

An Asian Studies Center Forum

**Easing Cold War Tensions on the Korean Peninsula:
Options for U.S. Policy Makers**

**The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz
U.S. House of Representatives**

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Easing Cold War Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: Options for U.S. Policy Makers

Dr. Edwin Feulner: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am Ed Feulner, President of the Heritage Foundation. It's a pleasure to welcome you to our Asian Studies Center Symposium on ending Cold War tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

I don't mean to betray my age, but it seems almost like yesterday that my colleagues here at Heritage were issuing papers criticizing then-President Carter's attempt to withdraw our troops from Korea. Later, when Richard Allen joined our Asian Studies Center as Chairman of its Advisory Council after his tour of duty as President Reagan's first National Security Advisor, he was quick to impress on us the importance of the Korean Peninsula. I am proud to say that Heritage has played a key role in maintaining Washington's strong support for Korea over the last decade, especially during times when many in Washington doubted that the will of the Korean people would prevail.

During the crucial events of 1987, leading up to the historic December presidential election in Seoul, our analysts were providing advice to the Reagan Administration. We even sent observers to that election. In fact, the Asian Studies Center has issued some 30 *Backgrounders*, lectures, and other special reports on Korea.

If I sound like Heritage is taking all the credit, let me be the first to inject some modesty and say that we did have a lot of help. This came in the not-insignificant form of what became a bipartisan consensus on Korean policy in the late 1980s. I am particularly pleased to welcome here today one of the principal architects of that bipartisan policy in the House of Representatives, the Honorable Stephen Solarz. I have asked our colleague, Richard Allen, to give a proper account of Steve's contributions, but let me say that, on the issue at hand, Steve Solarz's leadership in our Congress has been crucial to a successful Korean policy. I know we all look forward to his remarks today.

I would like to reflect a moment on the achievements of the Korean people over the last decade. Who could have imagined during the height of the troop withdrawal debate in the late 1970s, or during the anxious moments of 1987, that the prime ministers of North and South Korea would in 1990 be shaking hands and raising toasts, as they did last week?

The Korean people deserve the credit for this current state of affairs. It's their desire for security, for democratic freedom, for economic prosperity, and finally, for the unification of their homeland, that has driven their leaders. And a large amount of credit also is due to President Roh Tae Woo. His bold Northern policy of seeking better relations with the communist bloc is largely responsible for the small but important thaw that we currently see between the two Koreas.

For four decades, Kim Il Sung's regime has provided the model of a Communist nightmare. From the reports of friends who have managed to visit Pyongyang recently, it is clear that this last bastion of Stalinism cannot survive much longer.

How this chapter of the Cold War comes to its own conclusion is the focus of our panel discussion today. It is our hope that the eventual transition in North Korea will follow the example of East Germany – that is, a peaceful surrender to democracy and capitalism. But at The Heritage Foundation, we are acutely aware that the North remains unpredictable and dangerously well armed. Real peace on the Korean Peninsula will not be possible until North Korea begins to follow the example of its comrades in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and discards the failed nostrums of Marx and Lenin. Until that time, I believe that Korea deserves American support, and a high priority in our Asian policy. In conclusion, let me say that I'm confident that President Bush will continue to build on President Reagan's achievements in this regard, and I'm confident that congressional leaders, like Steve Solarz, will help to formulate a Korean policy that strengthens our friendship with the Korean people. Now I will turn the panel over to my distinguished colleague, the Honorable Richard V. Allen, Chairman of our Asian Studies Center Advisory Council.

Richard V. Allen: Thank you, Ed, and welcome to all of you. We are particularly pleased to have such a strong interest and attendance this morning. Ed Feulner has told you of the contributions the Asian Studies Center has made over the years.

Heritage has a reputation for taking positions on issues. One of the great virtues of The Heritage Foundation, and one of the joys of being associated with it, is that Heritage positions on the issues are delivered in a very timely fashion. Whether you agree or disagree with our positions, they are readable and presented in a format that can be tucked into a briefcase and taken home, and provide good and solid information about the policy options open to the United States government.

Heritage – for those of you who come from uptown – is downtown here on Capitol Hill, where it retains a significant path of communication to the United States Congress, to its staff and, of course, to leading media representatives, and to the Administration itself.

It is often said that there are two places where you do not want to be caught with Stephen Solarz. One is in his hearing room, and the second is on a tennis court. I have been in his hearing room. I have not been on the tennis court with him, but I do know that he is a formidable opponent there, and he can also be a very formidable opponent in scholarly and civilized debate.

It has been my privilege to appear before and with Congressman Solarz on numerous occasions, discussing issues of mutual importance. Particularly during the years of the difficulties in the Philippines I came to have not only a greater understanding of what makes him tick, that is, the quest for good, bipartisan public policy, but also a genuine desire to promote democracy throughout the world. In that regard, he has certainly been an extraordinarily consistent and able public servant.

Steve graduated from Brandeis University in 1962, took his master's degree in public law and government from Columbia University, and became a political science professor at the City University of New York. In 1968, he was elected to the New York State Assembly, and served in that legislature with distinction. In 1974, he began the first of eight successful races for election to the House of Representatives from the 13th Congressional District of Brooklyn, and he currently serves on four committees in the House: the Foreign Affairs Committee, for which he is perhaps best well known, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Economic Committee. He is fourth

in seniority on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and he also chairs the crucially important Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Many of you here today have had an opportunity also to appear with or before Congressman Solarz. I note that his former colleague, Congressman Leggett, is with us, as well as Ambassador Art Hummel, who served with great distinction, among other places, in the People's Republic of China on behalf of the United States during the first years of the Reagan Administration. We are happy to have you here, Art.

Steve has been a very prolific writer and one who appears frequently on the most important television shows. But he always has time for undertakings such as ours and regularly contributes to policy debates at various institutions. We are more than delighted that you are here with us today. You grace us with your presence, and we certainly look forward to an active exchange of views with you.

Join me, if you will, in welcoming Congressman Steve Solarz.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Representative Stephen Solarz: I want to thank Dick Allen very much for those extraordinarily gracious remarks. They certainly were a welcome contrast to a letter I received not too long ago, which went as follows: "Dear Congressman Solarz: Until I saw you on the McNeil-Lehrer Show last evening, I always thought my own Congressman, Henry B. Gonzalez of Texas, was the most stupid member of the House of Representatives."

"I now realize," my correspondent went on, "how mistaken I was. Congressman Gonzalez is only the second dumbest Congressman in the House of Representatives."

So, Dick, I appreciate your kind comments. They came at a very timely moment.

I also want to congratulate The Heritage Foundation for its exquisite sense of timing in scheduling this conference at this particular moment. It comes only a week after the meeting of the two prime ministers, and on the very day that we expect to be voting on the floor of the House of Representatives on an amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill which calls for a reduction to 30,000 in the number of American troops deployed in Korea by 1993. I think that both of these developments give a very special significance to the discussions that will be taking place at The Heritage Foundation today.

