

A Study for
The American Jewish Committee's
Information and Research Services

THE 1984 NATIONAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN JEWS

Political and Social Outlooks

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SUMMARY

This 1984 National Survey of American Jews, the fourth in an annual series, surveyed 996 Jews nationwide in April-August 1984. The study's purpose was to discern Jews' attitudes on major public issues and to understand how certain social and demographic characteristics influence political thinking. Among the major findings are these:

1. Self-defined liberals outnumber conservatives by more than 3 to 2, but middle-of-the-road Jews are about as numerous as the liberals. Thus, many more Jews than other Americans are liberal, and far fewer call themselves conservative.
2. Jewish Democrats outnumber Republicans by over 4 to 1, but the Democratic proportion has been shrinking (at least since 1981) in favor of Independents. Moreover, a slight majority now say they would have preferred a Reagan to a Carter victory in 1980.
3. On various public issues, the majority reports the following views:
 - a. Opposition to quotas in hiring minorities, but support for affirmative action in other forms.
 - b. Support of the goals of social-welfare programs but split on their effectiveness and on maintaining financial support.
 - c. Security-oriented on crime: support for both gun control and capital punishment.
 - d. For gay rights, but troubled by the rise in homosexuality.
 - e. For Church/State separation in several areas (tuition tax credits, silent meditation in public schools), but split on the centrality of religion in affecting public morality.
 - f. Split on protecting extremists' civil liberties.
 - g. Support for capitalism over socialism.
 - h. Support for "dovish" or "detentist" U.S. policies toward the USSR.
 - i. Split on the use of U.S. military force.

j. Opposition to nuclear power plants.

k. For less U.S. military spending, but also for a strong U.S. military capability to back up Israel.

l. Support for staying in the U.N.

4. The sense of being a minority group figures prominently in American Jews' political thinking. Most believe American anti-Semitism continues to threaten them. They see conservative groups as more anti-Semitic than liberal groups, and they see other ethnic groups (especially blacks) as more anti-Semitic.

5. On most issues, the more liberal are those who are less involved in Jewish life (although not wholly uninvolved), have a post-graduate degree, read cultural or intellectual periodicals, and, to a lesser extent, are female. In most instances, income per se is unrelated to political views, although among the better-educated, the very affluent are somewhat more conservative.

INTRODUCTION

In political life, American Jews historically occupied a position to the left of the national center. As activists and contributors, they disproportionately supported the Democratic Party and many left-liberal social movements and organizations. As voters, they favored Democratic Party candidates more often than all other white ethnic or religious groups. And as respondents in public-opinion surveys, they identified more often than all other Americans as liberals (and less often as conservatives), while taking liberal positions on major public issues.

In recent years, however, some observers have either predicted or advocated a rightward shift in Jewish political thinking. One reason for these expectations and exhortations is that a sizable proportion of American Jews is affluent; thus, they have an economic interest in reducing taxes and cutting social services for which they personally have little need. Another consideration derives from the decade and a half of conflict between blacks and Jews over issues of high symbolic importance to both communities (affirmative action/quotas and Israel being the most prominent). As a result, Jews may no longer see themselves as allies of minorities or supporters of their generally liberal political agenda. As for the international arena, some have argued that Israel's security demands a strong American military force which U.S. leaders would be prepared to utilize to aid America's allies. If so, then pro-Israel Jews have ample reason to take issue with liberals' anti-militarism and anti-interventionism. Finally, the Soviet Union's opposition to Jewish interests in the USSR and in the Middle East could easily predispose concerned Jews to support a "hard-line" American posture in dealings with the Soviet Union.

If these factors were influencing Jews the way parallel developments seem to affect other Americans, then Jews should become less liberal and more conservative, and vote less Democratic and more Republican.

Jews, however, continue to confound the logic of those who have anticipated a rightward shift in their politics. Recent exit polls and public-opinion surveys still report disproportionate Jewish support for liberal candidates and issues. To cite one example, in the 1982 Congressional elections, three quarters of Jewish voters cast their ballots for Democratic candidates. Putting matters in perspective, the national political center has moved right over the last fifteen years, and Jews have moved accordingly, but the center of the Jewish political spectrum remains left of the national center. Why Jews lean to the liberal side of the political spectrum remains a mystery, in part because of the limited research thus far on their political attitudes, values, and beliefs.

While national voting and public-opinion studies have offered valuable Jewish-Gentile comparisons, by their very nature they could not focus on issues or characteristics pertinent to the study of American Jewry. To address the relative paucity of high-quality data on current American Jewish beliefs and attitudes, the American Jewish Committee has been sponsoring an annual National Survey of American Jews (NSAJ) since 1981. Last year's study explored American Jewish attitudes toward Israel and Israelis; this year's NSAJ, conducted during a presidential-election campaign, focused on attitudes toward major issues in American domestic and international affairs.

The study was directed at Jewish respondents (N=959), concentrating on those issues particularly relevant for understanding current Jewish political thinking and exploring those issues in some detail. In particular, it considered the possibility that many Jews may hold seemingly contradictory positions. Such apparent contradictions may reflect conflicts between Jews' historic liberal commitments and the conservatizing influences cited above; or they may testify to the evolution of more complex constellations of political thinking. To search for seeming contradictions, the questionnaire asked for reactions to two or three policy alternatives or viewpoints related to the same issue.

Not only did the study gauge opinions on a wide variety of issues, it also examined such factors affecting Jewish political thinking and behavior as social class, Jewish involvement, sex, and age.

The lack of comprehensive, large-scale studies of Jewish public opinion in previous years precludes drawing definitive comparisons. Nevertheless, we can say with some confidence that the results presented below indicate that American Jews as a whole have not experienced a shift to the political right, at least relative to the ever-shifting national center. On issue after issue, a sizable fraction (generally over a third) of this national sample of American Jews endorsed solidly liberal positions, and they did so even in the face of questions phrased so as to highlight a Jewish group-related reason to reject the standard liberal response. Of those who voiced other than a clearly liberal stance, the vast majority (roughly almost half the entire sample on most questions) expressed a middle-of-the-road position. On most issues, less than a quarter of the sample endorsed positions favored by conservative activists or by the Republican Party.

More than income, education and some aspects of Jewish involvement (ritual observance, having Jewish friends and neighbors) had the most powerful associations with Jewish political attitudes. While American Jews differ considerably over their understanding of Jewish values and interests, the vast majority show awareness of group concerns when expressing their political views. Such interpretations emerge as we examine the data from the 1984 National Survey of American Jews.

SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION

The data were derived from 959 mail-back questionnaires returned in May-August 1984 by a nationwide sample of households with distinctive Jewish names listed in the nation's telephone directories. The A.B. Data Corporation of Milwaukee undertook the sampling and data collection. The company had previously identified over 37,000 family names (e.g., Cohen, Levy) frequently possessed by Jews; in fact, they found that about 40% of all American Jews have such names. They also found a small percentage of persons with such names who are not Jewish, reflecting, perhaps, the historic effects of intermarriage and common origins of Jewish and non-Jewish family names.

In April 1984, A.B. Data mailed all potential respondents a letter telling them to anticipate the questionnaire, then a copy of the questionnaire, and finally, a reminder post card. To the non-respondents it mailed a second and, if necessary, a third copy of the questionnaire. It then tried to reach all non-respondents with a reminder phone call, followed with a fourth copy of the questionnaire, yet another round of reminder phone calls, and a fifth questionnaire. By the end of the process (in August), A.B. Data determined that of the 2,471 names in the initial mail-out, at least 634 were inaccessible (539 incorrect addresses or deceased) or ineligible (95 confirmed non-Jews). Of the 1,767 confirmed or possibly eligible respondents (i.e., possible or known Jews) who received the questionnaires, 996 (or 56%) returned them, and, of these, 959 were usable. A majority of questions were completed. (Since the non-respondents include an unknown number of non-Jews, the actual response rate as a proportion of the eligible and contacted respondents is probably slightly higher than 56%.)

We compared the social, demographic, and Jewish identity characteristics of this sample with data derived from a far more costly data collection technique (60% Random Digit Dialing and 40% Distinctive Jewish Names; N=4,505) used in the 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Study conducted by Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen. These comparisons revealed few if any significant differences (see Tables 14 and 15). This finding is consistent with the small literature on the adequacy of DJN sampling. The sampling technique underrepresents mixed-marriage families with born-Jewish wives and recent immigrants from Israel and the USSR. However, most researchers who have examined DJN samples now believe that they reasonably reflect

the distribution of American Jews' socio-demographic characteristics as well as the diversity in Jewish affiliation and ritual-observance patterns.

Apart from the few small biases introduced by DJN sampling, the mail-back technique presents its own problems. Most critically, less educated and elderly potential respondents are less likely to complete mail-back questionnaires than they would telephone interviews, a far more costly procedure. Thus, to some unknown extent, these data probably underrepresent the elderly and those with lower levels of educational attainment. (See the discussion in Appendix I for further details.)

THE FINDINGS

Moderate to Liberal, Democratic to Independent

Table 1 summarizes the very broad patterns of Jewish political orientations, party affiliation, and presidential preferences. We asked respondents to describe their political orientation ("liberal," "conservative," etc.). As in other studies, we found that Jews thought of themselves as liberal (or radical or socialist) much more often than other Americans (36% in this study versus 24% in a recent nationwide survey) and as conservative (or very conservative) considerably less often (25% here versus 35% across the country). Thus while Americans generally are split between conservatives and moderates (or middle-of-the-roaders) with a small liberal minority, Jews see themselves as divided between moderates and liberals with conservatives comprising the smallest group. In comparison with the 1981 survey, the number of Jewish moderates decreased as the numbers to the political left and right increased commensurately. This trend may reflect the polarizing influence of an Administration with a strong ideological (in this instance, a conservative) bent.

The results also portray the historic Jewish identification with the Democratic Party. Democrats outnumbered Republicans by over 4 to 1, a ratio far greater than among the larger population where the ratio is roughly 3 to 2. However, alongside the disproportionate number of Democrats, we can note what may be the beginning of a growing disenchantment among Jewish voters with the Democratic Party. From the 1981 to the 1984 National Surveys of American Jews, Democratic identification declined from 65% in 1981, to 59% in 1983, to 57% most recently. Most of the commensurate gains were registered by Independents rather than the Republicans in a fashion consistent with recent national trends in which major party identification has declined to swell the ranks of the Independents.

The weakness of Democratic identification among Jews, despite their ideological tilt in a moderate-to-liberal direction, can also be seen in the results of the 1980 presidential election. Consistent with results obtained from exit polls on Election Day 1980, the 1984 NSAJ respondents claimed they marginally supported Carter (44%) over Reagan (39%), with a substantial minority (15%, or about twice the national average) claiming they had voted for Anderson.

Table 1
Politics and Voting

	<u>NSAJ</u>		
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Political orientation:	<u>1984</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1981</u>
Radical or Socialist	1	2	2
Liberal	35	36	32
Middle of the road	38	38	49
Conservative	24	23	16
Very conservative	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	100*	100	100
Party identification:			
Democratic	57	59	65
Independent	31	30	24
Republican	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>
	100	100	100
Whom did you vote for in 1980?			
Anderson	15		
Carter	44		
Reagan	39		
Other	<u>3</u>		
	100		
Whom would you rather have seen elected?			
Reagan	53		
Carter	<u>47</u>		
	100		

*In some tables percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding out.

When asked to reflect on the election four years later (largely in the spring of 1984, before not only the election but the conventions as well), a slim majority (53% versus 47%) said they actually would have preferred a Reagan to a Carter victory, demonstrating the extent of the President's popularity among American Jews. (Interestingly, about 90% of the 1980 Reagan voters and 80% of the Carter voters maintained their original preferences in retrospect, while the Anderson voters split down the middle when asked whether they would have preferred a Reagan or Carter victory.)

