

SOCIO-IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THE U.S. JEWISH POPULATION

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Preface

While the pluralistic nature of the U.S. Jewish population has been widely recognized, both in casual observation and, more recently, in sociological thought, much remains to be done in describing accurately the unique character and consequences of prevailing patterns of 'being Jewish in America'. One approach to this central problem focuses on a reconceptualization of Jewish Affiliation and Nonaffiliation, based on the following definitional criteria:

A person is considered to be affiliated with the Jewish community if he/she explicitly describes himself/herself as identifying with a Jewish ideology (e.g. Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, etc.), and if, in addition, he/she belongs to one (or more) Jewish congregation(s), or if he/she belongs to one (or more) Jewish organization(s), or both of the latter.

This definition takes account both the person's ideological self-description, and expressed behaviour (as reported) in Jewish congregation and/or Jewish organization membership. Accordingly, the derivative concept of 'Socio-ideological Type' spans psychological and sociological considerations, and provides a useful framework for systematic analysis of underlying Jewish population characteristics and emerging trends. Significant relationships between designated socio-ideological types and various demographic characteristics, - including age, income, and general education, - have been previously reported⁽¹⁾.

The question now arises whether 'socio-ideological type' analysis also facilitates systematic differentiations relating to the *quality* of Jewish affiliation, and with regard to 'subjective' elements, as for instance attitudes toward Jewishness, Israel and the non-Jewish environment. This paper addresses several issues associated with this inquiry.

Some Aspects of Methodology in Jewish Attitude Survey Research

Obstacles standing in the way of representative study of Jewish populations are frequently noted and lamented. To overcome the typical barriers, the U.S. National Jewish Population Study, NJPS, (1970-71) was based on a multi-stage stratified probability sample, systematically making pos-

(1) See Massarik, Fred. 'Affiliation and Nonaffiliation in the United States Jewish Community: a Reconceptualization'. In: *American Jewish Year Book 1978*. Vol. 78. p. 262-274.

sible inclusion of more 'elusive' sub-groups, - the marginal and unaffiliated - as well as those overtly related to the organized Jewish community. On this basis, the study design, utilizing an explicit probabilistic weighting procedure, sought to minimize bias typically found in surveys based exclusively on readily-available lists of known Jewish households.

The problem of representativeness is aggravated if one wishes to study attitudes rather than demographic characteristics. With regard to the latter, while definitional problems (e.g. for empiric purposes - 'who is a Jew?') necessarily must be faced, with regard to attitude research a host of subtler concerns surfaces. For instance, a particular household may be considered appropriate for inclusion if one or more of the persons contained therein specified criteria of 'Jewishness'. However, any one respondent in the attitude survey phase of the interview, while qualified on the basis of age, may or may not turn out to be a qualified Jewish respondent, if one wishes to so restrict the attitudinal inquiry. By way of obvious example, a non-Jew in an intermarriage may meet the age criterion of qualification (21 years old, or older) but may warrant exclusion on religious-ideological grounds, ('is not now and never was Jewish'). Less distinct gradations in religious-ideological identifications, viz. persons of mixed parentage, persons 'drifting' from one ideological orientation to another without the benefit of conversion, etc. complicate the judgment.

The NJPS made use of a random respondent selection procedure, based on specified decision rules, communicated to the interviewer in a pre-determined selection table contained in the interview form⁽²⁾. In accordance with this probability-determined algorithmic procedure, the interviewer was to select the designated respondent and that respondent only as the person to reply to the attitude questions.

While the formally-required procedures of respondent selection typically were well followed, 'common sense' adaptations and interviewer judgments resulted in inclusion of small numbers of non-Jews in addition to ex-Jews (converts out of Judaism) and avowedly 'atheist' or 'agnostic' Jews⁽³⁾. For many of these it may be assumed that attitude questions dealing specifically with Jewish issues may not appear relevant. In the present analysis, 2.6% of the respondents derive from these categories⁽⁴⁾. On 'purist' grounds it might be argued that none of these persons should have been queried on issues of specifically Jewish concern. Nonetheless

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- (2) This table required the interviewer to list specifically all persons resident in the housing unit who (a) are 21 years old or over, (b) are under 21 years of age but who are the 'head of the household' or the spouse of the head, *and* who (c) are non-Jewish or were Jewish in the past, or whose mother or father were/are Jewish.
- (3) 'Atheist' or 'agnostic' Jews explicitly deny or question the existence of God, but regard themselves as ideologically or ethnically Jewish.
- (4) Combined, non-Jews, ex-Jews (converts out of Judaism), 'atheistic' and 'agnostic' Jews constitute 7.2% of individuals in Jewish households, and 4.9% of NJPS household heads. (*Op. cit.* p. 265).