Let me begin my substantive remarks by observing that while the Cold War may have come to an end in Europe, it clearly has not yet come to an end on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, next to the Persian Gulf and possibly Kashmir, I can think of no area of the world other than the Korean Peninsula where there continues to be a very real possibility of major hostilities. There are well over a million men under arms on both sides of the 38th Parallel. North Korea has never renounced its ambitions to reunify the Peninsula under communist control. It continues to enjoy some significant advantages militarily in terms of armor and artillery, and manpower as well.

And therefore I do not think any of us could prudently dismiss the possibility that hostilities with catastrophic consequences could erupt on the Korean Peninsula. I do not think that is likely to happen, but it is by no means inconceivable that it could happen.

Therefore, I think it makes considerable sense for us to be thinking about what can be done to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. And here I think we need to know not only what we should do, but what we shouldn't do. One of the things we shouldn't do is to reduce gratuitously the level of our forces in South Korea below the reductions already planned by the Administration — that is, to 37,000 by the end of 1992.

It is one thing to make a modest reduction in the number of American forces deployed south of the 38th Parallel in coordination and cooperation with our South Korean allies in order to make sure not only that the deterrent value of our military presence is maintained, but also that the balance of power, such as it is, is preserved. It is quite another, on an unplanned and uncoordinated basis, to reduce the number of our troops even further.

Certainly, at a time when dialogue is underway between the North and the South, were the Congress unilaterally to mandate further reductions in American forces in South Korea, it would clearly diminish whatever incentives Pyongyang might have to agree to additional tension-reduction measures on the Korean Peninsula. Inasmuch as the total removal of all American forces from South Korea has clearly been for decades now one of North Korea's primary objectives, it might well reason that all it would have to do is to outwait the United States and no concessions on its part would be required.

And if Pyongyang should come to the conclusion that the U.S. Congress would do its work for it, without the need for any concessions on its part, I would suggest that the prospects for any really significant agreements between the North and the South in the context of the ongoing dialogue would clearly be diminished.

Furthermore, from a purely domestic point of view, it's not at all clear to me what the sponsors of this amendment hope to achieve, inasmuch as they make no provision in their proposal for the demobilization of the forces that would be withdrawn. Yet, without the demobilization of those forces, if they're simply redeployed elsewhere, not only won't we save any money — which is the presumptive motivation for the amendment — but it may very well end up costing us more money to relocate them.

So this is a proposal which, in my view, is bereft of strategic and fiscal logic. I don't know what the outcome will be on the floor because the Administration, I think, has been preoccupied with the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and I haven't sensed any major lobbying effort on the amendment. But I do hope that reason will prevail.

There can be little doubt that our military presence on the Korean Peninsula over the course of the last three decades has constituted a very significant contribution to the preservation of peace. Until such time as arrangements between the North and the South can be agreed upon which would render unnecessary the need for a continued U.S. military presence in South Korea, I think it would be a serious mistake to move in this direction.

What then should we do? What kind of positive contribution can we make to the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula? And here I would like to say that while I am pleased, as I'm sure all of you are, that the meeting between the two Prime Ministers took

place, and while I am encouraged that a follow-up session has been scheduled in Pyongyang, I am not overly optimistic that any significant breakthrough will be achieved.

Some of you may recall that I visited North Korea almost exactly a decade ago. I think I was the first, and perhaps the only, member of Congress to go there since John Glenn last flew over Pyongyang.

A lot of people asked me what it was like. My reply was that the best single book ever written about North Korea was George Orwell's *1984*. If you wanted to understand how the country worked, all you had to do was to read that book.

While I was there and had my substantive discussions, including a four-hour meeting with the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, it became clear to me that their view of how to achieve reunification was fundamentally different from the view of the South. They want to do it in one fell swoop. They want to move instantaneously to unification through an agreement on their proposal for a Federal Republic of Korea, a Korea from which foreign troops would be withdrawn. The forces on both sides would go down to 100,000. A confederation would be established in which, presumably, the political, social, and economic systems on each side would remain the same, but where they would have a common defense and foreign policy.

The view of the South, however, is that the only way to achieve real progress toward unification is incrementally, through a series of steps including family reunifications, trade, and tourism, and the demilitarization of the demilitarized zone. These could generate the kind of confidence that would then make it possible to achieve agreement on the larger issues. And there can be little doubt that the view of Seoul is far more realistic than the view of Pyongyang.

Interestingly enough, if you look at how China is approaching the problem of Taiwan, it has adopted an approach much closer to that of the South than that of the North. It is attempting through incremental steps to generate the confidence which, from its point of view, hopefully would lead to a breakthrough on the issue. And I was struck by the fact that in the meeting between the two prime ministers, according to the reports I've seen in the press, the North seemed basically to be sticking to the same approach which it had described to me back in 1980. In other words, it tends to view these incremental steps — like, for example, having both Koreas represented at the United Nations, or opening the border for family reunification and visits — as measures which, by making the division of Korea less unpalatable, are more likely to freeze it in perpetuity.

And therefore, so long as it sticks to that position, I don't think there is much chance for progress. Indeed, I am inclined to agree with what Ed Feulner said in his introductory comments, that the only real possibility for unification will come after the passing of the current leadership in North Korea, and hopefully the emergence of a fundamentally changed form of government in that country.

I think it's illustrative of the problems facing Korea that it took the collapse of Communism and the emergence of a genuine democracy in East Germany to pave the way for the unification of Germany. If and when fundamental political change takes place in North Korea, I think the unification of the Korean Peninsula will come very, very rapidly. I look forward to that day, because I know how much it means to the people of the Korean Penin-

sula, and also because I think the reunification of the country would eliminate a major source of tension in Northeast Asia.

In the interim, however, there are steps that I believe we can take. Perhaps the most important, in my judgment — and I don't know that all of you will agree with this — is finding a way to deal with the growing threat now being posed by North Korea's apparent effort to acquire the capacity to produce its own nuclear weapons, in spite of the fact that it is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). I view this as a deeply disturbing development. I think that if North Korea was to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be extremely destabilizing; and it would certainly put tremendous pressure on South Korea to develop its own nuclear potential as well. Given the ever-present danger of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, who can rule out the possibility that they might one day be used?

So how can we deal with this problem? So far, our efforts to persuade diplomatically or to pressure North Korea by encouraging the Soviet Union and China to agree to full scope safeguards have not been very effective. Indeed, I have come to the conclusion that an alternative approach is necessary.

What I suggest we should do is propose the establishment of a nuclear free zone on the Korean Peninsula, in which both North and South Korea, as well as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, would all agree neither to develop nor deploy nuclear weapons. In exchange, the North and the South would also agree to full scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear facilities.

It is possible that such a proposal might be acceptable to Pyongyang. They have, after all, been insisting for some time now that the United States withdraw what they believe to be the presence of live nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. To the extent that such a nuclear free zone would preclude the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons there, they might feel there was merit in agreeing to full scope safeguards.

In the event that they refused to agree — which they very well might — it seems to me it would clearly put on them the onus for whatever might subsequently happen. And that responsibility would be very much, I believe, in the interests of both Seoul and Washington.

