

PROFILES OF THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Volume II:
RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS
& BEHAVIOR
of College Faculty

GARY A. TOBIN
ARYEH K. WEINBERG

PROFILES OF THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Volume 2:

RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS
& BEHAVIOR
of College Faculty

GARY A. TOBIN, PH.D
ARYEH K. WEINBERG

Copyright © 2007 Institute for Jewish & Community Research

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

For information on this and other publications, go to www.JewishResearch.org.
To order copies of this volume, contact the Institute for Jewish & Community Research at info@JewishResearch.org.

Production — DC Type, San Francisco, CA

Printing — Master Color Printing, Roseville, CA

This book is printed on 70# chlorine-free, archival paper using all vegetable-based inks. The paper was manufactured using sustainably harvested eucalyptus pulp.

CONTENTS

Major Findings.....	1
Data Summary.....	3
Introduction	13
Religious Identity and Belief	19
Belief in God	22
Religious Behavior	29
Religion and Politics—Political Identity, Views of America, Business and Internationalism.....	45
Business.....	51
America	53
Internationalism.....	60
Prayer in the Public Sector.....	67
Religious Advocacy	71
Religious Tolerance and Intolerance.....	79
Conclusion.....	85
Appendix: Faculty Survey Methodology	89
Notes	95
About the Authors	100

MAJOR FINDINGS

Most Faculty Believe in God, but Atheism Is Significantly More Prevalent among Faculty Than the General Public

The proportion of faculty who self-identified as atheist is over five times the proportion of people who self-identified as atheist in the general public.

Faculty Are Much Less Religious Than the General Public

The American public is much more likely to say that religion is very important in their everyday lives and to attend religious services more frequently than faculty.

Religious Beliefs of College Faculty Are Highly Associated with Political Identity and Behavior

Faculty who are liberal and secular tend to be more critical about current American foreign and domestic policies. Those who are religious and conservative tend to be more positive about American foreign and domestic policies.

The Secular/Liberal Proportion of Faculty Is Much Higher Than the Religious/Conservative

Among faculty, secular/liberal is clearly the dominant ideology as compared to religious/conservative.

Faculty Feel Warmly about Most Religious Groups, but Feel Coldly about Evangelicals and Mormons

Faculty have positive feelings toward Jews, Buddhists, Catholics, and Atheists.

Faculty Feel Most Unfavorably about Evangelical Christians

This is the only religious group about which a majority of non-Evangelical faculty have negative feelings.

Faculty Are Almost Unanimous in Their Belief That Evangelical Christians (Fundamentalists) Should Keep Their Religious Beliefs Out of American Politics

Faculty who are secular/liberal are more likely to favor separation of religion and government, and those who are religious and conservative are more likely to advocate a closer connection between religion and government.

Although Faculty Generally Oppose Religion in the Public Sphere, Many Endorse the Idea That Muslims Should Express Their Religious Beliefs in American Politics

Faculty are far less likely to endorse Evangelical Christians expressing their beliefs in American politics.

DATA SUMMARY

Faculty Are Religiously Diverse

The largest religious group among faculty is non-Evangelical Christians, 25%, followed by Catholics, 18%, those with no religion, 14%, Evangelical Christians, 11%, atheists, 8%, Jews, 5%, Unitarians, 3%, and Buddhists, 2%. Muslims, Hindus and “other” are each around 1%. Ten percent of faculty preferred not to answer.

The General Public Has a Much Higher Evangelical Population Than Faculty

Among the public, the largest religious group is Evangelicals at 33%, followed Catholics, 24%, Non-Evangelicals, 22%, those with no religion, 11%, Jews, 2%, while Mormons, and atheists, Muslims, Buddhists and other all hover around 1%.

Faculty Are Much Less Christian Than the General Public

While 80% of the public self-identify as Christian, only 56% of faculty self-identify in the same way. The drop in Evangelicals among faculty, who are three times more numerous in the general public, largely accounts for the difference.

Most Faculty Believe in God

Among faculty, 46% asserted that they have a personal relationship with God, 19% answered that they have no relationship but believe in God, 19% said they do not, and 17% preferred not to answer. Within the public, 66% answered that they have a personal relationship, 27% answered that they have no personal relationship but believe in God, only 4% said they do not, and 3% chose not to answer.

Math, Science and Social Sciences Faculty Are the Least Likely to Believe in God

By academic department, Health and Education had the strongest personal relationship with God, 64% and 62% respectively, followed by Business faculty at 52%. Oppositely, 28% of Science/Math faculty and 23% of Humanities and Social Science faculty each said they do not believe in God.

A Minority of Faculty Says That Religion Is Very Important in Their Lives

Among faculty, 36% answered that religion is very important, 27% fairly important, 32% not important, and 6% preferred not to answer. Within the public, 61% answered that religion is very important, 24% fairly important, 13% not important, and 2% preferred not to answer.

Most Faculty Attend Religious Services, but Less Often Than the General Public

Among all faculty, 27% said that they attend every week or more often, including 9% who attend more than once a week, and 18% who attend every week. Another 10% said they attend almost every week, 7% once or twice a month, and 5% said that they attend 6 to 10 times per year. Fourteen percent said they attend a few times a year and 30% said they attend less often or never. Seven percent of the

respondents preferred not to answer the question. Conversely, 39% percent of all Americans said they attend religious services every week or more, 17% almost every week to once a month, 6% 6 to 10 times a year, 13% a few times a year, and 23% less often or never.

A Large Majority of Faculty Wants Their Children to Have Some Religious Training

Seventy-three percent of the faculty agreed, 19% disagreed, and 8% were not sure. Among the general population, 86% want their children to have some religious training, 13% more than faculty. Only 10% disagreed.

Most Faculty Agreed That There Are Certain Moral Values That Should Apply across All Cultures, Societies, and Nations

About 84% of faculty agreed, 13% disagreed, and 4% were not sure. However, the vast majority of faculty disagreed that having a strong religious background is necessary for a person to develop a strong moral character. Seventy-nine percent of faculty disagreed with the statement. Only 19% agreed, and 2% were unsure. Among all Americans, 54% agreed that it is necessary to have a religious background in order to build a strong moral character and 43% disagreed.

Faculty Are Twice as Likely as the General Public to Identify as Liberal

Overall, when asked to describe their position on most political issues, 48% of faculty said they are liberal, 31% said they are moderate/middle of the road, and 17% said they are conservative. Five percent chose not to answer or did not know. Comparatively, 22% of the general population self-identified as liberal, 31% as conservative, and 38% as moderate, a significant difference from the faculty.

Faculty Are Far More Democratic Than Republican

Overall, only 16% of faculty said they are Republicans, 46% Democrats, and 33% independents. In the public, 28% identified as Republican, 32% as Democrat and 31% as independent. No faculty religious group had a Republican majority, although Evangelical Christians came the closest with 48%, 18% of whom said they are Democrats and 33% who said they are independents.

Evangelical Christians Are the Only Religious Group on Campus Which Voted in the Majority for George Bush in 2004

Among Evangelical faculty, 68% voted for Bush, 30% for Kerry, and 2% for other candidates. Oppositely, 87% of Jews and 90% of atheists/no religion voted for John Kerry while only 12% of Jews voted for Bush, as did 7% of atheists/no religion. Catholics and non-Evangelical Christians were quite similar, with about three of ten voting for Bush and seven of ten voting for Kerry and other candidates.

Political Party Self-Identification among Faculty and a Belief in God Are Linked

Seventy-four percent of Republicans answered that they have a personal relationship with God while only 4% said they do not believe in God. Conversely, only 36% of Democratic faculty said they have a personal relationship with God, while 26% do not believe in God.

Political Ideology Is Highly Associated with Attendance at Religious Services

About fourteen percent of those faculty who self-identified as liberal said they attend religious services every week or more often and another 9% almost every week, for a rounded total of 24%. For those who called themselves moderates, about 31% said they attend

religious services every week or more often and 14% almost every week, for a rounded total of 44%. For those who identified themselves as conservatives, about 58% attend every week or more often and another 9% almost every week for a rounded total of 66%.

Faculty Who Identify as Atheist/No Religion Were the Most Likely to Agree That International Trade Agreements Have Favored Large Corporations

Seventy-eight percent of atheist/no religion faculty agreed. Evangelical Christians were the least likely to agree—64%. Seventy-five percent of Jews agreed, 73% of Catholics, and 69% of non-Evangelical Christians.

Most Atheist/No Religion Faculty Agreed That Many of the Problems That Now Exist in Middle Eastern Countries Can Be Traced to Misguided American Policies

Atheist/no religion faculty agreed by a margin of 64% who agreed to 28% who disagreed. About 47% of Jews agreed, as did 44% each of Catholics and non-Evangelical Christians. Yet, only 25% of Evangelical Christians agreed and 65% disagreed.

The Vast Majority of Faculty Listed North Korea Followed by the United States as the Two Greatest Threats to International Stability

When asked to list two countries that faculty think are “the greatest threats to international stability,” the vast majority of faculty, 70%, listed North Korea. Second to North Korea was the United States at 29%, then Iran at 27%, China at 19%, and other countries at less than 15%. For those who answered that religion is very important to them, only 16% see the United States as a threat to international stability versus 30% of those who said religion is fairly important to them and 41% who said religion is not important to them.

Less Religious Faculty Are More Likely to Name United States Policies as a Primary Cause for Islamic Militancy

Thirty-three percent of Evangelical Christians named the United States, as opposed to 68% of atheists/no religion. A majority of Catholics, 52%, and non-Evangelical Christian faculty, 55%, and 58% of Jews also named the United States. Seventy-two percent of liberals and 65% of Democrats versus 20% of conservatives and 23% of Republicans, and 66% of Kerry voters versus and 18% of Bush voters named United States policies in the Middle East as a cause for the growth of Islamic militancy.

Islam Itself Is Named as a Cause of Islamic Militancy

Fifty-two percent of Evangelical Christians listed the Islamic religion itself, 18% of atheists/no religion, and 25% of all other religious denominations. More frequent service attendees and those who said religion is very important to them were much more likely to name the Islamic religion itself. While 13% of liberals named Islam itself, 56% of conservatives did so. And while 17% of Democrats and 16% of Kerry voters named Islam itself, 50% of Republicans and 57% of Bush voters named Islam itself as a cause of Islamic militancy.

The Least Religious Faculty Are More Likely to List United States Policies as the Greatest Obstacle to Stability in the Middle East

A majority of Evangelicals, 57%, named Islamic fundamentalism, as did 47% of non-Evangelical Christians and Jews. Jews were also the least likely to list the policies of the United States in the Middle East as an obstacle to stability, 8%, aligned more closely with Evangelical Christians, 14% of whom named the United States. This compares to atheists/no religion, 35% of whom named the United States, as did 26% of Catholics and 24% of non-Evangelical Christian faculty.

Most Faculty Religious Groups Are Likely to Support Institutions Such as the International Court of Justice

Eighty percent of atheists/no religion agreed that supporting institutions such as the International Court of Justice is the right policy even if it limits America's options, as did 73% of Jews. On the other hand, only 39% of Evangelical Christians agreed, as did 59% of Catholics and 67% of non-Evangelical Christians. Fifty-four percent of those for whom religion is very important agreed versus 66% of those who said religion is fairly important and 81% of those who said religion is not important. In the same vein, 49% of those who attend religious services every week agreed versus 81% of those who attend rarely. Thirty-six percent of all Americans agreed with faculty while 42% rejected the idea that the International Court of Justice should be supported if it limits America's options.

Faculty Oppose American Unilateralism

Fifty-eight percent disagreed that "if other nations are unwilling to join America in fighting terrorism around the globe, then American must go it alone." About 34% of faculty agreed, and 8% were unsure. The public view was reversed—56% agreed, 39% disagreed, and 4% were unsure. The majority of Evangelical Christian faculty supported the statement, 56%, versus 37% of non-Evangelical Christians and 36% of Catholics. Twenty-eight percent of Jewish faculty agreed with this statement, as did 24% of atheists/no religion faculty. Among the general population, atheists/no religion were the least supportive of the statement—46% agreed and 46% disagreed—but were still more supportive than faculty as a whole.

Most Faculty Agreed That They Would Prefer a United Nations with More Authority

This would include resolving international disputes, including disputes involving the United States. Seventy percent of faculty agreed with this statement, 22% disagreed, and 8% were not sure. Among

all Americans, 61% agreed, 31% disagreed, and 7% were unsure. The most supportive groups among the public were Jews, 75%, Catholics, 71%, and atheists/no religion, 68%. Among faculty, atheists/no religion were most likely to agree, 82%, and Evangelical Christians were the least likely to agree, 44%. About 72% of Jewish faculty agreed, 71% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 66% of Catholics.

Faculty Are Split on Whether or Not to Eliminate Prayer from Government Functions

A sizable minority of faculty, 43%, said they believe that prayer should be eliminated from government functions. Forty-nine percent disagreed and another 8% were unsure. Only 17% of all Americans agreed that prayer should be eliminated from government functions, while 78% disagreed, and only 4% were not sure. About 82% of Jewish faculty agreed that prayer should be eliminated, as did 75% of atheists/no religion. Only 6% of Evangelical faculty agreed, while 92% disagreed. Twenty-six percent of Catholic faculty agreed, as did 32% of non-Evangelical Christian faculty. Among the public, Jews, 26%, and atheists/no religion, 34%, were the most likely to endorse eliminating prayer.

A Large Majority of Faculty Believes That This Country Would Be Better Off If Christian Fundamentalists Kept Their Religious Beliefs Out of Politics

A strong majority of faculty, 71%, agreed. Twenty-four percent disagreed and 5% were not sure. The public agreed, but at far lower percentages than faculty—54% agreed, 39% disagreed, and 7% were unsure. Sixty-five percent of Catholic faculty agreed, as did 72% of non-Evangelical Christians. Only 17% of Evangelical faculty agreed, and 76% disagreed. About 92% of liberals agreed that fundamentalist Christians should keep their religious beliefs out of politics, as did 66% of moderates, and 23% of conservatives.

Faculty Are Split over Whether It Would Be a Good Thing If Muslims in America Were More Politically Organized

Overall, 34% of faculty agreed. A similar percentage of faculty, 38%, disagreed with the statement, with a significant percentage, 28%, answering that they were not sure. Comparatively, 44% of the public agreed, 37% disagreed, and 18% were unsure.

Evangelical faculty were the least likely to agree, 19%, versus 44% of atheists/no religion. About 38% of Catholic faculty agreed, as did 33% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 33% of Jews. Similarly in the public, Jews and non-Evangelical Christians disagreed the most, 44% and 45% respectively.

A Majority of Faculty Believe Ethnic or Religious Minority Students at Their Institution Are Reluctant to Express Their Views

Seven percent of faculty very often “perceive that ethnic or religious minority students at [their] institution are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to those held by faculty,” another 14% said fairly often, and 38% said occasionally—a total of 59%. Only 30% said never or almost never, and 12% did not know.

