

Jews in America


A Contemporary Reader

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Brandeis University Press

Published by University Press of New England
Hanover and London

ספריית הר הצופים
למדעי הרוח והחברה



Center and Periphery

Israel in American Jewish Life

The Six-Day War is widely seen as having had major impact on American Jewry, including its relationship with Israel.¹ Whether the changes brought about in that relationship were “revolutionary,” as suggested by some,² is another question. In any case, there is considerable evidence that Israel moved from the periphery to the center in the structure and culture of the American Jewish community.

Viewed from the perspective of the institutional structure of American Jewry, Israel undoubtedly plays a central role in American Jewish life, and much of that role developed as a result of the Six-Day War. In the *American Jewish Year Book*'s annual listing of national Jewish organizations, for example, contains more than eighty organizations specifically devoted to Zionist and pro-Israel activities; and for many others, objectives and activities such as “promotes Israel welfare,” “support for the State of Israel” and “promotes understanding of Israel,” appear with impressive frequency. In addition, more than fifty of the largest and most active of these national Jewish organizations are affiliated with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, for which Zionist and pro-Israel activity is the major emphasis. The Conference of Presidents shares an address with the U.S. headquarters of the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization, and virtually all of its chairmen have had long records of extensive activity on behalf of Israel.

Israel became central to the American Jewish philanthropic structure as a result of the Six-Day War, as Menahem Kaufman has indicated, to the point where leaders of the United Jewish Appeal are supportive of almost every decision of almost every Israeli government, at times becoming actual lobbyists for Israeli government policy.³ The leadership acts in this manner out of its own convictions and also with the tacit support of a broad cross section of the American Jewish population. For example, in 1990 more than 70 percent of American Jewish baby boomers agreed with the statement “The need for funds for services and programs

in Israel is greater now than five years ago.”⁴ Although that figure has probably decreased somewhat as the result of the widely publicized assertion by Israel’s deputy foreign minister, Yossi Beilin, that Israel is a modern, growing society and no longer needs American Jewish charity,⁵ there is every reason to assume that Israel still plays a major role within the American Jewish philanthropic structure.

In terms of the overall pro-Israelism of the American Jewish community, the empirical evidence indicates very strong support for Israel among the community’s leadership. For example, a 1989 survey conducted by Steven M. Cohen that included “key professionals and top lay leaders from some of the most influential organizations in American Jewish life,” as well as a small number of academics who are involved with Israel, found that 99 percent of the respondents had been to Israel at least once and 84 percent had been there three times or more. Moreover, 78 percent identified themselves as Zionists, and 54 percent had “seriously considered living in Israel.” When asked, “How close do you feel to Israel?” 78 percent responded “very close” and 19 percent “fairly close.” Only 2 percent stated that they feel “fairly distant,” and none stated “very distant.”⁶ Jewish communal leaders not only feel close to Israel and identify with Zionism in the American sense of that term (i.e., pro-Israelism),⁷ they also appear to subscribe to the Zionist tenet of the centrality of Israel. Thus, in response to the statement “Jewish life in America is more authentically and positively Jewish than Jewish life in Israel,” 81 percent of Cohen’s sample disagreed and only 10 percent agreed.⁸ The ways in which Jewish organizations have been strongly involved in defense activity for Israel have been amply documented.⁹

Israel has also become increasingly central in the realm of American Jewish education. In 1968, Alvin Schiff found that Israel was taught as a separate subject in 48 percent of all Jewish schools, including all-day, weekday afternoon, and one-day-a-week schools under Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, communal, and secular auspices;¹⁰ by 1974, as Barry Chazan found, 63 percent of the school curricula listed Israel as a separate subject, and “a general increase of attention paid to Israel in all subject-areas as compared with 1968.”¹¹ Although there are no more contemporary empirical data, anecdotal “evidence” and personal observation convey the strong impression that this pattern has only intensified over the years. As for the role of Israel in American Jewish education, its increased importance is evidenced in a wide variety of ways, not the least of them being that Israel is today a major source for curriculum materials in the field of Jewish education. In certain respects, the biblical vision, *ki mitzion tetzei tora* (From Zion shall Torah flow) has been realized, for example, in the publication of *Judaica* and a wide variety of Jewish curriculum materials.