From the point of view of South Korea and the United States, let me say that I simply cannot envision any circumstances whatsoever in which we would want to use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. At the height of the Korean War, in the darkest days of that conflict when the North Koreans had virtually overrun the entire Peninsula, we didn't use nuclear weapons. After the Chinese invaded, we didn't use nuclear weapons. And I do not believe that we ever would, or should, use them even in worst case scenarios.

Furthermore, to the extent that the American nuclear potential contributes in any way to the prevention of war in Korea, that nuclear potential remains intact. Nuclear weapons don't have to be deployed on the Korean Peninsula in order to contemplate the possibility of using them.

So I think that this is a proposal which deserves consideration, because the problem is not going to be solved by taking an ostrich-like attitude and hoping that it will go away. Moreover, I see little reason to believe that North Korea is going simply to agree one day to full scope IAEA safeguards without something in exchange for it. I believe this proposal constitutes the basis for a perfectly acceptable *quid pro quo*.

Indeed, I would go so far as to say that one could make an argument that even without such an agreement it might be well to announce a policy that we have no intention of deploying nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. So far, there haven't been any significant protest movements in South Korea against the alleged presence of our nuclear weapons there. But there's always a possibility such a movement might emerge, and I certainly wouldn't want us to take such a step under pressure. It would be far better to do it under circumstances where it was seen as a constructive and creative initiative designed to contribute to the preservation of peace.

Let me just say, in conclusion, that a decade ago when I went to Pyongyang, an editorial about my visit appeared in the New York newspaper sponsored by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. As I recall it, the first sentence of the editorial went something like this: "Kim Il Sung opened the door to his Communist Kingdom just a crack last week, and in slithered New York Congressman Stephen Solarz." Well, I hope that my presence there didn't lend any comfort to the "Great Leader." I certainly made it very clear to him that the United States intended to stand by its determination to defend South Korea. I believe we have done so for the last decade. That has been possible largely, in my judgment, because of the extent to which our policy toward Korea has enjoyed strong support on both sides of the aisle, in the Congress, and, of course, from the Administration.

I think that this has been one of the great success stories of American foreign policy. It has created the underlying conditions which have made possible not only the economic miracle we all know took place in South Korea, but in recent years a political miracle as well. And I hope we stay the course, because I truly believe that before the end of this century, democracy will have come not only to South Korea, but to North Korea, and that the country will finally be reunified.

Mr. Allen: Congressman Solarz, there's a few minutes for questions, and we'll entertain them.

Guest: Mr. Congressman, do you plan another trip to North Korea?

Congressman Solarz: I can say, having been there once, my appetite for returning has been somewhat diminished, but if the circumstances were right, I would certainly consider it.

Actually, I almost went there a few months ago when I was hoping to see Prince Sihanouk, who was in Pyongyang at the time. It turned out, however, it was not possible for me to get there to see him. This was in connection with my efforts to try to move the Cambodian problem toward a solution.

Guest: What is your view on nuclear-free zones on the Korean Peninsula, or across Asia?

Congressman Solarz: Well, I don't favor a nuclear-free zone for all of Asia. I do not think that is a practical proposal.

I think there are certain areas and certain circumstances where a nuclear free zone can make a useful contribution. My view is that the Korean Peninsula is one of them, and if that enables us to solve the problem of an indigenous North Korean nuclear weapons program through the establishment of full scope safeguards, I think it is worth doing.

I don't know whether the North Koreans will actually accept it. They often will say things to make themselves look good politically, but when they're put to the test, they're not willing to do what they said they were going to do.

A few months ago, they proposed to open up the border for a few weeks and let people go back and forth; and when President Roh surprised them by more or less accepting their proposal, they quickly backpedaled and began to invent conditions which eventually turned out to be unacceptable.

So, I don't preclude the possibility that whatever they may have said about this happening in the future, when they're put to the test, they'll say no. I think they ought to be put to the test, because if they say yes, I think we can go a long way toward solving the problem. If they say no, it will be even clearer to the rest of the world where the responsibility lies, and that will in turn make it easier to mobilize international pressure against them.

Guest: There is a good bit of anti-Americanism among the younger generation in Korea. Do you see this as developing into a problem between the U.S. and Korea?

Congressman Solarz: Anti-Americanism has certainly affected much of the youth of Korea, at least judged by the demonstrations that take place with some frequency on their campuses. Having tried to get a better understanding of this phenomenon by meeting with groups of students when I go to South Korea, I can say that trying to converse with some of these young people is a very difficult task, since they seem to have a perspective on events that often bears little relationship to reality.

But I do believe that while many of the young people may be alienated, the overwhelming majority of the Korean people have warm feelings for the United States and very much want our forces to remain. And I have the impression that when many of these young people who participate in the demonstrations graduate from college and go out into the world of work and assume responsibilities for families, their political militancy diminishes somewhat.

So it does not appear to be a problem that has spread to the larger society. If it did, it would obviously have very serious implications for our relationship, because one thing is clear. The American people are not going to want to keep American forces in South Korea if they believe the Korean people don't want us there.

The student demonstrations notwithstanding, I think it is clear that the great majority of the Korean people, and their elected government, do want us to remain. I'm struck by the fact that even the opposition wants us to remain. I found in the 1970s and '80s, when I visited countries which had repressive regimes where American troops were deployed, that the opposition invariably wanted the American troops out on the theory that that would weaken the government to which they were opposed.

But in South Korea, even before the holding of the direct presidential elections and establishment of a much freer society, opposition leaders like Kim Dae Jung for example, made it very clear he did not want a departure of U.S. forces from Korea.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Roger Brooks: Good morning. I am Roger Brooks, Director of the Asian Studies Center. I am here this morning to introduce the fine array of panelists we have to address the principal issue of our conference.

So many important ideas already have been expressed this morning about the situation on the Korean Peninsula and I am sure so much will be said by our group of panelists about the prospects for ending Cold War tensions on the Peninsula.

Those of us who follow events on the Korean Peninsula find ourselves far from fully satisfied with the results of the meeting of prime ministers which took place in Seoul last week, although one cannot help being encouraged by the fact that the event took place at all. Many observers have been right to point out that reunification of the Korean Peninsula most likely will not come before radical political change transforms the North. Certainly, credit must be due to leaders in both Pyongyang and Seoul for agreeing to go forward with these talks and with a continuation of the dialogue, barring subsequent disagreement, in Pyongyang next month.

Still, I think that all of us here this morning look forward to the day when the North Korean leadership can, as President Roh put it in his announcement on the exchanges of Korean people on July 20, catch the "tide of openness and reconciliation" which has "torn away the Iron Curtain separating East and West."

This is not going to be an easy task. It is difficult, if not impossible, for us to discern any kind of democratic movement or recognizable opposition inside the North, or, for that matter, to get the inklings of a free and decentralized market inside the North. I am told, however, by friends who have visited the North that the aspirations of North Koreans for a better life are the same as the aspirations of people everywhere.

For these and other reasons, I would caution those who wish to impose the so-called German model on the Korean Peninsula, although I and my colleagues at Heritage fully understand the real and deeply-felt aspirations of the Korean people that someday the two Koreas might follow the German model of unification.

