

The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends

THE 1981 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK (AJYB) carried Sidney Goldstein's comprehensive study "Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography." The picture drawn there is here extended in two directions: (a) further investigation of nuptiality, fertility, and mixed marriage. These processes and their demographic consequences stand at the core of Jewish population dynamics in the United States and deserve special attention; (b) quantitative assessments of the dynamics of the U.S. Jewish population, expressed in projections according to alternative assumptions and in demographic balance sheets. This information on U.S. Jewry forms part of, and is briefly compared with, the results of similar research on all the regional Jewries of the world.

Because of space considerations most of this study is confined to reporting the population dynamics of U.S. Jews on the country-wide scale in comparison to all U.S. whites, and to ascertaining the demographic factors which directly induce the changes noted. We cannot enter here into an analysis of the underlying societal processes affecting U.S. Jews—trends in their socio-economic structure, residential mobility,¹ and Jewish identity, and institutions—or the general societal transformations in America which may influence Jewish demography.

The main data source on American Jewry used here both in the analysis of recent demographic dynamics and as a basis for population projections is the 1970–1971 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS). NJPS is the only recent documentation of the U.S. Jewish population that combines two important features: country-wide representativeness and a large sample size. Although many NJPS findings have already been published, the study has not been exhausted as a source of information. The tabulations presented in this article have been derived in the main from a special NJPS data file that has been created by amalgamating two separate data sets: the census-type characteristics of all the persons included in the survey and the

Note: The research activities which supplied the findings reported in this article have been mainly conducted in the division for Jewish demography and statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University. Research by Sergio DellaPergola for this article was partially undertaken during stays as visiting research associate at the population studies and training center, department of sociology, Brown University (1978–1979), and at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University (1980–1981). The authors wish to thank Sidney and Alice Goldstein for kindly reading a draft of this article and making valuable suggestions.

¹See Sidney Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution among American Jews," in U.O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson, and Sergio DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1981* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

particulars of each marriage and of each birth event relating to the ever-married persons included in NJPS. The amalgamated file was obtained by matching each individual in the census-type file with his/her detailed marriage record and, for women, fertility history in the vital events file. The few ever-married individuals for whom this record linkage could not be established have been excluded from the analysis.²

Size and Composition of U.S. Jewry

SIZE OF JEWISH POPULATION

The official U.S. decennial censuses do not supply information on the total number of Jews in the United States. The yearly estimates published in the AJYB have had an irregular course, both because of the great difficulties inherent in compiling consistent national totals from a multitude of local estimates and because of changes in sources and methodology. In March 1957 the U.S. Bureau of the Census inserted a question on religion in its Current Population Survey, and came up with a figure of 5,030,000 Jews. While the contemporary AJYB estimate stood at about 5,250,000, the difference between that figure and the Survey result is within the range of a reasonable sampling error. From that level, subsequent AJYB estimates rose substantially year after year, reaching 6,115,000 by the end of 1972. It was pointed out at the time, however, that this rise seemed exaggerated in light of what was known about the probable differences in the growth rates of the Jewish and general white populations.³

In 1970–1971, NJPS was conducted. This large-scale socio-demographic study led to a reduction in the estimate of Jewish population size in the United States. However, the results, as presented in different publications, raised serious conceptual and estimation problems: (a) the population size of 5,800,000, which was

²NJPS yielded 5,790 households net, at a 79 per cent response rate. (See Bernard Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group—the U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography*, August 1978, pp. 389–394. The amalgamated file comprises 4,719 ever-married males and 5,303 ever-married females. The authors gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of Fred Massarik of the University of California, Los Angeles, the scientific director of NJPS, who provided the census-type data file, and Bernard Lazerwitz, now of Bar-Ilan University, the statistical supervisor of NJPS, who provided the vital events data file. Record matching was executed at the computer center, Brown University, by Sergio DellaPergola and Robert Novy. Sidney Goldstein of Brown University, himself a member of the NJPS scientific committee, gave his advice on the file merging procedures. In evaluating NJPS data, attention should be paid to the limitations in statistical significance that are inherent in sampling and data-weighting procedures. See Bernard Lazerwitz, *Sampling Errors and Statistical Inference for the National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1974).

³See U.O. Schmelz, "Evaluation of Jewish Population Estimates," AJYB, Vol. 70, 1969.

published in AJYB and elsewhere as a result of NJPS, included 430,000 non-Jewish members of "Jewish households." At the same time, it did not include long-term institutionalized Jews, whose number was estimated at 50,000.⁴ In this framework the actual number of Jews in 1970–1971 was about 5,420,000; (b) an analysis of the statistical implications of the methodology and implementation of NJPS led to three estimates of the number of Jews, excluding those institutionalized on a long-term basis: low—5,555,000; medium—5,779,000; high—6,002,000.⁵

A reasoned demographic adjudication between all the various versions discussed above would require comprehensive research that might well retrace the evolution of the U.S. Jewish population since the inception of large-scale immigration in the last century.⁶ In the meantime, however, we can do no more than propose a provisional estimate which is so calibrated as to reasonably reconcile the principal pieces of evidence that are currently available.

On the basis of the 1957 Current Population Survey and our knowledge of the demographic dynamics of U.S. Jewry between 1957 and 1970, a moderate estimate of Jewish population size according to NJPS appears indicated. We have therefore provisionally proposed the figure of 5,600,000 for the total number of Jews in the United States at the end of 1970 (i.e., at the mid-date of NJPS).⁷

The number of Jews in the United States may be considered to have remained rather stable until the middle of the 1970's, with a modestly positive balance of external migrations offsetting a modestly negative balance of internal dynamics (i.e., natural movement and affiliative changes). However, in the second half of the 1970's the positive migratory balance of U.S. Jewry increased, due to the arrival of many Soviet Jews.⁸ On the basis of 5,600,000 Jews in 1970, therefore, we estimate the Jewish population at the end of 1980 to have been 5,690,000.⁹ The corresponding proportions of Jews in the total U.S. population in 1970 and 1980 were 2.73 per cent

⁴See Fred Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study," AJYB, Vol. 75, 1974–75, pp. 296–302.

⁵See Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group—The U.S. Jewish Population," *op. cit.*

⁶Initial steps along these lines have been taken by Jack Diamond, "A Reader in the Demography of American Jews," AJYB, Vol. 77, 1977, pp. 251–317 and Ira Rosenwaike, "A Synthetic Estimate of American Jewish Population Movement over the Last Three Decades," in U.O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson, and Sergio DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1977* (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 83–102.

⁷See U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population—Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981).

⁸For this and other factors of change, see below the section on the balance of demographic dynamics. For trends in U.S. Jewry and in other Jewish populations, see U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: the Demographic Factors," AJYB, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 61–117.

⁹See U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population," AJYB, Vol. 82, 1982, pp. 277–290.

and 2.54 per cent, respectively; the ratios of Jews per 100 U.S. whites were 3.10 per cent and 2.95 per cent, respectively.

COMPOSITION ACCORDING TO SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Jews as a group are more aged than the entire white population of the United States; they comprise a smaller proportion of young people and a larger share of the elderly. In the 1970's demographic aging increased among Jews and all whites; the percentage of children dropped, while that of the elderly (65+ years old) rose. The latter change has been much stronger among Jews. The non-Jewish household members of Jews are, as a group, far younger than the Jewish population, since they are largely composed of relatively recent spouses, especially wives, and children of mixed marriages (Table 1).

TABLE 1. JEWS AND OTHER POPULATION GROUPS, BY AGE, 1970 AND 1980

Age	1970				1980 ^a	
	Persons in Jewish Households			U.S. Whites	Jews	U.S. Whites
	Jews	Others	Total			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0-14	21.2	35.0	22.3	27.4	16.2	21.7
15-29	23.5	32.8	24.2	24.2	26.0	26.8
30-44	16.8	14.9	16.6	17.1	18.2	19.1
45-64	26.5	15.6	25.7	21.1	24.1	20.6
65+	12.0	1.7	11.2	10.2	15.5	11.8

^a1979 for all whites.

Sources: for persons in Jewish households, 1970—NJPS, authors' tabulations; for Jews, 1980—medium projection (see below); for all whites—U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Estimates of the Population of the United States, by age, race, and sex: 1976 and 1979*, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 870, 1980.

The recent age composition of U.S. Jews is to be understood as largely resulting from changing fertility levels in the past, whether in the United States itself or in Europe, from whence most of the immigrants came. This can be demonstrated by identifying the birth cohorts corresponding to the 5-yearly age groups as estimated for 1980 (Table 2).¹⁰ Of course, above age 60 the extant cohorts are already much depleted by deaths, and even below this age the effects of cumulative mortality are not negligible. Nonetheless, it can be seen from inspection of the cohort frequencies that substantial fertility prevailed until the 1920's, when birth control intensified.

¹⁰The estimates for 1980 were developed as part of the projections presented below.

Natality was particularly reduced during the period 1930–1945, which corresponded to the great depression and World War II. After the weak cohorts born in those years came the strong ones of the “baby boom,” which in the United States extended from the mid-1940’s to the end of the 1950’s. Beginning in the 1960’s, a drastic fertility decline set in, which, for Jews, was probably compounded by increasing losses of newborn due to mixed marriages.¹¹ These shifts in fertility trends run parallel to similar ones among the general white population of the United States, though Jews have shown peculiarities of timing and levels (see below).

Among other things, the age estimates for Jews in 1980 (which are an update of the empirical data of NJPS) make it clear that (a) there has been rapid progress in demographic aging. In 1980 the 65+ year olds were nearly as numerous as the children below age 15; (b) the potential exists for a further increase of the 65+ year olds, since the age group 50–64 was comparatively large in 1980; (This theme will be taken up again in the section which presents the results of projections into the future.) (c) paradoxically there likewise exists a potential for a temporary rise in the number of Jewish newborn, because of the increased frequency of Jews in the most

TABLE 2. JEWS, BY AGE AND BIRTH COHORT (ESTIMATES), 1980

Age	Birth Cohort	Jews (per cent)
Total	Total	100.0
0–4	1976–80	6.1
5–9	1971–75	5.4
10–14	1966–70	4.7
15–19	1961–65	6.8
20–24	1956–60	10.0
25–29	1951–55	9.2
30–34	1946–50	8.2
35–39	1941–45	5.4
40–44	1936–40	4.6
45–49	1931–35	5.2
50–54	1926–30	6.3
55–59	1921–25	6.0
60–64	1916–20	6.6
65–69	1911–15	5.7
70–74	1906–10	4.2
75+	Up to 1905	5.6

Source: medium projection (see below).

¹¹The data in Table 2 which show the age distribution of Jews reflect only the results of “effectively Jewish” births, excluding children from mixed marriages who are not Jews.

procreative ages. By 1980 the cohorts born in the 1945–1959 “baby boom” occupied ages 20–34. As an echo effect of that “baby boom,” the number of young Jewish children has probably risen and may remain on a somewhat raised level for several years. However, the transitory nature of this phenomenon should be realized. By 1995 all of the ages 20–34 will be occupied by weak cohorts born since 1961.

According to NJPS, 51 per cent of all Jews in 1970 were females. In middle age the proportion of women was also about one-half, but it amounted to 54 per cent among the elderly. This is in conformance with the biological tendency for lower mortality among women.

According to NJPS, the native-born constituted 85 per cent of all U.S. Jews, and more than 90 per cent of those up to approximately age 40. By now the former percentage must have risen further, while the latter applies up to age 50. This signifies strong objective prospects for integration into the American way of life, especially its middle- and upper middle-class metropolitan variants as consonant with most Jews’ socio-economic and residential situations. These prospects also exist with regard to demographic matters which depend on decisions of the persons concerned, such as marriage and fertility.

Family Formation

PROPORTION EVER-MARRIED

Nuptiality trends and levels are important factors in population growth because of their relationship to fertility levels, and, in the case of the Jewish minority, to the balance of cohesive and assimilatory forces affecting the choice of marriage partners and the religious composition of households. During the last decades, typical Jewish marriage patterns in Western countries have included a lower than average propensity to marry at young ages, but higher than average overall marriage propensities.¹² This, indeed, is the picture that emerges from an examination of past Jewish family formation trends in the United States (Table 3). According to NJPS, high proportions of the ever-married, ranging between 96 and 99 per cent, appear among both sexes between ages 35 and 49, and also among older males. The proportions of Jews ever-married at these ages in 1970–1971 were slightly but consistently higher than those found among the total white population. On the other hand, the percentages of ever-married Jews below age 30 were much lower than those found among all whites. The higher ages at marriage did not prevent the eventual attainment of virtually universal marriage among the Jewish population—at least until the recent past.

