

MOMENT



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**CHURCH-STATE:
 WHAT NEXT?**

**NEW FICTION
 BY LESLIE EPSTEIN**

**AMERICAN
 IMMIGRANTS
 IN ISRAEL**

**THE "LOATHSOME
 PHENOMENON":
 MEIR KAHANE, IN DEPTH**

**THE CONTINUING
 SURPRISE:
 WHAT AMERICAN JEWS
 BELIEVE**

MOMENT VOL. 10

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WHAT WE THINK

Results of this year's National Survey of American Jews

On November 6, 1984, 59 percent of all American voters cast their ballots for Ronald Reagan. Fifty-nine percent of all voters—and, according to several exit polls, 30 percent of Jewish voters. (The New York Times-CBS exit poll estimated the Jewish vote for Reagan at 32 percent, two points higher than most other polls.) Only black voters, at 90 percent Mondale, out Mondaled the Jews, at between 66 and 70 percent.

Plainly, Jews remain a very distinctive group—not to say idiosyncratic—marching resolutely to the beat of a different drummer, different from the one most other Americans hear.

What are the political attitudes and beliefs American Jews bring to the last decade and a half of the century? Here, as last year, Steven M. Cohen reports on his annual survey of those attitudes, conducted since 1981 for the American Jewish Committee.

**STEVEN M.
COHEN**

For some years now, many observers have either predicted or advocated (it's not always easy to tell the difference) a rightward shift in Jewish political thinking. After all, they have argued, a sizeable proportion of American Jews are uncommonly affluent, and affluence goes with a rightward orientation. Moreover, the last decade and a half has been marked by a falling-out between Jews and blacks on issues of great significance to both communities, and Jews no longer so readily identify as allies or supporters of minorities. On foreign affairs, Israel's vulnerability and Soviet behavior towards the Jews and towards Israel have predisposed some Jews to support both an increase in American defense expenditures and a tougher American line towards the USSR. All these factors together—so goes the argument—must have caused (or *should* have caused) a rightward shift among the Jews.

But the facts are otherwise. The center of American political gravity has been moving rightward in recent years, and the Jews may, indeed, have been moving with it—but they have remained, as they have long been, considerably more liberal than Americans in general. They are, in fact, as far to the left of center as they have been for decades.

This we know from diverse polls and surveys. Considerable additional detail is now available to us from the annual National Survey of American Jews (NSAJ), which this year tabulates the answers of 959 respondents in a nationwide sample. Last year's study, reported in these pages, explored Jewish attitudes towards Israel and Israelis; this year, we focus on attitudes towards major issues in American domestic and international affairs.

Steven M. Cohen is Professor of Sociology at Queens College, CUNY, and Visiting Professor at the Hebrew University. His recent writing includes American Modernity and Jewish Identity, (New York, Tavistock, 1983). Along with Calvin Goldscheider, he was interviewed in the September 1984 issue of MOMENT.

The Big Picture

The broad patterns of Jewish political orientation and party affiliation are summarized in Table 1. There we find that 35 percent of the respondents describe themselves as liberal (and another one percent as radical or socialist), compared to 25 percent who describe themselves as conservative (or very conservative). For the American public at large, those figures are 24 percent liberal and 35 percent conservative—precisely the reverse, that is, of the Jewish distribution.

Conservatives may take some satisfaction from the data in Table 1, as they show that the number of Jews who describe themselves as conservative grew by fully 50 percent between 1981 and 1984. Curiously, however, the number of liberals also grew a bit, reflecting, perhaps, the polarizing influence of an administration with a strong ideological bent. In 1981, in any event, there were two Jewish liberals for every Jewish conservative; by 1984, the ratio had dropped from two to one to three to two.

But that is the end of the good news for conservatives. Only half the Jewish conservatives identify as Republicans; the Jewish Republican figure has stayed where it was, as if it were easier to shift ideological persuasion than party affiliation. By contrast, the figure for Democrats exceeds that for liberals by a very wide margin—as if Democratic party affiliation were still the norm, for liberals and for a considerable proportion of middle-of-the-roaders as well. Among Jews, the Democrats have better than a four to one advantage—whereas in the country at large, the ratio is roughly three to two.

Still, there has been a marked fall-off in Jewish support for the Democratic party, which dropped from 65 percent in 1981 to 59 percent in 1983 and to 57 percent in 1984. Again, however, there was no correlative gain in Republican support; the Democratic defectors moved to the independent column.

