JEWISH ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACKS & RACE RELATIONS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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FOREWORD

Tom Smith's *Jewish Attitudes Toward Blacks and Race Relations* is the fifth in a series of "Jewish Sociology Papers" published by the American Jewish Committee. Previous installments in the series have dealt with demographic trends among American Jews, the quality of American Jewish life, and religious discrimination against American Jews in the labor market.

Dr. Smith's pioneering paper focuses on the crucial area of black-Jewish ties, exploring in depth the attitudes of American Jews toward blacks and race relations. This issue, together with the thorny question of black anti-Semitism, has evoked intense discussion in the media and elsewhere, discussion, however, hampered by the absence of hard data. Hard data is what Smith supplies in plenty, and for that we must be extremely grateful. The other element in the equation -- black anti-Semitism -- will be explored in another AJC publication.

David Singer, *Director*
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PREFACE

The major finding of this study -- that Jews in the United States exceed other groups in their positive attitudes toward blacks and their commitment to equal opportunity -- can be fully appreciated only in light of the history of contact between blacks and Jews in the 20th century.

Jews and blacks were early advocates for a strong governmental role in combating discrimination, alleviating the plight of the poor, and aiding social mobility. Both groups supported political candidates who were committed to greater equality, and both mounted court challenges against discriminatory practices. Jews were prominent among the founders of the NAACP in 1910.

These joint efforts intensified in the 1930s when both Jews and blacks became visible supporters of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. Most blacks had previously supported Republican candidates because of the historical legacy of the Civil War, while Jews had not been collectively identified with either major party. Both groups, however, shifted decisively to the Democrats beginning with Al Smith's urban-oriented coalition in 1928 and culminating in FDR's victories in the 1930s. Both communities remain heavily Democratic to this day.

The New Deal offered unprecedented benefits for blacks and Jews. It put government on the side of progress for populations emerging from urban poverty. It adopted an ethic of care that matched the religious and cultural traditions of blacks and Jews. And by the actions and associations of President Roosevelt, his wife, and his close advisers, it seemed to reach out to groups previously excluded from mainstream America and to bring them into the country's governing coalition. Jews and blacks saw the New Deal as a pathway to social acceptance as well as a means to achieve concrete benefits.

In many ways, however, both groups were disappointed with this alliance. Despite the gains that blacks made, the structure of social

and occupational segregation in America, especially in such key institutions as schools and the armed forces, was never seriously challenged. Jews did well on the domestic scene, but the Roosevelt Administration failed in several instances to rescue or aid Jews in Europe who became victims of the Holocaust. Thus the New Deal produced its share of dissatisfactions as well as accomplishments.

Still, blacks and Jews emerged from the New Deal experience as firm political and social allies. Both realized that several sectors of American life were closed to them, saw their mobility blocked by discrimination, and resolved to advocate equal opportunity. Both sought to accomplish these goals through court challenges to discrimination, support for the Democratic party, and strengthening of civil rights organizations.

Yet the interests of the two communities were not identical. Prejudice and discrimination against blacks were much more deeply rooted and harder to eradicate than barriers to Jewish advancement. For all the social, cultural, and economic problems they faced, Jews were clearly on the road of upward mobility. They needed the removal of particular disabilities -- such as quotas in university admissions, residential restrictions, and discrimination in the business and professional job markets -- so that their advance could continue. Blacks, on the other hand, faced widespread poverty, institutional segregation -- whether by law in the South or by custom in the North -- and deeply ingrained racism. They needed, not the elimination of blockages to mobility, but fundamental revolutions in the economic structure, educational system, and racial attitudes of American society.

Despite these real differences, the black-Jewish alliance persisted for two reasons. First, the substantive issues raised in the 1950s and 1960s advanced the material interests of both communities. Movement toward school desegregation, reduction in prejudice, integrated housing, and more equitable employment aided both the mobility of Jews and the emergence of blacks from degraded status. The issue agenda, as it stood then, did not draw attention to the differences in the material conditions of blacks and Jews.

Moreover, the two communities shared an overall ideological perspective. Both saw the struggle for equal rights as a natural outgrowth of their religious and cultural values. They dedicated themselves enthusiastically to a cause which seemed to embody their highest ideals. But it remained to be seen whether this ideological affinity could withstand the different perspectives that divergent

material interests were sure to produce.

Such divergences did not occur in the immediate postwar period. On the contrary, Jews and blacks in the 1950s and 1960s seemed closer allies than ever. They agreed on a strategy of seeking equality in the courts that won a landmark victory in the 1954 Supreme Court decision in the *Brown vs. Board of Education* school desegregation case. When public demonstrations, bus boycotts, and lunch counter sit-ins began to take hold in the South in the late 1950s and 1960s, Jews marched along with blacks in pursuit of equality. They often went to jail together and, in some instances, gave their lives together for the cause. Both found a hero and spokesman for their beliefs in Martin Luther King, Jr. They also played prominent roles in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Yet in the 1960s, serious strains threatened this alliance. In many cases these stemmed from disputes within the civil rights community itself. The slow pace of change, despite major legislative and court victories, convinced some blacks that a more confrontational strategy was needed. For all the support they received from freedom marchers coming South from northern universities and religious agencies, a vocal black group began to feel that it was southern blacks -- who had to live with white racism day after day and had no option to return North after a protest march -- who should take command of their organizations. As an ideological corollary to this, they stressed black pride rather than integrationist or coalitional values. Such a change in strategy led to the or alienation of many whites, including Jews.

These tensions grew more heated in the 1970s and 1980s. Many blacks contended that historical disadvantage could not be overcome by simple equal-opportunity programs, but rather required more activist affirmative-action initiatives, sometimes including numerical quotas, to assure black social and economic mobility. Jews, even when sympathetic to some forms of affirmative action, opposed quotas, which had historically impeded Jewish entry into advanced jobs and professional positions. This became the subject of widespread attention when Jewish and black organizations entered the landmark *Bakke* Supreme Court case on opposite sides.

Communal strife grew during the 1984 presidential campaign when Jesse Jackson, who was supported by the vast majority of black voters, upset many Jews both by remarks about them and by policy positions at odds with their convictions. The 1988 elections did little to heal this rupture. Attention during this period also focused on well-

publicized anti-Semitic speeches by certain black spokesmen, most notably Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam. Finally, a small but visible group of blacks embraced anti-Israel leaders, such as Yasir Arafat, and became openly critical of Israel. Taken together, these events led some to proclaim the end of the black-Jewish alliance.

Yet, simultaneous with these difficult events, black-Jewish relations continued to produce positive results as well, especially in elections and in the actions of public officials. The Congressional Black Caucus has for decades maintained a strong record in support of aid to Israel, assistance to Soviet Jewry, church-state separation, and other Jewish concerns. Jews in Congress have voted for sanctions against apartheid in South Africa, civil rights, and educational and support programs favored by blacks. Jews far exceeded other whites in voting for black officeholders such as Tom Bradley in Los Angeles and Harold Washington in Chicago, while blacks provided the margin of victory for such Jewish candidates as Carl Levin in Michigan and Howard Metzenbaum in Ohio. Opinion polls have consistently shown that Jews and blacks share political values and support similar issue positions. Moreover, mainstream organizations in both communities have never ceased working together, despite the recent tensions.

Given this uneven history over the past two decades, it is important to know how Jews feel about blacks. Have the tensions of the 1970s and 1980s created negative attitudes and threatened the alliance? Or have positive attitudes, based on compatible views and interests, persisted?