A better understanding of the dynamics of Jewish family formation is obtained by comparing the marital status of persons of different ages at similar points in the

¹²See Roberto Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1977).

TABLE 3. PER CENT EVER-MARRIED AMONG JEWISH POPULATION AND ALL WHITES BY AGE AND SEX, 1970-1971.

Year of Birth	Age at End 1970	Per Cent Ever-Married At Exact Ages:					Total	All Whites
		19	22	25	30	35		
		Males						
1949-51	19-21	0.0					2.9	22.8
1946-48	22-24	0.1	10.5				34.4	56.8
1941-45	25-29	0.9	17.1	64.4			75.0	81.3
1936-40	30-34	0.3	19.1	49.0	89.1		93.0	90.0
1931-35	35-39	1.2	18.5	55.0	84.9	94.3	96.3	92.4
1926-30	40-44	3.5	15.8	45.0	83.9	93.1	96.0	93.0
1921-25	45-49	3.7	14.2	45.9	84.9	94.1	98.4	93.8
		Females						
1949-51	19-21	1.2					22.0	43.4
1946-48	22-24	13.8	39.9				52.5	75.3
1941-45	25-29	5.6	46.3	80.6			85.2	89.1
1936-40	30-34	13.2	57.8	80.0	94.4		95.3	93.3
1931-35	35-39	13.3	65.3	87.9	94.9	97.3	97.6	94.6
1926-30	40-44	6.7	51.9	78.5	93.4	96.2	98.6	94.8
1921-25	45-49	10.3	50.2	80.8	92.6	94.6	97.6	94.8

Sources: for Jews—NJPS, authors' tabulations; for all whites—U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Subject Reports PC(2)-4C; Marital Status, 1972.

lifecycle. Among the younger cohorts, whose marital experience is yet incompletely described in the data reported here, a marked decline can be observed in the proportions of the ever-married at younger ages.¹³ While 65 per cent of Jewish women aged 35–39 in 1970–1971 had been married before reaching age 22, this was true of only 40 per cent of those aged 22–24. This marked the transition from the peak of the post-war increase in marriages to the declining marriage propensity of the early 1970's. Among males, the proportion married by age 25 apparently reached a peak among the cohort aged 25–29 in 1970–1971; the declining proportion married by age 22 among younger Jewish males suggests that a trend reversal was beginning.

The available data for both sexes point to less inter-cohort variation in the past at the older end of the marriage age range. Thus, the declining proportion married at younger ages might be interpreted as being due to a shift in the timing of marriage, which could be counter-balanced by more marriages at older ages, rather than in the propensity to marry at all. However, the more recent trends among the total U.S. white population do not support such an assumption. Since the 1960's, a marked general increase in singlehood has occurred, partially reflecting also an increase in the cohabitation of unmarried adults.¹⁴ For example, the proportion of women still single at age 22 increased from 26 per cent in 1960 to 48 per cent in 1980.¹⁵ There has been, moreover, an increase in the proportion of currently separated or divorced persons. Some of these trends, which may also have affected the Jewish population, recall changes in family formation that occurred during the years of the great depression. Many persons—in the case of the U.S. Jewish population, especially females—who reached prime marriage age during that unfavorable period, not only postponed marriage, but eventually ended up never-married. Part of the more recent changes, even if determined by temporary causes, such as cyclical constraints in labor market opportunities and income, may turn out to be irreversible in the long run for the currently marriageable population.

On the basis of the available evidence, it seems likely that there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of never-married American Jews in recent years, a trend that probably reflects normative changes in the relative position of the "parents and children" family *vis à vis* alternative life-styles in contemporary society.

AGE AT MARRIAGE

With regard to young Jewish adults marrying for the first time, age at marriage has been declining for both males and females since the end of World War II (Table

¹³For marriage-age-specific sex imbalances, see below.

¹⁴See Paul Glick and Arthur Norton, "Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the U.S. Today," *Population Bulletin*, October 1977, pp. 3–39.

¹⁵See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Marital Status and Living Arrangements—March 1980*, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 365, 1981.

4). Mean age at first marriage for Jews of each sex has been consistently higher—by one to three years—than among total whites. Higher Jewish educational attainment and the related longer period of schooling are major factors in this differential. Jewish age at marriage declined from 28.1 for grooms and 24.0 for brides in 1945–1949—when many weddings postponed in previous years were celebrated—to, respectively, 27.1 and 23.2 in 1955–1959, 25.7 and 23.0 in 1965–1969, and 24.9 and 22.9 in the last two years covered by NJPS data. The age gap between Jews and the general population at marriage has been narrowed for males. The speedier decline in age at marriage among Jewish males caused a reduction in the mean age difference between spouses from 4.1 years in 1945–1949 to 2.0 in 1970–1971. Hence the difference in average marriage age between the sexes, which was much greater among Jews than among all whites in the late 1940's, diminished and became similar for both these population groups.

TABLE 4. MEAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE AMONG JEWISH POPULATION AND ALL WHITES, BY YEAR OF MARRIAGE AND SEX, 1970–1971

Year of Marriage	Jews			All Whites		
	Males	Females	Difference	Males	Females	Difference
1970–71	24.9	22.9	2.0	23.4	21.2	2.2
1965–69	25.7	23.0	2.7	23.6	21.1	2.5
1960–64	26.7	22.9	3.8	23.7	21.0	2.7
1955–59	27.1	23.2	3.9	24.1	21.3	2.8
1950–54	26.5	23.0	3.5	24.4	21.7	2.7
1945–49	28.1	24.0	4.1	25.0	22.3	2.7

Sources: for Jews—NJPS, authors' tabulations; for all whites—U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population. Subject Reports PC (2)-4D; Age at First Marriage*. 1973.

The trend toward lower age at marriage can in part be explained by the improved quality of, and access to, contraception, which has led to a weakening of the previous linkage between marriage and childbearing and has reduced the importance of delayed marriage as a means of controlling family growth. At the same time, the age patterns observed here and in the preceding section seem also to reflect important fluctuations in the pool of Jewish candidates for marriage, fluctuations which are determined by the changing sex ratio of persons reaching marriageable ages in different years. Such sex ratios can be assessed by examining the age-sex composition of the Jewish population in 1970–1971¹⁶ (see Table 5). The customary age difference between somewhat older grooms and somewhat younger brides combined with wide fluctuations in the number of Jewish births before, during, and after World War II in generating alternate phases in the relative size of the cohorts of each sex which

¹⁶Adjusted data.

reached that stage in the lifecycle when young adults started considering marriage, exploring the available pool of candidates, and forming relationships that later led to marriage. In Table 5 this is exemplified by an age of 22.5 for males and 20 for females. With regard to this age-sex combination, a relative shortage of Jewish females prevailed during the 1950's as a consequence of the declining number of Jewish births during the years of the great depression. The young adult sex-ratio was reversed in the early 1960's, when the reduced male cohorts born during the depression and World War II confronted more numerous female cohorts born during the early stages of the post-war "baby boom." This shortage continued in the 1970's. However, during the 1980's young Jewish adult males born toward the end of the "baby boom" will again outnumber the somewhat younger Jewish females born in the low fertility years.

Other things being equal, an excess of persons of one sex on the "marriage market" will mean greater competition and reduced chances of success in finding suitable partners of the opposite sex. This may induce prolonged and perhaps definitive celibacy and later ages at marriage. Moreover, from the perspective of a given subpopulation within a total national population—as is the case with U.S. Jewry—a deficiency of potential spouses of a given sex within that subpopulation may stimulate the quest for partners from outside. Since sex imbalance may occur more or less at the same time among different subpopulations, mixed marriage is likely to increase in such periods, other things being equal. On the other hand, to counterbalance these internal pressures generated by changing population structures, mechanisms of demographic adjustment may emerge. Since the "marriage

TABLE 5. SEX RATIOS AMONG JEWISH POPULATION REACHING MARRIAGEABLE AGE, BY YEAR OF BIRTH, 1970-1971

<u>Year of Birth</u>		Approximate Years When Reaching: Males = Age 22.5 Females = Age 20	<u>Ratios^a</u>	
<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>		<u>Males</u> <u>Females</u>	<u>Females</u> <u>Males</u>
1928-32	1931-35	1951-55	105.4	94.9
1933-37	1936-40	1956-60	104.8	95.4
1938-42	1941-45	1961-65	90.4	110.7
1943-47	1946-50	1966-70	81.7	122.4
1948-52	1951-55	1971-75	94.4	105.9
1953-57	1956-60	1976-80	96.0	104.1
1958-62	1961-65	1981-85	125.3	79.8
1963-67	1966-70	1986-90	125.8	79.5

^aBalance between sexes = 100.0.

Source: NJPS, adjusted data, authors' tabulations.

squeeze" stems from the age differences between spouses (the number of men and women born during the same year being quite similar), variations in those differences are apt to reduce the imbalance between the number of potential grooms and brides. This is precisely what occurred among U.S. Jews between 1950 and 1971—on top of a general trend of declining ages at first marriage, the decline was speedier among males, who became outnumbered by females. It can be presumed that the reverse situation of the early 1980's, as pointed out in Table 5, i.e., the more privileged "market" position of Jewish females, might lead to a rise in male age at marriage and/or in male celibacy among U.S. Jews.

MARRIAGE DISRUPTION AND REMARRIAGE

Marriage can be terminated through the death of one of the spouses, or through divorce or separation. According to NJPS, in 1970–1971, 2.2 per cent of the Jewish male population aged 20–54 were currently divorced or separated, and 0.3 per cent were widowed. The percentages for females were 3.3 and 1.5, respectively. This type of information, conventionally available in census-type data, is of limited value because it results from a combination of variable levels of marriage disruption and remarriage. The incidence of these two factors should be investigated separately (see Table 6). The proportion of ever-married Jews aged 20–54 who had a terminated marriage was substantially lower than the proportion among the total white U.S. population. In 1970–1971, 9 to 15 per cent of ever-married Jewish males aged 35–54, and 10 to 16 per cent of females in these ages had an ever-terminated marriage.¹⁷ The corresponding levels for total whites in 1975 were 20 to 23 per cent among males, and 26 to 30 per cent among females. These findings confirm the generally known pattern of greater marital stability among Jews in Western countries.

The recent high frequencies of marital disruption in the United States—which have led to the prediction that 50 per cent of currently performed weddings in the general population might end in divorce¹⁸—find some support in the higher percentages of Jews with terminated marriages at ages 40–44, as compared to ages 50–54. The percentages of younger people with terminated marriages are higher than those of older ones observed at comparable ages. Moreover, these percentages are bound to increase in future years, following further exposure to the risk of marital disruption.¹⁹

¹⁷Inclusive of both divorce or widowhood. The predominant factor was divorce. Because of the low mortality levels at ages 20–54, differentials in survival of Jews and of all whites cannot have more than a very marginal effect on the observed differences in marital disruption.

¹⁸See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces in the United States: June 1975*, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 297, 1976.

¹⁹An increase in the proportion of previously divorced individuals among Jews currently marrying in Canada—from less than 10 per cent in 1971 to 18 per cent in 1979—is reported by Leo Davids, "Divorce and Remarriage among Canadian Jews," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, Spring 1982, pp. 34–47.

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGES OF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED AND OF REMARRIED PERSONS AMONG JEWISH POPULATION AND ALL WHITES, BY AGE AND SEX, 1970-1971

Age	Jews		All Whites	
	Per Cent With Ever-Terminated Marriages Among All Ever-Married	Per Cent Re-married Among Persons With Terminated Marriages	Per Cent With Ever-Terminated Marriages Among All Ever-Married	Per Cent Re-married Among Persons With Terminated Marriages
Males				
20-24	2.4	16.7	11.4	36.4
25-29	18.9	16.2	15.6	53.6
30-34	3.5	66.7	18.6	70.1
35-39	9.0	75.6	21.9	74.8
40-44	14.7	89.0	20.3	76.4
45-49	10.5	82.7	20.4	76.6
50-54	10.0	82.8	23.0	76.6
Females				
20-24	7.4	74.5	15.8	37.4
25-29	10.5	60.9	21.6	53.3
30-34	11.6	71.4	23.9	61.2
35-39	9.6	67.3	25.8	65.3
40-44	16.1	69.6	26.1	63.8
45-49	16.3	46.5	30.1	60.1
50-54	9.9	38.3	30.5	58.0

Sources: for Jews—NJPS, authors' tabulations; for all whites—U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Number, Timing and Duration of Marriages and Divorces in the United States, June 1975*, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 297. 1976.