Table 1. Comparative Socio-Ideological Distributions, All Individuals/Respondents

	Per cent (a) individuals	Per cent (b) respondents	Ratio R/I(c)	Respon- dents	Rank, in- dividuals	Rank, re- spondents
Total	100.0	100.0		8778		
CA (d)	29.7	30.5	1.03	2674	1	1
RA	19.3	21.8	1.13	1916	2	2
CNA	10.8	9.8	0.91	857	3	5
RNA	10.0	10.8	1.08	947	4	4
JJ	9.9	12.2	1.23	1072	5	3
OA	7.3	7.5	1.03	662	6	6
NJ	5.5	1.1	0.20	99	7	9
MISC-J(e)	3.5	2.8	0.80	246	8	7
ONA	2.4	2.1	0.88	181	9	8
XJ	0.9	0.6	0.67	49	10	11
AAJ	0.8	0.9	1.13	75	11	10

(a) Age 13 and up; see Massarik, F. 'Affiliation and Non-affiliation in the U.S. Jewish Community' . . . AJYB, 1978. p. 265.

(b) Age 18 and up, random respondent selection, but some practical divergence from ideal procedure.

(c) Ratio = % respondents : % individuals.

(d) See text for explanation of symbols in this and following tables.

(e) Includes cases with missing data on socio-ideological orientation.

the resulting data are of interest, and indeed may provide glimpses of the future, recognizing the increasing appearance of marginal and even explicitly non-Jewish persons in Jewish households.

It is observed that the most populous 'mainstream' categories, the Reform and the Conservative, constitute approximately 70% of all NJPS individuals and 73% of all respondents.

A comparison, qualifying the respondent sample in socio-ideological distribution, comparing percentage distribution respondents versus all individuals, appears in Table 1. As a convenient indication of equality of representation the column headed 'Ratio: R/I' shows relative over-representation (Ratio $>$ 1), or under-representation (Ratio $<$ 1). As expected, the Non-Jews and Ex-Jews (respectively NJ and XJ categories) are the most under-represented, with Ratios of 0.20 and 0.67 respectively. On the other hand, relatively over-represented are those identifying as 'Just Jewish' (JJ), Atheist/Agnostic Jews (AAJ), and the Reform Affiliated (RA), with Ratios ranging from 1.13 to 1.23. One speculates that the relatively high education level found in these categories and the respondents' desires to explicitly make known their position, serve to bring about slight over-representation in the dynamics of the actual interview.

Much of the proposed analysis treats each socio-ideological type as discrete entity, and thus the issue of under/over representation enters solely when the total respondent population is considered. It is likely that for analytic purposes and as indications of relatively stable attitude and demographic structures, changes through time in such total population parameters are more saliently related to changes in the relative size - and thus relative numeric impact - of the several socio-ideological types, rather than being functions of changes occurring within each of the socio-ideological types. Indeed, this hypothesis may constitute a purposeful rationale for utilization of socio-ideological types as descriptive and, potentially, as predictative constructs.

Findings

The Respondents' Age Pattern

The age distribution of respondents generally conforms to the distribution of all individuals from which the respondents are sampled.

Specifically, the rank orders of respondent age cohorts when contrasted with comparable figures for individuals shows no deviations exceeding one rank position. (See comparison of columns 'rank-respondent' and 'rank-individuals', Table 2.) While this correspondence is reassuring, it must be noted, however, that given the realities of interviewer

Table 2. Age and Socio-Ideological Types

Most 'Youthful' Respondent Categories				Most 'Aged' Respondent Categories			
Per cent under 40 ^(a) within respondent category				Per cent 60 and older within respondent category			
		Rank respondents	Rank individuals (b)			Rank respondents	Rank individuals (d)
RNA	58.3	1	2	OA	51.9	1	2
NJ	57.2	2	1	ONA	41.4	2	1
MISC-J	54.3	3	x ^(c)	CA	25.8	3	3
JJ	41.4	4	5	RA	25.6	4	5
XJ	41.1	5	4	CNA	22.2	5	4

(a) Generally 18 to 39.

(b) 13-39; percentages not shown.

