

THE WILLIAM PETSCHKEK  
NATIONAL JEWISH FAMILY CENTER

**ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES  
IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY**

**Singles, Single Parents,  
Childless Couples, and  
Mixed-Marrieds**

Steven M. Cohen



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The William Petschkek National Jewish Family Center was created by the American Jewish Committee in 1979 as an expression of its commitment to the family as the indispensable social institution for maintaining and enhancing Jewish identity, communal stability, and human fulfillment. Its goal is to promote research on family problems, help clarify family values, and stimulate the development of innovative programs to help meet the needs of parents, would-be parents, and their children. It also strives to encourage an awareness and responsiveness to those needs in the Jewish and general communities.

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Steven M. Cohen

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## FOREWORD

In recent years the Jewish community has expressed mounting concern about the growth of alternative family structures and constellations. Although most Jews continue to marry at some point in their lives and to have one or more children, many are passing through prolonged periods of singlehood and voluntary childlessness. Jews who do marry enjoy a divorce deficit relative to the non-Jewish population, but the numbers of failed marriages and single-parent homes have been increasing in absolute terms. Most importantly, intermarriage without the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse has become an increasingly legitimate option for almost a third of American Jewry.

The Jewish community is worried about these subpopulations for two reasons: First, each represents a departure from traditional Jewish norms, which define family in terms of marriage and children. The Jewish community, of course, always reached out to and accommodated those who pursued alternative living patterns whether out of choice or necessity. However, it simultaneously upheld marriage and parenting as vehicles both of self-fulfillment and of preserving Jewish continuity. The increasing numbers of Jews found in alternative family constellations threaten to undermine traditional ideals and replace them with a family value system in which all alternatives become equally valid.

Second, on a pragmatic level, Jewish communal affiliation has been heavily correlated with married couples who have children. Conversely, Jews living in alternative family settings manifest declining rates of participation in communal activities, thereby threatening future Jewish continuity.

Given these communal concerns, the American Jewish Committee's William Petschek National Jewish Family Center commissioned Steven M. Cohen to develop a portrait of contemporary Jews living in alternative families, utilizing the population studies of seven Jewish communities reflective of 3 million Jews, or over half of America's Jewish population. To be sure, the report does not reflect western Jewish communities, particularly Los Angeles, where rates of communal affiliation and participation are even lower than those described here, and therefore far more disturbing to communal leaders than the data for eastern Jewish communities.

Many of Cohen's findings sound familiar; others are surprising. Jews continue to marry in overwhelming numbers. The change lies in the later age of marriage, which may lead to decreased fertility. Moreover, since communal affiliation correlates so closely with the presence of children in the home, prolonged periods of singlehood and/or childlessness may create patterns of nonaffiliation that might prove unbreakable.

An even greater concern are the large numbers of mixed-marrieds, who participate even less than do singles in organized Jewish life. Surprisingly, Cohen here refutes the conventional wisdom that higher education means greater intermarriage. Those who pursue graduate degrees are actually less likely than others to find themselves in mixed marriages, probably because the heavy concentration of Jews in elite graduate programs increases the opportunities for endogamous Jewish marriages.

Similarly, Cohen refutes the popular perception that Jewish women with children are most likely to be pursuing full-time occupations and professions. One quarter of Jewish women with children are indeed working full time, but as many are engaged in part-time employment, and 50 percent prefer to stay out of the work force entirely until their children are older. Conversely, the single Jewish mother is twice as likely to work full time than is her married counterpart.

Finally, Cohen underscores how strongly Orthodox Jews have been preserving traditional family patterns. Orthodox Jews tend to marry early, have three or more children, and are the least likely to experience marital breakup. In New York City, children of Orthodox parents reported virtually no incidence of intermarriage. Of particular significance in this respect is the low incidence of intermarriage among alumni of Jewish day schools. Conversely, those with no Jewish education were the most likely to marry non-Jews. To be sure, Jewish day schools are serving children of the most committed homes and therefore have a built-in advantage in terms of countering intermarriage. Nevertheless, Cohen's findings should challenge those who perceive the reality of intermarriage as so overpowering that nothing can be done to counteract it. The value of day schools to the community ought to be especially recognized at a time when the cost of quality day-school education may be outstripping the ability of middle-class parents to pay for it.

Cohen discusses the demonstrated effectiveness of trips to Israel in building and maintaining Jewish identity. The Orthodox, as is well known, visit Israel more often and in proportionately greater numbers than do other Jews, although such visits are not required by their ideology. They are, in fact, desirable for all American Jews, irrespective of religious affiliation. An extended period spent in Israel might well be made a vital component of every teenager's Jewish education.

Cohen's analysis of his data suggests several possible directions for targeted and focused communal initiatives. Particular attention, for example, ought to be paid to the economic and psychological vulnerability of the single-parent home. Single parents express considerable desire to participate in communal programs since they often require Jewish communal services -- day care, for example. Such linkages to the Jewish community can serve as a powerful stabilizing force for children of divorce. However, single parents often face stiff economic barriers to utilizing communal services and may not be aware of the availability of scholarships and other forms of assistance. Communal policymakers ought to ensure the universal availability of services, especially to those who lack the means to pay their full cost.

Similarly, Cohen notes how policy might be targeted to well-educated Jewish women in their 30s, who are most at risk of never marrying. These women may be drawn to the Jewish community by cultural programs such as those pioneered in New York City by the 92nd Street YM-YWHA.

For working parents, the report highlights the need for surrogate child care. Public debate thus far has centered primarily on full-time day care. Given the preference of many married women for some part-time employment, the Jewish community ought to consider providing alternatives to full-time day care, including part-time child care and training of Jewish "nannies" for in-home child care. Moreover, the community should consider increasing the availability of part-time employment within Jewish communal organizations.

The report repeatedly underscores the success of Orthodox families and urges that attention be given to extending these models to non-Orthodox households. Orthodox families generally have three or more children, invest heavily in quality Jewish education, and enjoy very low rates of divorce. These facts should not be attributed to religious prohibitions against birth control and divorce, which are either minimal or nonexistent in traditional Judaism. Rather Orthodox successes testify to the close interrelationship between family and community. Strong families build strong Jewish communities. Conversely, vital Jewish communities create a public climate conducive to healthy family life. This latter aspect has been particularly evident in the case of the modern Orthodox Jewish experience in America -- a fact that should not be ignored by those who question how public norms can affect private behavior.

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## ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, rapid social change revolutionized the American family. More women entered the labor force and professions; young adults married later and postponed having children; and they divorced (and remarried) more often. As a result, many Americans were spending smaller fractions of their lives in families consisting of married couples with children.

Not surprisingly, these changes affected Jews as well, with significant, largely adverse, consequences for the Jewish involvement of families. Like Christians, Jews' involvement in Jewish activities is highest in conventional two-parents-plus-children families (Nash and Berger 1962; Nash 1968; Sklare and Greenblum 1979; Cohen 1983, 1988). Married parents with school-age children exhibit the highest rates of religious observance and communal affiliation.

The several years around 1970 saw dramatic increases in the number of unconventional or alternative families among Jewish young adults: singles, childless couples, intermarrieds, and single parents. Such alternative families participate less frequently in Jewish life than do conventional families.

In an analysis of changes in Boston Jewry between 1965 and 1975 (*American Modernity and Jewish Identity*, 1983), I concluded that almost all the declines in measures of Jewish involvement during the ten-year period could be attributed to the rise of alternative families. Two processes were operating. First, there were many more singles, single parents, childless couples, and intermarrieds in 1975 than there were in 1965. The proportion of conventional families -- the type given to higher levels of Jewish involvement -- had declined, causing some of the declines in several measures of Jewish activity.

But there was another process at work as well. Not only were there more alternative families but, by 1975, these sorts of families had grown more distant from Jewish life than their counterparts in 1965. Since the conventional families' Jewish-involvement levels had held constant, the gap in Jewish involvement between the Jewishly stable conventional families and the Jewishly declining alternatives widened considerably between 1965 and 1975.

In the 1970s, professional and volunteer leaders of organized Jewry came to recognize the challenges to Jewish life posed by the expanding numbers of young adults in alternative family situations and their lack of involvement in things Jewish. With a fair measure of alarm, Jewish



agencies sponsored conferences, issued press releases, and launched community programs to address the problems they believed inherent in the growth of the young singles population, in declining birthrates, in expanding intermarriage, and in rising divorce.

Organizational leaders sought to enhance the Jewish involvement of Jews in alternative family statuses through programs of "containment" and "recruitment." Containment meant efforts to curtail the growth of singlehood, childlessness (or postponed or reduced childbearing), intermarriage, and divorce. Recruitment endeavors took a different tack, accepting the existence of large numbers of alternative-family Jews but trying to increase their involvement in conventional Jewish life. Among such "outreach" initiatives were special programs for Jewish singles, mixed-marrieds, and single parents.

Today, the search for ways to contain the number of alternative families and for ways to bring them into Jewish life continues. Unfortunately, there has been little social-scientific study of young Jewish adults in conventional and alternative family configurations. This paper addresses that gap in our knowledge. By analyzing data collected recently in seven major Jewish communities, it provides some basic information on the family patterns of Jewish young adults and their implications for Jewish involvement.

The analysis first focuses on rates -- that is, the frequency in various sex and age groups -- of singlehood, divorce, and intermarriage. It then proceeds to examine how parents' religiosity and education may have affected these rates. Finally, the heart of the analysis asks how marriage, childbearing, divorce, and intermarriage affect each of numerous sorts of Jewish religious and communal activities. By identifying the patterns of Jewish identity change over the course of the family life cycle, policymakers can better appreciate the dimensions of the challenge posed by Jews in alternative families. In addition, they may gain some idea of what sorts of policies and programs may enhance the Jewish involvement of young adults, particularly those in alternative families.

Jewish communal policymakers and the Jewish rank and file react differently to singlehood, childlessness, divorce, and intermarriage. Policymakers differ among themselves as to the validity and acceptability of each of these statuses; they also tend to assign greater or lesser degrees of "blame" or merit to those who happen to be, or choose to be, single or childless or divorced or intermarried. This analysis makes neither normative judgments, explicit or implied, as to the worthiness of these statuses, nor any assumptions about how individuals come to occupy them. As a group, the four statuses simply represent the most frequently observed departures from the conventional Jewish family.

#### THE DATA: JEWISH POPULATION STUDIES FROM SEVEN METROPOLITAN AREAS

The data for this study, provided by the North American Jewish Data Bank, were derived from population studies sponsored by local Jewish federations in seven metropolitan areas: New York (1981), Chicago (1982), Cleveland (1981), Miami (1982), Washington (1983), Philadelphia (1984), and Boston (1985). About 3 million Jews were living in these areas, over half the total American Jewish population (estimated at 5.8 million in the 1986 *American Jewish Year Book*). In all, these surveys comprised 10,306 respondents, of whom 2,937 were in the 25-39 age range.

