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# Jewish Ultra-Nationalism in Israel: Converging Strands

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Although Israelis view their Israeliness and Jewishness (i.e., their sense of being Jews) as interrelated, their understanding of Judaism, of what it means to be a Jew, carries particular nuances that distinguish it from the Judaism of Diaspora Jewry. Most Israelis, whether they are observant or non-observant of Jewish law, place far greater emphasis on the national and territorial dimensions of Judaism than do Diaspora Jews. Indeed, the development of distinctively Israeli conceptions of Judaism, a tendency that has become particularly pronounced in the religious sector in the last few years, is a fascinating topic fraught with consequences for the future of Israel-Diaspora relations. These differences allow Israelis to differentiate their loyalty to the Israeli-Jewish collectivity from their loyalty to the world Jewish collectivity. In other words, the fact that Jewishness is a central component of Israeliness does not mean that Israeli Jews cannot conceive of conflicting loyalties to Israel or to Diaspora Jewry.

Our concern is with two basic questions. First, are Israeli Jews becoming more or less nationalistic? Second, what are the different strands or components that comprise their national identity? Neither of these questions admits of any simple answers, but they afford a convenient framework within which to discuss Israeli nationalism in 1984.

### Commitment to Israeli Nationalism

The answer to the first question, whether Israeli Jews are becoming more or less nationalistic, depends on the meaning of the term *nationalism*. One

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meaning is the loyalty or identity of an individual with his nation rather than other collectivities. Examples of other collectivities would be ethnic, religious, regional, or social groups or, in the case of Israeli Jews, the Jewish people as a whole—i.e., the international collectivity of Jews.

Observers have pointed to the growth and increased militance of Sephardic ethnicity in the last decade. It has been suggested that this ethnic identity comes at the expense of national integration and a sense of national loyalty. The 1984 election campaign and voting results suggest that the problem is less serious than was once thought. Tami, the only distinctively ethnic party on the Israeli political map, won 2.3 percent of the vote in 1981 and many feared that its vote would increase in future elections. In 1984 Tami's proportion of the vote dropped to 1.6 percent and its future seems doubtful. It is true that a new Sephardic party, Shas, won 3.1 percent of the vote. But unlike Tami, Shas did not appeal exclusively to Sephardic voters. Some of its support came from very religious non-Zionist Ashkenazim who supported Agudat Israel in the past but were unhappy with that group's internal bickering. Shas's leadership is entirely Sephardic but unlike Tami its campaign was not anti-Ashkenazic. Rabbi Eliezer Schakh, the outstanding figure of the Ashkenazic yeshiva world, quietly endorsed Shas and urged the entertainment personality Uri Zohar, now a yeshiva student himself, to appear at election rallies on its behalf.

The National Religious Party, hoping to attract Sephardic voters, placed a popular Sephardic candidate in a very prominent position on its list. According to an opinion poll, religious Sephardic voters voted or did not vote for the NRP without regard to the presence of the Sephardic candidate (*Haaretz*, 9 September 1984, p. 14).

The most striking evidence for the decline of a distinctive ethnic as opposed to a national identity among all Israelis is to be found in the 1984 voter survey conducted by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir. Forty-one percent of native Israelis whose fathers were also native-born declined to identify themselves as either Ashkenazic or Sephardic. The same is true of roughly a third of the native Israelis whose fathers were Sephardic and a third whose fathers were Ashkenazic.

A second alternative to a national identity would be identification with the sub-community of religious Jews. Tensions between religious (i.e., observant) and nonreligious Jews have always characterized Israeli society. But in this realm as well there is evidence that a national identity is replacing a narrow or exclusivistic religious identity among a growing segment of the religious population. The proportion of religious voters who supported non-religious parties first jumped in 1981. In that election the NRP lost almost half of its voters, primarily to parties of the right. These voters did not return in 1984. Indeed, excluding both Kach, the party of Rabbi Meir Kahane, and Tami, which do not conduct campaigns addressed exclusively to religious voters, the proportion of the religious party vote was 9.6 percent in 1981 and 9.9 percent in 1984. Not all of these voters were religious Jews. This low

level of support stems in good measure from the religious voter's confidence that his basic religious interests are secure, particularly under a Likud-led government; but it also indicates a growing measure of concern and identification of the religious voter with national issues that transcend particular religious interests.

Nationalist sentiment, then, has submerged ethnic and to some extent even religiously particularist sentiment. In the latter case this is not the result of a loss of religious commitment but its reinterpretation so that it now encompasses some nonreligious Jews and excludes some ostensibly religious Jews.

In some societies regional identities are alternatives to national ones, but this has never been true in Israel. Social class identity, once a force of some significance among Israeli voters of the Left, has virtually disappeared. The Labor party has eschewed the nominal socialism to which it once paid lip service. The party system cut across the rather inchoate class structure of Israel. Appeals to class consciousness are likely to backfire against the party that utilizes them.

One might suspect that Israeli Jews feel their primary political loyalty to the Jewish people conceived as an international entity rather than to the collectivity of Israeli Jews. Many Israelis felt this way in the early years of statehood.

The Israeli media seem less attentive to world Jewry than they were in the past. *Aliya* or the absence of *aliya* no longer evokes the excitement among Israelis that it once did. It was hardly mentioned during the election campaign. There are no satisfactory measures to support this impression, although it should have been anticipated given the increase in the proportion of native-born within the Israeli Jewish population. Furthermore, the special meaning of Israeli Jewish nationalism, to be discussed below, further alienates the Israeli nationalist from the Diaspora Jew.

A second meaning of nationalism would be a willingness to sacrifice or give of oneself for the nation or its ideals. Nationalism, in this sense of the term, means the submergence of self on behalf of the nation. A growth of Israeli nationalism in this respect would be contrary to tendencies throughout the Western world. On the other hand, given Israel's delicate security situation, a decline in national loyalty bodes poorly for its future.

There seem to be no clear indications of trends in one direction or another. For example, *yerida*, emigration from Israel, has remained fairly stable over the past few years. A 1984 study commissioned by the National Council for Research and Development on emigration of technical and professional workers concluded that there was no trend toward greater emigration in general or among professional and scientific workers in particular.

Even more encouraging from a nationalist perspective are responses to a questionnaire administered in August 1984 to a random sample of Israeli Jews aged fifteen to eighteen. Eighty-eight percent reported that if they

were free to live wherever they wanted they would choose to live in Israel. Twenty-three percent reported that they rarely contemplated the possibility of *yerida* and 42 percent reported they never did.

Another measure of the willingness of Israelis to sacrifice their own self-interests on behalf of the nation is the number of soldiers who prefer to serve in combat units. In the youth poll just cited, 49 percent of the males reported they would prefer combat units, 29 percent said they did not care, and 17 percent said they would prefer to serve in noncombat units.