Faculty Feel Warmest Toward Jews and Buddhists

Faculty feel most favorably about Jews, with 73% saying they have warm/favorable feelings, and only 3% saying that they have cool/unfavorable feelings. Similar results were recorded for Buddhists, with 68% of faculty saying they feel warm/favorable, and only 4% cool/unfavorable. Faculty also have positive feelings about non-Evangelical Christians and Catholics, for whom 62% and 64%, respectively, feel warm/favorable. Thirteen percent feel cool/unfavorable toward Catholics and 9% toward non-Evangelical Christians. About 41% of faculty said they feel warm/favorable toward atheists and 18% cool/unfavorable, while 50% feel warm/favorable about people with no religion and 10% cool/unfavorable.

Faculty Hold Unfavorable Feelings toward Mormons

About 33% of faculty have negative feelings about Mormons, and 38% of Social Science and Humanities faculty have such negative feelings.

Faculty Hold the Most Unfavorable Feelings toward Evangelicals

Just one group elicited high negative feelings among faculty: Only 30% ranked their feelings toward Evangelical Christians as warm/favorable, with only 11% feeling very warm/favorable, the lowest ranking among every other religious group, and 53% said that they have cool/unfavorable feelings toward Evangelical Christians. Faculty feelings about Evangelicals are significantly cooler than any other religious group, leading Mormons as the least liked religious group by 20%. These negative feelings are noted across academic disciplines and demographic factors.

INTRODUCTION

The American university is often described with images of the “ivory tower”: an environment separated from the realities of everyday, ordinary life. Faculty who spend their professional lives within the walls of academia are sometimes characterized as isolated and apart, and by implication, different from the general population. Certainly, faculty are different by definition: They have higher education levels and therefore will resemble the more highly educated segments of the population. But differences beyond the level of educational achievement may be at play. Either because academia attracts a certain type of individual, or because institutions of higher education create a strong acculturation effect, or both, the faculty as a whole is distinguished from the general public.¹

A number of studies have illustrated how faculty differ politically from the general public.² Criticism from the Right has increased about the liberal character of American college faculty.³ Faculty are far more likely to call themselves liberal than conservative, vote Democratic than Republican, and hold beliefs and attitudes that generally align with the Left rather than the Right. This is especially true for social sciences and humanities faculty, and even more so for particular disciplines such as sociology.⁴

While the demographic character and political identity of university faculty have been documented, relatively little has been

studied or written about their religious identity, beliefs, and behaviors. Historically, religion and higher education were inextricably linked.⁵ But what is the relationship of faculty to religion today? Do they believe in God? Are they spiritual?⁶ Do they attend religious services? What is their denominational affiliation? How do they feel about various religious groups? What is their opinion about the role of religion in public life and politics? How do faculty compare to the general public? Are there generational differences?⁷ Are they substantially more or less religious? A number of critics argue that higher education has become far too secular, that it is removed from its religious origins.⁸ Others document this change, but with less uniform criticism.⁹ This study analyzes these questions, and offers a broad look at American university faculty and religion.¹⁰ It is part of the small but growing body of literature on religion and higher education.¹¹

It is vital to understand the religious identity and behavior of faculty. Their religious beliefs and behaviors are not only relevant to their own teachings and scholarship, but also affect those with whom they interact. "Faculty attitudes and behaviors are known to have important implications for student development. The actions of faculty both within and outside the classroom impact the learning and development of future teachers, lawyers, physicians and policymakers, not to mention their very own academic successors and the thousands of others whose work affects our daily lives."¹²

Our survey confirms some likely assumptions—faculty are far less religious than the general population in both belief and behavior. The conventional wisdom is that academics are "anti-religious":

"For many academics, 'spirituality' can be a loaded word, especially if it conjures up notions of sectarian religious indoctrination, mythology, superstition, and the like."¹³

At the same time, most faculty believe that the university should not be fostering religion. One survey showed that only 30% of faculty agree that "colleges should be concerned with facilitating

students' spiritual development."¹⁴ Perhaps in contradiction to stereotype, most faculty believe in God, attend religious services, and want their children to have a religious education—but at nowhere near the levels of the rest of the American population.¹⁵ Faculty do align more with people who have attained higher education levels, but not perfectly. Faculty are different from those Americans most like them. Americans are among the most religious people in the world (certainly more so than Europeans).¹⁶ Compared to some, then, faculty are quite religious. Compared to other Americans, they are quite secular.¹⁷

Faculty are, however, not monolithic. There are divisions among faculty ranks. Science and math faculty are the least religious in belief and behavior. Business faculty are the most conservative and most religious. Humanities faculty, though the most politically liberal, are not less religious than other faculty and on some measures are more religious. Faculty, while less religious than the general population, are complex in their religiosity.

This study explores not only how faculty approach religion in their lives, but also how they regard the religion of others. Faculty, like other Americans, have their own religious stereotypes and prejudices. But the faculty and the public differ dramatically when looking at what prejudices each holds. One of the surprises of the study is the level of negativity faculty showed for Christian fundamentalists and Evangelicals. If not outright prejudice, faculty sentiment about the largest religious group in the American public borders dangerously close. How one chooses to characterize negative feelings among faculty about Evangelical Christians may be in question, but these feelings are indisputably documented in our research.

This research raises many questions. Are the sciences and math, by definition, more "rational" disciplines, and therefore more detached from belief and faith? Do faculty attitudes about religion and politics influence their teaching and research? What are the implications of the negativity that faculty feel about Evangelical Christians?

This study reveals six major themes. First, religious identity, political beliefs, and political behavior are highly associated. Reflecting a trend in larger society, those who identify as Evangelical Christians, believe religion is important to them, and attend religious services more regularly tend to be more conservative, call themselves Republicans, and vote Republican. Those who are more secular and identify as atheist/no religion, Jewish, and non-Evangelical Christian tend to be more liberal, call themselves Democrats, and vote Democratic.¹⁸

Second, religious identity and behavior strongly influence how faculty view American foreign policy, business institutions, and the role of the United States in global affairs. Conservatives and those with higher levels of religiosity are more positive, while the more liberal and secular faculty tend to be more critical.

Third, although the data revealed some inconsistencies, many faculty are strong advocates for separation of church and politics. Liberal faculty are most supportive of restrictions on religion in government. Faculty who do not want religion and politics to mix are especially critical of Christian fundamentalist involvement in American politics.

Fourth, faculty tend to be very tolerant of most religious groups, including Jews, atheists, Buddhists, and others. There are two exceptions to this tolerance: Mormons and Evangelicals. It may be that faculty object not only to the political behavior of Evangelicals, but likely also to their religious beliefs and culture. Our data confirm the disapproval of Evangelical political behavior, and strongly hint at disapproval of Evangelical beliefs and culture as well. Of course, Evangelicals are not a monolithic group, and come from both the political right and left. Some are racially diverse, and hold a wide range of social and political views.¹⁹

Fifth, faculty are religiously diverse. They represent a broad range of faiths, traditions, and denominations. A majority of faculty self-identifies as Christian, but not overwhelmingly so. Certain

religious groups are underrepresented compared to the general population, namely Evangelical Christians. Others are overrepresented—Jews, those with no religion, and atheists. Religious diversity on campus is as rich and varied as in the general public, but not with the same divisions.


Sixth, faculty religious groups tend to reflect the beliefs and behaviors of their counterparts in the general public. Jewish faculty are less religious, atheists are more liberal, Evangelicals are more conservative, and so on. However, the data also showed that the least religious faculty groups are often more extreme in their views than their counterparts in the American public, and conversely, the most religious faculty groups are less religious than their counterparts. Nevertheless, relatively, each religious group plays the same role in its respective environment.


This monograph is one of a series on college faculty. The first was entitled *The Political Beliefs and Behavior of University Faculty*. A third publication will explore faculty attitudes about the Middle East and Israel.

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND BELIEF

As in the public, the majority of college faculty identified as Christian, but not by an overwhelming margin (See Figure 1). About 56% of faculty said they are Christian. Broken down by denomination, 25% of faculty are non-Evangelical Christian, 18% Catholic, 11% Evangelical and 2% Mormon and other Christians. The second largest category is no religion, 14%, and atheist, 8%, a total of 22% who said they are atheist or have no religion. Five percent of faculty identified as Jewish, 3% Unitarian, 2% Buddhist, and 3% all other faiths including Muslim, Hindu, and other.

While the majority of faculty self-identified as Christian, they fall far short of the general population, of which 80% self-identified as Christian (See Figure 2). Evangelical Christians, 33%, are the largest Christian group in the general public, followed by





Catholics, 24%, non-Evangelical Christians, 22%, Mormons, 1%, and other Christians, 1%. Those with no religion, 11%, are the second largest group after Christians in the general public. Jews comprise just over 2%, atheists just over 1%, and Muslims, Buddhists and other just under 1% each.

There are 24% fewer Christians among faculty than in the general public. If Christians are underrepresented among faculty, which groups, religious or not, are overrepresented? The most notable are those with no religion and atheists, who among faculty constitute 22% of the total, compared to 12% in the general public. Also, Jewish faculty comprise 5% of the faculty compared to just 2% in the general public. Jewish faculty, and faculty atheists/no religion, as will be shown, are remarkably similar in many of their political, social, and religious views. Mormon faculty, 2%, and Buddhist faculty, 2%, are also both overrepresented compared to the general public.

Faculty are not only less likely to identify as Christian than the general public, but among Christians, they are less likely to identify as Evangelical and Catholic, favoring mainline denominations. Far fewer faculty identified as Evangelical, 11%, than members of the general population, 33%, a disparity of 3 to 1 (See Figure 3). Faculty also identified as Catholic, 18%, in smaller proportions to the general public, 24%. On the other hand, more faculty identify as non-Evangelical, 25%, than the public, 22%. Yet if Catholics and non-Evangelical Christians are combined, only a 3% difference exists between the public and faculty. Nearly the entire disparity between the pu-

blic and faculty in terms of the number of Christians is due to the drop in Evangelicals among faculty (See Figure 4).

Moreover, the total percentage of Evangelicals among faculty is considerably less than the 11% of the total they represent if private denominational colleges are excluded. Of those who say that they are Evangelical, 41% are at private denominational institutions. Only 8% of faculty at all other colleges and universities identify as Evangelical Christians, including only 6% at private non-denominational schools. Jews are the most concentrated in non-denominational private schools, accounting for 9% of the faculty.

Controversy reigns among scholars of religion over how to interpret the category “no religion.” The debate about the religious character of those who say they have no religion was reignited by a study conducted by a research team at Baylor University. They argue that Americans are as religious as ever, and that those who

Figure 3: Percentage of Population Identifying as Evangelical Christians (Faculty and General Public)





Figure 4: Which of the following best describes your religious orientation? (Christian Faculty)




say that they have no religion are strongly influenced by the way questions are asked in surveys.²¹ As the faculty data show, 43% of those who say that they have no religion believe in God, 21% attend religious services at least a few times a year, and 16% say that religion is fairly or very important. Having no identified

religious classification does not equal a total disengagement from religious life. But those who say that they have no religion are far less likely to attend religious services than those who name a religion or say that religion is very important to them. Of course, some who name a religious affiliation do not believe in God, attend religious services, or say that religion is important to them. Yet, overall, having a religious identity is a good predictor of religious behavior, as is having no religious identity.

BELIEF IN GOD

The majority of faculty do belong to a religious tradition, but religious self-identification alone reveals little about how much faculty believe in their chosen or given religious tradition. We asked faculty to respond to the following question: “Which statement comes closest to describing your relationship to God?” Nearly half, 46%, said that they have a personal relationship with God, 19% said they do not have a personal relationship with God but believe in God, and 19% said that they do not believe in God (See Figure 5). About 17% preferred not to answer the question. Belonging to a




religion does not equate to a belief in God. Nor does not belonging to a religion preclude a belief in God. Only among faculty atheists and Evangelicals does religious identity intersect almost perfectly with answers affirming belief in God.²²

Comparatively, among the general population, 66% of Americans said that they have a personal relationship with God, 27% said they do not but that they believe in God, and only 4% said they do not believe in God; 3% refused to answer. The data indicate that the general population has a significantly stronger connection with God than do faculty—19% of faculty said they do not believe in God, and 17% did not answer the question.

Far fewer Americans in the general public, 4%, than faculty, 19%, answered that they do not believe in God. Clearly, the dominant belief among the general public is belief in God. While this is true for faculty as well, the 19% of faculty who do not believe in God constitute a significant minority group. It is interesting to note that far more faculty are atheist by definition (they claim not to believe in God) than the 8% that self-identified as such. Moreover, while the campus may not be a place to express one's religiosity, it can be a central forum that supports a lack of religiosity, lending weight to the views of the minority of faculty who do not believe in God.

Some observers believe that higher education has become "anti-religious," while others have shown that most faculty are spiritual. However, the two are not mutually exclusive. Spirituality is, perhaps, separated from organized religion for faculty, and while they themselves may be spiritual, they might also harbor some criticism of organized religion and/or its traditions. Most faculty consider themselves spiritual, even if most do not consider religion to be very important in their everyday lives.²³

We can also deduce that the proportion of faculty who do not believe in God is somewhat higher than the 19% who answered yes to this question. Much higher proportions of liberals, Democrats, and those who said religion is not important to them did not answer the question—19%, 18% and 19% respectively, compared to conservatives, Republicans, and those who said religion is very important to them—5%, 3% and 5% respectively (See Figure 6). Liberals, Democrats, and those who said religion is not important to them showed much higher



proportions saying that they do not believe in God—29%, 26% and 51%, respectively—compared to conservatives, Republicans, and those who said religion is very important to them—5%, 4%, and 1%.

We can conclude that those who did not answer are more likely to answer that they do not believe in God. The overall proportion of atheists among the faculty as a whole is actually more like 24% than the 19% shown by those who answered affirmatively. About

25% of Kerry voters said they do not believe in God compared to 4% of Bush voters, while 18% of Kerry voters versus 4% of Bush voters did not answer. Thirty-six percent of Kerry voters versus 73% of Bush voters said that they have a personal relationship with God.


Among the general population, the groups that said they feel closest to God are Evangelicals, with 88% claiming a personal relationship, non-Evangelical Christians, 69%, and Catholics, 64%. No Evangelicals in the public answered that they do not believe in God. Other than atheists/no religion, 35%, Jews are the least likely to hold a personal relationship with God, 37%, and most likely not to believe in God, 6%. (The sample for Jewish faculty is small and should be viewed with caution.) This disparity is, perhaps, for both Jewish faculty and Jews in the general public, influenced by the language of the question, which reflects a more Christian-oriented understanding of God. Twenty-five percent of atheists/no religion do not believe in God, by far the most of any group but still only one quarter of the total. Only 2% of the general population refused

to answer the question, significantly lower than the percentage for faculty.