Do Jews' 1980 presidential preferences suggest an erosion of liberalism? Alternatively, are presidential politics (either in 1980, or generally) distinctive from other political attitudes and beliefs? The figures for self-defined liberals, moderates, and conservatives, or Democrats, Independents, and Republicans, only begin to answer these questions. These shorthand self-definitions reflect general tendencies, but they obviously tell only part of the story. Thus, self-defined conservatives in this study were at least twice as likely as self-defined liberals to oppose affirmative action, spending on social-welfare programs, gun control, aid for abortions, and the nuclear freeze, and twice as likely to support capital punishment, tuition tax credits for parents of private-school pupils, and building nuclear plants. Meanwhile, twice as many liberals as conservatives favored quotas for hiring minorities, the government guaranteeing jobs for the unemployed, protecting the civil liberties of extremists, cutting defense spending, and restricting the use of U.S. military force. These patterns are certainly consistent with conventional images of differences between conservatives and liberals. But, only by looking at each issue in detail can we appreciate how the liberal/conservative balance shifts from one issue to the next.

No to Quotas, Yes to Affirmative Action

Table 2 presents the responses to questions relating to domestic-affairs issues. The first pertains to job quotas and affirmative-action programs for members of minority groups, an issue which has sharply divided Jewish and black activists, one-time allies, for over a decade. Blacks have asserted they need specific goals and timetables in hiring policies to overcome years of racial discrimination. Jewish agencies have voiced support for the goal of rectifying previous wrongs and ensuring equal opportunity for all groups, but have rejected quotas as inconsistent with those goals. For Jews, the very idea of quotas conjures up traumatic memories of anti-Semitic exclusion not only in 19th- and 20th-century Europe, but in the United States as well, especially in the period prior to the Second World War. The Jewish intergroup relations agencies (such as the American Jewish Committee) evolved a position on this issue which rejected quotas but supported affirmative action in other forms. These may include such actions as widely publicizing job openings, making special efforts to recruit minority-group applicants, and removing those criteria in hiring which discriminate against minorities and which have little relation to actual performance on the job.

Table 2

Opinions on Domestic Issues

	<u>Favor/ Agree</u>	<u>Oppose/ Disagree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
		<u>Per cent</u>	
Job quotas for minorities	22	64	14
Affirmative Action	70	20	10
For quotas	21		
For affirmative action	55		
For neither	23		
	<u>100</u>		
Welfare and Food Stamps:			
Support goals of welfare programs	75	17	8
Programs have hurt people	64	23	13
Cut because of fraud & waste	43	45	12
Against cuts	45		
For goals, not anti cuts	33		
Anti goals, not anti cuts	23		
	<u>100</u>		
Death penalty for murderers	68	20	12
Need permit to buy gun	90	7	3
Not for penalty, pro permit	29		
Pro penalty, pro permit	61		
Pro penalty, not pro permit	7		
Other	2		
	<u>100</u>		

Table 2 (continued)

Pro homosexual rights	87	9	4
Troubled by homosexual rise	43	49	8
Pro rights, untroubled	47		
Pro rights, troubled	40		
Not pro rights	13		
	<u>100</u>		
Government aid for abortions	81	13	6
Adultery is wrong	73	16	11
Tax credits, private schools	29	63	8
Tax credits, Jewish schools	30	61	9
Religion's decline hurt morals	44	42	14
Silent meditation in schools	21	70	9
Secularist (2 "disagrees")	35		
Ambiguous	25		
Separationist	26		
Religionist (2 "agrees")	14		
	<u>100</u>		
Protect unpopular groups	48	41	12
Suicide to protect extremists	44	43	13
Capitalism works better than socialism	73	7	20
Guarantee jobs for all who want	37	44	19

The 1984 NSAJ shows that the majority of the Jewish public favors this latter approach. Only over a fifth endorsed quotas; about the same number were on the far opposite side of this question, rejecting even "affirmative action without quotas to promote equal opportunities for minorities." However, most (55%) adopted a middle position, one which refrains from endorsing job quotas but which supports other forms of affirmative action. In other words, characterizations of Jewish opinion as opposed to affirmative action are incorrect. The vast majority (almost 4 in 5), in fact, supported either a moderate affirmative-action approach or even stronger policies (quotas), and, concurrently, of the large majority who opposed quotas, most supported affirmative action in other forms.

Interestingly, the strongest support for quotas, limited as it was, came from lower-income respondents, those with only a high school education, those over 60, and, to a lesser extent, women. These groups tend to be insulated from conflicts in the job market with minority groups. Much of the conflicts around affirmative action have centered on law- and medical-school admissions, and hiring for such occupations as teachers, social workers, and professors. As a result, it is non-elderly, middle-class Jewish professionals who are most likely to be aware of, and threatened by, hiring quotas.

Pro Welfare Goals, But Split on Effectiveness

One question which has sharply divided liberal and conservative elites for many years concerns strategies for alleviating the burdens of poverty. Liberals have generally supported programs which offer direct government assistance to the poor. Conservatives have argued that poor people are in fact often hurt by such well-meaning assistance and that they fare best in an expanding economy for which minimal government spending and interference are a prerequisite. Recently, some politicians and intellectuals have offered a neo-liberal critique of social programs. They differ with conservatives in that they believe government has an important role to play in directly assisting the poor; but they also differ with old-line liberals in their skepticism over the effectiveness of current programs.

Answers to the questions on welfare and food stamps demonstrate that American Jews are united in their support for government assistance for the poor (at least in theory); but, like many Americans, they are divided on their assessment of the value of existing programs. Thus, the overwhelming majority (75%) "support the goals of such government programs as welfare and food stamps," but almost as many (64%) also agreed that these programs "have had many bad effects on the very people they're supposed to help." On balance, the sample split evenly over the advisability of "efforts to reduce or eliminate some of these programs," in light of the "fraud and waste" involved in them. (The question was phrased so as to elicit the widest possible support for cutting programs.) As might be expected, lower-income Jews were slightly more sympathetic to these programs

(for reasons of self-interest) as were those with post-graduate degrees (for reasons connected with the liberalizing effect of higher education).

We combined the answers to the "goals and philosophy" question with those to the "reduce or eliminate" question so as to describe with some complexity the distribution of Jewish public opinion on social-assistance programs. The plurality (but not a majority) came out solidly in favor of the programs, that is, both their goals and philosophy as well as their current spending levels. Only about half as many (23%) expressed the characteristic conservative position, one which combines philosophical opposition with support for reducing spending on the programs. A large middle group--about a third of the sample--expressed what may be regarded as the neo-liberal position. They favored the goals and philosophy of welfare and food stamps, but --perhaps (as our question suggested) because of concern over fraud, waste, and lack of efficacy--they wanted to reduce spending on these programs.

On Crime: Neither Liberal Nor Conservative, but Security-Oriented

We asked two questions relating to crime prevention and deterrence: one on capital punishment and the other on whether people should be required "to obtain a police permit before" they "could buy a gun." According to prevailing stereotypes, liberals should favor gun control and oppose capital punishment (which are, in fact, the positions of the American Civil Liberties Union), while conservatives should take the opposite positions. Indeed, the self-defined liberals in this survey more often supported the gun-permit law and failed to endorse the death penalty than others, while the conservatives more often responded with the reverse pattern of answers. However, in terms of the responses to both crime-related questions, most respondents (like most Americans on recent surveys) fell neither into the stereotypical liberal nor the stereotypical conservative camp.

Over two thirds (68%) endorsed "the death penalty for persons convicted of murder" and, simultaneously, 9 in 10 favored the gun-permit law. In comparison with recent national surveys of all Americans, Jews support capital punishment just as often and gun control even more often (90% here versus only 72% on the 1983 National Opinion Research Center's nationwide General Social Survey). A somewhat greater number of women took the more liberal positions on both questions. Those leaning more to religious observance more often supported the death penalty, and, as in surveys of Americans generally, the more highly educated often opposed capital punishment.

When we cross-classified the responses to the two crime-related questions, we found that almost a third (29%) took a fully liberal position, one which combines ambivalence or opposition to capital punishment with support for gun control. Only 7% expressed what may be called a strictly conservative view, that is pro capital punishment and neutral or in opposition to gun control. The clear preference of

most (3 out of 5) respondents was the ostensibly paradoxical position of supporting both the death penalty and a mandatory permit before buying a gun.

This position corresponds neither to a liberal nor to a conservative approach to crime control. Rather, it may simply derive from fears of crime and disorder. Most respondents said, in effect, "Make it as hard as possible for criminals to buy guns, but if they do get them and kill somebody, punish them severely."

Homosexuals: Pro Rights, but Troubled

The research literature on tolerance consistently reports that Jews score higher than Catholics and almost all Protestant denominations on support for the rights of unpopular groups. However, there is no reason to assume that commitment to protecting the rights of unconventional groups (such as homosexuals) necessarily extends to endorsement of their lifestyles.

Consistent with Jews' reputation for tolerance, six out of seven respondents (87%) agreed that, "Whatever my personal views of homosexuality, I think that homosexuals should have the same rights as other people." However the sample almost split down the middle (a slight plurality disagreed) on the question, "Whatever my views of the rights of homosexuals, I am troubled by the rise in their visibility." As a result, about half (47%) of the sample supported gay rights and were untroubled by the rise in homosexuality (the forthright liberal response pattern), almost as many (40%) favored gay rights but were nevertheless "troubled" (the equivocal view), and a small group (13%) was opposed to or ambivalent about equal rights for homosexuals (the clearly conservative position).

As might be expected, women, the more highly educated, and the less observant were somewhat more sympathetic to equal rights for homosexuals than their opposite numbers. Even larger relationships characterized the associations of many socio-demographic variables with the "I am troubled" question. Here, over 20 percentage points separated the extreme groups on three dimensions: the less "troubled" young (under 40) from their elders (over 60); the high-school graduates from the graduate-degree holders; and the least observant from the most observant.

These answers suggest that even when most Jews take a liberal stance on public-policy questions related to personal lifestyle, they can split on their assessment of the lifestyle itself. For example, we know from previous studies that Jews overwhelmingly endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment. And here, in this study, they overwhelmingly (by over 6 to 1) endorsed "government aid for abortions for poor women." (In contrast, only a slim plurality of Americans in a recent survey--47% versus 39%--endorsed the far less demanding option, "legal abortions for the women who choose to have them." In other words we can expect even less nationwide support for government financial

subsidies of abortions, which was the way our survey formulated the issue.) Many conservative activists have contended that ERA and aid-for-abortion supporters are "anti-family." But most American Jews would probably reject that characterization. In fact, three quarters (73%) affirmed the traditionalist view, very simply worded, "Adultery is wrong." (In contrast, in a recent study of television and Hollywood film producers, less than half were willing to say that "adultery is wrong.")

Undoubtedly, to be certain about this area of investigation, we would prefer to have asked a broad battery of questions about various "social issues" and private lifestyles. However, on the basis of this scant evidence and parallel trends in public-opinion research nationally, one can infer that American Jews' opinions on public policies and private lifestyle are quite distinct. Certainly, they seem to be saying that they don't want the government interfering with individuals' lifestyles and personal moral choices, even if personally they are not all that enthusiastic about the rise in unconventional social trends.

Church-State Separation

This distinction between public policy and private values may well have influenced answers to several questions we asked about religion in public life. By a solid 2-to-1 majority this sample opposed providing "tuition tax credits for parents of children in private or parochial schools." At a point in the questionnaire graphically very distant from this question, we asked for opinions on tax credits for "parents of children in Jewish day schools." Very few respondents changed their views in response to this group-oriented appeal; by the same 2-to-1 ratio, they rejected tax credits in this instance as well. Only among the most observant, many of whom send their children to Day Schools, did a clear majority favor tax credits. Jews near-solid opposition to the credits sharply contrasts with the views of other Americans, a majority of whom actually favor the credits (51% versus 45%, according to a 1983 Los Angeles Times poll).