Greater Jewish familism also appears in the generally higher frequencies of remarriage among persons with terminated marriages. Among Jewish males the remarriage rates below age 30 were low, partly in connection with their higher ages at first marriage; but over 80 per cent of the relevant persons aged 40-54 had remarried, as against 76 to 77 per cent among all whites. Among females below age 45, Jewish remarriage rates were higher than those of total whites; in the older age groups in which widowhood tends to become the predominant factor in marital disruption, they were lower.

It can be noted, in evaluating these findings, that, on the whole, mixed couples involving Jews have had higher rates of divorce than homogamous Jewish couples.²⁰

²⁰See Larry Bumpass and James Sweet, "Differentials in Marital Instability, 1970," *American Sociological Review*, 1972. Another indicator of greater instability of mixed marriages, at

Remarriages, in turn, have been more often heterogamous than first marriages. These tendencies should be kept in mind in the interpretation of increasing frequencies of both divorce and mixed marriage (see below) among U.S. Jews.

Family Growth

RECENT TRENDS

In recent decades two main patterns have characterized the fertility trends of U.S. Jews in comparison to those of the total white population:²¹ (a) a generally lower than average completed family size, whether estimated through analysis of the natality level of a given period or ascertained from the cumulative number of children born to women by the end of their reproductive cycle; (b) greater responsiveness to those periodic societal changes that have stimulated upward or downward swings in the general levels of American fertility. Jews have usually anticipated these changes by a few years.

The total fertility rate (TFR) (a synthetic expression of the level of reproductivity in a given period) of Jews reached an all-time minimum of 1.3 children around 1935 (as against 2.1 among total whites), climbed to 2.8 around 1955 (versus 3.5 among total whites), and declined again to 1.5 (versus 2.2 among total whites) around 1970.²² Similar, though less pronounced, fluctuations are apparent in the cumulative childbearing experiences of Jewish women who had completed reproduction in 1970–1971: a minimum average of 1.4 children among women born in 1901–1905, followed by relatively higher levels of 2.2 to 2.4 children on the average among women born between 1921–1925 and 1931–1935, and a subsequent decline of fertility among later born women. These data relate to all women, regardless of marital status; the mean completed fertility of ever-married women was slightly higher, ranging between 1.5 and 2.4 children, according to the birth cohorts involved. Fluctuations indicated here reflect the evolution of total white American fertility over the last 50 years.²³ Some lack of synchronization in the pace of change is revealed by the varying ratio of Jewish fertility to all white fertility as expressed by

least in the past, is the shorter duration of interfaith, as compared to intrafaith, marriages ending in a divorce. See, e.g., State of California, Department of Public Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, *Divorce in California: Initial Complaints for Divorce, Annulment, and Separate Maintenance, 1966* (Berkeley, 1967).

²¹See Sidney Goldstein, "Jewish Fertility in Contemporary America," in Paul Ritterband, (ed.), *Modern Jewish Fertility* (Leiden, 1981), and Sergio DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *Demography*, August 1980, pp. 261–273. For a description of similar trends in Canada and comparisons between Jews and many other ethnic groups, see K. Basavarajappa and S. Halli, "Are Ethnic Fertility Differences in Canada Disappearing? An Examination of the Period 1926–1971," paper presented at IUSSP general conference, Manila, 1981.

²²See DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *op. cit.*, Table 1.

²³See Ronald Rindfuss and James Sweet, *Postwar Fertility and Differentials in the United States* (New York, 1977).

period measures (TFR): 59 per cent around 1935; 87 per cent around 1945; and 66 per cent around 1970.

Recent developments in Jewish fertility should be seen against the background of the continuing decline in general U.S. fertility. An assessment of the trend between 1971 and 1976 can be made by comparing the 1970–1971 NJPS data with the small Jewish subsample included in cycle 2 of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), carried out in 1976 by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics.²⁴ By comparing the number of children born on the average to women belonging to the same birth cohort and surveyed at different ages in 1970–1971 and 1976, we can roughly estimate the number of additional children born during this approximate five-year period to each such group of mothers (Table 7). By summing the age-specific additions to family size, a total marital fertility of 1.5 is obtained, which corresponds to a TFR (relative to all women, regardless of marital status) of 1.3 to 1.4 in 1970–1976. This compares with a total white TFR of 1.8 in the same period. Thus, Jewish fertility, by the mid-1970's, was again very close to the bottom levels of the inter-war period. However, since total white fertility in the 1970's was substantially lower than during the 1930's, the ratio of Jewish to total fertility (72 to 78 per cent) was higher than in the past.

These age-specific fertility estimates provide a tentative empirical basis for estimating a crude birthrate (CBR) for the U.S. Jewish population in the years 1971–1975. By multiplying the average number of additional children born to each age-group by the number of women in the respective age-group and adding up the results, a rough CBR estimate of nine to ten per 1,000 Jewish population is obtained.²⁵ This compares with a general U.S. birthrate of 15 per 1,000 during the same period. Assuming invariance in the age-specific fertility schedule of Jewish women, the changed female age composition alone would produce an increase of 10 to 15 per cent in the Jewish CBR in 1976–1980, bringing it to 11 to 12 per 1,000.

On the basis of such data, no firm conclusion can be reached as to the ultimate family size of Jewish and total women that were at childbearing ages during the 1970's. The possibility of an upward fertility swing, which might at least partially compensate for the effects of the recent prolonged phase of low fertility, has been extensively discussed in the United States and elsewhere.²⁶ It has been hypothesized by some economists and demographers that the entrance into the labor force of the small cohorts born since 1960 might stimulate easier employment, relatively better wages, more marriage opportunities, and, in consequence, larger families in the 1980's. But, even if the assumed conditions materialize, there are weak points in the hypothesis of a consequent rise in fertility. Because of changing sex norms, the link

²⁴The data are presented in Schmelz, "Jewish Survival," *op. cit.*

²⁵A similar CBR for 1967–1969 has been estimated by Sidney Goldstein. See "Jewish Fertility in Contemporary America," *op. cit.*

²⁶See, for example, Richard Easterlin, "What Will 1984 be Like? Socioeconomic Implications of Recent Twists in Age Structure," *Demography*, November 1978, pp. 397–432.

TABLE 7. AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY AMONG JEWISH WOMEN, 1970-1971 TO 1976

Year of Birth	1970-71		1976		Additional Children, 1971-76, Ever-Married Women	Per Cent Ever-Married	Additional Children 1971-76, All Women
	Age	Average Children, Ever-Married Women	Age	Average Children, Ever-Married Women			
1956-60	10-14	0.0	15-19	—	0.0 ^a	1	0.00
1951-55	15-19	0.3	20-24	—	0.4 ^a	35	0.14
1946-50	20-24	0.5	25-29	1.1	0.6	85	0.51
1941-45	25-29	1.3	30-34	1.7	0.4	95	0.38
1936-40	30-34	2.2	35-39	2.4	0.2	98	0.20
1931-35	35-39	2.4	40-44	2.5	0.1	99	0.10
1926-30	40-44	2.2	45-49	—	0.0 ^a	98	0.00
					Total marital fertility rate = 1.5	Total fertility rate = 1.33	

^aOur estimates, assuming additional children born to women of respective age, were slightly below total white levels.

Sources: for Jews—NJPS, authors' tabulations (see DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *op. cit.*); for all whites—U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, National Survey of Family Growth, Cycle 2. Data reported by Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," *op. cit.*

between marriage and fertility has become less clear than it was in the past, particularly during the great post-war fertility increase. More marriages, made possible by improved economic conditions, still do not guarantee that many more children will be born.²⁷ Moreover, relatively "old" mothers (aged 30–39) had an important role in the increased natality of the late 1940's and 1950's. The changes in contraceptive patterns that have emerged in the United States in more recent years include a growing diffusion of voluntary sterilization, especially toward the later stages of the reproductive span.²⁸ Consequently, for a rising number of households, including substantial proportions of Jewish couples, the currently achieved low fertility levels might become irreversible even in the hypothetical case of future renewed demand for larger families.

By the end of the 1970's, after 20 years of decline, U.S. white fertility had actually stabilized, and there were even modest signs of recovery. But the somewhat higher birthrates among women aged 30 and over—pointing to delayed childbearing—could not compensate for the low birthrates that had characterized the same women in the preceding years. It appears that the eventual completed family size of all white and, by inference, of Jewish women who around 1980 were already at central or terminal ages of their reproductive life-span is bound to be rather small.

FERTILITY EXPECTATIONS AND THE PACE OF FAMILY GROWTH

Data on the total number of children expected by Jewish women provide another way of assessing the recent and expected level of fertility among American Jews. In an efficiently contracepting population, such as the American Jewish community, birth expectation data may provide a useful indication of current trends for aggregate cohorts, even if not for individual women. A substantial decline in Jewish birth expectations took place between 1970–1971 (according to NJPS) and 1976 (according to NSFG). The 2.7 children expected on average by Jewish women aged 15–19 in 1970–1971 had declined to 2.1 among women aged 20–24 some five years later. Among the women aged 20–24 in 1970–71, who were roughly 25–29 years old by 1976, birth expectations declined from 2.5 to 2.2; among women aged 25–29, from

²⁷See Larry Bumpass, "The Changing Linkage of Nuptiality and Fertility in the United States," in Lado Ruzicka, (ed.), *Marriage and Fertility* (Liège, 1981), pp. 195–209.

²⁸According to the 1975 Boston Jewish Community Survey, 23 per cent of couples with 31–39-year-old wives, and 22 per cent of couples married for 10 to 15 years, included a husband or wife that had undergone a sterilization operation. Among older couples, and at longer marriage durations—whose fertility levels are minimal in any case—the per cent sterilized was nearly twice as high. See Calvin Goldscheider, "Contraceptive Use among American Jewish Families," in Schmelz, Glikson, and DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1981*, *op. cit.* For general discussions of trends and prospects in sterilization in the United States, see Charles Westoff and Norman Ryder, *The Contraceptive Revolution* (Princeton, 1977) and Kathleen Ford, "Contraceptive Use in the United States, 1973–1976," *Family Planning Perspectives*, 1978.

2.3 to 2.0; and among those aged 30–34, from 2.4 to 2.1. These changes are partly explained by the fact that women who join the married population at older ages tend to have lower birth expectations, and to depress the averages expressed by women who had married earlier. Moreover, there may have been an actual revision of reproductive targets, consistent with the general lowering of fertility during the 1970's. Jewish birth expectations in 1976 were lower by five to 25 per cent, according to age-groups, than those of all white women.

Marriage cohorts provide more stable data on the expected fertility of younger women, since each marriage cohort is unaffected by marriages occurring subsequently. The evidence of the later marriage cohorts covered by NJPS points, in fact, to declining expectations: from 2.4 children on average among women married in 1955–1959, to 2.1 to 2.2 among those married in 1965–1969, who were at the peak of reproduction during the 1970's (see Table 8). The data on the number of final births expected by ever-married Jewish women reveal an evident convergence toward an expectation of two children. This was the case among 64 per cent of Jewish women married in 1965–1969, as against 41 per cent of those married in 1950–1954. Steady decline has occurred with regard to the proportion of women preferring only one child. The trend in expected childlessness is more irregular, though there may have been some increase in the latest marriage cohorts studied. On the other hand, there has been a decline in the proportion of Jewish women expecting relatively large families of four and more children. Additional NJPS data—not presented here—on the fertility expectations of the marriage cohort of the late 1960's show that the higher fertility standards which prevailed in the past in the religiously more observant and segregated sections of American Jewry have settled at relatively moderate levels, around three to four children on the average per married woman.

These fertility expectation data quite naturally raise the question whether the observed current—and so far incomplete—fertility schedules of younger Jewish women are actually adequate to achieve the expectations. An answer can be outlined by comparing the pace of family growth of younger women with that of women with completed fertility. Delayed beginning of family growth, has generally characterized U.S. Jewish households as compared to the total white population. Among Jewish women married between 1920 and 1964, the proportion having a child by the end of the first year of marriage ranged between 25 per cent (as against 30 per cent of total whites) in 1920–1924 marriages and four per cent (versus 24 per cent) in wartime marriages (1940–1944); among Jewish women married in 1965–1964, eight per cent had a child during the first year of marriage (as against 37 per cent of total whites).²⁹ The latter figure includes 20 per cent of white women who had their first

²⁹The data on total whites are taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Marriage, Fertility, and Childspacing: August 1959*, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 108, 1961 and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Trends in Childspacing: June 1975*, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 315, 1978.

