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AT THE U.N. : THE KIRKPATRICK LEGACY

INTRODUCTION

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, after four years as the chief U.S. representative at the United Nations, will be returning to private life next month. During her long tenure at the U.N., she has demonstrated that the United States need not always be on the defensive and need not always apologize for pursuing U.S. interests. Her willingness to state U.S. positions forcefully and directly and at times to be confrontational has begun paying dividends. She has strengthened the U.S. role at the U.N., slowed the pace of attacks on Western values and institutions, and attempted to bring the U.N. back to the original purposes of its Charter. This contrasts sharply with the defeatist policies pursued at the U.N. by her Carter Administration predecessors-- Andrew Young and Donald McHenry. Kirkpatrick declared to the U.N., for example, that the U.S. would no longer wear the "kick me" sign at the organization, and argued convincingly that those who use the U.N. as a political "playpen" demean the organization. She therefore set out not only to argue passionately and persuasively for U.S. interests, concerns and values, but also, and more important, to get the votes needed to actually win some key decisions within the organization. As such, the Kirkpatrick years at the U.N. have left the U.S. an important legacy and teach the U.S. valuable lessons about how to conduct U.S. diplomacy successfully in international organizations.

A key part of the Kirkpatrick legacy is her perception, as she told the U.S. Senate last year, that other member-states of the U.N. must be shown that "their votes, their attitudes and their actions inside the U.N. system inevitably must have consequences for their relationship (with the U.S.) outside the U.N. system."¹

¹ Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, March 2, 1984.

She also identified a number of trends at the U.N. which not only work against U.S. interests, but prevent the U.N. from fulfilling the worthwhile goals of its Charter. Among these trends are:

- the use of the U.N. by the Group of 77 (the Third World bloc) and the Soviet bloc to attack the free enterprise system in general, and multinational corporations in particular, as the source of the world's "economic ills";
- the "globalization" of world problems by bringing local or regional issues to the General Assembly, forcing every nation to take a stand;
- the U.N.'s support for terrorist organizations and the elevation of those organizations; particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Southwest African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), to quasi-member status;
- a "double standard" by which the U.N. majority practices "selective indignation" over alleged human rights violations by the U.S., Israel, South Africa, and other Western states, while so often overlooking outrages committed by socialist and communist countries.

Succeeding Kirkpatrick at the U.N. is General Vernon Walters. If he is to build on the Kirkpatrick legacy, he must be prepared to address the U.N. problems identified by Kirkpatrick and reduce, if necessary, the U.S. role and financial support for those components of the U.N. that promote agendas inimical to U.S. interests and the West. Where appropriate, he must be willing to review U.S. participation in those programs and bodies.

Most important, Walters should be aware of the seven major lessons of the Kirkpatrick years at the U.N.:

LESSON #1: TAKE THE U.N. AND ITS AGENDA SERIOUSLY

In testimony before congressional committees, in speeches at the U.N. and to audiences throughout the world, Kirkpatrick has emphasized the importance of "taking the U.N. seriously."² At the U.N. she demonstrated that Washington no longer would "shrug off what happened at the U.N. as though it didn't really matter."³ She did so, for example, in April 1981 when she headed the U.S. delegation to the U.N.'s International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA-I) in Geneva. After learning that the majority at the Conference was about to introduce a resolu-

² Most recently repeated in her remarks at a Press Briefing, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, November 20, 1984.

³ Ibid.

tion to expel Israel, she declared that if the resolution were introduced she would fly back to New York with the more than \$200 million which the U.S. had earmarked for the refugees. The anti-Israeli initiative collapsed.

She was similarly tough later that year when the so-called "nonaligned" countries on September 28, 1981, issued a communiqué criticizing the U.S. by name for a host of the globe's political and economic ills. On October 6th, Kirkpatrick sent a letter to most of the U.N. ambassadors of the nonaligned nations, expressing surprise and dismay at the communiqué, and asking each of them whether the statement actually represented the views of their country. The letter noted that the Soviet Union, which was conducting or supporting wars in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Chad, was not mentioned even once in the document, while the U.S. was condemned nine times. Many of the "nonaligned" delegates were dumbfounded that anyone would care what the communiqué said, or that any U.S. official would even read such a document. When Kirkpatrick made it clear that the U.S. was paying attention to what happens at the U.N., many nations began acting more carefully when it came to offending Washington. Kirkpatrick had gotten the message across.