Apparently, as a religious minority, Jews continue to be highly sensitive to Church-State issues. Consistent with this sensitivity, the sample also overwhelmingly rejected (by over a 3-to-1 margin) the initiation of "a moment of silent meditation each day in the public schools," probably the least objectionable method of officially permitting prayer in school. In contrast, in a national Roper poll this year, Americans supported the very explicitly worded "allowing prayer in the public schools" by an overwhelming 5-to-1 majority (75% to 14%). As one might expect, the most observant Jews were somewhat more likely to support a moment of meditation; and the more highly educated more often opposed the idea than did respondents with less schooling.

Although most American Jews oppose lowering barriers between Church and State in the instances of tax credits and school prayer,

many still value religion's influence in society. Respondents split just about evenly when asked whether they agreed with the statement, "The decline of religion in American life has contributed to a decline in morality." The split fell heavily along lines of religious observance: three quarters of the most observant endorsed the statement, and less than a third of the less observant did so. Also, higher education's secularizing influence was clearly evident: only a third of those with post-graduate degrees assented as compared with a clear majority of the high-school educated.

When we cross-classified the moment-of-meditation with the religion-and-morality responses, we arrived at a familiar pattern of results. Those taking a stereotypical liberal position (opposition to a moment of meditation and disagreement with linking religion and morality) outnumbered the stereotypical conservatives (pro moment, pro religion in American life) by over 2 to 1 (35% to 14%). However, the most frequent response (given by almost half the sample) consisted of mixed or Church-State separationist answers. While this middle-of-the-road group largely opposed a moment of meditation, they did not deny the contribution of religion to public morality.

Split on Civil Liberties of Extremist Groups

As noted, American Jews have long enjoyed a reputation for being strongly committed to civil liberties. However, recent years have seen this commitment put to the test by an atmosphere of embattlement, the sense that powerful international and domestic forces are anti-Semitic, anti-Israel or both. One instance where these conflicting tendencies were starkly revealed took place in 1977 when many Jews vigorously fought the efforts of American Nazis to demonstrate in the Chicago suburb of Skokie, home of many Jewish survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. In fact the ACLU reported that several thousand members (presumably mostly Jews) resigned to protest the organization's efforts to defend the Nazis' right to demonstrate. Thus, it was not at all clear to us before this study whether the respondents would unequivocally endorse the protection of "the rights of very unpopular groups--like Ku Klux Klan, Nazis, and Communists--to demonstrate publicly."

In fact, a plurality (though not quite a majority) did agree that "it's good that the government protects" those rights, but almost as many disagreed, with about 1 in 7 undecided. Interestingly, we obtained almost the same pattern of responses to a statement worded in the reverse fashion: "It's suicidal for a democracy to protect extremist groups who want to overthrow democracy." Here a plurality also agreed, with almost as many disagreeing, and about 1 in 7 once more saying they were "not sure." Studies of support for civil liberties in the larger population have long demonstrated the powerful effects of education. Jews are no different in this respect, as differences on the order of 30-40 percentage points separated the more civil libertarian post-graduate degree holders from the high-school-

educated. Moreover, differences that were not quite as large separated the most and least observant (the latter being more civil libertarian).

Clearly, American Jews are split on the question of protecting the rights of extremists to demonstrate. In the light of past research, one would suppose that these questions may well elicit more civil-libertarian responses among Jews than among other Americans, in part because of the Jews' high level of education. Even if that were the case, the data certainly demonstrate that the American Jewish commitment to civil liberties for all, including the most extremist and unpopular, is far from broad-based, and is concentrated among the most highly educated and the least observant.

Some Liberals, Few Socialists

Shortly after the turn of the century, socialists comprised a large segment (some might say the largest single segment) of political activists among the Jewish immigrant community. And throughout the decades, Jewish individuals have played prominent roles in socialist and social-democratic organizations and intellectual circles, both in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, historians of the period have cautioned against over-interpreting this elite involvement to indicate widespread popular support for socialism among the Jewish "rank-and-file."

While we are unable to gauge accurately the extent of sympathy for socialism among Jews in the past, we were able to ask our respondents in 1984 whether they believed, "Capitalism works better than socialism." Almost three quarters (73%) agreed with this assessment, only 7% disagreed, and one fifth (20%) were "not sure." More detailed analyses demonstrated that the following groups had somewhat more sympathy for socialism: women, those under 40, the lower-income, and the less observant. We should recall here that only 1% of the sample identified themselves as "radical or socialist." (Perhaps some former socialists might have declined to call themselves simultaneously "radical" and answered "liberal" instead.) Certainly, if there ever was a large popular sympathy with socialism per se, that support has shrunk considerably.

This is not to suggest that American Jewish support for some of the policies advocated by socialists and social democrats is necessarily as small as is identification with socialism as such. We asked whether, "The government should guarantee jobs for everyone who wants to work." While the Democratic Party declined to include a government-as-last-employer plank in its 1984 platform as it had several times in the past, over a third (37%) of the NSAJ respondents agreed with this proposition, the plurality (44%) disagreed, and almost a fifth (19%) were undecided. The strongest support for this left-liberal position came from those with lower incomes, those with just a high-school education, and to a lesser extent, from those over

60, women, and the more observant. For the most part, these are among the more economically vulnerable groups and it stands to reason that they have had the most experience (personal or indirect) with unemployment.

Although Jews largely eschew identifying as socialists or endorsing socialism, a significant minority is willing to endorse key economic-policy positions central to the thinking of many contemporary American socialists, social democrats, and left-wing Democrats.

Doves and Detentists

We asked several questions relating to American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union (see Table 3). Where we could make comparisons with other recent studies of the larger public, we found Jews voicing more "dovish" or "detentist" views. Thus, by the overwhelming margin of more than 8 to 1 (84% to 10%), they favored "the U.S. agreeing to a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union." (In contrast, in a May 1983 Gallup Poll, Americans supported the freeze by a smaller, though still lopsided ratio over 3 to 1 or 70% to 21%.) Similarly, a 2-to-1 majority (55% to 29%) of NSAJ respondents disagreed with the proposition that, "The U.S. should be more forceful . . . with the USSR even if it increases the risk of war."

In a statement last year which received wide publicity, President Reagan called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." We asked our respondents whether "he was basically accurate" in making that statement; half (50%) agreed, one third (35%) disagreed, and a sixth (15%) were undecided. We followed that question with: "Whether or not President Reagan was factually correct, he displayed poor judgment in calling the Soviet Union an 'evil empire.'" Here, two thirds (66%) agreed in criticizing the President, only a quarter (25%) disagreed, and a very small number (9%) were not sure. (Were the President more popular among Jews, the "basically accurate" statement probably would have received more support. In other words, the question not only asked whether the USSR is evil, respondents were also answering, in part, whether they trusted Reagan personally to be accurate.)

In general, women were about 7 to 10 percentage points more dovish on most foreign policy questions than were the men (as are women nationally). The more educated were also more dovish (as they are nationally), as were the less observant, and younger (under 40) respondents.

When we cross-classified the respondents to the "evil empire" questions, we found three major response categories. The first consisted of a little over a third (35%) of the sample who were clearly "doves"--they denied that Reagan's calling the USSR an "evil empire" was accurate. At the other extreme were a smaller number (a little over a fifth or 22%) who were outspoken "hawks"--they thought both that the USSR is an "evil empire" and that it was right for

Table 3

Opinions on Foreign Affairs Issues

	<u>Favor/ Agree</u>	<u>Oppose/ Disagree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
		<u>Per cent</u>	
Nuclear freeze with the USSR	84	10	6
Be more forceful with USSR	29	55	17
Reagan accurate to call USSR "evil empire"	50	35	15
Reagan showed poor judgment	66	27	9
Inaccurate	35		
Accurate, poor judgment	35		
Other	8		
Accurate, good judgment	22		
	<u>100</u>		
Use of U.S. military force if: USSR invaded Western Europe	56	19	26
Arabs cut off oil to U.S.	38	37	25
Build more nuclear power plants	31	48	22
Build nuclear plants to lessen dependence on Arab oil	38	42	20
Cut military spending to reduce deficits, relieve tensions	59	27	14
To support Israel, U.S. should maintain a strong military	61	24	15
Not for strong mil., pro cut	28		
Ambiguous	6		
Keep strong, not anti cut	39		
Against cuts	25		
	<u>100</u>		
The U.S. should leave the UN	21	69	9

President Reagan to say so. Finally, over a third (35%) fell into a middle category of what we may call for brevity's sake "detentists"--people could not reject the "evil empire" characterization, but who thought it imprudent for a president (and, perhaps, especially President Reagan) to use such language.

The composite portrait of American Jewish attitudes on American policy toward the Soviet Union suggests many more "doves" than "hawks." Depending on the question, hawkish policy positions (against a nuclear freeze, for more forcefulness, and for denouncing the Soviet Union) mustered only between 10% and 29%. In each case, dovish positions (for the freeze--84%; against more forcefulness--55%; and against the President calling the USSR an "evil empire"--66%) garnered far more support, and, where comparisons were possible, more support than among the American public at large. Of the majority who regarded the USSR as an "evil empire" or were unsure, at least half took dovish policy stances on the other questions. These may be called "detentists" rather than doves--they see in the USSR something evil or threatening, but they prefer policy options which emphasize diplomacy and negotiation over denunciation and the threat of force.

Split on Use of Force

We asked the respondents whether they would support "the use of U.S. military force" under two sets of circumstances. "If Soviet troops invaded Western Europe," a bare majority (56%) favored the use of force, almost a fifth (19%) opposed it, and over a quarter (26%) were "not sure." In the less threatening circumstance that "the Arabs cut off oil shipments to the U.S.," the sample was understandably even more reluctant to support the use of force; here, it split down the middle (38% for, 37% against).

In both instances, living up to their reputation as the more hawkish sex, men were about 20 percentage points more likely to support the use of force than were women. While observant and non-observant had similar attitudes on using force to respond to a Soviet invasion, the observant were far more likely to advocate force in the event of an Arab oil cutoff. Apparently, the Arab oil question evoked the deeper passions that the more observant tend to feel about threats to Israel.

Like other Americans, Jews are hesitant to endorse the commitment of American military forces in hypothetical situations. Recent experience with surveys and actual events have shown, however, that reluctance in hypothetical situations recedes when American troops initially enter combat situations. On the other hand, should the troops fail to achieve their objectives quickly the American public becomes restive with the deployment of military personnel in combat. Presumably, American Jews would react (and have reacted) in a similar fashion.

No to Nuclear Plants

For several years, public support for nuclear-power plants in the United States has been shrinking. Recent public-opinion polls report more opponents than supporters of building more plants.

In contrast, a few Jewish organizations have argued for expanding nuclear-power facilities so as to reduce American energy reliance on imported oil from Arab countries. Exponents of this view believe that Arab countries' political influence in the United States is to some extent proportionate to their economic involvement, thus, reducing petroleum imports from these countries will reduce both economic involvement and political influence.

We asked respondents whether they favored "building more nuclear-power plants in the U.S." Less than a third (31%) favored such a policy, but more (almost half or 48%) opposed it, and about a fifth (22%) were "not sure." We sought to determine the extent to which an appeal to American Jews' concern over Arab influence in the United States would affect their responses to the nuclear-power plant question. Thus, at a point in the questionnaire somewhat removed from the earlier question, we asked whether "the U.S. should build more nuclear-power plants so as to lessen dependence on the Arabs' oil." The wording change resulted in a net shift of only 5-6 percentage points. Opponents still outnumbered supporters of nuclear power, although by a smaller margin (38% for and 42% against), and a fifth (20%) were undecided.

As one might expect, the shift in opinion was concentrated among respondents with stronger Jewish commitment. They had the same views as others regarding building nuclear-power plants in the first, question, but the mention of Arab oil opened a gap of approximately ten percentage points between the more and less Jewish-committed respondents.