The data in Dr. Smith's paper demonstrate that positive Jewish attitudes toward blacks indeed persist. This is true when Jewish views are examined in themselves, and even more impressively when they are compared to those of other groups: Jews have more positive attitudes than any other white group. There are a few exceptions to this generalization, especially in Jewish opposition to certain activist efforts to help blacks, such as quotas or school busing. But, by and large, it is clear that despite all that has happened in the past 20 years, Jews remain committed to equal opportunity and feel warmly toward blacks. On the basis of these attitudes, strong coalitions can continue to be built and maintained.

Ira Silverman
Executive Vice President

JEWISH ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACKS
AND RACE RELATIONS

Relations between Jews and blacks in the United States have evoked considerable commentary and controversy since the mid-1960s (Brenner, 1984; Friedman, 1985; Gans, 1969; Harris and Swanson, 1970; Johnson, 1985; Perry and White, 1986; Pinkney, 1978-79; Rose, 1981; Selected Bibliography, 1966). Simply put, there has been deepening concern that, instead of being allies in the struggle for civil rights and racial equality, the two groups have become ethnic rivals, and their relationship to each other has shifted from one of harmony to one of hostility. Determining whether and to what extent this perception is accurate requires attention to two distinct but inter-related issues: black feelings about and behavior toward Jews, and Jewish feelings about and behavior toward blacks. This essay addresses only the latter issue.[1] It analyzes in detail a large body of survey data to find out how Jews feel and act about race relations in general and relations with blacks in particular, how these Jewish feelings and actions compare with those of other racial, ethnic, and religious groups, what factors help explain the Jewish patterns, and how those patterns have changed from the 1970s to the present.

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[1] Considerable attention has been directed toward the attitudes of blacks toward Jews (Gilboa, 1987; Glock et al., 1975; Martire and Clark, 1982; Marx, 1967; Quinley and Glock, 1979; Rosenfeld, 1982; Schneider, 1978; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Tobin, 1988; Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, 1981). The key findings are (1) blacks are more likely to hold economic stereotypes about Jews than are whites, but not more inclined to profess other types of prejudice toward Jews; (2) while anti-Semitic beliefs appear to have declined over the last several decades among whites, economic stereotypes about Jews appear to have remained unchanged among blacks; (3) while members of younger cohorts and the better educated are less prejudiced toward Jews among whites (and this situation appears true for almost all types of prejudice), these relationships appear weaker and perhaps nonexistence among blacks; and (4) while blacks tend to be favorably disposed toward Israel, their support is less than that expressed by whites.

Despite widespread interest in the subject, there is little scholarly literature on it. Few general studies of racial attitudes deal specifically with how Jews view race relations. Indeed, several of them do not even consider religion as a factor (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 1985; Schwartz, 1967; Taylor, 1977), while other studies that have considered religion have not studied Jews (Apostle et al., 1983; Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1964; Pettigrew, 1971; Taylor, 1986). This neglect of Jews comes from the fact that much research has focused on the South, where Jews make up only a minuscule share of the general population and have little involvement in the Old South tradition of white superiority. Also, it reflects the reality that, in general population surveys, Jews are usually too small a group for separate analysis.

Some studies have focused on Jewish attitudes, however. Most of them (Campbell, 1971; Capeci, 1985; Cohen, 1983; Chalfant and Peek, 1983; Glock et al., 1975; Greeley, 1975, 1977; Hughes and Hertel, 1985; Lenski, 1961; Leon, 1977; Marx, 1967; Middleton, 1976; Rokeach, 1969; Sigelman and Welch, 1984; Smith and Sheatsley, 1984) have found that Jews are more racially tolerant and more for racial integration than other whites. Only a few studies (Caditz, 1975; Harris, 1978; Harris and Swanson, 1970) have come up with contrary results. Unfortunately, conclusions from these studies are qualified by various limitations in their design and coverage. Several studies relate to single communities or specialized subpopulations (Caditz, 1975; Capeci, 1985; Glock et al., 1975; Harris and Swanson, 1970; Lenski, 1961), many are based on very small samples of Jews (e.g., 26 Jews in Lenski, 1961; 43 Jews in Leon, 1977; 61 Jews in Middleton, 1976; and 28 Jews in Rokeach, 1969), and others employ questionable samples or comparisons (Harris, 1978; Cohen, 1983).

In addition, few of the studies cover the last decade, and many are based on data from the 1960s or even earlier (Lenski, 1961; Harris and Swanson, 1970; Campbell, 1971; Greeley, 1975; Glock et al., 1975; Capeci, 1985; Middleton, 1976; Rokeach, 1969). None of the studies addresses the question of how Jewish feelings have shifted over time, so we cannot tell whether Jewish attitudes about and behaviors toward blacks may -- as some say -- have changed.

Data

To study the racial attitudes of Jews, we have employed the General Social Surveys (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center,

University of Chicago, and the American National Election Studies (ANES) of the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. (For details on these studies, see Appendix 3.) Several factors make these the best possible sources for studying Jewish feelings about blacks. First, the GSS and ANES are both representative national samples of adults living in households in the United States. Thus Jewish respondents in these surveys are a representative sample of American Jews. Of course in any particular survey Jewish respondents make up too few cases to constitute an adequate and reliable sample. However, since both the GSS and the ANES have been repeatedly administered (the GSS annually since 1972 except for 1979 and 1981 and the ANES biennially over this same period), it is possible to pool together the separate surveys into one merged file which in effect samples time as well as people.[2] By pooling across all GSS and ANES surveys from 1972 to the present (the latest available years are the 1988 GSS and the 1986 ANES), we get up to 505 Jewish respondents from the GSS and 323 Jewish respondents from the ANES. For a particular subgroup of years, and on most individual questions, there are fewer Jewish respondents.

Second, the GSS and ANES contain a rich range of questions on race relations. We have included in our analysis any item dealing with the subject that was asked on at least three surveys. Appendix 1 lists the questions and subquestions that met this criterion. The appendix indicates both the exact question wording and response categories, as well as the series (GSS or ANES) using the item and a mnemonic name for the question (e.g., DESEG for the first item listed) that will be used in some tables to identify what questions are being used. Appendix 2 lists which surveys these questions appeared in.

These surveys contain attitude questions in nine areas: (1) *General Integration and Other*: items on desegregation, legalization of interracial marriage, objecting to a black dinner guest, and changing segregated club rules; (2) *Residential Integration*: two items on residential desegregation and open housing; (3) *School Integration*: two items on school busing, an item on blacks and whites attending the same schools, and a scale dealing with degree of minority student enroll-

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[2] The GSS data are organized as a merged file so pooled analysis can be performed without technical problems. Because the ANES data are organized only in single-year files, the results must be generated separately for each year and merged by hand.

ment; (4) *Spending for Blacks*: two items on the amount of government spending for blacks; (5) *Special Help*: two items about special efforts by the government to help blacks; (6) *Reasons for Black Disadvantages*: a four-item scale asking why blacks are less well-off than whites; (7) *Group Feelings*: three feeling-thermometer items asking how "warm/cold" one feels toward blacks, black militants, and civil rights leaders, and an item on whether one feels close to blacks; (8) *Rate of Change*: items on the speed of civil rights progress, whether blacks should "push where they're not wanted," and an estimate of how much progress has been made by blacks in recent years; and (9) *Politics*: items on the amount of black influence in politics and society and willingness to vote for a black for president. In addition, there are three behavioral questions: a scale on actual degree of neighborhood integration, an item on having had a black dinner guest in recent years, and a question on whether one's church/synagogue is integrated. These items provide a rich and detailed picture of racial issues, touching upon both personal and public-policy aspects of race relations and covering such important issues as school busing, open housing, and preferential treatment.