Kirkpatrick told The Heritage Foundation that the job required using all her skills as a seasoned political scientist. It also required that she carefully select articulate, intelligent and high-principled individuals to serve her in a forceful "management team" at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. This "team" included Charles Lichenstein, Richard Schifter, Jose Sorzano, Alan Keyes, Kenneth Adelman, Carl Gershman, and Allan Gerson.

An obvious result of the Kirkpatrick policy of taking the U.N. seriously was the unusual moderation in tone of the recently concluded U.N. 39th General Assembly. Verbal abuse was generally diminished, direct assaults on the U.S. were few and muted and even vitriolic attacks on Israel declined. The earlier condemnation of the U.S. for its "colonial" and "imperialist" domination of Puerto Rico, a staple of U.N. resolutions for two decades, arose neither in U.N. committees nor in the plenary. Furthermore, an intensive U.S. lobbying campaign in world capitals and New York produced two 62 to 47 vote victories for the U.S.-backed amendments that deleted the words "in particular the United States and Israel" from a general condemnation of Western aid to South Africa.⁴ Perennially, the U.S. and Israel had been singled out for condemnation.

In another case, the Nicaraguans withdrew an anti-American resolution in the General Assembly when they found that they could not marshal sufficient votes for its adoption.

⁴ The Interdependent, September/October 1984, Volume 10, Number 5. Also see: U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39/15.

A recent press report on a preliminary study of 1984 U.N. voting records indicated that the U.S. voted with the majority of U.N. members only 14 percent of the time in 1984, down from 21 percent in 1983.⁵ Kirkpatrick explains, however, that when the statistics are examined according to issues the U.S. considers important and when other, unquantifiable factors are taken into account, the last General Assembly "was substantially more constructive than [it] had been for some time."⁶

In 1984, for example, the U.N. majority, as in previous years, targeted Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala for "selective indignation" in three separate resolutions,⁷ while ignoring abuses in Cuba and Nicaragua. Though the U.S. voted against all three resolutions, Kirkpatrick succeeded in changing much of the language in the resolution condemning El Salvador so that it was far preferable to previous General Assembly resolutions on the same subject.

Kirkpatrick's resolve to take the U.N. seriously prompted her to use the veto in the Security Council when U.S. security interests, or those of U.S. allies and friends, were at stake. Since 1981, the U.S. cast 17 of the total 39 vetoes it has cast since the U.N.'s inception. During Kirkpatrick's tenure, the U.S. has cast the lone opposition vote 12 times. She admits that she would like to have avoided this, but that the U.S. was going to stick to its principles, with or without help from other countries.

LESSON #2: CONFRONT SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.N. CHARTER ABUSES

Kirkpatrick and her team forcefully confronted the Soviets and their clients on their human rights abuses and their continuing effort to export war, revolution, and unrest. She also began to confront the Soviets on their abuses of the U.N. Charter within the U.N. Secretariat.

Addressing the General Assembly on December 17, 1984, for example, Ambassador Jose Sorzano of the U.S. Mission, deplored the "shameless introduction" by the USSR of a resolution on "State Terrorism." Sorzano noted that this demonstrated "George Orwell's point that totalitarian regimes seek to hide their own despotic practices by... accusing others of acts in which they themselves systematically engage."⁸ The U.S., joined by 29 other nations, abstained on the resolution in order to demonstrate contempt for the "multilateral cynicism" of the U.N.⁹

⁵ "Study Shows U.S. Losing More Votes in the U.N.," The New York Times, Friday, February 13, 1985.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ 39th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Resolutions 39/119 (El Salvador), 39/120 (Guatemala), and 39/121 (Chile).

⁸ Statement by Ambassador Jose Sorzano, in Plenary, 39th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, on State Terrorism. U.S. Mission to the United Nations, December 17, 1984.

⁹ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39/159.

Kirkpatrick and her deputies made equally strong statements on the Soviet war and occupation in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese aggression against the people of Cambodia. For the fifth year in a row in each case, the General Assembly voted to condemn the occupation of those countries by "foreign forces," without condemning by name the Soviets in Afghanistan or the Vietnamese in Cambodia.¹⁰

Kirkpatrick successfully opposed Moscow's candidates in 1984 for the non-permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviets sponsored Outer Mongolia and Ethiopia. Through the exercise of what one of Kirkpatrick's advisors has called "good machine politics," the U.S. successfully pushed the election of Thailand and Madagascar for the two vacant seats.