(c) MISC-J not included in prior analysis of individuals (*Op. cit.* AJYB. 1978); AAJ ranks there '3' in series.

(d) 65 and older; percentages not shown.

behaviour in the field, - random respondent selection rules notwithstanding - there is some tendency for over-inclusion of female respondents in several age categories.

In rank order, the most 'youthful' respondent categories are the Reform Non-affiliated, Non-Jews, 'Miscellaneous' Jews, Just Jewish, and Ex-Jews; for these, the proportions below age 40 range from about 40 to 58 per cent. The highest proportions of 'aged' respondents, 60 and older, appear for the following, in order: the Orthodox Affiliated, the Orthodox Non-affiliated, the Conservative Affiliated, the Reform Affiliated, and the Conservative Non-affiliated.

The Orthodox constitute a clearly defined unit with by far the highest aged proportions, - 41 percent to nearly 52 percent. Among the remaining categories, - the Conservative regardless of affiliation, and the Reform Affiliated, - appear as still another distinct entity; for these, the proportions of aged fall in the low to mid-20 percent range, indicating that most of the respondents are in mid-life.

Jewish Affiliative Activity Levels

We recall that socio-ideological types are constructed on the basis of reports of ideological self-description and memberships. However, beyond the relatively 'objective' expression of Jewish affiliation, one wonders whether such affiliation is followed up (at least in accordance with the respondent's statement) by direct activity in the institutions' programs. For instance, do affiliated persons appear to be active in congregation and Jewish organization programs; and are there differences in the extent of activity among the several ideologies?

Distribution of activity levels, respectively shown for temple or synagogue, and for Jewish club, or organization, appear in Tables 3 and 4. (NJPS variables 358, 359).

Considering the respondents as a group, it is clear that activity levels are quite low, and that differences between activity levels reported for temple or synagogue (to be referred to as 'congregation') on one hand, and for Jewish club or organization (to be denoted 'Jewish organization') on the other are minor: more than 60 per cent report no activity at all; only 11 to 13 per cent claim high activity levels.

These general trends, however, mask important differences among socio-ideological types. This becomes apparent as one examines the several 'clusters' of types shown in Tables 3 and 4, and in the derived rank ordering of types appearing in Table 5.

As expected, the most active, both in congregation and in Jewish organization, are, in order, the Orthodox Affiliated, the Conservative Affiliated, the Reform Affiliated and those in the Miscellaneous-Jewish category. Moderate to high activity levels in descending order from above 60 per cent to about 50 per cent, are reported by the Orthodox Affiliated, Conservative Affiliated and Reform Affiliated.

The Orthodox, whether or not explicitly temple members, tend to be

Table 3. Socio-ideological Types and Jewish Affiliative Activity Levels - Temple or Synagogue (variable 358)

	Not at all	(b) Moderate	(a) High	N.A.	Total	N
OA	34.4	32.2	31.8	1.6	100.0	(662)
CA	46.1	38.2	15.0	0.7	100.0	(2674)
RA	49.6	35.2	13.8	1.4	100.0	(1916)
MISC-J ^(c)	67.5	14.6	16.7	1.2	100.0	(246)
ONA	80.7	13.8	5.0	0.5	100.0	(181)
CNA	92.5	6.3	1.0	0.2	100.0	(857)
RNA	93.2	6.2	0.3	0.3	100.0	(947)
JJ	90.5	7.1	2.1	0.3	100.0	(1072)
AAJ	98.7	1.3	0	0	100.0	(75)
XJ	100.0	0	0	0	100.0	(49)
NJ	84.8	7.1	6.1	2.0	100.0	(99)
Total	63.5	24.8	11.0	0.7	100.0	(8778)

(a) 'quite active' + 'very active'.

(b) 'slightly active' + '?'.
(c) 'MISC-J' + 'MISSING' : viz. heterogeneous category including respondents with specific and/or unreported Jewish congregational and/or Jewish organizational associations, including among others Reconstructionists, Sephardic, 'traditional', and the like.