The seven surveys are not completely representative of American Jewry, being confined to Jewish communities east of the Mississippi. While these encompass the vast majority of American Jews, Jews from smaller and western communities are not represented in the data. With its 600,000 Jews, the Los Angeles metropolitan area is the most notable omission.

The analysis is restricted to those 25-39 years old for several reasons. Survey data of adults under 25 are particularly unreliable. Many of these youngest adults live in temporary housing, on campuses, or with their parents, and are typically undersampled by telephone interviewers. And since this inquiry focuses upon the younger generation of American Jews and how their family choices affect their Jewish involvement, extending the analysis to those older than 39 would have diluted this aim.

The analysis often distinguishes between the New York area and elsewhere. Since the New York area contains more Jews than the other six cities combined, failure to separate out New York would have generated results that reflect a disproportionate New York influence. For the most part, though, the important substantive conclusions are the same for New York as for other communities.

WOMEN MARRY EARLIER THAN MEN;  
ALMOST ALL JEWS EVENTUALLY MARRY;  
DIVORCE RATES CLIMB WITH AGE

Among Jews 25-39 years old, about a third of the men and a slightly smaller proportion of the women were single (table 1). "Single" embraces all the currently unmarried -- that is, the never-married as well as the divorced and widowed. About a quarter of the men and a fifth of the women had never married.

As one might expect, the rates of both singlehood and never-married varied considerably with age. Among those 25-29, about half the men but only about a third of the women had never married. But by the late 30s, the proportion of never-married men and women had dropped to about 10 percent. (If roughly 10 percent of those 35-39 were never-married, it is reasonable to conclude that more than 10 percent of the 35-36-year-olds and fewer than 10 percent of the 38-39-year-olds were never married.)

These results suggest two things: first, women marry earlier than men; second, almost all Jews (well over 90 percent) get married at some time. Although almost all Jews marry by the beginning of middle age, increases in divorces leave large numbers of Jews under 40 single. That is, as age increases, rates of singlehood decline, but they decline neither as rapidly nor as deeply as do the proportions who never married. Among those in their late 30s, about a quarter of men and women (both in New York and elsewhere) were single. As age increases, the chances of having been married at least once go up, but so do the chances of having experienced a divorce. By the time they reach their late 30s, about a fifth to a quarter of those ever-married have been divorced (of whom some have remarried).

These trends in marriage and divorce mean that the reason for singlehood changes over the years. Among those 25-29, almost all singles are never-married; among those ten years older (35-39), about two-thirds of the singles have been married before, have been divorced, and have not yet remarried.

Although the vast majority of the currently unmarried will eventually marry, there is no escaping the fact that the median age at marriage is probably higher now than it has been at any time since the end of World War II. And it is the later age of marriage that has sparked concern, if not alarm, among parents who worry that their children may never marry and Jewish policymakers who worry about the effect of delayed marriage on the size of the Jewish population.

THE MORE RELIGIOUSLY TRADITIONAL MARRY EARLIER  
AND DIVORCE LESS OFTEN

In general, Americans who are more religiously involved display what may be called more traditional family characteristics. They marry younger, more frequently within their group, have more children, and divorce less often.

Among Jews, traditionalism (sometimes measured by religious-service attendance, sometimes by observance, and sometimes by movement affiliation) has been linked to higher fertility, lower intermarriage, and lower divorce rates (Broadbar-Nemzer 1984, 1986; Cohen and Ritterband 1981; DellaPergola 1980; Goldscheider 1973; Cohen 1988; Massarik and Chenkin 1973; Sherrow 1971; Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983.)

One question that the literature on Jewish traditionalism and family patterns leaves unresolved is whether the repeated and clear differences between the Orthodox and the other Jewish denominations are to be found between the less traditional denominations. Simply put, while we know that the Orthodox have more traditional family patterns than the non-Orthodox, we do not know whether those raised in Conservative homes display more traditional family patterns than those raised in Reform homes and whether the Reform, in turn, have more traditional family patterns than those raised by nondenominational parents.

To address these questions, table 2 presents the percentages of single, never-married, and ever-divorced (of those ever-married) by parents' denomination, broken down into age and sex groupings. For the most part (and there are indeed exceptions), the results support the idea that the Orthodox do indeed have more conventional (or traditional) family patterns than the non-Orthodox. With less consistency, they provide limited support for the idea that those from Conservative backgrounds exhibit more traditional family patterns than do Reform Jews. (It should be emphasized that the table examines parents' and not respondents' denomination; presumably, the association between conventional family patterns and one's own denomination are stronger than those involving parents' affiliation.)

The table contains six age/sex groupings, providing six comparisons between Orthodox and non-Orthodox respondents. In four of these, the Orthodox married more often than those in all the other denominations. The two exceptions to this generalization occur among the youngest men (who have the lowest ever-married rates) and the oldest women (who have the highest ever-married frequencies). Moreover, among the oldest men, almost as many of those from Conservative homes had been married as those from Orthodox homes. It appears that the Orthodox "advantage" in marrying early takes effect only when substantial numbers of a particular age-and-sex group start getting married, and it evaporates when almost all members of the group have had the chance to marry. In other words, the Orthodox marry earlier but, in time, they probably do not marry more often than the non-Orthodox.

Those brought up Orthodox also divorce less frequently. Orthodox-raised respondents who had been married at least once were considerably less likely than non-Orthodox of the same age and gender to have experienced divorce. This gap is all the more impressive when we recall that the most traditional tend to marry earlier. Thus, for any given age group, the Orthodox have been at risk of divorce far longer than have the non-Orthodox. Clearly, family traditionalism extends to a lower probability of divorce as well as a greater probability of early marriage.

Are the Orthodox/non-Orthodox differences replicated in parallel differences between Conservative and less traditional Jews? While the comparisons between offspring of Conservative and Reform parents yield more ambiguous and less consistent results, they do point in the direction of greater family traditionalism among the children of Conservative parents. Within age/sex

groupings, rates of never-married for Reform offspring either exceed or match those of respondents raised in Conservative homes. These patterns suggest a somewhat earlier timing of marriage among children of Conservative parents. In the six comparisons of divorce rates, three show the Reform children exceeding the Conservatives, two are the reverse, and one is a virtual tie. Over the entire age range (25-39), the children of Conservative families report less frequent divorce than those of Reform families. These results, a muddy picture at best, lend weak support to the idea that the relationship between religious traditionalism and family traditionalism extends beyond the Orthodox to the two other major denominations as well.

One possible policy implication to be drawn from these findings is that singles programs should be devised to appeal to non-Orthodox adults. The far lower rates of singlehood among younger Orthodox Jews suggests that the Orthodox are generally successful in finding eligible and compatible mates. The "problem" of singlehood, then, is largely limited to the non-Orthodox 90 percent of American Jewry. If so, then insofar as singles programs have a denominational slant, it may be wise to direct limited funds and resources to programs under Conservative, Reform, or non-denominational auspices such as the Jewish community center.

The other implication to emerge from these findings is to focus on the familism of the Orthodox. In terms not only of early marriage and low divorce rates but also (as we shall see) of low intermarriage rates and higher birthrates (reported in other studies), the Orthodox exhibit family patterns that Jewish communal policymakers tend to applaud. We may want to ask what it is about the Orthodox that leads to such ostensibly positive family patterns. Can, and should, Orthodox familism be emulated by or "exported" to non-Orthodox Jews? How do the Orthodox succeed in promoting marriage, in-marriage, stable marriage, and higher birthrates?

DAY SCHOOL ALUMNI:  
EARLIER MARRIAGE, LESS DIVORCE

As one might expect, the family differences between the Orthodox and the others resemble those found between graduates of full-time Jewish schools and those with other sorts of childhood Jewish schooling. That is, for the most part, day-school and yeshiva alumni reported far earlier marriage and far less divorce than did others (table 3). To take one example, among women 30-34 years old, just 8 percent of the day-school alumnae were single compared to over a quarter of the afternoon-school and Sunday-school graduates; similarly, only 7 percent of ever-married day-school alumnae had experienced divorces, a rate less than half as large as that found among those with other Jewish-school backgrounds. However, the relationship between Jewish educational intensiveness and family traditionalism does not extend to other forms of Jewish schooling. That is, there is no clear pattern of differences in timing of marriage or frequency of divorce distinguishing those with afternoon-school, Sunday-school, or no Jewish education.

The traditionalist marriage and divorce patterns among the full-time alumni ought not be seen as necessarily reflecting the effects of full-time Jewish schooling per se. Rather, as the research literature on a variety of outcomes documents, what at first blush appears to be a sizable impact of yeshiva and day-school training is, in fact, attributable to parents' religiosity (Cohen 1974, 1988; Bock 1976; Himmelfarb 1974, 1977). Day-school and yeshiva graduates often appear different later in life largely because their parents were highly observant. Day-school students are a self-selecting group. Applying this reasoning to the present case, the traditional family pattern of alumni of full-time Jewish schools probably owes more to the traditionalism of their upbringing (i.e., their parents) than to the educational impact of attendance at a yeshiva or day school. These results do, however, confirm the inference that traditional upbringing leads to traditional adult family patterns.

THE IMPACT OF HIGHER EDUCATION: MUCH LATER  
MARRIAGE FOR THE MOST EDUCATED WOMEN

American women with higher levels of education tend to marry later. Since the demands of building a family still fall more heavily upon the wife/mother than upon the husband/father, professional women probably (correctly) see marriage and childbearing as conflicting with their careers, especially in the early stages. Education may also impede women's chances of marrying young in another way. Men seem to marry "down," that is, they marry women no more educated than they are; on the other hand, most women marry "up," that is, they marry men as educated or more educated than they are. To the extent this pattern is widespread, the higher a woman's education, the smaller is the pool of men who are educationally suitable marriage partners.

Table 4 reveals the very strong adverse impact of Jewish women's educational status upon their likelihood of ever having been married. No such relationship exists for the men. Neither does there seem to be any consistent relationship between education and the probability of divorce, for either men or women.

The relationship between women's education and their chances of marrying is apparent at all age levels. Taking the 30-34-year-olds as one example, we find that only 6 percent of women with some college were never married, as were 12 percent of those with a B.A. degree, 24 percent of those with a low-status master's degree (e.g., M.A. or M.S.W.), and an astounding 43 percent of those with a high-status graduate degree (e.g., Ph.D., M.D., M.B.A., law degree, etc.). Even at age 35-39, the differences were pronounced: of women with a B.A., 9 percent were never married; of those with a high-status graduate degree, 21 percent had never married. In all three age groups, more women with high-status graduate degrees were unmarried than were those with just college degrees.

Moreover, the prospects of well-educated single women finding equally educated Jewish men to marry are quite slim. Among Jews aged 30-39 with a high-status graduate degree, women were single twice as often as men. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these single, highly educated Jewish women in their late 30s are either quite anxious about their prospects of getting married or else resigned to the probability of never marrying.