More important, perhaps was Kirkpatrick's determination to expose Soviet use of the U.N. Secretariat as a base of espionage operations against the U.S. and as a center for dissemination of Soviet propaganda. Soviet espionage activities at the U.N. recently have been documented in the recollections of Arkady Shevchenko, a former Soviet Under-Secretary General in the U.N.¹¹ Kirkpatrick also brought to the attention of the U.N. Secretary-General and the media that the Soviet bloc, through inordinate influence within the U.N. Secretariat, controls important staff appointments and the daily agenda of U.N. conferences, agencies, and meetings.

General Walters should work with Congress to ensure passage of legislation to reduce the numbers of Soviet bloc personnel in New York and to restrict their mobility within the U.S. There is a need too to press the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint more Americans to high level Secretariat positions. He should also reemphasize to the Secretary-General President Reagan's demand to put an end to Soviet propaganda activities in the U.N. through the Secretariat's Political Information News Service (PINS).

LESSON #3: FIRMLY OPPOSE ATTACKS ON ISRAEL ANYWHERE IN THE U.N. SYSTEM

During Kirkpatrick's years at the U.N., Israel has dominated the U.N. agenda. Of the Security Council's 88 sessions in 1982, for example, 46 were on issues related to Israel. In the 37th General Assembly in 1982 and its seven main committees, debates on the Middle East consumed over one-third of the delegates' time and led to 44 resolutions. The 39th General Assembly produced 36 Israel-related resolutions.

Kirkpatrick has made U.S. firmness in the defense of Israel a focal point of her tenure at the United Nations. Not only did

¹⁰ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39/5 and 39/13.

¹¹ See: Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), esp. pp. 131 ff.

she work to ensure U.S. opposition to attacks on Israel, but also worked with lawmakers in Washington, including Senator Robert Kasten and Congressmen Jack Kemp and Stephen Solarz to enact legislation tying Israel's status within the U.N. to that of the U.S.: if Israel is driven out, says the legislation, then the U.S. leaves too.

The message sent by the U.S. Congress and reinforced by Kirkpatrick have reduced the severity of threats to expel Israel from the General Assembly and other U.N. bodies in 1984. At the 39th General Assembly the annual effort by radical Third World elements, joined by the communist and Arab countries, to expel Israel foundered. It had less support than in previous years.

General Walters should re-affirm the strong U.S. commitment to Israel at the U.N. He should ask Congress to ensure that, if the U.S. leaves a U.N. body when Israel is expelled, the U.S. will not restore funding lost to the organization if and when the U.S. returns.

LESSON #4: WORK TO DISRUPT U.N. VOTING BLOC PATTERNS

Kirkpatrick split several of what had been solid U.N. voting blocs. She developed previously untapped and underutilized sources of support among moderate states within the so-called "nonaligned" movement in the U.N. In a January interview with The Heritage Foundation, she pointed to the most notable of these "moderates": Cameroon, Ivory Cost, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Togo, Zaire, the Eastern Caribbean states, and the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). To some extent, this is becoming true of the Portuguese-speaking countries of Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, Mozambique and Cape Verde.

In an attempt to circumvent the normal voting blocs within the U.N., the U.S. has been going to U.N. member-state capitals to voice opinions on issues under consideration by the General Assembly, agencies, and committees, and to rally support for Security Council resolutions. Kirkpatrick and her colleagues have visited scores of capitals. Along with those of State Department and U.S. embassy officials, the visits also conveyed displeasure with the way a country may have voted or spoken at the U.N., or expressed gratitude for support within the world body.

Working behind the scenes with individual countries before and during a General Assembly session have helped the U.S. in the work of the U.N.'s First (Disarmament) Committee. There were three notable U.S. successes in the disarmament area during the 39th General Assembly.

First, the U.S. successfully sponsored a carefully worded resolution on chemical and bacteriological weapons that called

for the "strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons," and condemned "actions that contravene them."¹² The resolution, which implicitly condemned Soviet chemical weapons use in Afghanistan and Cambodia, received 118 votes of support. An alternative resolution, sponsored by East Germany, and implicitly critical of the United States for "the intended production and deployment of binary chemical weapons," received only 84 "yes" votes.