Other measures of national commitment are the willingness of young soldiers to enter officer training school and the proportion of junior officers prepared to remain in the army after their initial military obligation is complete. Such decisions are likely to be influenced by economic considerations but given the identification of army service and national priorities, continued service is also influenced by nationalist commitment. Precise figures in this regard are secret but to judge from articles that regularly appear in the Israeli press, there seems to be some decline in the willingness of young Israelis to serve their country in this respect beyond that which is required of them. The question is whether there has been a serious decline. Observers are divided.

The most troubling sign for Israeli nationalism would be resistance on the part of young people to the draft, although such resistance to army service is not incompatible with a strong national loyalty. The reference here is to young people who seek to avoid the draft because it interferes with their material well-being. From time to time, suggestions have been made that such resistance is growing. Even if true it still does not appear to be a widespread phenomenon.

A third meaning of the term *nationalism*, to which the remainder of this essay is devoted, is the commitment to a set of public policies that affirm national pride, territorial expansion, hostility to other nations, and the elaboration of the national interest as a supreme social value. As we shall see, the evidence is quite conclusive as to the growth of nationalism in this sense of the term. Events over the course of the year, public reaction to these events, the election campaign, the election results, and public opinion polls all point in the same direction.

In 1982 the Israeli writer Amos Oz interviewed Yisrael Harel, chairman of the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza and editor of its newspaper, *Nekudah*, a publication to which we attribute special significance in this essay. Harel observed that the national-religious movement used to be an imitation of the Labor movement but this changed after the Six-Day War. Labor, gnawed by "vacillation, doubt, weakness, perhaps by its own feelings of guilt at the victory" declined while the national religious youth led by Gush Emunim (formed in 1974) spearheaded the settlement in the newly captured territories. But, added Harel, "in recent months, as a result of the destruction of the Yammit region [i.e., the last phases of

Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1981] and the war in Lebanon, the 'dovish left' again finds itself on the offensive, while Gush Emunim and its followers have been pushed into a defensive position."

The impression that Gush Emunim and the forces of Israeli nationalism were on the defensive continued throughout 1983. Growing numbers of Israelis seemed to question the wisdom and even the morality of the war in Lebanon. Opposition to the war in Lebanon or Israel's remaining in Lebanon is not necessarily associated with opposition to settlement on the West Bank (or YESHA, as first its proponents and since then the media increasingly refer to the territories.)<sup>3</sup> Nor are both these positions necessarily linked to the adoption of repressive policies toward Arab residents of the West Bank, much less Arab citizens of Israel.<sup>4</sup> But in fact, they frequently are. Hence the general impression as the year 1984 began was that forces favoring better treatment of Arabs in YESHA or in Israel itself, and territorial concessions in exchange for some form of a peace agreement with Jordan were on the rise. The feeling was reinforced by announcement of the results of an opinion poll conducted in January which indicated that 28 percent more voters preferred the Alignment to the Likud.

In February the Karp Commission report was made public. Judith Karp, assistant to Israel's attorney general, headed a commission appointed with the approval of then Prime Minister Begin to investigate incidents during 1981 in which Jews on the West Bank committed criminal offenses against Arabs (robbery, assault on property and on persons, including instances of death) that had gone unpunished. The Karp report was submitted in May 1982 and kept confidential for twenty-two months. It was finally released in February 1984 after the media and some of the opposition had raised a fuss. The report, both directly and by implication, pointed to neglect by the army and the police and to the unwillingness of settlers to cooperate with the police; a policy that was apparently encouraged by certain circles within the army. The report further concluded that one of the reasons Arabs refrained from submitting complaints against Jewish settlers was fear of reprisals.

The head of the investigation division of the police department confirmed that the report was written "with objectivity and described conditions in the field" (*Huaretz*, 10 February 1984, p. 11). But the minister of the interior, the minister of justice, and other political figures attacked the report. They also joined representatives of YESHA settlers in impugning the motives of its authors and demanded Judith Karp's resignation. (It must be noted that not all settlers believe that Jews are blameless in their dealings with Arabs on the West Bank). In retrospect, the reaction to the Karp report—its denunciation by a whole series of political figures before they had even had time to examine its veracity—suggested that the forces of nationalist chauvinism were not entirely on the defensive. Two further events of a similar nature confirm this impression. In both cases, like that of the Karp report, one might have anticipated that public reaction would have strengthened the

"dovish" or reconciliatory element in Israeli political life. Instead, it demonstrated the deep roots of chauvinist sentiment.

On 14 April four Arab terrorists hijacked an Israeli bus. The government announced that all four were killed when Israeli security forces overtook the bus. It subsequently developed that two of the terrorists had been taken alive but were beaten to death by security personnel after they had revealed vital information sought from them. The military censor sought to prevent publication of the evidence that two terrorists had been captured alive. Following a scandal of international proportions, the minister of defense did appoint an investigating commission. The murder was condemned by all Israeli leaders as both immoral and unprofessional. But anger in the "Israeli street" was not directed against those who killed the terrorists but rather against the newspaper that published the photographs of the two terrorists alive and in custody. A May sample found that 65 percent of Israeli Jews opposed the appointment of an investigation commission. In another poll taken among passers-by at the Central Bus Station in Tel-Aviv, a sample that overweighs poorer and Sephardic classes, 85 percent of the respondents felt that the security men who murdered the terrorists had behaved reasonably whereas only 10 percent thought the matter was one for concern. (The poll was taken by the paper *Hadashot*. It was reported some months later in a story in *Haaretz*, 1 June 1984, p. 13).

The most sensational event of the year began with the announcement on 29 April of the arrest of a group of Jews suspected of undertaking terrorist activity against Arabs. Twenty-seven men were eventually detained. Two of those arrested were army officers charged with providing information in the attempted murder of five pro-PLO leaders on the West Bank (three of whom were mayors). The army officers were tried by a military court. Five other defendants plea-bargained their way to reduced charges, and they were tried and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from eighteen months to ten years. A variety of charges were leveled against the remaining twenty defendants including: membership in a terrorist organization, illegal acquisition and possession of weapons, conspiracy to blow up Moslem buildings on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, attempted murder of five pro-PLO leaders, placing booby-trapped grenades in a school playground in Hebron, planting bombs in five Arab-owned buses timed to detonate during an hour of peak usage, and premeditated murder in an attack on the Hebron Islamic college.

The trial opened in September 1984. Trial on the charge of premeditated murder was to be conducted separately. Hence, the guilt, relative guilt, or innocence of the accused was not the issue. As the trial progressed in September and October 1984 it appeared that the image of the terrorists and some of the acts attributed to them had been distorted by "leaks" to the press in the first month or two following the arrests. Not all the accused were charged with all the acts attributed to some of them. Questions were raised as to whether they really intended to carry out in full the most heinous of all

the acts with which they were charged, the explosion of five Arab buses that would have led to the indiscriminate killing of men, women, and children. Apparently some of the terrorists were surprised by what others did or intended to do. But the point that must be stressed here is that until the trial opened, and certainly during May and June, virtually every Israeli believed the accused were guilty of the charges that had been leveled against them based on evidence obtained by Israeli security forces. By their own admission, all of the accused were guilty of at least some of the acts with which they were charged.