Whether the goal is to decrease singlehood among Jewish young adults, or to increase the involvement of single Jews in Jewish life, the highly educated single woman in her 30s ought to concern Jewish policymakers. Of course, synagogues, federations, and Jewish community centers are not in a position to restrict singles' programs to holders of high-status graduate degrees aged 30 and over. But they are able to target certain industries or professions in their recruitment and advertising. Moreover, they can plan programs that will appeal to the highly educated. Travel programs are one example, as are lectures conducted at a fairly sophisticated level.

MIXED MARRIAGE: LOWER IN NEW YORK,  
HIGHER AMONG MEN, STABLE OVER TIME

Since the late 1960s, intermarriage has been a central concern of Jewish communal leaders. But despite widespread interest in the topic, social-scientific investigation of the phenomenon has been fairly limited. We still are not quite certain about the rates of Jewish-gentile intermarriage, how and why they vary across communities or for different categories of Jews, or what are its consequences for the individuals' Jewish involvement, for the Jewish community, and for Jewish population size. On these issues, the research literature, sparse as it is, contains a good measure of inconsistent if not downright contradictory pieces of evidence and interpretations (Sherrow 1971; Farber and Gordon 1982; Mayer and Sheingold 1979; Mayer 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Cohen 1980, 1988; Lazerwitz 1980, 1981; Goldscheider 1986).

This report's limited analysis cannot definitively answer the many pressing questions regarding intermarriage. But neither can it ignore the topic entirely. Rather, the meager evidence available from the seven-city data set should be seen as a small contribution to our very limited collective understanding of Jewish-gentile marriage.

To some readers, the rates of mixed marriage reported here may seem lower than expected. Aside from the sampling problems described in the Appendix, one reason for this is the geographic location of the seven surveys. Much of the "headlines" associated with intermarriage rates have come from studies of communities with unusually high rates, places of relatively newer Jewish settlement west of the Mississippi. In contrast, the New York and Miami studies (two of the seven used here) reported the lowest rates of intermarriage of any recent major Jewish population study. The other five surveys were conducted in communities with well-established Jewish populations where Jewish density exceeds that found in the West or in newer areas of settlement.

The rates reported below may seem low for another reason. Intermarriage rates may be reported in four different ways. They may be computed either for couples or for individuals; and they may be based on religion before marriage (such as at time of birth or in childhood) or after marriage (when conversion may have already taken place). Couple rates are always higher than individual rates, and rates calculated on the basis of current (postmarital) religion are lower than those based on premarital religion.

To illustrate the difference between couple and individual rates, suppose that thirty Jews marry; ten marry non-Jews and the remaining twenty marry each other. These thirty Jews then would be involved in twenty marriages, ten of which would be intermarriages. In other words, the couple rate (proportion of couples with at least one Jew who are intermarried) would be 50 percent but the individual rate would be only 33 percent. The rates reported below are (the lower) individual rates (proportion of Jews intermarried); in contrast, most population studies report (the higher) couple rates.

Several previous studies have reported that about one-sixth of born-gentiles convert to Judaism after marriage to a Jew; the rate is about four to five times higher for gentile women than it is for gentile men (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983; Cohen 1988). A far smaller number of Jews (no study provides an accurate estimate) abandon their Jewish identity after marrying a non-Jew. As a result of these conversions, the outmarriage rate (computed on the basis of religion some time before marriage) is higher than the mixed-marriage rate (computed on the basis of religious identity of the marriage partners at the time of marriage). The rates below are the (lower) mixed-marriage rates.

The rates are confined to those who were married at the time of the survey. Since intermarried couples have a higher divorce rate, exclusion of the currently divorced yields a lower mixed-marriage rate than would otherwise be the case. Finally, the mixed-marriage rates reported below are computed on the basis of religion reported by the Jewish respondent. Some respondents might regard their spouses as Jewish, while the spouses themselves would report otherwise.

With these qualifications in mind, we can proceed to examine the rates of mixed marriage by location (New York area versus non-New York), gender, and age (table 5). The male mixed-marriage rate is about double the female rate; moreover, the rate outside New York is about double that found in the New York area. The rates vary little by age. Contrary to reports of rapidly rising intermarriage, among those 25-39 the younger respondents report rates that are almost identical with those of their elder counterparts.

Consistent with the foregoing, mixed-marriage rates are lowest among New York women (6 percent), highest among men outside New York (22 percent), and intermediate among New York men and women outside New York.

LESS MIXED MARRIAGE AMONG  
CHILDREN OF THE ORTHODOX

Religious Jews are less likely to marry gentiles (Sherrow 1971; Massarik and Chenkin 1973; Cohen 1988). One reason is that the more religiously traditional are more ethnically segregated; another is that they tend to be more deeply committed to Jewish continuity and involvement. Thus they are less likely than the more secular even to meet non-Jewish prospective marriage partners, and, should they do so, they are less likely to have an interest in pursuing intimate relationships with them. Moreover, in the event that a Jew and gentile do marry, the gentile is more likely to convert where the Jew is deeply committed to Judaism.

It therefore comes as no surprise to find (table 6) that the children of the Orthodox are the least likely to report marriage to non-Jews. In New York, mixed marriage among children of Orthodox parents is almost totally absent. Outside New York, only a small number of sons of the Orthodox report mixed marriages, but (inexplicably) a hefty proportion of daughters of Orthodox parents said their husbands were non-Jewish.

The higher rates of mixed marriage among the Orthodox outside New York than among those in New York suggests two differences between New York and other Jewish communities. First, the lesser Jewish density outside New York raises the chances of intermarriage among all Jews, even the Orthodox. Second, Orthodox self-identification outside New York connotes a less thoroughly traditional orientation than it does for the New York Orthodox. (A separate computer run -- data not shown -- demonstrated that the New York Orthodox were somewhat more ritually observant than their counterparts outside New York.)

Within New York, aside from the Orthodox/non-Orthodox distinction, religious traditionalism had no consistent impact upon mixed marriage. But outside New York, among the men, the children of the nondenominational had the highest rates of mixed marriage, closely followed by the children of Reform parents, whose mixed-marriage rates vastly exceeded those of the offspring of Conservative Jews.

Apparently, the expected relationship between parental traditionalism and children's mixed marriage among the non-Orthodox emerges only when intermarriage is as frequent as it is among men outside New York. In New York, the opportunity to meet a highly educated white non-Jew is slimmer than elsewhere, even for the non-Orthodox. Outside New York (at least in the six major Jewish population studies under investigation), Jewish women did not out-marry with great frequency. But among the men outside New York, the intermarriage rates are high enough to allow the parents' denomination to exert a noticeable impact upon the likelihood of mixed marriage.

LESS MIXED MARRIAGE AMONG DAY-SCHOOL ALUMNI,  
MORE AMONG THOSE WITH NO JEWISH SCHOOLING

Consistent with the results presented just above, day-school and yeshiva alumni reported the lowest rates of mixed marriage (table 7). At the same time, those with no Jewish schooling generally reported the highest levels of mixed marriage. The results are particularly clear-cut for men outside New York, the group with the highest rate of mixed marriage. Among those with a full-time Jewish education, just 7 percent were mixed-married; of those with an afternoon- or Sunday-school education, the rate jumps threefold to 21 percent; and of those with no formal Jewish schooling, as many as 42 percent were married to non-Jewish wives.

As was noted earlier, Jewish schooling reflects the parents' commitment to their children's Jewish upbringing. The alumni of the most intensive forms of Jewish education were raised by the

most Jewishly intensive parents, while those who never received any formal Jewish schooling probably had the least Jewishly committed parents.

FOR SOME, HIGHER EDUCATION IS LINKED  
WITH LESS FREQUENT MIXED MARRIAGE

Historically, religious traditionalists -- Jewish and otherwise -- have viewed higher secular education with suspicion, often assuming that academic values undermine traditional religiosity. Science, rationality, universalism, and cultural relativism all appear to be in tension, if not in conflict, with the religious worldview. Among the Orthodox, anxiety about higher education has been so pronounced that major streams within Orthodoxy could be distinguished by the extent of their hostility toward higher learning in secular universities.

This traditional understanding of higher education leads one to expect a strong direct relationship between university attendance and the likelihood of marrying a non-Jew. By sabotaging commitment to traditional Judaism and by bringing the student into contact with large numbers of non-Jews, the university experience is supposed to promote marriage of Jews to gentiles.

The findings for New York, where mixed marriage is so uncommon, are ambiguous, and no conclusion can be drawn. However, in the six major cities outside New York, the results are precisely the reverse of what the traditional perspective would anticipate (table 8). Higher education is associated with lower rates of mixed marriage, and this association is stronger for men than for women. (Similar findings were reported for an analysis using a very different sort of sample in Cohen 1986a.)

Outside New York, among men who have never attended college, over 40 percent were mixed-married; of those who began but did not complete college, the rate dropped to 32 percent; of those with a B.A., just 18 percent were mixed-married; of those with a low-status M.A., the rate rose again to 27 percent; but the rate was lowest among those with a high-status graduate degree (16 percent). Among women, almost a third of those who never attended college were mixed-married; just 13 percent of those with some college (but no degree) reported a gentile husband; and of those with a B.A. or higher degree, between 5 percent and 9 percent were mixed-married. In other words, with some qualification, outside New York more education appears to lead to less intermarriage.

To understand these counterintuitive results, we need to recall that the vast majority of young adult Jews go to college; in this sample, 92 percent of the men and 86 percent of the women had at least some higher education. Moreover, Jews tend to concentrate in higher-quality four-year colleges and universities in cities and regions with larger Jewish populations.

Attending college and graduate school actually thrusts Jews into contact with one another and, it seems, improves their chances of meeting prospective Jewish marriage partners. Moreover, the Jew who fails to attend (and complete) college, especially a young man, is something of a "social deviant" within Jewish society, both in statistical and normative terms. (That is, Jewish college dropouts are both statistically rare and lacking in social status within the Jewish community.)

Higher education may diminish the chances of mixed marriage in yet another way. Sociologist Egon Mayer has speculated on the factors that affect the probability of the gentile -- particularly the woman -- converting to Judaism when an out-marriage is contemplated or has occurred. Mayer suggests that where the Jewish husband is of especially high social status and where the gentile wife is of especially low status, the chance that the wife will want to join the religious community of her husband and his family increases. Thus higher education may not only reduce the chances that Jews will meet and marry born-non-Jews; it may also improve the likelihood that the non-Jewish spouses



will convert. Obviously, either eventuality (marrying a Jew or marrying a gentile who converts) results in an "unmixed" or, in technical terms, an endogamous marriage.

#### EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

The employment patterns and incomes of Jews in different sorts of family configurations may have implications for those planning Jewish outreach programs for singles, marrieds, single parents, and other sorts of young-adult Jews.

No matter what their family status, the vast majority of young-adult men work full-time (table 9). The only significant deviation from this pattern occurs among single men, a notable minority of whom were working part-time, were students, or were unemployed at the time of the surveys.

As women change their family status, they experience far more variation in work status than men. While almost all men 25-39 were working full-time, fewer than half the women were so employed. Full-time employment was highest among single women and among married women with no children, although in both cases fewer worked at full-time jobs than did comparable men. In contrast, only about a quarter of married women with children were working full-time, and, among mothers married to Jewish husbands, another quarter were working in part-time jobs.