TABLE 8. COMPLETED FAMILY SIZES EXPECTED BY EVER-MARRIED JEWISH WOMEN, BY YEAR OF MARRIAGE, 1970-1971

Year of Marriage	Total	Expected Final Births					Mean	Actual Births, Mean
		0	1	2	3	4		
1965-69	100.0	8.0	3.1	64.4	17.7	6.0	0.8	0.87
1960-64	100.0	10.7	5.7	44.9	32.0	5.3	1.4	1.89
1955-59	100.0	3.8	9.5	46.8	29.3	7.6	3.0	2.27
1950-54	100.0	8.0	9.8	41.3	24.4	15.2	1.3	2.34

Source: NJPS, authors' tabulations.

child not later than seven months after marriage (five per cent were born before marriage), i.e., more than twice the proportion of contemporary Jewish wives having a child by the end of their first year of marriage. Rarer premarital conceptions resulting in a birth, and more stringent marital contraception among Jews, in particular in the early stages of marriage, underlie these differentials. They, in turn, may be related to differences in socioeconomic structure—e.g., different enrollment rates in higher education—as well as cultural norms and values of Jews and members of other subpopulations in the United States. The progression of family growth at increasing marriage duration (Table 9) leads to a narrowing of these very substantial initial differentials. Taking an average of all the marriage cohorts examined, Jewish women achieved 28 per cent of their total marital fertility after three years of marriage, 49 per cent after five years (virtually the same as among recent total white cohorts), 72 per cent after eight years, and 93 per cent after 15 years (above

TABLE 9. CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO EVER-MARRIED JEWISH WOMEN UP TO SELECTED MARRIAGE DURATIONS, 1970-1971

Year of First Marriage	Exact Years Since First Marriage				Total
	3	5	8	15	
	Average Births				
1965-69	0.48				2.15 ^a
1960-64	0.69	1.18	1.64		2.20 ^a
1955-59	0.73	1.41	1.86		2.36 ^a
1950-54	0.59	1.04	1.75	2.21	2.34 ^a
1945-49	0.66	1.15	1.64	2.07	2.17
1940-44	0.52	1.03	1.57	2.19	2.35
1935-39	0.49	0.83	1.26	1.83	2.00
1930-34	0.47	0.72	1.12	1.56	1.72
1925-29	0.60	0.92	1.26	1.61	1.71
1920-24	0.60	0.94	1.37	1.64	1.84
	Per Cent of Total Births (Actual or Expected) Already Achieved				
1965-69	22				100 ^a
1960-64	31	54	75		100 ^a
1955-59	31	60	79		100 ^a
1950-54	25	44	75	94	100 ^a
1945-49	30	53	76	95	100
1940-44	22	44	67	93	100
1935-39	25	42	63	92	100
1930-34	27	42	65	91	100
1925-29	35	54	74	94	100
1920-24	33	51	74	89	100

^aFinal birth expectations.

Source: NJPS, authors' tabulations.

total whites). There has been variation around these averages, pointing to the adaptation of childbearing patterns to changing societal circumstances in the United States. Women married during the economic depression and World War II were "slow starters" in the family building process, but displayed more rapid family growth at longer marriage durations. Women married after World War II have tended to achieve higher proportions of their total marital fertility at relatively lower marriage durations. Correspondingly, the mean age of the women at the time of their terminal birth has tended to decline.

A comparison of the actual incomplete fertility schedules of women recently married (1965–1969) with their reported fertility expectations reveals a particularly slow pace of family growth at short marriage durations. A greater reproductive effort would thus be required at later stages of family growth to attain the expected fertility. This, however, contrasts with the pattern of declining fertility at longer marriage durations that emerges from an examination of the previous marriage cohorts.³⁰ The initial birth history of the 1965–1969 marriages resembles that of the 1940–1944 cohort, whose fertility was later swept upward during the American post-war "baby boom." However, the declining levels of general fertility in the United States during the 1970's are not likely to have stimulated greater fertility at later marriage durations among the young American Jewish women.³¹ Rather, their already low birth expectations in 1970–1971 may have been revised still further downward in the years that have followed.

What emerges clearly from the analysis is that the differences between Jewish and other women are even greater in the timing of fertility onset and in the spacing of successive births than in the cumulative number of children born. Jewish women reach the peak of childbearing at ages 25–29, *inter alia* because of their higher age at marriage and longer first birth intervals, and not at 20–24, as among the total white population.³² This fact, in itself, is of some demographic significance: given the same final average number of children, a higher age at motherhood, i.e., greater generation length, makes for slower population growth.

In considering family growth among American Jews, it must be borne in mind that measurements of period fertility (Table 7) may differ from those of cohort fertility. Moreover, differences between marital fertility and the fertility of all women, including the unmarried, must be duly taken into account. The role of changing marriage patterns may be very significant in this context. When marital fertility is anyway very low, age at marriage may have only minor effects on the final number of children ever born (at least for that large majority of women who marry between ages 19 and 34);³³ but a momentous question is which proportion of the many young Jewish adults who were single in 1970–1971 actually married in subsequent years. If the probably

³⁰See DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *op. cit.*

³¹See, however, concluding remarks in the previous section.

³²See DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *op. cit.*

³³See Sergio DellaPergola, "Contemporary Jewish Fertility: An Overview," in Schmelz, Glikson, and DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1981, op. cit.*

exaggerated expectations of the latest marriage cohorts studied in NJPS are critically evaluated, fertility is found to have recently been below replacement level, which, at minimal mortality, is 2.1 children on average for all women, including the unmarried. While fluctuations are quite possible, continuation of essentially low fertility among U.S. Jews seems to be the most likely trend for the foreseeable future.

Out-Marriage and its Implications

PAST AND EXPECTED LEVELS

Out-marriage³⁴ is one of the most intriguing factors in the demographic development of subpopulations. Its study involves numerous definitional and measurement problems, the solution of which may influence both the reading and interpretation of the observed trends. Different analysts have used somewhat different approaches for computing the frequency of out-marriage among households that were surveyed in the NJPS.³⁵ In this report we present a new set of NJPS estimates of the extent of out-marriage, by period of marriage. The data presented in Table 10 illustrate the religious composition of first marriages among ever-married persons, regardless of current marriage status. The frequencies of marriage with originally non-Jewish spouses are given, broken down according to whether conversion to Judaism took place (prior to the date of the survey or the termination of the marriage through the death of the spouse or divorce).

In 1970–1971 altogether 11.0 per cent of ever-married Jewish men and 5.1 per cent of Jewish women had contracted their first marriage with an originally non-Jewish partner. This corresponded to 8.1 per cent of Jewish spouses of both sexes together, and to 15.0 per cent of all couples with at least one Jewish partner.³⁶

After reducing these initial out-marriage rates because of conversions to Judaism, the overall frequencies of mixed marriage are somewhat lower: 6.8 per cent of Jewish spouses (8.5 per cent of Jewish husbands, and 4.9 per cent of Jewish wives), and 12.5 per cent of couples with at least one Jewish partner. A significant increase in the extent of mixed marriage is shown by comparing the latter data with an earlier nationwide study. In 1957, according to the U.S. Current Population Survey, the

³⁴The term "out-marriage" is used throughout with reference to all weddings in which one of the spouses was not born Jewish or was not Jewish at the time the two partners first met. When the non-Jewish partner does not change his/her original identification, the term "mixed marriage" applies. In case of conversion, use of the term "intermarriage" may be appropriate.

³⁵See Fred Massarik, "Explorations in Intermarriage," *AJYB*, Vol. 74, 1973, pp. 292–306; Dov Lazerwitz, "Current Jewish Intermarriages in the United States," in Schmelz, Glikson, and DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1977, op. cit.*, pp. 103–114; and Bernard Lazerwitz, "Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions," *Jewish Social Studies*, Winter 1981, pp. 31–46.

³⁶"Couple" rates of out-marriage are higher than "individual" rates because homogamous Jewish couples are entered in the denominator once in the former case and twice in the latter.

TABLE 10. PER CENT OF OUT-MARRIAGES, BY SEX OF JEWISH SPOUSE, CONVERSION STATUS OF ORIGINALLY NON-JEWISH SPOUSE, AND YEAR OF MARRIAGE, EVER-MARRIED PERSONS, FIRST MARRIAGES, 1970-1971

Year of Marriage	Per Cent of Jews with Originally Non-Jewish Spouse						Per Cent of Couples with Originally Non-Jewish Spouse ^a					
	All Ever-Married Jews ^a			Jewish Husbands			Jewish Wives			Total		
	Total	Spouse Converted to Judaism	No	Total	Spouse Converted to Judaism	No	Total	Spouse Converted to Judaism	No	Total	Spouse Converted to Judaism	No
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Total	8.1	1.3	6.8	11.0	2.5	8.5	5.1	0.2	4.9	15.0	2.5	12.5
1965-71	29.2	6.7	22.5	41.1	10.8	30.6	10.3	0.4	9.9	45.1	10.3	34.8
1960-64	11.6	1.7	9.8	13.0	3.1	9.9	10.0	0.3	9.7	20.7	3.1	17.6
1955-59	6.6	1.7	4.9	10.1	3.1	7.0	2.8	0.1	2.7	12.3	3.1	9.2
1950-54	5.1	0.6	4.5	7.5	1.0	6.5	2.5	0.2	2.3	9.7	1.2	8.5
1945-49	6.5	0.3	6.2	5.1	0.5	4.6	7.9	0.2	7.7	12.2	0.6	11.6
1940-44	5.9	0.2	5.7	5.3	0.4	4.9	6.5	0.1	6.4	11.2	0.4	10.8
1935-39	3.9	0.5	3.4	6.5	0.9	5.6	1.2	0.0	1.2	7.5	0.9	6.6
1930-34	3.4	0.4	3.0	3.9	0.8	3.1	2.6	0.4	2.2	6.6	0.8	5.8
1925-29	2.6	0.5	2.1	2.0	0.5	1.5	3.0	0.0	3.0	5.0	0.9	4.1
Up to 1924	1.7	0.3	1.4	2.1	0.6	1.5	1.4	0.0	1.4	3.4	0.5	2.9

^a"Couple" rates of out-marriage are higher than "individual" rates, because homogamous Jewish couples are entered in the denominator once in the former case and twice in the latter.

Source: NJPS, authors' tabulations.

overall extent of mixed marriage among the currently married was: 4.0 per cent of Jewish spouses (5.2 per cent of Jewish husbands, and 2.7 per cent of Jewish wives), and 7.6 per cent of couples with at least one Jewish partner.³⁷

Let us now focus on the net frequency of mixed marriage after any conversions to Judaism took place, and examine more closely the changes that occurred over time in the rate of formation of mixed households. On the assumption that most conversions occur before marriage, our data reflect the composition of couples at the moment of marriage (see columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 in Table 10). Mixed marriage was relatively rare among U.S. Jews, as compared to other Jewries in Western countries, from the beginning of the century until the late 1950's. Over that half century, the proportion of Jewish spouses in first marriages marrying a partner who was not originally Jewish, and had not been converted to Judaism, passed from less than 1 per cent around 1900 to 3 per cent during the 1930's, about 6 per cent during the 1940's, and slightly lower levels (4 to 5 per cent) during the 1950's. A marked increase has occurred since the 1960's in the levels of Jewish heterogamy, bringing it to 10 per cent in 1960–1964, and reaching 22 to 23 per cent in the latest marriage cohorts reflected in NJPS (1965–1971). Translated into couple rates, these data indicate that the proportion of mixed couples among current weddings with at least one Jewish spouse passed from 6 to 7 per cent in the 1930's to 11 to 12 per cent in the 1940's, 8 to 9 per cent in the 1950's, 17 to 18 per cent in 1960–1964, and 35 per cent in 1965–1971.

It is interesting to compare these estimates with the official data routinely available for neighboring Canadian Jewry. In Canada, the proportion of mixed couples among all new marriages involving at least one Jewish partner was 9 per cent in the 1940's, 13 per cent in the 1950's, 17 per cent in 1961–1965, 21 per cent in 1966–1970, 31 per cent in 1971–1976, and 40 per cent in 1978.³⁸ In terms of the individual Jewish spouses involved, the rates increased from 3 per cent during the 1930's to 5 per cent in the late 1940's, 7 per cent in the 1950's, 9 per cent in 1961–1965, 12 per cent in 1966–1970, 19 per cent in 1971–1975, and 25 per cent in the late 1970's. In other words, the previously moderate levels of mixed marriage among Canadian Jews more than doubled between the mid-1960's and late 1970's. If allowance is made for the fact that the steep increase in out-marriage among U.S. Jews began a few years earlier, the NJPS data do not differ much from the Canadian data.

In evaluating the trends of the recent past and determining those most likely to occur in the near future, the interplay of identificational and demographic factors must be carefully considered. Even if the level of out-marriage is primarily shaped

³⁷U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957, 1967*, mimeographed. Spouses with religion not reported were excluded from the computations; spouses reporting no religion were included in the percentages. Out-marriages which had led to conversion in either direction were not reflected in these data.

