

**ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN JEWS  
TOWARD ISRAEL AND ISRAELIS**

**The 1983 National Survey of American Jews  
and Jewish Communal Leaders**

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**A Study Commissioned by the  
Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations  
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Many recent developments have fostered speculation that American Jews are becoming alienated from Israel. The hard-line posture of the Begin government, the rise to public prominence of Sephardic Israelis, recurrent Jewish and Arab violence on the West Bank, the 1982 war in Lebanon, and highly publicized disagreements between American and Israeli officials all have prompted some to suggest that the once-strong cultural, spiritual and political connections between American Jews and Israel are weakening.

If true, such a development would have far-reaching consequences, particularly in two areas. First, the commitment of American Jews to Israel has undoubtedly helped generate a strong pro-Israel American foreign policy stand, and a perceived dampening of American Jewish enthusiasm for Israel could eventually translate into reduced U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic support for the Jewish state. Second, for more than three decades, and especially since 1967, Israel has been a major element of American Jewish group identity. Support for Israel has been central to many philanthropic and other communal endeavors, and Israel has figured prominently in the spiritual life of American Jewry. Any changes in these attitudes and actions are likely to have profound consequences for contemporary Jewish identity and institutional life.

To increase understanding of how American Jews feel about Israel, and why, the Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations commissioned this nationwide study of American Jewry. The study investigated such issues as the depth of psychic attachment to Israel, the extent of involvement in pro-Israel activities, perceptions about Israelis, conflicting attitudes toward Israeli foreign policy and public figures, and anxieties about general American attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel.

This study -- the most in-depth and extensive analysis ever conducted regarding American Jewish behavior and attitudes toward Israel -- benefits from two less comprehensive studies of American Jewry commissioned by the American Jewish Committee in 1981 and 1982. By comparing the findings of all three studies we can detail the complex set of images, beliefs, and behaviors pertaining to Israel prevailing among American Jews, and, in many instances, understand how those phenomena have changed over periods before, during, and after the war in Lebanon. Moreover, this study reports on not only the responses of the general American Jewish public, but also those of a select Jewish leadership group, highlighting both where the views of the Jewish communal leadership parallel those of its putative constituency and where these two sets of views diverge.

### The Surveys

As noted, this study consists of two surveys, one of a representative nationwide sample of American Jews, the other of board members of five prominent Jewish communal organizations.

The public sample survey data collection was conducted by A.B. Data Corporation of Milwaukee, a firm that conducts direct marketing campaigns of Jewish communities. In the last year, A.B. Data compiled approximately 80,000

Distinctive Jewish Names (DJN) which it applied against lists of the country's 70 million telephone subscribers to yield well over a million households with a high probability of containing a Jewish member. Using this list, the survey was initially sent (in June, 1983) to a sample of 1600 households. About a quarter of these, in turn, were ineligible or unreachable (non-Jewish, deceased, moved with no forwarding address, etc.). Of the remaining 1200 or so, about half (N=640) eventually returned the questionnaire. Many had received as many as five mailings: an introductory letter, the first questionnaire, a postcard reminder, a second and a third questionnaire, as well as a follow up reminder phone call. The survey's last respondents replied in late July 1983.

Previous research has compared DJN and non-DJN Jews drawn from random samples secured through Random Digit Dialing and other high-cost techniques. That research found few differences, all of which were minor and in conflicting directions, between Jews with Distinctive Jewish Names and those without such names. In other words, it is safe to assume that DJNs are neither more nor no less Jewishly committed than non-DJN Jews. The selectivity in returning mail questionnaires might well pose a greater problem. Previous research on returned-mail questionnaires indicated lower response rates among the lesser educated, the geographically mobile, the elderly, and those with less interest in the subject matter. However, a comparison of this survey's respondents with those of more sophisticated (and costly) Jewish population studies revealed only small differences (see Appendix). Slightly more of the present respondents are married; they are slightly more affluent, more Israel-oriented, and more denominationally affiliated than the others. In general, the differences between them and respondents in other studies total about 5% or less.

The leadership sample consists of board members from five national organizations: the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the International B'nai Brith, and the United Jewish Appeal. Again, about half of the eligible respondents returned the questionnaire (N=272). Results below are reported collectively for the four organizations.

## The Findings

### Psychic Attachment to Israel

By all measures, American Jews reported a deep attachment to Israel (see Table 1). About three-quarters said that "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew," and as many agreed that "If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life." Meanwhile, over 9 in 10 classified themselves as "pro-Israel" or "very pro-Israel" and the rest were mostly "neutral." Conversely, only about 1 in 10 reported that they were "sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel."

Clearly, the vast majority of American Jews not only claim to care deeply about Israel, they are not ashamed to say so in public. (This finding is all the more

impressive in light of fairly widespread images they have of American anti-Semitism and hostility to Israel reported below.)

Comparisons with earlier studies (the questions on "personal tragedy" and "pro-Israel" were asked in 1982 and 1981) demonstrate a small, but noticeable change over the three studies. The proportion who said they were "very pro-Israel" dipped slightly between December, 1981 and August, 1982 (during the war in Lebanon), but has returned to the pre-war level since then (43%, 36%, and 43%). Moreover, over the three surveys, the proportion answering affirmatively to the "personal tragedy" question has held virtually steady (83%, 83%, and 77%).

On all measures of psychic attachment to Israel the leadership sample somewhat exceeded the general Jewish public. More leaders (90% versus 78%) said caring about Israel was important to their Jewishness; more felt that Israel's destruction would be a personal tragedy; fewer felt sometimes uneasy identifying as a supporter of Israel; and more termed themselves "very pro-Israel" (63% versus 43%). That the leaders scored higher on these measures is, of course, not at all surprising in light of their involvement in Jewish communal life at the highest levels, and of their derivative experiences, socialization and peer pressures.

In brief, broad psychic attachment to Israel is still widely felt among American Jews, be they leaders or the larger public. The findings suggest little or no erosion in the most fervent and passionate support for Israel. Caring for Israel still ranks with attending a Passover Seder and lighting Hanukkah candles as among the most popular and widespread contemporary expressions of American Jewish commitment.

TABLE 1

Indicators of Psychic Attachment to Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
"Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew."	78%	90%
"If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life."	77	83
"I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel."	10	4
"Feelings about Israel"		
Very Pro-Israel	43	63
Pro-Israel	43	35
Neutral	6	0
Anti-Israel	2	2
Very Anti-israel	1	0

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### **Personal Involvement with Israel**

American Jews not only feel a strong attachment to Israel, they manifest it in several ways (see Table 2). Almost all (93%) reported paying special attention to newspaper and magazine articles about Israel (in fact, the proportion actually exceeds those attending a Passover Seder, the most popular Jewish religious ritual in the United States). Moreover, three-quarters (75%) claimed they "often talk about Israel with friends and relatives," while over half (56%) considered themselves "very well-informed about Israel."

As with psychic commitment, the leaders outscored the public in terms of personal involvement, in particular in terms of often discussing Israel with friends and family (97%) and a self-image of being well-informed about Israel (93%). Again, given the nature of their communal involvement, these results are perfectly understandable.