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Table 4. Socio-ideological Types and Jewish Affiliative Activity Levels - Active in Jewish Club or Organization (variable 359)

	Not at all	(b) Moderate	(a) High	N.A.	Total	N
OA	38.5	28.8	34.1	1.6	100.0	(662)
CA	47.5	34.0	17.3	1.2	100.0	(2674)
RA	49.9	31.1	17.0	2.0	100.0	(1916)
MISC-J ^(c)	58.1	18.7	21.5	1.7	100.0	(246)
ONA	87.3	7.7	3.9	1.1	100.0	(181)
CNA	90.7	6.2	2.7	0.4	100.0	(857)
RNA	91.7	7.2	0.9	0.2	100.0	(947)
JJ	86.6	8.0	4.6	0.8	100.0	(1072)
AAJ	77.3	17.3	5.3	0.1	100.0	(75)
XJ	100.0	0	0	0	100.0	(49)
NJ	82.8	12.2	4.0	1.0	100.0	(99)
Total	63.2	22.4	13.2	1.2	100.0	(8778)

- Notes as shown in Table 3 apply.

Table 5. Jewish Affiliative Activity Levels - Ranks

A. Rank Summary ('high' + 'moderate')		
Rank	Temple or synagogue	Jewish club or organization
1	OA (64.0)	OA (59.9)
2	CA (53.2)	CA (51.3)
3	RA (49.0)	RA (48.1)
4	MISC-J (31.3)	MISC-J (40.2)

5	ONA (18.8)	AAJ (22.6)
6	NJ (13.2)	NJ (16.2)
7	JJ (9.2)	JJ (12.6)
8	CNA (7.3)	ONA (11.6)
9	RNA (6.5)	CNA (8.9)
10	AAJ (1.3)	RNA (8.1)
11	XJ (0)	XJ (0)

B. Mean Rank - (Temple or Synagogue + Jewish Club or Organization)

Predominant activity in . . . (a)

OA	1	T
CA	2	T
RA	3	
MISC-J	4	O
NJ	6	O
ONA	6.5	T
JJ	7	O
AAJ	7.5	O
CNA	8.5	O
RNA	9.5	O
XJ	11	

(a) Difference of 1% or more in percentage reporting 'high' or 'moderate' activity level in temple or synagogue/Jewish club or organization:
 T = Temple, O = Jewish organization.

relatively more involved with a congregation than with a Jewish organization.

The Conservative and Reform Affiliated balance about evenly their activity levels between congregation and Jewish organization. For all other socio-ideological types, organizational activity somewhat exceeds congregational activity.

Totally inactive are the Ex-Jews, while - and the apparent anomaly may be of substantial long-range significance in view of high intermarriage rates, - Non-Jews in Jewish households report modest activity levels (moderate or high activity) of 13 per cent for congregations and 16 per cent for Jewish organizations.

The primacy of the congregation among the Orthodox, regardless of affiliative status, conforms to popular views of Orthodox religious life. With formal membership, as by dues paying, a less pronounced requirement among the Orthodox, and with relatively intense emotional commitment to the temple, such predominance of congregational involvement over the 'secular' Jewish organization is readily understood.

Differences between congregational and Jewish organizational commitment are less distinct among the Conservative Affiliated and Reform Affiliated. For all other categories, (excluding the totally inactive Ex-Jews), the quasi-secular (or, at any rate, less directly 'religious') commitment to Jewish organization activity is evident.

Of special interest is the rather high percentage of Agnostic-Atheist Jews who, while almost completely rejecting religious connection, often are quite active in Jewish organizations, perhaps typically for business and professional reasons.

Noting the high incidence of religiously-active aged in the Orthodox categories and, conversely, the young among the Reform Non-affiliated, Non-Jews, Miscellaneous Jews and the Just Jewish, a fundamental rethinking by temple and synagogue leadership may be in order if the younger unaffiliated - a significant group in demographic projections - are to be reached.

Attitudes Toward the Roots of Jewish Continuity

A persistent concern of the organized U.S. Jewish community centers on the possibilities of Jewish 'survival' or Jewish 'continuity' in the United States. Lately it has been recognized that elemental facts of fertility, perhaps in greater measure than high intermarriage rates, are critical in determining sheer numbers of the Jewish population. However, numbers alone are, in one sense, irrelevant unless affirmation of Jewish life, rooted in personal and social commitment prevails. Both research and informal observation suggest that commitments to Continuity or Survival are likely to be associated with differences in socio-ideological pattern. Survey findings confirm important regularities in this regard.