To begin this morning's panel presentations, we are deeply honored to welcome Ambassador Hyun Hong-Choo, the Republic of Korea's Ambassador and Permanent Observer to the United Nations. Ambassador Hyun is one of his country's foremost experts on the political situation on the Korean Peninsula, and has had wide-ranging experience in government and politics in the ROK.

He was appointed to his current post in May 1990. Before that, he had held, among other roles, the position of Minister of Legislation (February 1988 to March 1990); Member of the Presidential Transition Committee (January 1988 to February 1988); Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) (July 1987 to January 1988); and Member of the National Assembly (January 1985 to April 1988). Ambassador Hyun has asked that he be able to present his views on this morning's subject from his perspective at the United Nations.

Following Ambassador Hyun will be Karl Spence Richardson, Director of the Office of Korean Affairs at the Department of State, a position he has held since August 1989. One of Washington's top experts on Korean issues, Spence Richardson spent many years in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul where he was Deputy Section Chief of the Political Section (1978 to 1983). Mr. Richardson will be looking at today's issue from his own experience in this field in Foggy Bottom and as a U.S. diplomat in Seoul.

Third on the panel this morning will be Brent Franzel. Mr. Franzel is Legislative Counsel to Senator Christopher Bond of Missouri. A lawyer by training who has worked in the Senate since December 1986, Mr. Franzel will be looking at our conference subject from his own study of the subject and from a congressional staff perspective.

Wrapping up the panel discussion will be Daryl Plunk. Mr. Plunk, as Visiting Fellow and former Policy Analyst at Heritage's Asian Studies Center, has written and spoken on this subject in many journals and conferences both here and in Asia. Mr. Plunk began his work on Korean affairs over a decade ago, when from 1978 to 1980 he served as a Peace Corps volunteer in South Kyungsang Province in Korea. Mr. Plunk also is Vice President of the Richard V. Allen Company in Washington, D.C.

I will now turn the podium over to Ambassador Hyun.

Ambassador Hyun: Thank you, Mr. Brooks and The Heritage Foundation, for giving me this opportunity to speak to you about my job at the United Nations and the meaning in the Korean context of all these changes around the world.

I arrived in New York in late May of this year and these three-and-a-half months have been a quite interesting period, and very exciting one. Since August 2, we have seen dramatic developments in the Persian Gulf and have been able to observe how the United Nations is reacting to this crisis.

Many lessons have been learned from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait about the role of the United Nations and the meaning of regional conflict in this age at the end of the Cold War. I think the first lesson from the Gulf crisis is that the decline of the Cold War by no means suggests an end to regional conflict in all areas of the world, and the United Nations can really play a peacemaking role, as had been originally envisioned by its founders.

The second lesson is that the peacekeeping role of the United Nations can only become viable when the national interests of the countries involved converge. Had it not been for the consensus reached among the nations involved, the reaction of the United Nations could have been a lot slower. The prompt reaction, in my view, was possible simply because the national interests of those countries involved were similar, or even identical, in most cases.

The third lesson we have learned is that if the United Nations is going to be effective, there has to be some muscle, whether it is political muscle or military muscle. Without this muscle, United Nations resolutions remain the repetition of empty words at most.

The fourth lesson which can be drawn from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is the emergence of the United States — not the United Nations, but rather the United States, as the most crucial key to managing the world crisis. Had it not been for the United States' muscle, troops deployed in Saudi Arabia, the situation could have deteriorated further, and it could have

been a disaster. Many people are talking about the new U.N., but without the United States playing a significant role, I don't think there is a new U.N.

From these four lessons, much can be applied to the Korean situation. From the first lesson, the fact that regional conflict is not dead but alive and well, we can illuminate the fact that the Korean Peninsula could be the best candidate for becoming the next flashpoint. North Korea, as you know, is well armed. It is stronger than Iraq militarily, and the possibility is always there something might go wrong, even as the Cold War ends.

And because of this, the United Nations, which was designed to be a peacemaking body, can have a very significant role in preventing possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula. If there is any term like preventive diplomacy, Korea is the very area where that kind of diplomacy should be implemented. What the United Nations can do to prevent further conflict on the Korean Peninsula is to let the two Koreas participate fully in the works of the United Nations. In other words, make the two Koreas full members. I'm not suggesting that U.N. membership of the two Koreas in and of itself would guarantee the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. I would like to stress the fact that because the United Nations is an effective and institutionalized channel of communication between member states, if the two Koreas joined the United Nations, the channel of communication could be utilized for meaningful dialogue between them.

We are now engaging in various dialogues, but I think that the dialogue which can be engaged in in the quiet lobbies of the United Nations is the best one for genuine communication. And by so talking, we would be slowly building confidence in one another. Then if that happened, I think it would be a very significant breakthrough in North-South relations.

The second lesson, if it is applied to Korea means that all national interests of the countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula should converge if we are to expect meaningful progress in resolving intra-Korean issues. In the case of Korea's membership in the U.N., I see no reason that any of the surrounding countries should oppose it.

The United States has been the most ardent supporter of our membership at the U.N. for several decades, and we are grateful for that. And the United States' interest will be better served by having Korea become economically strong and politically mature, and by having its security guaranteed. The peaceful situation which we can expect from the Koreas' simultaneous U.N. membership will help achieve these goals.

In the case of Japan, simply because of geographic proximity, it has no objection to Korea's becoming a stable country, and it too is supporting our membership at the U.N.

As for China, it has no desire to see any armed conflict erupt again on the Korean Peninsula. It is in its national interest to insure that the Korean Peninsula remains peaceful. If Korean membership could contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, China would have no reason to object to it.

The Soviet Union is trying to establish diplomatic relations with us. I think the announcement will come very soon, if we are to believe what has been reported by Soviet newspapers. It will come sometime, anyway. And it, of course, has no objection to the Koreas' membership.

Some member states have suggested that having the two Koreas simultaneously becoming members of the United Nations might perpetuate the division. I think that it goes against the precedent set by Germany. Germany, having enjoyed several years of simultaneous membership, is now on the threshold of unification. So the second lesson concerning national interests, which is very important in making the U.N. feasible, is that all the countries involved have their national interests converge on this point of accepting the two Koreas' membership. Against the argument that it would perpetuate division, we say that it rather would facilitate unification. That is very clear from the experience of Germany.

The third lesson we can learn from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is that we can provide some muscle to the United Nations if we become a full member. Even without being a full member, we felt honored — as well as embarrassed — when President Bush, in his press conference, named Korea, right after Japan and before West Germany, as countries to which he was sending two envoys, Secretary Baker and Secretary Brady, to ask financial cooperation for the management of the Gulf crisis.

Even without membership, we will contribute. But if we become a member, I think Korean taxpayers will be much more comfortable in supporting the U.N. effort.

The fourth lesson, which says the United States' role is a key one, is easily applied to the Korean situation. By having a strong show of support from the United States for Korea's membership — it has been its most ardent supporter — then most U.N. member states will feel more confident in supporting us. It could lead China, the last stumbling block to our effort to gain membership, to change its mind. If the United States wants to achieve something, we see that many things can be achieved.