Jews and Racial Issues

Table 1 compares Jewish attitudes on some 20 race-related issues. These items cover public policies to promote racial integration and racial equality as well as some attitudes about personal integration and interracial socializing. By comparing the prointegration or racially tolerant response across these questions, we can assess what types of actions receive high or low support and ascertain some of the key factors that govern level of approval.[3] It is clear that Jews overwhelmingly support integration. Jews almost unanimously oppose strict segregation (99.4%) and de jure segregation of schools (96.9%). Support for the legalization of interracial marriage (87.7%) is also quite high. Likewise, Jews are highly tolerant of black dinner guests (90.9%) and very willing to vote for a black for president (89.2%).

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[3] Since these questions used various response scales, their distributions cannot be exactly compared. To increase comparability the questions have been cut into pro/anti-integration dichotomies. For items that were asked as trichotomies and could not be readily dichotomized, we have presented two dichotomies with the middle category grouped with both extreme categories. The full distributions are given in Appendix 4.

Similarly, Jews reject the notion that too much government money is being spent on blacks (87.0-88.6%).

In addition, a majority of Jews support certain policies that promote integration and reject the notion that blacks and the civil rights movement are moving too fast. Fully 80% of Jews disagree with the idea that whites have a right to maintain segregated neighborhoods and that blacks should "respect" this right, and 54.5% favor an open-housing law. Similarly, 79.2% have no objection to sending children to a school that is half black. In addition, most Jews feel that the civil rights movement has not been moving too fast (59.4%) and disagree with the idea that "blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted" (51.7%).

A majority of Jews do not favor government measures to help blacks, more government spending for blacks, and the use of busing to achieve school integration, though the full distributions of the Jewish responses listed in Appendix 4 show that Jewish support for these positions is far from negligible. A plurality of 42.1% of Jews endorse the idea that government should "make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups," with 28.2% neutral or undecided and 30.7% opposed. Favoring the view that "the government has a special obligation to improve their [blacks'] living standard" are 27.9% of Jews, with 46.1% opposed and the rest neutral or undecided. Only 14.3% and 20.9% of Jews responded positively to the two questions on busing to achieve school integration.

Unfortunately, the surveys do not provide sufficient data to speak with confidence of Jewish attitudes toward affirmative action programs that use quotas. Nevertheless, the one opinion survey that did ask about this appears to confirm the common perception that most Jews oppose such policies.[4]

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[4] Only the 1986 ANES included questions that explicitly covered quotas. Since there were only 31 Jewish respondents, the results are subject to considerable sampling variation. There were two related questions asked about employment policies and two on educational admissions. The employment questions asked: "Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites/gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" The college admission questions are: "Some people say that because of past discrimination it is sometimes necessary for colleges and universities to reserve openings

Two general principles appear to shape Jewish attitudes on race relations. First, while the principle of equal treatment and nondiscrimination on the basis of race is widely endorsed, the idea of special efforts to help blacks is less popular, especially if couched in the language of preferential treatment. Second, support for integration varies depending on the means used and the degree of integration required. Integrated schools are supported by 97% of Jews, but only 14-21% of Jews back busing to achieve such integration. In terms of sending their own children to integrated schools, only 5% object if a few of the students are black, 21% if blacks make up half the students, and 61% if most of the students are blacks.

A second set of items on *Group Feelings* allows us to assess Jewish feelings toward blacks as a social group as well as feelings toward black militants and civil rights leaders. On the whole, while Jews do not consider themselves to be close to blacks, they have a positive feeling toward them. Only 15.2% of Jews closely identify with blacks, but on the feeling thermometer which allows respondents to relate to social and political groups and personalities from a highly unfavorable zero degrees to a neutral 50 degrees up to a highly favorable 100 degrees, the mean "temperature" of Jews toward blacks is a moderately favorable 63.2 degrees (Appendix 4). Toward civil rights leaders on the one hand and black militants on the other, Jews have distinctly different reactions. On the feeling thermometer Jews rate civil rights leaders a moderately favorable 63.4 degrees, but black militants are given a decidedly less favorable 24.0 degrees.

The items on *Reasons for Black Disadvantages* offer four explanations for why blacks have "worse jobs, income, and housing" than whites (Appendix 1). Two of the offered explanations -- "discrimination" and not having "the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty" -- are liberal reasons for existing inequalities. The other explanations -- that blacks have "less in-born ability to learn" and "just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty" -- are illiberal reasons that may contain elements of racist ideology. Jews are most likely to favor the liberal "educational

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for black students. Others oppose quotas because they say quotas discriminate against whites/give blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion -- are you for or against quotas to admit black students?" Employment preference for blacks was favored by 10.3% of Jews and 13.3% of non-Jewish whites and educational quotas by 22.6% of Jews and 27.1% of non-Jewish whites.

opportunity" argument (64.7%). The "lack of will power/ motivation" and "discrimination" explanations are also fairly frequently mentioned (by 54.0% and 49.6% respectively). The inherent inferiority argument is accepted by only 14.5%. Looking at the four explanations together, we see that 39.1% mention only liberal reasons, 4.5% only illiberal reasons, 3.6% no reasons, and 52.8% some mix of liberal and illiberal explanations. Jews thus lean toward liberal explanations for racial differentials in material well-being, but the ideologically suspect "will power" explanation is also endorsed by a majority of Jews.

Finally, behavioral items on actual level of integration indicate the degree of integration that occurs in the social, residential, and religious realms. About 42% of Jews have had a black dinner guest during the past few years and 60% have some black neighbors (33% live on the same block with blacks). Less integration occurs in the religious area, with only 19% reporting blacks attending their religious services.

Jewish/Non-Jewish Differences on Racial Attitudes and Behaviors

Jewish attitudes and behaviors toward blacks take on greater meaning when these are compared to those of other whites in general and other ethno-religious groups in particular. Table 2 shows that, overall, Jews are consistently more likely to favor prointegration policies, hold favorable attitudes about blacks, and engage in racially tolerant behaviors than are non-Jewish whites. In 24 of 29 comparisons Jews are more liberal on racial matters than other whites. On only two items are Jews less for integration than other whites, and in three cases there were no statistically significant differences.

Table 3 then compares Jews to several other ethnoreligious and racial groups: white Protestants, white Catholics, whites with no religion, whites with some other religion (Eastern Orthodox, Buddhist, Muslim, personal religions, etc.), Hispanics, and blacks. It summarizes the group breakdowns presented in Appendix 4 by listing the ranking of each group. For example, on the first line of Table 3 blacks are given a rank of 1 because they are most in favor of desegregation on the general integration question (66.0%) and white Protestants are ranked 7th because they are least in favor of desegregation (33.9%). Across all items blacks almost always are most supportive of integration and civil rights, with an average rank of 1.2. Jews and Hispanics virtually tie for second place, with average ranks of 3.2 and 3.1. They are in turn closely followed by whites with no religion and whites with

some other religion (ranked 4.0 and 3.9 respectively). White Catholics come next at 5.8 and white Protestants are last with an average rank of 6.7. Thus among nonblacks, Jews are the most racially tolerant religious group and essentially tied with Hispanics as most in favor of racial equality.