Generally, there is a powerful association between income and political identity; the more affluent, the more conservative. It is this association, to the continuing puzzlement of observers (and the chagrin of

some), that does not seem to hold among American Jews. Our study provides specific insight into the relationship of income to ideology among Jews.

Specifically, we find that there are, indeed, very few differences in either the political self-identification or the political attitudes of our respondents that tie into the differences in their economic status. That is, of course, the puzzling fact. But if we examine the structure of that fact more carefully, we see that it ignores the association between higher education and higher income, and that once we take account of the issue of education, we discern an interesting phenomenon: In each income group, the more educated are more liberal than the less educated. And of those with higher education, the more affluent tend to be more conservative than the less affluent.

For Jews, education and income are very highly correlated; more often than others, Jews become rich by way of higher education. So what we have is two competing tendencies: On the one hand, increased wealth induces conservatism; on the other, increased education induces liberalism. Thus, for example, among those in the \$30,000-74,999 income brackets, the least well-educated are plainly the least liberal; 20 percent of them score high on our summary index of liberalism, compared to 44 percent of those in the same income category who have graduate degrees. If we turn that table on its side, we find that among holders of graduate degrees, 38 percent of those with the highest income score high on liberalism, as do 44 percent of those in the next highest income group, as, finally, do 51 percent of those in the lowest income group.

In short, it is not the case that income does not affect political belief among Jews, but that the effects of income, while quite real, are masked by the still more potent effects of education.

How, if at all, do the self-descriptions of our respondents as liberals or conservatives relate to specific attitudes and beliefs? The conservatives in our study were at least twice as likely as the liberals to oppose affir-

Table 1. Ideology and party

<i>Jewish Political Orientation</i>	<i>1984</i>	<i>1983</i>	<i>1981</i>
Radical or Socialist	1%	2%	2%
Liberal	35	36	32
Middle-of-the-road	38	38	49
Conservative	24	23	16
Very conservative	1	1	1
<i>Party Identification</i>			
Democratic	57%	59%	65%
Independent	31	30	24
Republican	12	11	12

Table 2. Opinions on domestic issues

	<i>Favor/ Agree</i>	<i>Oppose/ Disagree</i>	<i>Not Sure</i>
Job quotas for minorities	22%	64%	14%
Affirmative action	70	20	10
Support goals of welfare programs	75	17	8
Welfare programs have hurt recipients	64	23	13
Should be reduced because of fraud and waste	43	45	12
Death penalty for murderers	68	20	12
Need permit to buy gun	90	7	3
Pro-homosexual rights	87	9	4
Troubled by homosexual rise	43	49	8
Government aid for abortions	81	13	6
Adultery is wrong	73	16	11
Tax credits for private schools	29	63	8
Tax credits for Jewish schools	30	61	9
Religion's decline has hurt morals	44	42	14
Silent meditation in schools	21	70	9
Protect unpopular groups' right to demonstrate	48	41	12
It is suicide to protect extremists	44	43	13
Capitalism works better than socialism	73	7	20
Guarantee jobs for all who want	37	44	19

native action, spending on welfare programs, gun control, aid for abortion and the nuclear freeze—and twice as likely to support capital punishment, tuition tax credits for parents of private school pupils and building of nuclear plants. Twice as many liberals as conservatives favored quotas for hiring minorities, government guarantees of jobs for the unemployed, protection of the civil liberties of extremists, cuts in defense spending and restrictions on the use of U.S. military force.

This pattern of response is, of course, plausible. (We should note, however, that by normative American standards, the conservatives in our sample are more liberal, and the liberals more radical, than the terms normally suggest. It appears that a Jew who shifts from a traditional liberal perspective may think him/herself a conservative, but it is doubtful that by the conservatives he/she is a conservative.) It is when we look at each issue in detail that we can appreciate the full significance of the liberal/conservative split.

No to Quotas, Yes to Affirmative Action

Table 2 presents the responses to a series of questions on domestic affairs. The first of these deals with job quotas and affirmative action programs for minority groups, an issue that has sharply divided Jews and blacks—erstwhile allies—for more than a decade. For Jews, of course, the very idea of quotas conjures up traumatic memories of anti-Semitic exclusion, not only in 19th-century Europe, but in 20th-century America as well. At the same time, blacks have argued strenuously that without specific quotas and timetables for their achievement, the consequences of discrimination—as, indeed, its practice—will persist.