Well, that's my understanding of the lessons we have learned from the Gulf crisis. And as a former United States Ambassador to the U.N. once noted, "The one peace dividend at the end of the Cold War will be a more effective United Nations." I think that her prediction is quite correct — this was made in 1988 — and I can assure you that, as a full member, the Republic of Korea could make a positive contribution to the United Nations, and make that peace dividend a little bit bigger. Perhaps not significantly bigger, but bigger. And I think it would be good for Korea, the United States, and the United Nations.

Mr. Franzel: I've been asked today to focus my comments on congressional action relating to reunification and future options for U.S. policy makers on the Korean Peninsula. You've already had the opportunity to get a firsthand account of the congressional viewpoint from Congressman Solarz, one of the members who is most involved in U.S.-Korean matters. I certainly can't match his experience, but I'll try to build upon his comments by discussing some of the matters relating to Korea that have come before the Congress this year. Clearly all of these actions by Congress will affect developments on the Peninsula, and will affect U.S.-Korean relations.

There has been little discussion in Congress so far this year regarding reunification or the meetings that have just taken place in Seoul. This is understandable, given the fact that Congress has not been around for most of the time that those talks were going on, and the fact that the attention of most members of Congress has been turned toward the Gulf.

But a few individual members have taken the opportunity to comment on the activities that took place both last week and when President Roh made his July 20th speech. In state-

ments on the House floor, members of both the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees have praised President Roh for his proposal to open the border to travel in August. Others have noted the recent move on behalf of the North, for the first time since 1954, to return some of the remains of U.S. soldiers, expressing hope that this will perhaps at some point lead to an improvement in relations between our two countries.

Now that Congress has returned and is discussing these issues on the floor and in committee, I am sure we will hear many more members, both in the House and Senate, offer their support for the recently concluded talks and their hope for a continued, successful dialogue.

As Congressman Solarz noted this morning, one issue of importance to Korea that has been a primary concern to many members of Congress over the past several years has been the continued presence of 40,000 U.S. troops in the South, and who should pay for them. There have been a number of calls over recent years for a withdrawal of some, or all, of the U.S. troops stationed in the South.

Most supporters have cited budgetary concerns as the need for withdrawing troops, but others have suggested that the troops are no longer needed there. Underlying all of these calls has been the suggestion that the United States should not be paying to base troops in South Korea at a time when that nation is running a large trade deficit with the United States.

The Administration's announcement earlier this year that it would reduce the number of U.S. troops in Korea by 7,000 as part of an overall force reduction, seems to have taken some of the pressure off these congressional efforts to cut troops. There were, for example, no efforts on the Senate floor this year during consideration of the Defense Authorization Bill to cut troops, as there were last year. However, as Congressman Solarz noted, we are seeing an effort along that line in the House today, and we hope that it will not be successful. But it raises the fact that it is still an issue of concern to many members of Congress, and one that will continue to be discussed.

At the same time, it has been encouraging to see that there have been some actions taken in Congress to reaffirm the importance of a continued U.S. troop presence in the South. Several members have gone to the floor over this during the past summer to express their view that the United States must maintain its commitment to the South's defense.

Earlier this summer, the House passed a resolution unanimously expressing the sense of Congress that the United States remains firmly committed to its mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea. The sponsors of this measure — Congressman Solarz being the principal one — stated that their purpose in passing this resolution was to make it clear to North Korea and the rest of the world that the planned troop withdrawal by the Administration did not signal any change in the U.S. policy toward Korea, or any wavering of the U.S. commitment to South Korea's defense.

In addition, I believe that the recent events in the Gulf, specifically the unexpected invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, will act as a brake on most congressional efforts to pull additional troops out of Korea. The Gulf situation serves as a stark and constant reminder to all members of Congress that, despite the changes we have seen in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the world remains a dangerous place, and the United States must be prepared to respond at a moment's notice to regional threats, such as the one that we see on the Korean

Peninsula. I'm hopeful that members of the House will remember that as they go to vote on the withdrawal amendment today on the floor.

At the same time, there continue to be calls in Congress for South Korea, along with other countries including Japan and some European countries, to contribute more toward the cost of basing American troops overseas. Pressure for increased burden sharing will only grow as budget pressures in the United States increase. As Senator John McCain, a Republican member of the Armed Services Committee, stated earlier this year: "The political realities of the situation are simple. The United States can only maintain a stable presence in the region if Japan and South Korea take advantage of their growing economic strength to help offset the cost of the disproportionate military efforts of the United States."

It is important to note, of course, that Korea has recently announced steps to increase its portions of the costs of keeping U.S. troops there. That action, combined with a substantial lowering of the trade deficit with the United States, seems to me likely to go a long way toward easing congressional pressure on this issue.

However, I believe the Korean government should not be lulled into a false sense of confidence by these recent moves. Burden sharing remains, and will remain, a significant issue in Congress, one that rings true with the folks back home, and therefore one that is not likely to fade anytime in the near future.

In fact, the burden-sharing debate has taken on a new twist in recent weeks, as the United States has scrambled to gain international support for its efforts in the Gulf. President Bush, as we all know, has issued strong calls to all nations to support the U.S. effort with troops, with economic assistance, and both if possible. Members of Congress have already begun to look very carefully at how individual nations are responding to that effort, and some have begun casting a critical eye at South Korea.

Just yesterday, for example, in introducing an amendment in support of President Bush's effort to enlist the aid of other countries in the Gulf, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona noted that while most countries are responding to Bush's call for assistance, some rich countries can do more. And he specifically cited Japan and South Korea as two examples. He noted that South Korea relies heavily on oil imported from the Gulf, and he said that Korea could do more to help, including sending troops, sending additional transport, and increasing aid to the region.

There is a feeling among many members of Congress that the United States should not continue to bear the entire cost of military actions that help our allies as much as, if not more than, the United States, the effort to protect Gulf shipping being the most recent example. And I believe members of Congress will watch very closely in the coming months to see how individual nations respond to the current situation, and they will not soon forget who was helpful, and who was not. Though this concern is not directed solely at South Korea, it is clear that that country is in for close scrutiny by some members of Congress.

Finally, I'd like to touch on one additional issue which has been of interest to Congress this year — the Korean fighter program. The South's decision to purchase 120 F/A-18 *Hornet* fighter aircraft, which will be co-produced with McDonnell Douglas, has drawn the attention of several members of Congress, many of whom believe that the planes should be bought off the shelf, rather than produced partly in the United States and partly in Korea.

Senator Alan Dixon, a Democrat of Illinois, has been the leader of those who have sought to put roadblocks in the path of the deal. He has expressed concerns that the deal will help Korea build an aerospace industry with which the United States would then have to compete.

He has taken several actions, most recently in August, when he offered, and then withdrew, an amendment to the Senate Defense Authorization Bill which would have set aside the normal process for considering arms sales and would have instead required Congress to pass a resolution approving the sale. Senator Dixon has indicated his intention to raise this issue later this fall.

Those supporting the Korean fighter deal and opposing Dixon's efforts to raise obstacles, including my boss, Senator Bond, have argued that the deal is a good one for both Korea and the United States, pointing out that the United States will gain almost \$4 billion in exports to Korea which will, of course, help us with our trade deficit, and that Korea will get an important weapons system that will go far towards strengthening its defensive capabilities.