Clearly, by every measure examined, Israel plays a prominent part in the cognitive and emotional lives of a vast majority of American Jews. Indeed, as the next table shows, a large minority of the sample also reported having direct personal contact, communication and connection with the Jewish State and society.

### **Contact and Communication with Israel and Israelis**

Several previous studies of American Jews reported that about 38% of American Jews said they had visited Israel and 15% had been there twice or more. The figures reported in Table 3 (40% and 17%) are slightly higher and may reflect an actual small growth in the proportion who had visited Israel (in fact, 4% reported having visited Israel in 1982 and 3% said they had already visited in the first half of 1983).

It should be understood that not all 40% who have visited Israel did so out of a deep sense of Jewish commitment. A national study conducted in 1981 for the Israel Government Tourist Office found that not only had 38% of American Jews visited Israel, but that -- in the same sample -- almost as many (35%) had been to Italy. For many American Jews, Israel's attraction as a tourist destination is not all that different from other historically interesting vacationlands. However, in this and other studies, those who have travelled twice or more to Israel (17%) scored substantially higher on several measures of Jewish commitment; the repeat travellers are largely visiting Israel out of a sense of commitment to their Jewishness and to the Jewish State. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that between 1-in-5 and 2-in-5 Jews share a very deep personal connection with Israeli society.

Similar conclusions may be drawn from the frequent reports of family and friendship connections between American Jews and Israelis. About a third of the public sample reported they had family in Israel and as many said they had "personal friends in Israel." Interestingly, in a parallel study of Israelis conducted simultaneously by the Institute, an even larger proportion of Israelis reported having been to the U.S., and having family and friends here. These results suggest that a very substantial minority of both Jewish communities--the one in Israel and that in the United States--has a deep personal investment in the other community.

TABLE 2

Indicators of Personal Involvement with Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Pay special attention to newspapers and magazine articles about Israel	93%	99%
"Often talk about Israel with friends and relatives."	75	97
"Consider yourself very well-informed about Israel."	56	93

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TABLE 3

Indicators of Contact and Communication with Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Visited Israel		
Once or More	40%	94%
Twice or More	17	78
"Have any family in Israel."	34	35
"Have any personal friends in Israel."	35	69
"Ever seriously considered living in Israel."	17	17

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The leaders in the surveys reported even more extensive contact with Israel than the Jewish public at large. Although they are no more likely than the general respondents to have family in Israel or to have considered living there, they are much more likely to have been to Israel and, as a result, many more of them have developed personal friends there. Almost all the leaders (94%) have been to Israel and over three-quarters (78%) have been there at least twice; moreover, more than two-thirds (69%) reported personal friends in Israel.

Thus, it is clear that the ties of American Jewry to Israel go well beyond ethnic or religious symbolic concerns (powerful as these may be). When many American Jews think of Israel and worry about her future they are thinking not merely of some abstract distant image, but of real places they have seen, and real people who are close and dear to them.

### **Images of Israelis**

Respondents were asked to comment on how accurately they thought various descriptions applied to most Israelis (see Table 4). About half or even more thought that five descriptions characterize "most Israelis...to a great extent": industrious, aggressive, heroic, peaceloving, and progressive. The sample largely rejected three characterizations: intolerant, religious, and conservative. And it was ambivalent about the remaining four modifiers: idealistic, arrogant, secular, and materialistic.

In all likelihood, informed observers of Israeli society would be considerably more prepared than were the respondents to describe Israelis as intolerant, religious, and conservative.

This discrepancy derives from a certain idealization of the Israeli in the eyes of American Jews. In particular, American Jews like to think of Israelis as akin to themselves, and to project their own self-images onto the Israelis.

This phenomenon of course only partially explains the results in Table 4. The high scores for "aggressive" and "heroic," descriptions that few American Jews would probably apply to themselves, suggest the special place Israelis hold in American Jewish imagery. With "peaceloving," these descriptions suggest the image of an embattled society heroically struggling to achieve true peace and security.

TABLE 4

To What Extent Do You Think Each Of The Following  
Descriptions Applies To Most Israelis?"

	<u>"To A Great Extent"</u>	
	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Industrious	81%	69%
Aggressive	68	71
Heroic	66	66
Peaceloving	53	75
Progressive	50	44
Idealistic	30	14
Arrogant	29	29
Materialistic	21	19
Secular	20	41
Intolerant	13	14
Religious	12	4
Conservative	8	6
"Generally I feel closer kinship with Israeli Ashkenazim than Israeli Sephardim."	59	55

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As noted, communal leaders travelled to Israel and had more extensive contact with Israelis than the Jewish public as a whole. As a result, although most of their images of Israelis were consonant with those of the public sample, the leaders were more likely to characterize Israelis as "peaceloving" and "secular." Their experience of meeting with them in their own land probably heightened their sense of the many hardships Israelis are enduring because of their ongoing conflict with their Arab neighbors. Those hardships, and the anxieties they produce, readily apparent to anyone who gets to know Israelis on a personal level, may well increase one's image of Israelis as "peaceloving." Similarly, direct contact with Israelis tends to dispel idealized images of a largely religious society and to make clear that many Israelis--especially the Ashkenazim--have developed a Jewish culture in a thoroughly "secular" mold.

That many American Jews see Israelis in part as extensions of themselves is evident in the majority (59% of the public; 55% of the leaders) who openly agreed with what for some must have been a very delicate statement: "Generally I feel a closer kinship with Israeli Ashkenazim than Israeli Sephardim." The sense of common (European) communal origins serves for many American Jews as a tie bridging the two communities separated both by great geographical and cultural distance. This finding suggests a potential for misunderstanding and alienation as Israeli Sephardim come into increasing prominence in Israeli public life. While some American Jews who now feel closer with Israeli Ashkenazim will in time also come to feel close to the Sephardim, as they are exposed to them, others may well feel slightly less connected with Israel because of differences they sense between themselves (largely Ashkenazim) and the emerging Israeli leadership.

### **Support for Israel Activities**

The widespread Jewish psychic attachment to Israel and the considerable personal contact and communication many Jews have with the country and society translates into a large minority of American Jews active in Israel's support (Table 5). Almost half the sample (46%) reported giving charity directly to Israeli educational or charitable institutions while over a third reported contributing \$100 or more to the UJA (the Israeli-oriented central communal philanthropic drive) in the past year. Almost a third reported having "contributed money to a political candidate" within a year of the survey because "he/she would support Israel." About a fifth said they had "written a newspaper or elected official in support of Israel" in the last 12 months.

Previous research has demonstrated the phenomenon of people over-reporting or exaggerating socially approved behavior. Nevertheless, on the basis of other more sophisticated surveys of American Jews, it is safe to assume that at least three-quarters who reported a UJA contribution of \$100 actually gave that much. In any event, roughly a third of American Jews view themselves --accurately or inaccurately -- as active supporters of Israel, both philanthropically and politically.

