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PART II THE AGE OF DIVERSITY:
JUDAISMS AND MODERNIZATION, 1789–

Chapter 6
**The Judaic Reformation
as a Sociopolitical Process**

Calvin Goldscheider and Alan Zuckerman

As the ordered society of estates eroded and new social and political institutions emerged, the religion of the Jews changed. New religious ideologies, changes in the forms of public worship, and declines in personal religious observance accompanied the initial phases of modernization. In Western Europe, Judaism became the legal, political, and ideological definition of the Jewish people. Did the new religious ideologies determine changes in the synagogues? Did they lead to declines in the religious practices of the Jewish masses? Did they, on the other hand, halt the slide of the Jews toward assimilation and apostasy? How is the modernization of Judaism related to the broader processes of transformation?*

Religious ideologies are the work of the intellectual elite. The philosophers and rabbis who organized the Reform movement, the Historical school, and Neoorthodoxy provided new understandings of the place of Jews and Judaism in a modernizing world. They responded to philosophical challenges met in the universities and brought them from there to the Jewish communities. The ideologies developed as their spokesmen competed to control communal institutions, not as the unfolding logic of ideas. New synagogues and changes in the form of public worship emerged in response to conflicts between lay leaders and rabbis. They also derived from changes in government policies toward general issues of modernization and the specific place of Jews and Judaism.

*References to the literature have been omitted in this selection.—Eds.

Neither the new ideologies nor the ritual changes was the direct consequence of the demands of the Jewish masses. In Western Europe most Jews opposed or were indifferent to religious reforms. During the period of greatest intellectual innovation, the first half of the nineteenth century, the new religious ideas reached the smallest number of Jews. The era of greatest visible impact on the Jewish masses occurred when the ideologies had lost their intellectual vitality.

The new ideologies and synagogues did not restructure the lives of the Jews. Religious decline resulted neither from the inability of old ideas to adapt to new conditions nor from the less demanding nature of some of the new religious ideologies, but from transformations in social conditions. Migrations to towns and cities with weak Jewish institutions, the growth of secular public education, and interaction with non-Jews in jobs and in new neighborhoods had much more to do with declining levels of personal religious observance. Similarly, continuing patterns of occupational and residential cohesion had more to do with the persistence of Jewish communities than the new religious ideologies. Our argument emphasizes the role of structural factors in determining ideological, institutional, and behavioral changes. The evidence we present rejects the assertion that ideological changes led the forces of religious modernization.

THE IDEOLOGY OF REFORM JUDAISM

Reform Judaism was the first of the new religious ideologies that emerged in Germany. It viewed Judaism as the Jews' unique quality. Jews were individuals with distinct religious beliefs but similar in all other ways to their Christian neighbors.

The movement's intellectual leaders persistently reiterated common themes: we have come not to diminish Judaism but to make it more meaningful to each Jew and to reach the increasingly indifferent masses, especially the youth. Sermons in German would uplift the spirit and the moral character, as would a service that is quiet, dignified, and orderly. These themes echoed the calls of reforming Protestant clergy. All these changes would combine to "edify" the Jew, and, thereby, bring him closer to the feelings of his Christian neighbors and the eternal tenets of Judaism.

They emphasized the religious feelings of individual Jews and their place in the changing Germany, while deemphasizing the importance of the Jews as a separate people and the distinctive Jewish ceremonies that would isolate Jews from modern society. Efforts to reform the prayer book rested on these principles: "That the people of Israel no longer lives, that Amalek has lost its significance for us, that Hebrew no longer lives, and that no hope is associated with Jerusalem." A response to the blood libel in Syria, in 1840, highlights the importance of Jewish entry into German society and rejects a broader conception of Jewish peoplehood: "That the Jews in Prussia may have the chance to become pharmacists or lawyers is much more important to me than the rescue of all the Jews of Asia and Africa, an undertaking with which I sympathize as a human being." The religious and lay

leaders who joined the Reform efforts were particularly interested in smoothing the integration of Jews into German society.

The Reformers bemoaned the state of Jewry and Judaism. They claimed that the masses were religiously ignorant and performed the commandments by rote. They saw increasing rates of conversion to Christianity accompanying this religious indifference. The Reformers attacked the established rabbis for being unwilling and unable to respond to the exigencies of the times. Changes in religious norms, they argued, would reinvigorate religious practices. Many of their demands focused on the synagogue service and public worship. Decorum, sermons in the German language, clerical robes, choirs and music, they contended, would produce a properly dignified worship. All would result in the edification of the individual Jew, whose conscious acceptance of the commandments became the requisite for proper, religious behavior.