Within this overall pattern there are several highly instructive variations. On school integration, Jews are more supportive of having black and white children attend the same schools than any other group (even marginally more so than blacks), but the least willing to send their own children to a school with a majority of black students. This item was also the only attitude question on which Jews were less for integration than whites as a whole. Too much should not be made of this one reversal, since it is of only borderline statistical significance. It might be more prudent to say that on this item Jews fail to show their usual pattern of being more for integration. Also, the GSS busing item was one of only three questions on which Jews did not differ from other whites as a whole, and on the ANES busing item the greater Jewish support for integration mostly reflects the fact that they are more likely than other groups to be only partly against busing rather than completely opposed. In brief, Jews appear to be very ambivalent about school integration, leading in support for the principle of integrated schools, differing little from other groups in support for school busing, and the least likely to favor sending their children to a school with a majority of black students.

Three possible explanations might be offered for this anomalous pattern. First, within each level of residential integration, Jews are actually less likely to object to sending their children to a majority black school than non-Jewish whites. Objections increase with degree of integration, and Jews live in more racially integrated neighborhoods than do non-Jewish whites. This is what leads to the overall level of Jewish objections being higher than that of non-Jews. Second, Jews, who are among the best educated of all American ethnic groups, place great value on education. Jews may be concerned that certain types of school integration (e.g., the busing of Jewish students into inner-city schools) may hinder their children's educational development. Third, Jews are a historically persecuted minority and may be more reluctant than other groups to have their children be a minority in a black school where they may be subject to black anti-Semitism or to a more general antiwhite hostility.

The other anomaly appears among the behavioral items. Although

Jews are much more likely than other white groups to live in integrated neighborhoods and to have had a black dinner guest, they are much less likely to report attending an integrated house of worship than non Jewish whites. This is not at all surprising, since it is widely known that few blacks are Jews.[5] Obvious as this fact is, it still means that Jews and blacks seldom interact in what is typically the very positive situation of being members of the same congregation, and that integration in this realm is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.

We also compared Jews to white Protestants of fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal theological leanings.[6] As we saw above, white Protestants as a whole are consistently the least favorable on integration measures. Among them, support for integration and racial equality varies greatly by theological orientation, being lowest for fundamentalists and highest for liberals. For example, legalization of interracial marriage is supported by 50.3% of fundamentalists, 64.5% of moderates, and 72.0% of liberals. Despite the greater racial tolerance of white liberal Protestants compared to other Protestants, they are not more tolerant than Jews. On each of the GSS racial questions (except objecting to sending a child to a school with a majority of black students), Jews are more for integration than liberal Protestants.

In brief, we find that Jews are consistently more for integration and racial tolerance than other whites and tied with Hispanics as the most racially liberal nonblack group, with the partial exceptions of opposition to busing and reluctance to send their children to a majority-black school.

Explanations for Jewish Feelings on Racial Matters

Several explanations have been offered to explain the greater racial tolerance of Jews. Among them are religious beliefs, cultural values, political liberalism, minority status, and sociodemographic attributes. Several of these explanations overlap and commingle, and none are

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[5] The GSS finds that 0.6% of Jews are black. Some of these black Jews belong to nontraditional branches of Judaism founded by blacks.

[6] Smith (forthcoming) classifies all Protestant denominations as either fundamentalist (e.g., Church of God, Southern Baptist, Assemblies of God, Nazarene, Lutheran-Missouri Synod), moderate (e.g., Disciples of Christ, Reformed, American Lutheran Church), or liberal (e.g., United Church of Christ, United Methodist Church, Episcopal, Unitarian).

mutually exclusive. The religious-beliefs explanation argues that both human and racial equality are explicit principles of Judaism (Caditz, 1975; Cohen, 1983; Gordis, 1962). The cultural-values theory contends that Jews share both religious and secular beliefs that promote the general principle of equality as well as the application of this principle to all races (Gordis, 1962; Rokeach, 1969). The political-liberalism argument suggests that Jews favor civil rights because they are political liberals, a stance which is, in turn, traced to their religious and cultural beliefs, historical experiences in both Europe and the United States, and their status as a minority group (Cohen, 1983; Campbell, 1971; Levy and Kramer, 1972). The minority-status explanation itself argues that Jews can identify with blacks not only as a fellow minority, but as a minority that has, like Jews, suffered persecution from the non-Jewish white majority (Campbell, 1971; Capeci, 1985; Glock et al., 1975). Finally, the sociodemographic-attributes hypothesis suggests that Jews' racial tolerance comes from their socioeconomic and geographic location in relatively nonracist segments of American society. We cannot systematically test each of these explanations with the available survey data, but we can examine, in part, the importance of some of these theories.

Multiple Regression Analysis of Jewish/Non-Jewish Differences on Racial Matters

Jews differ from other ethnic groups in many ways besides religion. These other attributes may help explain why Jews are more racially tolerant than non-Jewish whites. The literature on race relations (Campbell, 1971; Pettigrew, 1971; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 1985; Schwartz, 1967; Smith and Sheatsley, 1984; Taylor, 1977) indicates that white opposition to integration and racial equality is strongest in the South, rural communities, older age cohorts, conservatives, and the less educated. With the exception of age, Jews are more likely to be in each of the prointegration categories than non-Jewish whites. Jews tend to live in non-Southern, metropolitan areas, be politically liberal, and have a high educational level, factors that could explain the religious differences on racial matters.

Table 4 shows the results of a multiple regression analysis.[7] By

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[7] Since only the GSS had all cases organized in a single data file, we had to restrict the multiple regressions to GSS variables.

controlling for the various socio-demographic factors, this procedure reveals the strength of the relationships between each of these factors and Jewish racial liberalism. The closer the standardized coefficient is to +1.0, the stronger the relationship; 0.0 indicates no relationship; and a negative coefficient means a negative relationship. The first column, with only race controlled for, is essentially the Jewish/non-Jewish difference among whites. The second column shows the relationship between Jews and non-Jews with controls for region, community, cohort, party identification, and education added. In every case save one,[8] the difference between Jewish and non-Jewish whites was reduced, and in five of 14 instances the differences become statistically insignificant. That means that in each case the sociodemographic factors explain some of the Jewish/non-Jewish difference, and in some cases so much so that no significant difference on racial matters remains between the two groups.

Thus the greater Jewish liberality on racial matters is at least partially a function of Jews' greater education, non-Southern and metropolitan residence, and Democratic leanings (the older age of Jews actually works against their being racially tolerant). While all of these elements play a role in explaining Jewish attitudes on race, education is consistently the most powerful explanatory factor. Across the questions analyzed in Table 4, education usually explains more of the Jewish edge in racial tolerance than either geographic factors or political leanings. In fact, education often explains as much as the other factors combined.[9]

Since none of these factors are causes of being Jewish (or non-Jewish), and several, such as higher education and Democratic leanings, might well be results of Jewishness, the control variables do not show that the Jewish/non-Jewish difference is spurious, but indicate important intermediate variables through which the relationship works and coincidental variables that help create the relationship. In most

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[8] The one relationship that grows in magnitude after controls is the negative association between being Jewish and being less likely to attend an integrated synagogue. Thus if it were not for the greater education, urbanness, etc. of Jews, the difference between Jews and non-Jews in their degree of church integration would be even larger.