Just as the leaders reported greater attachment and involvement with Israel, so too did they report considerably more charitable and political support for Israel. As generally wealthy Jews involved in Jewish life, virtually all of them contributed

TABLE 5

Reported Acts of Support for Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
"Contribute directly to Israeli educational or charitable institutions."	46%	94%
Have given the UJA/Federation \$100 or more in the last 12 months	34	97
"Contributed money to a political candidate" in the last 12 months because "he/she would support Israel"	30	76
"Written a newspaper or elected official in support of Israel in the last 12 months."	20	70

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both to the UJA and directly to Israeli institutions. For similar reasons, it is not at all surprising to learn that over three-quarters (76%) reported contributing to a pro-Israel political candidate in the last year and almost as many (70%) said they had written pro-Israel letters to a newspaper or elected official.

In short, large numbers of American Jews act out their commitment through political and philanthropic activities.

### **Images of American Society and Its Orientation to Jews and Israel**

As a result of deep commitments to both Israel and the United States, American Jews firmly reject the notion that a commitment to one in any way contradicts a commitment to the other. Over 9 in 10 affirmed that "U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest," while fewer than 1 in 4 agreed that "There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America" (Table 6).

In fact, the devotion of American Jews to the United States and to Jewish life here has been so thoroughgoing, that many observers have suggested that American Jews are pro-Israel but not Zionist -- as least in the classic way the term has been used. In this sample where almost all said they were "pro-Israel," only a substantial minority (39%) considered themselves Zionists and an even smaller number (17%) said they had ever seriously considered settling in Israel. Over 4-in-5 implicitly rejected central tenet of classical Zionist thinking -- the imperative to make aliyah (settle in Israel). Earlier studies revealed other repudiations of classic Zionism: the vast majority of American Jews believes that American Jewish life has a bright future and rejects the proposition that "Israel's future is secure." Interestingly, findings in the Institute's parallel study of Israelis, revealed that they hold converse views: consistent with Zionism's pessimistic prognosis for Jewish life in the Diaspora, most Israelis agreed that American Jewry is on the road to assimilation and that Israel is chiefly responsible for maintaining American Jewish continuity.

Although American Jews regard American and Israeli interests as ultimately consistent, they are--to put it mildly--not convinced that other Americans see things that way. Three questions designed to tap American Jewish concern about continued U.S. support for Israel demonstrate that about half of all American Jews are deeply worried about whether that support will continue. Thus, less than half (47%) agreed that "Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest," and more than half expressed fears about the solidity of America's commitment to Israel's security. Most (54%) agreed that "When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive" and said (55%) they were "worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel." The attachment to Israel, the concern for her security, and the anxiety over American support for the embattled state lead almost three-quarters (73%, the same as in the 1981 study) to agree that "Jews should not vote for candidates....unfriendly to Israel."

To some outsiders, Jews' anxiety about U.S. support for Israel may appear misplaced, if not downright ludicrous. After all, for many years, U.S. economic and military aid has amounted to about \$2 billion a year and more. The U.S. can be

TABLE 6

Israel, American Jews, and the Larger Society

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
"U.S. Support for Israel is in America's Interest."	91%	96%
"There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America."	24	17
Consider self a Zionist	39	50
"Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest."	47	60
"When it comes to the crunch few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive."	54	41
"I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel."	55	48
"Jews should not vote for candidates unfriendly to Israel."	73	66
"Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews."	69	55
"Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews."	37	64
"Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews."	27	44

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counted on to veto U. N. Security Council resolutions voicing one-sided criticism of Israel; in fact, the voting records of Israel and the U.S. in the U.N. agree an extraordinary 85% of the time. In light of these and several other indications of a strong U.S. support for Israel, why are American Jews so anxious over that support?

Part of the reason may lie with their anxieties over the security of their own position in the American society. Despite notable advances in politics, the media, business, academe, and other prestigious or powerful spheres of American society, Jews still feel potentially threatened by American anti-semitism. Over two-thirds (69%) agreed that "Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future become a serious problem for American Jews." Only one third or so gave answers expressing lack of anxiety over the Jewish position in America. Thus, only a third (37%) agreed that "Anti-Semitism is currently not a serious problem for American Jews," and a similar number (27%) agreed with the mildly worded statement that "Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews."

In most respects, the findings reported for the leaders and the public in Table 6 are very similar. However, in one area the two views diverged notably. Leaders were much more likely to downplay the contemporary importance of American anti-semitism. Almost two-thirds (64%) agreed that it is currently not "a serious problem," compared with about one-third (37%) of the wider Jewish public. Moreover they were much more likely to agree (44% to 27%) that, "Virtually all positions of influence...are open to Jews." As successful business leaders and as leaders who are concerned with a wide variety of Jewish communal problems, these individuals are less likely than the typical American Jew to experience personal anti-semitism and more likely to be concerned with other communal issues.

In this context, it is worthwhile to examine whom American Jews see as their friends with respect to Israel, and whom they see as adversaries (see Table 7). Respondents were asked to characterize several American groups as "generally friendly, mixed or neutral, or generally unfriendly to Israel." The results are reported in the form of a "friendly index," that is, the percentage seen as "generally friendly" minus the percentage seen as "generally unfriendly." They suggest rather distinctive patterns in American Jewish perceptions. Four groups were seen as especially "friendly": Democrats, liberals, Congress, and labor unions. In contrast, President Reagan and five groups were characterized as predominantly "mixed or neutral" although slightly more friendly than unfriendly.

In the "mixed or neutral" grouping, in addition to the President, the respondents listed Republicans, the military, conservatives, "mainstream" Protestants, and Evangelical Protestants. A few groups were seen as mildly hostile to Israel: Catholics, the news media, and, in particular, the State Department and corporations. One group -- blacks -- emerge in the sample's collective mind, as the most unfriendly to Israel.

Several factors obviously help shape American Jewish perceptions of their friends and adversaries. As a liberal community and with historical memory of liberalism, American Jewry believes its friends are found in established liberal groups and institutions. Moreover, the Democratic Party, liberals, Congress and



TABLE 7

Are each of these "American Groups...generally friendly,  
mixed or neutral, or generally unfriendly to Israel?"

	<u>Friendly Index<sup>a</sup></u>	
	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Democrats	60	76
Liberals	46	44
Congress	38	76
Labor Unions	33	58
President Reagan	16	55
Republicans	14	42
The Military	12	24
Conservatives	10	27
"Mainstream" Protestants	8	10
Evangelical Protestants	3	63
News Media	-3	-20
Catholics	-5	9
State Department	-11	-53
Corporations	-15	-29
Blacks	-41	-58

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a. Friendly Index = (the difference between the % who answered "Generally Friendly" and the % who answered "Generally Unfriendly.")

labor unions are all places where many American Jews feel truly accepted on a personal as well as a political level. As a result, they view them as more friendly to Jews and more inclined to support Israel.

To American Jews the groups listed in the middle of Table 7 constitute "America's social and political power structure." The President, Republicans, the military, conservatives and Protestants not only control America, they believe, but haven't fully accepted American Jews. Thus, one must be vigilant and ultimately skeptical of their professed friendliness toward Israel.

All the groups seen as hostile are, in one way or another, viewed as competing with American Jews for the support of the general public on a variety of issues. Jews and Catholics often conflict around Church-State and some social issues; the news media, especially after the war in Lebanon, were seen by many Jews as biased against Israel; the State Department has long been considered by American Jews as dominated by Arabists, patriotic diplomats who sincerely believe that America's long-range interests lie with the oil-rich and populous Arab world; the word "corporations" conjures up images of businesses still intolerant of Jews, which act in an amoral fashion to maximize profits, and which, as a result, have cast their lot with the economically profitable Arab world.

