> <i>White House</i>	FRANK C. P. MCGLINN <i>Executive Vice President, Fi-</i> <i>delity Bank, Philadelphia,</i> <i>Pa.</i>
WILLIAM J. CASEY <i>President and Chairman, Ex-</i> <i>port-Import Bank of U.S.</i>	MIKE MANSFIELD <i>United States Senate</i>
MRS. CHARLES E. ENGELHARD, JR. <i>The Engelhard Company</i>	STANLEY P. WAGNER <i>President, East Central Uni-</i> <i>versity, Ada, Oklahoma</i>
AREND D. LUBBERS <i>President, Grand Valley State</i> <i>College, Allendale, Michi-</i> <i>gan</i>	CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI <i>U.S. House of Representatives</i>
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD <i>U.S. House of Representatives</i>	PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN*** <i>U.S. House of Representatives</i>
NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER <i>The Vice President</i>	

\* Resigned December 1973; succeeded by Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, January 1974.

\*\* Resigned November 1974; succeeded by Nelson A. Rockefeller, December 1974.

\*\*\* Resigned January 1975; succeeded by William S. Broomfield, March 1975.

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1. The Commission's Studies Program by PETER L. SZANTON.
2. Alternative Organizational Models for the Conduct of Foreign Policy by WILLIAM I. BACCHUS and R. ROGER MAJAK.
3. Problems in the Conduct of United States Foreign Policy: A Compilation of Recent Critiques by J. DANIEL O'FLAHERTY.

APPENDIX C

Legislation

P.L. 92-325:

Established a twelve member study commission to submit findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy.

Expressed the sense of Congress that the Commission study and investigate all departments and instrumentalities of the U.S. Government participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy and submit a comprehensive report recommending any necessary constitutional amendments, legislation and administrative actions for the effective conduct of foreign policy.

P.L. 93-126:

Extended the completion date for the Commission study a year, to July 30, 1975.

APPENDIX D

Reports and Congressional Documents

International Information, Education and Cultural Relations:  
Recommendations for the Future. Washington, Center for  
Strategic and International Studies, 1975.  
(Stanton Panel Report)

Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities  
within the United States, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.  
Off., June 1975. (Rockefeller Commission Report)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.  
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. Report 92-  
754, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972.

## APPENDIX E

Selected References

Cambell, Franklin. The foreign affairs fudge factory. New York, Basic Books, 1971.

An examination of the administration of foreign affairs in the State Department with specific proposals for organizational reform.

Clark, Keith C. and Lawrence J. Legere, eds. The President and the management of national security. A report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. New York, Praeger, 1969.

A study of the coordination and policy planning process in matters of national security. Concludes that the personality of the President and his principal advisers overrides any formal organizational procedures.

Cronin, Thomas E. and Sanford D. Greenberg, eds. The presidential advisory system. New York, Harper and Row, 1969.

A compilation of authoritative essays in which each contributor reviews a specific aspect of the presidential advisory system.

Davis, David Howard. How the bureaucracy makes foreign policy. Lexington, D.C. Heath and Co., 1972.

An analysis of lateral interaction among the departments of State, Treasury, Labor and NASA and the manner in which such interorganizational arrangements may affect the activities of executive agencies in their administration of foreign affairs.

Destler, I. M. Presidents, bureaucrats and foreign policy. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1972.

An analytical discussion of the history and politics of organizational reform and the need for closer attention to the bureaucratic realities of the foreign affairs community. The author proposes a strategy to enhance the role of a Secretary of State responsive to presidential needs. Includes case studies of foreign policy-making by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.

George, Alexander L. The case for multiple advocacy in making foreign policy. American political science review, v. 46, September 1972: 751-795.

A discussion of the necessity of multiple advocacy in the foreign policy making process.

Halperin, Morton. Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1972.

A study of the relations between the bureaucracy and the President in the process of decisionmaking and policy implementation in the field of national security. Uses case studies to illustrate the use of maneuver and persuasion in the policy making process.

----- The President and the military. Foreign affairs, v. 50, January 1972: 310-324.

An examination of the relationship between the President and the military. The author offers two basic changes involving the channel by which the President receives advice from senior military officers and the role of civilian advisers in issues of military concern.

Holbrooke, Richard. The machine that fails. Foreign policy, n. 1, winter 1970-71: 65-77.

The author concludes that the number of organizations and chains of command in the foreign affairs community must be reduced and responsibility for the administration of foreign affairs returned to a reformed State Department.

Johnson, Richard A. The administration of United States foreign policy. Austin, U. of Texas Press, 1971.

Given the unalterable character of many obstacles to effective administration of U.S. foreign affairs, the author suggests more coordinated participation by all federal agencies involved with any aspect of foreign policy and an end to the "luxury of conducting overseas affairs as a projection of domestic bureaucratic rivalries."

Leacacos, John P. Kissinger's apparatus. Foreign policy, n. 5, winter 1971-72: 3-27.

An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger National Security Council (NSC). The author concludes that Nixon's foreign policy record indicates the success of the NSC process.

Malgren, Harold B. Managing foreign economic policy. Foreign policy, n. 6, spring 1972: 42-68.

The author proposes, as a long term solution, a reduced National Security Council staff oriented toward crisis management, arbitration and enforcement and he advocates close cooperation with a small foreign economic policy staff.

Schlesinger, Arthur. Congress and the making of American foreign affairs. Foreign affairs, v. 50, October 1972: 78-113.

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Seidman, Harold. Politics, position and power. The dynamics of federal organization. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970.

A critical examination of the thesis that a decision concerning institutional types and structural arrangements has significant political implications. The author concludes that the organization of the federal government must remain flexible and take into account the necessary linkages between the legislative and executive branches.

Thayer, Frederick C. Presidential policy processes and new administration: a search for revised paradigms. Public administration review, September/October 1971: 552-561.

Using the National Security Council as an example, the author argues that there is a need to reorient the public policy process and replace it with an approach that places as "much emphasis upon interactions between organizations and their internal environments as upon the internal workings of complex organizations."

Wilcox, Francis O. Congress, the executive and foreign policy. New York, Harper and Row, 1971.

A critique of the present relationship between the legislative and executive branches in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and the implications of the separation of powers on the policy making process. The author concludes with recommendations for increased consultation between the branches.

Yost, Charles W. The instruments of American foreign policy. Foreign affairs, v. 50, October 1971: 59-68.

An historical account of the administration of American foreign policy since Franklin D. Roosevelt. The author argues that President Nixon's dependence on the National Security Council in the conduct of foreign policy was a "disservice to the national interests." Yost advocates a return of the responsibilities of foreign policy to the Department of State.