Among faculty, as with the general public, having no religion is not the same thing as atheism—18% of faculty who said that they have no religion also said that they have a personal relationship with God, and another 25% said that they believe in God, a total of 43%, while 35% said that they do not believe in God; 22% did not answer. Jewish faculty, like Jews in the public, are also more likely to reject belief in God, but at far higher rates than the public—29% to 6%. Only 19% of Jewish faculty said that they have a personal relationship with God, 30% said they believe in God, and 23% refused to answer. Oppositely, 95% of Evangelicals said they have a personal relationship with God, 5% believe in God, and none responded that they do not believe in God, and none refused to answer. Among non-Evangelical Christians, 55% said they have a personal relationship with God, as did 63% of Catholics. Only 4% of non-Evangelical Christians and 3% of Catholics said that they do not believe in God.

About 64% of health faculty and 62% of education faculty said that they have a personal relationship with God, and 8% and 9% respectively said that they do not believe in God, the lowest proportions among faculty (See Figure 7). Among so-

Figure 7: Which of the following statements comes closest to describing your relationship with God? (Faculty) by Academic Field



cial sciences and humanities faculty, 42% said that they have a personal relationship with God, 16% believe in God, 23% do not believe in God, and 19% did not answer. Science and math faculty had the highest percentage of those not believing in God—28%, and another 18% who did not answer the question. About 52% of business faculty have a personal relationship with God, 20% believe in God, and 16% do not. Twelve percent preferred not to answer.

Seventy-one percent of minority faculty said that they have a personal relationship with God, compared to 45% of white faculty. Oppositely, 20% of white faculty said they do not believe in God, compared to 4% of minority faculty. Sixty-one percent of faculty at private denominational schools said they have a personal relationship with God, 17% said they believe in God, 12% said they do not believe in God, and 10% preferred not to answer. At private non-denominational schools, 27% said that they do not believe in God, and 20% preferred not to answer. We estimate the percentage of atheists at private non-denominational schools to be about 32%, compared to 22% at public universities.

Not surprisingly, in the public, belief in God corresponds strongly to importance of religion and frequency of religious attendance. Among those who attend religious services every week or more, 92% asserted a personal relationship with God, compared to only 41% of those who rarely or never attend. Still, among the least frequent attendees of religious services in the general population, belief in God matches that of the faculty as a whole. Basically, faculty hold the same views of God as the least religious Americans. Eighty-four percent of those who claimed religion is very important in their lives have a personal relationship with God, compared to only 25% of those for whom religion is not important. While one's views on God are not necessarily tied to religiosity (with many interpretations about the meaning and definition of God), they are generally intertwined for most Americans.


Aside from religious tradition among the public, females, 56%, were less likely to affirm a personal relationship with God


than men, 75%. Those Americans living in the Southern region of the United States claimed the strongest personal relationship with God, 75%.

Belief in God among all Americans is also related to political affiliation. While 78% of conservative Americans have a personal relationship with God, 60% of liberal Americans feel the same. Likewise, while 9% of liberals do not believe in God, only 1% of conservatives do not believe in God. The division is a bit less stark between Democrats and Republicans. Personal belief, while higher among Republicans, is also shared by a strong majority of Democrats. Seventy-seven percent of Republicans have a personal relationship compared to 65% of Democrats, while 5% of Democrats and 1% of Republicans do not believe in God.

RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR

One’s religious character is defined not only by one’s identity and beliefs, but also by one’s behavior. While one may identify with a religion and have faith in a higher power, this might not heavily impact how one lives one’s life. Faculty were asked, “How important is religion in your life?” Thirty-six percent of faculty said very important, 27% said fairly important, 32% said not important, and 6% preferred not to answer (See Figure 8). Comparatively, 61% of all Americans said that religion is very important in their lives, 24% fairly important, 13% not important, and 2% did not answer. While the middle ground for both faculty and the public remains around one quarter of each, nearly twice as many in the general public responded that religion is very important, and less than half said not important. These numbers are dramatically different than those for faculty, underscoring the true difference between faculty and most Americans. Most faculty may belong to a religion, believe in God, or





even attend religious services, but, in the lives of a majority of faculty, religion does not play a very important role.

By academic discipline, no majority was recorded—50% of health faculty said that religion is very important to them (the highest), as did 43% of business faculty, and 41% of both education and humanities faculty (See Figure 9). Only 28% of science/math faculty and 29% of social sciences faculty said that religion is very important in their lives. Oppositely, science/math faculty were the most likely to say that religion

is not important to them—40%, and then 37% of social sciences faculty, 33% of humanities faculty, 25% of business faculty, and 21% of health faculty. Social sciences and math/science faculty bear strong similarities on this question, as they do regarding most questions about religiosity.

Among faculty, Evangelicals and Catholics were the only two religious groups (of those that are well represented among faculty) for which religion is very important to a majority (See Figure 10). Eighty-nine percent of Evangelical Christians said that religion is very important in their lives, as did 53% of Catholics, 38% of non-Evangelical Christians, 13% of Jews, and only 3% of atheists/no religion. Religiosity among the general population varies by religious group as well. While 83% of Evangelicals said that religion is very important in their lives, only 36% of Jews agreed. Likewise, only 3% of Evangelicals said religion is not important compared to 24%

of Jews. The overrepresentation of the least religious groups—atheists and those with no religion and, to a lesser extent, Jews—and under representation of Evangelicals in academia has a direct impact on the religiosity of faculty, where the most religious group is swapped for the least.


Those faculty for whom religion is important are predictably the most frequent attendees at religious services.


Eighty-eight percent of those who attend religious services every week or more said that religion is very important to them. Thirty-nine percent of those who attend religious services almost every week said that religion is very important to them, compared to 12% who attend a few times a year and only 3% who attend rarely or never.

Importance of religion is also highly associated with political ideology, identification, and behavior. Generally, the more conservative one's political leanings are, the greater the importance of religion, and, conversely, the more liberal one is, the lesser the importance of religion. About 20% of liberals said that religion is very important in their lives versus 44% of moderates and 67% of conservatives (See Figure 11). Oppositely, 47% of liberals said that religion is not important in their lives versus 22% of moderates and 11% of conservatives. Twenty-six percent of Democrats and 26% of Kerry voters, 62% of Republicans and 64% of Bush voters said that religion is very important in their lives.

On a similar question, when asked, "How much guidance in your day to day living does your religion provide?" 24% said a great

Figure 10: How important is religion in your life? (Faculty) by Religious Identification





deal of guidance, 16% said quite a lot of guidance, 20% said some guidance, and 34% said none. In contrast, 61% of the general public answered that religion is very important in their lives. While faculty are not overwhelmingly less religious than their non-academic counterparts, they do see the application of religion in

their daily lives quite differently. It is very possible that while faculty do observe religion for the most part, they regard religion primarily as a more cerebral exercise rather than a directive for how to live one's life.

Among faculty, there was little difference recorded either by age or gender on this question. Social sciences and science/math faculty, consistent with other questions, were the most likely to say that religion provides no guidance in their day-to-day living—39% of social sciences and 42% of science/math (See Figure 12). About 32% of humanities and education faculty said that religion provides a great deal of guidance in their day-to-day living, as did 30% of business faculty, 20% of social sciences faculty, and 18% of science/math faculty.


Only Evangelical faculty were likely to respond that religion provides a great deal of guidance, far outpacing their religious co-workers. For those who identified as Evangelical Christians, 76% said that religion provides a great deal of guidance in their day-to-day living, 16% said quite a lot of guidance, 7% said some guidance, and less than 1% said none. Catholics were a distant second, with about 33% responding that religion provides a great deal of

guidance in their day-to-day living—another 24% said quite a lot, 24% said some, and 16% said none. Non-Evangelical Christians were even less likely to say a great deal of guidance, 19%, while 25% said quite a lot. However, 33% said some, and 16% said none. Jews, atheists, and those with no religion each had only 2% saying that religion provides a great deal of guidance, though 16% of Jews said quite a lot, 32% said some, and 50% said none. Ninety-six percent of atheists said that religion provides no guidance in their day-to-day living, as did 81% of those with no religion.

By comparison, in the general public, 85% of Evangelicals said religion provides a great deal or quite a lot of guidance, followed by Catholics, 66%, and non-Evangelical Christians, 66%. Interestingly, Jews, 42%, were about the same as atheists/no religion, 45%. However, the majority of Jews, 56%, said that religion provides some guidance.

This question reflects the usual breakdown among faculty by political party, ideology, and behavior. For Democrats, 16% said that religion provides a great deal of guidance in their everyday lives, and another 14% said quite a lot, for a total of 30%. Almost identical numbers were recorded for Kerry voters. On the other hand, 48% of Republicans said that religion provides a great deal of guidance, and another 21% said quite a lot, a total of 69%. Likewise, 49% of Bush voters said a great deal and 21% said quite a lot, a total of 70%.


Figure 12: How much guidance in your day-to-day living does your religion provide? (Faculty) by Academic Field



Similarly, 46% of Democrats and 43% of Kerry voters said religion provides no guidance in their day-to-day living versus 11% of Republicans and Bush voters. Those who identified as moderates and independents resemble liberals and Democrats more than they do conservatives and Republicans in how they view religion’s role in their day-to-day living.

Predictably, the frequency of religious attendance directly correlates to a dependence on religion for guidance. Sixty-eight percent of those attending every week or more feel religion provides a great deal of guidance, 22% quite a lot, and less than 1% none at all. Compare this to those rarely or never attending, among whom 2% said a great deal, 3% quite a lot, 9% some, and 83% none at all.

It is important to measure quantifiable religious behavior as well as belief. Faculty were asked, “How often, if at all, do you usually attend religious services?” Twenty-seven percent said that they attend every week or more often, including 9% who attend more than once a week and 18% who attend every week (See Figure 13). Another 10% said they attend almost every week, 7% said once or twice a month, and 5% said they attend 6 to 10 times per year. Fourteen percent said




they attend a few times a year, and 30% said they attend less often or never. Seven percent of the respondents preferred not to answer the question. Conversely, 39% percent of all Americans attend religious services every week or more, 17% almost every week/monthly, 6% 6 to 10 times a year, 13% a few times a year, and 23% less often or never. The proportion of faculty who attend almost every week or more is nearly four in ten, considerably

higher than many might expect. On the other hand, the proportion of faculty who attend only a few times a year or less is 44%—considerably higher than the general population.

Faculty at private denominational schools are the most likely to attend most often, with 46% attending every week or more often, compared to 23% of faculty at public institutions and only 15% at private non-denominational schools. Oppositely, only 17% of faculty at private denominational schools attend rarely or never, compared to 33% at public institutions and 32% at private non-denominational institutions.


Of those faculty who said that religion is very important to them, nearly 66% attend religious services every week or more often and another 16% almost every week, for a rounded total of 81%. About 2% of those who said that religion is very important to them attend religious services rarely or never, and another 5% attend a few times a year. Oppositely, of those who said that religion is not important to them, less than 1% attend every week or more often or almost every week. Seventy-five percent attend less than a few times a year or never, and another 16% a few times a year, a total of 91%.

Eighty percent of faculty who identified themselves as Evangelical Christians attend weekly or more often (See Figure 14). Another 9% attend almost every week for a total of 89%. About 42% of Catholic faculty attend every week or more often, and another 14% almost every week, a total of 56%. Twenty-five percent of



non-Evangelical Christians attend every week or more often, and another 18% almost every week, a total of 43%. Oppositely, 10% of Catholics attend rarely or never, and another 12% just a few times a year, a total of 22%. No faculty who identified themselves as Evangelical Christians attend religious services rarely or never, and only 3% said they attend only a few times a year. Among non-Evangelical Christians, 16% said they attend religious services rarely or never, and 20% only a few times a year for a total of 36%.


Atheists, those with no religion and Jews are the least likely to attend religious services. Only 1% of atheists/no religion said that they attend every week or almost every week (See Figure 15). Among Jews, only 4% said that they attend every week or more often, and another 9% said that they attend every week. Eighty-four percent of those who identified as atheist/no religion attend less than a few times a year or never, and another 13% a few times a year, a total of 97% who attend less than a few times a year or never. Among Jews, 37% said they attend rarely or never, and another 26% a few times a



year for a total of 63%. Similar to Jewish faculty, Jews in the general public remain by far the least observant among religious groups when it comes to attending religious services. Only 18% of Jews in the public attend weekly, while 48% attend a few times a year or never. In the public, only atheists, at 85%, attend less frequently. Evangelicals are the most observant, with 62% attending every week or more, and 17% rarely or never.

In a reverse pattern that contradicts most survey research on religion, male faculty were slightly more likely than female faculty to attend the most frequently, 29% versus 23%. And in a break in the pattern for humanities professors, they are most likely to attend the most frequently—34% attend every week or more often. Oppositely, they also have a relatively high proportion attending most infrequently—35% attend rarely or never. About 18% of social sciences faculty said that they attend weekly or more often, the lowest proportion among all faculty, and 31% said that they attend less frequently than a few times a year or never. At 36%, science and math faculty show the highest proportion of those that say they attend less than a few times a year or never, just slightly higher than humanities faculty, 35%. Health faculty had the lowest proportion saying they attend rarely or never, 16%. Thirty-two percent said they attend every week or more often.

Political ideology is highly associated with attendance at religious services. For those faculty who identified themselves as liberal, about 14% attend religious services every week or more often, and another 9% almost every week, for a rounded total of 24% (See Figure 16). For those who called themselves moderates, about 31% attend religious services every week or more often, and 14% almost every week, for a rounded total of 44%. For those who identified themselves as conservatives, about 58% attend every week or more often, and another 9% almost every week, for a rounded total of 66%. Among Dem-



ocrats, about 17% of faculty attend religious services every week or more often, and another 11% almost every week, for a rounded total of 27%. Independents are slightly more likely to attend every week or more often, nearly 27%. Another 11% attend almost every week, for a total of 38%. Among Republicans, about 52% attend every week or more often, and another 10% almost every week, for a rounded total of 61%. Oppositely, for those who identified as liberal, about 41% attend rarely or never, and another 17% attend only a few times a year, for a rounded total of 59%. For moderates, about 13% attend religious services a few times a year, and 23% less often or never, for a rounded total of 35%. Only around 10% of conservatives say that they attend religious services less than a few times a year or never, and 11% a few times a year, for a rounded total of 20%. Among Democrats, about 40% say that they attend religious services less than a few times a year or never, and 16% a few times a year for a rounded total of 55% who attend a few times a year or less. Among Republicans, the percentage attending a few times a year or less is 21%. Among Kerry voters, 17% attend every week or more often compared to 55% of Bush voters. Oppositely, 38% of Kerry voters attend less than a few times a year or never, compared to 10% of Bush voters. In private denominational schools, 46% of faculty attend every week or more often, and another 13% almost every week.

Among the general public, political party has an interesting relationship with attendance to religious services. While 28% of Republicans and 37% of Democrats claim to attend only a few times a year or never, they are more observant than independents, of whom 45% rarely or never attend. Political ideology, however, fits conventional wisdom, with conservatives more observant than liberals, and moderates falling in between.