The extraordinary frequency with which Jews see blacks as unfriendly toward Israel bears special mention. In other surveys Jews have made clear that they share a common domestic agenda with blacks and support large-scale social spending to benefit blacks, other minorities, and all needy Americans. Nevertheless, Jews have been chastened by the apparent collapse of the once-strong Black-Jewish civil rights alliance, the urban confrontations of the last two decades, and the involvement of several prominent black community leaders with the PLO. Thus, while Jews remain sympathetic to black domestic concerns, they are very suspicious of blacks when they act in the international arena.

In most but not all ways, the perceptions of the leaders regarding various groups in U.S. society paralleled those of the public sample. Generally, the leaders had more definite or extreme views about whether groups were friendly or hostile towards Israel; thus, groups which the public rated as friendly were usually even more positively rated by the leaders, and the converse was true for groups rated hostile.

Three of the larger discrepancies between public and leaders' views include Congress, the President, and Republicans. On these and several other political groups and institutions, the leaders perceived much greater friendliness, probably because of their greater access to public officials and their greater command of specialized information.

In two other instances sophisticated knowledge undoubtedly shaped leaders' views. They saw the State Department and Evangelical Protestants as respectively much more hostile and much more friendly to Israel than did the public. The image of a pro-Arab State Department has been especially vivid among Jewish communal leaders for decades. Similarly, the pro-Israel stance of many Evangelical Protestant leaders surprises many Jews whose conventional images of

fundamentalist Christians are of religiously inspired anti-semitism. Only those Jews especially attentive to intergroup relations and to the images of Israel among the American public are likely to know much about the pro-Israel sympathies of many Evangelical Protestants.

Leaders also tended to see most American groups and institutions as more friendly toward Israel than did the general Jewish public. Since the perception of a hostile environment generally feeds reluctance to take risks and compromise, the public may be expected to have less conciliatory or "dovish" views on the Middle East conflict than the communal leaders. That this indeed is the case may be seen in comparing the two groups' views on Israeli security policies.

### Divergent Opinions About Israeli Security Policies

Although American Jews are substantially united in their concern for Israeli security, they, like Israelis, hold diverse views about how Israel should best pursue its search for peace and security (Table 8). Pragmatism and concern for security are two themes which run through American Jewish thinking about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A plurality of the public (42% to 29% with 30% undecided) preferred that Israel "maintain permanent control over the West Bank." But, for many, this view does not translate into outright annexation of the West Bank. By roughly similar margins (42% to 34% with 23% undecided) the sample endorsed Israel offering "the Arabs territorial compromise...for credible guarantees of peace," and favored (51% to 28% with 21% not sure) suspending the "expansion of settlements in...the West Bank...to encourage peace negotiations."

Previous AJC studies have shown that American Jews overwhelmingly (by about 5 to 1) support Israel's refusal to negotiate with Palestinian leaders committed to Israel's destruction. But in this most recent study, that stance is revealed as primarily a response to feelings of threat and vulnerability. Were the PLO to "recognize Israel and renounce terrorism," the vast majority of the sample (70% to 17%) agreed that Israel should talk with the PLO. By almost 2 to 1 (48% to 26% with 27% undecided) they also endorsed the right of Palestinians to a "homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel."

That threat and vulnerability are at the heart of American Jewish attitudes toward the conflict can be seen in a number of ways. First, responses to the same question -- on "territorial compromise" -- in the three AJC surveys may be compared. In December 1981, the sample was evenly split (41% to 41%) on the question; during the Lebanon war, in August 1982, when Israel was engaged in active military operations and appeared to be under attack by the American media, the sample rejected territorial compromise by a wide margin (31% for, 52% against). Now, after hostilities have diminished, a slight majority favors territorial compromise. Similarly, the minority of the Jewish public that opposed open

TABLE 8

Opinions About Israeli Security Policies

	<u>Public</u>			<u>Leaders</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"Israel should maintain permanent control over...the West Bank."	42	29	30	21	59	20
"Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in...the West Bank and Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace."	42	34	23	74	16	10
"Israel should suspend the expansion of settlements in...the West Bank...to encourage peace negotiations."	51	28	21	55	25	20
"Israel should talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism."	70	17	13	73	17	11
"Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel."	48	26	27	51	28	22

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criticism of Israeli policies by American Jews was lowest in this last survey. Thus, the number opposing criticism started at 33% in December, 1981; it grew to 43% in August, 1982; and it has fallen to its lowest level of 31% in this study (see Table 11).

The third demonstration that Jewish attitudes are influenced by their perceptions of Israeli vulnerability lies in the findings drawn from an index of perceived hostility toward Israel. The index was created by adding "points" for seeing groups as "generally unfriendly to Israel" and subtracting points for seeing groups as "generally friendly." The third of the sample that saw more American groups as anti-Israel was some 20% less likely to endorse "dovish" points of view than was the third of the sample who considered the American public more friendly toward Israel.

If the American Jewish public tends to lean toward a "dovish" posture on Israeli policies, the communal leadership does more so. By about 2 to 1 (55% to 25%) the leaders endorsed suspension of West Bank settlement expansion, and the right of Palestinians to a homeland which does not threaten Israel (51% to 28%). By more than 4 to 1 (73% to 17%) they endorsed the position that Israel should talk with the PLO provided the PLO renounces terror and recognizes Israel. On these three questions the leaders were only slightly more conciliatory than the public at large. However, on the two questions in Table 8 pertaining to territories (and in two others reported in Table 10), leaders were significantly more eager for Israel to relinquish control of the territories than were respondents in the public sample. Thus they rejected by 3 to 1 (59% to 21%) the notion that "Israel should maintain permanent control over...the West Bank"; and by the much larger margin of over 4 to 1 (74% to 16%) they endorsed the proposal to offer territorial compromise for "credible guarantees of peace."

Several interrelated factors may account for the conciliatory views of most communal leaders. Previous studies of American Jewish public opinion identified several factors associated with such thinking. Those who were better educated, more politically liberal, younger, and less communally affiliated were more likely to hold dovish views (and these results hold up for this survey as well). These variables should be interpreted not in their own right, but as indicators of some underlying concept. (I have suggested that they all betoken cosmopolitanism -- being oriented and involved in thinking and groups beyond the exclusively Jewish sub-culture.)

Thus, even though the leaders share few of the distinctive socio-demographic characteristics which predispose the larger public to take a dovish stance, they have been exposed, by virtue of their leadership responsibilities, to the perspectives and values of influentials who are neither Jewish nor Israeli.

The leaders' point of view, moreover, makes for some interesting paradoxes. Generally, those in the larger Jewish population who care more deeply and are more politically and financially supportive of Israel, and have greater contact and communication with Israelis are slightly more "hawkish" than their less Israel-involved counterparts. On the other hand, the communal leaders who exhibit commitment to, and involvement with, Israel at levels far above the larger Jewish

population, are decidedly more dovish than one would anticipate on the basis of such high involvement. These contradictory tendencies could make for intra-organizational tension, with broad-based membership groups' local chapters leaning in a more hawkish direction while the top national leadership exhibits a more dovish view.