[9] One exception to this pattern is on neighborhood integration.   The high educational level of Jews explains little of the greater Jewish level of neighborhood integration.   Urban residence is the major factor that accounts (in part) for the greater residential integration of Jews.

cases (nine of 14) the Jewish/non-Jewish difference is not explained away by the control factors, indicating that some aspect of being Jewish other than these must explain the Jews' relative racial tolerance.[10]

Other Factors Related to Jewish Racial Attitudes and Behaviors

We also carried out specialized tests of several other factors that have been suggested to explain Jewish racial tolerance: national origins, religious beliefs, and cultural values. The national-origins explanation suggests that, as fairly recent immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe (and especially from Russia), Jews have escaped long-term exposure to American racism and may also come from national cultures that are more racially tolerant than America's core Anglo-Saxon culture. To examine this idea we compared Jews to non-Jews who shared the same national origins: Russia, Austria/Germany, Poland, and the rest of Eastern Europe. In 48 of the 76 cases we examined (four nationalities by 19 questions), there were too few respondents for meaningful comparisons. In the remaining 28 cases, Jews were significantly more tolerant than non-Jews from the same country in nine instances. No statistically significant differences appeared in the other 19 comparisons (mostly due to the small sample sizes), but they generally showed differences in the same direction. For example, among Russians, 96.2% of Jews (n=106) and 74.4% of non-Jews (n=86) had no objection to a black dinner guest. Among Poles, 87.8% of Jews (n=49) and 78.4% of non-Jews (n=357) were willing to vote for a black for president. It appears that national origin does not explain greater Jewish racial tolerance.

The religious-beliefs explanation argues that the religious precepts of Judaism account for greater Jewish racial tolerance. A standard test of this explanation tries to assess the impact of Jewish religious teachings on racial feelings by dividing Jews by levels of observance. Cohen (1983) grouped Jews on the basis of their ritual observance as secular, minimal, moderate, and observant. He found, "Generally, the proportions who gave liberal responses rise with the transition from

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[10] The previous literature also indicates that some, but not all, of the Jewish edge on racial matters is explained by such control factors as used here. See Chalfant and Peek, 1983; Greeley, 1975, 1977; Hughes and Hertel, 1985; Sigelman and Welch, 1984; Middleton, 1976.

'secular' to 'minimalist' respondents, and then fall, reaching the lowest level among the 'observant.'" However, except for the "minimal" Jews being the most liberal, this pattern does not hold for his three race-related questions. Campbell (1971) grouped Jews by their frequency of attending synagogue and found "no indication that frequency of attendance of religious services has any relationship to the racial outlook of Jews."

With the GSS questions we carried out two similar comparisons. In the first we divided Jews into low and high synagogue attenders (two or less times a year vs. more than twice a year).[11] In the second, we compared Jews who did not consider themselves "strong" Jews to those with a "strong" identification.[12] Out of 38 comparisons (19 questions by two ways of classifying Jews), 33 show no statistically significant differences between "religious" and "nonreligious" Jews. Each of the five significant differences is in the direction of "nonreligious" Jews being more liberal. However, four of these five statistically significant differences are on "reasons for black disadvantages" items, so the effect is both infrequent and clustered in one fairly specialized topic. Overall, these results agree with both Campbell and Cohen in finding that degree of religious involvement has little relationship to Jewish support for racial tolerance and that, if anything, the less involved are the more liberal on racial matters. Since Jewish racial attitudes and behaviors have little relationship to level of religious involvement, Judaic teachings (or at least the kind that would be stressed or emphasized during synagogue services) may not explain Jewish liberalism on racial matters. Yet it is also possible that the religious source of racial liberalism is learned during one's initial religious socialization (typically as a child) and that current levels of attendance and identification do not affect that early socialization.

A third explanation suggests that Jewish racial tolerance comes from general cultural differences between Jews and non-Jews that encompass, but are not restricted to, overtly religious beliefs. In particular, Cherlin and Celebuski (1983) have shown that Jews differ

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[11] Dividing Jews in this fashion creates approximately two equal groups of relatively high and low attenders.

[12] The question on strength of religious identification immediately followed a question on religious affiliation and asked, "Would you call yourself a strong Jew or a not very strong Jew?" The volunteered middle response of "somewhat strong" was grouped with "not very strong" versus the "strong" response.

from non-Jews in the qualities they consider important for their children. As they noted, "Jewish parents appeared to place a higher value on self-direction for their children and a lower value on conformity than did non-Jewish parents." We, in turn, conducted an analysis that demonstrated that (1) those favoring self-direction vs. conformity were significantly more likely to be for racial equality and that (2) valuing self-direction and being Jewish were independent predictors of racial tolerance. This suggests that a belief in self-direction is one of perhaps many Jewish cultural traits (such as an interest in education) that leads to greater racial tolerance among Jews.

In brief, a complicated set of factors appear to explain Jewish attitudes on racial issues. National origins and level of religious involvement do not seem to play a role, and we cannot directly measure the role of religious beliefs. Cultural values such as interest in education, political liberalism, and certain childrearing values seem to be important. Finally, geographic as well as social distance from the traditional white supremacy of the Old South is also notable.

Trends in Jewish Racial Attitudes and Behaviors

It has frequently been suggested that Jews have become less racially tolerant in recent years. The "fall from liberal grace" argument suggests that, as Jews have assimilated into American society and moved into the upper middle class, they have ceased to be liberals. This argument rests heavily on Marxist class assumptions, the example of Jewish leadership among the neoconservatives, and alleged inroads by Republicans into the heavy pro-Democratic/liberal voting record of Jews. Most empirical analysis of ideological and voting preferences finds little support for this hypothesis (Cohen, 1983; Fisher, 1979; Schneider, 1985; Waxman, 1981). Nor do updated results through the 1988 election show any clear secular trend in a conservative direction (Table 5). While some changes have been occurring, they do not comfortably fit into the "liberal fall" explanation. The pro-Democratic/ liberal voting edge has varied over the years, being relatively large for Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey and smaller for Stevenson and Carter, but has not shown any steady decline. Democratic party preference and liberal self-identification did decline during the 1970s and 1980s, but this was paralleled by a similar shift among non-Jewish whites. This Jewish decline is modest in magnitude,

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however, and related to a society-wide shift, apparently not to any special aspects of Jewish assimilation or mobility.

A second argument, stressing the importance of an "urban ethnic backlash," asserts that white ethnics in general have become increasingly hostile to blacks because of competition for economic resources (jobs, college admissions, union memberships) and government services (public housing, job training programs, community grants) and because of black-on-white crime. In the case of Jews, the various community conflicts in New York City (e.g., Ocean Hill-Brownsville) and succession struggles (e.g., residence and store ownership in Harlem) are cited as examples. In addition, the anti-Zionist sentiments expressed by some blacks are seen as an added reason for Jewish resentment. Table 6 examines the idea of a Jewish racial backlash. By pooling studies from 1972 to 1978 and from 1980 to 1988, we can compare changes from the 1970s to the 1980s. Of the 18 trends, Jewish attitudes/behaviors became more liberal in 15 cases, no change occurred in one case, and in two cases attitudes became less liberal. Because of the small samples involved, only three of the 15 increases were statistically significant (neither of the declines was significant). The overall movement of Jewish attitudes toward racial tolerance is abundantly evident, however, and clearly refutes the idea of a Jewish backlash against blacks. There remains the possibility that Jews may be losing their liberal edge over non-Jewish whites. Table 7 examines the strength of the association between being Jewish and support for racial integration. A positive gamma indicates that Jews are more supportive of racial equality than non-Jewish whites. If the probability figure in front of the gamma is below .05, the difference is statistically significant. On "group feelings" items, the difference is measured in mean degrees on the feeling thermometer. We see two reversals from the 1970s to the 1980s -- on attitudes toward sending children to a majority-black school (which is not significantly related to being Jewish during either period) and on approval of black militants. For the other 16 trends, Jews remain more liberal than non-Jews. However, there has been a slight tendency for the relationship between racial liberalism and Jewishness to weaken. In 11 of the 18 cases, non-Jewish attitudes were becoming more racially liberal at a faster rate than Jewish attitudes. The pattern is neither general enough nor large enough to suggest that the general liberal edge of Jews on racial items is disappearing.