A number of Jewish organizations, sensitive to black concerns, have developed a position that rejects quotas but supports affirmative action in other forms. Our 1984 survey shows that the majority of the Jewish public favors this approach. About a fifth endorse quotas; another fifth oppose any form of affirmative action; and, as we learned from our cross-classifica-

tion (not shown in the table), most—55 percent—take a middle position, rejecting quotas but endorsing affirmative action.

This is a finding of considerable consequence, since Jews are often charged with having abandoned their traditional concern for the welfare of the oppressed—and, specifically, of opposing affirmative action. Instead, we find that not only do most Jews in fact support affirmative action, but the overwhelming majority of Jews—four out of five—support either a moderate affirmative action approach or the even stronger policy of affirmative action *and* quotas.

The strongest support for quotas, limited though it was, comes from lower-income respondents, those with only a high school education, those over 60, and, to a lesser extent, women. In the Jewish community, quotas are widely perceived as threatening to law and medical school applicants, or to employment opportunities in education, social work and the civil service. Hence, it is non-elderly, middle-class Jewish professionals who are most opposed to quotas.

Pro-Welfare—But How Effective?

Liberals and conservatives are sharply divided over the best strategy for alleviating the burdens of poverty. Generally, liberals have supported programs that offer direct government assistance to the poor. Conservatives, for their part, have argued that poor people are often hurt by such well-meaning assistance, that they do better in an expanding economy for which minimal government spending and interference are, in their view, prerequisites.

Lately, a neo-liberal critique has emerged, agreeing with the conservative position that current programs are not likely to be effective in “curing” poverty, but holding, with liberals, that government must nonetheless provide direct assistance to the poor until better solutions are developed.

Our questions on welfare and food stamps show that American Jews are united in their support of government assistance to the poor (at least in theory), but are divided in their

assessment of the value of current programs.

Thus, 75 percent of our respondents “support the goals of such government programs as welfare and food stamps,” but almost two-thirds (64 percent) also agree that such programs “have had many bad effects on the very people they’re supposed to help.” On balance, the sample split evenly on the desirability of “efforts to reduce or eliminate some of these programs” in light of the “fraud and waste” they involve. (The question was phrased so as to elicit the widest possible support for cutting programs.)

Overall, a plurality of our respondents (but not a majority) are solidly in favor of both the theory and the practice of welfare programs; they endorse the goals of such programs and oppose any cuts in them. Only half as many (23 percent) take the “pure” conservative position, opposing the goals and supporting cuts. A large group—about a third of the sample—favors the goals, but, perhaps out of concern over fraud, waste and/or ineffectiveness, wants the level of spending on welfare reduced.

On Crime: Security Above All

We asked two questions related to crime prevention and deterrence—one on capital punishment, the second on gun control.

According to prevailing stereotypes, liberals should favor gun control and oppose capital punishment (the positions of, among others, the American Civil Liberties Union), while conservatives should hold the reverse positions. And, in fact, those in our survey who called themselves liberals, as also those who called themselves conservatives, took the predicted positions more often than others. But most respondents—as most Americans on recent surveys—fall into neither of the stereotypic camps.

Instead, more than two-thirds (68 percent) of our sample endorse “the death penalty for persons convicted of murder”; at the same time, nine out of ten favor a law requiring that people “obtain a police permit before” they can “buy a gun.” (Recent national surveys show that general support for

Jews score higher than Catholics and almost all Protestant denominations on support for the rights of unpopular groups.

The long-standing reputation of American Jews as firmly in support of civil liberties is not supported by our study.

capital punishment is at just about the same level as it is for Jews, but that Jews are considerably more likely than others—90 percent here, compared to 72 percent nationally—to support gun control legislation.) In our survey, women are more likely than men to take the liberal positions on both questions; the more religiously observant more often support the death penalty; as in national surveys, the more highly educated most often oppose capital punishment.

When we cross-classify the responses, we find that almost a third (29 percent) of respondents take a fully liberal position, combining ambivalence or opposition to capital punishment with support for gun control. Only seven percent express what might be called the “strictly conservative” view, pro-capital punishment, anti-gun control. The clear preference of most (three out of five) respondents is the ostensibly paradoxical position of support for both capital punishment and gun control, a position that is neither liberal nor conservative. It is apparently not ideology that determines the answers here so much as it is concern with safety. “Make it as hard as possible for criminals to buy guns,” most respondents seem to be saying, “but if they get them and use them for evil, they must be punished to the maximum degree.”