Some aspects of one's religious identity are often not so much a reflection of personal choice. Upbringing and environment come into play. Religion is often passed from parent to child. Belief in God can also be a given for some, regardless of their devotion to


religion. Even the importance of religion in one's life, or the amount of guidance it provides, can be a function of habit and acculturation. Questions about one's personal religiosity are very different from questions about the religiosity of others and in particular those to whom the respondent feels close. Confirming, and even exceeding indicators from previous questions, a large majority of faculty said that they want their children to have some religious training. Seventy-three percent of the faculty agreed with the statement "I would want my child to have some religious training." Only 19% disagreed, and 8% were not sure (See Figure 17).

Among the general population, 86% said they want their children to have some religious training, 13% more than faculty. Only 10% disagreed. Though the general population is more likely to want children to have religious training, faculty are not far behind. It is possible that less religious respondents regarded this question not as an endorsement of religiosity but rather as an educative component. Religious or not, most Americans, including faculty, may at the very least feel it is necessary to prepare their children for inclusion in, or interaction with, religious groups.

While both faculty conservatives and liberals record majorities in favor of religious training, politics does play a role. Sixty-six percent of Democrats and 67% of Kerry voters versus 93% of Republicans and 91% of Bush voters said that they want their child to have some religious training. Political party also plays a role in the general public. Ninety-three percent of Republicans agreed, compared to 82% of liberals.

Differences among faculty by department are even less pro-

Figure 17: I would want my child to have some religious training. (Faculty and General Public)



nounced. By all disciplines, a solid majority wanted children to have some religious training. The highest percentages were recorded in the health and education disciplines, 86% and 87% respectively. Seventy-five percent of business faculty agreed versus just under 70% for all other fields. Differences exist for faculty, reflecting the usual divisions by department and politics, but nevertheless, a majority of most faculty groups agreed.

Generally, agreement remains when looking at faculty by religious denomination. Of those faculty who identified as Evangelical Christians, 98% said they want their child to have religious training, as do 90% of Catholics, and 91% of non-Evangelical Christians. Eighty-two percent of Jews agreed, again at a lower percentage than that of their religiously affiliated colleagues, but not far behind. Perhaps faculty are more interested in religion for their children than for themselves. In the public, Catholics are the most likely to agree, 95%, but are joined by Evangelicals, 94%, and non-Evangelical Christians, 86%. Jews, 72%, are the least likely to desire religious training for their children, after atheists/no religion, 50%. But both are more likely to agree with the statement than previous answers indicate. The importance of religious training for Americans is not necessarily dependent upon religious devotion, as half of the least religious Americans want their children to have religious training.

The data for the general public on the importance of religious training for one's children is not so much differentiated by how often one attends religious services, but whether one attends at all. Low levels of religiosity do not necessarily translate into an aversion to religion for one's child, and though a total lack of religiosity does affect one's answer, not even this precludes wanting religion for one's child. Ninety-four percent of those attending services at all, even those attending as few as a handful of times a year, said they want their child to have religious training, while 74% of those who attend less often or never agreed. Among those for whom religion is very important, 95% agreed, while among those for whom religion


is somewhat important, 88% agreed; of those for whom religion is not important, 48% agreed.

A related question asked of faculty elicited an entirely different response. The vast majority of faculty, 79%, disagreed with the statement “Having a strong religious background is necessary for a person to develop a strong moral character.” Only 19% agreed, and 2% were unsure (See Figure 18). On many questions, the “don’t know” and “unsure” responses were much higher. Such low numbers indicate a high level of confidence among faculty in answering this question, and for most, rejecting it. Faculty are clear about this issue—religious background is not an essential ingredient for a strong moral character. This response from faculty adds to the complexity of their response regarding religious training. Building moral character is, for most faculty, not the reason they want religious training for their children. Again, for faculty, religious training may have little to do with religiosity. Among all Americans, 54% agreed that it is necessary to have a religious background in order to build a strong moral character, and 43% disagreed.

Social sciences and math/science faculty are the least likely to agree, 11% and 14% respectively, while health and business faculty are the most likely to agree, 31% and 25%. But a large majority of faculty across academic fields rejects the notion of religious background being essential for a strong moral character.

Only those who identified as Evangelical show a significant majority that agreed, 62%, versus 28% of Catholics, 18% of non-Evangelical Christians, 6%

Figure 18: Having a strong religious background is necessary for a person to develop a strong moral character. (Faculty and General Public)




of Jews, and 1% of atheists/no religion. Likewise in the public, Evangelicals, 73%, are by far the most likely to endorse this idea, followed by Catholics, 53%, non-Evangelical Christians, 50%, Jews, 40% and atheists/no religion, 20%. All religious groups in the public, except Evangelicals, are much more likely than their faculty counterparts to believe a religious background is necessary for a strong moral character. Atheists and those with no religion in the public were 20 times more likely to agree than faculty atheists and those with no religion.

Among faculty, even those for whom religion is very important did not record a majority in agreement with the question. About 45% of those for whom religion is very important agreed, 10% of those for whom religion is fairly important, and less than 1% for those whom religion is not at all important. In contrast, in the public, both high frequency of religious attendance and importance of religion directly correlate to agreement with the statement that morality is tied to religious training. Seventy-one percent of those who attend religious services every week or more agreed with the statement, as did 35% of those who attend rarely or never. Likewise, 69% of

those for whom religion is very important agreed, compared to only 18% of those for whom religion is not important.

Politics among faculty create one of the more significant divisions on this question. Only 7% of liberal faculty agreed, 21% of moderates, and 52% of conservatives, as did 9% of Democrats, 19% of in-



dependents, and 44% of Republicans (See Figure 19). Similarly, only 9% of Kerry voters agreed versus 47% of Bush voters.

Political party and affiliation impact this question in the public as well. Seventy-four percent of conservatives agreed with the statement compared to 45% of moderates and 42% of liberals. Seventy percent of Republicans agreed, 45% of independents, and 46% of Democrats. Similar to other answers given, moderates and independents line up with or fall below Democrats and liberals regarding support of religion as a guiding tool. Because ideology and party mark points of departure, the political divisions are similar for both the public and faculty, but overall, faculty of all political persuasions are far less likely than their counterparts in the public to agree with the statement. Among faculty, differences also appear by race—18% of whites agreed versus 30% of minorities.

Most faculty reject religion as a necessary component of moral character, but do we know whether or not they believe in the very idea of a moral character or general morality in the first place? If they do not, then their response has very different implications than if they do. Overwhelmingly, faculty responded that they indeed believe universal morals exist—only 17% agreed with the following: “There are no moral values that can be applied across all cultures, societies, and nations.” Eighty-one percent disagreed, and only 2% were not sure. This dominant belief in universal moral values was confirmed when the statement was flipped around. About 84% of faculty agreed that “there are certain moral values that should apply across all cultures, societies, and nations.” Only 13% disagreed, and 4% were not sure.

This belief was high across all academic disciplines, although dropped somewhat for those under 35, of whom 71% agreed in universal moral values versus 86% of those over 55. A belief in universal moral values is one of the few shared by a majority of all religious groups among faculty—94% of Evangelical Christians endorsed this belief, 86% of Catholics, 83% of non-Evangelical Christians, Jews, and

atheists. Those who think religion is very important are more likely to endorse universal moral values, conservatives more so than liberals, but the numbers are very high for all faculty sub-groups.


RELIGION AND POLITICS

POLITICAL IDENTITY, VIEWS OF AMERICA, BUSINESS, AND INTERNATIONALISM

Political identity has proven to be a fairly reliable indicator of faculty responses to questions about religion.²⁴ Even where faculty on the whole seem to agree about a particular statement, when segmented by political party, ideology or voting pattern, significant differences among faculty are revealed. If we flip this equation around and analyze political identity and opinion by religious identity and belief, do similar divisions appear? Does religiosity or lack thereof influence responses about political questions?²⁵

One can make some assumptions. The least religious faculty—Jews, atheists and those with no religion—will likely be the most liberal. Conversely, Evangelicals should be the most conservative. Overall, when asked to describe their position on most political issues, 48% of faculty said they are liberal, 31% said they are moderate/middle of the road, and 17% said they are conservative. Five percent chose not to answer or did not know. Comparatively, 22% of the general population identified as liberal, 31% as conservative, and 38% as moderate—a dramatic difference from the faculty.

The following table represents the religious/political alignment of faculty (See Figure 20). Scored on answers to core questions about politics and about religiosity, faculty (who answered all relevant



questions) can be placed into one of nine categories. These categories range from secular-left to religious-right, with all possible combinations in between. The data show that, by far, the dominant constituency among faculty is comprised of those on the left who are either secular or neutral about religion. The data also show that very few secular faculty align to the right along the political spectrum. Faculty fall into all categories. However, despite


the variety, the faculty are overwhelmed by the religiously secular/neutral-left.

Confirming assumptions, seventy-nine percent of Jewish faculty described themselves as liberal, and only 3% as conservative (See Figure 21). Fifteen percent said they are moderate/middle of the road. Sixty-nine percent of atheists/no religion called themselves liberal, 22% moderate/middle of the road, and 6% conservative. Forty-five percent of non-Evangelical Christians identified themselves as liberal, 39% as moderate, and 15% as conservative. Catholics were similar, with 41% saying they are liberal, 36% moderate, and 20% conservative. Only Evangelical Christians identified themselves much differently, with 9% liberal, 33% moderate, and a 54% conservative majority.

Other than Evangelicals, only faculty who said religion is very important to them or those who attend religious services every week or more registered slightly higher proportions saying that they are conservative rather than liberal—31% of those who said their re-


ligion is very important to them said they are conservative versus 28% who said they are liberal. Thirty-six percent of those who attend religious services every week said they are conservative versus 26% who said they are liberal. Oppositely, for those who said their religion is not important to them, 71% said they are liberal, 21% moderate, and only 6% said they are conservative. Of those who attend religious services the least frequently, 67% said they are liberal, 24% moderate, and only 5% said they are conservative.

Figure 21: Which of the following best describes your political position on most issues? (Faculty) by Religious Identification



Similar patterns were found when faculty were asked to identify

Figure 22: Political Party Self Identification (Faculty) by Religious Identification



their party affiliation. Only 16% of faculty overall identified as Republicans, 46% as Democratic, and 33% as independent (See Figure 22). In the public, 28% identified as Republican, 32% as Democratic, and 31% as independent. No faculty religious group has a majority identifying as Republican, although Evangelical Christians come the closest with 48%. Eighteen percent of Evangelicals said they are Democrats, and 33%

said they are independents. In contrast, 79% of Jews said they are Democrats, and 2% Republicans, a ratio of 40 to 1. Sixty-one percent of atheists/no religion said they are Democrats versus 6% who said they are Republicans, a ratio of 10 to 1. Seventeen percent of Catholics and 19% of non-Evangelical Christians said they are Republicans, and 44% of Catholics and 45% of non-Evangelical Christians said they are Democrats. Strong political divisions exist by religion.

One might also assume that strong divisions exist by importance of religion for faculty as well. For those who said religion is very important to them, 29% said they are Republicans, 33% said they are Democrats, and 32% said they are independents—about an even split. However, for those who said their religion is not important to them, 5% said they are Republicans and 63% said they are Democrats, a ratio of 12 to 1 in favor of Democrats. The division certainly exists, but is only dominant among those for whom religion is not important—they are nearly all Democrats. However, those for whom religion is very important are made up of a mixture of political affiliations.

The findings based on frequency of religious attendance are nearly identical to those of religious importance. Those who attend religious services every week or more found 32% saying they are Republicans, 29% Democrats, and 33% independents. But for those who attend religious services most infrequently, only 5% identified as Republican and 62% as Democrat, a ratio of 12 to 1 (32% identified as independents).

Political behavior, however, is more telling than political identification. While a third of faculty self-identify as independent, they tend to vote Democratic. For example, of faculty who voted in 2004, 72% of faculty voted for John Kerry, 1% for Ralph Nader, 2% for other candidates, and only 25% for George Bush. In contrast, 51% of the general public voted for Bush, 48% for Kerry, and 1% for Nader.²⁶


The only religious group that voted for George Bush in 2004 was the relatively small minority of Evangelical Christians on cam-


pus—68% voted for Bush, 30% for Kerry, and 2% for other candidates. Oppositely, 87% of Jews and 90% of atheists/no religion voted for John Kerry, and only 12% of Jews voted for Bush along with 7% of atheists/no religion. Catholics and non-Evangelical Christians were quite similar, with about three of ten voting for Bush, and seven of ten voting for Kerry and other candidates (See Figure 23). Of those

for whom religion is very important, 45% voted for Bush, 52% for Kerry, and 3% for other candidates. On the other hand, of those for whom religion is not at all important, only 7% voted for Bush, 90% for Kerry, and 3% for other candidates. A majority of faculty, 51% who attend religious services every week or more, voted for Bush, 46% for Kerry, and 4% for other candidates. Oppositely, of those who attend religious services rarely or never, only 8% voted for Bush, 89% for Kerry, and 3% for other candidates.

Very similar patterns were found concerning the 2004 Congressional elections for the United States House of Representatives. Seventy-one percent of faculty voted for the Democratic candidate, 3% for some other candidate, and only 26% for the Republican candidate (See Figure 24). Ninety-four percent of Jews and 86% of atheists/no religion voted for the Democratic candidate, and only 6% of Jews and 11% of atheists/no religion voted for the Republican candidate. Evangelical Christians were the only religious group to show a majority voting Republican, with 70% voting for the Republican candidate, 29% for the Democrat, and 1% for other candidates. Cath-

Figure 23: 2004 Presidential Vote (Faculty who voted for major candidates only) by Religious Identification





tant voted for a Democratic candidate (even though they tend to be conservative on many issues), 45% for the Republican candidate, and 3% for other candidates. Among those for whom religion is not at all important, 87% voted for the Democratic candidate and another 3% voted for other candidates. Similarly, for those who attend religious services the most infrequently, 87% voted for the Democratic candidate and another 2% for other candidates. For those who attend religious services every week or more, 50% voted for the Republican candidate, 46% for the Democratic candidate (4% for some other candidate)—near an even split.

The most evident pattern among faculty concerns those who register low levels of religiosity. Nearly all are liberal and Democratic. Conversely, while conservatives and Republicans are likely to rank higher on religiosity, they do not dominate this group. Those faculty with the highest religiosity are just as likely to be liberal as conservative and Democratic as Republican. However, one must remember that there are very few conservatives and Republicans among faculty. Were there an equal number of faculty conservative/

olics voted 71% for the Democratic candidate, 4% for other candidates, and 26% for the Republican candidate. Non-Evangelical Christians were very similar, with 68% for the Democratic candidate, 30% for the Republican candidate, and 2% for other candidates. The overwhelming propensity to vote for the Democratic candidate is shown by the breakdown of voting by religious importance—51% for whom religion is very impor-


Republicans as liberal/Democrats, the proportion of those with high religiosity would likely tilt toward the right. Even still, it is unlikely that faculty conservatives would dominate the most religious segment to the extent that liberals dominate the least religious segment.