The accused were all religious Jews, one of them a proselyte. Many were prominent among the leaders of YESHA settlements. A number of them had very distinguished war records.

Initial public reaction was shock and apparent condemnation of the accused and/or the acts attributed to them. This condemnation was often coupled, as in the case of a statement by then Prime Minister Shamir, with the assertion that the behavior of the accused in no way reflected on YESHA settlements. "Sometimes love of the Land of Israel can result in very exaggerated expression," Shamir was quoted as saying in early May. Only one prominent political figure, Minister Yuval Ne'eman of the right-wing Techiya party had some good words to say for some of the terrorists' acts and even he distinguished their "justifiable" acts from the attempt to blow up the Arab buses. Techiya's other Knesset members spoke in stronger tones. Geula Cohen stated "there is no 'Greater Land of Israel' without morality" and Hanan Porat, a leader of Gush Emunim, denied that the notion of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel means expulsion of the Arab population. "I pray with all my heart," he said, "that the evil doers will be uncovered, that the land will be cleansed of evil doers of the left and the right. I mean Jews and Arabs . . ." (*Haaretz*, 4 May 1984, p. 15).

Both Gush Emunim and the Council of Settlements of YESHA were critical of the acts, although the latter group announced that every YESHA settlement should tax its members to support the families of the accused and afford them legal counsel.

However, even in the first month or two public opinion was not unanimous. Among the rank and file of the settlers, particularly among the youth, there was far greater sympathy for the terrorists and the acts that they had allegedly committed. According to random impressions of religious school teachers outside the territories, a majority of pupils (about 70 percent according to one source) even justified the attempt to blow up the five Arab buses. Although almost all rabbis who spoke out on the issue were critical of the terrorists in one degree or another, there were those who defended them and found religious justification for the acts attributed to them, including the attempted explosion of the buses. (The journal, *Tzfiyah*, published by LAOR, an organization created to defend the terrorists and their behavior,

was rich in such sentiment. The first issue is dated August 1984. See especially pp. 24-25 and 30-31.)

During the summer months public opinion seemed to shift even further in favor of the accused. As one regular contributor to *Nekudah* noted with dismay (19 August 1984, p. 7), attitudes gradually changed from condemnation to efforts to understand and justify the acts attributed to the terrorists and finally even to expressions of admiration. The "understanding" came quite early. The Dahaf Research Institute asked a random sample of Israeli Jews in June 1984 how they felt about the Jewish underground. Sixteen percent said they justified them and an additional 50 percent said that whereas they did not justify them, they related to what they did with understanding. LAOR, the group created to support the accused terrorists, was permitted to house itself in the offices of the NRP. In October, LAOR sponsored a giant post-holiday (Simchat Torah) demonstration in Hebron attracting thousands of Israelis including Ariel Sharon, who spoke. Yitzhak Shamir (by then foreign minister) sent a telegram of greeting. By October some twenty members of the Knesset formed a lobby to support the accused terrorists.

On 28 October 1984 a rocket was fired at an Arab bus en route from Jerusalem to Hebron. One passenger was killed and ten injured. The perpetrators also took responsibility for throwing a grenade into an Arab coffee shop on 22 September, which injured four people. They left a note signed "the Avengers" and threatened continued strikes at Israeli Arabs because the government's policy toward them was too soft. The immediate impetus for attacking the bus was the murder of two Israeli hikers by an Arab terrorist a week earlier. The condition for ceasing the attacks, according to the note, was freeing the accused Jewish terrorists. The initial reaction to the attack was condemnation by the political establishment, praise from Kahane, and "understanding" from circles close to the accused terrorists. Rabbi Moshe Levinger called the act the result of government weakness against the Arabs, leading "young men whose concern for the honor of Israel and the honor of the nation is close to their heart" to act in place of the government (*Haaretz*, 29 October 1984, p. 2.). In one national-religious school, the incident was greeted with joy; disappointment was expressed that only one Arab was killed (*Haaretz*, 2 November 1984, p. 1).

The election campaign offers further evidence of the increase in nationalist sentiment. (Significantly, the Likud labeled itself "the national camp" and its newspaper ads pictured a cross section of Israelis identifying themselves with the slogan "I'm in the nationalist camp".) The Likud's list of Knesset candidates was more significantly nationalistic than its 1981 list. Within the Liberal party, one of the two major factions that comprise the Likud, two leading moderates, Berman and Zeigerman were dropped from the list or did not offer their candidacy. The candidates who did run on the Liberal party



list in 1984 are closer to the policy preferences of Herut, the more nationalist faction in the Likud, than was true in the 1981 election. Columnist Dan Margalit (*Haaretz*, 2 May 1984, p. 9) noted the marked influence within Herut of Ariel Sharon, the super hawk.

Within Techiya, a party to the right of Herut, Geula Cohen, who had condemned Jewish acts of violence in the territories, was dropped from second to third on the list, though not for this reason. He was replaced by former army chief-of-staff Rafael Eitan, who rivals Sharon in his hawkishness and is equaled only by Kahane in his derogatory statements about Arabs.

Eitan was an important candidate for Techiya. The party sought, through him, to appeal to a populist base and break through its image as an Ashkenazi intellectual party. Eitan, for example, charged that "the Arabs of the state of Israel are as hostile as their brothers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza and perhaps worse than them" (interview in *Haaretz*, 19 May 1984, p. 11). In an interview in *Nekudah* (23 December 1983, p. 26.) he said, "the root of the problem lies in the readiness of the coming generation to fight. The solution must begin now in kindergarten." The most chauvinistic of all, however, was the fourth candidate elected to the Knesset on Techiya's list, Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, leader of the yeshiva in Kiryat Arba, the Jewish settlement on the outskirts of Hebron. A lecture of Waldman's delivered during the war in Lebanon is printed in the book *Al Daat Hazman V'hamakom*, and the following quotation was excerpted in *Haaretz* (19 August 1984, p. 14.):

I don't know if our leaders understand the matter. Order in the world will be determined by us. After all, that is what God wants. The inner order of the world, the moral order, the order of faith will be determined by the Jews . . . But can one attain this internal order without concern for external order, opposing evil, military valor? And we shall determine this order as well. We have already begun to do so . . . There is no reason to be embarrassed by this: it's a great responsibility. We will definitely establish order in the Middle East and also in the world . . . After all, who will establish order in the world? The leaders of the west with their weak personalities? They will determine the order of the world?