Homosexuals: Pro-Rights, But . . .

The research literature on tolerance consistently reports that Jews score higher than Catholics and almost all Protestant denominations on support for the rights of unpopular or unconventional groups. There is, however, a distinction between support for their rights and endorsement of their distinctive behaviors.

It is, therefore, no surprise that seven out of every eight of our respondents (87 percent) agree that “whatever my personal views of homosexuality, I think that homosexuals should have the same rights as other people.” At the same time, respondents split almost down the middle on the question, “Whatever my views on the rights of homosexuals, I am troubled by the rise in their visibility.” Overall, then,

about half (47 percent) of the sample unequivocally endorses gay rights and is not troubled by the visibility of homosexuals; 40 percent take the somewhat equivocal view, endorsing the rights of homosexuals but expressing discomfort with their visibility; a small group (13 percent) either opposes or is ambivalent with regard to gay rights.

As might be expected, women, the more highly educated, and the less religiously observant are somewhat more sympathetic than others to equal rights for homosexuals. Differences are still more dramatic with regard to the “I am troubled” question. Here, more than 20 percentage points separate respondents under 40 from those over 60, graduate degree holders from high school graduates, the least observant from the most observant.

The interesting aspect of the responses to these questions, as also to our question on abortion, which measured approval of “government aid for abortions for poor women,” is the distinction respondents evidently draw between public policy and private perception. The fact that a respondent is troubled by the rise in visibility of homosexuals does not lead him/her to seek to deny equal rights to homosexuals. Similarly, the fact that 73 percent of our respondents believe that “adultery is wrong” does not lead them to oppose government aid for abortions; four out of five endorse such aid. This rather sophisticated ability to distinguish between private taste and belief, on the one hand, and government or public policy on the other, is significant evidence of how deeply the requirements of a genuinely pluralistic system are ingrained in American Jews. It is closely tied to Jewish views on church-state issues, to which we now turn.

Church-State

By a solid two-to-one majority, our sample opposes providing “tuition tax credits for parents of children in private or parochial schools.” We asked—at a very different point in the questionnaire—for opinions on tax credits for “parents of children in Jewish day schools.” Very few people changed their minds; the rejection was, again, by a two to one margin.

Only among the most religiously observant respondents, many of whom send their children to day schools, does a clear majority favor tax credits. (The Jewish position on tax credits stands in sharp contrast to the position of other Americans, who endorse such credits by a 51 to 45 percent majority, according to a Los Angeles Times 1983 survey.)

Similarly, our sample overwhelmingly rejects—this time by a more than three to one margin—“a moment of silent meditation each day in the public schools”—a position endorsed by five to one in one recent national survey.

Although most American Jews are extremely sensitive to issues of church-state separation, many still believe in the social importance of religion. Our respondents split just about evenly when asked whether they agreed that “the decline of religion in American life has contributed to a decline in morality.” As one might expect, this statement won the assent of three quarters of the most observant respondents—but of less than a third of the less observant.

Civil Liberties for Extremists?

The long-standing reputation of American Jews as firmly in support of civil liberties is not supported by our study. A plurality of our respondents hold that “it’s good that the government protects the rights of very unpopular groups—like Ku Klux Klan, Nazis and Communists—to demonstrate publicly, but just about the same number agree with the reverse question—“It’s suicidal for a democracy to protect extremist groups who want to overthrow democracy.” In both cases, about one in eight respondents is unsure, and the balance are rather evenly split.

The questions were purposely designed to probe an issue on which Jews are, as we learned during the Skokie affair back in 1977, especially vulnerable. Other, less sensitive questions might have elicited a different pattern of response. Still, we have here an indication of the fragility of support for one aspect of First Amendment guarantees, and this from a group that is normally in the vanguard of defense of those rights. (As

Table 3. Opinions on foreign affairs

	Favor/ Agree	Oppose/ Disagree	Not Sure
Nuclear freeze with USSR	84	10	6
Be more forceful with USSR	29	55	17
Reagan accurate on “evil empire”	50	35	15
Reagan showed poor judgment	66	27	9
Use of U.S. military force if:			
USSR invades Western Europe	56	19	26
Arabs cut off oil to U.S.	38	37	25
Build more nuclear power plants	31	48	22
Go nuclear to lessen energy dependence	38	42	20
Cut military spending	59	27	14
Maintain strong military in order to back Israel	61	24	15
U.S. should leave U.N.	21	69	9

expected, the differences here between the better educated and the less well-educated respondents is on the order of 30-40 percentage points, and large differences also separate the religiously non-observant from the religiously observant.)