³⁸Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics*, various issues. See also the detailed statistical appendix in Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish and Mixed Marriages in Milan, 1901–1968* (Jerusalem, 1972).

by the degree of cultural, social-structural, and ideological assimilation of a minority group within the surrounding majority, demographic factors such as changing size and composition of the "marriage market" (already discussed above) may play an important role in determining individual chances to choose a spouse within one's own group. Thus there is a need to separately inspect the out-marriage trends of Jewish males and females. According to NJPS, the out-marriage rates have generally been higher for males than for females. Yet, growth of female out-marriage was more rapid than that of males between the early 1950's and the mid-1960's. In Canada, too, the increase in Jewish out-marriage since the 1960's has been more substantial among females than among males. It can be presumed that the excess of marriageable Jewish females over marriageable Jewish males contributed to this narrowing of the male-female differential in out-marriage. On the other hand, among the latest NJPS marriage cohorts (1965-1971) over 30 per cent of Jewish husbands and about 10 per cent of Jewish wives had unconverted non-Jewish-born spouses.

A considerable excess of young adult males expected during the 1980's (Table 5) may have the effect of bolstering their already high out-marriage level, while moderating somewhat the out-marriage rate of Jewish females. Whether this in fact occurs depends also, of course, on normative-ideological factors. In the past, out-marriage by Jewish women was relatively rare, indicating non-conformist social behavior. However, once established on a larger scale, under the influence of temporary "marriage market" constraints, it may have become socially more acceptable and thus irreversible.

CONVERSION PATTERNS OF THE OUT-MARRIED

The pattern of conversion in U.S. Jewish households has been examined in previous research.³⁹ Here we shall briefly trace the evolution over time of a factor that is increasingly perceived as a potentially important component in Jewish population change. The data reported in Table 10 relate to first marriages of all ever-married persons included in the NJPS definition of Jewish or mixed households, regardless of their marital status at the time of the survey. The NJPS data report on the religion of the spouses both at the time they first met and at the time of the survey. This makes it possible to give alternative estimates of out-marriage rates—before or after conversion—as well as rates of conversion among the originally non-Jewish partners of Jewish spouses. However, NJPS does not constitute an adequate source for assessing the extent of conversions or informal dropouts from Judaism in connection with marriage or otherwise. Both alienated Jews who converted out or severed their links with the Jewish group and Jews, whether ideologically estranged or not, who lived in areas completely isolated from the existing

³⁹See Massarik, "Explorations in Inter-marriage," *op. cit.* and Lazerwitz, "Current Jewish Inter-marriages in the United States," *op. cit.*

network of Jewish community organizations had fewer chances of being investigated in NJPS.⁴⁰

With regard to the population for which information is available, the propensity of originally non-Jewish marriage partners to convert to Judaism has been much greater among females than among males. Of all ever-married originally non-Jewish wives covered by NJPS, 22 per cent were converted to Judaism, as against only 3 per cent of the husbands. Declining rates of conversion to Judaism characterized the females as long as the frequency of out-marriage was generally low. While the percentage of Jewish husbands outmarrying—regardless of the conversion of the spouse—passed from less than 4 per cent in weddings up to 1939 to 5 per cent among the marriage cohorts of the 1940's, conversions declined from 19 per cent to 8 per cent⁴¹ of the originally non-Jewish wives. Later on, when Jewish male out-marriage rose from 7 per cent in 1950–1954 to 13 per cent in 1960–1964, the proportion of originally non-Jewish wives converting to Judaism followed a parallel course, increasing from 14 per cent to 24 per cent. However, the more recent increase in male out-marriage (41 per cent in 1965–1971) failed to be matched by a parallel response in the propensity of non-Jewish wives to convert to Judaism (26 per cent in the same period). Conversions to Judaism of originally non-Jewish husbands of Jewish women broadly followed a similar pattern, though at a far lower level.

EFFECTS ON JEWISH FERTILITY⁴²

The relevance of out-marriage for Jewish population trends is probably greatest in terms of its impact on "effectively Jewish" fertility. Thus it is vital to know if there are fertility differentials between homogamous and mixed couples. Moreover, we need to determine the proportion of children of out-marriages who are reported as Jews by their parents or will identify themselves with the Jewish group later in life. These factors, combined with the frequency of mixed couples, may determine the long-run gains or losses for the Jewish population as a consequence of out-marriage.

Table 11 presents an attempt to evaluate the overall effect of out-marriage on U.S. Jewish fertility and to disaggregate this effect into its various components.⁴³ The data relate to all ever-married women included in NJPS and to their current or former husbands. The religious identification of the spouses or ex-spouses relates to the time

⁴⁰See Fred Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study: A New United States Estimate," *AJYB*, Vol. 75, 1974–75, p. 300 and Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group," *op. cit.*

⁴¹Per cent ratios of columns (5) and (4) in Table 10.

⁴²For brevity's sake, "Jewish" fertility has been used in this specific section instead of the fuller term "effectively Jewish" fertility, which has been employed elsewhere in this article.

⁴³For a more detailed presentation of the computation technique, and for analogous data on Jewish communities in other countries, see Sergio DellaPergola, "L'effet des mariages mixtes sur la natalité dans une sous-population: quelques problèmes et résultats concernant la diaspora juive," in *Demographie et Destin des Sous-Populations* (Paris, forthcoming).

TABLE 11. EFFECTS OF OUT-MARRIAGE ON JEWISH FERTILITY, BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF WIVES,* 1970-1971

Characteristics of Wives	Per Cent of Out-Married Couples Among All Couples in Given Category ^a	Per Cent Difference of Fertility of Out-Married Couples as Compared to Jewish Couples ^b	Per Cent Jewish Among All Children of Out-Married Couples ^c	Per Cent Difference of Jewish Fertility of Out-Married Couples as Compared to Jewish Couples ^d	Total Per Cent Effect on Jewish Fertility
Total	14f	-24	49	-26	-4
<u>Year of Marriage</u>					
1965-71	45	+33	25	-34	-15
1955-64	15	-36	76	-3	0
1945-54	11	-13	46	-21	-2
1935-44	10	+57	53	+66	+6
1925-34	6	-24	53	-19	-1
Up to 1924	3	-52	38	-63	-2
<u>Conversion Patterns</u>					
Husband Jewish, wife converted to Judaism	28	-52	94	-10	0
Husband Jewish, wife non-Jewish	78	-14	27	-72	-5
Wife Jewish, husband non-Jewish	58	-19	86	+39	+2

they first met. Both converted and unconverted originally non-Jewish spouses are included in this analysis, conversion being considered as one of the elements affecting the relationship between out-marriage and Jewish fertility. The religious identification of the children—as reported by the parents—was ascertained by examining the individual records of each of about 10,000 births reported in the detailed fertility histories of NJPS.

While the data reflect the out-marriages ascertainable from NJPS (if the wife or ex-wife was included in that survey) and show a net loss for the reproduction of the Jewish population, they still give too optimistic a picture because of the limitations of the survey. There is an asymmetry in the coverage of out-marriage in NJPS. Out-marriages may be divided into three categories: “mixed” marriages where each partner preserves his/her religious identification; matches involving the conversion to Judaism⁴⁴ of the originally non-Jewish partner; and matches involving the out-conversion (or informal dropping out) of the originally Jewish partner. The first two categories may be considered to be adequately represented in NJPS. However, the third category is insufficiently covered—because of a lack of information, no statement can be made about the fertility of couples comprising an ex-Jewish spouse, even though the bias produced by them with regard to the ascertainable identification of the children of out-marriages is obvious. Our analysis relates to the original composition of the couples. Hence it was assumed that for originally out-married couples, i.e., those composed of a Jew/Jewess and an initially non-Jewish spouse, the expected probability of the identificational distribution of the children between Jews and non-Jews was an even one (50:50). In those households in which a conversion to Judaism took place, a very great majority of the children were raised as Jews, thus attaining a gain for the Jewish population. On the other hand, in those households in which the Jewish-born spouse left the Jewish group, it must be presumed that the children were raised as non-Jews. However, the losses caused thereby to the Jewish population in the second generation are hardly reflected in the NJPS data.⁴⁵

The first component examined is the overall fertility (i.e., average number of children ever born) of out-married couples compared to that of Jewish couples,

⁴⁴There may be some instances of self-identification as Jew/Jewess without any formal conversion, though the NJPS questionnaire was rather specific on the topic of conversion.

⁴⁵If the current composition of out-married couples—and not the original one—had been taken as the reference situation, the expected probabilities of Jewish identification for the children would have been: (a) mixed marriages—50 per cent; (b) originally non-Jewish spouses converted to Judaism—100 per cent; (c) originally Jewish spouses who left the Jewish group—0 per cent (this last category is, as stated, largely undocumented in NJPS). With this approach, a gain to the Jewish population in (b) (or the loss in (c), if recorded) would have already been attained in the parent generation. However, according to the actual NJPS data, situation (b) resulted in a serious loss of fertility—the gain in the first generation and the loss in the second generation roughly cancelling each other out, and thus replicating the zero effect shown in Table 11. We have preferred to display the more comprehensive picture that emerges when out-marriages are traced to their roots.

regardless of the religion of the children. The former has generally been much lower—24 per cent less on the average; there have been few exceptions to this pattern of lower fertility among the out-married. With regard to the fertility of families formed after 1965, whose fertility was still incomplete by the time of NJPS, out-married couples displayed relatively higher levels, but this may have been due to differences in the timing of initial childbearing.

The second component is the proportion Jewish among all children of out-married couples and the variation from a hypothetical split into equal parts (50:50) as between the two different parental identifications. In the American Jewish community, unlike Jewish communities elsewhere, this factor had caused only a minor loss by 1970–1971, if all out-marriages are considered together: 49 per cent of all children of out-married couples were identified as Jewish. For several older marriage cohorts, Jewish children even formed a majority among the children of the out-married couples. However, only 25 per cent of the children were Jewish among the out-marriages contracted since 1965.

On the whole, considering the combined effects of the two previous components, the Jewish fertility⁴⁶ of out-married couples was lower by 26 per cent than the fertility of Jewish couples. Since out-married couples constituted 14 per cent of the total,⁴⁷ the overall effect of out-marriage on fertility of the Jewish population⁴⁸ was to diminish its level by 4 per cent. The mid-1960's apparently constituted a turning point with regard to both the rapid increase in out-marriage and its effect on Jewish fertility as examined here. While this effect had been only marginally negative or even moderately positive in the case of the marriage cohorts formed prior to 1964, the most recent cohort (1965–1971) displayed a net fertility loss of 15 per cent.

The effect of out-marriage on Jewish fertility must also be specified in terms of the conversion status of the originally non-Jewish spouse. The fertility of couples in which originally non-Jewish women converted to Judaism was much below that of Jewish couples, but since most of their children were Jewish, no overall effect on Jewish fertility resulted. Out-married Jewish women ended up with a higher than average Jewish fertility, because their relatively low fertility (in general) was more than compensated for by the predominant Jewishness of their children. The losing element consisted of couples made up of Jewish husbands and unconverted non-Jewish wives, where low fertility was associated only seldom with the Jewishness of the children. In the United States, the religious identification of the children of out-married couples mostly follows that of the mother, unlike in continental

⁴⁶Obtained by comparing *twice* the average number of Jewish children of out-married couples (assuming only half of the children of these couples should be expected to be Jewish) with the average number of children of homogamous Jewish couples.

⁴⁷See note (f) to Table 11.

⁴⁸Computed by multiplying the per cent of differences between *Jewish* fertility of out-married and homogamous Jewish couples, and the percentage of out-married couples among all couples with at least one Jewish partner, i.e., column (5) in Table 11 was obtained by multiplying columns (1) and (4).

European Jewish communities, where it mainly follows the father's religion.⁴⁹ It should be stressed again that a full inclusion of couples in which the out-married Jewish partner converted or dropped out of Jewish life would have affected the patterns reported here, revealing a stronger erosion of Jewish fertility in connection with out-marriage.