In sharp contrast with their married counterparts, most single mothers were working full-time and another quarter were working part-time. Thus not only are single mothers deprived of the emotional support and assistance in parenting often provided by a husband, but they are also compelled to work outside the home far more often than married mothers to support themselves and their children.

The financial pressures on the single mother are further illustrated in the figures for median household income (table 10). (These figures have not been adjusted for inflation, and so can provide only a very general understanding of income variation over the several family statuses. The New York figures, which have been separated from the combined figures for the other six cities, appear lower in part because the New York survey was one of the earliest conducted.) As might be expected, married couples reported higher incomes than did one-adult households. In the six cities outside New York, married couples reported earnings almost double that of their single counterparts (about \$42-45,000 versus \$20-30,000). Among the unmarried, single men earned more than single women (\$30,000 versus \$22,000), but single mothers earned even less (\$20,000) than single women without children at home. The New York area results show similar patterns: married couples, for the most part, earned the most; single men reported an intermediate level of income; and single women (with or without children) reported the lowest median income.

In terms of the Jewish income distribution, single mothers are as a group living in relative poverty. The large gaps in average income suggest that policymakers would not frequently err if they presumed that single mothers are financially hard pressed.

#### DENOMINATIONAL AFFILIATION

Denominational affiliation -- identifying as Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or something else -- generally indicates intensity of Jewish involvement. Many measures of Jewish activity are highest among the Orthodox, intermediate among Conservative Jews, low among the Reform, and even lower among the nondenominational (Cohen 1983).

In New York and elsewhere, the singles (never-married men and women, and single mothers)

most frequently declared themselves "nondenominational," choosing such options as "just Jewish" or "something else" in response to questions about their denominational identification (table 11). About a third of the singles outside New York and an even larger minority in New York provided such responses. In a sense, these responses testify to the unconnectedness to organized Jewry felt by many singles.

Both marriage and having children tend to reduce the proportions of nondenominational individuals. Among childless couples, nondenominational responses were offered by roughly a quarter of the respondents; among the married parents, the proportion was even lower, about one in six.

The transition from singlehood to marriage to parenthood is associated with an apparent marginal increase in the percentage of Reform Jews and a larger increase in the percentage of Conservative Jews. Among married parents, the percentage of Orthodox is especially high. Outside New York, about 8 percent of the in-married parents said they were Orthodox, as opposed to hardly any of those in the other family statuses. In New York, over a fifth of in-married parents identified as Orthodox, as opposed to very small percentages of the other family groups. As noted earlier, Orthodoxy promotes early marriage, in-marriage, and parenting, although, to some extent, the experiences of marriage and childbearing may prompt some formerly non-Orthodox to declare themselves Orthodox.

Variation in the levels of Conservative, Reform, and nondenominational Jews as the family life cycle unfolds suggests that marriage and parenting do spark changes in denominational identification. We cannot be sure, but the data suggest that marrying a Jew and having children cause some nondenominational Jews to think of themselves as Reform or Conservative, and some one-time Reform Jews to identify as Conservative.

As might be expected, the mixed-married display the least traditional denominational distributions. None of them claimed to be Orthodox; about half were nondenominational; and of those with a denominational preference, most chose Reform. Institutionally, Reform congregations are most welcoming of the mixed-married; moreover, the low religious-observance levels of many Reform Jews are closer to those of most mixed-married Jews than are those of the more traditional denominations.

If denomination can be seen as an indicator of Jewish intensiveness, then the mixed-married are the least affiliated or least Jewishly intensive. By this reasoning, somewhat more intensive are the three groups of single-adult households (single men, single women, and single mothers); next are those who were married but not yet parents; and finally, married couples with children are the most active in conventional Jewish life. These inferences are confirmed by the data on religious observance and communal affiliation.

#### THE IMPACT OF MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN ON RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

On almost all the religious-observance and communal-affiliation measures, the in-married had the highest rates of Jewish involvement and the mixed-married the lowest; singles and childless couples reported intermediate rates. While the ordering of the family groups may be almost always identical, the sizes of the gaps between one sort of family status and another differ for different measures of Jewish involvement. Even as marriage and childbearing promote almost all sorts of Jewish involvement, marriage seems to affect certain measures far more deeply than others.

Understanding just which sorts of Jewishness measures are most influenced by family-status

changes -- and which are least affected -- can help illuminate how the transitions from singlehood to married parenthood (and other transitions as well) affect the expression of Jewishness. In addition, such a focus can also tell us something about the character of different ways of expressing Jewish involvement. As we shall see, some religious observances or ways of affiliating with the Jewish community are particularly frequent among (and, presumably, meaningful to) people in conventional families.

We begin with religious observances and then examine a group of affiliation measures. It should be clear that the meaning of these items, to the respondents or to the analyst, is not always clear. While 90 percent of the respondents claimed to attend a Passover seder, the seders they attend vary considerably in traditional religious content and form, as well as in familial and social dimensions. While a third of the respondents claimed that Sabbath candles were lit in their homes, what their answers imply for the meaning they attribute to the Sabbath is unclear. For example, what sort of sense of obligation -- to God, to family, to Torah, and to the Jewish people -- do the Sabbath candle lighters bring to their act? What memories, what connotations, and what sentiments are aroused or symbolized by the lighting of Sabbath candles? These and other questions like them cannot be answered by the available survey data, although one could certainly imagine studies that would probe deeper into such matters. Here we can only claim that these items provide approximate indicators of some commitment or involvement in certain aspects of Jewish life, but we cannot expect or demand much precision about what these items signify.

We do know that the frequencies with which the religious observances are performed vary considerably. They vary across practices and they vary by family status (table 12). Most respondents reported performing four of the items: attending a Passover seder (90 percent); lighting Hanukkah candles (79 percent); fasting on Yom Kippur (66 percent); and having a mezuzah on the front door (63 percent). Only a third or less reported performing practices connected with *Shabbat* and *kashrut*: lighting Sabbath candles (34 percent); buying only kosher meat (28 percent); having separate sets of dishes for meat and dairy (23 percent); and following a strict Sabbath prohibition such as handling money or not riding (9 percent).

To get a clearer picture of how the several religious observances vary by family status, table 13 presents the results of a Multiple Classification Analysis that expresses the frequencies as deviations from the mean. To take an example, we may focus on the second column, top panel of table 13. The overall mean frequency of Hanukkah candle lighting is 79 percent. The figure for single men (-23) means that they lit Hanukkah candles 23 percent less frequently than the mean (79 percent - 23 percent = 56 percent), while those who were married parents (+16) lit them 16 percent more often than the mean (79 + 16 percent = 95 percent). This table, then, permits ready comparisons of the effects of the several family statuses upon the several observances.

To truly isolate the effect of family status, we need to control for other variables that may obscure or exaggerate its impact. For example, one reason married couples with children may score so high on certain observance variables is that so many of them had an Orthodox upbringing. The bottom panel, then, controls for several possibly confounding variables: parents' denomination, intensiveness of childhood Jewish schooling, city, and whether they had experienced a divorce. In other words, the bottom panel reports the differences in religious observance between one family status and another assuming that all the family status groups had the same distributions of parents' denomination, Jewish schooling, and so forth.

For three observances, approximately 30 percentage points separate the low frequencies among singles from the far higher rates among married parents. These items are: lighting Hanukkah candles, posting a mezuzah on the front door, and lighting Sabbath candles. Two items undergo a smaller but still substantial change: attending a Passover seder (which increases by about 15 percentage points in the passage from singlehood to married parenthood) and having a Christmas

tree (which declines by about 20 percentage points in the same transition). The four remaining items show a far smaller impact of family status: Yom Kippur fasting, having two sets of dishes, buying kosher meat, and strict observance of the Sabbath.

The larger changes in some practices over the course of the family life cycle are fairly understandable. For about a third of the population, it seems that certain observances take on meaning only in a conventional family context. Lighting Hanukkah candles is often undertaken by the entire family gathered around the menorah. Lighting Sabbath candles is traditionally associated with the woman of the house fulfilling her traditional roles as wife and mother. Affixing a mezuzah on one's door symbolizes a sense of domestic permanence, one apparently achieved particularly when one is married and even more so when one has children. Interestingly, these three practices are made much more frequent both by marriage and by the arrival of children.

Passover seder attendance may rise somewhat less than these other practices because seders are often intergenerational affairs. While single adults living on their own may feel little need to light Hanukkah or Sabbath candles, they can (and do) join their parents or other family members for an annual seder.

Some single Jews apparently enjoy having Christmas trees in their homes. But it seems that the phenomenon almost disappears with marriage to another Jew. (Of course, mixed marriage, especially with children present, is a vital spur to the erection of Christmas trees. Almost all mixed-married Jewish respondents with children home reported the presence of a Christmas tree.)

Of the four behaviors that undergo rather small changes in the transition from singlehood to parenthood, three reflect the most traditional dimension of Jewish ritual life: the two concerning *kashrut* and strict observance of the Sabbath. One reason their practice increases so little is that, for many who practice them, these activities flow from a deep commitment to Jewish tradition. In many cases, this commitment was developed in childhood and maintained even in the years of singlehood. Since some religious young-adult singles may never abandon *kashrut* or Sabbath observance, marriage and parenthood (for them) should have little impact on these practices.

Fasting on Yom Kippur is the only other practice where the singles' rates come close to those of their counterparts who are married with children. As on Passover, many young-adult singles spend Yom Kippur with their families where, it may be presumed, the expectation of fasting is more keenly felt than were they home alone. In addition, many American Jews in the statistical middle range of religious commitment conceive of Yom Kippur as the one holiday when they ought to make an all-out effort to link themselves to Jewish spirituality and tradition. The structure of meaning surrounding the Yom Kippur holiday may also provide a certain legitimation to its observance in isolation from close family. Although often observed by attending synagogue with hundreds of other worshippers, Yom Kippur emphasizes personal introspection and atonement.

Conventional imagery suggests that Western women, including Jewish women, are more disposed to religiosity than men. The results are inconsistent and ambiguous. Controlling for background variables, the single women do tend to outscore the single men on most, but not all ritual measures. In some cases, their lead is narrow and statistically insignificant. In short, the proposition that Jewish women are more religious than men finds limited support in the data, but the evidence is far from conclusive.

Do single mothers behave ritually more like single women or more like married parents? With respect to seder attendance, Hanukkah candle lighting, affixing the mezuzah, and rejecting the Christmas tree, the single mothers' rates of religious observance approximate the higher frequencies of married parents rather than the lower levels of single women. Their Sabbath candle lighting rate is intermediate between those of the two other groups. Factoring out their more nontraditional

Jewish upbringing, by and large, single mothers' religious observance more resembles that of married parents than it does that of single and childless women.