Foreign Policy: Détente

We asked several questions regarding American policy towards the Soviet Union. Where we could make comparisons to other recent studies of the larger public, we found the Jews more “dovish” or “détentish.” Thus, Americans in general support a nuclear freeze (Gallup, May 1983) by a margin of 70 to 21 percent, but, as we see in Table 3, among Jews the endorsement is still more lopsided—84 to 10.

Again, we find here a capacity to distinguish between private perspective and public policy. While our respondents disagree by 55 to 29 percent with the statement that “the U.S. should be more forceful . . . with the USSR even if it increases the risk of war,” 50 percent also agree that President Reagan “was basically accurate” when he termed the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” (One third disagreed, and 15 percent were undecided.) That question was followed by, “Whether or not President Reagan was factually correct, he displayed poor judgment in calling the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire.’” Here, two-thirds agree that the President exercised poor judgment, and

only a quarter disagree.

In general, women are about seven to ten percentage points more “dovish” on most foreign policy questions than are men; the more educated are also more dovish; so also are the less religiously observant and the younger (under 40) respondents.

When we cross-classify the responses to the two “evil empire” questions, we find three major response categories. The first, which includes a little more than a third of our sample, are “pure” doves: They deny that Reagan was accurate in calling the USSR an “evil empire,” and they also believe it was poor judgment to do so. At the other extreme are the 22 percent who are “pure” hawks. These believe the USSR is an evil empire, and that the President was right to say so. Finally, more than a third of our respondents fall into a middle category—détentists, perhaps?—who agree that the USSR is an evil empire, but think the President was imprudent to say so.

There appear to be many more doves than hawks among American Jews. Depending on the question, hawkish policy positions (against a nuclear freeze, for more forcefulness, for denouncing the Soviet Union) muster the support of only between 10 and 29 percent of our respondents. In each case, the dovish position (for the freeze, 84 percent; against more forcefulness, 55 percent; against the President calling the USSR an evil empire, 66 percent) garners far greater

support, and, where comparisons are possible, more support than among the American public at large.

We also asked respondents whether they would support "the use of U.S. military force" under two sets of circumstances. "If Soviet troops invaded Western Europe," a bare majority favor the use of force, almost a fifth oppose it, and over a quarter are "not sure." In the less threatening circumstance that "the Arabs cut off oil shipments to the U.S.," the sample is even more reluctant to support the use of force—38 percent for, 37 percent against.

In both instances, men live up to their reputation as the more hawkish sex; they are about 20 points more likely to support the use of force than are women.

No to Nuclear Plants

For several years, public support for nuclear power plants in the United States has been diminishing. Recent polls show that more people oppose than support the building of more such plants.

There has been some effort to mobilize Jewish opinion on this question, based on the argument that it would be "good for the Jews" if America were less dependent on Arab oil. Accordingly, we asked respondents whether they favored "building more nuclear power plants in the U.S." Less than a third favor such a policy; almost half oppose it; and about a fifth are not sure.

At a different point in the questionnaire, we changed the wording, asking whether "the U.S. should build more nuclear power plants so as to lessen dependence on the Arabs' oil." The change in wording resulted in a net shift of only five or six percentage points, with opponents still outnumbering proponents, this time by 42 to 38 percent. So much, then, for the argument that Jewish attitudes towards general public policy questions are wholly derived from an assessment of what is seen as in Israel's best interests. (At the same time, the Jewishly more involved respondents did react more forcefully to the change in wording, opening up a gap of about 10 points between themselves and the less involved.) In short, Jewish com-

mitments to particular liberal policy positions remain, generally, intact, even in the face of quite direct appeals to Jewish group interests. (We saw this earlier in connection with the two questions on tuition tax credits.)

Less Spending, But a Strong Military for Israel

Most American Jews hold two different sorts of political commitments. On the one hand, their general political tendencies are liberal-moderate. At the same time, as last year's NSAJ convincingly demonstrated, the overwhelming majority care very deeply about Israel's security, and most are nervous about the reliability of U.S. support for Israel.