The processes described here are further clarified by examining fertility differentials by the Jewish denominational preference of the mother. There is a basic difference between the level of out-marriage and its effect on Jewish fertility among married women in Jewish households who are willing to express a preference for any of the three main ideological streams in American Jewry (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform), and among those who are not. The former, who represented 83 per cent of ever-married women in NJPS, experienced relatively low rates of out-marriage. The low fertility of the out-married was more than compensated for by the Jewish identification of most of the children, which resulted in a moderate raising of Jewish fertility.⁵⁰ On the other hand, nearly two-thirds of all recorded out-marriages involved couples in which the wife did not express any denominational preference,⁵¹ and fully half of the recorded denominationally undefined couples were out-married. Fertility losses among the denominationally undefined wives in the Jewish population as a consequence of out-marriage are very substantial—30 per cent as compared to the respective homogamous couples. Lack of denominational preference might be explained as the consequence of mixed marriage, rather than as its background. Yet it appears that internal mobility between the more and the less identified may have remarkable consequences for the current and future demographic trends of American Jewry by changing the proportion between the stable and losing sections.⁵²

Actual achievement of fertility expectations, already discussed above in general terms, may be of relevance in this context. We have indicated that out-marriage had a reductive effect on Jewish fertility among the 1965–1971 marriage cohort, even after account was taken of the conversion of originally non-Jewish wives to Judaism. These converts, however, whose fertility at early marriage durations was very low,

⁴⁹See DellaPergola, "L'effet des mariages mixtes sur la natalité dans une sous-population," *op. cit.*

⁵⁰There are very few out-married couples that are Orthodox-oriented. Differences between Conservative and Reform-oriented out-married couples are more apparent in fertility levels than in the percentage of children reported as Jewish. Interdenominational differences in conversion requirements and in recognizing the validity of conversions performed by other denominations have been left out of consideration here.

⁵¹Or, in a few cases, indicated a label other than the three major ones.

⁵²For further extended discussions of these topics, see Bernard Lazerwitz and Michael Harrison, "American Jewish Denominations: A Social and Religious Profile," *American Sociological Review*, August 1979, pp. 656–666 and Fred Massarik, "Socio-Ideological Differentiation in the U.S. Jewish Population," in Schmelz, Glikson, and DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977*, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–162.

expressed higher than average final fertility expectations. Should these targets be achieved, the overall impact of out-marriage on the fertility of the more recently out-married American Jews might become slightly positive. Nonetheless, in view of the reservations we have already expressed about the predictive value of the fertility expectations of the women who in 1970-1971 were recently married, we suggest that the evidence of actual current fertility loss seems to outweigh the promise of possible future gain.

Summary of Family Processes

Summing up the interrelated dynamics of the several family processes reviewed in the previous sections, it appears that the late 1960's and the 1970's witnessed considerable internal demographic erosion among American Jews. In part, this reflected the diffuse redirection of marriage and fertility patterns in the United States from the predominance of stable parents-children families toward a greater frequency of smaller households headed by single or divorced, and often childless, adults.³³ The combination of fewer marriages and few children (actual or expected) per married woman was already experienced during the years of the great depression. The renewed impact of these trends has recently been accompanied by higher rates of marriage disruption, though the frequency of remarriage, relative to the ever-divorced, has been quite high too. An additional factor shaping current Jewish population dynamics, whose weight was relatively unimportant during the earlier decades of the century, is assimilation. Higher out-marriage rates, even at stable rates of conversion to Judaism, have meant growing absolute numbers of mixed households, which, in turn, have been associated with greater losses in the affiliative balance of children of the out-married. Consequently, further significant attritional elements have been added to the already low Jewish fertility.

A recurring question in the preceding analysis has been whether trends described are irreversible or rather follow a wave-like pattern in which phases of slower population growth may be followed by phases of relative recovery. This is a very complex question, relating as it does to the interplay of values and norms (which may be changing and continue to change) in the Jewish population with more mechanical demographic processes, whose unfolding depends upon cyclical transformations in population structure, which themselves are determined by conditions in the past. Keeping in mind certain apparent contradictions between actual demographic behavior and the future expectations of the younger cohorts covered in NJPS, one may detect fluid and unstable elements in the demographic and identificational patterns shaping the quantitative evolution of U.S. Jewry. However, the

³³For a discussion of the possible implications of these changes on Jewish family community life in the United States, see Steven Cohen, "The American Jewish Family Today," *AJYB*, Vol. 82, 1982, pp. 136-154.

cumulative evidence of all the relevant factors that have been assessed points in the direction of negative population growth in the future.

Balance of Demographic Dynamics

It has been indicated that in recent years, the fertility of Jews has been very low and by itself insufficient for demographic replacement.

Jewish population trends have also been negatively affected by out-marriage, which has most likely increased in the decade since the NJPS survey was carried out.

There are no recent large-scale data on mortality among U.S. Jews, but life expectancy at birth is certainly high. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Jews in Europe and North America had an impressive record of comparatively low age-specific mortality, especially in the case of children. It is probable that the differentials in life expectancy at birth between Jews and non-Jews have meanwhile been largely bridged by the general progress of public health. Among the white population of the United States, life expectancy has recently gone up, after stalling in the 1960's. Jews may be assumed to have achieved analogous progress in their mean length of life. Yet, because of the considerably higher proportion of persons in late middle and old age in the Jewish population, the crude death rate⁵⁴ of Jews must have been greater than that of the general population.

The external migration balance of Jews in the United States was mildly positive in the first half of the 1970's. It became more positive in the second half, with the arrival of many Soviet Jews in addition to immigrants from other Diaspora regions and *yordim* from Israel. While the total number of Jewish immigrants during 1971–1975 was estimated at about 40,000,⁵⁵ with about 11,000 coming from the Soviet Union, Soviet Jewish arrivals alone ran to 69,000 during 1976–1980.⁵⁶

Exaggerated figures are often mentioned with regard to *yordim* in the United States. Admittedly their number is not accurately known and the whole issue is beset with definitional difficulties. However, upper limits can be established by using Israel's official statistics. Taking the period 1971–1980, the total external migration balance of Jews permanently resident in Israel (excluding the first arrival of new immigrants) was negative to the extent of 71,000. This figure is based on the registration of border crossings, which is quite reliable because of tight frontier control. In Israeli statistics, "permanent population" includes residents absent for less than one year; thus the figure is the difference between the number of

⁵⁴Crude rates relate to the entire population, both sexes and all ages together.

⁵⁵HIAS reports. See also, Diamond, "A Reader in the Demography of American Jews," *op. cit.*, p. 319.

⁵⁶HIAS reports. See also, Joseph Edelman, "Soviet Jews in the United States: An Update," *AJYB*, Vol. 82, 1982, pp. 155–164.

permanently resident Jews who departed for abroad and did not return within 12 months, and between the number of such returnees after an absence of 13 months or longer.⁵⁷ The total of 71,000 extends to all countries of the world, and it is unlikely that more than 50,000 went to the United States.

Figures on the emigration of Jews from the United States are available only for *aliyah* to Israel. American *olim*, most of whom contented themselves at first with the status of "potential immigrants," amounted only to 23,300 in 1971-1975, and 13,500 in 1976-1980. Re-emigration has been frequent among them. According to the immigration absorption survey, a longitudinal study regularly conducted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics throughout the 1970's, about 30 per cent of the "potential immigrants" and immigrants from North America⁵⁸ left Israel permanently or for a long period within three years of taking up residence in the country. On the one occasion that this matter was looked into after five years, nearly half were reported to have left Israel.

A demographic balance sheet for U.S. Jewry has been tentatively computed for 1976-1980 (Table 12). It is based on the age-sex-distribution indicated in NJPS and the available updating information, and attempts to account empirically or conjecturally for all direct factors of change. The purpose is to illustrate the order of magnitude of the factors involved and to compare Jews to all whites in the United States. It should be emphasized that the figures on assimilatory losses are conjectures resting on very fragmentary evidence. However, without these figures the balance sheet would remain incomplete.

The tentative findings are as follows:

(a) Assuming that the low fertility diagnosed for the early 1970's continued approximately, the "effectively Jewish" birth rate⁵⁹ may have gone up somewhat in 1976-1980. Such an occurrence would be explained by the frequency of Jews in the most procreative ages as an echo effect of the "baby boom" which took place around 1945-1959. In fact, around 1980 the percentage of females aged 20-34 was higher in the Jewish population than in the entire white population of the United States.⁶⁰ Even so, the "effectively Jewish" crude birth rate of Jews must have remained

⁵⁷The figure includes Israelis who had been abroad uninterruptedly for more than one year by the end of 1980 but returned later, e.g., students and professional trainees. On the other hand, it does not include holders of Israeli passports who stayed abroad in process of *yerida* but came on a "home visit" in 1980 and, after renewed departure, did not yet again reach a continuous absence of 12 months before the end of 1980. Recent immigrants, *inter alia* from the Soviet Union, who failed to strike roots and left Israel are included. However, "potential immigrants" (compare the next paragraph in text) are excluded.

⁵⁸Nearly 90 per cent of them came from the United States.

⁵⁹The "effectively Jewish" birth rate excludes those newborn, mostly from mixed marriages, who are not identified as Jews by their parents.

⁶⁰This percentage was estimated at 27 per cent of Jewish females in 1980 as against 24 per cent of all white females in 1979. The higher proportion of "baby boom" cohorts among the Jews was due *inter alia* to their more intensive fertility reduction before and after the "baby boom."

beneath that of all whites, because of lower fertility and assimilatory losses of the newborn.

(b) The crude death rate of Jews has exceeded that of all whites, because of greater aging.

(c) The crude rate of natural increase among Jews has been lower than that of all whites, and only barely positive.

(d) Jews are a small minority in an open, secularized society. Consequently, they are exposed to affiliative changes whose net effect is the assimilatory loss of persons who were Jews. The loss of alienated ex-Jews, through informal dropping-out or formal conversion, is estimated to have at least offset the anyway modest natural increase during 1976–1980, so that the Jewish population's balance of internal dynamics was perhaps slightly negative.

(e) The external migration balance of U.S. Jewry has been positive and, per 1,000 of respective population, larger than that of all whites.

(f) Yet the overall demographic balance of all whites has been relatively more positive than that of Jews.

(g) According to this analysis, the growth in the number of U.S. Jews from 1975 to 1980 was largely due to the then prevailing positive migration balance. It was assisted by a temporary rise in the number of persons in the procreative ages and by a consequent rise in the birth rate.

(h) At the bottom of Table 12, the assimilatory losses of the newborn have been estimated. They are incurred if less than 50 per cent of the newborn of mixed

TABLE 12. COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE AMONG JEWS AND ALL WHITES, 1976–1980^a

	Jews (Estimates)	All Whites
Annual Rates per 1,000 of Population		
a) "Effectively Jewish" births	+12	+14
b) Deaths	-11	-9
c) Natural increase (a-b)	+1	+5
d) Assimilatory losses	-2	not applicable
e) Balance of internal dynamics (c-d)	-1	+5
f) Balance of external migrations	+4	+1
g) Total balance (e+f)	+3	+6
h) Assimilatory losses of newborn	-2	not applicable
i) Total assimilatory losses (d+h)	-4	not applicable

^a1976–1978 for all whites.

Sources: for Jews—authors' estimates; for all whites—U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1980, 1982*.

marriages, or any of the newborn of homogamously Jewish marriages,⁶¹ are not considered Jews by their parents.⁶² These losses of the newborn figure outside the body of the just summarized demographic balance sheet in which the birth rate was given at its "effectively Jewish" level, i.e., as reflecting the net of such losses of the newborn. Adding together the conjectured net affiliative losses above infancy and the losses of the newborn, their total may have approximated—and therefore offset—the increasingly positive migratory balance of U.S. Jews in the quinquennium considered.

(i) The balances of the three types of demographic changes—natural, affiliative, and migratory—were all rather small. In 1976–1980, the increased positive migratory balance was perhaps able to cancel the immediate effect of total assimilatory losses on Jewish population size.⁶³ Writing these lines in 1982, it seems necessary to add that the migratory balance of U.S. Jewry has meanwhile dwindled because of the virtual stoppage of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

While this article was being finalized for publication, important new empirical information became available.⁶⁴ The "1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Survey," carried out by Paul Ritterband and Steven Cohen, has yielded a preliminary estimate of four per cent children in ages 0–4, including the non-Jewish children of mixed marriages. This would imply a gross average for the annual Jewish birth rate of 0.8 per cent (or eight per thousand) of the Jewish population during the five years preceding the survey. The "effectively Jewish" birth rate, excluding the non-Jewish children of the surveyed Jews, must have been even lower. Since the age composition of New York Jewry was somewhat older than that indicated in Table 1 and Table 2 for all U.S. Jews in 1980, the death rate is also likely to have been somewhat greater and to have exceeded even more the death rate of the general white population (see Table 12). The inevitable conclusion is a deficit in the natural movement of New York's Jews.

⁶¹Whether the couple was homogamously Jewish from the outset or was made so by the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse.

⁶²The lower fertility of mixed couples as compared to Jewish ones (see Table 11) has here been accounted for in the "effectively Jewish" birth rate. As for the expected identification of the children, see footnote 45.