Tables 6, 7 and 8 focus on three attitude items, as follows:

- *The concept of 'a common bond'* - 'Jewish people everywhere have some important things in common' (NJPS variable 387);

Table 6. A Common Bond?: 'Jewish people everywhere have some important things in common' (variable 387)

	No			Yes		NA	Total	Agreement	Doubt
	--	-	?	+	++				
OA	1.1	0.8	4.2	18.1	70.1	5.7	100.0	88.2	9.9
CA	1.6	3.7	1.6	25.6	64.8	2.7	100.0	90.4	4.3
RA	1.3	5.7	1.5	33.6	53.3	4.5	100.0	86.9	6.0
ONA	6.1	5.0	4.4	19.9	61.9	2.8	100.0	81.8	7.2
CNA	2.6	1.6	2.1	37.8	53.1	2.8	100.0	90.9	4.9
RNA	2.3	6.4	6.8	38.0	44.1	2.3	100.0	82.1	9.1
MISC-J	1.0	6.2	11.9	19.6	47.9	13.4	100.0	67.5	25.3
JJ	8.0	11.0	2.0	42.2	33.3	3.5	100.0	75.5	5.5
AAJ	2.7	10.7	5.3	30.7	48.0	2.7	100.0	78.7	8.0
XJ	14.3	12.2	8.2	40.8	18.7	6.1	100.0	59.2	14.3
NJ	1.0	4.0	13.1	33.3	27.3	21.2	100.0	60.6	34.3
Total	2.6	5.1	3.0	31.4	54.0	3.9	100.0	85.4	6.9

'Agreement' = + and ++; e.g. 'agree strongly' plus 'agree'. Similar combinations used in following Tables, adapted to specific question wording.

'Doubt' = '?' and 'NA' ('no answer').

- *Commitment to Jewish survival* - 'it is important that there should always be a Jewish people' (variable 388); and
- *Commitment to Jewish education* - 'Jewish children must have some Jewish education' (variable 391).

These three items stand high in the manifest relevance to the issues, and in their pivotal position in rudimentary scales of 'Jewish identity'. The following are major results:

- (a) Commitment to Jewish Continuity is overwhelmingly affirmed in each instance, - by at least 80 per cent of respondents when the total of high and moderate agreement is considered.
- (b) Commitment is most clear-cut for the position that 'it is important that there should always be a Jewish people' - above 70 per cent strongly concur in this view.
- (c) Within each ideological category, endorsement of views favourable to Jewish Continuity among the Affiliated consistently exceeds such endorsement by the Unaffiliated.
- (d) Considering exclusively the most favourable extreme of the several response scale (e.g. 'strong agreement'), *completely* regular associations appear:

Highest proportions of "pro-Jewish Continuity" positions are found among the Orthodox, followed by the Conservative, in turn followed by the Reform.

Further, for each ideological category, this positive attitude is found in higher proportion among the Affiliated than among the Non-affiliated.

- (e) At the low end of the ordering among socio-ideological types, with respect to affirmation of Jewish Continuity stand the Agnostic-Atheist Jews, the Non-Jews and the Ex-Jews. (It is worthy of note that the attitudes among the Ex-Jews are less positive in this regard than those expressed by Non-Jews.)

When a wider band of pro Jewish-Continuity attitudes is considered (e.g. "strongly agree" and "agree" combined) differences among ideologies, and between affiliated and unaffiliated narrow. For the three attitude questions combined, the mean rank of positive response by the Conservative exceeds that found for the Orthodox! This is contrary to the frequently recurring constellation in pro Jewish-Continuity positions that runs 1 - 2 - 3, -- Orthodox, Conservative, Reform. One speculates that while *intense* Jewish affirmation is most prevalent among the Orthodox, a broad middle-range affirmation of Jewishness is characteristic of the ideologic 'mainstream' constituted by the Conservative movement.

So far we have focused principally on various *degrees* of positive attitude towards Jewish Continuity, an emphasis consistent with the very high proportion of such supportive attitudes (80-90%) found in the study population. To briefly examine the negative, and the appearance of doubt: even with inclusion of Ex-Jews, Non-Jews and Agnostic-Atheist Jews, only

Table 7. Commitment to Jewish Survival: 'It is important that there should always be a Jewish people' (variable 388)