Both pro-Israel conservatives and anti-Israel liberals have argued that pro-Israel, liberal Jews who oppose U.S. interventionism abroad are inconsistent. The conservatives would have the Jews support increased military spending and a more interventionist foreign policy; the liberals argue that concern for Israel's security has made Jews less reliable allies in the anti-military liberal coalition.

We asked two questions that are relevant to this controversy. "To help reduce deficits and relieve world tensions, U.S. military spending should be cut" was followed by, "In order to be a reliable military supplier of Israel, the U.S. should retain a strong military capacity." The results were virtually identical: About three-fifths of our respondents agreed with both statements, about a quarter disagreed and about one in seven were "not sure." (By contrast, only about a quarter of Americans in recent national surveys endorsed defense cutbacks. Thus, at least twice as many Jews as other Americans want military spending reductions. Note, however, that our question was worded so as to elicit maximal support for reductions.)

Upon cross-classification, we find about 28 percent "pure" doves, people who support cuts in military spending and who do not endorse a strong military capacity; at the other extreme, an essentially equal number (27 percent) emerge as "pure" hawks, opposing (or unsure on) spending cuts, supporting a strong military. The

plurality, however—about 40 percent—take a kind of neo-liberal position, supporting cuts in spending but, at the same time, endorsing a strong military.

Jews and Others

Which groups in America do our respondents see as hostile to Jews? We presented respondents with a list of groups, and asked, "What proportion of each of the following groups in the U.S. is anti-Semitic?" (See "Selected Excerpts," page 41.)

We notice immediately that the Jewish perception is that blacks are more anti-Semitic than any other of the listed groups. Fifty-four percent of our respondents believe that many or most blacks are anti-Semitic, making blacks the only group so identified by a majority of respondents. But there are others that do not lag very far behind; 46 percent of our respondents think many or most fundamentalist Protestants are anti-Semitic, 44 percent think that of big business, 42 percent of mainstream Protestants, 40 percent of Catholics, and 40 and 39 percent of the State Department and Pentagon respectively.

In short, Jews perceive anti-Semitism as a widespread phenomenon—and find it considerably more prevalent on the right than on the left, at least in America. Thus, only seven percent of our respondents think many or most liberals are anti-Semitic, while 35 percent think that of conservatives; six percent think that of Democrats, but 29 percent of Republicans. In other words, five times as many Jews perceive anti-Semitism as common among conservatives and Republicans than see it as common among liberals or Democrats. Indeed, liberals and Democrats were the only groups we mentioned of whom many respondents were prepared to say that only "few" of them were anti-Semitic. (Forty-seven percent of our respondents said that of liberals, 36 percent of Democrats.) The discrepancy between perception of big business and union leaders is not quite so great, but is in the same direction, a two-to-one advantage for union leaders.

Evidently, our respondents feel safer, or more comfortable, on the

Selected Excerpts from the 1984 National Survey of American Jews

	<i>Favor/ Agree</i>	<i>Oppose/ Disagree</i>	<i>Not Sure</i>
When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive	57	29	14
Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in return for credible guarantees of peace	43	37	20
If only because you can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel, Israel should maintain its rule over all of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)	44	33	22
The Jewish history of persecution has made Jews especially sensitive to the needs of minority groups	80	11	9
Parents of children in Jewish day schools should receive tuition tax credits	30	61	9

<i>Is your impression of each of the following generally</i>	<i>Favorable</i>	<i>Unfavorable</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>No Impression</i>
ACLU	42	13	24	22
NAACP	54	12	28	6
Moral Majority	7	69	14	10
NOW	41	11	20	28
AIPAC	16	3	4	77
Rabbis	60	3	23	14
UJA	74	4	16	7
Hasidim	29	16	44	11
JDL	24	41	27	8

<i>In your opinion, what proportion of each of the following groups in the U.S. is anti-Semitic?</i>	<i>Most</i>	<i>Many</i>	<i>Some</i>	<i>Few</i>	<i>Not Sure</i>
Big business	11	33	40	10	7
Union leaders	6	17	43	20	14
Hispanics	8	22	37	14	19
Blacks	17	37	32	7	6
Democrats	1	5	48	36	10
Republicans	4	25	48	13	10
Liberals	2	5	34	47	13
Conservatives	7	28	42	12	12
Catholics	11	29	42	10	8
Mainstream Protestants	11	31	40	9	10
Fundamentalist Protestants	19	27	28	6	20
State Department	13	27	35	12	13
Pentagon	12	27	37	10	14
Media	4	14	45	27	9
Police	3	16	48	20	13

left. Whether that is because so many of them define themselves as on the left, or whether they so define themselves because that is where they are most comfortable, we cannot say.