In a certain sense, these results parallel those reported earlier for tuition tax credits, where we asked about credits generally, and about credits for parents of Jewish all-day school students. There too the patterns of responses for the two questions were nearly identical. These results, then, demonstrate not only Jews' commitment to particular liberal policy positions; they also show that commitment can remain largely intact even in the face of direct appeals to group interests, as only the most Jewish in involvement respond to the group-oriented stimuli.

Less Spending, But a Strong U.S. Military for Israel

Most American Jews share two sorts of political commitments. On the one hand, as we have been demonstrating, most have moderate-to-liberal political tendencies. At the same time, as last year's NSAJ convincingly demonstrated, the overwhelming majority care deeply about Israel's security and most are worried about U.S. support for Israel.

Both pro-Israel conservatives and anti-Israel liberals have argued that pro-Israel, liberal-minded Jews opposed to U.S. interventionism are inconsistent. Conservatives would have such Jews rethink their opposition to military spending increases and to an interventionist foreign policy. The anti-Israel liberals claim that American Jews have been restrained in opposing the build-up and the utilization of the American military, and that concern for Israeli security has made Jews less reliable allies in an anti-military liberal coalition.

To address this area of possible conflict, we asked two questions in sequence: "To help reduce deficits and relieve world tensions, U.S. military spending should be cut" and "In order to be a reliable military supplier of Israel, the U.S. should maintain a strong military capacity." The results for both seemingly contradictory questions were virtually identical. About three fifths endorsed each position, about a quarter disagreed, and about 1 in 7 were "not sure." (In contrast, only about a quarter of Americans in recent nationwide surveys endorsed defense cutbacks. Thus, at least twice as many Jews as other Americans want military spending reductions; however, we should qualify this conclusion to take account of the wording of our military expenditure question which was designed so as to elicit maximal support for spending reductions.)

Consistent with their greater dovishness elsewhere, women were about 15 percentage points more likely than men to take anti-military positions on these statements. And also, as one would expect, the ritually observant were only a little more likely to oppose spending cuts, but much more likely than less observant respondents to support a strong military capacity for the sake of defending Israel.

We cross-classified the responses to the two "military" questions. Over a quarter (28%) were out-and-out "doves"--they wanted cuts in military spending and failed to endorse a strong U.S. military capacity. At the other extreme were an equal number (27%) who were "hawks"--they opposed or were unsure about spending cuts, and they wanted a strong military capacity. The plurality (about two fifths) took what neo-liberals have defined as their defense-policy position: that the U.S. can reduce its military spending and still should (and presumably could) retain a strong military capacity. (The phrasing of our questions could not adequately capture the position of mainstream Democrats, one which combines very modest military spending increases with an intent to maintain a strong military. Presumably, a large portion, if not the majority, of our sample would have supported this position.)

Remain in the U.N.

For years Jews have been prominent among the supporters of the United Nations. That support has been consistent with their aversion to what they see as the tragic consequences of unchecked nationalist passions and their belief in international diplomacy as an effective

way of avoiding conflict. However, in recent years, their support for the U.N. as a legitimate expression of these noble beliefs and aspirations has been sorely tested by the numerous well-publicized anti-Israel and anti-Zionist actions by the U.N. and affiliated agencies. Conservative commentators and others have argued that the U.N. has failed to promote international peace, that it has served as an instrument of anti-Americanism, and that it is unambiguously anti-Israel. As such, they have argued, the U.N. is no longer deserving of American Jewish support.

Despite these considerations, the sample rejected by 3 to 1 the proposition, "The U.S. should leave the U.N." As before, less than a quarter (21%) articulated what may be regarded as a conservative position (endorsement of leaving). In contrast, only about half as many Americans (12%) in a 1983 Gallup Poll said, "The U.S. should give up its membership in the U.N." Although our questionnaire contained no reminders of the U.N.'s recent Israel-related actions and positions, we can presume that large proportions of the sample could not have been totally unaware of this recent history. In fact, the most observant were about twice as likely to agree the U.S. should leave (38% for, 52% opposed) as were less observant respondents.

Others who disproportionately supported leaving were those over 60; while the post-graduate degree holders were especially likely to oppose departing the U.N.

Thus, as with other issues reported above, a historic American Jewish commitment to a liberal policy position remains largely, although not totally, intact, despite many group-related reasons to abandon such a position. However, the large size of the Jewish minority opposed to U.N. membership as compared with other Americans suggests that some Jews--particularly the more Jewish-committed--have soured on the U.N. precisely because of its anti-Israel record.

Hawks versus Doves

To assess in a summary fashion the balance of support for different sorts of candidates defined in the broadest possible terms, we asked the respondents to rank order their preferences among four hypothetical candidates for President. The candidates were the four possible combinations of liberal/conservative in domestic affairs, and hawk/dove in foreign affairs. Table 4 reports the proportions giving 1st-, 2nd-, 3rd-, and 4th-place responses to each of the four candidates ("liberal dove" through "conservative hawk").

Both types of liberals received far more first-place votes than both types of conservatives: more than three fifths chose the two liberals as their first choice over the two fifths who preferred one of the conservatives. At that same time, by a small margin, the sample preferred the hawk of either political stripe to the dove.

Just as the first place choices tell us whom respondents most

Table 4

Presidential Preference

Of 4 hypothetical candidates for President, who would be your 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th choice?

	<u>Choice</u>				
	<u>Per cent</u>				
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	
Domestic liberal & a foreign affairs dove	33	20	15	33	100
Domestic liberal & a foreign affairs hawk	31	29	30	9	100
Domestic conservative & a foreign affairs dove	17	29	35	19	100
Domestic conservative & a foreign affairs hawk	27	21	12	41	100

Table 5

Opinions About Jews in American Society

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Jews have a uniquely long and tragic history of persecution	94	5	1
The Jewish history of persecution has made Jews especially sensitive to the needs of minority groups	80	11	9
The U.S. has offered Jews more opportunities and freedom than any other Diaspora country	83	6	10
There is nothing wrong with members of ethnic and religious groups in the U.S. organizing politically to further their group interests	79	11	10

preferred, so the fourth or last place selections tell us whom they most opposed. Over 2 in 5 chose the "conservative hawk" for last place; but, significantly, almost as many (about a third) saw the ideologically opposite candidate, the "liberal dove," as the least desirable (i.e., in fourth place). The "liberal hawk" was the least objectionable to the broadest majority of respondents; this candidate received more first- and second-place votes and fewer last-place respondents than any other.

These results suggest that the reputed support of American Jews for such "Cold War liberals" as the late Henry Jackson and Hubert Humphrey and New York's current senior Senator, Daniel P. Moynihan, derive not merely from their outspoken support for Israel and Soviet Jewry. These political figures also combined New Deal liberalism with an international hawkishness, a combination which has appealed to American Jews qua participants in the larger political process.

Although the "liberal hawk" generated the broadest consensus among American Jews, the "liberal dove," by virtue of having barely led in first-place choices, seem to have excited the most commitment. This most widespread positive reaction to the "liberal dove" reflects the ability of many Democratic liberal dovish candidates (such as George McGovern) to elicit both passionate support and deep antipathy among a large minority of Jewish voters and political activists.

Political Values

To acquire some understanding of why American Jews adopt certain political attitudes and positions, we composed four questions which we thought articulated some widely held underlying values and beliefs. The statements, which in fact elicited very broad agreement (see Table 5), illustrate some of the values which inform most Jews' political thinking:

- (1) "Jews have a uniquely long and tragic history of persecution."
- (2) "The Jewish history of persecution has made Jews especially sensitive to the needs of minority groups."
- (3) "The U.S. has offered Jews more opportunities than any other Diaspora country."
- (4) "There is nothing wrong with members of ethnic and religious groups in the U.S. organizing politically to further their group interests."

Common to these statements is the theme that American Jews have a keen sense of themselves as a minority group within American society. Moreover, Jews are like many other minority groups in that they

maintain a sense of group victimization, a self-image of having suffered unusual persecution. A sense of victimization often produces a moral or noble self-image illustrated here by the claim that Jews are unusually sensitive to other minority groups. Often, a victimization mentality, especially when coupled with an image of moral superiority, engenders claims to special privileges. That is, many minority groups justify special claims upon the society or the world around them on the basis of real or imagined historic or contemporary injustices. For example, many Jews believe that the Gentile world "owes" support and special consideration to the State of Israel because of the Nazi Holocaust.

Yet another consensual element in Jews' political thinking is their positive image of the United States as a country unusual in the welcome it extends to Jewish participation in the political process. It not only guarantees individual freedom, but it is one of the few places in the world which guarantees group freedoms as well.

Concomitantly, American Jews value highly both their Jewishness and their Americanness. As we learned in the 1983 NSAJ, they harmonize their twin commitments to the United States and to the Jewish people. When the perceived interests or values of the U.S. and those particular to Jews appear to conflict, Jews strive to minimize or reinterpret perceptions of conflict. They tend to see these occasions (e.g., American-Israeli policy differences) as limited in scope, or as a result of misunderstandings, or as caused by special-interest groups who, for commercial gain or out of a misguided sense of America's true national interests, would have U.S. policy ignore the many interests and values ostensibly shared by American society and American Jewry (or Israel).

But Jews' confidence in the tolerance and ultimate justice of American society in its ideal form does not prevent them from fearing deviations from America's highest principles. In short, Jews believe they need to be vigilant to guard against the ever-present danger of recurring anti-Semitism.

Fear of Anti-Semitism

Irrespective of the actual extent of exclusion of Jews from certain positions or sectors of reward, esteem, and influence in American life, the perception of exclusion has been an important element in the consciousness of American Jews. Thus, despite all their gains in the economic, political and cultural worlds, Jews still feel they are outsiders, and this sense of being outside the centers of secure influence, this sense of vulnerability, may well have much to do with the persistence of Jews' distinctive political orientations.

In both the 1983 and 1984 surveys, roughly half or more expressed in various ways their concern with contemporary anti-Semitism (see Table 6). Thus, in 1984 almost half (47%) rejected the view that

Table 6

Opinions About Extent of Anti-Semitism (1984 & 1983)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Not sure</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews	77	10	13
1983 NSAJ:	69	11	20
Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews	40	47	13
1983 NSAJ:	37	43	20
Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews	31	58	11
1983 NSAJ:	27	55	18
When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive	57	29	14
1983 NSAJ:	54	24	22

"anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews." A 2-to-1 majority also rejected the proposition that "virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews." The same ratio agreed that "when it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive." Even larger numbers expressed concern about the possible emergence of anti-Semitism: over three quarters (77%) agreed that "anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews."

Between 1983 and 1984, on three of the four questions, fears of anti-Semitism grew slightly. Though the differences are too small to substantiate statistically any significant upswing in fear of anti-Semitism, the results certainly indicate no abatement in that concern among American Jews in the last year.

Perceived Anti-Semites: Religious and Ethnic Groups, and Conservatives Too

Since most Jews fear prejudice, we sought to understand just which groups in American society Jews believe are hostile to them. Table 7 reports the answers to the question, "What proportion of each of the following groups in the U.S. is anti-Semitic?"

Two sorts of groups had the highest proportions of perceived anti-Semitism: (1) other religious, racial or ethnic groups, especially blacks; and (2) groups associated with the conservative camp. In contrast, very few respondents believed that "most" or "many" Democrats and Liberals are anti-Semitic.