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir the Likud campaign was less dramatic and flamboyant than it had been in 1981 when Begin had set the tone. Shamir's political position, however, is probably more extreme than Begin's. He called upon "all the forces who believe in the Land of Israel to unite in one bloc in order to insure that the Land of Israel in its entirety will be under Jewish sovereignty and under exclusive Jewish sovereignty" (*Haaretz*, 2 May 1984, p. 3).

The Alignment muted its differences with the Likud during the campaign. It reminded the voters that Jewish settlement in YESHA began during its administration, whereas the Likud had surrendered territory to the Arabs

and demolished settlements in Sinai as a result of the Camp David agreements. The major complaint against Likud policy in the territories was that the settlements were too costly. The argument that Likud settlement policy was an obstacle to peace with Jordan or resulted in radicalizing the local Arab population was expressed in small gatherings but was not a campaign theme. Slogans from the 1981 campaign such as "the Jordanian option" or "territorial compromise" disappeared in 1984 and the Alignment's program for an accommodation with Jordan received little publicity. The campaign noted that the Alignment had supported the war in Lebanon and only became critical of the war after Israel advanced beyond the first twenty-five miles. The Karp report and Jewish terrorism were almost totally ignored. A prominent advertisement by the Alignment appearing a number of times in the newspapers stated that "The Alignment says no return to the '67 borders, no uprooting settlements, no negotiations with the PLO, no Palestinian state," but "yes to a democratic Jewish state, yes to defensible borders, yes to responsible Zionism, yes to peace and security." The reader will observe that the "no's" are specific, as specific as the promise made by the Alignment candidate for defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, that "the Jordan will be our eastern border." The "yes's" are vague. They are code words that promise nothing but that do hint to leftist voters who so wish to interpret them that the Alignment favors full rights for Arab citizens, is prepared for territorial compromise based on Israel's security needs, and opposes annexation of a territory with one million Arabs, preferring a more vigorous pursuit of peace negotiations with Jordan. The reluctance of the Alignment to state all this explicitly tells us a great deal about its estimate of the country's mood.

The election returns must be interpreted in light of the campaign. The Alignment's slight margin of victory cannot be interpreted as a defeat for the nationalist forces in view of the effort on its part to blur its differences with the Likud on nationalist as distinct from economic issues. There were four Jewish parties whose campaign might be interpreted as favoring territorial compromise. They won 42 percent of the vote. Five parties supported the Likud's stance or stood to the right of it; they received the same percentage. Each bloc also received the same number of seats in the Knesset—fifty-three. However, of the fifty-three mandates of the "left, almost four were contributed by Arab voters. In other words, within the Jewish sector, the nationalist parties gained a clear majority despite the economic blunders for which the country held them accountable, despite the fact that they had moved further to the right than in 1981 and despite the fact that the Alignment's campaign assured the voter that its nationalist policies would resemble those of the Likud. Soldiers casting their ballots in army precincts gave noticeably more support to nationalist than to dovish parties. As *Nekudah* phrased the results: over half the soldiers voted "for the government, 'for war', for the Land of Israel, for national as opposed to private goals" (10 August 1984, p. 24).

## The Components of Israeli Nationalism

As has been pointed out, one meaning of the term *nationalism* is national chauvinism, and it has been argued that this sentiment is present and growing in strength in Israel. There are three analytically distinct streams to chauvinist Israeli nationalism. These streams are converging although, as we shall see, not every partisan of one stream approves of another. In some cases they constitute outspoken antagonists.

### *Territorial Nationalism*

The most widely known and most popular strand of Israeli nationalism is territorial: the conception of the Greater Land of Israel (literally the whole Land of Israel). The political expression of this nationalism is the demand that Israel annex the West Bank. Its minimal demand is that the status quo be retained; i.e., that Israel retain sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and not withdraw any further from territory captured in the Six-Day War, even in exchange for a peace agreement with Jordan. The maximalist territorial position is the annexation of Jordan and Jewish settlement in southern Lebanon both of which are part of the Biblical Promised Land. In October 1984 an organization was created to further these aims, but it has not engendered serious public support.

A variety of arguments are offered in favor of annexation or, at the minimum, retention of the status quo with respect to the West Bank. Minor arguments include Israel's need for land and population dispersal. The arguments most frequently heard focus on Israel's security needs and the religious argument. But a number of observers have pointed out that the reason so many Israelis object to returning any part of the territories is that after seventeen years of sovereignty (almost half the age of the State), many of them—younger people in particular—have become accustomed to thinking of the West Bank as their land. The election campaign and voting returns confirm the impression that large numbers of Israelis object to any kind of territorial compromise. However, Israeli willingness to compromise has never been put to a real test. Although the majority of Israelis report that they are opposed to returning any part of YESHA, they are responding to a theoretical question. Jordan, for example, has never presented Israel with a concrete proposal for a peace agreement. It has declared that any settlement with Israel must include Israeli return of all the territory captured in the Six-Day War which includes East Jerusalem. The support that the Israeli-Egyptian agreement originally evoked among the Israeli public suggests there may be a latent conciliatory sentiment that does not find expression at the present time. But the public's sense that Israel paid an enormous price for a peace agreement that is not "real" peace may have hardened attitudes.

Bearing this in mind, public opinion samples suggest that Israelis are

TABLE 1. SOLUTIONS TO ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL PROBLEM

	PERCENTAGE FAVORING EACH PROPOSAL				Youth Sample Aug. '84
	March '83	July '83	Jan. '84	June '84	
Return	40.0	38.9	38.6	31.4	22.0
Annex	19.0	30.8	20.0	26.6	32.6
Status Quo	37.3	25.7	37.4	36.9	39.5
No Answer	3.7	4.6	4.0	5.1	5.9

becoming increasingly more resistant to territorial compromise. Mina Zemach, Director of the Dahaf Research Institute, regularly presents her respondents with three (at one time four) proposals to resolve "the long term problem of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip" and asks them with which proposal they most agree. The first is: "In exchange for a peace agreement return most of YESHA with concern for security arrangements acceptable to Israel." (In earlier polls, respondents were also offered the possibility of "a Palestinian State in exchange for a peace agreement." So few respondents agreed with this response that it was dropped from later questionnaires. Our analysis combines both responses.) The second proposal is "Annex YESHA" and the third is "Status quo (leaving the situation as it exists)." The table that follows compares returns between March 1983 and June 1984 and the August 1984 youth sample (fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds) to which we have already referred.

The youth are more nationalist than adults. Among adults there is a steady decline in the proportion prepared to return any territory in exchange for a peace agreement. There is a gradual increase in those who favor annexation. An exception to this trend occurs in the July 1983 sample with an unexplainable jump followed by a drop in January 1984 of those favoring annexation. The jump comes at the expense of those favoring the status quo.