Perhaps the key aspect that predisposes the top leaders toward more conciliatory attitudes is their direct contact with a large number of Israeli influentials, many of whom strongly oppose the present government position and support other views. As Jewish communal leaders learn to appreciate distinctions between Israeli leaders and policies, they also come to recognize that expression of their more conciliatory foreign policy instincts is not necessarily heretical or disloyal.

### Ratings of Israeli Political Leaders

We asked respondents to indicate whether they had a "very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable" impression of six well known contemporary Israeli political leaders, or "no impression" at all of any of them. (Table 9)

Abba Eban -- a figure held in modest esteem by Israelis and well-known in the United States since his service as a UN Ambassador during the Six Day War (1967) -- emerged as the most popular figure among American Jews. Ariel Sharon -- now in disrepute in Israel for his bellicosity and individualism during the war in Lebanon -- was the least popular. The four other figures -- Rabin, Navon, Begin and Peres -- had fairly similar, intermediate favorability scores.

Past Israeli President Yitzchak Navon was the least well-known figure (44% had no impression). Of those who claimed to know about him, almost all gave him favorable ratings; among these, he was as popular as Eban. Labor Party leader Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Begin elicited quite different levels of feeling. About half of those with an impression of the Prime Minister thought of him as either "very favorable" or "very unfavorable"; whereas 3 out of 4 who rated Peres put him in either the "somewhat favorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" categories. Apparently, as among Israelis, Shimon Peres excites neither enthusiastic support nor diehard opposition.

The leaders' evaluations of Israeli leaders differ from those of the public in fairly predictable ways. Leaders were considerably less likely to report "no impression" of any of the six leaders. As a result, they were more likely to think favorably of Yitzchak Navon. Their views of Labor Party leaders Peres and Rabin were similar to those of the public sample; however, their views of Prime Minister Begin and former Defense Minister Sharon were decidedly less favorable than those of the public. The leaders were split down the middle on Menachem Begin and clearly unfavorably impressed with Sharon. Begin's popularity among the leaders is far behind that of the four Labor Party personalities. Their views of Israeli political leaders, then, are consistent with their views of which policies would best bring about peace and security for Israel. Just as they endorse Labor Party style policies, so too are they more comfortable with Labor Party personalities.

**TABLE 9**  
Favorability Ratings of Six Israeli Political Leaders

	Public		Leaders	
	Favorability Rating <sup>a</sup>	%No. Impression	Favorability Rating <sup>a</sup>	%No. Impression
Abba Eban	72	8	72	0
Yitzchak Rabin	41	28	45	4
Yitzchak Navon	36	45	57	14
Shimon Peres	31	23	32	6
Menachem Begin	31	3	6	0
Ariel Sharon	5	7	-39	0

---

a. Favorability Rating = 1 X (% "Very Favorable" - % "Very Unfavorable")  
+ 0.5 X (% "Somewhat Favorable" - % "Somewhat Unfavorable")

Clearly, American Jews distinguish among various Israeli political leaders as well as alternative foreign policies, and are also generally willing to express implicit criticism of certain Israeli policies when given the opportunity to do so.

### **Criticism of Israeli Policies and Leaders**

That many American Jews are uncomfortable with some aspects of current Israeli foreign policy is evident. By almost 2 to 1 (48% to 29% with 23% unsure) the respondents affirmed (Table 10) that they were "often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government." Aside from differences with Israeli leaders on how to pursue peace and security (refer back to Table 8), the sample by a 2 to 1 margin expressed concern with the way the Israeli government has been handling relations with the U.S. They agreed (50% to 24% with 26% undecided) that "Israeli leaders have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealings with American officials"; and, by a similar margin (50% to 24%; 26% not sure) they assented to the view that Israeli government policies "have hurt Israel in the U.S."

Apparently criticism of the adverse impact of Israeli policies on U.S.-Israeli relations is, in a sense, "fair game" among American Jews, as is support for more dovish policies. However, more direct attacks on current leaders and policy directions received the support of only substantial minorities. Thus, by a slim margin (38% to 35%) the sample rejected the notion that Prime Minister Begin's policies "have damaged Israel." By margins of about 2 to 1 (52% to 24%; 42% to 28%, and 50% to 22%) they also rejected three statements which directly expressed lack of faith in Israel's democracy or continuity as a viable Jewish state. Thus, they rejected the suggestion of a recent erosion in "Israel's commitment to democratic values," as well as the idea that the West Bank occupation will erode Israel's democratic, humanitarian or Jewish character.

As one would expect, the leaders were in substantial agreement with the public on these issues, but they were even more critical of the present Israeli government and its policies. Thus, many more said they were "troubled" by the government's policies (70% agreed, only 21% disagreed), and there was a near consensus that the government has hurt U.S.-Israel relations unnecessarily. By over 4 to 1 (68% to 15%) the leaders agreed that Prime Minister Begin's policies "have hurt Israel in the U.S." and even more (81% versus 10%) agreed that Israelis "have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealings" with American leaders.

Consistent with these highly critical views, a plurality (43% to 32%) agreed that the present government's policies "have damaged Israel." And while they were more hesitant than the public to declare that Israel's "commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years," they were clearly more ready to express their fears for Israel if occupation of the territories were to continue. Pluralities (47% to 33% and 43% to 36%) agreed that continued occupation will "erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character" and her "Jewish character" as well. These views, of course, echo those expressed frequently by Israelis themselves. With their greater familiarity with the issues surrounding the occupation and with indigenous Israeli anxieties about those policies, communal leaders are more likely than the larger Jewish public to feel uneasy with those policies.



TABLE 10

Expressions of Overt Criticism of Israeli Policies and Leaders

	<u>Public</u>			<u>Leaders</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government." <sup>a</sup>	48	29	23	70	21	9
"The policies of Prime Minister Begin and his government have hurt Israel in the U.S."	50	22	28	68	15	18
"Israeli leaders have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealing with American officials."	50	24	26	81	10	9
"The policies of Menachem Begin and his government have damaged Israel."	35	38	27	43	32	25
"Israel's commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years."	24	52	24	22	64	14
"Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character."	28	42	31	47	33	20
"Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's Jewish character."	22	50	27	43	36	21

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a. Answers to the first question only are "Agree," "Disagree," "Not Sure"

The respondents from both samples, then, were willing to take issue with certain aspects of Israeli political decision-making, but they were resolute in their commitment to a certain idealized vision of her society. Just as they made distinctions over the substance of permissible criticism, so too did they distinguish between those who may, and those who may not, express criticism of Israeli policies.

Thus, the sample overwhelmingly supported the right of Israelis to criticize their own government and, by inference, they suggested such criticism was a good thing. By a 4 to 1 margin (70% to 17% with 12% not sure) they rejected the proposition (see Table 11) that "Israelis who strongly criticize" some of the government's policies "are bad for Israel." They were slightly less enthusiastic about American Jewish criticism, but even here they were largely supportive. By roughly 2 to 1 margins they assented to the view that "American Jewish organizations should feel free to criticize" (60% to 27%), and they rejected the notion that "American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policies publicly" (57% to 31%). In contrast, the sample implicitly rejected the right of non-Jews to take Israel to task. By a 67% to 15% majority, respondents disagreed with the view that "non-Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries," even as they affirmed 52% to 37% that American Jews had the right to make such a distinction.