	Not important			Important		NA	Total	Important	Doubt
	--	-	?	+	++				
OA	0.2	0.6	5.9	3.6	84.6	5.1	100.0	88.2	11.0
CA	2.0	0.6	2.6	9.7	82.3	2.8	100.0	92.0	5.4
RA	1.1	3.1	8.0	14.4	68.8	4.6	100.0	83.2	12.6
ONA	3.3	0	5.0	7.2	81.8	2.8	100.0	89.0	7.8
CNA	1.9	2.1	3.7	11.8	77.6	2.9	100.0	89.4	6.6
RNA	1.5	3.8	10.8	22.4	59.3	2.2	100.0	81.7	13.0
MISC-J	2.6	2.1	7.7	21.1	52.6	13.9	100.0	73.7	21.6
JJ	2.5	3.5	15.0	28.8	46.8	3.4	100.0	75.6	18.4
AAJ	14.7	29.3	10.7	14.7	26.7	4.0	100.0	41.4	14.7
XJ	18.4	10.2	12.2	24.5	28.6	6.1	100.0	53.1	18.3
NJ	2.0	3.0	16.2	21.2	36.4	21.2	100.0	57.6	37.4
Total	1.9	2.4	7.0	14.7	70.2	3.8	100.0	84.9	10.8

Table 8. Commitment to Jewish Education: 'Jewish children must have some Jewish education' (variable 391)

	Do not need to have Jewish education			Must have Jewish education		NA	Total	Must	Doubt
	--	-	?	+	++				
OA	1.8	1.2	2.6	6.9	86.1	1.4	100.0	93.0	4.0
CA	0.5	3.3	1.4	16.9	77.2	0.8	100.0	94.1	2.2
RA	6.4	5.2	2.0	27.2	57.7	1.5	100.0	84.9	3.5
ONA	3.9	2.2	3.3	10.5	77.9	2.2	100.0	88.4	5.5
CNA	2.8	1.6	2.2	35.2	56.9	1.2	100.0	92.1	3.4
RNA	4.0	7.0	9.0	46.7	31.9	1.5	100.0	78.6	10.5
MISC-J	13.9	2.6	2.1	15.5	54.6	11.3	100.0	70.1	13.4
JJ	12.7	14.9	15.1	32.8	21.9	2.5	100.0	54.7	17.6
AAJ	25.3	21.3	9.3	28.0	13.3	2.7	100.0	41.3	12.0
XJ	26.5	16.3	8.2	32.7	8.2	8.2	100.0	40.9	16.4
NJ	2.0	13.1	13.1	31.3	20.2	20.2	100.0	51.5	33.3
Total	4.8	5.5	4.6	25.5	57.7	1.8	100.0	83.2	6.4

Table 9. The Roots of Jewish Continuity: Ranks (total +, ++)

	Common Bond	Commitment to survival	Commitment to Jewish education	\bar{M}_r	Rank of \bar{M}_r
CA	2	1	1	1.3	1
CNA	1	2	3	2.0	2
OA	3	4	2	3.0	3
ONA	6	3	4	4.3	4
RA	4	5	5	4.7	5
RNA	5	6	6	5.7	6
JJ	8	7	8	7.7	7
MISC-J	9	8	7	8.0	8
AAJ	7	11	10	9.3	9.5
NJ	10	9	9	9.3	9.5
XJ	11	10	11	10.7	11

some 4% specifically disagree with the statement that "it is important that there should always be a Jewish people". However, about 8% question whether "Jewish people everywhere have some important things in common", and about 10% clearly disagree with the view that "Jewish children must have some Jewish education". (Some of those disagreeing may opt for a more voluntary view of Jewish education, psychologically delegating decision power to the child.)

Doubt, as revealed by response indicating uncertainty (i.e. checking the '?' alternative), or absence of response altogether appears most frequently among the Non-Jews in the Jewish households. Such doubt characterizes more than one-third of the group. The more marginal categories as well (the Just Jewish, Agnostic-Atheist Jews and Ex-Jews) also frequently reveal fairly substantial doubt levels, - from 10 to 25 per cent.

In the long-term we may well see a further broadening of Conservative ideology and not extreme but broad middle-of-the-road affirmation of Jewish Continuity by this large group. However, given projected age and mortality factors and the probably limited impact of groups such as the young Hasidim, the most enthusiastic positive support represented by the Orthodox appears on the wane. Further, continued influx of Non-Jews into Jewish households by intermarriage may somewhat dilute the intensity of commitment to Jewish survival. At the same time, the absence of explicitly negative response among persons frequently marginal to their Jewish roots and influx of Non-Jews into the 'Jewish' family may establish a novel basis for dialogue on Jewish commitment that previously did not exist. Present attitudes establish a favourable starting point for such dialogue.