Israel also has become an integral part of the synagogue service of American Jewish denominations. As David Ellenson and I have indicated, almost all of the standard American Jewish prayer books now incorporate some prayers for the State of Israel as a part of the weekly service. Thus, the official prayer book of the American Reform Movement, *Sha’arei Tefillah* (Gates of Prayer), published

in 1975, is radically different from its predecessor, the Union Prayer Book, in many ways, not the least being its inclusion of a prayer for the State of Israel as part of the weekly and holiday service. The movement's holiday liturgy, as set down in *Gates of the Seasons* (1983), incorporates Israel's Independence Day, Yom Ha'atzmaut, into the religious calendar and the ritual service. Although the most popular edition of the Orthodox Art-Scroll *Siddur* does not contain any reference to the State of Israel, there is an abundance of data to substantiate that the Orthodox have the most extensive and deepest attachments to Israel.¹²

Perhaps even more dramatic is the impact of the Six-Day War on the culture of the American Jewish community. In their assessment of the extent to which Israel has become central within the American Jewish community since the Six-Day War, published in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* in 1971, Eventov and Rotem indicated that Israel now occupies "an important place in synagogue activities, sermons, and various religious celebrations," including Israel Independence Day. They continued: "The Israel flag is frequently displayed in synagogues and community centers. In many synagogues, prayers for the welfare of the State of Israel and world Jewry are recited on Sabbaths and holidays following that for the welfare of the United States. . . . Hebrew songs and Israel folk dances have become American Jewish popular culture: at weddings, bar mitzvot, and on many college campuses."¹³

Although Israel has become part of the religious behavior of American Jews, as Charles Liebman observed,¹⁴ or even *the* religion of American Jews, as Nathan Glazer observed,¹⁵ it is nevertheless the case that America's Jews are a "nonreligious" group, even though they might define themselves as a religious group. Understanding this requires a recognition of the difference between the American Jewish community and the American Jewish population. They are certainly not one and the same. In fact, a majority of American Jewish baby boomers are not affiliated with the American Jewish community. They are not members in any Jewish organization; they do not subscribe to any Jewish publication, and they are not members in any synagogue or temple—even the ones they don't attend.

A careful examination of the evidence on the behavior and attitudes of American Jewish baby boomers strongly suggests that the impact of the Six-Day War is actually significantly less than a look at American Jewish communal life might indicate. The data presented below underscore a basic fact of American Jewish life, namely, that there is a vast difference between the American Jewish community and the American Jewish population.

The population with which we are concerned—American Jewish baby boomers—is composed of those who were born between the years 1946 and 1964 and who, when asked in the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS), "What is your current religion?" identified themselves as Jewish. This age group was selected for analysis because it represents those currently ascending to leadership and dominance in a variety of institutional spheres in American society. Thus, for

example, the election of Bill Clinton as U.S. president was widely seen as symbolic of the ascendancy of the baby boom generation to political dominance.

Without getting too technical about it, it is important to know that the NJPS sample consists of 2,441 respondents. Each of the respondents provided the information for himself or herself and also for each member of their household. Thus, the survey obtained information on almost three times as many people as the actual number of respondents, or 6,514 individuals. The resulting data were subsequently statistically weighted, so that the sample of Jewish households would then represent more than three million American households nationally.

The question "Who is a Jew?" is an important one, not only on the Israeli political scene but also for social scientists studying Jews and Jewish communities. The problem may be even more difficult for social scientists in that they can not resort to ideological definitions; they can only follow the empirical evidence. Moreover, people may define themselves as Jewish by different criteria. That is, some may define themselves as Jewish by religion, some as Jewish by ethnicity, some as Jewish by birth, and others as Jewish by emotion (i.e., they "feel Jewish").

Since the vast majority of those who identify as Jewish say that they are Jewish by religion, and since the vast majority of those who identify as Jewish but say that they are not Jewish by religion manifest very low levels of Jewish identity and identification, I selected for analysis only those who when asked, "What is your current religion?" responded, "Jewish." Thus, the NJPS sample selected for analysis consists of 801 Jewish baby boomer respondents. There are several reasons that only actual respondents were selected for analysis. In general, I have problems with relying on data obtained from anyone but the actual respondent. Even more important in terms of this article is the fact that many of the questions probing Jewish identity were asked only of respondents.