From these results it would seem that American Jews believe some forms of criticism of Israel, by some people, on some issues and of some personalities, is acceptable. But criticism is acceptable only if it is internal to the group, and the more internal the better. Thus, the sample saw Israelis themselves as the most accepted critics, followed by American Jewish organizations and American Jewish individuals. Criticism by non-Jews -- whose views and motives are always suspect -- of the Jewish State, her leaders, policies, and society is not acceptable. (Non-Jews can, perhaps, "get away" with regretting U.S.-Israel tensions, but not with blaming Israel for causing those tensions.)

Finally, the loyalty of potential Jewish critics to the group is seen as a *sine qua non*. By more than 3 to 1 (61% to 20%), the sample rejected the view that "Those who stop giving to UJA because they oppose Israeli government policies are right to do so." Clearly, criticism has its limits, and the decision to stop giving to the central pro-Israel communal philanthropic drive is seen by the vast majority of American Jews as transcending those limits.

In many respects, the leaders' views of who may acceptably criticize parallel those of the larger public, and perhaps they were more sharply defined. Thus, they were more resolute than the public in support of Israelis who criticize their government and they were also more definite in rejecting the right of non-Jews to hold Israel to higher standards than other countries. And their opinions about American Jews -- as individuals -- criticizing Israel virtually replicated those of the public sample.

TABLE 11

Attitude Toward Criticism of Israeli Policies

	<u>Public</u>			<u>Leaders</u>		
	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"Israelis who strongly criticize some of the government's policies are bad for Israel."	17	70	13	7	85	7
"American Jewish organizations should feel free to publicly criticize the Israeli government and its policies."	60	27	13	42	37	21
"American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policy publicly."	31	57	11	31	57	12
"Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries."	52	37	11	50	39	10
"Non-Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries."	15	67	19	12	79	9
"Those who stop giving to UJA because they oppose Israeli government policies are right to do so."	20	61	19	10	78	13

The one major difference between Jewish leaders and the public in this sphere entailed attitudes toward Jewish organizations publicly criticizing the Israeli government. The public respondents were equally comfortable with organizational and individual criticism. However, among the leaders, only a slim plurality (42% to 37%) endorsed organizational criticism. As one would expect, leaders take the role of their organizations more seriously than the public. They value their pronouncements and may believe their official positions are more consequential, and potentially more damaging to Israel, than the expression of individual views. For if Jewish organizations who are committed to Israel's security criticize the government, others, whose motives are more suspect, feel greater license to take Israel to task.

In short, the reluctance of many Jewish communal leaders to issue organizational statements critical of certain Israeli policies does not derive from their concurrence with these policies, since the leaders are, in fact, more opposed to the present government and its policies than are Jews generally. Rather, the communal leaders' sense of their responsibilities as leaders inhibits them from collectively and officially expressing the views of Israeli policies they hold as individuals.

### A Spectrum of American Jewish Views on Israel's Policies

From the results of these surveys it is possible to construct a composite portrait of the American Jewish opinion on Israeli security-related policies.

Utilizing the terms "doves" and "hawks" as a shorthand, American Jews may be divided into three broad groups. About 45% may be seen as doves; that is, roughly, the proportion that support territorial compromise, favor suspending settlement activity, and are willing to consider a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank and Gaza that does not threaten Israel. In fact, much more than 45% supported a formula for talking with the PLO (it must recognize Israel and renounce terrorism). In addition, over 45% affirmed the right of American Jews loyal to Israel and Israelis (especially) to criticize the government.

About 30% may be seen as "hawks." This is roughly the proportion that rejected territorial compromise; somewhat more wanted permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and somewhat fewer rejected even a non-threatening Palestinian homeland; and roughly this number also rejected the propriety of American Jewish criticism of Israeli policies. Between the doves and the hawks were the roughly 25% who were ambivalent or inconsistent about the major policy issues.

The "doves" and "hawks" in turn may be divided into roughly equal halves, that is, between strongly and weakly committed segments. Strongly committed doves (about 25% out of the 45%) consist of those who openly voice the fear, shared by Israel's Peace Now activists, that Israel's democratic, humanitarian, and Jewish character is now in jeopardy. The remaining 20% constitute weakly committed doves who prefer a Labor-oriented foreign policy, but refrain from publicly questioning Israel's major directions. As for the hawks, the 17% who would not talk with even a peace-oriented PLO suggests that the hawks too divide into a more extreme and a more moderate wing.

In sum, while commitment and attachment to Israel are matters of consensus among American Jews, the findings suggest a leaning among American Jews toward a dovish posture coupled with considerable fluidity in their thinking. They also exhibit wide diversity of views regarding Israel's current leaders and policies.

Using the same criteria, the leaders can be classified according to the same schema. Since from 51% to 74% assented to dovish positions, it is reasonable to infer that about 60% would qualify as doves; and since between 16% and 28% rejected those views, about 25% may be called "hawks." The remaining 15% may be seen as ambivalent or inconsistent. Among the doves, roughly 35% expressed views harshly critical of current policies (strongly committed) leaving 25% weakly committed; and among the hawks, 17% rejected talks with a PLO which recognized Israel and renounces terrorism (strongly committed) leaving 8% weakly committed.

Reasonable people may of course differ on how one defines such classifications "hawk" and "dove." But that the communal leaders are considerably more dovish than the larger Jewish public is indisputable.

## **Appendix A: Demographic and Social Characteristics**

The method of data collection used in this study -- mailing questionnaires to Jews with Distinctive Jewish Names nationwide -- offers an important advantage over other methods: it is extraordinarily low-cost. Its principal disadvantage, though, is that it may produce biased, or somewhat unrepresentative results. To determine the extent to which this sample is indeed representative of American Jewry, Table 12 compares selected social and demographic characteristics of the 1983 National Survey of American Jews with the largest recent survey of American Jews, the 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Study conducted by Paul Ritterband and myself for New York's UJA Federation. This study interviewed over 4500 Jews living in eight counties containing about a third of all American Jewry.

In many respects the two samples are, if not virtually identical, quite similar. The median age, proportion of households married, the household size and many of the ritual activities are very close. The national sample reported slightly higher income, owing in part to inflation over the last two years, and in part to the higher concentration of working-class Jews in New York, relative to the rest of the country. For similar reasons, educational attainment in the national sample was also higher.

The national sample does appear to over-represent Orthodox and Conservative Jews, and as a consequence it may under-represent the Reform or unaffiliated. In part, these differences are due to the slightly greater motivation of more Jewishly committed individuals to complete and return the study. In contrast, the friendship results point in the opposite direction: fewer of the national respondents (61% versus 70%) reported only Jewish close friends than did respondents in the New York study.

In sum, then, some characteristics of the national sample differ in small measure from the standard for representativeness derived from the more sophisticated and more costly New York study. However, none of these differences are large enough to seriously impugn the substantive inferences drawn in this study.