Second, Ambassador Sorzano, assisted in this case by other U.N. delegations and a well-documented U.N. Secretariat report, blunted the efforts of several developing countries to undermine the Antarctic Treaty, and move Antarctica under the questionable management of the U.N. In the process, they also discouraged a resolution that would have declared the resources of the Antarctic the "common heritage of mankind," U.N. code-language for the redistributionist strategy of the "New International Economic Order."

Third, U.S. negotiators convinced the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to return to the consensus voting principle on substantive matters. This will require the Committee to seek uniform agreement on such issues before passing a draft resolution to the General Assembly. This enables the U.S. to wield a veto in the Committee.

In the past four years, nations discovered that lending the U.S. support on key votes and in crucial debates within the U.N. would not go unnoticed or unappreciated by Washington. Congressional legislation requiring the annual accounting of how nations voted in the U.N. also helped gain behind-the-scenes support from some countries.

Furthermore, the commitment of the U.S. to leave UNESCO at the end of 1984 sent shock waves throughout the U.N. system. To numerous delegates from moderate Third World states, U.S. withdrawal demonstrated that the Reagan Administration was not bluffing when it warned that it was going to take the U.N. seriously.

LESSON #5: CONTROL THE EXPANSION OF THE U.N. BUDGET

Despite U.S., industrialized nation, and Soviet bloc opposition or abstention on all three budget resolutions, the 39th General Assembly approved a U.N. budget for the biennium 1984-85 of \$1.6 billion. Of this, the U.S. must pay 25 percent, or approximately \$400 million. What is worse, the U.S. and 14 other countries in the U.N. will pay around 85 percent of the assessed contribution alone, or about \$1.3 billion. The U.S. contribution, however, is only part of the total \$1.5 billion that the U.S.

¹² U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39/65A.

hands over to the U.N. bodies, agencies, and voluntary programs each year.

Two recent examples illustrate the difficulties encountered and moderate success enjoyed by the U.S. in controlling the U.N. budget:

□ In 1984, the U.N.'s International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) recommended that all U.N. employees in New York receive a 9.6 percent "post adjustment" salary increase, the first half of which would become effective immediately. The increase was also effected in all other U.N. duty stations throughout the world. At the 39th General Assembly, because of strong U.S. opposition, the second half of the "post adjustment" increase was voted down by the General Assembly's Fifth (Budgetary) Committee.

□ In December 1984, over U.S. opposition, the General Assembly approved the construction of a \$73.5 million conference center in Ethiopia, even as millions of Ethiopians were starving. The U.S. delegation emphasized the utter hypocrisy in such a vote, embarrassing a large number of West European states that did not oppose the resolution.

Under Kirkpatrick's leadership, U.S. policy regarding the U.N. regular or assessed budget has been to encourage the U.N. to maximize the level of program output through better use of available resources and to exercise "significant restraint in budget growth."¹³ The U.S. has also encouraged administrative reform in the U.N. system and has sought and gained assistance from other delegations to hold down the level of budget growth.

Yet, as 1982 U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee hearings discovered, there is little or no incentive at the U.N. to hold down budget growth or reduce cost. The reason is that the vast majority of nations voting on a budget pay a tiny share of U.N. outlays. Thus, for every \$1 million increase in the United Nations budget, the 80 developing countries who contribute the minimum 0.01 percent of the U.N. budget are assessed a mere \$100. These countries, of course, receive far more aid and assistance from each \$1 million the U.N. spends than their \$100 investment. Thus, it is the U.S. and other developed countries who bear the burden of increased budgets, and not the developing nations who insist on budget growth. The trouble is that the U.S. and the developed nations have relatively few votes with which to influence budget decisions.

Nonetheless, Kirkpatrick enjoyed significantly more success than her Carter Administration predecessors in holding down the

¹³ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Participation in the U.N. Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 335.

growth of the regular U.N. budget. Even though the 39th General Assembly approved a revised appropriation for the current two-year budget (1984-1985) of \$1.61 billion, with the U.S. and 16 other nations opposing the resolution, this budget still represents less than a 10 percent increase over the 1982-1983 appropriation. Indeed, during Kirkpatrick's tenure at the U.N., the average increase in the regular biennial U.N. budget has been around 13 percent. On the other hand, the average increase for the U.N. regular budget for the biennia 1978-1979 and 1980-1981, during the Young-McHenry tenure at the U.N., was approximately 30 percent. The reduction in U.N. regular budget growth in recent years derives significantly from Reagan Administration economic policies which have virtually eliminated inflation in the U.S. and strengthened the dollar throughout the world. Yet Kirkpatrick's effectiveness in articulating Reagan Administration policies, and her tenacity in holding down U.N. spending have played equally important roles.