Since there has been something of a debate among the social scientists most directly involved with NJPS as to exactly which, if any, weighting procedure should be used in many instances¹⁶ and especially when dealing with Jewish cultural issues, all of the tables presented below are of three sets: one consisting of unweighted percentages, one using an alternative weighting procedure suggested by Steven M. Cohen (SMC), and one using the NJPS weights (POPWGT). Although the figures differ depending on which set is used, the most important findings are not the very specific percentages but the patterns; and in the patterns there are no basic differences between sets.

It should be emphasized that the figures in table 11.1 are for the national American Jewish population, and there are regional differences. A major study of the New York Jewish population found that New York Jews rank higher in their ties with Israel, as well on most indices of Jewish identification and identity, than do Jews nationwide. Thus, among New York Jews aged 18–34, 40 percent stated that they had been to Israel; among those aged 25–49, 37 percent did.¹⁷

How one interprets these figures is obviously a matter of perspective. To those who accepted the figures frequently bandied about by representatives of the Jewish

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TABLE 11.1
Number of Times Jewish Baby Boomers Have Been to Israel

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPWGT</i>
Once	15.0	15.7	12.8
Twice	5.0	5.5	4.8
Three times	1.5	2.2	1.9
4–9 times	3.5	4.3	3.3
10+ times	0.5	0.4	0.4
Born in Israel	1.1	1.5	1.4
Never	73.4	70.4	75.3

Agency and/or the World Zionist Organization—to wit, that only about 10 percent of America’s Jews have ever visited Israel—the data may be good news. However, if one considers the facts that Israel is supposedly a key component of American Jewish identity and that America’s Jews are relatively well off socioeconomically and presumably travel considerably, the figures would appear to suggest something quite different.

The meaning of the baby boomer figures takes on additional significance when we compare their rates of visits to Israel with those of what may be called “middle agers,” those who were 45–65 in 1990 (see table 11.2).

It might be suggested that the reason most American Jewish baby boomers have not visited Israel is the fact that they are busy with their families, especially their children, and at this stage in their lives have too many financial obligations to visit Israel (even though they do find the time and money to visit elsewhere).

TABLE 11.2
Number of Times Been to Israel, Baby Boomers and Middle-Agers

	<i>Ages 26–44</i>	<i>Ages 46–64</i>
Once	12.8	19.8
Twice	4.8	5.0
Three times	1.9	1.5
4–9 times	3.3	3.2
10+ times	2.0	2.0
Born in Israel	1.4	.3
Never	75.3	68.3

Instead, it may be more revealing to look at feelings about Israel rather than actual visits. However, when we look at the data on the emotional attachments of American Jewish baby boomers to Israel, the picture is not all that different. Some 70 percent say that they are either “not attached” or “somewhat attached,” and only about 30 percent say that they are either “very attached” or “extremely attached” (see table 11.3).

Here again, we find that the baby boomers’ levels of emotional attachment to Israel are lower than those of the middle-agers (see table 11.4). Since emotional attachments do not, in and of themselves, cost money, the lower levels are indeed significant.

America’s Jews are highly pro-Israel. Indeed, 85 percent of those sampled in a 1988 *Los Angeles Times* survey favor strong U.S. support for Israel.¹⁸ Such a high percentage of pro-Israelism is obviously a manifestation of Israel as an important factor in American Jewish identity.¹⁹ However, to place this in proper perspective, it must be recalled that Americans as a whole are quite favorably disposed toward Israel.²⁰ One should also be cautious in interpreting the significance of the sharp rise in pro-Israelism among American Jews in 1967. It was probably not as clear a reflection of the centrality of Israel in American Jewish identity as some have suggested.²¹ It was also a reflection of the *Americanization* of America’s Jews, in that many of them felt by then comfortable enough as Americans to express their support for Israel, especially since the United States supported Israel; whereas in earlier times (e.g., 1956 and 1948) they were less comfortable doing so lest they be viewed as less than complete Americans. That support for Israel is today completely compatible with being American is evident from a remark made recently by a 55-year-old (slightly older than baby boomer) New York Jewish “radio personality,” who said about Israel: “I’m glad it’s there. I viscerally support them in their wars with the various Arab states, but I’m an American and I’m going to live and die in America most likely.”²²