To elaborate, more respondents (54%) thought that most or many blacks were anti-Semitic than any other group listed. However, almost as many thought that most or many members of the other ethnic groups--Fundamentalist Protestants (46%), Mainstream Protestants (42%), Catholics (40%), and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics (30%)--were anti-Semitic as well. Paradoxically, as many as 40% thought that most or many Catholics were anti-Semitic, but only 6% thought the same of Democrats; while 42% thought that most or many Mainstream Protestants were anti-Semitic, a smaller (but still hefty) 29% thought that most or many Republicans were so disposed. A large number of respondents were saying, in effect, that Catholic Democrats or Protestant Republicans who act as Catholics or Protestants may be anti-Semitic, but those who behave primarily as Democrats or Republicans probably are not.

These findings suggest that Jews are fearful of other Americans with articulated group identities, be they religious, ethnic, or racial. Jews have a historical consciousness of having been persecuted as a religious, ethnic, and even racial minority by non-Jewish majority groups and may well associate the vigorous expression of non-Jewish group identities with anti-Semitism. Hence, Jews' perception of black anti-Semitism may only partially be due to

Table 7

Rating of Groups for Anti-Semitism

In your opinion, what proportion of each of the following groups in the U.S. is anti-Semitic? Most, many, some or few?

	<u>Most or many</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Few or Not Sure</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Big business	44	40	17
Union leaders	23	43	34
Democrats	6	48	46
Republicans	29	48	43
Liberals	7	34	60
Conservatives	35	42	24
Hispanics	30	37	33
Blacks	54	32	26
Catholics	40	42	18
Mainstream Protestants	42	40	19
Fundamentalist Protestants	46	28	26
State Department	40	35	25
Pentagon	39	37	24
Media	18	45	36
Police	19	48	33
Is Jesse Jackson anti-Semitic?	YES: 74	NO: 8	NOT SURE: 18

the specifics of black-Jewish political or social differences. In part, Jews may be reacting to blacks as they would (and do) to any other minority group which vigorously asserts and expresses its group character (even though Jews do so themselves and say they regard such expressions as legitimate).

The second major trend to emerge from these data is that many Jews see conservative groups as more anti-Semitic than their liberal counterparts. Thus, perceptions of "big business anti-Semitism (44%) outscored that of "union leaders" (23%) by almost 2 to 1; institutions associated with conservative America--the State Department (40%) and the Pentagon (39%)--outscored the media (18%), which is often associated with the liberal camp, by over 2 to 1 as well; and most pertinent, Republicans (29%) outscored Democrats (6%) while conservatives (35%) outscored liberals (7%) by huge ratios of 4 to 1. (For reasons which we cannot fully explain, relatively few (19%) saw the police as anti-Semitic. Perhaps Jews' fear of crime and disorder, their consequent reliance on the police as a protector, and their infrequent adversarial contact with the police serve to outweigh any historically induced imagery of the police as instruments of a persecutorial, anti-Semitic regime.)

In the answers to the questions we asked about the impressions respondents held of four politically active groups, we find even more support for the inference that Jews like or trust liberals and dislike or fear conservatives (see Table 8). Of respondents reporting an impression one way or the other, lopsided majorities (by ratios of 3 or 4 to 1) said they were "generally favorable" toward the ACLU, NAACP, and NOW, groups associated with the left (we specifically chose to use acronyms so as to discourage answers from those who were so unfamiliar with the groups as to fail to recognize their acronyms). However, by about a 10-to-1 ratio, they said their impression of the Moral Majority was "generally unfavorable."

(The extent to which we are dealing with the masses rather than political elites bears emphasis. American Jews have been credited with having a very effective Congressional lobby, one spearheaded by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee or AIPAC. Despite the excellent reputation this organization enjoys among elites and the importance of Israel to American Jewry, over three quarters had "no impression" of AIPAC, as compared with only 6% who had "no impression" of the UJA. [See the questionnaire in Appendix II for detailed distributions.]

The responses to the perceived anti-Semitism questions not only tell us who American Jews think are friendly or hostile but show these perceptions to be rather closely related to Jews' political views. That is, we found that liberal respondents more often thought that right-leaning groups--such as conservatives, Republicans, the Pentagon and the State Department--were anti-Semitic; simultaneously, they were less likely to think that left-leaning groups -- such as liberals,

Democrats, the media, blacks, Hispanics, and union leaders--were anti-Semitic (Table 9).

We calculated the percentage of liberals, moderates, and conservatives (classified in terms of their positions on 29 issues largely covered in Tables 2 and 3, that is, the first 29 questions in the questionnaire reproduced in the Appendix) among respondents differentiated in terms of their perception of right-wing or left-wing anti-Semitism. Not surprisingly, we found that conservatives fear left-wing anti-Semitism and that liberals perceive right-wing anti-Semitism. Thus, of those who were relatively more concerned about left-wing than about right-wing anti-Semitism, only 1 in 5 (19%) qualified as liberals; and of those more concerned with the right, over 2 in 5 (43%) were solidly liberal.

In other words, for Jews, political views and selective perceptions of group anti-Semitism are intertwined, although the causal direction between political views and anti-Semitic perceptions is far from clear. Either Jews arrive at a general political stance and then impute anti-Semitism to the opponents of that stance, or they adopt a political stance in response to real or perceived anti-Semitism on the part of opponents of that position. Whatever the case, it is clear that Jews' ethnic identity and their political attitudes are mutually related.

In fact, political advocates within the Jewish community long have recognized this association. Historically, Jewish liberals have argued that the anti-Semites were largely on the right. In recent times, Jewish conservatives have asserted that many on the left--Democrats, blacks, trade unionists, the U.N. (to cite one recent article)--are, if not quite anti-Semitic, then, at the least, are taking positions opposed to Jewish interests. Jewish liberals' rebuttal often cites the extensive support for Israel and other Jewish causes from liberal, black and Hispanic legislators and questions the interests and inclinations of big business, the military, the diplomatic corps, and Fundamentalist Christians. In other words, the debate among Jews over which politics they should adopt often revolves around disputes over which side has been most friendly or hostile to Jews and Jewish interests.

Blacks and Jews: Making Distinctions Over People and Issues

The results reported above contained answers to several questions relating to black Americans and to issues especially important to them. These answers clearly demonstrate that Jews make fine distinctions (accurately or inaccurately) among different black personalities or groups. We obtained very different reactions to questions pertaining to Jesse Jackson, the black leader and former Democratic presidential aspirant, to blacks in general, and to the NAACP, the civil rights association with which Jews have had a long cooperative history. To the baldly stated question, "Is Jesse Jackson anti-Semitic?" about three quarters (74%) of the sample said he was,

Table 8

Impressions of Selected Groups

	<u>Generally Favorable</u>	<u>Generally Unfavorable</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>No Impression</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>			
ACLU	42	13	24	22
NAACP	54	12	28	6
Moral Majority	7	69	14	10
NOW	41	11	20	28

Table 9

Political Self-identification and Views by Perceptions of
Left-wing and Right-wing Anti-SemitismPrincipal Source of Perceived Anti-Semitism

	<u>Left- wing</u>	<u>Both or neither</u>	<u>Right- wing</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>			
<u>Self-identification</u>				
Liberal	25	37	46	38
Middle of the road	40	38	38	38
Conservative	35	26	16	25
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>Political Views*</u>				
Liberal (18-29)	19	26	43	31
Middle of the road (9-17)	63	64	50	58
Conservative (0-8)	18	9	7	11
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

* Summary score of liberal responses to 29 questions. Most of those with 18-29 liberal responses identified as "liberal"; most of those with 9-17 liberal responses identified as "middle of the road"; most with 0-8 liberal responses identified as "conservative."

hardly any (8%) disagreed, and almost a fifth (18%) were unsure (see Table 7). In contrast, a slim majority (54%) thought that "most" or "many" blacks were anti-Semitic (Table 7 again). And in even sharper contrast, the same majority (54%) said they had a "generally favorable" impression of the NAACP which, in fact, recorded more "generally favorable" responses than either the ACLU or NOW (Table 8).

Jesse Jackson's image fared much worse than that of blacks in general, probably owing to his identification with what have been seen as overtly anti-Israel positions and to his much-reported use of anti-Semitic epithets in a conversation during the 1984 presidential campaign. The NAACP, on the other hand, elicited far more favorable responses in part because of the history of NAACP-Jewish cooperation and in part because many Jews undoubtedly view the organization (correctly or not) as an effective agency espousing a relatively moderate posture in its program and operations.

Not only do Jews distinguish between those whom they see as friendly or unfriendly blacks, they distinguish among various positions especially important to black Americans. Earlier we noted that the vast majority supported some form of affirmative action, but almost as many opposed or were unsure about quotas. While the vast majority supported the general philosophy behind governmental assistance to the poor, most believed these programs sometimes hurt the poor, and the sample was divided over whether funding for the programs should be reduced because of waste and fraud.

These findings suggest some ground for coalition-building between Jews and blacks on certain items on the domestic agenda. Probably in contrast to other Americans, Jews are more in sympathy with the employment and social-welfare goals of many blacks. However, it seems that they part company with those blacks who advocate specific programmatic solutions which Jews see either as unworkable or, as in the case of quotas, objectionable from a value or historical or group-interests perspective.

Our 1983 survey found that Jews think that blacks, far more than any other group listed in the study, are unfriendly to Israel. The results suggest that Jews see blacks, relative to other groups in society, as more anti-Israel than anti-Semitic. (Specifically, about as many Jews reported perceptions of black anti-Israelism--in 1983--as reported perceptions of black anti-Semitism in 1984. However, while they perceived few other ethnic or religious groups as anti-Israel, they thought many such groups to be almost as anti-Semitic as blacks. Hence, perceptions of black anti-Israelism were more outstanding than perceptions of black anti-Semitism.

Thus, Jews distinguish among different policy arenas. Although they may think that blacks agree with them about many domestic items, they also think that blacks, much more than other Americans, disagree with them about the need for strong American support for Israel.

The source of Jews' political alienation from American blacks illustrates the importance of perceived anti-Semitism in influencing Jewish political beliefs. By extension, these findings also demonstrate that Jews' group ties heavily influence their political orientations. In this specific case, and in the instance of the liberal and conservative camps generally, we have seen how perceptions of the sources of anti-Semitism are closely associated with political attitudes. Other evidence of the importance of group ties can be found when we compare the political attitudes of Jews with different sorts of involvement in Jewish life.

Jewishness and Politics: Ethnic Moderates, Integrated Liberals

For several reasons, we would expect that those who are more involved in Jewish life (and defining involvement is indeed a thorny issue) will espouse more conservative, or perhaps more accurately, less liberal views. One aspect of Jewish involvement--the practice of traditional rituals--implies a greater proximity to a traditional religious culture which holds relatively conservative views on many lifestyle issues. It is also a culture which values the clear and overt expression of Jewish group interests in the political arena. Another key dimension of Jewish involvement--the extent of formal and informal ties with other Jews--is also associated with a group-oriented worldview: Jews who spend most of their intimate social lives in the company of other Jews may well receive less exposure to the interests and values of Gentiles. Thus, from both religious and ethnic standpoints, there are many good reasons to suppose that Jewish involvement promotes conservative inclinations.

On the other hand, one might argue that, to some extent, involvement with other Jews would promote liberal tendencies. If the political subculture of American Jews is indeed somewhat more liberal than the mainstream politics of the rest of the country, then involvement in the Jewish subcommunity should reinforce the liberal political views peculiar to that subcommunity.

The 1981 NSAJ, in fact, uncovered an unusual relationship between Jewish involvement and political views. That study showed that the more involved Jews were less liberal, while highly assimilated Jews were so distant from the politically liberal Jewish subcommunity that they held political beliefs closer to the more conservative views of American non-Jews with similar social characteristics, though not as close to those of the most involved Jews.

As we demonstrate below, the 1984 results correspond to the 1981 study. They confirm that Jewish liberalism does indeed increase as Jewish involvement (as we define it) declines, but only up to a point. The most uninvolved had less liberal political views than did those with slightly more Jewish involvement, who had the most liberal views of all, but, the uninvolved were still more liberal than the most involved Jews.