However, political self-identification and voting patterns only provide an overview, a summary of political leanings. Much more detail is derived from asking specific questions about political and social issues affecting most Americans. What follows is an analysis of such questions according to religious identity and belief. The analysis is divided into three sections: views on business, views on America, and views on internationalism.

BUSINESS

Those with higher levels of religiosity have different views on American business than faculty with lower levels of religiosity. Generally, the more conservative one's politics are, the more supportive of business one will be, and, conversely, the more liberal one is, the less supportive. Faculty were asked to agree or disagree with this statement: "People in developing countries benefit more than they lose from involvement of global corporations." Overall, 38% of faculty agreed, 37% disagreed, and 25% were unsure (See Figure 25). In the public, 54% agreed, 28% disagreed, and 18% were unsure. Faculty are notably less likely to agree.

Figure 25: People in developing countries benefit more than they lose from involvement of global corporations. (Faculty) by Religious Identification



By religion, 57% of Evangelical faculty agreed, as did 43% of non-Evangelical Christians and 37% of Catholics, compared to 28% of Jews and 30% of atheists/no religion. Those who say that religion is very important to them and attend religious services more frequently are much more likely to see the benefits of global corporations than those who say religion is not important to them and rarely attend religious services. Liberals, Democrats, and Kerry voters are much less likely to see the benefits of global corporations for people in developing countries than conservatives, Republicans, and Bush voters.

Antipathy towards large corporations is one of the few trends that can be found among all faculty groups regardless of religious identification and behavior. Seventy-three percent of faculty agreed with the statement that "international trade agreements have favored large corporations to the disadvantage of people and local businesses in less developed countries." Only 16% disagreed, and 11% were not sure. The general public, by and large, stands with faculty on this statement—63% agreed, 23% disagreed, and 14% were unsure. Though faculty were more likely to agree that international trade agreements are unfair, the public's opinion was not far behind.

Those faculty who identified as atheist/no religion were the most likely to agree, 78%. Evangelical Christians were the least likely to agree at 64%. Seventy-five percent of Jews agreed, 73% of Catholics, and 69% of non-Evangelical Christians. In the public, atheists/no religion were also most likely to agree, 73%, and were followed closely by non-Evangelical Christians, 71%, and Jews, also 71%. Evangelicals were the least supportive, with about 50% who agreed and 31% who disagreed. Between the public and the faculty religious groups, only Evangelicals responded much differently than their faculty counterparts. A majority of faculty for whom religion is very important, 65%, agreed with the statement, as did 77% for whom religion is fairly important, and 79% for whom religion

is not important. Frequent attendees at religious services agreed at 64% versus 78% of those who attend infrequently.


The differences were even more dramatic by political ideology as opposed to religious identification and behavior. Eighty-seven percent of liberals agreed with this statement versus 42% of conservatives, and 84% of Democrats and 83% of Kerry voters agreed versus 45% of Republicans and 43% of Bush voters. All in all, large corporations were looked upon disapprovingly.

Faculty were also asked about less specific situations, such as those regarding economic strategies for developing nations. When asked whether or not they agree with the statement that “although capitalism helped bring prosperity to this country, it is not well suited to accomplish the same thing in most developing nations,” 36% percent of faculty agreed, 48% disagreed, and 17% were unsure. As in the question about global corporations, there are very small differences by religious denomination and behavior and much starker differences by political ideology.

AMERICA

While 68% of all faculty agreed with the statement “America has made a contribution to the world by expanding freedom to more and more people,” a bare majority of self-identified atheists/no religion, 54%, agreed versus 87% of Evangelicals, 76% of non-Evangelical Christians, 73% of Catholics, and 61% of Jews (See Figure 26). For those who said religion is very important to them, 80% agreed versus 70% who said it was fairly important, and 54% who said it was not important. Similar differences were found by frequency of religious service attendance. Even stronger differences were recorded by political identification—95% of conservatives versus 53% of liberals agreed that America has made a contribution to expanding freedom, as did 97% of Bush voters versus 59% of Kerry voters.

A strong majority, 75% of all Americans, agreed that America has expanded freedom, while 20% disagreed, and 4% were unsure.



Among religious groups, only atheists/no religion fell below the national average, with 60% agreeing, and 35% disagreeing. However, politically, Americans are very divided on America’s global contributions. While 90% of Bush voters agreed and only 7% disagreed, 65% of Kerry voters agreed and 30% disagreed. Likewise, while 85% of conservatives and 90% of Republicans agreed, 60% of liberals and 68% of Democrats agreed.

While, among the public, the frequency of attendance at religious services has a moderate impact on beliefs about America’s contribution, the importance of religion influences them strongly. Eighty percent of those for whom religion is very important agreed, 75% of those for whom religion is somewhat important, and only 56% of those for whom religion is not important.

Faculty with lower levels of religiosity tend to be more critical of American foreign policy. Faculty were asked to respond to the following statement: “Many of the problems that now exist in the Middle Eastern countries can be traced to misguided American policies.” Overall, 47% agreed, 42% disagreed and 11% were unsure. Atheists/no religion agreed with this statement by a margin of 64% versus 28% who disagreed. About 47% of Jews agreed, as did 44% each of Catholics and non-Evangelical Christians. Yet, only 25% of Evangelical Christians agreed, and 65% disagreed. For those who said religion is very important to them, only 36% agreed with the statement, along with 44% of individuals who said religion is fairly

important and 62% of those who said religion is not important. Similarly, 35% of faculty who attend religious services every week or more agreed with this statement versus 45% of those who attend less frequently and 61% of those who rarely or never attend. As with similar questions, 66% of liberals agreed that many of the problems that now exist in Middle Eastern countries can be traced to misguided American policies versus 35% of moderates and only 15% of conservatives. Sixty percent of Democrats agreed along with 58% of Kerry voters versus 19% of conservatives and 13% of Bush voters.

Among all Americans, 37% agreed, and 51% disagreed that problems in the Middle East can be traced to American policies. Jews were the least likely religious group to agree with the statement—25% agreed and 70% disagreed, departing from atheists who were the most likely to agree at 51%.

Faculty were asked to rate a number of countries on their human rights record over the past five years or so. They were instructed to use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for an “extremely poor record” and 10 stands for an “outstanding record.” About 47% of faculty ranked the United States 8 through 10, the top three on the scale, and only 4% ranked it 0 through 2, the bottom three. Sixty-seven percent of Evangelical Christians ranked the United States at the highest end of the scale, as opposed to 50% of Catholics, 49% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 37% of Jews and atheist/no religion faculty. About 58% of those for whom religion is very important ranked the United States highest versus 47% for whom religion is fairly important, and 34% for whom religion is not important. Similarly, 61% who attend religious services most frequently ranked the United States the highest in human rights as opposed to 37% who attend rarely or never.

The ranking was most differentiated by political ideology, with only 27% of liberals ranking the U.S. in the highest category versus 58% of moderates and 84% of conservatives. About 35% of Democrats and 35% of Kerry voters versus 78% of Republicans and 82% of


Bush voters gave the United States the highest ranking on its human rights record. One may interpret that those who are more religious and conservative have a more positive view of the United States, or one may argue that those who are less religious and liberal have a more realistic view of the United States—or each group may argue its point in this way.

Religious identification and participation have a strong influence on how faculty view America’s role in the world.²⁷ When asked to list two countries that are “the greatest threats to international stability,” the vast majority of faculty, 70%, listed North Korea. Second to North Korea was the United States at 29%, Iran at 27%, China at 19%, and all other countries at less than 15% (See Figure 27). While only 10% of Evangelical Christians listed the United States as one of the two greatest threats to international stability, 47% of atheists and 39% of those with no religion did; so did 31% of Jews, 26% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 24% of Catholics.

For those who said religion is very important to them, only 16% see the United States as a threat to international stability versus 30% of those who said religion is fairly important to them and 41% who

said religion was not important to them (See Figure 28).


Compared to 17% of those who attend religious services every week or more, 40% of those who attend rarely or never listed the United States as one of the two greatest threats to international stability. Political ideology and behavior are strong predictors



on how faculty view the United States. Forty-five percent of those who are liberal listed the United States as one of the two greatest threats to international stability, versus 17% of moderates and 3% of conservatives. Thirty-eight percent of Democrats and 39% of Kerry voters versus 4% of Republicans and 4% of Bush voters listed the United States as an international threat.


Similar differences were found when faculty were asked

Figure 28: The United States is one of two countries posing the greatest threat to international stability. (Faculty) by Importance of Religion



which two of four causes were responsible for Islamic militancy. The choices provided were “political corruption in home countries,” “United States policies,” “spread of Western culture,” or the “Islamic religion itself.” Atheists/no religion, those who said religion is not important to them, and infrequent attendees at religious services were far more likely to name the United States than were Evangelicals, those for whom religion is very important, and frequent religious service attendees. Thirty-three percent of Evangelical Christians named United States policies as opposed to 68% of atheists/no religion. A majority of Catholics and non-Evangelical Christians, 52% and 55%, and 58% of Jews also named United States policies. Seventy-two percent of liberals versus 20% of conservatives named United States policies; 65% of Democrats and 66% of Kerry voters versus 23% of Republicans and 18% of Bush voters named United States policies in the Middle East as a cause for the growth of Islamic militancy.²⁸

On the other hand, 52% of Evangelical Christians listed the Islamic religion itself versus 18% of atheists/no religion and 25% of all other religious denominations (See Figure 29). Frequent ser-



vice attendees and those who said religion is very important to them were much more likely to name the Islamic religion itself.

The question also showed distinct differences by political ideology and behavior. While 13% of liberals named the Islamic religion itself, 56% of conservatives did the same. And while 17% of Democrats and 16% of

Kerry voters named the Islamic religion, 50% of Republicans and 57% of Bush voters did the same. Clearly, religious denomination and political ideology are strong determinants of how faculty view causes of terrorism, and whether they view Islam as a religious force in the growth of militancy and terrorism.

When asked, “From what you know about it, do you feel that the power granted the United States government under the Patriot Act should be strengthened, reduced, or left pretty much unchanged?” only 5% of faculty said they want it strengthened, 64% reduced, 20% unchanged, and 11% were not sure. Strong differences appeared by religious identify and behavior. Eleven percent of Evangelical Christians said they want the Patriot Act strengthened, and another 39% said they want it left unchanged—a total of 50%. This compares to 1% of atheist/no religion faculty who want it strengthened, and 10% who want it left unchanged—a total of 11%. Ten percent of Catholic faculty want the Patriot Act strengthened, 20% left unchanged, a total of 30%. Three percent of non-Evangelical Christian faculty want it strengthened, and 24% left unchanged, a total of 27%; and only 2% of Jewish faculty want it strengthened, and 8% unchanged—a total

of 10%. For those who said religion is very important, 39% said the Patriot Act should be strengthened or left unchanged versus 12% for whom religion is not important. Oppositely, while 47% of faculty for whom religion is important want the powers of the Patriot Act reduced, 81% for whom religion is not important advocated reducing the powers of the Patriot Act. Similar differences were found by religious service attendance.

While only 5% of liberals said they want the Patriot Act strengthened or left unchanged, 71% of conservatives said so. And while 8% of Democrats and 9% of Kerry voters said they want the Patriot Act strengthened or left unchanged, 66% of Republicans and 70% of Bush voters advocated that the Patriot Act be strengthened or left unchanged. Oppositely, 87% of liberals advocated that the Patriot Act powers be reduced, as did 83% of Democrats and 82% of Kerry voters. It should also be noted that both Evangelical Christians and Catholics had a higher proportion of faculty answering "not sure" on this question than on most other questions—17% for Evangelical Christians and 16% for Catholics.

When asked, "Which two of the following do you think are the greatest obstacles to stability in the Middle East?" and given five options—"Islamic fundamentalism; Israel's actions and policies; Palestinian violence; authoritarian governments in the region, such as Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran; or the policies of the United States in the Middle East"—a majority of Evangelicals, 57%, named Islamic fundamentalism, as did 47% of non-Evangelical Christians and Jews. The importance of religion and religious service attendance were not significant determinants for naming Islamic fundamentalism as a great obstacle to stability in the Middle East. On the other hand, Jews were the least likely to list the policies of the United States in the Middle East as a great obstacle to stability, only 8%, and aligned more closely with Evangelical Christians, only 14% of whom named the United States. This contrasts to those who are atheist/no religion, 35% of whom named the United States, as did 26% of Catholics, and

24% of non-Evangelical Christian faculty. Similarly, conservatives were more likely to name Islamic fundamentalism than liberals, 62% versus 41%, while Republicans, by a margin of 56% to 40% over Democrats, named Islamic fundamentalism. Forty-one percent of Kerry voters named Islamic fundamentalism versus 63% of Bush voters, and 31% of Kerry voters named the United States versus 4% of Bush voters. Jews, Evangelicals, and conservatives were far more likely to list Palestinian violence as a greater obstacle to stability in the Middle East, while atheists/no religion were far more likely to ascribe blame to Israel's policies and actions, as were faculty who said religion is not important to them. Forty-five percent of liberals listed Israel's policies and actions versus 15% of conservatives, as did 43% of Democrats and 44% of Kerry voters versus 21% of Republicans and 16% of Bush voters. The more secular and liberal faculty are, the more likely they are to ascribe instability in the Middle East to the policies of the United States and Israel. The more religious and conservative faculty are, the more likely they are to list Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian violence.

INTERNATIONALISM

Beyond domestic issues, one of the most prominent political divides for Americans today is that of internationalism versus unilateralism. Support for American interests versus those of the collective world body (defined as support for international authority, such as the United Nations), when they conflict, create significant controversy in the political arena. Generally, the more conservative one is, the less supportive of internationalism, and the more liberal, the more supportive. But does this breakdown hold weight over religiosity, aligning the most religious with unilateral sentiment and the least with internationalism?


Indeed, the data show that faculty with low levels of religiosity tend to be more globalist in their outlook. Faculty were asked to respond to the following statement: "Supporting institutions

like the International Court of Justice is the right policy even if it would limit America's options." Eighty percent of atheists/no religion agreed, as did 73% of Jews (See Figure 30). On the other hand, only 39% of Evangelical Christians agreed, while 59% of Catholics and 67% of non-Evangelical Christians agreed. Of those for whom religion is very important, 54% agreed versus 66% of those who said religion is fairly important to them and 81% of those who said religion is not important to them. In the same vein, 49% of those who attend religious services every week agreed versus 81% of those who attend rarely.

Like other questions that align along religious lines, this question also aligns along political identification. Eighty-six percent of those who identified themselves as liberal said they would support institutions like the International Court of Justice over America even if it would limit America's options, as did 62% of moderates, and only 23% of conservatives. Similarly, 83% of Democrats endorse the idea versus 63% of independents and only 30% of Republicans. Eighty-one percent of Kerry voters endorsed the idea of global institutions even if they were to limit America's options versus 25% of Bush voters.

Americans, while split, do not support the authority of the International Court of Justice over American interests. Forty-two percent of all Americans rejected the idea that the International Court of Justice should be supported, while 36% agreed with the faculty. Religiosity plays little role in the public's views.