Respondents who favor the status quo are asked whether, if Israel has only two options, they prefer returning most of the territories in exchange for a peace agreement or if they prefer annexation. Over the past year and a half those who chose annexation range from three-quarters to two-thirds of those whose first choice was to retain the status quo.

Territorial nationalism, however, is not simply an objection to surrendering territory to Jordan or creation of a Palestinian state. Rather, the term *Land of Israel* by which nationalists mean the Greater Land of Israel has become a symbol that evokes resonances among its adherents that could hardly be explained by economic or even security requirements. Amos Oz has noted that the issue of the boundaries of the Land of Israel is "the only issue that brings the masses into the street" (*Haaretz*, 30 January 1984, p. 9). The formulation may be overstated but correctly points to the importance of the issue to Israelis.

During the election campaign, parties of the right—both religious and nonreligious—called themselves “the faithful to the Land of Israel”. A lengthy editorial in *Nekudah* following the election (10 August 1984, p. 4) called for a unity government comprising the Alignment as well as the Likud. Like many articles in *Nekudah*, the editorial was rich in connotative language—for example: “house of Israel,” “patriotic Jews,” “people of Israel,” but mostly “Land of Israel” as expressed in such terms as “interests of the Land of Israel” or “lovers of the Land of Israel.” Clearly, Land of Israel is more than a territorial designation.

The connotations evoke religious or quasi-religious sentiments and it was not surprising that territorial nationalism found its most ardent supporters among religious Jews. In the July 1984 opinion poll, respondents were asked if they observed all or much of the tradition, a little of the tradition, or none of the tradition. Only 20 percent of the first group, compared to 31 percent of the second group and 51 percent of the third group were prepared to surrender most of YESHA in exchange for a peace agreement.

The settlement movement in YESHA was led by national-religious Jews. The ideology of Gush Emunim and the vast majority of ideological discussion within *Nekudah* had been formulated in religious or quasi-religious terminology. The significance of *Nekudah* rested on the fact that it was a publication of the Council of all the settlements in YESHA, religious as well as nonreligious. Furthermore, although *Nekudah*'s audience was found primarily in the territories, the journal had also been written for a wider audience and noted explicitly that it was concerned with reaching its antagonists as well as its sympathizers. However, an adequate understanding of what the Land of Israel symbol connotes to leaders of Gush Emunim and many YESHA settlers would require an analysis of the literature emanating from yeshiva circles. The essays of Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook (1891–1982), the spiritual father of Gush Emunim, were particularly important in this regard, though an enormous literature, much of it far more radical in orientation, could be found in some of the esoteric publications produced in national-religious circles. In summary, Land of Israel, its conquest and settlement by Jews, points to the imminent redemption of the Jews if not all mankind. “The wholeness of the Jewish people cannot be obtained without the wholeness of the land” is the way Gush Emunim's spokeswoman phrased it in a television interview. Or, as another leader of Gush Emunim observed in a newspaper interview: (*Hareetz*, 18 May 1984, p. 17):

The central point is the understanding that the object of our generation is to settle the Land of Israel not as a refuge for a people who only seeks a place to live but as the redemption of the chosen people. . . .

Not all national-religious Jews were territorial nationalists. Those who were not, and they once constituted the mainstream of religious Zionism,

viewed the return of Jews to the Land of Israel, whether to all the land or only part of it, as an instrument in the rebirth and ultimate redemption of the Jewish people. For territorial nationalists inspired by both Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935), first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Palestine, and his son Rav Zvi Yehuda, the Land of Israel is more than an instrument. In its most radical formulation the Land of Israel is both the object and the content of the Jewish rebirth. According to one settler, the object is to turn "the Land of Israel into the sole content of Judaism and Judaism into the sole content of the Land of Israel" (*Nekudah*, 23 March 1984, p. 9).

This extreme position came to be challenged within Gush Emunim circles. After all, what had been propounded was more than a political program, it was theology of Judaism. The immediate response to the arrest of the accused terrorists among some YESHA spokesmen, in addition to condemnation, was a measure of soul-searching. According to one rabbi, the problem may have been "that we became one sided in our values. Land of Israel above all" (*Nekudah*, 25 May 1984, p. 11).

### *Ethnic Nationalism*

Ethnic nationalism, the radical hostility to non-Jews, dramatically surfaced in 1984. It was not simply enmity toward Israel's neighbors or even the demand that Israel adopt a tougher stance toward PLO sympathizers within the territories or in Israel itself. The ethnic nationalism under consideration involved hostility and prejudice toward all Arabs (less frequently toward all non-Jews), and was expressed in a number of ways. These included rising tensions in contacts between Arabs and Jews within Israel, increased instances of Jews (including the police) indiscriminately cursing and beating Arabs, and the growing numbers of Israeli Jews who favored restricting the civil rights of Arabs and/or of expelling them. Very few political figures adopted this view publicly. Its only ideological legitimacy came from religious circles, though the sentiment was by no means confined to them.

Five eighteen-year-olds, all from middle-class homes, were interviewed on a variety of topics shortly before they commenced their military service (*Huaretz*, 26 Sept. 1984, p. 7. One of them said: "Around us we hear more and more statements like: we have to finish the Arabs. We have to kill them. That's the style today. I don't know what once was true but this is discussed openly today." A second youngster confirmed this. No one, he said, is embarrassed to say it anymore. "And when you see what's going on around you . . . people begin to understand that this may be the best answer."

1984 was the first time the attorney general recommended charging a newspaper (a small Russian-language paper) with violating Israel's law against racial incitement because of the hostility it expressed toward Arabs. The growth of anti-Arab prejudice among Israeli Jews led a number of public

institutions including the army and the ministry of education to combat what is sometimes called "challenges to Israeli democracy" and popularly referred to as Jewish racism.

Much of the public concern arose from the election of Rabbi Meir Kahane to the Knesset. Kahane's party, Kach, received 1.2 percent of the popular vote entitling it to one seat. A poll conducted a month after the election revealed that if the elections were held again 2.2 percent of the voters would support Kahane. This increase, assuming the accuracy of the poll, might be accounted for by the enormous amount of publicity Kahane received after his election. It might also stem from the fact that many of his supporters did not vote for him since they did not believe he would obtain the 1 percent minimum vote necessary to secure Knesset representation. Kahane was the only candidate openly to espouse expulsion of Israel's Arab citizens. His campaign slogan "give me the power—I'll deal with them" shocked many Israelis but spoke to the hearts of at least a small minority. Most of his support came from small development towns (3.3 percent of their vote) populated by poor Sephardic Jews. He also did well in poor urban neighborhoods (2.7 percent in poor neighborhoods in Jerusalem) and in religious *moshavim* (non-cooperative agricultural settlements where Kahane received 3.2 percent of the vote). Among YESHA settlers one estimate put his proportion of the vote at 5 percent and another at 3 percent. But most surprising was that 2.5 percent of the soldiers balloting in army polls gave their vote to Kahana.