These ideas legitimated the most visible religious changes of the era, new synagogues and alterations in the worship service. In 1817, the group establishing the Reform temple in Hamburg proclaimed:

Since public worship has for some time been neglected by so many, because of the ever decreasing knowledge of the language by which alone it has until now been conducted, and also because of many other shortcomings which have crept in at the same time—the undersigned, convinced of the necessity to restore public worship to its deserving dignity and importance, having joined . . . together to arrange . . . a dignified and well-ordered ritual . . . Specifically, there shall be introduced at such services a German sermon and choral singing to the accompaniment of an organ.

Other communal leaders reiterated the same claims.

Those seeking to change the worship service struggled to control the religious institutions. The legal proclamations issued in Cassel, Westphalia, in 1810, at the inauguration of the first of these new synagogues, introduced a set of directives that reappeared over and over again, emphasizing order, decorum, and dignity. The first paragraph permits services in only one synagogue in Cassel, a political statement of particular importance. The second paragraph establishes the role of the warden as the supervisor of the synagogue, and the next permits the employment of only one cantor-sexton, to be approved by the temple board. Other paragraphs proposed to enforce a dress code, prohibit children younger than four years of age from attending services, and establish the central role of the temple's cantor, and no others, in the worship service. Paragraph 16 sets out the new form of sermon: "Since rabbinical discussions do not belong in the synagogues, no rabbi is to deliver Talmudic or Kabbalistic or mystical discourses. He should speak about the teachings of religion or ethics only." Another paragraph limits the calling-up to the Torah to those who have taken family names, thereby fostering integration into the general society. This synagogue opened to a procession of dignity and pomp in which Jews and Gentiles entered together to the peal of church bells. The goal of the temples and new services was to establish a Judaism befitting the times and the equal place of Judaism in the emerging Germany.

THE RESPONSE OF THE ESTABLISHED RABBIS

The Reformers did not enter a Jewish community devoid of alternative ideologies and rabbis. The various Jewish communities were led by established rabbis, whose power rested on political as well as religious legitimacy. The established rabbis denied the Reformers' criticisms and plans. Most fundamentally, they denied the Reformers' right to an ideology. The members of various rabbinical courts responded to the intellectual and religious challenges as well as to the attacks on established authority. The Hamburg Rabbinical Court evoked these themes in 1815 as they responded to the new temple:

These are the words of the covenant with Jacob, a law unto Israel, an eternal covenant; the word of God is one forever and forever. [These words are uttered] in accordance with the Torah and by judgment of the court of justice of the holy community of Hamburg—may the Lord bless it well—with the support of the leading men of learning in Germany, Poland, France, Italy, Bohemia, Moravia and Hungary. All of them join together . . . to abolish a *new law* [which was fabricated by several ignorant individuals unversed in the Torah] instituting practices which are not in keeping with the law of Moses and Israel.

Their political legitimacy derived, they maintained, from God and the Torah.

The court then prohibited the "three cardinal sins" of the Reformers: changes in the prayers, German sermons, and the use of musical instruments in the synagogues on Sabbaths and festivals. The rabbis based their injunction on their established authority as a court and not on the religious-legal sources of the halacha. The Reformers lacked the piety, holiness, and knowledge, so they argued, to effect religious changes. These were not only differences of ideological posture and attachment. These were mainly conflicts over authority. They concluded their pronouncement:

Brethren, the children of Israel, it shall not be; Israel has not yet been abandoned. There are still judges in the land who are zealous for God's sake and who will rend the arm, crack the skull of him who pursues the sin of the Reformers. To these judges we shall hasten for aid. . . . Accordingly, we have girded our loins and written to the famous learned men of the holy communities of Germany, Poland, Bohemia, Moravia and Italy. We have sent them our legal judgment.

Calling on the police as well as the legal and religious authority of the established communities, these rabbis pronounced their negation of the Reformers' efforts.

Conflict between the established rabbis and the Reformers did not occur uniformly across Germany. Not all areas had movements for religious reform, and in those places the established rabbis did not take part in the conflict. They, therefore, did not develop any ideological response. Only in those areas where Reform emerged, as in Hamburg, was there an immediate reaction. Over time, these ideological disputes were translated into political maneuvering which involved large numbers of rabbis and their institutions.