Last, we can focus on the mixed-married. How do their religious activities differ from those of the in-married, and how do those of the mixed-married without children differ from those who have children? While the mixed-married consistently report lower rates of religious observance, majorities did report at least attending Passover seders and lighting Hanukkah candles. About a third even fasted on Yom Kippur. However, hardly any of the mixed-married observed the Sabbath or *kashrut* in any way. The vast majority (especially when children are present) reported having Christmas trees in their homes.

Surprisingly, the mixed-married with children reported slightly lower rates of religious observance than those without children. One would think that, as with in-married parents, religious observance would rise with parenthood. Moreover, the presence of Christmas trees is higher among mixed-married parents than among childless mixed-married, while the celebration of Passover and Hanukkah is slightly lower. In other words, the mixed-married parents are "less Jewish" and "more Christian" than the childless mixed-married.

One explanation for this apparent anomaly is that the arrival of children may provoke some gentile spouses to convert to Judaism. As a result, the more Jewishly inclined households move from mixed marriage to in-marriage. Those who remain mixed-married even after parenthood, then, may simply be less Jewishly inclined than the initial group of intermarrieds.

#### THE POWERFUL IMPACT OF CHILDREN UPON COMMUNAL AFFILIATION

How do marriage and parenthood influence communal affiliation and activity? The communal activities found in the seven studies include religious-service attendance (a third claim to attend more often than the High Holidays), belonging to a synagogue (37 percent), belonging to another Jewish organization (31 percent), belonging to a Jewish community center (13 percent), having mostly Jewish close friends (83 percent), and having traveled at least once to Israel (31 percent).

The difference between singles and childless marrieds in rates of synagogue attendance and of organization membership (synagogues, organizations, and JCCs) is not all that great (tables 14 and 15). In other words, marriage alone does not seem to provoke any sharp and consistent increase in involvement in formal Jewish life.

However, consistent with the research literature on both Christians and Jews, the impact of parenthood is much more significant and widespread (Nash and Berger 1962; Nash 1968; Sklare and Greenblum 1979; Cohen 1983, 1988). Controlling for religious upbringing and other factors, we note the following jumps in affiliation rates between childless couples and married parents: synagogue attendance (19 percentage points); synagogue membership (33 points); and Jewish organization membership (19 points). While the gap in JCC membership is only eight percentage points, we ought to note that only 13 percent of the sample claimed JCC membership compared to about a third who had other affiliations. On a proportional basis, the eight-percentage-point difference between childless couples and parents is quite significant.

Formal organizational affiliation is far more affected by parenthood than by marriage alone, but the reverse is the case for the Jewish composition of one's closest friends. Overall, five respondents out of six (83 percent) reported that most of their closest friends were Jewish. However, the rate is about twelve percentage points lower than that for single adults and about ten percentage points higher for in-married parents. Clearly, between singlehood and parenthood, the frequency of those

with mostly Jewish friends appears to climb over twenty percentage points.

Upon closer examination, we learn that most of this jump is associated with marriage rather than parenthood. In the move from singlehood to marriage, the adjusted percentage reporting mostly Jewish close friends climbs by over twenty-five percentage points, while the difference between in-married couples with and without children is a meager two percentage points.

We can only speculate on why changes in Jewish friendship coincide so closely with the transition from singlehood to marriage. One factor is undoubtedly a self-selection process in which the more Jewishly involved marry other Jews and the more Jewishly remote marry gentiles. (Here we need to recall that we are comparing all singles -- regardless of their Jewish commitment -- with people who are not simply married but married to other Jews.) Beyond self-selection, there is probably an impact of marriage per se. Marriage often leads people to move to homes in neighborhoods where they intend to raise their children. There they also begin to make friends, many of whom are married couples. Since most Jews have Jewish spouses, the tendency of married couples to associate with other couples increases the probability that married Jews will make friends with other Jews.

Combining these results with those reported earlier for patterns of formal affiliation, we may have the outlines of the process by which young adults come to formally affiliate with agencies of the Jewish community. In the early years of marriage, Jewish couples may learn from their married friends of choices in synagogues, community centers, other organizations, and schools for their unborn (or preschool) children. When children reach school age, the parents begin to formally affiliate with a synagogue and perhaps other institutions as well. Affiliation also mounts when children approach the bar/bat mitzvah years.

Since the late 1960s, travel to Israel has become more and more routine for American Jews. Many travel there for the first time during their teen years. Indeed, a recent survey suggested that about a fifth to a quarter of college-age Jewish youngsters had traveled to Israel; among the Orthodox, the rate was over double that of the non-Orthodox (Cohen 1986b). Israel travel is empirically related to other dimensions of Jewish identification. The more involved -- those who are Orthodox, or who are connected to Jewish young groups or adult Jewish organizations -- are more likely to be motivated to spend time in Israel. In turn, the trip to Israel elevates certain measures of Jewish involvement, at least in the short term.

Most surveys asked whether the respondent had ever traveled to Israel (about a third of the sample had done so). In contrast with other forms of Jewish communal involvement, the rates for singles were close to those of married parents. The crucial difference between Israel travel and other forms of involvement is that the Israel-travel question refers to any time in the past, while the others measure current activity.

Single mothers reported relatively high rates of synagogue attendance and organizational affiliation. Their synagogue-membership rates were between those of the singles and the married couples with children, although closer to the latter; and their levels of in-group friendship were also between the low rates of the singles and the higher rates of the in-married. They reported by far the highest rate of Jewish-community-center affiliation and the lowest rate of Israel travel (as low as that for the mixed-married).

The portrait of single mothers that emerges here is consistent with the one we began to draw earlier. Single mothers appear to have as much motivation as married parents to participate in Jewish life. However, their incomes are relatively low. Where an activity is free or nearly free (as are most religious observances or synagogue attendance or even joining most Jewish organizations), single mothers participate about as frequently as married parents. Where cost is a factor, as it is

to some extent with synagogue membership and to a great extent with Israel travel, their participation rates fall off. Single mothers' extraordinary utilization of Jewish community centers may well derive from their urgent need for child-care services (such as summer camps) and, possibly, from their need for opportunities to socialize with other Jewish adults.

Consistent with their low rates of religious observance, mixed-married Jews are virtually absent from organized Jewish life. However, while their formal affiliation rates are low and their rates of friendship with other Jews is also well below average, mixed-married respondents still reported that most of their closest friends were Jews. In other words, at least in terms of the most widely observed Jewish holidays and informal Jewish networks, mixed-married Jews are still very much a part of the Jewish community.

#### THE LIMITED IMPACT OF DIVORCE UPON JEWISH INVOLVEMENT

Jewish life -- its rituals and modes of affiliation -- are very much tied to the conventional Jewish family. The experience of divorce obviously disrupts that family and, quite possibly, the ties of its members to Jewish life. Moreover, as we have seen, divorce is more frequent among those raised in less traditional religious environments. For all these reasons, and more, we might expect those who have experienced divorce to distance themselves from various aspects of Jewish communal life. Alternatively, one could argue they may act no differently from people of similar family status. Those who remain divorced may participate as much (or as little) as others their age who are single; those who remarry may act like other married individuals who have never experienced divorce. Consistent with this second model, the data above for single mothers (almost all of whom were divorced) suggest very little residual impact of divorce except for the consequences of diminished family income.

To examine the impact of divorce per se, a Multiple Classification Analysis compares the religious observance and affiliation levels of those who have been divorced (remarried or not) with the levels of those who are currently married but have never been divorced (table 16). The results indicate that the ever-divorced undertake several Jewish activities far less often than those who have never divorced. Differences on the order of thirteen to eighteen percentage points separate the two groups with respect to lighting Hanukkah candles, lighting Sabbath candles, buying kosher meat, fasting on Yom Kippur, posting a mezuzah on the front door, and having separate dishes for meat and dairy. Smaller differences, generally in the expected direction (where the Jewish-involvement rates for the never-divorced exceed those for the ever-divorced), characterize most of the other measures.

Before concluding that divorce dramatically depresses Jewish observance and affiliation, we need to recall that the divorced derive disproportionately from non-Orthodox homes. Hence, it is by adjusting for differences in parental religiosity, Jewish education, and other background factors that we can truly understand the net impact of divorce upon various forms of Jewish involvement. The second column of table 16 presents the adjusted scores. Here we learn that divorce appears to have only an inconsistent impact on religious observance. The differences are small and in both directions. In other words, from a statistical point of view, holding background constant, divorce is sometimes associated with slightly higher rates of religious observance and sometimes with slightly lower rates. In fact, almost all the affiliation rates are higher for the divorced than for the nondivorced.

It appears, then, that divorce, in and of itself, has little if any long-range impact on Jewish activity. Rather, those who were divorced behave much like the never-divorced of similar family status.

#### CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY

Changes in family patterns in the late 1960s and early 1970s prompted concern among Jewish communal policymakers and others committed to Jewish community and continuity. They feared that the rise of singles (occasioned by later marriage, nonmarriage, and divorce), single parents, childless couples (primarily the result of later marriage), and intermarriage would severely curtail participation in conventional Jewish life, both at home and in the community.

This analysis of data from seven major Jewish population studies investigated some of the processes that have helped generate a rise in alternative family configurations as well as the consequences for Jewish identification that flow from them. When measured against the alarmist response of many communal leaders, the findings tend to offer some reassurance. Although the data are not complete and convincing on this point, the emergence of singles, single parents, childless couples, and mixed-marrieds seem both more understandable and more limited than the alarmist perspective would suggest. More critically, the unconventional families do not seem to pose severe dangers for Jewish continuity, although they do constitute a challenge to an organized Jewry that to this day is built largely around the conventional two-Jewish-parents-with-children family. To make this point more vividly, we should recall from the analysis that singles do not seem permanently alienated from Jewish life; rather, much conventional Jewish activity is undertaken after one marries another Jew and has children. Divorce does not seem to exert a long-term impact on Jewish connectedness; rather, divorced singles act like other singles, and remarried people are as Jewishly active as other married Jews. Parenthood does seem to inspire institutional attachments, and childlessness is associated with lower levels of communal affiliation and activity.

The organized community has responded to the rise of alternative households by enacting diverse programs to limit the expansion in their number. Put simply, the implicit and often rudimentary policy of synagogues, Jewish community centers, federations, and family agencies is to convince Jews to marry each other early in life, stay married, and have children. Although this research did not directly address the effectiveness of this policy, it does seem safe to say that "demographic jawboning" can have only limited impact on the rates of Jewish singlehood, divorce, mixed marriage, and childbirth. After all, demographers dispute whether governments have been able to achieve significant impacts upon such decisions; it is unlikely that a voluntary community in a free society can directly influence family-formation behavior. On the other hand, the Orthodox population in this sample did manifest higher rates of early marriage, intact marriage, endogamy, and childbearing (although the fertility data here are incomplete, other evidence substantiates higher birthrates among the Orthodox). The Orthodox data suggest that a traditionally oriented community with high levels of commitment among its members can indeed influence family behavior. Thus, not all efforts to affect the family choices of young adult Jews ought to be seen as impractical.