A case could be made that none of these figures justified the furor that his election provoked. His Knesset membership did provide him with a national and even international forum and access to people and places heretofore denied to him. But what troubled many even more was that support for Kahane among the youth—religious youth in particular—was far stronger than the voting returns suggested. Furthermore, many who do not support Kahane were sympathetic to his point of view.

A trial poll of summer camp leaders in the national-religious youth movement (Bnei Akiva) found that 20 percent supported Kahane (*Haaretz*, 10 August 1984, p. 15). The director of one of Israel's largest religious high schools reported in a private conversation that up to half the student body in his and similar institutions supported Kahane. Among a random sample of Israelis polled in January, 1984, 53 percent objected to Jews and Arabs living in the same building (*Haaretz*, 31 January 1984, p. 1). In the poll of Israeli youth cited earlier, 69 percent objected to living in the same building and 53 percent to studying in the same class with Arabs. In a Dahaf poll conducted in July, 1984, 15 percent of the respondents favored expulsion of the Arabs in the territories. Among those aged eighteen to twenty-two the figure was 25 percent.

Among the fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds, 42 percent thought that the rights of all non-Jewish citizens within Israel including the right to vote

should be restricted. Fifty-five percent felt that Arabs in Israel should not have the right to criticize the government and 48 percent that Muslims and Christians shouldn't be permitted to hold important public offices. Sixty-four percent felt that if YESHA were annexed to Israel, Arabs living there should be denied the right to vote in Knesset elections.

The youngsters were asked to identify themselves as "religious," "traditional" or "secular." Religious youth were consistently more hostile to non-Jews; secular youth were the least hostile. For example, 28 percent of the religious—in contrast to 54 percent of the secular—objected to denying non-Jews important public office.

As has already been suggested, the battle over the legitimacy of anti-Arab prejudice was taking place in religious circles. In September 1984 the teachers of one religious high school felt they had to confront the belief held by most of their students that Jewish law permits the murder of non-Jews. When asked by the head of the school how they differed from Nazis, their reply (he reported in private conversation) was that the Nazis killed Jews in the name of a madman whereas they will kill Arabs in the name of Jewish law. Given the influence that religious Jews have exercised over Israeli public life in the last decade and a half, the conflict within religious circles may have important consequences.

The generally unstated assumption of religious Jews, particularly in Israel, was that the characteristic of being a Jew, and therefore of being a non-Jew, was relevant to all of one's attitudes and behavior. Hence it would be reasonable to legislate for Jews and non-Jews on a group basis, and it would furthermore be reasonable to assume that non-Jews were hostile to Jews. Since the "Arab people as a whole declared war on the Jewish people who live in Zion they must be judged as a people" (*Nekudah*, 12 December 1983, p. 23). Even when the argument was phrased in secular terms it proceeded from assumptions that are deeply rooted in the religious tradition, particularly in the Israeli understanding of the tradition. This assumption is shared by many religious leaders such as Rav Yehuda Amital who sometimes expressed repugnance for the specific conclusions which the ethnic nationalists drew. The notion of permanent gentile hostility to the Jew that is also fed by the perception of the Holocaust, and the continual reminders of the Holocaust in Israeli culture provided an internal logic to the ethnic nationalist position which made it more persuasive to a neutral observer than many Israelis would care to admit. Finally, classical religious texts also provided specific support to the ethnic nationalists.

An author in *Nekudah*, defending his argument that in accordance with Jewish law Arabs need not be granted equal rights, noted that "Rav Kahana looks like a sweet playful poodle compared to Maimonides" (13 January 1984, p. 14), and a second author cited contemporary religious authorities to prove that Arabs were to be treated as the biblical nation of Amalek; in other words, wiped out (7 June 1984, pp. 32–34). Indeed, in an interview with a



leading rabbinical figure among YESHA settlers who was critical of the acts attributed to the accused Jewish terrorists, the respondent was asked: "Why did our rabbis say 'kill even the best of the goyim'?" The Rabbi answers that "this was said only in time of war . . . since even someone who doesn't fight directly may help the war effort indirectly" (*Nekudah*, 21 June 1984, p. 20). Otherwise, he explained, it is forbidden to kill a non-Jew.

The summer 1984 issue of *Kivunim*, the quarterly Hebrew language publication of the World Zionist Organization published an article by Mordecai Nisan called "A New Approach to Israeli Arab Peace." According to Nisan, only Jews can determine the order of national life in the Land of Israel. "The son of the servant [a biblical allusion to Ishmael] doesn't belong to the tribe of Abraham" (p. 34). Relying on Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah* which is an authoritative document for all religious Jews, the author stated that Jews may tolerate the presence of non-Jews in the Land of Israel as long as non-Jews acknowledged their inferior status. Otherwise Jews will have to expel them. "The simple meaning of the term 'Land of Israel' points to the dominance of Jews in their land and there is no room for homiletics on this point" (p. 34).

The author, a member of the Hebrew University's School for Overseas Students, was a religious Jew. But the article's venue, the journal of the World Zionist Organization, testified how unexceptionable the expression of such views had become throughout Israeli culture.

Many YESHA leaders became disturbed by the growth of ethnic nationalism. Some *Nekudah* editorials were critical of Kahane and of acts of indiscriminate violence against Arabs although the editorials invariably ended by blaming the government for not adopting tougher measures against hostile Arabs. The Israeli vacillation and weakness, they charged, encouraged Arab violence. Most troubling of all, they claimed, were the regular instances of rock-throwing by Arab youths at vehicles driven by Jews on West Bank highways; an act that on at least one occasion resulted in the death of a passenger. But there have also been cases of Jews who were deliberately killed. This led settlers to believe that they must take the law into their own hands, according to *Nekudah's* line of reasoning.

Territorial nationalists who are critical of ethnic nationalists have challenged them on two grounds. One is pragmatic. Jews and Arabs can and must, they say, live together in peace, even in the territories. The ethnic nationalists and their acts of reprisals disturb the good relationships between Arabs and Jews.

The second line of criticism was based on religious sources. Critics did not advocate extending the liberties or rights of Arabs beyond what they already had, but did oppose further restrictions of their rights, the indiscriminate harassment of Arabs and proposals to expel them. An interesting expression of this second line of criticism was offered by a non-observant Jew, Eliakim Haetzni, who was both an advocate of Arab rights as well as a rather ex-

reme spokesman for territorial nationalism. (He had virtually urged civil revolt if the government should attempt to surrender any of the West Bank. See *Nekudah*, 31 August 1984, p. 8-9.) According to Haetzni, the one common denominator among all the YESHA settlers is that the Land of Israel belongs to the people of Israel. He then observed that most of the condemnation which YESHA settlers voiced against the accused terrorists was their halakhic error of "false messianism." The real issue, he says, is "thou shalt not murder." Rabbis, he charges, have become indifferent to crimes that Jews commit against other Jews on a nonpolitical basis as well as to the crimes committed against Arabs. "Those who live among us and the sanctity of their lives require a great defense on the part of the teachers of halakha" (*Nekudah*, 21 June 1984, p. 23).