TABLE 12

Social and Demographic Characteristics

	<u>1983 Public</u>	<u>1981 Greater N.Y.<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>1983 Leaders</u>
Median Age	48	49	58
% Married	70	65	90
Mean Household Size	2.6	2.5	2.6
% B.A.	62	53	90
Median Income	\$37,000	\$31,000	\$135,000 <sup>b</sup>
Denomination			
Orthodox	15	13	8
Conservative	44	36	34
Reform	29	29	50
Other	12	23	8
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Seder	89	90	95
Chanukah Candles	77	76	81
Yom Kippur Fast	59	68	61
Sabbath Candles	34	37	42
Separate Dishes	22	30	16
Christmas Tree	11	--	12
% 3 Closest Friends Jewish	61	70	79
% Currently intermarried (of those married)	17	11	4

a. Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, 1981-4 Greater N.Y. Jewish Population Study, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y.

b. Approximate calculation, 69% of the leaders reported incomes in excess of \$100,000.

### Summary of Findings

1. Almost all American Jews express deep attachment and caring for Israel.
2. A substantial minority are in close touch with Israel and Israelis. About 2-in-5 have been to Israel and 1-in-6 have been there twice or more; over a third have family and friends in Israel.
3. A substantial minority of American Jews support her with political and charitable contributions.
4. Most are anxious about continued U.S. support for Israel as well as about American anti-semitism and the acceptance of Jews in the U.S.
5. Most believe the liberal-left (Democrats, liberals, Congress, labor unions) are pro-Israel; that the Establishment (President Reagan, Republicans, the military, Protestants) are mixed toward Israel; and that certain political actors (the State Department, corporations, and especially Blacks) are anti-Israel.
6. The American Jewish public tilts toward preferring a "dovish" Israeli foreign policy. Pluralities or majorities favor territorial compromise, suspension of settlements, talks with the PLO provided the PLO renounces terror and recognizes Israel, and a Palestinian homeland if it would not threaten Israel.
7. Labor Party leaders are more popular than Mr. Begin or Mr. Sharon.
8. Criticism of Israeli government policies by Israelis and American Jews is acceptable.
9. Leaders differ from the public in two significant ways:
  - a. They are even more deeply involved with Israel: they travel there more often, have more Israeli friends, and are much more active in political and charitable affairs.
  - b. They are more "dovish." In particular, they are much more eager for Israel to eventually relinquish control of the territories for real peace, and are more likely to see continued occupation of the territories as jeopardizing Israel's democratic, humanitarian, and Jewish character.

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# 1983 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS

## AMERICAN ISSUES

1. Which of these best describes your usual stand on political issues? (Circle number in this and all other questions)
- |                    |    |                   |    |                    |    |
|--------------------|----|-------------------|----|--------------------|----|
| RADICAL, SOCIALIST | 2  | LIBERAL           | 36 | MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD | 38 |
| CONSERVATIVE       | 23 | VERY CONSERVATIVE | 1  |                    |    |

2. Do you usually think of yourself as Republican, Democrat or Independent?
- |            |    |          |    |             |    |       |   |
|------------|----|----------|----|-------------|----|-------|---|
| REPUBLICAN | 11 | DEMOCRAT | 59 | INDEPENDENT | 30 | OTHER | 1 |
|------------|----|----------|----|-------------|----|-------|---|

3. Do you vote in most elections? (Circle number)
- |     |    |    |    |
|-----|----|----|----|
| YES | 90 | NO | 10 |
|-----|----|----|----|

4. Did you happen to vote in the 1982 election?
- |     |    |    |    |
|-----|----|----|----|
| YES | 90 | NO | 10 |
|-----|----|----|----|

## ISRAEL

5. Have you been to Israel?
- |           |    |           |    |                    |    |
|-----------|----|-----------|----|--------------------|----|
| NO, NEVER | 57 | YES, ONCE | 25 | YES, TWICE OR MORE | 18 |
|-----------|----|-----------|----|--------------------|----|
6. (IF YES) When was the last time you were there? (YEAR):
- |         |    |        |    |        |    |
|---------|----|--------|----|--------|----|
| Pre 69: | 13 | 69-71: | 9  | 72-74: | 17 |
| 75-77:  | 12 | 78-80: | 24 | 81-83: | 25 |
7. (IF YES) Was your impression of Israel mostly favorable?
- |     |    |    |   |       |    |
|-----|----|----|---|-------|----|
| YES | 86 | NO | 4 | MIXED | 11 |
|-----|----|----|---|-------|----|

- |   | YES | NO |
|---|-----|----|
| 8. Have you ever seriously considered living in Israel? (Circle number).....  | 17  | 83 |
| 9. Do you have any family in Israel? (Circle number).....   | 34  | 66 |
| 10. Do you have any personal friends in Israel? (Circle number).....  | 35  | 65 |
| 11. In the last 12 months, have you contributed money to a political candidate because you believed he/she would support Israel? (Circle number)..... | 30  | 70 |
| 12. In the last 12 months, have you written to a newspaper or elected official in support of Israel? (Circle number).....                             | 20  | 80 |
| 13. Do you often talk about Israel with friends and relatives? (Circle number).....   | 75  | 25 |
| 14. Do you pay special attention to articles about Israel when you read newspapers or magazines. (Circle number).....                                 | 93  | 7  |
| 15. Do you consider yourself very well-informed about Israel?.....  | 54  | 46 |
| 16. Do you consider yourself a Zionist? (Circle number).....  | 39  | 61 |

17. Do you like Israel more now, less now, or the same as the last few years?
- |          |    |          |    |                                |    |
|----------|----|----------|----|--------------------------------|----|
| MORE NOW | 22 | LESS NOW | 15 | THE SAME AS THE LAST FEW YEARS | 63 |
|----------|----|----------|----|--------------------------------|----|

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
18. Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew. (Circle number) .....	78	9	13
19. If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.....	77	10	13
20. Generally, I feel a closer kinship with Israeli Ashkenazim (those of European lineage) than Israeli Sephardim (those of Asian or African lineage). (Circle number) .....	59	22	19
21. Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries. (Circle number) .....	52	37	11
22. Non-Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries. (Circle number) .....	15	67	19
23. I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government. (Circle number).....	48	29	23
24. There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America. (Circle number).....	24	65	11
25. U.S. support of Israel is in America's interest. (Circle number).....	91	3	6
26. Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest. (Circle number).....	47	22	31
27. I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel. (Circle number).....	55	31	14
28. Jews should not vote for candidates who are unfriendly to Israel. (Circle number).....	73	15	12
29. The policies of Prime Minister Begin and his government have hurt Israel in the U.S. (Circle number).....	50	22	28
30. I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel. (Circle number).....	10	85	6
31. American Jewish organizations should feel free to publicly criticize the Israeli government and its policies. (Circle number) .....	60	27	13
32. American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policies publicly. (Circle number) .....	31	57	11
33. Generally, Jews who oppose certain Israeli government policies are made to feel unwelcome in most Jewish organizations. (Circle number) .....	22	31	47
34. When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive. (Circle number) .....	54	24	22
35. Israelis who emigrate and settle in other countries are doing something wrong. (Circle number) .....	16	66	18
36. Those who stop giving to UJA because they oppose Israeli government policies are right to do so. (Circle number) .....	20	61	19
37. Anti-Semitism in America, may in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews. (Circle number).....	69	11	20
38. Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews. (Circle number).....	37	43	20
39. Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews. (Circle number).....	27	55	18