Attitudes Toward Israel

Our analysis addresses three aspects of U.S. Jews' response to Israel:

- *Commitment to Israel*: "Jews in the U.S. must do all they can to help Israel survive", (NJPS variable 393);
 - *Aliyah*: "Jews in the U.S. should move to Israel" (variable 394), and
 - *Israel Interest Support*: "If official U.S. policy were opposed to Israel's interests, (respondent) would support Israel's interest". (variable 397).
- (See Table 10, 11, 12 and 13).

Principal Findings

(a) There is wide agreement that U.S. Jews must do all they can to help Israel survive: strongest agreement by 67 per cent and, (inclusive of the latter) general agreement by more than 85 per cent.

(b) There is no widespread public support among U.S. Jews for Aliyah, with only 9 per cent agreeing that Jews in the United States should move to Israel.

Table 10. Commitment to Israel: 'Jews in U.S. must do all they can to help Israel survive (variable 393)

	Do not help Israel survival			Help Israel survival		NA	Total	Help Israel	Doubt
	--	-	?	+	++				
OA	0.6	0.9	0.8	5.9	90.0	1.8	100.0	95.9	2.6
CA	1.8	1.9	1.1	12.8	81.2	1.1	100.0	94.0	2.2
RA	0.9	4.3	6.0	22.5	64.4	1.9	100.0	86.9	7.9
ONA	0	1.1	3.3	9.4	84.5	1.7	100.0	93.9	5.0
CNA	0.9	17.6	2.7	19.8	57.4	1.5	100.0	77.2	4.2
RNA	3.7	6.2	8.0	27.0	53.1	1.9	100.0	80.1	9.9
MISC-J	1.5	2.6	14.9	17.5	52.1	11.3	100.0	69.6	26.2
JJ	4.9	3.3	12.2	25.6	46.8	7.3	100.0	72.4	19.5
AAJ	5.3	9.3	12.0	14.7	57.3	1.3	100.0	72.0	13.3
XJ	14.3	14.3	12.2	38.8	12.2	8.2	100.0	51.0	20.4
NJ	6.1	2.0	16.2	26.3	28.3	21.2	100.0	54.6	37.4
Total	2.1	4.7	5.1	18.6	66.8	2.7	100.0	85.4	7.8

Table 11. "Aliyah": 'Jews in U.S. should move to Israel' (variable 394)

	No		?	Yes		NA	Total	Agreement	Doubt
	--	-		+	++				
OA	26.4	19.0	20.7	19.2	10.3	4.4	100.0	29.5	25.1
CA	48.0	26.8	12.0	9.1	2.6	2.5	100.0	11.7	14.5
RA	67.5	19.7	5.4	4.0	0.3	3.1	100.0	4.3	8.5
ONA	47.0	21.0	16.6	8.8	5.0	1.7	100.0	13.8	18.3
CNA	48.7	37.7	5.4	5.8	0.8	1.6	100.0	6.6	7.0
RNA	62.2	22.0	7.4	5.0	0.6	2.8	100.0	5.6	10.2
MISC-J	46.9	22.2	9.8	6.2	2.6	12.4	100.0	8.8	22.2
JJ	48.3	19.6	20.5	2.5	1.2	7.9	100.0	3.7	28.4
AAJ	61.3	9.3	16.0	5.3	1.3	6.7	100.0	6.6	22.7
XJ	77.6	8.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.2	100.0	4.0	10.2
NJ	55.6	10.1	20.2	3.0	0	11.1	100.0	3.0	31.3
Total	52.6	23.7	11.2	6.9	2.2	4.4	100.0	9.1	15.6

(c) In case of conflict between U.S. government policy and Israel's interests, nearly one-half of respondents favour support of Israel's interests. However, while in this kind of cross-pressure situation, specific support of U.S. policy is asserted by less than 20 per cent, a substantial proportion, nearly 31 per cent, express doubt as to the direction of their likely support.

(d) For the major ideological groups, - Orthodox, Conservative and Reform, - the *most* favourable attitudes towards Israel appear among the Orthodox, followed by the Conservative, and Reform, - in that order, paralleling previously established patterns. There are, however, some minor divergences from this common regularity.

(e) The Reform are significantly less likely to express endorsement of Aliyah or of support of Israel's interests in case of governmental policy conflict than other socio-ideological types, - not only as compared with the Orthodox and Conservative, but also in contrast with the Miscellaneous category and Agnostic-Atheist Jews. The latter group may be more sympathetic to *Aliyah* and to support of Israel's interest in case of policy conflict as expression of an articulate secularist philosophy, though personal commitment may be low.