A realistic article on the topic of Jewish moral obligations to non-Jews observed two tendencies in the tradition, one universalistic and the other particularistic. The former taught that a Jew was obliged to help others regardless of whether they are or are not Jewish.

In days when hollow chauvinism also raises its head in our camp, it is well to remember that it is written [in the Bible] "and God created man in His image, in the image of God he created him." (*Nekudah*, 21 September 1984, p. 33)

One looks in vain for a forthright defense of the rights of Arabs rooted in religious sources and written by a religious authority acceptable to the territorial nationalists. The ethnic nationalists relied on religious authorities and brought proof-texts to prove that Arabs did not fall into the category of "strangers" whom the Torah orders the Jews to protect. They were reinforced by religious opinions challenging the rights of Arabs to live in the Land of Israel and cited chapter and verse to justify their expulsion (for example, *Tzfiyah*, 1 August 1984, pp. 32-35). But no less important, the spirit of the tradition in national religious circles emphasized Jewish chosenness, Jewish uniqueness, innate Jewish virtue, which was contrasted to gentile hostility to Jews and gentile vice.

Defense of Arab rights, by way of contrast, was often rooted in pragmatic and apologetic arguments that by their very nature were unattractive to the proud and assertive Jew in the national-religious camp. For example, Israel's first Ashkenazic chief rabbi, the widely admired Isaac Herzog (1888-1959) offered just such an argument when he declared that denying freedom of religion to Christians and Muslims would be impractical because the United Nations would not tolerate it. Liberal statements when emanating from religious sources have tended to be vague rather than specific in their citation of text. Indeed, rabbinic defenders of the terrorists even accused Gush Emunim of distorting Jewish law when they proclaimed that the settlement of the Land of Israel by Jews was not intended to deny Arabs their rights. It was not by accident, they noted, that Gush Emunim cited no

sources for this assertion whereas there was abundant religious opinion to the contrary (*Tzfiyah*, 1 August 1984, p. 36). The Chief Rabbinical Council was under some pressure to issue a statement condemning Kahane after he and his followers conducted a victory march through the Arab market in Jerusalem shouting "Arabs out of here." The Council's statement did not mention Kahane by name but did reject his program, saying that "the Torah perspective" calls for "paths of peace and brotherhood" in dealing with the Arabs. Such statements may have had some public relations value but carried little weight among religiously committed Jews.

### *Cultural Nationalism*

The Knesset minutes record a fascinating debate that took place in December 1983 and January 1984 (reprinted in *Nekudah*, 2 March 1984, pp. 22-31). The debate was opened by Rabbi Chaim Drukman, a leading figure among the nationalists. He charged that the theater in Israel "assaults the basic values of Judaism, the nation and the state." He observed that art has a purpose but instead of fulfilling that purpose the theater, television, and press disseminate pornography and material offensive to religion and harmful to Israel's security. "Is everything permitted in the name of freedom of expression?" he asked rhetorically. His answer was that everything published or presented to the public "must be in accordance with moral and educational standards." Drukman's speech was not the first in that vein over the past year or two. Nor were all those who advocated this position necessarily religious. Indeed, the most widely known accusation that artistic expression in Israel undermined national values came from the deputy minister of education and culture who was not herself religious.

Drukman's speech did not go unanswered. In the course of the Knesset debate a variety of speakers endorsed a variety of positions. Those who challenged Drukman included some who felt that the artistic expressions offensive to religion that he cited were intrinsically meritorious. Others demurred from the content of the art but opposed any effort at state censorship or even, as Drukman had proposed, the withdrawal of public funds to support the presentation of such material. No voices challenged Drukman in the name of Jewish rather than Zionist values. The observer was left with the impression that Zionism and humanist libertarian values were equated. Indeed, as one author reminded his readers in *Nekudah*, not only did European humanism owe nothing to Judaism, it did not even derive its roots from the Judeo-Christian biblical heritage (16 April 1984, pp. 32-33). It was the exclusive affirmation of Jewish or Judaic values, the exclusion of all others, and the assumption that Jewish norms and values evolved independently of or uninfluenced by the norms and values of other cultures that we call cultural nationalism. According to the cultural nationalists only Jewish na-

national culture and only its norms and values need concern members of the Jewish nation.

Of the three strands of nationalism that we have identified, cultural nationalism is the least rooted in Israeli society. Nevertheless, it was extremely important within religious circles since it served to insulate the religious nationalists against opposing arguments and defended both territorial and ethnic nationalism against charges that they violated standards of universal morality.

In 1977 Zevulun Hammer of the NRP was appointed minister of education in the newly formed Likud-dominated government. During his seven years in office the number of hours devoted to teaching the Jewish tradition in nonreligious schools were substantially increased and the post of rabbi was established in many schools. The hours devoted to studies of scientific subjects declined. An adviser to Hammer was quoted as saying that if "we must cut an hour from nature study or an hour from math study in order to offer Judaism, it won't bother me" (*Haaretz*, 7 October 1984, p. 9).

It is difficult to judge what impact the enrichment of the Judaic curriculum had on nonreligious students. It would be facile to attribute the rise in territorial and ethnic nationalism to this although there may be some relationship. But there is no evidence that the general public or even the nationalist youth shared the radical sentiments of the cultural nationalists. In the sample of fifteen-to eighteen-year-olds referred to earlier, only 18 percent wanted more hours devoted to Judaic studies; 23 percent wanted fewer hours. By contrast 64 percent wanted more hours devoted to technical or scientific subjects and only 7 percent fewer hours. On the other hand, 31 percent wanted more Jewish history and only 14 percent less.

In fact, cultural nationalism is an almost exclusive commitment of religious nationalists, and not all of them echoed this cry. However, their number seemed to be growing.

The growth of cultural nationalist tendencies among religious nationalists is a fairly recent development. One of the distinguishing features of religious Zionists as opposed to religious anti-Zionists in the past was that the former were receptive to Western culture, affirming both its outward forms and even some of its values. Even among the religious anti-Zionists, the German school of neo-orthodoxy affirmed the value of Western civilization and the possibility of religious Jews benefiting from its fruits.

Of course, Western culture today—and the values it projects—is not the Western culture of one hundred or even fifty years ago. Second, the mass media, television in particular, have disseminated popular rather than high culture, whereas it is the latter rather than the former which religious Jews affirmed. Third, the Holocaust experience as interpreted by Israeli society has been an important factor in encouraging cultural insulation among religious Jews. A favorite argument of cultural nationalists has been to point to

the behavior of the Nazis as the natural product of political isolation which Israeli nationalists feel, has led them to reject not only the political and moral criticism leveled against them but the cultural basis upon which such criticism rests.