Figure 30: Supporting institutions like the International Court of Justice is the right policy. (Faculty) by Religious Identification



Those for whom religion is very important, 46%, and those regularly attending religious services, 49%, do not believe that supporting the International Court of Justice is the right policy, compared to 50% of those for whom religion is not important who do support the policy, with 46% of those who rarely or never attend religious services also showing support. While religiosity is influential for faculty, the same is not true for the public.


Looking more closely at the relationship between religion and views on internationalism, faculty were asked a more specific question about American unilateralism. The data show that, in line with their support for international institutions, faculty in general are opposed to unilateral American action: 58% disagreed with the statement that "if other nations are unwilling to join American in fighting terrorism around the globe, then America must go it alone." About 34% of faculty agreed, and 8% were unsure. The public view was reversed, as 56% agreed, 39% disagreed, and 4% were unsure. This is consistent with most questions regarding American unilateralism and internationalism, where the public is significantly more trusting of American action than faculty.

Though faculty oppose unilateralism overall, higher levels of religiosity are associated with support for America fighting terrorism alone if it must. Among those for whom religion is very important, 45% agreed with the statement as opposed to 35% who said religion is fairly important to them and 24% for whom religion is not at all important. Similarly, 48% of those who attend religious services every week or more agreed with this statement versus 25% of those who attend religious services rarely or never. The majority of Evangelical Christian faculty support the statement, 56%, versus 37% of non-Evangelical Christians and 36% of Catholics. Twenty-eight percent of Jewish faculty agreed with this statement, as did 24% of atheist/no religion faculty. Among the general population, atheists/no religion were the least supportive of the statement, 46% agreed, and 46% disagreed.

Unilateralism versus internationalism lies at the heart of many political battles, and is a hot topic on many campuses in light of the Iraq war. It is therefore not surprising to find that responses to this question are highly associated with political ideology. Only 13% of liberals agreed versus 43% of moderates and 78% of conservatives that if other nations are unwilling to join in fighting terror, the United States must go it alone. Similarly, 19% of Democrats and 18% of Kerry voters versus 77% of Republicans and 79% of Bush voters agreed with the statement. The same holds true for the general public. Bush voters, Republicans, and conservatives all are significantly more supportive of American unilateralism than Kerry voters, Democrats, and liberals.

Another statement that measures faculty response on American unilateralism versus global consent and cooperation went as follows: "Even if most other countries support a particular international agreement which the United States disagrees with, the United States must do what is in its own interest." Only 36% of faculty agreed with this statement, 52% disagreed, and 12% were not sure. The responses were both religious and political. Among all Americans, 67% agreed, 25% disagreed, and 8% were unsure.

Fifty-nine percent of Evangelical Christians said that the United States must do what is in its own interest even if most other countries support a particular international agreement that the United States disagrees with, as opposed to 23% of atheists/no religion (See Figure 31). Forty-one percent of Catholics also agreed, as did 38% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 23% of Jews. Forty-nine percent of those for whom religion is very important and 53% of those who attend religious services every week agreed, as opposed to 22% of those for whom religion is not important and 23% who attend services rarely or never. Even among the most religious faculty, including Evangelicals, support for American unilateralism garners the barest of majorities. By contrast, in the general population, atheists/no religion were the least supportive, but still agreed, 50%, more than disagreed, 36%.



Politically, however, strong majorities of conservatives and Republicans agreed, although they represent a small proportion of faculty. Only 16% of liberals agreed versus 79% of conservatives, as did 20% of Democrats and 21% of Kerry voters versus 75% of Republicans and 78% of Bush voters. In the general population, 82% of Bush voters, 81% of Republicans and 80% of conservatives agreed, compared to 57% of Kerry voters, 63% of Democrats and 49% of liberals. Political divisions do

exist, but liberal/Democrat/Kerry voters in the public were still more likely than not to endorse the statement.

Faculty support for global institutions is also noted in their response to the following: “I would prefer a United Nations with more authority over resolving international disputes, including disputes involving the United States.” Seventy percent of faculty agreed with this statement, 22% disagreed, and 8% were not sure. Among all Americans, 61% agreed, 31% disagreed, and 7% were unsure. The most supportive groups in the public were Jews, 75%, Catholics, 71%, and atheists/no religion, 68%. Among faculty, atheists/no religion were most likely to agree, 82%, and Evangelical Christians were the least likely to agree, 44%. About 72% of Jewish faculty agreed, 71% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 66% of Catholics.

A majority of those who said religion is very important to them agreed, 60%, compared to 72% of those who said religion is fairly important to them, and 81% who said religion was not important

to them. Fifty-five percent of those who attend religious services weekly or more agreed versus 82% who attend rarely or never.


Liberals overwhelmingly agreed with this statement—88% versus 28% of conservatives. Eighty-six percent of Democrats and 84% of Kerry voters versus 40% of Republicans and 32% of Bush voters agreed with this statement. Support for a stronger United Nations received more endorsement among conservative and Republican faculty than other measures of globalism and internationalism. This belief is among the strongest for faculty, with only Evangelical Christians showing less than a majority endorsement. For the faculty as a whole, support for international institutions is a fundamental ideological component. While there are notable differences between the most religious and the least religious, these differences are not as significant as those found for most other questions in the survey.

PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The strongest intersection between religious and political views concerns prayer in the public sector. The issue of prayer in government functions is directly related to the idea of the separation between church and state and, as one of the regular “culture wars” waged in the United States, is always an ongoing debate.

The survey asked faculty whether they believed prayer should be eliminated from government functions such as the inauguration of the President and the opening of Congress. A sizable minority of faculty, 43%, agreed that prayer should be eliminated (See Figure 32). Forty-nine percent disagreed, and another 8% were unsure. Only 17% of all Americans agreed that prayer should be eliminated from government functions, 78% disagreed, and only 4% were not sure.

Religious identity and behavior are strong determinants of views about the place of prayer at gov-



ernment functions. About 82% of Jews agreed that prayer should be eliminated, as did 75% of atheists/no religion. Only 6% of Evangelical faculty agreed, and 92% disagreed. Twenty-six percent of Catholic faculty agreed, as did 32% of non-Evangelical Christian faculty. Among the public, Jews, 26%, and atheists/no religion, 34%, were the most likely to endorse eliminating prayer. Jews, who constitute a liberal religious minority, are thereby more supportive of a stronger separation between church and state. Jews in the general public, while less so than their faculty counterparts, tend to desire less religiosity in the public realm as well.

Predictably, religious importance weighs heavily on this question. Only 16% of faculty for whom religion is very important agreed, 40% for whom religion is fairly important, and 76% of faculty for whom religion is not important. Similar patterns are found for attendance at religious services. Those who attend most regularly often disagreed that prayer should be eliminated, 80%, as opposed to those who rarely or never attend, of whom 73% agreed.

Throughout the survey, religious identity and behavior often intersect with political identity and behavior. About 69% of liberals said that they agree, compared to 24% of moderates, and only 7% of conservatives. Sixty percent of Democrats agreed that prayer should be eliminated from government functions, as did 57% of Kerry voters, compared to 38% of independents and only 10% of Republicans and 8% of Bush voters. Among the public, a similar difference exists for this question based on political ideology, with 27% of liberals agreeing versus just 7% of conservatives, and 22% of Democrats versus 8% of Republicans. Both independents and moderates fall in the middle with 16% each. Only 10% of Bush voters endorse eliminating prayer, compared to 22% of Kerry voters.

Substantial differences among faculty were revealed by academic field—54% of social sciences and humanities faculty agreed that prayer at government events should be banned, 39% disagreed, and 7% were unsure. Forty-six percent of science/math faculty, 34%


of education faculty, 31% of business faculty, and 28% of health faculty agreed with eliminating prayer. Solid majorities of health and business faculty disagreed with the idea of eliminating prayer at public functions—66% and 60% respectively. The type of institution also matters: 50% of faculty at private non-denominational schools agreed, as did 47% at public schools versus 29% at private denominational schools. Differences by race are also apparent—45% of whites agreed versus 26% of minorities.


RELIGIOUS ADVOCACY

Religion in the public realm elicits a fairly negative response from the faculty on the whole. Opposition increases when faculty are asked specifically about Christian fundamentalist political advocacy. A strong majority of faculty, 71%, believe that “this country would be better off if Christian fundamentalists kept their religious beliefs out of politics.” Twenty-four percent disagreed and 5% were not sure (See Figure 33). The public agreed, but at far lower percentages than faculty—54% agreed, 39% disagreed, and 7% were unsure.

Female faculty were slightly more likely to agree than men—76% versus 68%. A solid majority of faculty agreed across academic fields, including 74% of those in social sciences and humanities and 63% of those in health and business fields. One of the most absolute findings in the survey was found in the answers of Jews and atheists, 99% and 96% respectively, who believe the U.S. would be better off if Christian fundamentalists kept their religious beliefs out of politics. This finding underscores their

Figure 33: This country would be better off if Christian fundamentalists kept their religious beliefs out of politics. (Faculty)





response to prayer in the public realm, further reinforcing the idea that the separation of church and state remains most important to those who are not religious or who are part of a religious minority. The only two groups in the public to share the views of faculty are Jews and atheists/no religion, who support the statement with 78% and 76% respectively (See Figure 34). This is again a reflection of a desire to protect the right to believe differently than the


majority, or not to believe at all. Sixty-five percent of Catholic faculty agreed, as did 72% of non-Evangelical Christians. Only 17% of Evangelical faculty agreed, and 76% disagreed.

For those faculty who said religion is very important to them, 42% agreed that Christian fundamentalists should keep their beliefs out of politics. However, the number jumps significantly to 81% among those who said religion is fairly important, and to 94% for those who said religion is not important to them. Even among semi-regular attendees at religious services (monthly/weekly), 72% agreed, as did 94% of those who do not attend religious services very often. Among the public, the greater the importance of religion, the less likely one is to support the statement. Only 43% of those for whom religion is very important agreed, while 83% of those for whom religion is not important agreed.

While political ideology plays a strong role in this belief, so strong is the faculty culture about Christian fundamentalists/Evangelicals that some conservatives and Republicans break ranks on this is-

sue. About 92% of liberals agreed that fundamentalist Christians should keep their religious beliefs out of politics, as did 66% of moderates, and 23% of conservatives (See Figure 35). Eighty-eight percent of Democrats and 87% of Kerry voters agreed versus 33% of Republicans and 29% of Bush voters—69% of independents agreed. Whites, 72%, were more likely to agree than minorities, 63%. In the public, similar divisions were represented by political party and ideology, with 69% of liberals and 70% of Democrats agreeing, and 36% of conservatives and 37% of Republicans agreeing. Seventy-four percent of Kerry voters agreed compared to 33% of Bush voters.

While faculty strongly reject most forms of religious influence in politics, overwhelmingly asserting their desire to see Christian influence lessened, they are far less critical and even supportive of increasing Muslim religious influence in politics. Overall, 34% of faculty agree that it would be a good thing if Muslims in America were more organized so that their religious views could be better represented in public policy. A similar percentage of faculty, 38%, disagreed with the statement. Twenty-eight percent were not sure, a significant percentage. Comparatively, 44% of the public agreed, 37% disagreed, and 18% were not sure. Both the public and faculty seem at least somewhat supportive of increasing the Muslim religious voice in the public realm. The difference, however, is that while the faculty in all other areas are extremely hostile to religion in the public sphere, the public are mixed. With regard to Muslim



political advocacy, faculty readily part with what is otherwise an overriding sentiment—the separation between religion and state.

Evangelical faculty are the least likely to agree that the Muslim religious voice in politics should increase—19% versus 44% of atheists/no religion. About 38% of Catholic faculty agreed, as did 33% of non-Evangelical Christians, and 33% of Jews. In the public, Jews and non-Evangelical Christians disagreed the most, 44% and 45% respectively. This is an interesting contrast to the warm feelings among Jews towards Muslims (evidenced in the next section), but is likely related to a general Jewish desire to separate the public sphere from religion in general. Atheists/no religion in the public, who are the most hostile toward Evangelicals, were the most supportive of Muslim religious representation at 48%.

The less important religion is, the more faculty endorse Muslim political participation—28% of those for whom religion is very important versus 40% of those for whom religion is not important. Younger faculty are more positive about the idea of Muslims becoming more involved in American politics—43% of those under 45 versus 31% of those 45 or older.

Considering the relatively low religiosity of faculty coupled with their adherence to a strict interpretation of separation between church and state, their response is at odds with other faculty attitudes—less than four of every ten reject the idea of Muslims being more organized to represent their religious views in American politics. Moreover, the one faculty group that does register high on religiosity and does not take such a strong stance against religion in public policy, Christian Evangelicals, largely disagreed with the statement on Muslim religious influence. Therefore, the 35% of faculty that do favor increased Muslim influence come from among the least religious and most likely to criticize the idea of religion in politics.

If we presume that liberal ideology opposes religious influence in politics, it is particularly interesting to note that 43% of self-

identified liberals agreed with the statement, while only 29% disagreed. This compares to 17% of conservatives who agreed, and 63% who disagreed. Likewise, the Democratic Party has increasingly defined itself in opposition to what is perceived as religious influence in the Republican Party, yet 42% of faculty Democrats said they desire more Muslim religious influence in politics versus 24% of Republicans. Similarly, 39% of Kerry voters agreed versus 21% of Bush voters. Among the public, Democrats and Republicans are separated by only 2% in supporting the statement, 43% to 41%; liberals and conservatives are separated by 9%, 49% to 40%; and the least and most frequent religious service attendees are separated by 2%, 44% to 42%. Politically, it seems that Americans do not differ greatly in their view of Muslim religious influence in politics. This stands in contrast to faculty, among whom this issue is heavily weighted by politics.

The other split of note is that between faculty members under 45 years of age and those 45 and above. Younger professors are more likely to agree, 43%, that Muslim religious beliefs should be better represented in politics, while 30% disagree. Older professors are reversed, with 31% agreeing and 42% disagreeing. Perhaps young people, especially university students, with whom many younger faculty still identify, are increasingly sympathetic to political causes of Muslims worldwide. Therefore, it is possible that support among younger professors for Muslim influence in public policy is less a statement on religion in politics, and more a statement of solidarity with Muslims in general.

What can be made of the seeming contradiction between support for Muslim religious influence in public policy and the general opposition to religion in politics, especially that of fundamentalist Christians? It is possible that faculty simply seek a balance of religious influence for the sake of equality between Muslims and their more established Christian and Jewish counterparts? Yet, faculty's desire to see Christian influence lessened would seem to seek to

accomplish this goal, and any concurrent support of increased Muslim influence would simply shift the imbalance. Moreover, one must question whether faculty believe that religion in politics leads to inherent inequality and that, therefore, an increase in any religious influence, even that of the least represented, would ultimately lead to more inequality.