Black militancy in general, and an anti-Zionist stance by some

black groups in particular, may have led to a special Jewish reaction in this particular area. Table 6 shows that Jewish approval of black militants dropped marginally (but not significantly) from the 1970s to the 1980s. Non-Jewish feelings improved during this period, so Jews switched from being 5.9 degrees warmer toward black militants than other whites during the 1970s to being 3.8 degrees cooler toward black militants during the 1980s. This shift may have something to do with changes in the meaning of the term "black militant." From being a group of major political relevance in the late sixties and early seventies, black militants declined in importance and probably changed from being thought of as a radical black-power movement to being seen as more of a Black Muslim and anti-Zionist movement.[13]

Conclusion

Jews as a group are dedicated to the principle of a color-blind society based on the principle of racial equality. They favor many policies to promote integration, though they tend to oppose busing to achieve school integration and take a negative view of affirmative action programs that utilize racial quotas. They are consistently more supportive of racial integration than whites of any other religious preference, including liberal Protestants.

Jewish support for racial equality apparently comes from a complex set of factors, including religious principles, cultural traits such as general value orientations and an emphasis on education, and some situational circumstances, such as geographic separation from the traditional racism of the American South.

There is no evidence of a Jewish backlash against the goal of racial equality or against blacks as a group either as part of a general movement away from liberalism or as a specific result of racial conflicts with blacks. Feelings toward black militants, never very favorable, are now even less favorable than those of non-Jewish whites, perhaps because of changes in the perceived composition of this group.

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[13] An informal and unscientific questioning of a dozen colleagues about what the term "black militants" meant to them revealed that (1) most people named groups and individuals from the late sixties/early seventies (e.g., the Black Panthers) and (2) the only contemporary figure mentioned was Louis Farrakhan. The declining salience of black militants is also shown by the fact that in 1972-74 6% of respondents replied "Don't know" on the feeling thermometer, but in 1986 11.4% said "Don't know."

At the same time, however, Jews are considerably more favorable toward civil rights leaders than are other whites. Now, as in the past, Jews remain committed to racial equality and are more likely than other nonblacks to favor and accept integration.

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Table 1
Jewish Attitudes on Racial Issues

Attitudes	Percent
For school busing (RACBUS)	14.3
Civil rights, too slow (CRSPEED)	14.8*
For school busing (BUSING)	20.9
For special help (HELPBLK)	27.9
Spending too little (NATRACE)	33.7*
Spending too little (RACCAST)	35.2*
Blacks lack influence (BLKINFLU)	35.8
Majority black school OK (RACSCALE)	39.3*
For special efforts (SPECEFF)	41.9
Disagree blacks shouldn't push (RACPUSH)	51.7
For open housing (RACOPEN)	54.5
For desegregation (DESEG)	57.0*
Civil rights, not too fast (CRSPEED)	59.4
For integrating clubs (RACCHNG)	67.9
Half black school OK (RACSCALE)*	79.2
Disagree on residential segreagation (RACSEG)	80.0
Not spending too much (NATRACE)	87.0*
Legalize intermarriage (RACMAR)	87.7
Not spending too much (RACASST)	88.6*
Vote for black president (RACPRES)	89.2
Black dinner guest OK (RACDIN)	90.9
Same schools for all (RACSCHOL)	96.9
Not for strict segregation (DESEG)	99.4*

*Question appears twice, cut two different ways.

Table 2
Jewish and Non-Jewish Responses on Racial Attitudes
and Behaviors (Non-Blacks Only)

Attitudes and behaviors	Religion		Statistic	
	Jewish	Non-Jewish	Prob.	Gamma
General integration and other				
General integration (Deseg.)	57.0%	35.9%	.0000	+ 0.445
Intermarriage (Legal)	87.7	67.4	.0001	+ 0.552
Dinner guest (No objection)	90.9	73.6	.0000	+ 0.551
Segregated club (Try to change)	67.9	53.2	.0034	+ 0.296
Residential integration				
Whites keep blacks out (Disagree)	80.0	67.5	.0000	+ 0.278
Open housing law (Vote for)	54.5	42.0	.0000	+ 0.248
School integration				
Busing (Not against, 1-6)	48.8	25.4	.0000	+ 0.387
Busing (Favor)	20.9	17.9	.1169	+ 0.107
Same school (Favor)	96.9	88.0	.0001	+ 0.619
Objection to majority black (None)	39.3	43.2	.0400	− 0.014
Spending for blacks				
Assistance for blacks (Too little)	35.2	19.0	.0005	+ 0.357
Improving black conditions (More)	33.7	21.7	.0000	+ 0.297
Special help				
Government obligation (Yes, 1-3)	42.1	22.0	.0000	+ 0.275
Government help blacks (Yes, 1-2)	27.9	14.8	.0001	+ 0.214
Reasons for black disadvantages				
Discrimination (Yes)	49.6	40.6	.0680	+ 0.179
Less in-born ability (No)	85.5	77.3	.0480	+ 0.267
Less education (Yes)	64.7	51.1	.0040	+ 0.275
Less will power (No)	46.0	36.6	.0500	+ 0.193
Group feelings				
Toward blacks	63.2*	61.5	.0050	_____
Toward black militants	24.0*	22.8	.0050	_____
Toward civil rights leaders	63.4*	44.1	.0000	_____
Close to blacks (Yes)	15.2	10.6	.0650	+ 0.202
Rate of change				
Civil rights (Too slow)	15.1	6.4	.0000	+ 0.301
Blacks shouldn't push (Disagree)	51.7	30.4	.0000	+ 0.361
Politics				
Black influence (Too little)	35.8	24.2	.0150	+ 0.215
Black for president (Vote for)	89.2	81.7	.0005	+ 0.300
Behaviors				
Black neighbors (Same block)	32.0	17.9	.0000	+ 0.333
Black dinner guest (Have had)	41.5	24.8	.0000	+ 0.367
Blacks attend your church (Yes)	19.4	39.9	.0000	− 0.469