Do you believe each of the several American groups and institutions below is *generally friendly, mixed or neutral, generally unfriendly* towards Israel? (Circle number)

Towards Israel, this group is:	GENERALLY FRIENDLY	MIXED OR NEUTRAL	GENERALLY UNFRIENDLY	NO IMPRESSION
40. "Mainstream" Protestants.....	20	47	12	22
41. Evangelical Protestants.....	23	28	20	29
42. Catholics.....	14	50	20	17
43. Blacks.....	7	31	48	14
44. State Department.....	22	37	33	9
45. The military.....	31	36	19	15
46. Liberals.....	53	30	7	11
47. Conservatives.....	25	49	15	11
48. Corporations.....	12	45	27	16
49. Labor unions.....	37	39	7	17
50. News media.....	21	51	24	5
51. Congress.....	44	44	5	7
52. President Reagan.....	72	28	0	0
53. Democrats.....	66	31	0	3
54. Republicans.....	26	53	12	9

What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders? (Circle numbers)

	VERY FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE	NO IMPRESSION
55. Abba Eban.....	61	27	3	1	8
56. Ariel Sharon.....	22	30	20	21	7
57. Menachem Begin.....	34	34	20	10	3
58. Shimon Peres.....	19	42	13	3	23
59. Yitzchak Navon.....	22	30	2	1	45
60. Yitzchak Rabin.....	26	38	7	1	28


Below are positions often articulated by some of Israel's principal political leaders and parties. Please indicate whether you agree with those Israelis advocating each of the following positions. (Circle number)

	DO YOU AGREE WITH ISRAELIS HOLDING THIS VIEW?		
	YES	NO	NOT SURE
61. Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace. (Circle number).....	42	34	23
62. Israel should maintain permanent control over Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). (Circle number).....	42	29	30
63. Israel should suspend the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in order to encourage peace negotiations.....	51	28	21

DO YOU AGREE WITH ISRAELIS  
HOLDING THIS VIEW?

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
64. Israel's commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years. ....	24	52	24
65. Israel should talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism. ....	70	17	13
66. Israel should grant Conservative and Reform rabbis the same status as Orthodox rabbis. ....	79	9	13
67. Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character. ....	28	42	31
68. Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's Jewish character. ....	22	50	27
69. Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel. ....	48	26	27
70. The policies of Menachem Begin and his government have damaged Israel. ....	35	38	27
71. Israeli leaders have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealings with American officials. ....	50	24	26
72. Israelis who strongly criticize some of the government's policies are bad for Israel. ....	17	70	13

73. In general how would you characterize your feelings about Israel? Please circle one *number* on the scale below.



To what extent do you think each of the following descriptions applies to most Israelis? (Circle *numbers*)

	TO A GREAT EXTENT	TO SOME EXTENT	HARDLY AT ALL	DON'T KNOW, NOT SURE
74. Idealistic.....	30	50	7	13
75. Arrogant.....	29	48	10	14
76. Secular.....	20	51	9	20
77. Materialistic.....	21	47	18	14
78. Conservative.....	8	42	24	26
79. Peaceloving.....	53	36	4	7
80. Industrious.....	81	15	1	4
81. Aggressive.....	68	25	2	5
82. Heroic.....	66	26	1	7
83. Intolerant.....	13	56	18	14
84. Religious.....	12	55	24	9
85. Progressive.....	50	37	4	8

## JEWISH BACKGROUND

86. What was the main type of formal Jewish education you received as a child? (Circle *number*)

NONE 14      SUNDAY SCHOOL 18      HEBREW SCHOOL OR OTHER PART-TIME 55  
 DAY SCHOOL, YESHIVA, OR OTHER FULL-TIME 9      OTHER 4

87. Of your three closest friends, how many are Jewish? (Circle *number*)..... 0=8    1=11    2=21    3=61

88. Do you belong to a synagogue? (Circle *number*) ..... YES 59                      NO 41

89. (IF YES) Is it:..... ORTHODOX 24    CONSERVATIVE 45    REFORM 27    OTHER 3

90. I think of myself as (Circle *number*)..... ORTHODOX 15    CONSERVATIVE 44    REFORM 29    OTHER 12

91. In what religion were you raised? ..... JEWISH 94    CHRISTIAN 3    OTHER 0    NONE 3

92. In what religion was your spouse raised? ..... JEWISH 84    CHRISTIAN 13    OTHER 0    NONE 4

93. What is your spouse's religion now?..... JEWISH 84    CHRISTIAN 8    OTHER 1    NONE 7

94. In what religion will/have/did you raise(d) your child(ren)?..... JEWISH 89    CHRISTIAN 3    OTHER 2    NONE 6

95. What did your parents consider themselves? Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, something else, or non-Jewish? (Circle *number*)

. ORTHODOX 39      CONSERVATIVE 35      REFORM 18      OTHER JEWISH 7      NON-JEWISH 2

	YES	NO
96. Do you take part in a Passover seder at home or elsewhere?.....	89	11
97. Are Chanuka candles lit in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	77	23
98. Do you fast on Yom Kippur? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	59	41
99. Are Sabbath candles lit in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	34	66
100. Do you use separate dishes for meat and dairy products in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	22	78
101. Do you belong to a Zionist organization? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	20	80
102. Do you belong to another Jewish organization aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	44	56
103. Do you usually give to the UJA/Federation? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	64	36
104. Did you happen to give the UJA/Federation \$100 or more in the last 12 months? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	33	67
105. Do you contribute directly to Israeli educational or charitable institutions? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	45	55
106. At Christmastime, do you have a tree in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....	11	89

## DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

107. Your sex: (Circle *number*)      MALE 65    FEMALE 35

108. Your age: 53 years.  
Median:

110. Your zip code: \_\_\_\_\_

115. Marital status:    NEVER MARRIED 12      MARRIED 76      DIVORCED OR SEPARATED 5      WIDOWED 7

116. How many people live in your home? 1=17    2=43    3=13    4=17    5+=10

117. How many children have you had? 0=21    1=14    2=40    3=18    4=5    5+=2

118. Do you have any children living at home?    YES 39    NO 62

119. What is the highest level of education you (and your spouse) have completed? (If you are not currently married, disregard the column for spouse.) (Circle <i>number</i> )	YOU	YOUR SPOUSE
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE OR LESS .....	20	29
SOME COLLEGE .....	18	18
COLLEGE DEGREE.....	26	29
POST-GRADUATE DEGREE.....	36	24

121. Finally, what was your approximate family income from all sources, before taxes, in 1982? (Circle *number*)

LESS THAN \$10,000    5	\$30,000 TO \$39,999    16	\$60,000 TO \$74,999    12
\$10,000 TO \$19,999    11	\$40,000 TO \$49,999    14	\$75,000 TO \$99,999    6
\$20,000 TO \$29,999    19	\$50,000 TO \$59,999    9	\$100,000 AND OVER    8

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