In the end, I believe Congress will allow the Korean fighter program to go forward. This is important to the United States-Republic of Korea relationship, because it will further solidify our defense relationship; it will put a large dent in our problematic trade deficit with Korea; and it will allow the Koreans to play a larger role in the defense of their nation.

In summary, I would say that although there continue to be some isolated issues on which members of Congress will see the need to continue to put pressure on Korea, the issue of burden sharing being the most obvious one, Congress will remain strong in its support for Korea. It will remain firmly committed to the United States' defense role there, and the Congress will over the years serve a positive role in support of the South's efforts to achieve peace and to achieve reunification.

Mr. Richardson: Thank you, Roger — and I'd also like to thank The Heritage Foundation. I was here not quite a year ago, just before President Roh's visit to Washington, and I think it's terrific what organizations like The Heritage Foundation have done to encourage public dialogue and understanding of America's foreign policy.

Today I want to talk about the U.S. government's perception of the so-called *Nordpolitik*, or South Korea's opening to the Communist and socialist countries, and about U.S. policy toward North Korea.

We are all well aware of the scope and structure of South Korea's economic miracle. These economic, political, and diplomatic advances have been matched by a concurrent period of economic decline, political confusion, and diplomatic reversal in the Communist world. This has given the Republic of Korea the opportunity to expand its ties with its former adversaries, especially China and the Soviet Union.

Dubbed "*Nordpolitik*," this initiative dates from about two years ago, and has drastically altered the frame of reference in North-South relations. The North Korea diplomatic universe has been turned upside down, and the pressures on an already troubled and weak economy have been intensified. Increasingly hindered by low capital investment, rigid management, a military budget consuming over 20 percent of its GNP, the North has fallen into virtual stagnation.

Isolation increasingly has described Pyongyang's diplomatic position. The former Eastern bloc has rushed to embrace Seoul, depriving Pyongyang's counterbalance to South Korea's numerous diplomatic links with the West. The Soviets and the Chinese remain linked to Pyongyang by security agreements and trade, and for the time being, membership in the communist club; but the hard facade of Socialist solidarity has been cracked by economic self-interest.

I believe that last week's prime ministerial talks took place largely because of the success of *Nordpolitik* over the past couple of years. South Korea had the confidence to host the meeting and make concessions. As Congressman Solarz said, once the North had proposed a border opening, the South went them one better.

The Republic of Korea is increasingly confident. It can be confident of the backing of its allies, especially the United States. It can be confident that the national debate over reunification and North-South relations will not seriously threaten the country's political institutions.

Were the talks a success? Although no agreements were signed, the mere occurrence of the talks was a major step in South-North dialogue. The prime ministers are scheduled to meet again in Pyongyang in mid-October. Who knows? Maybe there will at last occur a meaningful dialogue between the two Koreas.

Although the principal context of U.S. policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea, *Nordpolitik* has also shaped U.S. thinking toward the Korean Peninsula. We have supported *Nordpolitik* from the very first, and we were proud to play the modest role of supplying a venue for the historic June meeting between Presidents Roh and Gorbachev.

Nordpolitik's successes have also underlined our support for Korean unification. Some in Korea say that they doubt that U.S. really supports the unification of the two Koreas. Let me state that the U.S. unequivocally supports the peaceful reunification of North and South on terms that are acceptable to all Koreans. This is simple, this is clear, and this is American policy.

In October 1988, in support of President Roh's July 7, 1988, opening to the North, and because it is in the joint U.S.-Korean interests to draw North Korea out of its isolation, the United States took four steps. This package remains in force.

First, we now encourage unofficial, nongovernmental visits from the DPRK in academic, sports, cultural and other areas. We have granted visas to several North Korea academic and religious delegations. More delegations will visit this year.

Two, to facilitate the travel of U.S. citizens to the DPRK, the U.S. now permits travel services to North Korea on a case-by-case basis, such as those travelling for academic and family reunion purposes.

Three, trade regulations have been revised to permit commercial exports from the DPRK of goods that meet basic human needs, such as food, clothing, medicines, and other supplies.

Four, U.S. diplomats may hold substantive discussions with DPRK counterparts in neutral settings. My boss and I and the people on the Korea desk have spoken to North

Koreans either here in Washington or, most recently in my case, in a seminar at Stanford University.

The U.S. and the North Korea political counselors in Beijing have held eleven meetings since December 1988. We find these contacts useful and hope that they will lead to an increased mutual understanding, and perhaps eventually to improved relations.

Since announcing the October 1988 package, we have waited for reciprocation. We have suggested areas in which the DPRK could make a positive response. We would like to see progress in South-North dialogue, the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty safeguards agreement, return of war remains, military confidence-building measures, an end to anti-U.S. slander, and credible assurances that Pyongyang does not support terrorism.

We have not said that these are preconditions to improve relations, or that they must all be satisfied at once. When North Korea takes positive steps toward better relations, we, for our part, will take further steps.

Let me just mention a couple of the issues on the North Korea conclusion of a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is of great concern to us.

By signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, North Korea incurred an obligation to apply IAEA safeguards. Application of international safeguards, and full disclosure of fissile material would help satisfy international concerns — not just of the U.S., but of all countries — about North Korea's nuclear energy program. The North Korea conclusion and implementation of a safeguards agreement would be seen by us, and by other countries, as a very positive step.

We made it clear to North Korea that we welcomed the return of five sets of war remains, presented to Congressman Sonny Montgomery through the Military Armistice Commission. Return of war remains is an obligation North Korea assumed when it signed the Armistice agreement. We have provided North Korea with maps and diagrams of burial sites, and we would like to see the return of the remains of all who fought in the Korean conflict.

On confidence-building measures, North Korea academicians with close ties to the government — in most cases, they are in the government — have held detailed discussions with American scholars. And we can all be pleased at the manner in which confidence-building measures figured in the just-completed prime ministerial talks.

Terrorism is a very difficult issue to resolve. We are not asking for an act of contrition on the part of North Korea, but we do expect a credible promise that the North does not support terrorism. By law, a country cannot be taken off the so-called terrorist list unless the President certifies that its record has been clean for the past six months, and it has given assurances that it does not support terrorism. Politically, the requirements are probably tougher, since Congress would have to be persuaded to consent to the Administration's decision to redesignate a country that has no constituents in Washington.

Our October 1988 initiative was not taken with the expectation that it would spark quick, major changes in DPRK policy matters. The question remains, how to induce North Korea to reciprocate this initiative?

North Korea officials tell journalists they have reciprocated by engaging in exchanges with mainstream U.S. academicians and by seeking high level contacts. We have told Pyongyang we seek steps that are more durable on issues of U.S. interest, especially in the security area.

Let me make it clear. We have never said that these are preconditions for improving DPRK-U.S. relations. The North Koreans should realize that positive, as well as negative, actions on their part will prompt a proportionate U.S. response.