*Degrees, not percentages

Table 3
Rank Order of Ethnoreligious and Racial Groups on Race Relations

Attitudes and behaviors	Jewish	White Prot.	White Cath.	White none	White other	Hispanic	Black
General integration and other							
General integration (Deseg.)	2	7	6	5	4	3	1
Intermarriage (Legal)	2	7	6	5	3	4	1
Dinner guest (No objection)	2	7	6	4	5	3	1
Segregated club (Try to change)	4	7	6	5	3	2	1
Residential integration							
Whites keep blacks out (Disagree)	4	7	6	2	3	5	1
Open housing law (Vote for)	3	7	6	4	5	2	1
School integration							
Busing (Not against, 1-6)	2	7	6	4	5	3	1
Busing (Favor)	5	7	6	4	3	2	1
Same schools (Favor)	1	7	6	5	4	3	2
Objection to majority black (None)	7	6	5	3	4	2	1
Spending for blacks							
Assistance for blacks (Too little)	3	7	6	5	2	4	1
Improving black conditions (More)	3	7	6	4	5	2	1
Special help							
Government obligation (Yes, 1-3)	3	7	6	5	4	2	1
Government obligation (Yes, 1-2)	3	6	7	5	4	2	1
Reasons for black disadvantages							
Discrimination (Yes)	4	7	6	3	5	2	1
Less in-born ability (No)	2	7	6	1	5	3	4
Less education (Yes)	2	7	6	4	3	5	1
Less will power (No)	4	7	6	2	3	5	1
Group feelings							
Toward blacks (Degrees)	3	6	5	7	4	2	1
Toward black militants (Degrees)	5	7	6	3	4	2	1
Toward civil rights leaders (Degrees)	2	7	6	5	4	3	1
Close to blacks (Yes)	3	7	6	5	4	2	1
Rate of change							
Civil rights (Too slow)	4	7	6	3	2	5	1
Blacks shouldn't push (Disagree)	3	7	6	2	4	5	1
Political							
Black influence (Too little)	2	7	6	4	3	5	1
Black for president (Vote for)	2.5	7	6	4	٥5	2.5	1
Behaviors							
Black neighbors (Same block)	3	7	6	5	4	2	1
Black dinner guest (Have not)	2.5	7	6	4	2.5	5	1
Blacks attend your church (Yes)	7	4	1	5	6	3	2
Overall average rank	3.2	6.7	5.8	4.0	3.9	3.1	1.2

Table 4
Summary of Multiple Regressions of Jews/Non-Jews
on Racial Relations (Standardized Coefficients)

Attitudes and behaviors	Controlling for race	Controlling for other variables*
General integration		
Intermarriage	.067	.025
Dinner guest	.062	.034
Segregated club	.046	.029
Residential integration		
Whites keep blacks out	.048	.019
Open housing law	.039	.021
School integration		
Busing	NS	NS
Same school	.043	NS
Objection to majority black	NS	NS
Spending for blacks		
Improving black conditions	.055	.031
Special help		
Government help blacks	.047	NS
Reasons for black disadvantages		
Discrimination/lack of education	.039	NS
Less in-born ability/will power	.034	NS
Rate of change		
Blacks shouldn't push	.080	.042
Politics		
Black for president	.031	NS
Behaviors		
Black neighbors	.064	.020
Black dinner guest	.056	.030
Blacks attend your church	− .056	− .093

NS = not statistically significant at the .05 level.
*Region, city type, age, education, and party identification.

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Table 5
Changes in Presidential Vote, Party Preference, and Ideological Identification

Presidential vote (% Democratic)*

	Source and years					
	CBS 1976	CBS 1980	CBS 1984	CBS 1988	CBS 1988	ABC 1988
Protestant	44%	41%	31%	40%	40%	38%
Catholic	55	50	44	47	52	54
Jewish	65	60	67	65	71	72
Jewish—Protestant	+21	+19	+36	+25	+31	+34

Presidential vote (% Democratic)*

	Source and years				
	GSS 1968	GSS 1972	GSS 1976	GSS 1980	GSS 1984
Jewish	83.3	66.7	69.1	67.7	58.2
Non-Jewish whites	40.1	38.0	56.3	53.4	38.3
Jewish–non-Jewish	+43.2	+28.7	+12.7	+14.3	+19.9

Party preference (% Democratic)

	Source and years	
	GSS 1970s	GSS 1980s
Jewish	60.4	53.3
Non-Jewish whites	43.1	38.9
Jewish– non-Jewish	+17.3	+14.4

Ideological identification (% liberal)

	Source and years	
	GSS 1970s	GSS 1980s
Jewish	49.0	43.5
Non-Jewish whites	28.9	25.5
Jewish–non-Jewish	+20.1	+18.0

*Plus Anderson vote in 1980.

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Table 6
Changes in Jewish Attitudes and Behaviors Regarding Race Relations

Attitudes and behaviors	1970s	1980s	Change
General integration and other			
Intermarriage (Legal)	85.5%	90.9%	+ 5.4
Dinner guest (No objection)	90.9	90.9	0.0
Residential integration			
Whites keep blacks out (Disagree)	51.8	58.2	+ 6.4*
Open housing law (Vote for)	52.5	55.9	+ 3.4
School integration			
Busing (Not against, 1-6)	50.7	57.5	+ 6.8*
Busing (Favor)	18.2	24.3	+ 6.0
Same schools (Favor)	95.6	98.2	+ 2.6
Objection to majority black (None)	41.7	36.7	− 5.0
Spending for blacks			
Improving black conditions (More)	31.8	35.2	+ 3.4
Special help			
Government obligations (Yes, 1-3)	40.8	43.3	+ 2.5
Group feelings			
Toward blacks (Degrees)	61.9	64.8	+ 2.9*
Toward black militants (Degrees)	24.4	23.6	− 0.8
Toward civil rights cases (Degrees)	62.7	64.4	+ 1.7
Rate of change			
Civil rights (Too slow)	14.7	15.1	+ 0.4
Blacks shouldn't push (Disagree)	28.7	32.4	+ 3.7
Political			
Black for president (Vote for)	88.5	90.0	+ 1.5
Behaviors			
Black neighbors (Same block)	31.5	34.3	+ 2.8*
Black dinner guest (Have had)	57.8	59.1	+ 1.3

*Significant at the .05 level.

Note: The number of Jewish respondents in the 1970s ranges from 109 to 251 and averages 161.
In the 1980s it ranges from 73 to 256 and averages 141.

Table 7
Changes in the Relationship of Jewish/Non-Jewish Attitudes on Race Relations (Non-Blacks Only)

| | Years and statistics | |
| | 1970s | 1980s |
Attitudes and behaviors	Probability/Gamma	Probability/Gamma
General integration and other		
Intermarriage	.0000/.534	.0000/.610
Dinner guest	.0000/.588	.0023/.489
Residential integration		
Whites keep blacks out	.0003/.284	.0002/.296
Open housing law	.0003/.332	.0144/.186
School integration		
Busing (RACBUS)	.0000/.465	.2330/.172
Busing (BUSING)	.1520/.142	.5090/.071
Same schools	.0031/.579	.0087/.707
Objection to majority black	.2290/.022	.1940/-053
Spending for blacks		
Improving black conditions	.0000/.280	.0000/.312
Special help		
Government obligation	.0000/.243	.0000/.332
Group feelings		
Toward blacks*	1.3	2.5
Toward black militants*	5.9	− 3.8
Toward civil rights leaders*	22.6	13.5
Rate of change		
Civil rights	.0000/.364	.1120/.174
Blacks shouldn't push	.0000/.384	.0000/.347
Political		
Black for president	.0040/.336	.0600/.256
Behavior		
Black neighbors	.0000/.282	.0000/.381
Black dinner guest	.0000/.453	.0002/.302

*Difference in degrees (Jewish–non-Jewish), not gammas.

Question Wordings

General integration and other

ELEC: What about you? Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between? (DESEG)

GSS: Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites? (RACMAR)

GSS: How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a black friend home for dinner? Would you object strongly, mildly, or not at all? (RACDIN)*

GSS: If you and your friends belonged to a social club that would not let blacks join, would you try to change the rules so that blacks could join? (RACCHNG)*

Residential integration

GSS: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with black-white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel?

   White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should respect that right. (RACSEG)

GSS: Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. Which would you vote

for?
- A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to blacks.
- B. The second law says that homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. (RACOPEN)

School integration

ELEC: There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their own neighborhood. Others think letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about it?