When the established rabbis deigned to examine the Reformers' intellectual claims, they dismissed them out of hand. Since the commandments were established by God, their habitual performance was not necessarily a problem. Personal edification, in and of itself, was not the point of the prayer service. Legal authority prescribed that public prayer could be conducted in no language but Hebrew:

Our sages of blessed memory said that the world was created in Hebrew. . . . If this is so, then this is the language of the Holy One, Blessed Be He, in which He gave us His Torah and it is inconceivable to speak before Him in our everyday language. Rather, we should speak the special language befitting His holy words. This is the opinion of the men of the Great Assembly who established the texts of the prayers and benedictions in the Holy Tongue.

Communal prayer is bound by the traditions and legal precedents of the community's courts.

The different styles of language that emerge in these documents reflect profound conceptual differences. In turn, these divergences tie to dissensus and conflict over communal authority. There were few halachic prohibitions on prayer in languages other than Hebrew, and legal precedent abounds in rabbinic literature to permit prayer in local languages. These precedents were not invoked. The issue was not only legal but political as well. The primary concern seems to have been less with theological correctness than with authority structure and political legitimacy.

As much as the established rabbis understood the political challenge of the Reformers, they misjudged their own strength. They could do little to shore up the erosion of their authority. Even a generation earlier, Berlin was not Vilna. As political conditions in the general and Jewish communities changed, so did the power of the established and Reform rabbis. Over time, others used new ideas and political techniques to defend the received religion. Conflict between the Neo-orthodox and the Reformers also occurred in the language of theology and religion. It derived, however, from efforts to control communal institutions.

IDEOLOGIES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The established rabbis erred in another way. Although Reform rabbis called for changes in the rituals and worship services, their pronouncements were neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for these changes. In France, rabbis became preachers and pastors, not judges; they wore clerical robes, gave sermons in French, and introduced choirs into the worship service. More generally, the French rabbinate echoed the role and organizational structure of the Catholic Church. No conferences of Reform rabbis met in France, no journals of Reform theology were published, no new historical studies were completed, and yet the same changes that occurred in the religious service in Germany took place in France. Indeed, Reform Judaism, as an ideological movement, did not arrive in France until 1905, when church and state formally disassociated.

These same changes followed the extension of French rule and the establishment of consistories. Reforms in Cassel occurred when Westphalia was ruled by Jerome, Napoleon's brother, who permitted the new temple. When French rule ended in 1815, the consistory and temple collapsed. Similar changes occurred farther to the East. Napoleon's short-lived Grand Duchy of Warsaw also witnessed the inauguration of a Reform Temple, which dissolved when French rule ended. The comparison of areas under French and German governments makes clear that political change played a direct and central role in effecting change in religious institutions. Hence, an ideology of religious reform was not a necessary condition for the emergence of new synagogues.

What accounts for an ideology espousing religious reform in Germany and not in France? In part, the answer relates to dominant philosophical issues in the German universities as well as the employment patterns in these countries. The rise of a Reform ideology and movement reflected intellectual and employment problems particular to German university students, especially those in the arts and humanities. The giants of German philosophy, first Kant and then Hegel, attacked Judaism and challenged the faith of many Jewish students. At the same time, those who sought to pursue careers in philosophy and teaching were legally barred from employment in the gymnasias and universities. Many accepted positions in the newly created Jewish communal schools or as rabbis who could give sermons in the German language. The university world in France may have been as harsh on the faith of Jewish students, but it provided them with jobs in French schools. The rise of a new Jewish ideology required both new ideas and a mechanism for their diffusion into the Jewish community.

In the world of German universities at the end of the eighteenth century, no figure challenged Kant's intellectual supremacy. He provided the agenda for scholarly discussion and his answers dominated all others. His challenge to Judaism was direct and overpowering. Accepting Mendelssohn's definition of Judaism as a religion of laws and actions, not beliefs, Kant argued that Judaism was not a religion since it did not require conscious individual choice. The religion of Jewish students was not only the social, economic, and political burden that it had always been but it was now an intellectual embarrassment. "Kant's views on Judaism must have been especially agonizing for the Jewish intellectuals of the period. Not only did Judaism fail to compare favorably with Christianity, it was inferior even to polythesim." Jewish intellectuals could not repel his attack, and "agonizingly acquiesced."