⁶³It did not offset all the long-term effects of the assimilatory losses; in the long-range demographic view, the lost newborn are not compensated for by the immigration of, for instance, elderly persons.

⁶⁴Kindly communicated by the authors.

Projections to The Year 2000

GENERAL EXPLANATIONS

The demographic projections for U.S. Jewry that are outlined here are part of a larger complex of projections for world Jewry.⁶⁵ The projections are based on estimates of Jewish population, by age and sex, in 1975. In the case of U.S. Jewry, these estimates have been derived from the 1970-1971 NJPS.

The various versions used in computing the projections for U.S. Jewry are briefly set out in Table 12A. Versions A to E are "complete" insofar as they account for all factors of change. Versions A, C, and E correspond, respectively, to the principal versions—medium, high, and low—of our regional projections for world Jewry. Versions B and D are additional variants whose informative value will be set out below. The remaining versions are hypothetical, as they deliberately take into consideration only an incomplete range of demographic factors: F—natural movement alone; G and H—natural movement and assimilatory losses, but not external migrations. The purpose of versions F to H is to make possible, through comparison with other versions, an assessment of the separate influence of various factors. While Table 12A gives only a general indication of the level of each factor, concise information on parameter size can be found in the Appendix.

TABLE 12A. VERSIONS USED IN COMPUTING PROJECTIONS FOR U.S. JEWRY

Symbol and Name of Version	Fertility	Mortality	Assimilation	Immigration
A—Medium	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate
B—	Low	Low	Moderate	Stronger
C—High	Rising	Low	Moderate	Moderate
D—	Rising	Low	Stronger	Moderate
E—Low	Low	Low	Stronger	Moderate
F—	Low	Low	—	—
G—	Low	Low	Moderate	—
H—	Low	Low	Stronger	—

⁶⁵See Schmelz, *World Jewish Population—Regional Estimates and Projections*, *op. cit.*; U.O. Schmelz, "Evolution and Projection of World Jewish Population," in U.O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson, and Julius Gould, (eds.), *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1972-1980* (Jerusalem, forthcoming); and U.O. Schmelz, "World Jewish Population Trends: Projections and Implications," in Schmelz, Glikson, and DellaPergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography*, 1981, *op. cit.*

PROJECTED SIZE OF U.S. JEWRY

In Table 13 the eight versions of the projections for the future size of U.S. Jewry have been listed in ascending order of magnitude as of the year 2000. In most instances the same order is also found in 1990 and 1995. The index numbers on the right-hand side of Table 13 compare future population size with the 1975 estimate of 5,600,000 (a figure close to the one that already held good for U.S. Jews in 1970). It should be borne in mind that the updated estimate as of 1980 has risen to 5,690,000,⁶⁶ a figure closely approached by the medium projection.

The demographic dynamics underlying the projection results can be summarized as follows:

(a) If low fertility continues at approximately its recent level, the outcome of natural movement will turn negative, despite high life expectancy at birth, and deaths will increasingly outnumber births. This trend will be intensified by the aggravation of aging in the Jewish population. Consequently, version F, which accounts for natural movement alone, indicates that a modest temporary rise in the total number of Jews will be followed, toward the end of the projection period, by a decline below the initial level.

(b) The negative trend in the evolution of population size is much accelerated if, in addition to natural movement, assimilatory losses—moderate or strong—are taken into account (versions G and H, respectively).

(c) However, these negative tendencies can be offset, at least partly and temporarily, through a positive migration balance (versions A to E).

(d) This is exemplified by the medium projection (A), which assumes low fertility and moderate levels of both assimilatory losses and a positive migration balance. The two latter factors largely cancel each other out, so that the results of the medium projection toward the end of our century are close to those of the version allowing for natural movement alone.⁶⁷ The medium projection leads to a population figure of roughly 5,650,000 by 1990, which is less than the 1980 estimate of 5,690,000, though still above the initial 1975 level of 5,600,000. The figure projected for year 2000 approaches 5,300,000, which is five per cent lower than the initial level.

(e) Among the modifications of parameters in the complete projections, version C—rising fertility combined with moderate assimilation and migration—delays the drop of Jewish population below the initial level until the end of the century. Rising fertility has been so calibrated as to lead up to the “replacement level” of 2.1 children on average per woman by 1996–2000. The projected decline in population size which nevertheless occurs is due mainly to the following causes: (1) The level of 2.1 children per woman assures replacement at minimal mortality, if this fertility is continued for a long time. In the short run, which may extend over several decades,

⁶⁶See the section on Jewish population size.

⁶⁷The change in ranking of the results of these two versions between 1995 and 2000 is due to the assumption that immigration operates with decreasing strength, while assimilation functions with increasing strength.

the actual birth rate and rate of natural increase/decrease also depend on age composition. The great aging which prevails among U.S. Jews depresses these rates. (2) The level of 2.1 children is only reached at the end of the projection period. (3) Among Diaspora Jews, fertility has to contend not only with mortality, but also with assimilatory losses, which are on the increase—including the loss of offspring of mixed marriages.

(f) A more strongly positive migration balance (B) will boost Jewish population size in a manner similar to rising fertility (compare with version C).

(g) In versions D and E, stronger assimilation has been assumed together with a moderate migration balance. If stronger assimilation is combined with rising fertility (D), it tends to cancel the latter's positive influence on Jewish population size. The combination of stronger assimilation, low fertility, and low immigration constitutes the low projection (E), which, according to the actual assumptions used, implies a decrease of 11 per cent in the U.S. Jewish population between 1975 and 2000.

The future levels of the parameters used in computing the projections are necessarily conjectural. Yet all the versions of the projections presented here point to a decrease in the size of the U.S. Jewish population before the end of the century. At the assumed intensities of the various parameters (see Appendix), only the conjunction of rising fertility with stronger immigration and moderate assimilation would prevent this from happening.

Maintenance of the size of U.S. Jewry, or even its increase, could be produced if fertility or immigration were to reach levels beyond those assumed in the higher variants of the parameters. However, even the low fertility used in the projections—1.5 children on average per woman—exceeds the level of 1.3–1.4 attributed to all Jewish women in 1970–1976.⁶⁸ Moreover, the rise of Jewish fertility up to 2.1 in versions C and D equals the future rise of fertility assumed by the Bureau of Census in its medium projection for all U.S. whites (see below), whereas empirically Jewish fertility in the United States has long been below that of total whites. Both the moderate and stronger variants of the positive migration balance for U.S. Jews, as applied in the projections, have resulted from computations of the worldwide potential for international Jewish migration. Hence, if constant age-specific emigration rates are applied to the future Jewish population projected for Eastern Europe and other emigration regions in the Diaspora, the expected volume of migrants contracts rather sharply. At any rate, the assumptions for stronger immigration imply a net intake of more than 600,000 Jews during the 25 years of projections, which is 11 per cent of the initial population. Yet even this may not be enough to offset the negative balance of internal dynamics at the end of the century.

The projections presented here should be viewed primarily as illustrating trends in U.S. Jewish population size rather than as reporting absolute levels. It has been

⁶⁸This is the more so, as further inroads on fertility *per se*, irrespective of the identification of the children, may be caused by the increase of out-marriage which is anticipated in the projections (see Table 11).

TABLE 13. PROJECTIONS OF JEWS UP TO YEAR 2000

Symbol ^a and Name of Version	In Thousands			Index Numbers (1975=100)		
	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995	2000
Versions Arranged According to Assumptions						
A—Medium, regular	5,645	5,503	5,321	101	98	95
B—Medium, stronger immig.	5,785	5,700	5,571	103	102	99
C—High, regular	5,739	5,665	5,563	102	101	99
D—High, stronger assim.	5,519	5,364	5,178	98	96	92
E—Low	5,435	5,222	4,972	97	93	89
F—No immig., no assim.	5,619	5,498	5,345	100	98	95
G—No immig., mod- erate assim.	5,393	5,197	4,974	96	93	89
H—No immig., stronger assim.	5,188	4,925	4,639	93	88	83
Versions Arranged in Rising Order of Estimates for Year 2000						
H—No immig., stronger assim.	5,188	4,925	4,639	93	88	83
E—Low	5,435	5,222	4,972	97	93	89
G—No immig., mod- erate assim.	5,393	5,197	4,974	96	93	89
D—High, stronger assim.	5,519	5,364	5,178	98	96	92
A—Medium, regular	5,645	5,503	5,321	101	98	95
F—No immig., no assim.	5,619	5,498	5,345	100	98	95
C—High, regular	5,739	5,665	5,563	102	101	99
B—Medium, stronger assim.	5,785	5,700	5,571	103	102	99

*Estimated number of Jews (in thousands): 1970—5,600; 1975—5,600; 1980—5,690.

^aSee Table 12A.

Source: authors' projections.

stated before that even the present size of U.S. Jewry is not clearly known; the necessarily conjectural magnitude of the parameters of demographic change during the projection period is obvious. If any parameter should exceed the assumed magnitude in a positive or negative direction, the projected population size would change accordingly. The actual future size of the Jewish population in the United States may turn out to be either higher or lower than some or even all the complete versions of the projection.

While the future levels of U.S. Jewish population size are contingent and conjectural, as is implied in the presentation of numerous alternatives within the

projections, the direction in which each relevant demographic factor operates *per se* is certain. Moreover, the result of the interplay of these trends is fairly evident for the not too distant future. If fertility is by far insufficient for demographic replacement, even at minimal mortality, and has moreover to contend with assimilatory losses and with the effects of pronounced aging, a population decrease is bound to come, unless there is large and ever-increasing immigration. In other words, for U.S. Jewry, in the long run, to achieve growth or even maintain its size ("zero population growth"), it would be necessary to either raise fertility, curb assimilatory losses, attract immigration, or attain a combination of these positive influences, and moreover do so very substantially.

To date, a decrease of U.S. Jewry has been prevented by the direct and indirect effects of the extended "baby boom" of 1945–1959 and by the immigration of Soviet Jews in the second half of the 1970's. The first influence is transitory. As for the second, emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union has been virtually discontinued at the time that these lines are being written.⁶⁹ However, it is important to realize that any migratory reinforcement, even if it should come, can have no more than a temporary effect on population size, unless the negative trends in the internal dynamics of U.S. Jews should change. If these trends continue to prevail and are also adopted by the new immigrants—or if the latter bring with them and maintain in America the even more negative demographic trends now characteristic of East European Jewry—the effects of such migratory transfusions on U.S. Jewish population size can only delay, but not in the long run prevent, renewed decreases.

AGE COMPOSITION

An increase in the number of elderly Jews (65+) is inevitable in the near future because of the age structure of the adult Jews as reflected in the 1970–1971 NJPS and updated to 1980 in Table 2. The strong cohorts born ca.1916–1930, which occupied the late middle-age range in 1980, will penetrate into the old-age range.

The elderly constituted 12 and 15.5 per cent, respectively, of the U.S. Jewish population in 1970 and 1980 (Table 1 above). According to the three principal versions of the projections for Jews, the percentage will rise to 16 to 18 per cent by the end of the century (Table 14). This compares to 12 to 13.5 per cent 65+ year olds among all whites in the United States by the year 2000, according to official projections.

Tables 14 and 1 show, furthermore, that not only the proportion of the elderly but also the proportion of persons in later middle age (45–64 year old) will continue to be greater among Jews than among all whites. On the other hand, the percentage of children (aged 0–14) will keep on being much smaller in the Jewish population. Among all whites as well as among Jews, the proportion above age 30 will rise, while the proportion below that age will drop, due to the reduction in size of the cohorts

⁶⁹See the section on the balance of demographic dynamics.

TABLE 14. PROJECTIONS OF JEWS AND ALL WHITES, BY AGE (PER CENT), 2000

Age	Jews			All Whites		
	Medium Proj.	High Proj.	Low Proj.	Medium Proj.	High Proj.	Low Proj.
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0-14	13.9	17.0	12.7	21.5	25.6	18.5
15-29	18.8	18.6	18.9	19.7	20.3	19.1
30-44	22.5	21.6	22.6	22.6	20.8	24.0
45-64	27.7	26.4	28.1	23.3	21.4	24.8
65+	17.1	16.4	17.7	12.7	11.8	13.5

Sources: for Jews—authors' projections; for all whites—U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Projections of the Population of the United States: 1977 to 2050*, Current Population Report, Series P-25, No. 704, 1977.

born successively during the post-World War II "baby boom" and after its termination.