Meanwhile, U.S. policy toward North Korea remains consistent. We applaud the success of the prime ministerial meetings in Seoul, and South Korea's *Nordpolitik*. We hope that Seoul and Pyongyang will continue toward what would be a meaningful dialogue.

The U.S. will stay the course. We will support our South Korea allies while at the same time being ready to improve relations with North Korea. We are willing to do what we can, although the two Koreas are the principal players to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea.

Mr. Plunk: There is perhaps no communist country in the world that has been a stronger holdout in the wave of economic and political reform sweeping through much of the communist world than the repressive regime in North Korea. In the capital of Pyongyang, the longest ruling Communist tyrant, Kim Il Sung, imposes what is probably the world's most isolated and repressive political system upon his people.

Furthermore, North Korea maintains a formidable military force, whose forward deployment and offensive capability pose a continuing threat to the Republic of Korea, and American soldiers are stationed there with the mission of deterring possible North Korean aggression. Of great concern are credible reports that the North is pursuing a nuclear weapons development program.

So, for all these reasons, and many more, the Korean Peninsula is one of the last remaining Cold War hot spots in the world.

Last week, Seoul and Pyongyang held a series of meetings between their respective prime ministers, an encouraging development which represents the highest level contact ever between the two sides. While no significant progress resulted from this first round of talks, it is perhaps a sign that the North is feeling the effects of its growing isolation and the international opposition to its longstanding intransigence at the bargaining table.

I was struck by the many interesting reports from Seoul about the prime ministerial summit. I was reminded of an incident in 1985 during the last round of high-level talks. On their way to a bargaining session in Seoul, several North Korean officials were delayed in one of the ROK capital's infamous traffic jams. The Northerners began complaining to their South Korean colleagues in the front seat, and finally accused them of bringing all the cars in the country into Seoul just to impress the North Korean delegation.

One of the South Koreans in the front seat turned around and said, "Geez. That was nothing. You should have seen how difficult it was to bring all of these skyscrapers here."

The obstacles which have for years impeded productive dialogue remain formidable. They include sharp differences over the process of achieving reunification itself. Congressman Solarz made a very good point about this conflicting stance. The North has taken

an all-or-nothing approach and calls for enormous initial steps, such as its confederation formula. Similarly, it has proposed sweeping arms and troop cuts without first allowing for agreements on basic confidence-building measures.

Seoul's formula aims first at achieving basic confidence-building measures, such as border openings and expanded North-South trade. These fundamental measures would lead to gradual tension reduction and pave the way for a consideration of the more contentious political and military issues. Rightly, I believe, Seoul stresses that this gradual approach is the more realistic way to reduce the high degree of tension between the two sides.

Throughout the past forty years, Kim Il Sung's policies toward the South have not been aimed at fostering good faith negotiations, but rather at eventually dominating the entire Peninsula under his rule. Kim has tolerated sporadic dialogue with Seoul when it has suited his purposes.

Over the years, for instance, the timing of North Korean policy initiatives appears to have been designed either to bolster the North's sagging international image, or score points during periods of political instability in Seoul. Pyongyang's repeated use of violence and military force against its rival, beginning with the 1950 invasion of the Republic of Korea, also lends credence to the charge that it's simply not committed to tension reduction.

Despite the North's stubbornness and aggression, improving East-West ties are having an important impact on the Korean Peninsula. Sensing that the time was right to take advantage of the reform movements which are sweeping many communist nations, in 1988 South Korean President Roh Tae Woo unveiled his bold "Northern Policy," which Spence Richardson discussed in some detail. President Roh pledged to intensify his government's efforts to ease tensions with the North, and on a parallel track improve ties with Pyongyang's communist allies. This signaled a major break with past policy and reflected Seoul's confidence in its increasingly formidable world economic and diplomatic stature.

A primary focus of Seoul's effort has been a push to improve ties with the North's closest and most powerful allies, the Soviet Union and China. Annual trade between China and South Korea now totals around \$3 billion. Still, the PRC has remained sensitive to Pyongyang's concerns, and has avoided any substantive political contact with government officials from Seoul.

In contrast to China's reticence is the Soviet Union's policy towards the ROK. Moscow's links with the government in Seoul are extensive and have reached the highest echelons of political leadership. President Roh and President Gorbachev met in San Francisco in June, signaling a willingness on the part of the Soviets to recognize eventually the Republic of Korea.

Gorbachev's desire to improve ties with Seoul are, of course, driven by pragmatism. I think Moscow is keen on bolstering its own ailing economy through trade with one of Asia's most prosperous nations. North Korea, after all, has little or nothing to offer Soviet planners who are hoping to revive their stalled economy.

Even on the political front, Gorbachev has deliberately distanced himself from the belligerent policies of Kim Il Sung. Despite occasional and increasingly perfunctory statements in support of Pyongyang, Soviet officials admit privately that Pyongyang is not committed to good faith dialogue with Seoul.

The communist superpower also worries that the North's militarism might some day compromise Moscow's own security. For instance, Soviet government officials openly express concern over the prospects of the North's development of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union is likewise disappointed by Pyongyang's refusal to consider economic reform, and even disdains the North's repressive internal policies. Moscow considers the North to be an embarrassment to what remains of the socialist world. Another reason why Moscow has distanced itself from the tarnished Kim Il Sung regime, I believe, is its wish to be viewed in Asia as an important diplomatic and economic player, rather than merely as a military power.

With so many traditional allies of Pyongyang openly acknowledging the ROK's legitimacy, and establishing extensive political and economic exchanges with Seoul, international pressure on the Kim regime runs quite high. But so far, the North has given little indication that it is prepared to change its ways, and therein, in my opinion, lies the greatest obstacle to North-South relations, and perhaps the most serious threat to peace in Northeast Asia.

To maintain their tight grip on the North Korean political system, and to safeguard their own rule, the Kims — Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il — will remain obstinate at the bargaining table, it seems to me. After all, any political accommodation to the South leading to significant social or economic exchanges would soon reveal to the North Korean people that, for decades, they've been duped by their "Great Leader."

I think last year's Tiananmen Square uprising and events in East Germany, Romania, and other socialist states have further convinced the North Korean leadership that dabbling with reform and moderation could spell disaster. So it's quite possible, as Congressman Solarz suggested, that until Kim Il Sung passes from the scene, there may be little prospect for improved North-South relations.

In the meantime, the policies of the Bush Administration toward North Korea, which Mr. Richardson outlined, are sound and should be maintained. Furthermore, any future changes in U.S. policy toward Pyongyang should be considered only in close consultation with Seoul.

A high priority should be to press for North Korean submission to the International Atomic Energy Agency's scrutiny. Before the U.S. can significantly upgrade relations with the North, it must dispel the strong suspicions that it is developing nuclear weapons. Washington should also press Pyongyang to continue the recently resumed high level talks and move toward agreements on confidence-building measures. The North's continued refusal to allow progress on these very basic steps would call into question its willingness to bargain in good faith over the more complex issues, such as arms control and reunification itself.

When there has been a resolution in the nuclear dispute, as well as a show of North Korean flexibility at the bargaining table, the U.S. could move to expand contact between American and North Korean government officials. At that time, Washington might also consider easing restrictions on U.S.-North Korean trade.