One of our two measures of Jewish involvement consisted of the total number of ritual practices the respondents said they observed. (We had asked respondents whether they attended Passover Seders, fasted Yom Kippur, attended Sabbath services one a month or more, and had two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products.) We constructed the other measure of involvement from the responses to two questions on the Jewish composition of "your 3 closest friends," and "the 3 people in your neighborhood with whom you are closest." We simply added the number of Jewish friends and neighbors. This defined a Jewish networks measure ranging from 0 to 6 (see Table 10).

One political measure consisted simply of the self-definition as liberals, conservatives, etc. The other political measure reported in the table divided the respondents into liberals, moderates, and conservatives on the basis of their answers to 29 issue questions. As noted earlier, we simply added the number of unambiguously liberal responses to the 29 opinion items. Most of those who gave at least 18 liberal answers defined themselves as "liberals." Most who gave between 9 and 17 liberal responses called themselves "middle of the road," and most of those who gave 8 liberal answers or fewer called themselves "conservatives." Hence, we divided the political spectrum into three groups accordingly.

Liberalism does increase dramatically as Jewish involvement diminishes. Only 15% or less of the two more ritually observant groups took liberal positions as opposed to almost half of those practicing only one ritual. The results at the other (conservative) end of the political spectrum correspond as 10% or fewer of the three less observant groups had conservative views as contrasted with about twice as many of the two most observant groups. Moreover, we find similar but less dramatic association between ritual practice and the respondents' own political self-definition: again, the more observant, the less liberal. However, fewer of the least observant had highly liberal views than did those who observed one practice, but the former slightly more often identified as liberals.

When we turn to the Jewish friends and neighbors measure, we also find that the more Jewish-involved are generally less liberal (either in terms of self-classification or of the opinions on the 29 issues). However, as the number of Jewish intimates declines, the liberal proportion peaks among those with 1-2 Jewish (out of 6 closest) friends and neighbors. Those with none were less often liberal than those with 1-2 Jewish associates, but more liberal than those with 5 or 6 close Jewish friends and neighbors.

Particularly interesting here is an apparent discrepancy in the politics among the most involved, be they the most ritually observant or the most socially ethnic (those with the most Jewish friends and neighbors). On the one hand, their views on the issues are decidedly less liberal and more conservative than those of the less involved (i.e., the less observant or more socially integrated). On the other hand, almost as many of the involved as the uninvolved called them-

Table 10

Political Self-identification and Views, and Per cent Democratic,
by Ritual Observance, and by Jewish Friends and Neighbors

		<u>Self-identification</u>			<u>Political Views</u>		
		<u>Lib</u>	<u>Mid</u>	<u>Cons</u>	<u>Lib</u>	<u>Mid</u>	<u>Cons</u>
		<u>Per cent</u>					
<u>Ritual Observance</u>							
High	4	21	50	30	14	62	24
	3	30	36	35	15	65	20
	2	38	38	24	34	60	7
	1	46	35	20	45	49	6
Low	0	49	33	18	38	52	10
<u>Jewish Friends and Neighbors</u>							
High	6	33	39	28	24	64	12
	5	35	43	21	28	61	12
	4	34	39	27	31	57	12
	3	38	36	26	31	56	13
	2	45	30	25	44	46	10
	1	41	38	21	41	51	8
Low	0	40	36	24	31	61	8

selves "liberal." Perhaps the most committed Jews retain a greater allegiance to the labels of the political groups (liberals and moderates) who have been seen as historically friendly to Jewish interests.

The same phenomenon of allegiance to labels might be operating in the case of party identification. Despite substantial differences in political attitudes between those with varying levels of Jewish involvement, all these groups had similar distributions of party identification. Whatever their level of Jewish involvement, a slim majority said they were Democrats, even though almost half of the marginally involved Jews had solidly liberal views and only one observant Jew in seven reported opinions so far to the left. In other words, as any politician from a heavily Jewish district knows, many observant or ethnically involved Jews are Democrats, but their political views are relatively moderate or even conservative. They are the ones who are enthusiastic about New York's Mayor Edward Koch, who found George McGovern repugnant, and who crossed party lines to vote for Ronald Reagan in 1980.

The relative political conservatism (relative, that is to other Jews, although not to the rest of the country) of the more observant third of the Jewish population may help explain the discrepancy between "appearances" (anecdotes reported by many journalists during election seasons) and "reality" (the type of evidence contained in exit polls and public-opinion studies such as this). Observers often correctly report anecdotal evidence of opposition to liberal policies or candidates among many highly committed Jews. Then, the commentators or their audience mistakenly generalize from this highly visible sector of American Jewry to the entire population. As we have shown, there is a good reason for this error of inference. The more visible, more organized, more religious, and more ethnic Jews are simply less liberal and more conservative than those of average involvement in Jewish life.

Cosmopolitan Liberals: The Influence of Cultural Reading and Higher Education

We asked the respondents to tell us which of several politically and culturally oriented publications they regularly read or receive in their household. They reported extraordinarily high rates of reading (see Table 11). In part, these results may derive from the broad phrasing of the question ("read or receive"); in part, they may reflect the prestige this highly educated population attaches to reading; and, in part, they represent reality, that is, the great frequency with which Jews do, in fact, read middle-to-upper-brow magazines and other publications.

Each of three types of publications were reported by majorities of respondents: a major newsweekly (56%), a professional journal (56%), and a Jewish periodical (58%). Two fifths (41%) said they received or read the Sunday N.Y. Times, and almost as many (39%) reported reading

Table 11
Reading Behavior

	<u>Per cent</u>
Times, Newsweek or U.S. News & World Report	56
New Republic	4
National Review	2
Commentary	5
New Yorker	20
N.Y. Review of Books	10
Atlantic or Harper's	6
Business Week, Forbes or Fortune	27
Wall Street Journal	39
Sunday New York Times	41
Ms.	6
A professional journal	56
A Jewish magazine or newspaper	58
Moment	4
Jerusalem Post	7
Belongs to a book club	16

the Wall Street Journal. Over a quarter (27%) reported a major business magazine, a fifth said they read or received the New Yorker, one in ten checked off the N.Y. Review of Books, and each of the following had readership rates ranging between 2% and 7%: Jerusalem Post, Ms., Atlantic or Harper's, Commentary, New Republic, Moment and the National Review. Finally, 1 in 6 (16%) said they belonged to a book club (the Book-of-Month Club and the Literary Guild are the nation's largest).

We found (to no one's surprise) that readers of ideologically oriented periodicals disproportionately had political views reflecting those publications' ideological bent. Thus, readers of Commentary and the National Review were more conservative; readers of the N.Y. Review of Books, New Republic, and Ms. were more liberal. Readers of business publications were somewhat less liberal than others, but not very much so. Readers of newsweeklies and the Jewish publications were hardly different politically from non-readers.

Perhaps the most curious finding was that readers of upper-middle-brow publications having little overt political bent were substantially more liberal than non-readers. Reading the Sunday N.Y. Times, a professional journal, the New Yorker, and Atlantic or Harper's was associated with political liberalism. Liberal views increased with each additional cultural publication read or received (see Table 12). The percentage scoring highly liberal on the 29-issue index increased from 17% among those who read no such publications (less than a quarter of the sample), to 28% of those who read one periodical, to 35% of those who read two publications, to 46% of the small number 11% of the sample) who read 3 or more of the periodicals.

Apparently, reading certain publications is an indicator of a wider phenomenon, namely, involvement in a cosmopolitan sub-community of cultural consumers, one with its own values, perspectives, and worldviews. Reading such publications turns out to be an alternative to higher education as a vehicle for participating in this intellectual sub-community. The more one participates, even only as consumers rather than producers of that culture (and other studies have demonstrated heavy Jewish representation among the producers of sophisticated American culture), the more one adopts the liberal political views of the national, if not international, intelligentsia.

Part of the reason for this dramatic association between liberalism and certain types of reading is artifactual, a result of the high number of post-graduate degree holders among the readers. Indeed, further analysis uncovered that cultural reading serves as a functional alternative to graduate school in promoting liberal views. Those with a graduate degree, whether they were cultural readers or not (though most were), were the most liberal (see Table 12). Among those with a B.A. or less, reading cultural publications was associated with a more substantial difference in political views. Among the less well-educated respondents, those who read two or more publications were almost as liberal as those with a graduate degree.

Table 12

Political Self-identification and Views
by Cultural Reading and Education

		<u>Self-identification</u>			<u>Political Views</u>		
		<u>Lib</u>	<u>Mid</u>	<u>Cons</u>	<u>Lib</u>	<u>Mid</u>	<u>Cons</u>
		<u>Per cent</u>					
<u>Cultural reading</u>							
High	3	46	35	19	46	46	9
	2	44	34	23	35	55	10
	1	31	41	28	28	61	11
Low	0	33	41	26	17	68	15
<u>Education</u>							
	Graduate degree	45	32	23	43	47	10
	B.A.	34	39	27	28	60	12
	Some college, no B.A.	33	41	27	23	67	11
	High school or less	32	44	24	21	66	13

(Interestingly, the amount of education needed to exert a liberalizing influence has climbed upward over the years. In more detailed analysis, the sharp break in liberalism among those over 60 occurs among those with and without a B.A. Among those under 60, those with a graduate degree are most sharply differentiated in political terms from all the rest.)

These results, in combination with those for Jewish involvement, suggest the strong influence of what sociologists have called a "parochial-cosmopolitan" dimension of Jews' political views. (The very choice of terms reflects the social scientists' own preferences and prejudices. Perhaps the more neutral, but less elegant, "ethnically involved/intellectually oriented" would be more accurate.) Those who are heavily imbedded within an exclusively Jewish ethnic network, especially those who are committed to traditional religious practices, have the most conservative views; those who participate in a broader, cosmopolitan intellectual culture, at the other extreme, are the most liberal (provided they remain somewhat involved with other Jews).

Affluence Through Education: The Offsetting Effects of Higher Income and Higher Education

Much public-opinion research demonstrates a slight conservatizing influence of higher income on political attitudes. Certainly, rich and poor have vastly different economic interests; as a result, they have a good reason to differ over taxes and spending on social-welfare programs, if not other issues as well. In this context, for several decades many observers expected Jews to become more conservative as they acquired higher levels of income and affluence. However--relative to the ever-shifting national political center--it seems that Jewish political views have remained shaded toward the liberal side of the political spectrum.

Part of the explanation for the relatively small impact of affluence upon Jewish political attitudes can be found in Table 13 which presents political self-identification and the summary index of political views by income. Few, if any, significant differences in political identification or views characterize the table's three major income groups (less than \$30,000, \$30,000-75,000, and \$75,000 or over). (As an aside, we examined the political views of all income categories prior to collapsing them into three income groups. Here, too, the politics of all 10 income categories originally presented in the questionnaire hardly differed. The three particular groupings of income responses used in Table 13, in fact, maximize the appearance of differences in political views between income groups.)

At first glance, then, it appears that income indeed has little effect on Jewish political attitudes. However, such a conclusion ignores the association between higher income and higher education, an association which obscures income's conservatizing influence. That is, the more affluent are also often better educated. Were it not for

Table 13

Political Self-identification and Views
by Income, and by Income and Education

<u>Income</u>	<u>Self-identification</u>			<u>Political Views</u>		
	<u>Lib</u>	<u>Mid</u>	<u>Cons</u>	<u>Lib</u>	<u>Mid</u>	<u>Cons</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>					
	<u>All Educational Levels</u>					
\$75,000 +	37	38	25	32	57	12
\$30,000 - 74,999	40	38	22	31	58	11
\$ 0 - 29,999	33	36	31	34	57	9
	<u>Graduate Degree Holders</u>					
\$75,000 +	38	32	30	38	58	5
\$30,000 - 74,999	50	33	17	44	43	13
\$ 0 - 29,999	46	25	29	51	40	9
	<u>College Graduates (B.A.'s)</u>					
\$75,000 +	26	39	35	28	57	15
\$30,000 - 74,999	31	43	26	25	65	10
\$ 0 - 29,999	44	36	20	37	53	10
	<u>Some College (but no B.A.)</u>					
\$75,000 +	--	--	--	--	--	--
\$30,000 - 74,999	39	38	23	21	70	10
\$ 0 - 29,999	25	44	31	23	64	13
	<u>High School (or less)</u>					
\$75,000 +	--	--	--	--	--	--
\$30,000 - 74,999	27	47	27	20	73	7
\$ 0 - 29,999	37	41	23	20	66	14

their advanced education, the wealthy probably would be more conservative; and, of those with higher education, the more affluent may well be more conservative than their poorer, well-educated counterparts.