Even if the organized Jewish community cannot directly influence its members, it may be able to influence family-related policies of the larger society and polity. In light of Jews' extraordinary achievements in academia, cultural life, politics, and the economy, they may well be able to influence the larger society in ways that will indirectly affect Jewish family behavior in beneficial ways.

In any event, assuming that the number of singles, single parents, childless couples, and mixed-married families will remain significant and large in the near future, organized Jewry clearly has an opportunity to enhance the Jewish participation of these alternative households. To varying extents, the data seem to indicate an interest in Jewish life among all these types of Jews, albeit one accompanied by low to very low rates of communal affiliation. This pattern, in turn, suggests that a combination of factors is operating. To some extent, Jews in alternative family situations probably feel unwelcome in conventional public Jewish life. To some extent they are less visible, that is, they are less often connected to the informal networks that recruit people to synagogues, Jewish



community centers, organizations, and philanthropic campaigns. To some extent, they feel less of a need for the services provided by these institutions. And to some extent, they may indeed feel less committed to Jewish involvement. Further research needs to clarify the extent and nature of the factors operating to alienate such individuals from Jewish institutions. However, the very existence of substantial gaps in affiliation between conventional and alternative families suggests that the institutions themselves could identify programs and policies that may well attract greater participation on the part of singles, single parents, childless couples, and mixed-marrieds. The purpose of this paper is not to specify the nature of those policy or programmatic efforts; rather, it can merely serve to educate and encourage those many practitioners -- rabbis, educators, communal workers, and others -- who are actively engaged in efforts to extend Jewish communal life to all sorts of young-adult Jews beyond those who are found in conventional Jewish families.

#### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. Jews may be marrying later, but the vast majority marry at some point. While substantial proportions of younger-adult (age 25-39) Jews have never married, only just under 10 percent of those in their late 30s have never married.
2. Men marry later than women.
3. Of those who have married, up to a quarter have been divorced by age 35-39.
4. The religiously traditional marry earlier, divorce less often, and intermarry less frequently. There is a greater difference between Orthodox and non-Orthodox than between Conservative and Reform or nondenominational Jews.
5. Higher education adversely affects the likelihood of women getting married. The rates of singlehood are particularly high among Jewish women in their 30s with "high-status" graduate degrees.
6. High education reduces the chances that married Jewish men will have a gentile spouse. Apparently, less well-educated Jewish men marry gentile women more often and, of those who out-marry, their lower social status may make it less likely that their wives will convert.
7. While almost all men work full-time no matter what their family status, women's full-time participation in the labor force fluctuates dramatically with marriage and childbearing.
8. Single mothers work full-time more than twice as often as married mothers.
9. Single mothers have the lowest income of any family status.
10. Certain religious observances rise dramatically with marriage and/or with children. Those most sensitive to family changes include: lighting Hanukkah candles, affixing a mezuzah on the doorpost, lighting Sabbath candles, and, to a lesser extent, attending a seder and fasting on Yom Kippur.
11. The religious observances of the mixed-married are less frequent than (even) those of the singles, although most mixed-marrieds attend seders and light Hanukkah candles.
12. Patterns of observance of single mothers resemble more closely those of in-married parents than they do those of singles.
13. Singles score far lower than others on most measures of communal affiliation.
14. Marriage to a Jew seems to elevate the rate of friendship with other Jews but has a small effect on affiliation with Jewish institutions.
15. Parenthood has a substantial positive impact on rates of formal Jewish affiliation.
16. Single mothers are especially active in Jewish community centers, but score low on costly activities.
17. Divorce does not seem to have a major enduring impact on most measures of Jewish religious observance or affiliation.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

*The Data*

Merging the seven data sets proved to be a difficult task. Not all seven surveys asked the same questions; few of the questions on similar issues were worded the same; and rarely did similarly worded questions use the same answer codes. Thus, in order to construct a single data set, I needed to engage in extensive recording, recomputing, and transferral of data from the several data sets to a common master data set. Many times I had to make reasoned judgments as to whether to accept as parallel two (or more) versions of similar questions from the studies.

Once constructed, the master data set permitted analyses across the several cities simultaneously. There are at least two virtues to analyzing the merged data set rather than the seven individual surveys. First, except for the unusually large New York survey ( $N = 4,505$ ), no single Jewish population study contains enough cases of a particular young-adult family configuration (such as single men age 25-39) for reliable analysis. The typical Jewish population study, which has about 1,000 cases in all, might contain no more than a few score young-adult single men. Thus, only by aggregating several studies could we obtain samples of specific family subgroups large enough for this study.

Second, at this stage in our collective understanding of Jewish young adults, knowledge of broad national patterns is more policy-relevant than is information specific to any one community. By aggregating several studies, we "smooth over" the peculiarities found in one or another locality and obtain a more generalized picture applicable to several communities. The analysis utilized the weights assigned the respondents by the original survey researchers in each city. These generally take into account the problematics entailed in sampling from merged Jewish organizational lists, Distinctive Jewish Names, or Random Digit Dialing (the three major sources of Jewish respondents). They also correct for the intentional under- or overrepresentation of certain towns, neighborhoods, or regions within the survey area. Another level of weights was added to accurately reflect the population sizes of the seven communities. That is, respondents from cities with larger Jewish populations were weighted so that they, in effect, would count for more, while those from smaller communities were down-weighted so that they would count for less. A third set of weights took into account the number of adult Jews in the household. In practice, this meant that a Jewish respondent married to another Jew was given a weight of about 2.0 (to represent the respondent and his/her spouse), a single Jewish respondent received a weight of about 1.4 (not all Jewish singles live alone), and mixed-married Jewish respondents received a weight of about 1.0.

*Rates of Singlehood and Divorce:  
Methodologically Problematic, Substantively Useful*

For several reasons, the data on the rates of singlehood, divorce, and intermarriage are probably more unreliable than the results on relationships between these phenomena and other variables (such as parents' religiosity or current religious observance). One reason to be more skeptical about rates than about relationships is that the seven studies probably varied considerably in their ability to secure the cooperation of potential respondents found in several alternative-family situations. Singles (be they never-married or divorced) spend much of their leisure time out of the home and are therefore somewhat difficult for telephone interviewers to reach. Some of the mixed-married may be wary of cooperating with a survey sponsored by a Jewish federation. In contrast, Jews married to other Jews with children at home probably stand the greatest chance of being included in a random-sample survey conducted under Jewish auspices. The completeness of coverage of those in alternative families no doubt varies both by community and by the quality of interviewers and sampling techniques. Taken together, these problems mean that the studies probably understate the numbers of singles, single parents, divorceds, and mixed-marrieds; but the extent to which they do

so is both unknown and unknowable.

Although singles, single parents, divorced, and mixed-marrieds may be underrepresented in the surveys, there is no reason to believe that this affects the relationship of these family statuses with other variables (particularly other dependent variables) in this study. To take a simple example, we may consider the relationship of Sabbath candle lighting with family status. The report demonstrated that singles and mixed-marrieds light candles less often than conventional families. The underrepresentation of singles and mixed-marrieds should have absolutely no effect upon this relationship. That is, even though there may be fewer singles and mixed-marrieds in the sample than in the population, the gap in rates of candle lighting between conventional families and the singles or mixed-marrieds should still closely approximate that in the population.

#### *New York Versus Elsewhere*

For the most part, the results for the New York area and elsewhere were similar. New York respondents did report larger numbers of strict Sabbath observers as well as homes with two sets of dishes. But the frequencies of the other ritual items were very close to those in the other cities, as were the relationships between ritual practices and family statuses. Preliminary analyses that separated the New York data from the other data sets generated very similar substantive conclusions. For these reasons, the multivariate analysis combined the New York area data with those from the other seven cities.

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Table 1

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED  
(OF THOSE EVER-MARRIED) BY CITY, SEX, AND AGE

|                  | Single | Never-married | Ever-divorced |
|------------------|--------|---------------|---------------|
| Total            | 34     | 25            | 16            |
| OUTSIDE NEW YORK | 32     | 22            | 22            |
| Male             | 35     | 25            | 18            |
| 25-29            | 54     | 40            | 05            |
| 30-34            | 31     | 23            | 13            |
| 35-39            | 23     | 09            | 27            |
| Female           | 30     | 20            | 22            |
| 25-29            | 43     | 33            | 34            |
| 30-34            | 25     | 17            | 15            |
| 35-39            | 23     | 09            | 21            |
| NEW YORK         | 35     | 27            | 14            |
| Male             | 43     | 37            | 25            |
| 25-29            | 61     | 58            | 09            |
| 30-34            | 32     | 28            | 12            |
| 35-39            | 25     | 12            | 21            |
| Female           | 28     | 19            | 13            |
| 25-29            | 41     | 37            | 01            |
| 30-34            | 21     | 13            | 14            |
| 35-39            | 25     | 10            | 20            |

Note: "Single" includes those never married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed.

Table 2

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED (OF  
THOSE EVER-MARRIED)  
BY PARENTS' DENOMINATION, AGE, AND SEX

|              | Single | Never-married | Ever-divorced |
|--------------|--------|---------------|---------------|
| Total        | 34     | 25            | 16            |
| 25-29        | 50     | 44            | 12            |
| MALE         | 59     | 55            | 08            |
| Orthodox     | 67     | 67            | 00            |
| Conservative | 45     | 43            | 05            |
| Reform       | 76     | 69            | 06            |
| Other        | 57     | 51            | 15            |
| FEMALE       | 42     | 35            | 15            |
| Orthodox     | 10     | 08            | 02            |
| Conservative | 31     | 28            | 02            |
| Reform       | 46     | 34            | 28            |
| Other        | 56     | 48            | 24            |
| 30-34        | 26     | 19            | 14            |
| MALE         | 31     | 25            | 12            |
| Orthodox     | 18     | 18            | 00            |
| Conservative | 36     | 31            | 17            |
| Reform       | 36     | 33            | 10            |
| Other        | 29     | 20            | 14            |
| FEMALE       | 23     | 15            | 14            |
| Orthodox     | 16     | 03            | 08            |
| Conservative | 17     | 13            | 14            |
| Reform       | 18     | 15            | 08            |
| Other        | 32     | 19            | 22            |
| 35-39        | 24     | 10            | 22            |
| MALE         | 24     | 11            | 24            |
| Orthodox     | 26     | 06            | 22            |
| Conservative | 32     | 08            | 16            |
| Reform       | 36     | 22            | 41            |
| Other        | 16     | 09            | 23            |
| FEMALE       | 24     | 10            | 21            |
| Orthodox     | 20     | 11            | 08            |
| Conservative | 21     | 09            | 16            |
| Reform       | 26     | 09            | 20            |
| Other        | 27     | 11            | 32            |

NOTE: "Single" includes those never married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed.