(f) A majority of Non-Jews in Jewish households express agreement with U.S. Jewish support of Israel, though in lesser measure than do most Jewish socio-ideological types. Least supportive are the Ex-Jews.

More than any of the other types, the Non-Jews are inclined to offer no opinion on issues affecting Israel.

The above results point to a widely-based if not always specific or practical commitment to Israel's survival. The suggestion that Jews should leave the United States to seek a "homecoming" to Israel is, for the most part, coldly received. However, while thus asserting the essentially *American* character of U.S. Jewry, the respondents regard themselves as a force typically inclined to support Israel's interests under conditions of policy cross-pressure. Support of Israel as broadly defined (considering "strongly agree" and "agree" responses combined) is asserted most clearly by the Orthodox Affiliated, followed by the Conservative Affiliated (see Table 8). The Orthodox Non-affiliated also stand high in the rank ordering of Israel Support while, on relative terms, the Reform, both Affiliated and Non-affiliated appear less committed, particularly when Aliyah and Israel's interest in case of government policy conflict are considered.

One major expression of commitment to Israel is outside the purview of this paper - fundraising and organized Jewish philanthropy. With substantial success of fundraising campaigns, based heavily on the emotional appeal of Israel to the American Jew, as well as on U.S. and local community needs, study and observation indicate the continuing significance of Israel as a focal point in the U.S. Jewish experience. This issue will be treated in a separate paper.

Table 12. Israel Interest Support: 'If official U.S. policy were opposed to Israel's interests, would support ...' (variable 397)

	U.S. policy			Israel's interests		NA	Total	Support for Israel	Doubt
	--	-	?	+	++				
OA	3.0	10.7	15.9	17.7	44.1	8.6	100.0	61.8	24.5
CA	2.8	6.8	20.2	32.7	32.6	4.9	100.0	65.3	25.1
RA	6.5	17.9	29.6	17.7	21.9	6.4	100.0	39.6	36.0
ONA	5.0	13.3	11.0	23.2	42.0	5.5	100.0	65.2	16.5
CNA	2.7	24.5	25.8	26.4	16.2	4.4	100.0	50.3	30.2
RNA	9.0	24.3	27.9	15.4	20.1	3.4	100.0	35.5	31.3
MISC-J	3.3	15.0	29.7	13.4	27.3	11.4	100.0	40.7	41.1
JJ	8.1	10.4	28.3	17.6	26.0	9.6	100.0	33.6	37.9
AAJ	2.7	5.3	24.0	21.3	32.0	14.7	100.0	53.3	38.7
XJ	12.2	32.7	20.4	18.4	10.2	6.1	100.0	28.6	26.5
NJ	12.1	8.1	33.3	13.1	9.1	24.2	100.0	22.2	57.5
Total	5.1	14.1	24.5	22.8	27.0	6.4	100.0	49.8	30.9

Table 13. The View on Israel: Ranks (total +, ++)

	Commitment to Israel	Aliyah	Israel interest	\bar{M}_r	Rank of \bar{M}_r
OA	1	1	3	1.7	1
CA	2	3	1	2.0	2
ONA	3	2	2	2.3	3
CNA	6	5.5	5	5.5	4
AAJ	8	5.5	4	5.8	5
MISC-J	9	4	6	6.3	6.5
RA	4	8	7	6.3	6.5
RNA	5	7	8	6.7	8
JJ	7	10	9	8.7	9
XJ	11	9	10	10.0	10
NJ	10	11	11	10.7	11

Concluding Remarks

The analysis presented would seem to indicate the conceptual utility of the 'socio-ideological type' approach to the differentiation of Jewish populations. Certain consistent patterns, as reported, appear. Deviations from commonly-recurring patterns, generally placing the Orthodox Affiliated at one extreme and Ex-Jews at the other, lay the groundwork for purposeful discourse.

Substantively, we may conclude that *generic* support for Jewish Continuity and Israel's viability is pervasive but not universal. A spectrum of differences among socio-ideological types is discernible. Projected demographic changes point to corrolary changes in the attitude climate, particularly reducing the extreme of enthusiasm and 'heroic' commitment. Study results encourage the conclusion that Jewish people in the U.S. hold positive views of survival and their links to Israel. Within this framework, however, shifts and realignments appear nascent, and the future development of American-Jewish viability will require both deeper insight and imaginative redesign of Jewish religious and communal institutions.