Since the absolute number of the elderly for decades ahead is mainly determined by the alternating size of the already living birth cohorts, one can expect a decrease at the beginning of the next century, because of the penetration of the weak cohorts born in 1930-1945 into this age range. This will be followed by a strong rise and, afterward, by a renewed drop, due to the penetration of the strong "baby boom" cohorts born in 1946-1960 and the subsequent weaker ones, respectively. However, on the whole, the trend for aging, i.e., for a marked proportion of the elderly in the population, will increase if fertility remains low and if, in addition, assimilation makes its normal inroad, especially among the younger age groups.⁷⁰

Projections of the Jewish school age population, i.e., of children and youngsters between the ages of 3 and 25,⁷¹ are given in Table 15. These persons constitute the maximum potential for enrollment in Jewish educational institutions. The data are broken down into age groups which correspond, respectively, to kindergarten, elementary school, junior high school, senior high school, and college and university students. If the frequencies of these age groups are compared in the data base year 1975, the declining trend of Jewish births in the preceding two decades is once again revealed—from the 18-21 year olds, who were born at the peak of the "baby boom," down to the 3-5 year olds. Compared to the 1975 figures there is a marked decline, on the whole, in the projection period. However, there are also counter-currents: (a) the increase of Jews in the procreative ages, which is apt

⁷⁰See U.O. Schmelz, *Elderly Jews in the World—Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

⁷¹I.e., inclusive of age 17, but below age 18.

TABLE 15. PROJECTION OF JEWISH SCHOOL AGE POPULATION, 1975-2000

	3-17	3-5	6-11	12-14	15-17	18-25	18-21	22-25
	Total					Total		
Jewish children, 1975	1,108	172	365	229	342	840	435	404
				In Thousands				
				Index Numbers (1975 = 100)				
Medium projection								
1990	91	110	116	91	54	56	53	59
2000	75	74	84	79	62	65	64	66
High projection								
1990	96	128	123	91	54	56	53	59
2000	91	101	106	94	68	67	67	66
Low projection								
1990	85	100	108	87	53	55	52	57
2000	65	62	73	69	56	61	59	63

Source: authors' projections.

to raise the number of Jewish newborn from approximately the mid-1970's to the end of the 1980's,⁷² makes itself felt through a rise in ages 3–5 and 6–11 until about 1990. This will also mitigate the decrease of the 12–25 year olds toward the end of the century. Otherwise this decrease would be even stronger, especially for the 15–25 year olds, who in the base year 1975 still belonged to the strong “baby boom” cohorts; (b) in the high projection, the assumed rise in fertility has a boosting effect on the frequencies after 1980. In the college and university ages of 18–25, the decrease will be very strong—to 59–67, according to projection levels, in the year 2000, per 100 in 1975. This is due, on the one hand, to the high initial frequencies in 1975, when these ages were occupied by persons born in the “baby boom,” and, on the other hand, to the fact that these ages will be barely reached until the year 2000 by the again increased cohorts born as of the mid-1970's as an echo of the original “baby boom.”⁷³

These examples illustrate both the underlying tendency toward aging and the marked degree of instability in the short run, as stronger and weaker cohorts pass alternatively through certain stages. The negative impact of the shifts in cohort size on the “marriage market,” given the age differential between grooms and brides, has been mentioned above.

COMPARISONS

Table 16 compares the results for the year 2000 of the principal projections for Jews with the Bureau of the Census projections for all whites in the United States. While the former do not indicate a numerically positive outcome, the latter do. It is instructive to examine the reasons for this difference in anticipated evolution, particularly since the fertility assumptions of the medium projection for all whites and the high projection for Jews are the same—2.1 children by the end of the century—and the fertility assumptions of the low projection for all whites and the medium and low projections for Jews are not very different—about 1.7 in the former, instead of 1.5 in the two latter, throughout the projection period. Moreover, a relatively more positive external migration balance has been assumed for Jews (Table 16). Analysis shows that the main reasons for the difference in outcome are (a) the much greater aging of Jews (Tables 1 and 14), which depresses their crude birth rate and raises their crude death rate and (b) the Jews' assimilatory losses (which have no parallel among all whites), which diminish the number of Jewish persons and reduce the “effectively Jewish” birth rate if less than half the children of mixed marriages are not raised as Jews.⁷⁴

⁷²See above.

⁷³See U.O. Schmelz, *Jewish School Age Population—Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

⁷⁴In the medium projection the ratio of lost newborn per 1,000 of Jewish population (row H) does not grow appreciably from 1976–1980 to 1996–2000 (see Tables 12 and 16). This

TABLE 16. PROJECTIONS AND COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE AMONG JEWS AND ALL WHITES, 1996-2000

	Jews			All Whites		
	Medium Proj.	High Proj.	Low Proj.	Medium Proj.	High Proj.	Low Proj.
Population, 2000	95	99	89	117	128	111
Fertility, 1996-2000	1.5	2.1	1.5	2.1	2.7	1.7
	Index Numbers (1975 = 100)					
	Average Number of Children per Woman					
	Annual Rates per 1,000 of Population					
Components of Change, 1996-2000:						
a) "Effectively Jewish" births	+ 7.5	+10	+ 6.5	+ 13.5	+ 17	+ 11.5
b) Deaths	-14	-13.5	-14.5	- 10	- 9.5	- 10.5
c) Natural increase (a-b)	- 6.5	- 3.5	- 8	+ 3.5	+ 7.5	+ 1
d) Assimilatory losses (excluding newborn)	- 2	- 2	- 4		not applicable	
e) Balance of internal dynamics (c-d)	- 8.5	- 5.5	-12	+ 3.5	+ 7.5	+ 1
f) Balance of external migrations	+ 2	+ 2	+ 2	+ 1	+ 1	+ 1
g) Total balance (e+f)	- 6.5	- 3.5	-10	+ 4.5	+ 8.5	+ 2
h) Assimilatory losses of newborn	- 2	- 3	- 3.5		not applicable	
i) Total assimilatory losses (d+h)	- 4	- 5	- 7.5		not applicable	

Sources: see Table 14.

Table 17 shows the evolution of U.S. Jews in comparison to the Jewries of the Diaspora, Israel, and the whole world (according to the medium version of our regional projections). U.S. Jews are expected to decrease far less so than the rest of Diaspora Jewry; their number will evolve similarly to world Jewry as a whole, while Israel's Jews will grow markedly. The joint share of Jews in the United States and Israel among world Jewry is anticipated by the projections to increase from about two-thirds in 1975 to 80 per cent by year 2000. Thus, a bipolar configuration in world Jewry will increasingly manifest itself.

TABLE 17. PROJECTIONS OF JEWS IN THE U.S., DIASPORA, AND WORLD (MEDIUM VERSION), 1975 AND 2000

	Index Numbers ^a 2000	Per Cent Distributions			
		Diaspora		World	
		1975	2000	1975	2000
World	96	—	—	100	100
Diaspora, Total	79	100	100	77	64
U.S.	95	56	67	43	43
Other countries	59	44	33	34	21
Israel	152	—	—	23	36
U.S. and Israel	115	—	—	66	79

^a1975 = 100.

Sources: authors' projections.

The reasons for the more marked decrease in Jewish population in the rest of the Diaspora as compared to the United States are even greater aging and assimilatory losses and the even lower fertility in other Diaspora areas. Moreover, some Diaspora regions have a very negative migration balance, whereas U.S. Jewry is assumed to have a positive one.

The marked growth foreseen for Israel's Jews, alone among all large Jewries of the world, is due primarily to considerable fertility and the absence of net assimilatory losses, and only secondarily to a rapidly dwindling positive migration balance.⁷⁵ While the majority status of Jews in Israel of necessity precludes assimilation, the evolution of fertility among Israel's Jews has been quite remarkable.⁷⁶ Thirty years

happens despite the rising proportion of assimilatory losses among the newborn (see specifications in Appendix), and is due to the decrease in the Jewish birth rate. This decrease exercises an analogous influence in the other projection versions.

⁷⁵Israel's external migration balance, like that of U.S. Jews, has been fitted to global assumptions about Jewish migration streams in the projection period.

⁷⁶See Schmelz, "Jewish Survival," *op. cit.*, pp. 61-117.

ago, a striking difference of three to four children existed between the fertility levels of the two origin groups (Asian-African and European) of which Israel's Jews are composed. At present, however, the fertility differential has virtually disappeared; Asian-African Jews have rapidly reduced their fertility in acceleration of an anyway expected demographic transition; European Jews have increased their fertility, which has stood for the last 15 years at about 2.75 children on average per woman. All of Israel's Jews, including those of European provenance, have a fertility which not only exceeds by far that of Diaspora Jews, but also the recent fertility of the general populations in all the advanced countries.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The decrease anticipated in the number of Jews in the United States is less acute than that anticipated in most Diaspora regions. Yet the balance of the internal population dynamics of U.S. Jewry may already be slightly negative and, despite immigration, is expected to become overtly negative in the foreseeable future. Moreover, this quantitative problem is closely linked to qualitative problems prevalent in large sections of American Jewry with regard to the maintenance and transmission of Jewish identity.

Should there be a sizeable upswing in general U.S. fertility, Jewish fertility may be carried along with it, though, judging by the experience of the past, probably at a lower level. This might still fall short of the replacement needs of the Jewish population. Moreover, by itself a fertility upswing would neither change the trend toward cumulative assimilatory losses nor rapidly alter the tendency toward further aging.

Demographic policies are difficult to devise and apply. All the more so is this true when one is dealing with a minority group that must act on a voluntary basis. Failing shifts in the pattern of general society toward increased nuptiality and fertility, any change in the respective behavior of American Jews would seem conditional on making a wide Jewish public aware of the demographic situation and prospects. This study supplies some of the relevant information, though, for lack of space, the manifold implications of the demographic trends could not be discussed.

This study has called attention to the complexity and fluidity of such phenomena as nuptiality, fertility, mixed marriage, etc., in the modern, largely secularized American Jewish community. There is a clear need for frequent monitoring and systematic research so that they can be better understood. The same holds true for the seemingly more straightforward matter of the changing size of U.S. Jewry.

⁷⁷The "total fertility rate" of all whites in the United States was about 1.7 during 1975-1978. Even the high projection for whites by the Bureau of the Census assumes that only at the end of the century will there be a return to the fertility level that is currently prevalent among European Jews in Israel.

APPENDIX

CONCISE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PROJECTIONS
(Compare Table 12A)

Method: component method, applied age-sex-specifically.

Projection period: 1975–2000.

Base population in 1975: (a) size: 5,600,000; (b) age-sex composition: NJPS figures updated to 1975, with adjustments.

Fertility: “low”: total fertility rate = 1.5; “rising”: from 1.5 to 2.1. Appropriate age-specific fertility rates were applied to the Jewish women.¹

Mortality: life expectancy at birth: 72.9 years for males; 76.1 for females.²

Assimilatory losses (implying, *inter alia*, intensification of the consequences of out-marriage for the Jewish population): “moderate”: the number of newborn, computed according to the fertility levels, was reduced increasingly from 2.5 per cent in 1976–1980 to 12.5 in 1996–2000; above infancy, average loss of two per thousand per annum, with enhanced impact in ages 20–34; “stronger”: losses of newborn rising from 5 to 25 per cent; above infancy, average loss of four per thousand per annum. The estimates in Tables 12 and 16 of the assimilatory losses of the newborn try to account for both the losses already prevalent by 1975 and for their relative increase during the projection period.³

External migration balance:⁴ “moderate”: positive, though declining from 105,000 in 1976–1980 to 50,000 in 1996–2000; a total of 365,000 from 1975 to 2000; “stronger”: ranging between 122,000 in 1976–1980 and 137,000 in 1981–1985 to 110,000 in 1996–2000; a total of 627,000 between 1975 and 2000. Different age-sex schedules have been applied to immigrants from the Diaspora, to *yordim*, and to emigrants from the United States.

U. O. SCHMELZ
SERGIO DELLA PERGOLA

¹Conceptually, in the computation of births according to these fertility assumptions, the non-Jewish wives of out-married Jews were replaced by proxies, *viz.*, by that group of out-married Jewesses who were estranged, but had not yet seceded from the Jewish community, and who themselves hardly contributed to “effectively Jewish” fertility. Experimentation with different realistic schedules of age-specific fertility rates, at the same level of total fertility (TFR), has shown that the resulting variations in the Jewish population size by year 2000 are quite minor.

²This is in accordance with the world projections. It is modeled on Israeli experience, which provides the only reliable life-tables for a large Jewish population. Control computations of the mortality of U.S. Jews, using the life-table of all U.S. whites in 1975 (males—69.4, females—77.2), yielded results similar to those in the projections.

³The differential fertility of out-married couples is, in principle, accounted for by the fertility assumptions.

⁴Fitted to global estimates of Jewish migration streams, accounting for reduced potentials from the main emigration regions (at constant age-specific emigration rates), because of shrinkage and aging of the respective Jewish populations.