There are other explanations about why faculty would tend toward restricting Christian fundamentalist views in politics. Perhaps faculty believe that religious fundamentalist views run contrary to their own religious beliefs. This idea is most relevant as it relates to the hard sciences, where issues of rationality may seem to conflict with faith. There is also the general objection to religious influence in politics within liberal ideology as a whole. Since faculty identify as liberal for the most part, it follows that they would oppose fundamentalist religious views just as they would other religious views, though, interestingly, not those of Muslims.

However, even considering these explanations, the severe imbalance in support of ejecting Christian fundamentalist views from politics lends itself to a possibly more specified circumstantial explanation. Today's faculty have often aligned themselves in contrast to the policies, both domestic and foreign, of the current administration led by President George W. Bush. Bush has made no secret of his religious orientation and, as an Evangelical Christian, sympathizes and supports many identified fundamentalist views. His religiosity has often been the focus of intense criticism. He has been accused of pandering to fundamentalist lobbyists and leading a new "Christian crusade" against Islam. Though under most circumstances faculty would answer in opposition to religious influence in politics, the high percentage of faculty who agreed with the statement concerning fundamentalist Christians may likely be explained by the current political climate as well.

Moreover, it is interesting and even perplexing to see a shared inclination among faculty atheists, those faculty with no religion,

and those faculty for whom religion holds no importance: They defend the right of Muslims to express their religious beliefs in American politics, while holding openly hostile views of fundamentalist Christians.

A more accurate, though perhaps uncomfortable explanation is that faculty are, in fact, hostile to Christian influence in public policy specifically, while they at the same time feel morally bound to support a perceived underdog in American politics—Muslims. The idea of Muslim religious involvement in politics would seem to offend liberal sensibilities about religion and state. However, it does not.

In contrast, the public shows more consistency about the appropriate role of religion in politics than do faculty. Indeed, Americans on the whole are even more supportive of Muslims expressing their religious beliefs in politics than faculty.

Whatever the reason, the hostility faculty direct at so large a proportion of the general population in America is a cause for questions.²⁹ Conservative Christians have for some time been concerned about their children's campus environment. These data certainly legitimize their concerns. Indeed, faculty have their prejudices, as evidenced in the following section measuring faculty feelings toward religious groups.


RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE & INTOLERANCE

One of the troubling findings of the survey is that 7% of faculty very often “perceive that ethnic or religious minority students at [their] institutions are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to those held by faculty,” with another 14% saying fairly often, and 38% saying occasionally—a total of 59% (See Figure 36). Only 30% said never or almost never, and 12% did not know. The data are consistent by demographic factors, academic field, and political and religious orientation.

We do not know which religious and ethnic groups faculty think are reticent. We also do not know if faculty think they themselves as individuals are not open enough, if they think other faculty are not receptive, if they think minority students are unnecessarily reluctant to speak, or if they think some pervasive component of university or societal culture is the cause.³⁰

Universities pride themselves on their tolerance, pro-

Figure 36. How often, if at all, do you perceive that ethnic or religious minority students at your institution are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to those held by the faculty? (Faculty)



tection of freedom of speech, and academic freedom. If three of every five faculty believe that ethnic and religious minority students on campus often, sometimes, or occasionally do not want to contradict professors, they have identified a deep and wide breach in the promotion and protection of diversity and open debate.


The finding is certainly alarming, and in relation with the disconnect regarding Christian and Muslim political advocacy, one begins to wonder if faculty indeed harbor prejudices that affect the classroom environment and/or their research. A scale has been devised that measures both attachments and negative feeling that an individual might feel about racial, religious, ethnic, national, or other groups. Respondents were asked: "What are your overall feelings toward the following groups using a scale of 0-100, which goes from 100, very warm or favorable feeling, to 50, neutral, to 0, very cold or unfavorable?" The question can be used as a measure for prejudice—high negative feelings show dissonance or hostility about some group. A wide range of religious groups were included—non-Evangelical Christians; Evangelical Christians; Jews; Muslims; Mormons; Buddhists; atheists; those who have no religion. Faculty, in general, tend to be tolerant of many religious groups.

Faculty feel most favorably about Jews, with 73% saying they have warm/favorable feelings, and only 3% saying that they have cool/unfavorable feelings. Similar results were recorded for Buddhists, with 68% of faculty saying they feel warm/favorable, and only 4% cool/unfavorable. Faculty also have positive feelings about non-Evangelical Christians and Catholics, for whom about 62% and 64%, respectively, feel warm/favorable. Thirteen percent feel cool/unfavorable toward Catholics and 9% toward non-Evangelical Christians. About 41% of faculty said they feel warm/favorable toward atheists and 18% cool/unfavorable, while 50% feel warm/favorable about people with no religion and 10% cool/unfavorable.

One group elicited high negative feelings among faculty: Only 30% ranked their feelings toward Evangelical Christians as warm/

favorable, with only 11% feeling very warm/favorable, the lowest ranking among every other religious group, and 53% said that they have cool/unfavorable feelings towards Evangelical Christians (See Figure 37). Faculty feelings about Evangelicals are significantly cooler than any other religious group, leading Mormons as the least liked religious group by 20%. These negative feelings are noted across academic disciplines and demographic factors.

Figure 37: Unfavorable Views of Religious Groups (Faculty)



The general public does not share the views of faculty regarding religious groups. Among all Americans, Catholics and Jews ranked the highest, with just over 50% holding warm/favorable feelings toward them. Catholics and Jews are followed by Evangelical Christians, 42%, non-Evangelical Christians, 36%, Muslims, 36%, Mormons, 35%, Buddhists, 34%, persons not practicing any religion, 33%, and atheists, 18%. Americans on the whole feel warmest toward Christians and Jews, and coldest toward atheists, Muslims, and, interestingly, Buddhists. The most notable difference from the faculty is the reversal of Buddhists and Evangelical Christians. Among the public, while 60% of Evangelicals feel warm/favorable toward Jews, 37% of Jews feel cool/unfavorable toward Evangelicals, including 26% who feel very cold/unfavorable, revealing a bit of a one-sided affinity between the two communities.

Younger faculty, those under thirty-five, have a more positive view of atheists than those over sixty-five—30% percent and 16% respectively feel very warm/favorable toward atheists. Business faculty tend to have a more negative view of atheists, with 28% holding cool/unfavorable views. Fifty-one percent of social sciences faculty have a positive view of atheists, as do 46% of science/math faculty, and 48% of humanities faculty. Over 50% of those in the social sciences and humanities say they have a negative view of Evangelical Christians, 57% and 54% respectively. The numbers are even higher when removing Evangelical Christians themselves. Only 10% of social sciences faculty, 14% of science/math faculty, and 17% of humanities faculty said that they had a very warm/favorable view of Evangelical Christians. The total net positives among these three disciplines were 29% among social sciences faculty, 35% among science/math faculty, and 33% among humanities faculty. About a third of faculty responded with negative views about Mormons, including 42% of humanities faculty. On the other hand, 48% of faculty had a net positive feeling towards Muslims, but only 15% said that they feel very warm/favorable. Twenty-two percent said that they have cool/unfavorable feelings about Muslims; the highest negative feelings were among business management faculty, with 35% holding these feelings.


In general, there were few differences recorded for how faculty feel about most religious groups based upon faculty religious denomination, importance of religion for faculty, or faculty political ideology. The feelings about Catholics, non-Evangelical Christians, Buddhists, Jews or Muslims do not vary all that much. There are two exceptions: how faculty feel about atheists, and how faculty feel about Evangelical Christians.³¹

Of those who said that religion is very important to them, 35% have very warm/favorable feelings towards Evangelicals versus 9% of those who said that religion is fairly important to them and 2% of those who said religion is not important to them. Oppositely, 20%

of those who said religion is very important to them have unfavorable views of Evangelicals versus 53% of those who said religion is fairly important to them and 75% for whom religion is not important. Sixty-nine percent of liberals, 38% of moderates, and 10% of conservatives said they

have negative views of Evangelicals. Similarly, 65% of Democrats and 64% of Kerry voters had negative views of Evangelicals versus 16% of Republicans and 13% of Bush voters.

Moderates and independents actually fell in the middle, with 38% of moderates saying they hold unfavorable views of Evangelicals, along with 44% of independents (See Figure 38). Thirty-one percent of liberals said they have very positive views of atheists versus 11% of conservatives. Thirty percent of Democrats and 26% of Kerry voters said they have very positive views of atheists versus 10% of Republicans and 7% of Bush voters. Oppositely, 6% of liberals and 10% of Kerry voters said they have unfavorable views of Atheists versus 40% of conservatives and 38% of Bush voters.



CONCLUSION

This survey reveals some of the contradictory religious beliefs of college faculty. Some of the findings are reassuring, some are surprising, some are not so surprising, and some are troubling. On the reassuring side of the ledger, higher education faculty are religiously diverse. A broad range of faiths, traditions, denominations, and religious behaviors are found among the faculty. Also, faculty tend to be tolerant of many religions, feeling positively about a wide range of religious groups other than their own.

The data were surprising in revealing that faculty are more religious than many observers might have conjectured. Certainly, most faculty are not anti-religious. Most faculty believe in God, identify with some religious tradition, want their children to have some religious training, and attend religious services at least occasionally. Not so surprisingly, compared to the general public, faculty are less religious on nearly all measures.

The data are also troubling in a number of ways. First, while faculty are religiously diverse, Evangelical Christians are found in far fewer numbers than in the general public—even less in non-denominational public and private schools throughout the United States. What accounts for this disparity? Are Evangelical Christians not attracted to teaching and research in most colleges and universities? Is the academic environment somehow in conflict with the reli-

gious beliefs of Evangelical Christians? Are Evangelical Christians discriminated against when it comes to hiring and promotions? Because political ideology is so highly associated with religious beliefs and behavior on campus, are Evangelical Christians misfits because they tend to be conservative and Republican, while the campus is overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic?

The political question is central, given the second perplexing finding: Faculty believe that Muslims should be more involved in American politics than Christian fundamentalists. Our data do not tell us why—only that, in general, faculty tend to favor separation of church and politics. But why more so for Christians, and less so for Muslims? The inconsistencies are unclear, unless one surmises that faculty so overwhelmingly reject the political agenda and goals of Evangelicals that they wish Christian fundamentalists would stay out of American politics altogether. Perhaps faculty do not think about, or know about, the political agenda of Muslims in America. Or, oppositely, they do know about and support this agenda. Or, perhaps faculty believe that Muslims are somehow disenfranchised, and should be better heard regardless of their political goals. We know from our data that faculty do not feel negatively about Muslims in the United States.

Which leads to the third and most troubling finding in the survey: faculty feelings about Evangelical Christians.³² Faculty do not feel positively about Evangelicals at all. In fact, they feel less positively about Evangelicals than about any other religious group. The combination of responses—showing so few faculty Evangelicals on campus, showing imbalance in the support of Muslims versus Christians advocating their religious beliefs in American politics, showing strong negative views of Evangelicals compared to tolerance for other religious groups—raises serious concerns about how Evangelical Christian faculty and students are treated or feel they are treated on campus. The levels of faculty disapproval are high enough to raise questions about the overall climate on campus.

How does this disapproval affect the intellectual, emotional, and social experiences of those who identify as Evangelicals? As it was for Jews on campus two generations ago, maybe Evangelical Christians do not want to talk openly about their identities and beliefs. The prejudice against them stands out prominently in institutions dedicated to liberalism, tolerance, and academic freedom.

Faculty may deny that their feelings about Evangelical Christians affect research and teaching, or that they interact differently with colleagues and students who are Evangelical Christians. But faculty cannot deny, at least according to these data, that they feel very negatively about Evangelicals, especially compared to the tolerance expressed for other religious groups.

Our first monograph, *The Political Beliefs and Behavior of University Faculty*, showed that political liberalism is the dominant ideology on college campuses, especially in the social sciences and humanities. This study demonstrates that this political ideology is not benign. Indeed, it may be connected to a hostility and prejudice about a major religious group in America. Increasing interest can be found in the role and place of religion in higher education.³³

Colleges and universities have some serious soul searching to do about these findings. Faculty may argue that their level of negativity about Evangelical Christians is a political disapproval, not a religious one. This argument is unacceptable, as are the justifications for all prejudices. Some individuals, groups, and now even nations (Iran) attempt to justify anti-Israelism, saying that they disapprove of Israel—either in concept or because of particular Israeli government policies. Either way, such assertions do not legitimate prejudices against Jews. Nor does unhappiness with the politics of Evangelical Christians legitimate a lack of tolerance.

The attitudes of faculty about Evangelicals have not gone unnoticed by Evangelicals themselves. Organizations representing Christian communities have argued that many universities are inhospitable and some are hostile to Evangelical groups on campus.³⁴

Perhaps the high number of secularists and atheists combined with the negative attitudes about Evangelicals cements the view that universities are anti-religious, even though most faculty are not.

The desire among faculty to keep religion separate from the public sphere may also spill over into a desire to keep religious activities separate from university life. Faculty may see their institutions as places where religion should be kept at bay, regardless of their own private beliefs and behaviors. While faculty may not be “anti-religious,” they may very well value anti-religion as a key component of campus life.

Although most faculty embrace religion to some degree, these data do not inform as to the religious culture of higher education. The reputation of colleges and universities as “too secular” may derive more from the way many schools deal with issues of religion and campus life rather than the levels of religious belief and behavior of the faculty. Or the image may be based on the disproportionate number of atheists and secularists on campus as compared to the general public.

Perhaps the fact that liberals/secularists are the largest group on campus contributes to such perceptions, especially among those on the religious right. Much more research is required on the experience of religious faculty and students on campus. Is higher education receptive or hostile to organized religion, or neither? We know that most faculty embrace religion personally. What do they think about the role of religion and religious communities in the life of the university?

Despite their negativity towards certain religious groups and religious activism, college faculty should not be characterized as anti-religious, not even as unreligious. Most faculty embrace religious identity, behavior, and beliefs. Yet faculty become, in fact, what they object to most: an amalgam of religious and political beliefs, a group that does not distinguish between religion and politics—just as they define the Evangelical Christians that they criticize. The dissonance is profound. Faculty advocate separation of church and politics, but cannot realize this separation for themselves.

APPENDIX: FACULTY SURVEY METHODOLOGY

SAMPLING PROCEDURES, SURVEY ADMINISTRATION, AND DATA WEIGHTING

Sampling Procedures

The sample for the faculty survey was randomly selected from listings purchased from MKTG Services of Wilmington, Massachusetts, a compiler and seller of names and related information used primarily in direct marketing. Our sampling frame—the complete list of college faculty compiled—is updated by MKTG Services at least annually (bi-annually for many schools) by using the most current college catalogues to extract information on all faculty members and their departmental affiliation(s). The MKTG list is believed to be as complete and up-to-date a roster of United States college and university faculty as exists.

The sample selection process began by developing an inclusive set of academic field categories and obtaining unduplicated counts of faculty by field, by geographic region, and by field by region. These distributions were validated by checking them against data from the latest available National Survey of Post-Secondary Faculty (NSOPF), conducted by UNITED STATES Department of Education and available online from DOEd's National Center for Education Statistics.