Table 3

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED  
(OF THOSE EVER-MARRIED) BY TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING, AGE, AND SEX

|               | Single | Never-married | Ever-divorced |
|---------------|--------|---------------|---------------|
| Total         | 34     | 25            | 16            |
| 25-29         | 50     | 44            | 12            |
| MALE          | 59     | 55            | 08            |
| Full-time     | 63     | 61            | 09            |
| Part-time     | 56     | 52            | 07            |
| Sunday school | 62     | 55            | 07            |
| None          | 68     | 65            | 15            |
| FEMALE        | 42     | 35            | 15            |
| Full-time     | 16     | 13            | 05            |
| Part-time     | 49     | 45            | 10            |
| Sunday school | 37     | 35            | 26            |
| None          | 43     | 32            | 19            |
| 30-34         | 26     | 19            | 14            |
| MALE          | 31     | 25            | 12            |
| Full-time     | 15     | 12            | 00            |
| Part-time     | 35     | 29            | 17            |
| Sunday school | 35     | 32            | 06            |
| None          | 27     | 11            | 10            |
| FEMALE        | 23     | 15            | 14            |
| Full-time     | 08     | 04            | 07            |
| Part-time     | 26     | 19            | 18            |
| Sunday school | 32     | 19            | 18            |
| None          | 18     | 10            | 11            |
| 35-39         | 24     | 10            | 22            |
| MALE          | 24     | 11            | 24            |
| Full-time     | 16     | 06            | 19            |
| Part-time     | 27     | 11            | 25            |
| Sunday school | 22     | 13            | 22            |
| None          | 24     | 09            | 25            |
| FEMALE        | 24     | 10            | 21            |
| Full-time     | 10     | 08            | 01            |
| Part-time     | 27     | 13            | 15            |
| Sunday school | 28     | 08            | 35            |
| None          | 23     | 09            | 24            |

Note: "Single" includes those ever married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed.

Table 4

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED  
(OF THOSE EVER-MARRIED) BY EDUCATION, AGE, AND SEX

|              | Single | Never-married | Ever-divorced |
|--------------|--------|---------------|---------------|
| Total        | 34     | 25            | 16            |
| 25-29        | 50     | 45            | 12            |
| MALE         | 59     | 55            | 08            |
| Hi school    | 65     | 60            | 15            |
| Some college | 69     | 61            | 12            |
| B.A.         | 48     | 44            | 09            |
| M.A.         | 65     | 60            | 07            |
| Grad degree  | 62     | 61            | 01            |
| FEMALE       | 42     | 36            | 15            |
| Hi school    | 33     | 10            | 17            |
| Some college | 31     | 22            | 14            |
| B.A.         | 47     | 44            | 23            |
| M.A.         | 44     | 42            | 03            |
| Grad degree  | 76     | 68            | 18            |
| 30-34        | 26     | 19            | 14            |
| MALE         | 31     | 25            | 13            |
| Hi school    | 25     | 22            | 05            |
| Some college | 31     | 21            | 30            |
| B.A.         | 28     | 22            | 19            |
| M.A.         | 41     | 35            | 07            |
| Grad degree  | 26     | 20            | 04            |
| FEMALE       | 23     | 15            | 14            |
| Hi school    | 07     | 02            | 09            |
| Some college | 20     | 06            | 12            |
| B.A.         | 21     | 12            | 13            |
| M.A.         | 28     | 24            | 18            |
| Grad degree  | 58     | 43            | 29            |
| 35-39        | 24     | 10            | 22            |
| MALE         | 24     | 11            | 24            |
| Hi school    | 23     | 10            | 15            |
| Some college | 16     | 04            | 30            |
| B.A.         | 39     | 16            | 31            |
| M.A.         | 20     | 08            | 22            |
| Grad degree  | 22     | 12            | 22            |



|              |    |    |    |
|--------------|----|----|----|
| FEMALE       | 25 | 10 | 21 |
| Hi school    | 20 | 08 | 11 |
| Some college | 24 | 06 | 24 |
| B.A.         | 18 | 09 | 22 |
| M.A.         | 30 | 13 | 24 |
| Grad degree  | 42 | 21 | 26 |

Note: "Single" includes those never married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed. "M.A." includes so-called low-prestige graduate degrees such as the M.A. or M.S.W. "Grad degree" refers to all other degrees.

Table 5  
PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY  
AGE, SEX, AND LOCATION

|                  | Men | Women |
|------------------|-----|-------|
| Total            | 14  | 08    |
| OUTSIDE NEW YORK | 22  | 11    |
| 25-29            | 22  | 11    |
| 30-34            | 21  | 09    |
| 35-39            | 24  | 12    |
| NEW YORK AREA    | 10  | 06    |
| 25-29            | 07  | 07    |
| 30-34            | 10  | 05    |
| 35-39            | 11  | 06    |

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.

Table 6

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY PARENTS'  
DENOMINATION, SEX, AND LOCATION

|                  | Men | Women |
|------------------|-----|-------|
| Total            | 14  | 08    |
| OUTSIDE NEW YORK | 22  | 11    |
| Orthodox         | 04  | 17    |
| Conservative     | 06  | 08    |
| Reform           | 27  | 09    |
| Other            | 31  | 12    |
| NEW YORK AREA    | 10  | 06    |
| Orthodox         | 00  | 01    |
| Conservative     | 11  | 06    |
| Reform           | 07  | 08    |
| Other            | 15  | 07    |

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.

Table 7

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY TYPE OF JEWISH  
SCHOOLING, SEX, AND LOCATION

|                  | Men | Women |
|------------------|-----|-------|
| OUTSIDE NEW YORK | 22  | 11    |
| Full-time        | 07  | 00    |
| Part-time        | 21  | 13    |
| Sunday school    | 21  | 12    |
| None             | 42  | 13    |
| NEW YORK AREA    | 10  | 06    |
| Full-time        | 01  | 01    |
| Part-time        | 11  | 06    |
| Sunday school    | 02  | 05    |
| None             | 19  | 09    |

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.  
"Type of Jewish Schooling" refers to the most intensive schooling ever  
attended.

Table 8

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY EDUCATION, SEX,  
AND LOCATION

|                  | Men | Women |
|------------------|-----|-------|
| OUTSIDE NEW YORK | 23  | 11    |
| Hi school        | 42  | 31    |
| Some college     | 32  | 13    |
| B.A.             | 18  | 05    |
| M.A.             | 27  | 08    |
| Grad degree      | 16  | 09    |
| <br>             |     |       |
| NEW YORK AREA    | 10  | 06    |
| Hi school        | 04  | 10    |
| Some college     | 08  | 02    |
| B.A.             | 14  | 05    |
| M.A.             | 08  | 06    |
| Grad degree      | 09  | 16    |

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.  
"M.A." includes so-called low-prestige graduate degrees such as the M.A.  
or M.S.W. "Grad degree" refers to all other degrees.

Table 9

EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY FAMILY TYPE AND SEX

| Men        |            |                  |                  |                |                |       |  |
|------------|------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|--|
|            | Single man | Married, no kids | Married, parents | Mixed, no kids | Mixed, parents | Total |  |
| Full-time  | 83         | 90               | 96               | 96             | 89             | 90    |  |
| Part-time  | 06         | 05               | 01               | 02             | 00             | 04    |  |
| House      | 01         | 00               | 01               | 00             | 00             | 00    |  |
| Student    | 05         | 01               | 01               | 01             | 03             | 03    |  |
| Unemployed | 04         | 02               | 01               | 01             | 08             | 03    |  |
| Other      | 01         | 01               | 00               | 00             | 00             | 00    |  |

  

| Women      |              |               |                  |                  |                |                |       |
|------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
|            | Single woman | Single mother | Married, no kids | Married, parents | Mixed, no kids | Mixed, parents | Total |
| Full-time  | 76           | 58            | 66               | 23               | 75             | 28             | 45    |
| Part-time  | 11           | 23            | 11               | 23               | 00             | 11             | 17    |
| Retired    | 00           | 00            | 01               | 01               | 00             | 00             | 01    |
| House      | 01           | 07            | 14               | 47               | 23             | 40             | 28    |
| Student    | 04           | 04            | 03               | 01               | 00             | 03             | 03    |
| Unemployed | 08           | 07            | 05               | 04               | 02             | 17             | 06    |
| Other      | 01           | 01            | 00               | 01               | 00             | 01             | 01    |

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, parents" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, parents" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Table 10

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION  
IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS

|                  |    |
|------------------|----|
| OUTSIDE NEW YORK | 43 |
| Single man       | 35 |
| Single woman     | 25 |
| Single mother    | 28 |
| Married, no kids | 50 |
| Married, kids    | 54 |
| Mixed, no kids   | 43 |
| Mixed, kids      | 32 |
| <br>             |    |
| NEW YORK AREA    | 38 |
| Single man       | 35 |
| Single woman     | 26 |
| Single mother    | 23 |
| Married, no kids | 37 |
| Married, kids    | 45 |
| Mixed, no kids   | 46 |
| Mixed, kids      | 28 |

Table 11

DENOMINATIONAL IDENTIFICATION BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION

OUTSIDE NEW YORK

|          | Single man | Single woman | Single mother | Married, no kids | Married, parents | Mixed, no kids | Mixed, parents | Total |
|----------|------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| Orthodox | 02         | 01           | 00            | 01               | 08               | 00             | 00             | 04    |
| Conserv  | 34         | 27           | 20            | 38               | 38               | 28             | 13             | 34    |
| Reform   | 34         | 50           | 46            | 35               | 38               | 31             | 29             | 38    |
| Other    | 31         | 22           | 35            | 26               | 17               | 42             | 58             | 25    |

NEW YORK

|          | Single man | Single woman | Single mother | Married, no kids | Married, parents | Mixed, no kids | Mixed, parents | Total |
|----------|------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| Orthodox | 08         | 03           | 07            | 04               | 22               | 00             | 00             | 12    |
| Conserv  | 23         | 25           | 33            | 42               | 31               | 01             | 15             | 30    |
| Reform   | 27         | 29           | 29            | 31               | 32               | 60             | 29             | 31    |
| Other    | 42         | 43           | 31            | 24               | 15               | 39             | 56             | 27    |

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, parents" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, parents" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.