Concerning the specific issue of blacks, we find considerable complexity. For while it is true that blacks are perceived as more anti-Semitic than any other group we listed, and that 74 percent of our respondents think Jesse Jackson is anti-Semitic, it is also true that 54 percent have a favorable view of the NAACP, compared to only 12 percent who have an unfavorable view. Indeed, as we see in the table ("Selected Excerpts"), of the four non-Jewish groups on which we solicited a "favorable-unfavorable" opinion—the ACLU, NOW, the NAACP and the Moral Majority—the NAACP is the most favorably viewed.

Liberalism and Judaism

A number of questions dealt with the Jewish involvement of our respondents. Specifically, we asked about attendance at a Passover seder (86 percent attend); attendance at Yom Kippur services (68 percent do); attendance at Sabbath services once a month or more (24 percent do); use of separate dishes for meat and dairy products (20 percent do); and having a Christmas tree at home (12 percent do). Fifty-five percent report synagogue membership, 48 percent membership in a non-synagogue Jewish organization. Seven percent call themselves Orthodox, 32 percent Conservative, 23 percent Reform, two percent Reconstructionist and 37 percent "just Jewish." Finally, 56 percent report that of their three closest friends, all are Jewish, while 22 percent report that two are Jewish, 15 percent that one is, and eight percent report that none of the three is Jewish. Twenty percent tell us that of the three people they are closest to at work, all are Jewish, 21 percent that two of the three are Jewish, 27 percent that one is and 32 percent that none of the three is Jewish. Forty-two percent report that all three of the people in their neighborhood with whom they are closest are Jewish, 16 percent that two of the three are, another 16 percent that one is and 27 percent that

none is.

The question we then sought to answer was whether there is any relationship between the answers to these questions and the political dispositions of our respondents. One might, for example, argue that the more religiously observant would be likely to be more politically conservative. On the other hand, one might imagine that greater involvement with so liberal a community as the Jews would act as a spur to political liberalism.

In a sense, both these arguments are supported by the data. Jewish liberalism does, indeed, increase as Jewish involvement declines. But when we reach the extreme of non-involvement, we encounter less liberalism than we find among those with some involvement.

Specifically, 15 percent of those who practice at least two of the four religious rituals we included take liberal positions on the 29 questions that measure liberal vs. conservative opinions—as compared to 50 percent of those who practice only one of the four specified rituals. At the other end of the political spectrum, the same relationship holds: Among the more observant groups, more than 20 percent hold conservative views, while 10 percent or fewer of the less observant do. (Note, however, that just about as many of the more observant call themselves liberals and identify as Democrats, even though their attitudes on specific policy questions are in fact conservative.)

Similarly, when we add up the number of close friends and neighbors who are Jewish, we find that those with five or six (the maximum) are generally less liberal on the issues. But those with no Jewish friends or neighbors are not the most liberal; they turn out, instead, to be more liberal than those at the other end, but less liberal than those with one or two Jewish friends.

It seems, then, that those most likely to be liberal are those who are integrated into the larger society but who have not abandoned their group attachment and identity.

Conclusions?

Readers of diverse ideological orientations can all draw comfort from these data. Neo-conservatives can feel reassured that the Jews are hardly a knee-jerk liberal group, responding reflexively and monolithically to the standard slogans of liberalism. On capital punishment, on free speech, on readiness to trust other groups, on a strong defense, on a host of other issues, there is respectable Jewish support for the conservative position. Neo-liberals may take pleasure in the readiness of Jews to distinguish between liberal sentiment and public policy, to take a skeptical view of the efficacy of certain programs that, for all the good will they bespeak, don't seem to work too well.

Most of all, however, our data should serve to reassure those who have been concerned that American Jews may have abandoned their liberal commitments. For most Jews, those commitments remain intact, and there is no compelling evidence that the changes we do witness are symptoms of a major shift in Jewish thinking. Their scope and size suggest, instead, that they reflect the kind of periodic adjustment that any alert constituency will, from time to time, undertake. ★

Copies of the full report of the National Survey of American Jews are available for \$3.50 from the Publications Department, American Jewish Committee, 165 E. 56th St., New York, NY 10022.