A number of observers have suggested that the Six-Day War conjured up fears of another Holocaust.²³ Accordingly, ties to Israel are, in part, related to feelings of security in the United States. In fact, the condition of American Jewry is unprecedentedly positive. Perhaps Charles Silberman captured it best when, about eight years ago, he called them “a *certain* people.”²⁴ American Jews have made it

TABLE 11.3
Emotional Attachments of Jewish Baby Boomers to Israel

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POP1WGT</i>
Not attached	19.6	17.7	24.2
Somewhat attached	49.8	48.6	47.0
Very attached	20.1	22.0	18.2
Extremely attached	10.5	11.7	10.6

TABLE 11.4
Emotional Attachments to Israel of Baby Boomers and
Middle-Agers

	<i>Ages 26-44</i>	<i>Ages 46-64</i>
Not attached	24.2	15.0
Somewhat attached	47.0	38.0
Very attached	18.2	33.2
Extremely attached	10.6	13.7

into American society in ways that could not have been predicted even as recently as midcentury. Although much publicity was given to a recent ADL report showing that one in five, or 20 percent, of Americans hold anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes, what was not given notice was that this reflects a decrease in anti-Semitism. Indeed, all studies since World War II indicate a rather steady and consistent decrease in anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes by white Americans.²⁵ Does this mean that there is no anti-Semitism in the United States or that we shouldn't be concerned about it? Certainly not! It does exist, as the ADL report indicates, and it is greater in some parts than in others. For example, it seems fair to assume that in cities such New York, where the economy suffers substantially and where there is the greatest competition between Jews and blacks, hostilities will be greater. Moreover, Jews are disproportionately urban, so there is an even greater probability of such competition. And if there is one lesson that history has taught us, it is that we must constantly be vigilant to anti-Semitism, no matter how unrepresentative of the society it appears to be.²⁶

Also, although surveys of non-Jewish Americans consistently indicate a decrease in anti-Semitic attitudes, most Jews continue to believe that anti-Semitism is a serious problem in the United States. For example, approximately 82 percent of American Jewish baby boomers stated that the believed anti-Semitism to be a serious problem in the United States (table 11.5).

Anti-Semitism has long been a force in maintaining Jewish group identity and in maintaining ties to Israel, and one might assume that, with such a high

TABLE 11.5
Respondent: Anti-Semitism Is a Serious Problem in USA

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPMIWGT</i>
Strongly disagree	2.5	2.2	3.4
Somewhat disagree	14.9	15.1	14.3
Somewhat agree	33.5	30.7	34.9
Strongly agree	49.2	52.1	47.4

TABLE 11.6
Respondent Personally Experienced Discrimination

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPMTWGT</i>
Yes, getting job	1.2	1.8	1.3
Yes, promotion	2.8	2.9	2.6
Yes, both	2.0	2.1	1.6
Yes, other	2.4	2.4	2.3
No discrimination	91.2	90.3	91.5
Did not try for job	0.4	0.5	0.6

level of perception of anti-Semitism, the bonds will continue to remain firm.

However, when we look at those who say that they personally experienced discrimination because of their Jewishness, the percentages drop radically (table 11.6), with more than 90 percent of Jewish baby boomers stating that they have never experienced discrimination. And although the percentages were somewhat lower, when asked whether for their agreement or disagreement with the statement "In a crisis, Jews can only depend on each other," approximately 60 percent disagreed "somewhat" or "strongly" (see table 11.7).

There is ample evidence that Jews are making it into spheres of American society that were traditionally closed to them. Evidence from studies of occupational patterns indicate that Jews can now be found in virtually every occupational sphere and at the highest levels. Even more, they are able to reach these spheres and levels without denying their Jewishness. They don't have to change their names and make a secret of their Jewishness.²⁷

However, the "symbolic" rather than ideological and/or structural nature of their Jewishness is evident in a variety of manifestations. To cite but one example, when we look at the character of the neighborhoods in which American Jewish baby boomers live, we find an interesting paradox. On the one hand, a majority say that the Jewishness of their area is either somewhat or very important (table 11.8). On the other hand, when we look at the actual Jewish character of

TABLE 11.7
In Crisis Jews Can Only Depend on Each Other

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPMTWGT</i>
Strongly disagree	30.5	28.6	31.6
Somewhat disagree	30.5	28.6	30.0
Somewhat agree	14.5	16.1	14.6
Strongly agree	24.5	26.7	23.8

TABLE 11.8
Respondent's Assessment of Importance of Neighborhood Jewishness

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPWGT</i>
Not important	19.9	17.7	21.7
Not very important	25.8	24.4	25.0
Somewhat important	38.2	39.2	38.2
Very important	16.0	18.7	15.1

their neighborhoods as they describe them, we find that more than 60 percent state that their is little or no Jewish character to their neighborhood (table 11.9).