Because the NSOPF was an imperfect source for this due to a not entirely discernable categorization of academic fields (but likely different from ours), minor adjustments in the target distribution were made in a few of the cells.

A total of 6,600 faculty members were randomly selected for the starting sample, stratified by field and region as shown in the following table:

Table A-1: Sample Selections					
	Region 1	Region 2	Region 3	Region 4	Row %s
Agriculture	10	27	27	22	1.3
Business	124	129	113	109	7.2
Communications	34	38	34	27	2.0
Computer Science	82	63	50	55	3.8
Education	126	142	126	101	7.5
Engineering	47	64	57	63	3.5
English/Philos/Relig/Classics	213	181	155	158	10.7
Fine Arts and Architecture	137	156	106	102	7.6
Foreign Languages	63	49	25	42	2.7
Health Sciences/Nursing/ Medicine	226	271	224	177	13.6
Law	32	35	24	35	1.9
Natural/Physical Science and Math	262	240	213	228	14.3
Social/Behavioral Sciences	325	246	209	211	15.0
All Other fields	156	163	134	134	8.9
Column %s	27.8	27.3	22.7	22.2	100.0
The regional clusters of states used in the NSOPF were also used here:					
Region 1: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA					
Region 2: IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD					
Region 3: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV					
Region 4: AZ, NM, OK, TX, CO, ID, MT, UT, WY, AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, WA					

The primary objective of these sampling procedures was to product a maximally representative sample of all 4-year college faculty by academic field and region. An alternative plan—considered but ultimately rejected—would have aimed to achieve a sample maximally representative of *faculty who students encounter* at 4-year institutions. This approach would have given greater weight to selecting professors at larger schools and would have required stratification by school size (enrollment). Readers are urged to bear in mind this important distinction.

Survey Administration

The survey of faculty was conducted as an online, web-based survey. Faculty in the starting sample were sent a letter on the survey contractor's letterhead, describing the purpose of the survey in general terms, specifying a URL/link to the opening page of the survey along with a unique ID number, and requesting cooperation. A toll-free phone number was also provided for assistance in the event help was needed with the survey mechanics or for respondents wishing additional information. Sampled faculty were also offered a \$20 amazon.com gift certificate as an incentive for participating in the survey (which was sent to the e-mail address respondents supplied upon completion).

At least two additional contact attempts were made to reach faculty in the starting sample: First, a postcard was sent to everyone 1-2 weeks following mailing of the initial letter, urging participation and thanking those who had already completed the survey; then, 3-5 weeks later, a follow-up call made to as many remaining non-responders as could be reached, again requesting cooperation with the web survey. Messages were left at the numbers telephoned whenever possible in those cases when the intended respondent could not be reached directly.

In all, the survey generated 1,292 completed questionnaires, of which 23 were eliminated before the analysis because of excessive

missing data. This left a final sample of 1,269. To take account of known bad addresses and other factors causing failed contact attempts, an estimate was derived of the number faculty members having no opportunity to participate in the survey because they could not be reached at least once, or could not be reached in time. Then, adjusting the denominator in the response rate calculation to reflect the estimated number of faculty reached at least once produced a response rate of 24%. The 1,269 usable respondents represent 712 different colleges and universities, with Medical Schools and different branch locations counted separately. (In a small number of cases, other colleges housed within a university are also counted separately.)

The obtained, final sample was distributed by academic field and region as follows:

Table A-2: Final Sample Distributions (unweighted)					
	Region 1	Region 2	Region 3	Region 4	Row %s
Agriculture	1	7	5	6	1.5
Business	16	16	22	21	5.9
Communications	6	14	11	5	2.8
Computer Science	13	8	10	12	3.4
Education	20	35	30	18	8.1
Engineering	9	11	11	9	3.2
English/Philos/Relig/ Classics	31	34	29	36	10.2
Fine Arts and Architecture	21	27	16	18	6.5
Foreign Languages	11	10	4	9	2.7
Health Sciences/Nursing/ Medicine	36	45	27	27	10.6
Law	5	10	4	4	1.8
Natural/Physical Science and Math	55	59	43	51	16.4
Social/Behavioral Sciences	58	64	62	46	18.1
All Other fields	21	34	27	29	8.7
Column %s	23.9	29.5	23.7	22.9	100.0

Comparing the marginal percentages in Table A-2 with those in Table A-1 (the bottom rows and right-hand columns, respectively) indicates a close correspondence: The regional and academic field distributions are quite similar. Regionally, Region 1 (the Northeast plus several Mid-Atlantic states) is slightly underrepresented relative to the starting sample. Across the fields, the medical/health professions are a bit underrepresented, as is Business to a lesser extent, while the social sciences show disproportionately large participation. To a lesser degree, the same is true for natural science and math. None of the disparities, however, is marked, and all are corrected via the implementation of post-hoc weighting.

Weighting

Post-stratification weights were calculated using the two variables as in the sample selection: geographic region and academic field. “Rim weighting” procedures were applied (sometimes called “marginal weighting”) to minimize the variation in weights across cells while at the same time reproducing the estimated population parameter marginals—the target overall frequencies for region and academic field. The procedure produced cell weights with modest variation across 32 cells comprising the weighing matrix: 4 regions X 8 academic fields. (Several of the smaller fields were collapsed.) Examination of the set of weights also shows that this produced few “extreme” weights which differed much from 1.0—indicating once again that there was little non-response bias in the sample with respect to region and academic discipline. In other words, the unweighted final sample proportions were quite similar to the starting sample proportions (which, in turn, are believed to be good estimates of the population).

NOTES

1. For an overall look at faculty in American colleges and universities, see *The American Faculty: The Restructuring of Academic Work and Careers*, by Jack H. Schuster and Martin J. Finkelstein (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

2. For discussions of the political identity and behavior of faculty, see *Profiles of the American University: Volume I: Political Beliefs & Behavior of College Faculty*, by Gary A. Tobin and Aryeh K. Weinberg (San Francisco: The Institute for Jewish & Community Research, 2006). Several recent publications have measured the political leanings of faculty, affirming their liberal core. See Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, "Professors and Their Politics: The Policy Views of Social Scientists," *Critical Review* 17, nos. 3-4 (2005): 257; Christopher F. Cardiff and Daniel B. Klein, "Faculty Partisan Affiliations in All Disciplines: A Voter Registration Study," *Critical Review* 17, nos. 3-4 (2005): 237; Gary A. Tobin, Aryeh K. Weinberg, and Jenna Ferer, *The UnCivil University* (San Francisco, California: The Institute for Jewish & Community Research, 2005); Stanley Rothman, S. Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte, "Politics and Professional Advancement among College Faculty," *The Forum* 3, no. 1 (2005): article 2.

3. See Roger Kimball, *Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education* (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1990); Dinesh D'Souza, *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus* (New York: Free Press, 1991); David Horowitz, *The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006); Richard F. Hamilton and Lowell L. Hargens, "The Politics of the Professors: Self-Identifications, 1969-1984," *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (1993): 603-627.

4. Other avowedly conservative observers weighing in on this debate include Stephen Balch, president of the National Association of Scholars, who points to the department-oriented system of governance in universities as perpetuating uniformity of thought because they function as "little republics," being ideologically cohesive because of their small size and majoritarian procedures. He wrote, "Being diminutive, they easily fall under the sway of compact majorities that persistently monopolize positions of power and grind down opponents. And because the admission of new academic citizens is subject to the majority's control, as time passes those majorities tend to expand." See Stephen H. Balch, "The Antidote to Academic Orthodoxy," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 23, 2004, sec. B7. Also, Jim Piereson, former director of the Olin Foundation, writes, "College faculties are today awash in antibusiness and anti-free-market prejudices, with scholarly publications beating the drum against globalization and the supposed depredations of capitalism." See Jim Piereson, "Only Encouraging Them," *Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 2005, sec. editorial.

5. For an excellent analysis on the history of the role of religion in higher education, see George M. Marsden, *The Soul of the American University* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

6. For a look at how academics view spirituality, see "Meaning and Spirituality in the Lives of College Faculty: A Study of Values, Authenticity, and Stress," by A.W. Astin and H.S. Astin (Los Angeles, CA: Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA, 1999).

7. For a look at the way religion is evolving in American society, see Wade Clark Roof, *Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

8. For a critical assessment of how universities are now too secular, see Naomi Schaefer Riley, *God On the Quad: How Religious Colleges and the Missionary Generation Are Changing America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005).

9. For a collection of essays on the history of the role of religion in higher education, see George M. Marsden and Bradley J. Longfield, *The Secularization of the Academy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

10. There is also some discussion in the literature about how much religion is actually taught in higher education. One scholar

notes, for example, that most secular universities do not have a faculty position in Biblical studies. See Jacques Berlinerblau, "What's Wrong With the Society of Biblical Literature?" *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 10, 2006, sec B13.

11. For discussions of religion and higher education, see Andrea Sterk, *Religion, Scholarship, and Higher Education: Perspectives, Models and Future Prospects: Essays from the Lilly Seminar on Religion and Higher Education* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); Victor H. Kazanjian and Peter L. Laurence, *Education as Transformation: Religious Pluralism, Spirituality, and a New Vision for Higher Education in America* (New York: Peter Lang, 2000); David W. Gill, *Should God Get Tenure?: Essays on Religion and Higher Education* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997).

12. Jennifer A. Lindholm and Helen Astin, "Understanding the 'Interior' Life of Faculty: How Important is Spirituality?" *Religion & Education*, 33:2, (2006): pp. 64-90.

13. Alexander Astin and Helen Astin, *Meaning and Spirituality in the Lives of College Faculty: A Study of Values, Authenticity, and Stress* (Los Angeles, CA: Higher Education Research Institute, University of California, 1999).

14. Jennifer Lindholm, Helen Astin, and Alexander Astin, *Spirituality and the Professoriate: A National Study on Faculty Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behaviors* (Los Angeles, CA: Higher Education Research Institute, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California, 2006).

15. Other studies confirm some of our basic findings. Most faculty believe in God, but also are far more likely to be atheists than the general public. See Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, "How Religious are America's College and University Professors?" (Boston, Massachusetts and Washington D.C.: Harvard University and George Mason University, October 5, 2006).

16. For excellent discussions of modern religion both in the United States and around the world, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Robert Wuthnow, *America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).

17. For a thorough look at American attitudes and beliefs about religion, see George Gallup Jr. and D. Michael Lindsay, *Surveying the Religious Landscape: Trends in U.S. Beliefs* (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 1999).

18. A good discussion of the intersection of religion and political ideology as part of the changing cultural landscape of post World War II American society can be found in Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).

19. See Michael Gerson, "A New Social Gospel: Many Evangelicals Are Chafing at the Narrowness of the Religious Right. A New Faith-Based Agenda," *Newsweek*, November 13, 2006.

20. Data totals in both the charts and the text may reflect rounding errors.

21. Christopher Bader, Kevin Dougherty, Paul Froese, Byron Johnson, F. Carson Mencken, Jerry Z. Park, and Rodney Stark, *American Piety in the 21st Century: New Insights to the Depth and Complexity of Religion in the U.S.* (Waco, TX: The Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion and Department of Sociology at Baylor University, 2006).

22. Belief in God varies significantly in scope, including belief in God sometimes, and belief in God while still harboring doubts about the existence of God. See Bader et al., "American Piety in the 21st Century: New Insights to the Depth and Complexity of Religion in the U.S.," 2006.

23. (Lindholm, Astin, and Astin, 2006)

24. For a discussion of the connection between religious beliefs and political ideology, see Robert Wuthnow, "Religion and Culture: Views of 10 Scholars: Still Divided, After All," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 22, 2004, sec. B7.

25. An increasing number of books and articles have emerged that challenge the role of religion in society and especially the connection between religion and politics. See Sam Harris, *Letter to a Christian Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); Sam Harris, *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004); and Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006).

26. "America Votes 2004: Election Results," *CNN Election Results*, <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/president/>.

27. More religious Americans believe that the United States as a nation has special protection from God, cementing the intersection between religion, politics, and attitudes about foreign policy. See The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *America's Struggle with Religion's Role at Home and Abroad*, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Poll, 2002.

28. For a discussion of attitudes about Islam and the war on terrorism, see Yvonne Haddad, "Religion and Culture: Views of 10 Scholars: Defaming Islam and All Religious Belief," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 22, 2004, sec. B7.

29. Both this survey (33%) and others confirm that Evangelical/Born Again Christians constitute about one third of the population of the United States. See ABC News/Beliefnet Poll, *Most Americans Say They're Christian Varies Greatly From the World at Large*, ABC News Poll, 2002.

30. For information on how faculty view issues of diversity, see Jennifer A. Lindholm, Katalin Szelényi, Sylvia Hurtado, and William S. Korn, *The American College Teacher: National Norms for the 2004-2005 HERI Faculty Survey* (Los Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute at the University of California, 2005).

31. A Pew poll found that Americans are more tolerant of Muslims than they are of Islam (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Poll, 2002).

32. An ABC news poll in September 2006 showed that 31% of Americans said that they have unfavorable views of "Christian fundamentalist religions," which is different than views on Christian fundamentalists or Evangelicals. ABC News, 9/11/06: *Where Things Stand*, ABC News Poll, September 5-7, 2006.

33. Victor Kazanjian, "Religious Identity and Intellectual Development: Forging Powerful Learning Communities," *Diversity Digest*, Spring 1999.

34. For information about Christian concerns on campus, see David French, *FIRE's Guide to Religious Liberty on Campus* (Philadelphia: The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 2002).

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

GARY A. TOBIN, PH.D.

Gary A. Tobin, Ph.D., is president of the Institute for Jewish & Community Research. He was the director of the Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University for fourteen years, after spending eleven years on faculty at Washington University, St. Louis. He is the editor of two volumes about race in America, *What Happened to the Urban Crisis?* and *Divided Neighborhoods*. His books include *Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism*; *Rabbis Talk About Inter marriage*; *Opening The Gates: How Proactive Conversion Can Revitalize the Jewish Community*; *In Every Tongue: The Racial & Ethnic Diversity of the Jewish People*; *The UnCivil University*; and *Profiles of the American University, Volume 1: Political Beliefs and Behavior of College Faculty*.

ARYEH K. WEINBERG

Aryeh K. Weinberg is a research associate at the Institute for Jewish & Community Research. He received his B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, in international relations. Mr. Weinberg's areas of research include higher education and philanthropy in America. His latest publications include "An Exceptional Nation: American Philanthropy Is Different Because America Is Different" (*Philanthropy*, Nov-Dec 2004), *The UnCivil University*, and *Profiles of the American University, Volume 1: Political Beliefs and Behavior of College Faculty*.

THE INSTITUTE FOR JEWISH & COMMUNITY RESEARCH

The Institute for Jewish & Community Research is engaged in research and analysis on a broad range of issues including racial and religious identity, philanthropy, and higher education. The Institute is an independent, non-partisan think tank, and provides innovative research and pragmatic policy analyses to Jewish and other communities around the world.