LESSON #6: PROMOTE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND FREE ENTERPRISE FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT

The economic welfare of the globe's inhabitants is best served by expanding their economic opportunities, and thus increasing their living standards. Regrettably, the U.N.'s approach to development policy--and international economic issues in general--has retarded economic growth much more than advanced it. The U.N.'s economic philosophy is hostile to the free enterprise system and nearly ignores the market economy. This is shortsighted because private sector trade and investment benefit industrialized and developing nations alike.

Alan Keyes and Dennis Goodman, Kirkpatrick's deputies for economic issues, have argued firmly at the U.N. for increasing free market opportunities and ending statist barriers to growth in developing countries. They also have waged a tough campaign against the New International Economic Order, the predominant U.N. economic ideology, which calls for the transfer of wealth from developed to developing countries without regard for economic incentives. This new "order" also depicts multinational corporations as the source of all social evil and economic distress in developing countries.

The U.S. delegation opposed many U.N. guidelines and codes that would circumscribe and eventually reduce the activities of multinational corporations in the developing world. In cases where they did not oppose these initiatives, the U.S. delegation worked to improve the draft guidelines or codes. Keyes and his staff, for example, played a constructive role in the Economic and Social Council's efforts to come up with sensible Consumer Guidelines relevant to the needs of the developing world.¹⁴

¹⁴ "The Administration's Consumer Guidelines Effects on the U.N.," The New York Times, October 30, 1984.

U.S. policy in economic development at the U.N. should be to support those U.N. programs that help people rather than governments; that have limited and clearly defined goals; and that concentrate on producing results rather than on simply amassing or increasing inputs of resources. U.S. policy should assist U.N. member-state representatives in understanding that governments are not the chief engine of development, and that they indeed are often the obstacle to development. U.S. delegates should emphasize the importance of including the private sector in U.N. approaches to development problems.

The postwar transfer of resources from Western nations to the less developed countries, both direct and through multilateral bodies such as the U.N., appears to have accorded with neither of the two original premises for extending "development assistance"-- it has not improved the climate for productive international investment and it has not contributed generally to self-sustaining economic growth. Ironically, financial transfer from the industrialized states in the U.N. actually may have made it possible for many nations to avoid participating more fully in the world economy.¹⁵ Many U.N. development programs, particularly those conducted by the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization, do not encourage economic health or self-sustaining growth in low-income nations; indeed, they actually subsidize practices that perpetuate or even generate poverty in certain places. The U.S. should insist on change in these programs. Where change is resisted, the U.S. should consider diverting its contributions to other U.N. and non-U.N. programs which actually promote self-sufficiency and economic health.

LESSON #7: THE U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE MUST RESIST TRADITIONAL STATE DEPARTMENT POLICIES REGARDING THE U.N.

Charles Lichenstein, who served as a deputy to Kirkpatrick from 1981 to 1984, maintains the State Department establishment often posed greater problems for the U.S. Mission than did the U.N. itself. Kirkpatrick too is believed to feel this way. Frequently, State Department careerists tried determinedly to dilute Kirkpatrick's counteroffensive against attacks in the U.N. on U.S. interests and her efforts to halt the mismanagement of U.N. programs and agencies. Lichenstein and others close to Kirkpatrick have told The Heritage Foundation that each stage of increasing U.S. effectiveness at the U.N. faced the active opposition of the Department of State, usually at the "desk" level, sometimes from higher up.

Lichenstein recalls that State Department personnel who took part in negotiations at the U.N. often dismissed Kirkpatrick's

¹⁵ Nick Eberstadt, "Famine, Development and Foreign Aid," Commentary, March 1985, p. 30.

opening position as being unacceptable to other U.N. member-states. As such, these State Department staffers would exercise "pre-emptive capitulation" by giving in to other countries' demands even before negotiations began.

Kirkpatrick and her colleagues found that the predominant State Department view of the U.N. was that attacks leveled at the U.S. or its allies and friends merely represented the Third World "letting off steam" or what Kirkpatrick terms the "Turkish Bath" theory of the U.N. Senior State Department personnel maintained that other countries really did not mean any harm to the U.S., and that they would even "feel better" by venting some anger.