The intensification of Judaic studies and the rejection of non-Judaic culture has been especially pronounced in the national-religious school system in the last few years. With the encouragement of the Ministry of Education, a new network of religious schools, Noam, has emerged. Noam is critical of the national-religious school system because it accepts pupils from nonreligious homes and refuses in some cases to separate boys and girls in the classroom but primarily because, Noam charges, the system devotes too little emphasis to Torah studies, too much to general studies. The founders of the Noam schools are close to Gush Emunim and instill in their pupils the notion that Jewish standards and Jewish ethics and morality are the only standards by which they or Israel can be judged. Although an organization has been formed within national-religious circles called Neemani Torah V'Avoda (The Faithful to Torah and Labor) to counter this ideology and the creation of much such schools, Noam has influenced the established national-religious school system even as it created its own competing network of schools. One principal of a religious high school noted that the belief among his students that cheating on such "unimportant" subjects as math is appropriate since this is not a Jewish subject (*Haaretz*, 7 October 1984, p. 9).

According to Rav Yaacov Filber, a central personality for the leaders of Noam, Jews are enjoined to maintain themselves in isolation from other peoples. "We are commanded to raise barriers and not to destroy barriers" (*Hatzofe*, 26 September 1984, p. 17). Foreign culture is a particular anathema when its standards are used to criticize the territorial or ethnic nationalists. "Between the Torah of Israel and atheist humanism there is no connection." There is no place in Judaism, says an author, "for a humanistic attitude in determining responses to hostile behavior of the Arab population" (from an article in *Nekudah*, 9 March 1982 cited in *Haaretz*, 11 May 1984, p. 15). "Jewish national morality," says another YESHA settler, "is distinct from universal morality." Notions of universal or absolute justice "may be good for Finland or Australia but not here, not with us" (quoted in *Haaretz*, 24 May 1984, p. 7).

One standard that Jewish morality does not include is democracy, at least according to one of the heroines of the YESHA settlers. Democracy is "a ritual that is of value for Gentiles . . ." (from an interview with Miriam Levinger in *Haaretz*, 16 September 1984, p. 2).

As we already noted, the denigration of non-Jewish culture, the exclusive concern with norms and values that emerge out of the Jewish tradition is a commitment which the cultural nationalists share with non-Zionist religious elements. Where the cultural nationalists part company with them is in the assumption that the true, authentic, legitimate Jewish culture can only flourish

ish or is only properly comprehended in the Land of Israel. By implication, therefore, even the Jewish tradition in *galut* (Diaspora; literally, exile) is somehow flawed.

A letter in *Nekudah* from the wife of an accused terrorist asked why everyone, including YESHA settlers, does not recognize the merit of what the terrorists did. Her answer was that "... only a few have as yet succeeded in freeing themselves from the two thousand year old *galut* fear of 'what will the goyim say' . . ." (21 September 1984) p. 2). The charges reached their ultimate—though logical enough—conclusion in a biographical sketch written by one accused terrorist of another, Rav Dan Beerli. Beerli is a proselyte and the writer suggested that Beerli's non-Jewish origins "allowed him to absorb the Jewish system without the complexes of the *galut*" (*Nekudah*, 19 August 1984, p. 29).

The three strands of Jewish nationalism that have been identified seem to derive from very disparate sources. The first modern territorial nationalists were the revisionists, a militant secular Zionist party from which Herut emerged. The revisionists maintained Jewish rights to both sides of the Jordan river and affirmed the necessity for developing a martial spirit among Jews. But they also believed that despite the national conflict of interest between Jews and Arabs, Jews must respect their opponents and meticulously honor their civil liberties within a Jewish state. Culturally, under the leadership of Zeev Jabotinsky the revisionists were among the most cosmopolitan of the Zionist parties.

The archetypal ethnic nationalists were the Israeli lower classes, typically Sephardic, living in urban slums and development towns. It was the segment of the population among whom Kahane campaigned most intensely. They did not settle in the territories and there was some question as to how welcome they would be if they sought to do so. They had no particular territorial commitments nor did they harbor an antagonism to foreign culture. On the contrary, they were stereotypically the major consumers of the homogeneous mass culture purveyed by television and video-tape. Their leisure time was more likely to be devoted to sporting events than to study of sacred texts with which they had little familiarity.

Cultural nationalism defined as an exclusive concern with Jewish culture and rejection of anything of gentile origin derived from that segment of Judaism which rejected modernity and Zionism. It flourished in sections of Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, among the "Community of the Pious" to whom even Agudat Israel was suspect for the intensity of its dealings with the State of Israel. It harbored no love for non-Jews but its major antagonists, those against whom it displayed most marked hostility, were secular Jews.

These three strands of Jewish nationalism have yet to become fully merged ideologically. They do not speak to a single constituency of any significant proportion. They are most firmly anchored in three different seg-

ments of Israeli society. The most vigorous exponents of one strand include those who are indifferent and sometimes even hostile to the others. But, as we have seen, there are signs of their convergence. Their legitimation and ideological expression is rooted in a new conception of religious nationalism that owes its intellectual foundations to the teachings of the late Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, first Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Palestine, but primarily to his son Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook. This ideology has not gone unchallenged in religious Zionist circles. Organizations such as Oz V'shalom (Strength and Peace) and Netivot Shalom (Paths of Peace) are two national-religious organizations founded to combat the ultra-religious nationalists. But the latter organizations are weak. They have had an abundance of support from distinguished religious academicians but lacked the support of outstanding rabbinical figures essential for the success of any religious organization. Chauvinist nationalism seemed to be gaining influence within the country as a whole and within religious-Zionist circles in particular. Should the trends finally converge and a firm constituency develop for their spokesmen, heightened tension in Israel may be expected in the coming years.

### Notes

1. The questionnaire was designed on the data collected by Mina Zemach, director of the Dahaf Research Institute for the Van Leer Institute and the youth magazine *Hamtzan*. I am indebted to Dr. Zemach, who made the data available to me, and to Shlomit Cnaan, editor of *Hamtzan*, who permitted the early release of the figures to me.

2. Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (Huntington, N.Y.: Fontana, 1983), pp. 114-15.

3. YESHA is an acronym for the Hebrew names of the territories Yehuda, Shomron and Azá. The word *yeshu* also means salvation. In the remainder of the essay we will use the terms YESHA, West Bank or just the word *territories* as synonymous terms to refer to that area captured by Israel in the Six-Day War, still under Israeli military occupation, but not annexed to the state, as for example East Jerusalem or Ramat Hagolan were annexed. There is no value-neutral term for this area in Hebrew. Arabs call it "the occupied territory"; Jewish settlers prefer the term YESHA and consider even "West Bank" or "territory" as indicating hostility.

4. Arabs who live in the territories are not citizens of Israel. They are subject to military rule.