Table 12

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION

|                      | Seder | Han | YomK | Mez | 2Dish | Koshr | Candl | Sabth | Xmas |
|----------------------|-------|-----|------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Total (all cities)   | 90    | 79  | 66   | 63  | 23    | 28    | 34    | 09    | 20   |
| Total (non-New York) | 87    | 81  | 65   | 62  | 14    | 18    | 32    | 05    | 20   |
| Single man           | 83    | 61  | 64   | 42  | 09    | 14    | 12    | 01    | 12   |
| Single woman         | 78    | 66  | 60   | 46  | 12    | 14    | 23    | 02    | 23   |
| Single mother        | 97    | 77  | 60   | 61  | 11    | 29    | 48    | 05    | 14   |
| Married, no kids     | 88    | 85  | 66   | 66  | 13    | 18    | 32    | 03    | 16   |
| Married, kids        | 94    | 97  | 74   | 83  | 21    | 23    | 45    | 08    | 13   |
| Mixed, no kids       | 74    | 58  | 38   | 27  | 00    | 00    | 00    | 01    | 80   |
| Mixed, kids          | 66    | 57  | 37   | 18  | 01    | 01    | 07    | 03    | 91   |
| Total (New York)     | 92    | 78  | 66   | 64  | 28    | 32    | 34    | 13    |      |
| Single man           | 84    | 53  | 53   | 55  | 23    | 22    | 17    | 10    |      |
| Single woman         | 88    | 60  | 58   | 37  | 16    | 18    | 13    | 04    |      |
| Single mother        | 93    | 88  | 48   | 65  | 20    | 16    | 22    | 04    |      |
| Married, no kids     | 93    | 81  | 70   | 67  | 26    | 31    | 32    | 06    |      |
| Married, kids        | 97    | 94  | 77   | 79  | 38    | 44    | 52    | 22    |      |
| Mixed, no kids       | 80    | 65  | 30   | 33  | 00    | 23    | 21    | 00    |      |
| Mixed, kids          | 76    | 56  | 36   | 15  | 04    | 00    | 04    | 00    |      |

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to ritual abbreviations: Seder = attends Passover seder. Han = lights Hanukkah candles. YomK = fasts on Yom Kippur. Mez = mezuzah is posted on front door. 2Dish = has two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products. Koshr = buys meat only from a kosher butcher. Candl = lights Sabbath candles Friday night. Sabth = observes the Sabbath in a highly traditional way (e.g., will not ride or will not handle money). Xmas = has a Christmas tree.

Table 13

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION  
ADJUSTED FOR PARENTS' DENOMINATION, TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING,  
EDUCATION, AND INCOME

|                              | Seder | Han | YomK | Mez | 2Dish | Koshr | Candl | Sabth | Xmas |
|------------------------------|-------|-----|------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Mean                         | 90    | 79  | 66   | 64  | 23    | 28    | 34    | 09    | 20   |
| <i>Unadjusted deviations</i> |       |     |      |     |       |       |       |       |      |
| Single man                   | -06   | -23 | -08  | -13 | -05   | -08   | -18   | -03   | -08  |
| Single woman                 | -07   | -17 | -07  | -23 | -08   | -11   | -17   | -06   | 04   |
| Single mother                | 05    | 06  | -14  | -00 | -06   | -09   | -06   | -05   | -06  |
| Married, no kids             | 01    | 03  | 02   | 03  | -02   | -01   | -02   | -05   | -04  |
| Married, kids                | 06    | 16  | 10   | 17  | 09    | 10    | 16    | 07    | -07  |
| Mixed, no kids               | -12   | -17 | -32  | -33 | -23   | -08   | -16   | -09   | 60   |
| Mixed, kids                  | -20   | -22 | -30  | -46 | -21   | -27   | -29   | -07   | 71   |
| <i>Adjusted deviations</i>   |       |     |      |     |       |       |       |       |      |
| Single man                   | -09   | -22 | -06  | -16 | -04   | -03   | -18   | -02   | 03   |
| Single woman                 | -07   | -12 | -02  | -18 | -02   | -01   | -12   | -01   | 12   |
| Single mother                | 08    | 11  | -06  | 09  | -01   | -02   | -01   | -04   | -11  |
| Married, no kids             | 02    | 01  | 01   | 04  | 01    | 01    | 01    | -02   | -11  |
| Married, kids                | 07    | 14  | 06   | 16  | 04    | 03    | 12    | 03    | -12  |
| Mixed, no kids               | -12   | -18 | -33  | -32 | -12   | -02   | -10   | -03   | 59   |
| Mixed, kids                  | -16   | -21 | -28  | -41 | -13   | -21   | -23   | -03   | 73   |

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to ritual abbreviations: Seder = attends Passover Seder. Han = lights Hanukkah candles. YomK = fasts on Yom Kippur. Mez = mezuzah is posted on front door. 2Dish = has two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products. Koshr = buys meat only from a kosher butcher. Candl = lights Sabbath candles Friday night. Sabth = observes the Sabbath in a highly traditional way (e.g., will not ride or will not handle money). Xmas = has a Christmas tree.

Table 14

MEASURES OF JEWISH COMMUNAL ACTIVITY BY TYPE OF  
FAMILY AND LOCATION

|                      | Attend | SynMem | Org'n | JCC | Friends | Israel |
|----------------------|--------|--------|-------|-----|---------|--------|
| Total                | 33     | 38     | 31    | 13  | 83      | 31     |
| Total (non-New York) | 39     | 37     | 22    | 18  | 81      | 27     |
| Single man           | 31     | 17     | 12    | 08  | 65      | 28     |
| Single woman         | 35     | 22     | 16    | 15  | 69      | 29     |
| Single mother        | 33     | 44     | 19    | 49  | 61      | 16     |
| Married, no kids     | 35     | 30     | 16    | 14  | 92      | 35     |
| Married, kids        | 50     | 58     | 35    | 23  | 90      | 27     |
| Mixed, no kids       | 14     | 07     | 07    | 09  | 68      | 11     |
| Mixed, kids          | 22     | 07     | 04    | 02  | 65      | 12     |
| Total (New York)     | 30     | 37     | 37    | 11  | 84      | 33     |
| Single man           | 24     | 20     | 22    | 07  | 74      | 30     |
| Single woman         | 19     | 13     | 20    | 11  | 73      | 34     |
| Single mother        | 39     | 38     | 51    | 36  | 83      | 10     |
| Married, no kids     | 19     | 19     | 27    | 06  | 88      | 41     |
| Married, kids        | 41     | 60     | 52    | 14  | 95      | 35     |
| Mixed, no kids       | 04     | 04     | 21    | 06  | 59      | 15     |
| Mixed, kids          | 19     | 14     | 16    | 02  | 33      | 12     |

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to communal affiliation abbreviations: Attend = attends religious services more often than High Holidays. SynMem = synagogue member. Org'n = member of a Jewish organization other than synagogue or JCC. JCC = member of a Jewish Community Center. Friends = most closest friends are Jewish. Israel = visited Israel at least once.

Table 15

MEASURES OF JEWISH COMMUNAL ACTIVITY BY TYPE OF FAMILY AND LOCATION ADJUSTED FOR PARENTS' DENOMINATION, TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING, EDUCATION, AND INCOME

|                              | Attend | SynMem | Org'n | JCC  | Friends | Israel |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|------|---------|--------|
| Mean                         | 33     | 37     | 31    | 13   | 83      | 31     |
| <i>Unadjusted deviations</i> |        |        |       |      |         |        |
| Single man                   | - 07   | - 18   | - 13  | - 06 | - 12    | - 20   |
| Single woman                 | - 07   | - 20   | - 12  | - 01 | - 11    | 01     |
| Single mother                | 04     | 03     | 10    | 26   | - 06    | - 18   |
| Married, no kids             | - 08   | - 13   | - 08  | - 05 | 07      | 08     |
| Married, kids                | 11     | 22     | 15    | 04   | 10      | 01     |
| Mixed, no kids               | - 24   | - 31   | - 16  | - 07 | - 20    | - 17   |
| Mixed, kids                  | - 13   | - 27   | - 22  | - 11 | - 31    | - 19   |
| <i>Adjusted deviations</i>   |        |        |       |      |         |        |
| Single man                   | - 03   | - 21   | - 14  | - 07 | - 18    | - 02   |
| Single woman                 | - 00   | - 19   | - 11  | - 01 | - 16    | 06     |
| Single mother                | 07     | 06     | 10    | 26   | - 05    | - 14   |
| Married, no kids             | - 10   | - 10   | - 06  | - 04 | 10      | 08     |
| Married, kids                | 09     | 22     | 13    | 04   | 12      | - 02   |
| Mixed, no kids               | - 26   | - 29   | - 14  | - 07 | - 16    | - 13   |
| Mixed, kids                  | - 14   | - 23   | - 17  | - 11 | - 28    | - 13   |

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to communal affiliation abbreviations: Attend = attends religious services more often than High Holidays. SynMem = synagogue member. Org'n = member of a Jewish organization other than synagogue or JCC. JCC = member of a Jewish Community Center. Friends = most closest friends are Jewish. Israel = visited Israel at least once.

Table 16

THE IMPACT OF DIVORCE ON JEWISH INVOLVEMENT:  
 RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES AND MEASURES OF JEWISH COMMUNAL ACTIVITY BY  
 WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS EVER-DIVORCED,  
 WITH AND WITHOUT ADJUSTING FOR PARENTS' DENOMINATION,  
 TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING, CITY, AND TYPE OF FAMILY

|     |           | Unadjusted | Adjusted |
|-----|-----------|------------|----------|
|     | Seder     |            |          |
| YES |           | - 03       | - 02     |
| NO  |           | 03         | - 01     |
|     | Hanukkah  |            |          |
| YES |           | - 06       | - 02     |
| NO  |           | 09         | 02       |
|     | YomKFast  |            |          |
| YES |           | - 10       | - 04     |
| NO  |           | 05         | 03       |
|     | Mezuzah   |            |          |
| YES |           | - 05       | 02       |
| NO  |           | 09         | - 01     |
|     | Twodish   |            |          |
| YES |           | - 11       | - 04     |
| NO  |           | 06         | 02       |
|     | Kosher    |            |          |
| YES |           | - 12       | - 06     |
| NO  |           | 06         | 02       |
|     | Fricandle |            |          |
| YES |           | - 05       | 02       |
| NO  |           | 08         | 01       |
|     | Sabbath   |            |          |
| YES |           | - 06       | - 02     |
| NO  |           | 03         | 01       |
|     | Xmastree  |            |          |
| YES |           | 07         | 06       |
| NO  |           | 01         | 06       |
|     | Attend    |            |          |
| YES |           | - 01       | - 00     |
| NO  |           | 05         | 03       |
|     | SynMem    |            |          |
| YES |           | - 00       | 06       |
| NO  |           | 07         | - 03     |

|     |         |      |      |
|-----|---------|------|------|
|     | Org'n   |      |      |
| YES |         | - 03 | 01   |
| NO  |         | 06   | - 00 |
|     | JCC     |      |      |
| YES |         | 04   | 01   |
| NO  |         | 01   | - 00 |
|     | Friends |      |      |
| YES |         | - 04 | 01   |
| NO  |         | 05   | - 04 |
|     | Israel  |      |      |
| YES |         | - 03 | 02   |
| NO  |         | 02   | 00   |

Key to ritual abbreviations: Seder = attends Passover seder. Hanukkah = lights Hanukkah candles. YomKFast = fasts on Yom Kippur. Mezuzah = mezuzah is posted on front door. Twodish = has two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products. Kosher = buys meat only from a kosher butcher. Fricandle = lights Sabbath candles Friday night. Sabbath = observes the Sabbath in a highly traditional way (e.g., will not ride or will not handle money). Xmas = has a Christmas tree.

Key to communal affiliation abbreviations: Attend = attends religious services more often than High Holidays. SynMem = synagogue member. Org'n = member of a Jewish organization other than synagogue or JCC. JCC = member of a Jewish Community Center. Friends = most closest friends are Jewish. Israel = visited Israel at least once.

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