Many of the fundamental ideas of the Reformers were responses to Kant. Not being able to refute his philosophical claims, they attacked the accuracy of his understanding of Judaism. Redefining the faith, they reduced the place of the commandments and increased the significance of personal meaning attached to religious action. Prayer and the worship service, they argued, must uplift the individual. It must, therefore, take place in a language that he understands. In Judaism, like all religions that fit Kant's definition, the individual must freely choose to do good. Obedience to external law, like the halacha, stands at the most distant edge of religion. Furthermore, Judaism is a set of principles and beliefs. It

is not the religion of a particular nation or ethnic group. It does not require a halacha and a system of political controls to sustain its validity. Hence, it will persist as the religion of those who autonomously choose to live by its tenets, without their being a people and without political autonomy. Only this view, argued the Reformers, permits Judaism to stand as a philosophy of equal value to the other religions of Germany.

A generation later, Hegel provided an alternative to Kant's philosophy and another challenge to Jewish intellectuals. Hegel's ideas led to a new justification for Jews and Judaism, tying them to the historical link between ideas and people. According to the Hegelians, the idea-structure of Judaism was not necessarily religious and was not controlled by the rabbis. Rather, it emerged out of the life of the people and was best understood by the intellectuals. Reflecting their academic world, they formed the institutions of what would become known as the Historical School, The Society for the Preservation of the Jewish People, and the Society for the Culture and Science of the Jews (*Wissenschaft des Judentums*). They too were embarrassed by Judaism's intellectual weaknesses and adapted the dominant philosophy of their day to support their ideas. They attacked the intellectual bases of the established rabbis as well as their political power. The intellectuals who formed the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* offered a new understanding of the place of Jews and Judaism in the rapidly changing world of Germany.

The members of the Historical School remained a small group of scholars. Few were appointed rabbis or assistant rabbis; few controlled synagogues; at best their influence was felt in the community schools and the new rabbinical seminary in Breslau. They offered an intellectual challenge when only political success led to change in religious institutions. These intellectual issues affected very few Jewish students and, therefore, relatively few Jews. In any year during the first third of the nineteenth century, fewer than 1,000 Jews were among the 10,000–15,000 university students in Germany, and at the very most one-fifth of them studied in the faculties of humanities. We assume, therefore, that these intellectual challenges affected fewer than 200 Jewish students. Contemporary sources indicate even smaller numbers. A total of forty-two rabbis attended Reform rabbinical conferences in Germany in the 1840s. Hence, hardly any Jews took part in these intellectual debates.

The problems for these students extended beyond the realm of philosophy. The path to teaching in the gymnasia and universities was blocked to Jews who sought to pursue their philosophical interests. Several career options stood before them: they could forego their intellectual interests for a commercial career; they could leave Germany and pursue their scholarship in France; they could renounce their attachment to Judaism and convert to Christianity, thereby obtaining the "key to entrance into European civilization." If they maintained their attachment to philosophy, Judaism, and their families, they could pursue a career only within the educational and religious institutions of the Jewish community. Although most took careers in commerce, several chose Christianity and others migrated to France. Most remained in Germany as Jews.

The primary career possibilities in the Jewish community outside the world of commerce were teaching in the new schools, such as the Freischule in Dessau,

and serving as rabbis in synagogues seeking clergy fluent in German. Hence, the intellectual and career sources of all Reform rabbis and members of the Historical School fit this pattern. The philosophical and occupational pressures on these intellectuals were necessary conditions for the formation and diffusion of these new ideologies.

The same pattern applies to those who became leaders of Neo-orthodoxy, the other religious ideology to form during the middle third of the century. Unlike the established rabbis, the leaders of Neo-orthodoxy attended universities and grappled with the same philosophical issues as the Reformers. Having resigned as Chief Rabbi of Bohemia and Moravia, Hirsch returned to Frankfurt to lead an independent synagogue. He installed an ideology and movement distinct from the Reformers and the traditional Orthodox. Hirsch insisted on a quiet, dignified service, and delivered sermons in German. Hirsch battled the Reformers with their own weapons. He wrote religious treatises in the idiom of German philosophy. Using their political tactics, he maneuvered within the Jewish and general communities, established newspapers, journals, separate schools, and synagogues.