The age of the "melting pot," in which being ethnic was a stigma, is over. The change from an ideology of the melting pot to that of cultural pluralism took place during the 1960s. One of its first manifestations was the election of a Catholic, John F. Kennedy, to the presidency. Not only was JFK a Catholic, he was Irish; and when he visited Ireland he spoke proudly of his Irish homeland. In earlier times that would have been heresy! To be president one has to be actually born in the United States. As Theodore Roosevelt once said, hyphenated Americans are unacceptable. And then comes JFK and proclaims his Irish heritage.

The change to cultural pluralism was quickly picked up by Madison Avenue, and the late Pan Am Airlines had an ad campaign that proclaimed that all Americans have two homelands, the USA and that from which they or their parents emigrated; that you should visit your other homeland; and that when you do, of course, you should fly Pan Am. Or to cite one more example from the world of advertising, during the mid-1960s, Rheingold Beer had an ad campaign on television in which they would show a series of ethnic festivities, one for each ad spot—an Italian wedding, for example. They showed ethnic songs and dances, and at one point, all the people would lift their glasses of beer—Rheingold, of course—in blessing, salute, or what have you. The point is, this ad campaign was a clear public celebration of ethnicity, something that earlier would have been "un-American."

When I moved to New Haven in 1965, it was extremely rare to see a *kippa* at Yale. Today, that is not so rare, and one sees *kippot* on the heads of prominent

TABLE 11.9
Jewish Character of JBB's Neighborhood

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPWGT</i>
Not Jewish	31.2	28.5	33.0
Little Jewish	31.8	31.2	32.1
Somewhat Jewish	28.3	30.7	27.0
Very Jewish	8.7	9.6	7.9

doctors in major hospitals, in Wall Street offices, law offices, and even, several years ago, worn by the chief of the public defender's office in Los Angeles in the television series, *The Trials of Rosie O'Neal*. And frequently, no mention is made and no attention paid to the *kippa*. It's very natural.

That Jews have made it into American society is also evident in the fact that increasing numbers of Jews are running for public office on the national level, and they serve while retaining their Jewish affiliation. Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut is one outstanding example, and there are more.

One final manifestation of Jews having made it into American society is, much as it causes us pain, the significant rise in intermarriage. As the NJPS clearly shows, intermarriage today is basically different from what it was in the past in that the Jewish spouse is no longer expected to renounce his or her Jewishness. On the contrary, the non-Jewish spouse frequently finds the spouse's Jewishness attractive. This, again, is reflected in the media. Remember Michael and Hope on "*Thirtysomething*"? In a sense, it's in to be Jewish today. Several years ago, Joel, the doctor from New York on *Northern Exposure*, a very popular prime-time weekly television show, proclaimed, "I am not white. I'm Jewish." And you can be sure he was not looking for a Jewish wife in Alaska! In fact, the next season he proposed to his colleague, Maggie O'Connell.

Nor is it only with respect to mate selection that Jews are increasingly bonding with non-Jews. Approximately two-thirds of the Jewish baby boomer respondents said that none or few of their closest friends are Jewish (table 11.10).