Pyongyang already maintains economic ties with Japan, some Western European countries, and the Republic of Korea itself. So it seems to me that the U.S. embargo has lit-

the practical impact. American economic exchanges with the North might eventually poke a few holes into the North's shrouded society. After all, coaxing the North out of its isolation is an important facet of the policies pursued by both Washington and Seoul.

And finally, Washington should remain committed to close security cooperation with Seoul, and to the American troop presence in the ROK. When North Korea abandons its offensive posture along the DMZ, it will be time to consider future U.S. troop reductions. This course not only sustains an adequate deterrence and protects peace on the Peninsula, but also allows Seoul to continue bargaining with Pyongyang from a position of strength and confidence.

Mr. Samuel: I am Peter Samuel with *The New York City Tribune*. I wonder if any of the panelists could tell us how imminent they consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North Koreans?

Mr. Plunk: There have been published reports, in such publications as *Jane's Defence Weekly*, by analysts who have claimed that perhaps within the next five years the North Koreans might be able to produce such weapons. However, I think it's highly speculative.

Guest: I'd like to address this question to Mr. Plunk and Mr. Richardson. In light of the growing rapprochement between the Soviet Union and South Korea, what do you see as North Korea's reaction to official normalization? Also, how would that affect Soviet purchase of North Korean goods at low prices? Lastly, is the Soviet Union still the main supplier of military weaponry to North Korea? From the North Korean point of view, will the Soviet Union have influence on North Korea from that perspective?

Mr. Plunk: The Soviet Union has been, and remains, the main arms supplier to Pyongyang. There are some credible reports in recent months that perhaps the Soviets have dramatically scaled back their military supplies to the North Koreans. Moscow claims that it is no longer giving high level military assistance to North Korea.

On the economic front, it is my impression that trade between the North Koreans and the Soviets is not very large these days. Trade between Seoul and Moscow is much more active, and the Soviets have announced they are not interested in barter trade, which they have been carrying on with North Korea for some years. It remains to be seen how long a significant trade relationship can be sustained if the North Korean economy continues in a tailspin. Some statistics suggest that North Korea's trade is down dramatically.

Mr. Richardson: I agree with Daryl, that Soviet and Chinese influence is not great on North Korea. North Korea makes most of its own weapons.

Given the lack of foreign influence over North Korea, if we can bring it into the international community, whether it's signing and implementing a full scope safeguards agreement under the IAEA, or bringing it into the U.N. with South Korea, I think that is all to the good.

Mr. Allen: I would like to ask both Ambassador Hyun and Karl Spence Richardson to respond to a question. Japanese interests in what Korea has been doing in terms of *Nordpolitik* is very high. Korea is going to have basically a free hand in pursuing its

Nordpolitik for some time to come, until such time as the Gorbachev visit to Japan next spring.

At that time, Gorbachev may make a decision about the four Soviet-occupied islands north of Japan. People who watch Japan believe that could cause a very substantial change in Japanese attitudes toward the Soviets, and Japan would become an extremely serious and dedicated competitor with Korea for any and all business with the Soviet Union.

Would you care to comment on how you would forecast the shape of economic relations under the circumstances of an invigorated Japan free to pursue the markets in the U.S.S.R.?

Ambassador Hyun: We feel sometimes honored as well as embarrassed when we are called a "second Japan"; and in our approach to the Soviet Union, I really do not think that Japan can be any real obstacle in our effort to expand trade with the Soviet Union. While the Japanese excel in more high tech areas, Korea can supplement them at the next level of sophistication.

So side by side with Japan, I think that Korea can interact with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Richardson: I think that South Korea, certainly in such things as consumer electronics, is clearly above Japan in what it can offer the Soviet Union. If there's competition with Japan, good. That's what capitalism and, in a sense, democracy, is about.

I cannot speak for the Japanese, but I think they do not see South Korea and the U.S.S.R. coming together as a threat. It may take awhile, but Japan will see that everybody wins in that, and it is not a zero sum game.

Mr. Marshall Mayes: Years ago, I suggested an idea to the United Nations Development Corporation that a way of building economic ties between South Korea and North Korea would be to convince the North to establish a Chinese-style Special Economic zone along the DMZ. After withdrawing military units, North Korean laborers could be trained and employed in the zone. Investments would be managed principally by South Korean firms, and the products would be sold for hard currency.

The workers, as in the Chinese example, would earn part of their pay in hard currency, and would have the privilege of buying goods there. This would give workers from the North great exposure to the free market. This could be a very important confidence building and information program for the North.

Ambassador Hyun: Thank you, Mr. Mayes. This is a really wonderful idea, and is part of our proposal to the North. We can establish an economic zone along the DMZ, and, using the comparative advantages of both sides, could produce good things.

That is one of the 28 packages we proposed in the 1980s. The problem currently is, will North Korea accept it? Their traditional attitude is to disregard South Korea as a viable entity. They do not recognize the South as a legitimate government. In spite of that fact, we have a very successful government in the southern part of Korean Peninsula.

Guest: If Japan and South Korea relax their economic relations with North Korea, would the U.S. continue to stringently enforce the 1979 Trading with the Enemy Act restricting American trade with North Korea?

Mr. Richardson: It is U.S. policy to work with South Korea in opening up North Korea. I think if South Korea came to us and said, "We'd like you to do this to help in our policy toward North Korea," the Administration would do what it could. So again, it's U.S. policy to do whatever we can to further the North-South dialogue and open up North Korea to the outside.

The principal actors have to be the two Koreas, but certainly the Administration would do what it could.

Mr. Franzel: I would add, from the congressional side, that if South Korea did come to the United States and say, "We think this would be helpful, and we would like to see an easing of U.S. trade restrictions toward North Korea," I think there would be strong support in Congress for easing trade barriers.

Guest: Have the North Koreans been asking or hinting, for trade relations with the United States?

Mr. Richardson: I cannot go into much detail about the Beijing talks. We share everything with South Korea, but we have tried not to see those exchanges get into the press. Certainly in the dealings that people at my level have had with the North Koreans, they have not made any such suggestions. If they did, I think we would consult with our South Korean allies. But so far, nothing.

Guest: Assume for discussion here that a reformist regime succeeds Kim Il Sung. What would be the costs to South Korea for a peaceful reunification?

Ambassador Hyun: After seeing Germany unified, we know that reunification is not coming easily. It costs money, a considerable amount of money. I think maybe South Korea still has to wait some more years before it will be able to bear and absorb all the costs of the unification, like West Germany did. Even with their economic might, I understand West Germany is still suffering from the cost.

In Korea's case, the comparison between the North and South is not that stark. Of course, we are a healthy economy, and our GNP is five times larger than that of North Korea. But still, I feel the economic strength is not strong enough to absorb all the costs. At the same time, South Korea should allow democratic reforms to take deep root before we can claim that we are really ready to make a German type of unification. It will take some time, but it is coming soon.

Mr. Franzel: I would assume that there would be support in Congress for some assistance from the U.S. to help the South deal with the economics that would come with reunification, especially given the fact that we would, I assume, be able to give up our heavy defense burden there.