The new ideologies—Reform, Neo-orthodox, and the Historical School—had little impact on the religious beliefs and practices of the Jewish masses in Germany. Most Jews fit into one of three types. (1) Those who would change no part of the worship service, retaining the prayers and observances handed to them by their fathers. Even at mid-century, this group probably amounted to a majority. (2) Those like the founders of the temples in Cassel, Hamburg, and Berlin, who sought a service sufficiently dignified and modern to enable them to stand proud in the general community. This group predominated among the commercial elite and the lay leaders of the communities. (3) A third group remained part of the Jewish community but did not follow any of the religious practices and knew little of the beliefs. None of these groups contained individuals with profound theological and philosophical concerns. The relative size of the groups varied by locale and over time, but the variations had little to do with the ideology espoused by the local rabbi. Similar patterns characterize French Jewry.

POLITICS AND CHANGE IN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Political factors rather than ideologies or mass demands account for the diffusion of new temples and changes in religious services. In France, relatively high national unity, government centralization, and official ties between the state and the Jewish community through the consistories ensured that religious institutions changed in a generally uniform way across regions. Only resistance from some communities and rabbis in Alsace slowed this process. There is no evidence to support a claim that in Germany changes in a worship service occurred because the congregants sought a more meaningful form of prayer. Neither did the retention of the established service result from the preferences of the Jewish masses.

Was it economic or political factors which determined religious institutional change? Evidence indicates that there is no correlation between areas of economic

expansion and the presence of Reform temples and rabbis. Nor does the size of the Jewish community vary systematically with type of synagogue present. Reform rabbis were as likely to serve rural small towns as large urban congregations. The areas of Western Germany, where most Jews were agricultural middlemen, were those with the largest number of Reform institutions.

Our emphasis on the centrality of political factors in determining the presence of new religious institutions helps clarify what appears puzzling and unexplained by previous research. Three political factors are critical: (1) a state government with a general policy of modernization and a specific policy fostering the use of the German language and the economic integration of Jews, (2) lay leaders who sought to further the integration of Jews by having a more impressive worship service with an emphasis on German sermons, (3) a rabbi who identified with the Reform movement. Where all three came together there were German sermons, clerical garb, choirs, decorum, and the other ritual changes of Reform. The regions of Nassau, Saxe-Weimar, Wurttemberg, and Baden were among the first to exhibit this pattern. Where all three opposed change—the government as part of a general reactionary policy, the lay leaders, and the rabbi too—these ritual reforms did not occur. After a start toward political modernization, Bavaria exemplifies this pattern for much of the century.

It is possible to rank these factors in their relative order of importance. The policy of the local government seems to be most important. It served as a necessary condition for religious reform and at times came close to being a sufficient condition as well. One key element was the law that lasted until mid-century that limited each Jewish community to one synagogue. Hence, control of the synagogue determined the nature of the worship service for all members of the community. The first and most obvious example of the effects of this law in Germany occurred in Cassel, Westphalia. Another government policy required rabbis to have university degrees and academic training. Modernizing governments in Baden, Hesse, and Wurttemberg, western areas with predominately rural Jewish populations engaged in cattle dealing, illustrate this pattern. In 1834, the Wurttemberg government dismissed forty-five rabbis who had not passed the state qualifying examination. Hence, once this political policy is taken into account, it is not at all surprising that the western areas of Germany had relatively large numbers of Reform rabbis. Modernizing civil servants bent on rationalizing governments and economies took as one of their policy goals the education and the reorganization of the local Jews.

Where government policy opposed all forms of change, it precluded the spread of religious reform among the Jews. The case of Berlin clearly illustrates this point. Given the history of the Prussian capital as an early center of the Jewish Enlightenment, and given the presence of a Reform temple there in 1815, it may seem surprising that Berlin did not emerge as a leading center of religious reform. Prussian political reaction, in general, and specific policies that followed Napoleon's defeat in 1815 explain the relative absence of the Reformers until after mid-century. The Prussian Emperor simply forbade religious reform among the Jews. In 1823, a Prussian court decreed that rabbis might not wear clerical robes or

preach in German. These being Gentile customs, they must not be brought into the Jewish community. It took seventeen years of appeals for the Reformers to have the decision reversed. The Prussian government served as the court of last appeal in the struggles between the Reform and Orthodox and almost always favored the latter. It ruled, for example, that the Reformers might not enroll all the Jewish children in their schools. Thus, in regions of political reaction, government policy blocked all forms of change, including religious reform among the Jews.