Table 13 reports that these are accurate inferences. While overall (without controls for education), the Jewish "rich" (over \$75,000 in income) and "poor" (under \$30,000 in income) have similar political views, within particular education groups (e.g., all those with a B.A.), the "rich" are less liberal than the "poor." For example, of those with a graduate degree, the per cent with many liberal political views on the 29-item summary index goes up as income goes down: from 38% to 44% to 51% among the "poorest" group. Among those with just a B.A., comparable figures are 28%, 25%, and 37%. Similarly, the wealthiest groups among the graduate-degree holders and among the college graduates were the least likely to identify as liberals and the most likely to identify as conservatives. (The number of respondents who failed to graduate college and earned over \$75,000 was insufficient to allow for examination of the "uneducated" affluent Jews.)

Among Jews, perhaps even more than other Americans, the conservatizing influence of affluence is considerably muted precisely because so many of them become rich by way of higher education. Previous research has demonstrated not only that Jews are America's most highly educated ethnic or religious group, but that each year of education is worth more in lifetime earnings to Jews than to others. In this study, most of the under-\$30,000 group did not earn a B.A.; most of the middle-income (\$30,000-74,999) respondents did; and most of the wealthiest (\$75,000 and over) obtained a post-graduate degree. This evidence of a strong income-education association is even more impressive when we recall that the survey included many who were not principal earners, respondents who were reporting their own education but (principally) their spouses' incomes. Were we to focus only on principal earners or income, the already strong association between income and education would be even stronger.

Thus, while high income per se may incline Jews in a more conservative direction, the very high educational background of these affluent Jews inclines them in the opposite direction. And, as we have seen earlier, the liberalizing effects of education are quite powerful. For example, among those earning \$30,000-74,999, the per cent with a high score on the summary index of liberal political views rises with each increase in level of education (from 20% to 21%, to 25%, and finally to 44% among graduate-degree holders).

These results, consistent with those reported earlier, demonstrate that Jews--like other ethnic and religious groups--respond to a complex mixture of material interests, symbolic issues, and cultural concerns. No single overarching factor explains or predicts Jewish political thinking and behavior.

CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that relative to the national political center, Jews remain disproportionately liberal. Where comparisons with national survey data were possible, we found that Jews adopt what may be regarded as liberal positions more often, and conservative views less often, than other Americans. In instances where no strict comparisons were available, we still were able to discern a clear liberal tilt in virtually every issue area and the liberal tilt usually remained intact despite appeals in some questions to Jewish group interests.

The only finding seriously at variance with the liberal trend was that which showed a slight majority in retrospect favoring a Reagan over a Carter victory. While liberals in the sample more often favored Carter and conservatives favored Reagan, the large number of Reagan supporters is discrepant with the small number of conservatives (in terms of self-definition or various issues in the survey) and the relatively large number of liberals.

One lesson we may draw from this discrepancy is that presidential preference is no sure guide to ideology. Personality factors, especially character and leadership qualities, often play roles more important than political views in shaping an electorate's preferences in a presidential race. If Jews remain disproportionately liberal--as this study contends--then, all things being equal, they should vote for Reagan on November 6 somewhat less than other Americans. In other words, for the purpose of assessing the extent of Jewish liberalism, the absolute level of Reagan or Mondale support among Jews in the election is much less crucial than is a comparison of those levels with national voting statistics. (This study was completed and written before the November 6, 1984 election.)

This study also shed some light on the sociological sources of the Jewish liberal tilt, and not only on its persistence. Those who were most liberal were less involved with Jewish life, were more highly educated, more involved in the wider cosmopolitan culture, less affluent (once we controlled for education), and, to a lesser degree, women.

One very current conventional explanation for Jewish liberalism centers on allegedly liberal traditional values derivative and transformed from the pre-American Jewish past. Yet scholars of that past have noted that one can draw as many conservative as liberal contemporary political implications from the Jewish past. And, here, in this study, we found (as have others) that those who are strongly linked to the Jewish community (those with the largest number of close Jewish friends and neighbors) and those who are, in some sense, closest to the traditional Jewish past (the most observant) are also the least liberal. Surely, if traditional Jewish values were liberal, should not the most traditional or ethnic Jews today be the most liberal? Clearly, some other factors are at work.

Those Jews who are most liberal tend to occupy a certain place on the cultural map of American society and they manifest a certain sort of Jewish identity. As members of the larger society, they are relatively sophisticated in cultural and intellectual terms in that they are either highly educated, or participate in the national intellectual culture, or both. As Jews, they are neither strongly observant nor totally non-observant, and their social networks are neither very Jewish nor totally non-Jewish. They share with many other Jews a sense of being apart from American society, and they fear some lurking dangers of anti-Semitism, especially from the right.

In short, American Jews who are most frequently liberal are those who have--in terms many have set for themselves--successfully integrated into the larger society without abandoning their sense of group attachment and identity. Since the eighteenth century, Western Jews have typically integrated into the more enlightened, progressive, intellectual, culturally sophisticated, tolerant, and (for some reason) politically liberal sectors of society. It appears that in the United States Jews have followed that pattern and have not only joined that sector of society, but, over the years and in various capacities, have helped shape it as well. We can, therefore, expect American Jews to remain ever so slightly to the liberal side of the ever-changing center of American political life.

APPENDIX I

Description of the Sample: A Comparison with Other Surveys

Tables 14 and 15 report the principal Jewish and socio-demographic background characteristics respectively of the 1984 National Survey of American Jews' sample. They also report parallel information for the 1983 NSAJ and for the 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Study conducted by Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen for the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York.

There are no recent data on national Jewish characteristics; the massive National Jewish Population Study was conducted in 1970-71. Thus, in order to assess the biases and representativeness of the 1984 NSAJ, we are forced to rely on comparisons with local Jewish population studies. The New York study is not only the largest, but also the one which covered the largest community, consisting of about 30% of U.S. Jewry.

The New York study consisted predominantly of telephone interviews using a modified Random Digit dialing technique, a technique considerably more expensive than the mail-back, DJN-sampling technique used in the 1984 NSAJ. The New York data are considered to be more representative of its universe than the NSAJ is of American Jewry. Therefore, with appropriate modification, the New York data can be used as a point of comparison to locate and estimate sub-groups which may have been misrepresented in the NSAJ.

In comparing the characteristics of the NSAJ with those of New York Jewry, we need to bear in mind the significant ways in which New York Jews differ from those across the country. On the basis of the 1970-71 NJPS and the other recently conducted local population studies, we can readily conclude that more Jews in New York than elsewhere are: Orthodox, married to other Jews, have exclusively Jewish close friends, attended yeshiva, attended no Jewish school, and have lower incomes and lower educational attainment. Perhaps because of the high density of the Jewish population, fewer New York Jews than American Jews elsewhere affiliate with a synagogue or other Jewish organization.

Table 14
Jewish Background

<u>Denomination</u>	NSAJ		1981
	<u>1984</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Greater N.Y.</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Orthodox	7	15	13
Conservative	34	44	36
Reform	23	29	29
Other	--	12	23
Just Jewish	37	--	--
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
% Currently intermarried (of those married)	16	17	11
% 3 Closest friends Jewish	56	61	70
% 3 Closest neighbors Jewish	42	--	--
% 3 Closest co-workers Jewish	20	--	--
Synagogue member	55	59	41
Jewish organization member	48	44	33
Been to Israel once	40	43	38
Been to Israel twice or more	18	18	17
Jewish schooling as a child:			
Yeshiva or Day School	8	9	14
Afternoon School or "Other"	51	59	56
Sunday School	25	18	10
None	17	14	20
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Passover Seder	86	89	89
Yom Kippur services/fast	68	59	68
Sabbath services once a month or more	24	--	19
Separate dishes	20	22	30
Christmas tree	12	11	--

In most instances of comparison, the NSAJ either hardly differs from the New York data, or else differs in the anticipated direction. Thus, the 1984 NSAJ has fewer Orthodox (7% versus 13% in New York and the 10% most scholars think is the reasonable national estimate). But the "Just Jewish" response category in the 1984 questionnaire undoubtedly drew off responses which would have gone to the three major denominations had "Other" been the residual alternative. Fully 16% of the 1984 sample was intermarried at the time of the survey (of those married), about the same number as in the 1983 NSAJ, and considerably more than in New York at 11% or across the country (the NJPS reported 9%).

The proportion whose three closest friends were Jewish (56%) is appropriately below the New York figure (70%). Synagogue membership was somewhat higher in the 1984 NSAJ (55%) than in New York (41%), but then the 1971 NJPS reported a rate of 49%. Visits-to-Israel figures are consistent with New York figures and with data recently reported by many local Jewish population studies. Unquestionably, this figure has increased dramatically since 1967 (the NJPS reported just 15% in 1971). As expected, somewhat fewer NSAJ respondents attended yeshiva or day school than in New York (8% vs. 14%), but somewhat more of them received some Jewish education (83% vs. 80%).

The ritual-practice measures are largely comparable with New York's except that fewer NSAJ respondents maintained separate meat and dairy dishes, consistent with the supposition that more New Yorkers observe the more traditional religious practices.

The age, marital-status distribution, and proportion with children in the home are largely comparable with the New York data (see Table 15). One bias in this sample consists of the disproportionate number of men (60%). But, more important, the 1984 NSAJ sample reported higher educational attainment than did the New York respondents. In part this discrepancy reflects the actual difference in education between Jews in New York and those elsewhere. But it also reflects the tendency for better educated respondents to return mail questionnaires.

That the median income for the 1984 NSAJ exceeds that of New York reflects differences in time (3 years), in actual income (the nation is slightly more affluent), and in an upscale bias due to the mail-back technique.

Finally, Table 16 compares the geographical distribution of the Survey's respondents with that derived from the national Jewish population figures found in the 1984 American Jewish Year Book (AJYB). The Year Book's figures rely upon local Jewish population studies and estimates by informed local observers, and thus must be regarded with some caution. Nevertheless, they are the most authoritative estimates of local Jewish populations available.

Table 15

Social and Demographic Characteristics

	NSAJ		1981 Greater N.Y.
	<u>1984</u>	<u>1983</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Respondent's Sex (% Male)	60	65	--
Median Age	51	48	49
Marital Status:			
Never Married	12	12	15
Married	73	76	66
Divorced or Separated	6	5	8
Widowed	9	7	11
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
% with children at home	42	39	34
Education:			
High-school graduate or less	17	20	30
Some college	21	18	17
College degree	27	26	32
Post-graduate degree	35	36	21
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Median Income	\$42,000	\$37,000	\$31,000

Table 16

Geographical Distribution

<u>State(s)</u>	<u>1984 NSAJ</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>1984 AJYB</u>
New York	26		33
California	12		14
New Jersey	9		8
Florida	9		9
Massachusetts	7		5
Maryland, Virginia, D.C.	7		5
Illinois	6		5
Pennsylvania	5		7
Michigan, Ohio	5		4
All other	<u>14</u>		<u>10</u>
	<u>100</u>		<u>100</u>

Table 16 reports the distribution of the Jewish population for the survey and, as reported in the 1984 AJYB, grouped into the states with the largest Jewish populations. In all instances, except one (New York State) the differences between the two sets of figures are minor and can readily be attributed to the usual sampling error or to errors in population estimates. The Survey did apparently underrepresent New York Jews (26% in the Survey versus 33% in the AJYB) possibly because of the lower educational attainment levels of the New York Jewish population relative to the rest of the country. On the other hand, the Survey overrepresented (14% versus 10% in the AJYB) Jews living outside the major areas of Jewish residential concentration. We should emphasize that even these differences are rather small and had relatively little impact on the resulting political attitude distributions.