Again, New York Jews are significantly different. Among those between the ages of 18 and 34, 57 percent stated that most of their close friends are Jewish, and among those between the ages of 35 and 49, 61 percent did.²⁸

What we are dealing with is what Herbert Gans calls "symbolic ethnicity."²⁹ Traditional ethnicity meant submerging the individual self to the demands of the group. The group has strong social control. Today, the group has no control, and the individual does not submit. Symbolic ethnicity is modern; it is an attempt to synthesize individualism with what Robert Nisbet referred to as the "quest for community"³⁰—but not community in the traditional sense of power over the individual. Rather, it is a community with which one chooses to identify emotionally. It is, perhaps, a psychological community but not a sociological one. Even in

TABLE 11.10
JBB's Closest Friends Who Are Jewish

	<i>Unweighted</i>	<i>SMC Weight</i>	<i>POPWGT</i>
None Jewish	5.9	4.7	6.3
Few or Some Jewish	58.4	53.1	60.4
Most Jewish	26.7	31.4	24.3
All Jewish	9.0	10.8	9.0

choosing to identify with an ethnicity, the individual picks and chooses that which he can accept and that which he rejects. Symbolic ethnicity is “pick and choose” ethnicity, much as modern religion has become pick-and-choose religion. Charles Liebman also suggests that much of American Judaism is of a symbolic nature.³¹

James Davison Hunter has analyzed the “culture wars” raging in the United States today.³² A number of the speakers at the opening session of the Jerusalem conference³³ pointed to a somewhat similar series of culture wars in Israel. In the United States the more traditional element is much more involved with Israel. How that will play itself out if the less traditional element in Israel moves farther away from the “civil religion” of Israel remains to be seen. Likewise, the greater the strength of the *Haredi* element in Israel becomes, the more it is likely to alienate the American Jewish nontraditionalists as well as a smaller but significant percentage of those in the traditional fold. Again, what will emerge from such developments is difficult to predict.

What seems clear is the nature of the American Jewish-Israeli relationship has undergone substantial change since the Six-Day War. There is no solid evidence, despite suggestions to the contrary by both American Jewish communal leaders and others,³⁴ that visits to Israel are the *causal* factor in intensifying Jewish identity and identification. There is evidence that Israel plays an important part in American Jewish identification, and the American Jewish community needs Israel much as Israel needs the American Jewish community. However, as the evidence presented indicates, fewer Jews now identify with the organized American Jewish community and with Israel.

Yet it might be argued, that perhaps there actually has not been any diminution in American Jewish attachments to Israel, despite the evidence that there has. The data presented relate, primarily, to formal, institutional connections with Israel. Perhaps those have declined simply as a result of the broader decline in American Jewish attachments to what might be called the “public Judaism” of the organized American Jewish community. Some have argued that despite the decline in these type of attachments, there has been no decline—indeed, some suggest an increase—in “private Judaism,” that is, informal as well as formal Judaism within the private sphere, especially family, without the formalized institutional connections.

Reassuring as that hypothesis sounds, the evidence does not appear to support it. With respect to attachments to Israel, in particular, the data presented relate to “private” as well as “public” spheres. Emotional attachments are most certainly the private sphere and, as table 11.4 indicates, they have declined among baby boomers. Furthermore, if it were only the attachments to Israel in the public, formal institutional sphere that have declined, we might have expected that, for example, the rate of aliya among baby boomers at least remained constant. Aliya, after all, is “doing” rather than “joining.” Hard data on recent American aliya is meager. What is evident is that, although the median age of American immigrants to Israel, *olim*, remains in the 25–29-year-old cohort, as it has for at least several decades, there was a steady decline in the number of American *olim* during the

1980s, and the 1990 figures were the lowest since the 1960s.³⁵ So there does not appear to be anything in the Israel-related evidence, of a private sphere or public-sphere nature, to suggest that the diminishing of Jewish identification and identity is of only a limited nature. Although there may be sporadic and short-lived surges of manifestations of “symbolic Judaism,” especially with respect to episodic American Jewish attention to Israel, there has been a decline in attachments that are socially meaningful and significant—that is, involving the individual for any length of time in ways that can be empirically demonstrated. An important question then becomes whether those weakening ties will strengthen those in Israel who already wish to distance themselves from the American Jewish community and what impact such a trend may have on both the American Jewish community and Israel.

Notes

Paper presented at the conference on “The Six-Day War and Communal Dynamics in the Diaspora,” Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, December 20, 1994.