Where the government had no policy, the desires of the lay leaders and the rabbi determined the nature of the worship service. Where they agreed, they prevailed. Resistance by local Jews could be overcome, and indifference certainly provided no barrier. Where the rabbi and local leaders split, then the rabbi's legal power allowed him to block their demands. The lay leaders required government intervention to overcome their rabbi's resistance. Where the rabbi opposed reform, lay leaders sought government permission to hire an assistant rabbi to preach in German. Where there was a Reform rabbi, the lay leaders turned to the legal authorities to dismiss him. Sometimes, only the establishment of a new synagogue resolved the conflict. This too required government approval. The Neo-orthodox success in Frankfurt used interest group politics to obtain from the Prussian government the right to secede from the legally sanctioned Jewish community. Hirsch succeeded in the face of massive opposition from the Jews of the city, whatever their religious ideology. Those who joined his synagogue either worked for him or, as Polish immigrants, had no ties to the local community. Hirsch did not ride the crest of a mass movement. Instead, having obtained legal independence, he used the institutional bases of a separate community, especially the schools and synagogue, to build the movement. Government policy and political maneuvering within the Jewish community helped to spread Neo-orthodoxy as well as Reform.

Over time, and particularly after mid-century, government policies played a smaller role in Jewish communal life. Increasing economic, educational, and linguistic integration of the Jews resulted in declining government intervention in the internal affairs of the Jewish community. Subsequent religious institutional change, therefore, derived less from government policies than from conflict and competition among Jews.

The religious ideologies were elite expressions. Where their spokesmen fought with each other, very few Jews entered the fray. The most well known of these battles occurred in Breslau in the middle of the nineteenth century and involved a vote among 1,500 householders (10 percent of the Jewish population). The Reformers lost. Where one group prevailed, there is little evidence that they actually affected the beliefs and practices of their congregants. The schools of the Reform and the Neo-orthodox initially reached relatively few Jewish students.

Nahman's windstorm, as we have seen, moved Jews into new homes and places of living, weakened old institutions, and created new ones. As the kehillot declined, adherence to the established religious norms rested on personal choices. The observance of religious commandments had previously rested on the absence of other alternatives and the sanctions of the established community. It is not

surprising, therefore, that we find declines in the frequency and intensity of personal religious practices as new alternatives emerged and as traditional social, economic, and political sanctions weakened. As the Jewish population expanded, existing schools and synagogues were overwhelmed. As people moved to new cities, they encountered relatively few institutions of the Jewish community. In Paris, for example, there were four synagogues for the more than 50,000 Jews who lived there at mid-century. No more than 15 percent of the male adults could have attended synagogue services together in the French capital. The same pattern applies to other new centers of Jewish population. As long as the prohibition of more than one synagogue in the various German towns and cities held, most German Jews had little or no contact with that most important agency of a Jewish community. Hederim, private teachers, and new schools could not accommodate the growing number of Jewish children. New educational opportunities in general schools provided attractive alternatives. Informal Jewish education did not compensate for these new patterns of schooling. These transformations did not mainly reflect preferences for one type of education but the availability of alternative schools. The structure of opportunities and access, not values, determined educational choices.

Over time, those who studied in established, Neo-orthodox, and Reform schools were taught different curricula. More important, they developed allegiances to these branches of Judaism. Many had no formal Jewish education, and their Jewishness was likely to be associated with nonreligious communal institutions. Hence, synagogues and schools provided some bases for cohesion, while generating competition and conflict within the Jewish community. At the same time, the institutions maintained an image of a distinct body of Jews. They did not cause that distinction but helped to sustain it in the minds of Jews and non-Jews alike. The image neither determined nor impeded Jewish continuity. It legitimated and rationalized the broader changes that were unfolding.

The rise of new ideologies, declining personal religious observance, and the formation of new forms of public worship were all responses to political and social modernization. They paralleled similar developments in the broader society. Hence, while focusing on the Jews as a case study, our hypotheses derive from a general orientation to modernization and group cohesion. Our key explanatory factors are particular elements of political and educational modernization combined with population growth and urbanization. The new ideologies did not determine changes in religious behavior or institutions. The ideas of Reform, the Historical School, and Neo-orthodoxy are what must be explained. It is inadequate, therefore, to view the new religious ideologies and institutions as examples of assimilation. Similarly, those who obtained no Jewish education or rarely attended religious services had other bases for Jewish continuity. Communal organizations, socioeconomic, and residential patterns maintained Jewish cohesion in new forms. Modernization meant the differentiation of religious from other institutions as well as the creation of new supports for the Jewish community.