In short, the NSAJ undoubtedly contains several instances of under or overrepresentation of Jews with certain characteristics, probably the most consequential of which for political attitude research are the low numbers of those with only a high-school education or less. However, since the analysis largely focused on broad trends in the data supported by qualitative observations and public-opinion research generally, and since the biases are thought to be small, we would argue that the sample fairly accurately represents the political attitudes of American Jews in 1984.

APPENDIX II

THE 1984 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS*

Questionnaire

GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Do you favor or oppose each of the following policies?

	<u>Per cent</u>		
	FAVOR	OPPOSE	NOT SURE
1. Building more nuclear power plants in the U. S.	31	48	22
2. The death penalty for persons convicted of murder.....	68	20	12
3. Tuition tax credits for parents of children in private or parochial schools.....	29	63	8
4. Job quotas to assure equal opportunities for minorities.....	22	64	14
5. Affirmative action without quotas to promote equal opportunities for minorities.....	70	20	10
6. The U.S. agreeing to a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union--that is, putting a stop to the testing, production and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides.....	84	10	6
7. A law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun	90	7	3
8. The use of U.S. military force if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe.....	56	19	26
9. The use of U.S. military force if the Arabs cut off oil shipments to the U.S.....	38	37	25
10. Government aid for abortions for poor women...	81	13	6
11. A moment of silent meditation each day in the public schools.....	21	70	9

* Final N=959 (October 1984)

ISSUES AND OPINIONS

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
12. The U.S. should be more forceful in its dealings with the USSR even if it increases the risk of war.....	29	55	17
13. The U.S. should leave the U.N.....	21	69	9
14. Capitalism works better than socialism.....	73	7	20
15. The government should guarantee jobs for everyone who wants to work.....	37	44	19
16. President Reagan was basically accurate when he called the Soviet Union an "evil empire"...	50	35	15
17. Whether or not President Reagan was factually correct, he displayed poor judgment in calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire".....	66	25	9
18. The U.S. should build more nuclear power plants so as to lessen dependence on the Arabs' oil..	38	42	20
19. The decline of religion in American life has contributed to a decline in morality.....	44	42	14
20. It's good that the government protects the rights of very unpopular groups--like Ku Klux Klan, Nazis and Communists--to demonstrate publicly.....	48	41	12
21. It's suicidal for a democracy to protect extremist groups who want to overthrow democracy	44	43	13
22. To help reduce deficits and relieve world tensions, U.S. military spending should be cut	59	27	14
23. In order to be a reliable military supplier of Israel, the U.S. should maintain a strong military capacity.....	61	24	15
24. Adultery is wrong.....	73	16	11
25. Whatever my personal views of homosexuality, I think that homosexuals should have the same rights as other people.....	87	9	4

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
26. Whatever my views of the rights of homosexuals, I am troubled by the rise in their visibility.	43	49	8
27. In general, I support the goals and philosophy of such government programs as welfare and food stamps.....	75	17	8
28. Such government programs as welfare and food stamps have had many bad effects on the very people they're supposed to help.....	64	23	13
29. Because of the fraud and waste in such government programs as welfare and food stamps, I support efforts to reduce or eliminate some of these programs.....	43	45	12
x 30. Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews....	77	10	13
31. Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews.....	40	47	13
32. Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews.....	31	58	11
33. American Jews must be vigilant in combatting any signs of anti-Semitism.....	92	4	4
34. When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive.....	57	29	14
35. Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in return for credible guarantees of peace.....	43	37	20
36. If only because you can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel, Israel should maintain its rule over all of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).....	44	33	22
37. Jews have a uniquely long and tragic history of persecution.....	94	5	1
38. The Jewish history of persecution has made Jews especially sensitive to the needs of minority groups.....	80	11	9
39. The U.S. has offered Jews more opportunities and freedom than any other Diaspora country...	83	6	10

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
40. There is nothing wrong with members of ethnic and religious groups in the U.S. organizing politically to further their group interests..	79	11	10
41. Parents of children in Jewish day schools should receive tuition tax credits.....	30	61	9

Is your impression of each of the following generally favorable, generally unfavorable, or mixed? If you are unfamiliar with the group, indicate "no impression."

	GENERALLY FAVORABLE	GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE	MIXED	NO IMPRESSION
42. ACLU.....	42	13	24	22
43. NAACP.....	54	12	28	6
44. Moral Majority.....	7	69	14	10
45. NOW.....	41	11	20	28
46. AIPAC.....	16	3	4	77
47. Rabbis.....	60	3	23	14
48. UJA.....	74	4	16	7
49. Hasidim.....	29	16	44	11
50. JDL.....	24	41	27	8

51. Think of 4 possible candidates for President:

"A" is a liberal in domestic affairs, and a "dove" in foreign affairs

"B" is a liberal in domestic affairs, and a "hawk" in foreign affairs

"C" is a conservative in domestic affairs, and a "dove" in foreign affairs

"D" is a conservative in domestic affairs, and a "hawk" in foreign affairs

Other things being equal, who would be your 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th choice for President?

	1ST CHOICE	2ND CHOICE	3RD CHOICE	4TH CHOICE
"A" (THE LIBERAL DOVE)....	33	20	15	33
"B" (THE LIBERAL HAWK)....	31	29	30	9
"C" (THE CONSERVATIVE DOVE)	17	29	35	19
"D" (THE CONSERVATIVE HAWK)	27	21	12	41

ANTI-SEMITISM

In your opinion, what proportion of each of the following groups in the U.S. is anti-Semitic? Most, many, some or few?

	MOST	MANY	SOME	FEW	NOT SURE
52. Big business.....	11	33	40	10	7
53. Union leaders.....	6	17	43	20	14
54. Hispanics.....	8	22	37	14	19
55. Blacks.....	17	37	32	7	6
56. Democrats.....	1	5	48	36	10
57. Republicans.....	4	25	48	13	10
58. Liberals.....	2	5	34	47	13
59. Conservatives.....	7	28	42	12	12
60. Catholics.....	11	29	42	10	8
61. Mainstream Protestants.....	11	31	40	9	10
62. Fundamentalist Protestants....	19	27	28	6	20
63. State Department.....	13	27	35	12	13
64. Pentagon.....	12	27	37	10	14
65. Media.....	4	14	45	27	9
66. Police.....	3	16	48	20	13

MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS

Do you regularly read or receive any of the following?

	YES	NO
67. Time or Newsweek or U. S. News & World Report.....	56	44
68. New Republic.....	4	96
69. National Review.....	2	98

	YES	NO
70. Commentary.....	5	95
71. New Yorker.....	20	80
72. N.Y. Review of Books.....	10	90
73. Atlantic or Harper's.....	6	94
74. Business Week or Forbes or Fortune.....	27	73
75. Wall Street Journal.....	39	61
76. Sunday New York Times.....	41	59
77. Ms.....	6	94
78. A professional journal.....	56	44
79. A Jewish magazine or newspaper.....	58	42
80. Moment.....	4	96
81. Jerusalem Post.....	7	93
82. Do you belong to a book club?.....	16	84

POLITICS AND VOTING

83. Which of these best describes your usual stand on political issues?

RADICAL OR SOCIALIST 1 LIBERAL 35 MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD 38
 CONSERVATIVE 24 VERY CONSERVATIVE 1

84. Do you usually think of yourself as Republican, Democratic, or Independent?

REPUBLICAN 12 DEMOCRATIC 57 INDEPENDENT 31

85. Did you vote in the 1980 election for President?

YES 91 NO 9

(If Yes) Whom did you vote for?

ANDERSON 15 CARTER 44 REAGAN 39 ANOTHER CANDIDATE 3

86. Knowing what you do now, whom would you rather have seen elected in 1980, Reagan or Carter?

REAGAN 53 CARTER 47

87. Do you think that Jesse Jackson is anti-Semitic?

YES 75 NO 8 NOT SURE 18

ISRAEL

88. How many times have you been to Israel?

(0) 60 (1) 22 (2) 8 (3) 4 (4+) 6

ASSOCIATES

	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
89. Of your 3 closest friends, how many are Jewish?	8	15	22	56
90. Of the 3 people closest to you, whom you know from work, how many are Jewish? (If you are not employed, leave blank.).....	32	27	21	20
91. Of the 3 people in your neighborhood with whom you are closest, how many are Jewish?.....	27	16	16	42

RELIGION

	JEWISH	CHRISTIAN	OTHER	NONE	NO SPOUSE
92. In what religion were you raised?.....	97	1	0	2	-
93. What is your religion now?.	91	0	1	8	-
94. In what religion was your spouse raised?.....	83	15	1	2	5
95. What is your spouse's religion now?.....	84	7	1	8	5

Below are several religious practices. For each practice, please indicate whether: (a) you do this now; (b) you did it 10 years ago; (c) your parents did it when you were a child.

	NOW		10 YEARS AGO		EITHER OR BOTH OF YOUR PARENTS	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
	96. Attend a Passover Seder at home or elsewhere.....	86	14	88	12	90
97. Attend Yom Kippur service.....	68	32	73	27	84	16

	NOW		10 YEAR AGO		EITHER OR BOTH OF YOUR PARENTS		
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	
98. Attend Sabbath services once a month or more.....	24	76	29	71	41	59	
99. Use separate dishes for meat and dairy products.....	20	80	22	78	46	54	
100. Have a Christmas tree at home..	12	88	11	89	9	92	
101. Do you think of yourself as...							
ORTHODOX	7	CONSERVATIVE	32	REFORM	23	RECONSTRUCTIONIST	2
JUST JEWISH	37						
102. Do you belong to a synagogue?.....	YES 55		NO 45				
103. Do you belong to a Jewish organization aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group?.....	YES 48		NO 52				
104. What was the main form of Jewish schooling you received as a child?							
NONE	17	SUNDAY SCHOOL	25	AFTERNOON SCHOOL	41		
YESHIVA OR DAY SCHOOL	8	OTHER	10				

BACKGROUND

105. Your sex:.....	MALE 60		FEMALE 40		
106. Your age: <u>Median = 51</u>					
107. Marital status:					
NEVER MARRIED	12	MARRIED	73	DIVORCED OR SEPARATED	6
WIDOWED	9				
108. How many children have you had					
(0)	20	(1)	12	(2)	40
(3)	19	(4)	7	(5+)	2
109. What is the total number of children you expect to have?					
(0)	16	(1)	10	(2)	44
(3)	21	(4)	8	(5+)	2
110. How many children live with you?					
(0)	58	(1)	15	(2)	19
(3)	6	(4)	1	(5+)	0

111. What is your ZIP code? _____

112. What is the highest level of formal education you and your spouse have completed?

	YOU	YOUR SPOUSE
High school graduate or less.....	17	21
Some college.....	21	23
College degree.....	27	30
Post-graduate degree.....	35	26
No spouse.....	--	--

113. What was your approximate family income from all sources, before taxes, in 1983?

Less than \$10,000.....6	\$50,000 to \$59,999.....13
\$10,000 to \$19,999.....11	\$60,000 to \$74,999.....8
\$20,000 to \$29,999.....15	\$75,000 to \$99,999.....7
\$30,000 to \$39,999.....16	\$100,000 to \$149,999.....6
\$40,000 to \$49,999.....11	\$150,000 or more.....7

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