1. Arthur Hertzberg, “Israel and American Jewry,” *Commentary* 44 (2) (August 1967), pp. 69–73.
2. Menahem Kaufman, “From Philanthropy to Commitment: The Six Day War and the United Jewish Appeal,” *Journal of Israeli History* 15 (2) (summer 1994), p. 161.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 161–91.
4. The data are from the National Jewish Population Survey. Specifics on the population involved are discussed below.
5. *Long Island Jewish World*, Feb. 11–17, 1994, p. 2.
6. Steven M. Cohen, *Israel-Diaspora Relations: A Survey of American Jewish Leaders* (Ramat-Aviv: Israel Diaspora Institute [Report No. 8], 1990), pp. 26–28.
7. Chaim I. Waxman, *American Aliya: Portrait of an Innovative Migration Movement* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), pp. 105–18.
8. Cohen, *Israel-Diaspora Relations*. If it were based solely on this statement, Cohen’s interpretation of the responses to this question as a measure of Zionism would be somewhat questionable. Those who responded negatively may not have been affirming the centrality of Israel. Perhaps they merely do not subscribe to the centrality of America; that is, they may hold Israel and America as of equal importance. That would be in line with the findings of a study of Reform Jewry’s national leadership in which an almost identical percentage disagreed with the statement “It is easier to lead a fuller Jewish life in Israel than in the U.S.” (Mark L. Winer, Sanford Seltzer, and Steven J. Schwager, *Leaders of Reform Judaism: A Study of Jewish Identity, Religious Practices and Beliefs, and Marriage Patterns* [New York: Research Task Force on the Future of Reform Judaism, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1987] pp. 63–64). However, in light of the responses of Cohen’s sample to other Israel-related questions, his interpretation does seem appropriate for the majority.
9. See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of*

- American Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976), p. 288; Jonathan S. Woocher, *Sacred Survival: The Civil Religion of American Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 76–80.
10. Alvin I. Schiff, "Israel in American Jewish Schools: A Study of Curriculum Realities," *Jewish Education* 38(4) (October 1968), pp. 6–24.
 11. Barry Chazan, "Israel in American Jewish Schools Revisited," *Jewish Education* 47(2) (summer 1979), p. 10.
 12. David Ellenson, "Envisioning Israel in the Liturgies of North American Liberal Judaism," and Chaim I. Waxman, "The Changing Religious Relationship: American Jewish Baby Boomers and Israel," in Allon Gal, ed., *Envisioning Israel: The Changing Ideals of North American Jews* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996); also see Chaim I. Waxman, ed., *Israel as a Religious Reality* (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1994).
 13. *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 16:1147.
 14. Charles S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1973), pp. 88–108.
 15. Nathan Glazer, "American Jews: Three Conflicts of Loyalties," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 233.
 16. For example, see Steven M. Cohen, "Why Inter-marriage May Not Threaten Jewish Continuity," *Moment* 19(6) (December 1994), pp. 89ff.
 17. Bethamie Horowitz, *The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study* (New York: UJA-Federation, 1993), table 2.2, p. 52.
 18. Robert Scheer, "The Times Poll: U.S. Jews for Peace Talks on Mideast," *Los Angeles Times*, April 12, 1988.
 19. Chaim I. Waxman, "All in the Family: American Jewish Attachments to Israel," in Peter Y. Medding, ed., *A New Jewry? America since the Second World War*, Studies in Contemporary Jewry, vol. 8 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 134–49.
 20. A good analysis is that of Peter Grose, *Israel in the Mind of America* (New York: Knopf, 1984).
 21. For example, Eli Eyal, in his address at the opening session of the conference, "The Six-Day War and Communal Dynamics in the Diaspora," The Hebrew University, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Jerusalem, December 1994.
 22. Quoted in Jon Kalish, "The Roots of Radio," *The Jewish Week*, Queens edition, Oct. 14–20, 1994, p. 25.
 23. Chaim I. Waxman, *America's Jews in Transition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), p. 114.
 24. Charles E. Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York: Summit Books, 1985).
 25. Leonard Dinnerstein, *Anti-Semitism in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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 27. For example, see Samuel Z. Klausner, *Succeeding in Corporate America: The Experience of Jewish M.B.A.'s* (New York: American Jewish Committee, Institute of Human Relations, 1988).

28. Horowitz, *The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study*, table 2.2, p. 52.
29. Herbert J. Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Culture in America," in Herbert J. Gans, Nathan Glazer, Joseph R. Gusfield, and Christopher Jencks, eds., *On the Making of Americans: Essays in Honor of David Riesman* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 193–220.
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32. James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
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