The key 1983 law, in fact, that requires compilation of U.N. voting records (P.L. 98-151 and 98-164) was criticized by the State Department as being inappropriate and "unproductive."

Because probably of Kirkpatrick's persistence, the State Department has begun to provide more support to the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on important issues, and may appreciate that at times it pays to be firm in dealing with friends and adversaries at the U.N. Says one of her deputies: "Once they saw that we could be successful with a tough policy, they didn't object."

OVERCOMING PAST LEGACIES

In contrast to her predecessors, Kirkpatrick has had the advantage of longevity at the U.N. She has served in the role of U.S. Permanent Representative longer than any other ambassador since Adlai Stevenson. When she departs the U.N. this month, she will have been there 50 months--almost three times the average tenure of U.S. representatives at the world body. This extended term allowed her to become more effective at the U.N. and in the Department of State.

Upon arrival at the U.N., Kirkpatrick felt that she would have to overcome no small degree of bias against her as a woman. She has often said that any time a woman is involved in nontraditional roles, she is likely to encounter certain kinds of discrimination.

Kirkpatrick soon found that she would have to overcome a legacy of acquiescence and timidity left by her predecessors. The Carter Administration, in particular, allowed U.N. debate to depict the U.S. as the principal source of instability and injustice in the world.¹⁶ The posture of U.N. Ambassadors Andrew Young and Donald McHenry seemed to signal to the world that the U.S. was ready to abdicate its role as defender of the free

¹⁶ Daniel P. Moynihan, "Joining the Jackals: The U.S. at the U.N. 1977-80," Commentary, February 1981, p. 24.

enterprise system, of Israel, and of its other allies and friends. Young and McHenry also were reluctant to criticize Soviet and Third World human rights abuses. On numerous occasions, moreover, Young and McHenry indicated that the U.S. was willing join the U.N. majority in calling for the adoption of a long list of new "orders," most notably, the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)--a U.N. blueprint for restricting press freedoms throughout the world.

Because of a policy characterized in part by defeatism and self-deprecation, the U.S. found itself under attack, outvoted and outmaneuvered in the U.N. The attacks against the U.S. and the West continued for some time after Kirkpatrick arrived in New York. Realizing that these attacks were not going unnoticed outside the U.N., however, Kirkpatrick strengthened the prevailing image of the U.S. and eventually reasserted U.S. moral and political leadership in the organization.

CONCLUSION

Jeane Kirkpatrick has demonstrated that the U.S. need not always be defeated at the U.N. nor always on the defensive. She demonstrated too the continuing validity of key basic principles in the conduct of foreign policy:

- that international relations depend above all on the relative power of nations;
- that the power of international affairs is cumulative--the more you have, the more you get and vice versa;
- that the relative position of the U.S. and the Soviet Union depends in very important measure on U.S. success in dealing with non-communist nations in the world;
- that U.S. influence with other nations depends largely on hopes of gains and fears of losses; and finally
- that U.S. effectiveness and power in organizations as the United Nations require absolutely that the U.S. believe in itself and have confidence in its own values and experience.¹⁷

Kirkpatrick outlined these principles, which were first offered by American diplomat George Kennan thirty years ago, in a recent speech in Honolulu. She added that "even though we are a great nation, we became virtually powerless in the United Nations in the course of 20 years, largely because we ignored these basic facts about politics."¹⁸

¹⁷ Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Address to the American Farm Bureau Federation, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 9, 1985.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Whether Kirkpatrick's legacy continues will depend to a great extent on the actions of her successor. Few candidates for her post seem more qualified to build on the legacy than Vernon Walters. He would be wise to maintain the momentum that she started. But he could go beyond this, using his office and his prominence in the Reagan Cabinet to focus attention on much-needed structural reform of the U.N. system. He should look closely, for example, at the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), a woefully expensive organization which has subsidized training bases for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists.

Other bodies requiring intense scrutiny are the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the U.N.'s think-tank for furthering the ideology of the New International Economic Order; and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), a Rome-based specialized agency of the U.N., which has wasted enormous sums of money and has betrayed its mandate to provide sound economic development advice to the Third World.

Many other problems at the U.N. also deserve attention. In focusing on them, Vernon Walters can count on help from key members of Congress and the American people. Their awareness of the United Nations' shortcomings and threats to the U.S., indeed, may be one of the most valuable of the Kirkpatrick legacies.

Roger A. Brooks
Roe Fellow in United Nations Studies