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\text{Busing to achieve integration } = \ 1 \\
2 \\
3 \\
4 \\
5 \\
6 \\
\text{Keep children in neighborhood schools } = \ 7 \ \text{(RACBUS)}
\end{array}
$$

GSS: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black and white school children from one school district to another? (BUSING)

GSS: Do you think white students and black students should go to the same schools or to separate schools? (RACSCHOL)

GSS: Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are black?

IF NO or DON'T KNOW:
Where half of the children are black?
Where more than half of the children are black?
(RACFEW+RACHAF+RACMOST=RACSCALE)*

Spending for blacks

ELEC: If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of the following programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased?

Programs that assist blacks. (RACASST)
GSS: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.

Improving the conditions of blacks/assistance to blacks (NATRACE/NATRACEY)

("Improving" used in 1973-83 and on split sample in 1984-88; "Assistance" used on split samples in 1984-88)

Special help

ELEC: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.

Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (SPECEFF)

GSS: Some people think that blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to blacks. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?

```
I strongly agree the government is obligated
to help blacks=                               1
                                              2
I agree with both answers  =                  3
                                              4
I strongly agree that government shouldn't
give special treatment=                       5 (HELPBLK)
```

Reasons for black disadvantages

On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are...
   A. Mainly due to discrimination? (RACDIF1)
   B. Because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn? (RACDIF2)
   C. Because most blacks don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty? (RACDIF3)
   D. Because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty? (RACDIF4)

Group feelings

ELEC: I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I will use something we call the feeling thermometer and here is how it works:

I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward that person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward that person and that you don't care too much for that person.
You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. Our first person is _____. How would you rate him using the thermometer?
(Probe "I don't know" response: When you say "Don't know" do you

mean that you don't know who the person is, or do you have something else in mind?)

blacks (BLKTEMP)
black militants (MILTEMP)
civil rights leaders (CRLTEMP)

ELEC: Here is a list of groups. Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularly close to -- people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things.

blacks (CLOSEBLK)

Rate of change

ELEC: Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you: Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are they moving at about the right speed? (CRSPEED)

GSS: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with black-white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel?

Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted. (RACPUSH)

ELEC: In the past few years we have heard a lot about improving the positions of black people in this country. How much real change do you think there has been in the position of black people in the past few years: a lot, some, or not much at all? (CHANGE)

Politics

ELEC: Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. Here are three

statements about how much influence a group might have. For each group I read to you just tell me the number of the statement that best says how you feel. 1 = Too much influence; 2 = Just about the right amount of influence; 3 = Too little influence

blacks (BLKINFLU)

GSS: If your party nominated a black for president, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job? (RACPRES)

Behaviors

GSS: Are there any blacks living in this neighborhood now?

IF YES:
Are there any black families living close to you?
How many blocks (or miles) away do they (the black families who live closest to you) live?
(RACLIVE+RACDIS+RACCLOS=RACNEAR)*

GSS: During the last few years, has anyone in your family brought a friend who was a black home to dinner? (RACHOME)*

GSS: Do blacks attend the church that you, yourself, attend most often, or not? (RACCHURH)*

*Asked in terms of opposite race of respondent. Nonblacks asked as indicated above. Blacks asked about whites.

APPENDIX 2

Appearance of Questions

	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	80	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
General Intergration															
DESEG			E		E										
RACMAR	G	G	G	G	G			G	G		G	G		G	G
RACDIN	G	G	G		G	G		G	G		G	G			
RACCHNG					G						G	G		G	
Residential integration															
RACSEG	G				G	G		G	G		G	G		G	G
RACOPEN		G		G	G		G	G	G			G	G	G	G
School integration															
RACBUS	E		E		E			E				E			
BUSING	G		G	G	G	G	G		G	G		G	G		G
RACSCHOL	G				G	G		G	G		G	G			
RACSCALE	G		G	G		G	G		G	G		G	G		G
Spending for blacks															
RACASST							E		E		E				
NATRACE		G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Special help															
SPECEFF	E		E		E		E	E	E		E		E		
HELPBLK			G							G	G		G	G	G
Reasons for black disadvantages															
RACDIF1					G						G	G		G	
RACDIF2					G						G	G		G	
RACDIF3					G						G	G		G	
RACDIF4				G					G	G		G			
Group feelings															
BLKTEMP	E		E		E			E			E		E		
MILTEMP	E		E		E			E			E		E		
CRLTEMP	E		E		E			E			E				
CLOSEBLK	E				E			E			E				
Rate of change															
CRSPEED	E			E		E		E				E			
RACPUSH	G		G		G	G	G		G	G	G	G			
CHANGE	E					E		E				E			
Politics															
BLKINFLU	E	E		E											
RACPRES	G	G	G		G	G		G	G		G				
Behaviors															
RACNEAR	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
RACHOME		G	G		G		G	G		G	G		G	G	
RACCHURH						G	G			G	G		G	G	G

E = American National Election Studies
G = General Social Surveys

APPENDIX 3

Study Designs

General Social Survey

The National Data Program for the Social Sciences is conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, under principal investigators James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith. It is funded by the National Science Foundation. Since 1972 the National Data Program for the Social Sciences has carried out an annual (except for 1979 and 1981) cross-sectional survey called the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a probability sample of adults (18+) living in households in the United States. From 1972 to 1974 a probability with quotas at the block level was employed. In 1975 and 1976 a transitional design was used with half the sample using probability with quotas and half using a full-probability design. Full-probability sampling has been used since 1976. It is fielded in February-March-April. Each independent cross-section has about 1,500 respondents and across the 15 surveys conducted from 1972 to 1988 a total of 22,649 respondents have been interviewed. The GSS currently averages 90 minutes in length and has an average response rate of 77%. Full details are presented in Davis and Smith, 1988.

American National Election Study

The American National Election Study (ANES) is conducted by the Center for Political/Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, under principal investigators Warren E. Miller and the National Election Studies. It is funded by the National Science Foundation. The ANES is a full-probability sample of the voting age population. Since 1952 the ANES has carried out biennial surveys (except in 1954)

during each national election year. In presidential election years a pre-election survey is conducted about a month prior to the election and a post-election reinterview of these respondents is completed after the election. In off-year elections one post-election survey is conducted. In 1956-58-60 and 1972-74-76 the cross-sections contained a three-wave panel component. Sample sizes are generally from 1,300 to about 2,900. Except for an experimental half of the 1984 reinterviews, personal interviews have been used. In 1986 the response rate was 67.7% and the survey lasted 74 minutes. Details of the ANES are available Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980 and from the codebooks prepared by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

APPENDIX 4

Distributions

General integration and other

Desegregation (DESEG)	For desegregation	For something else	For strict segregation	
Jewish	57.0	42.4	0.6	(172)
White Protestant	33.9	54.3	11.8	(3907)
White Catholic	37.0	54.0	9.0	(1485)
White no religion	45.0	47.1	7.9	(342)
White other religion	49.5	45.5	5.0	(101)
Hispanic	54.8	39.7	5.5	(146)
Black	66.0	30.8	3.2	(682)

Intermarriage (RACMAR)	Should be illegal		Should be legal	
Jewish	12.3		87.7	(375)
White Protestant	39.7		60.3	(9081)
White Catholic	24.4		75.6	(3693)
White no religion	14.7		85.3	(1041)
White other religion	13.1		86.9	(221)
Hispanic	14.6		85.4	(635)
Black	7.9		92.1	(872)

Black dinner guest (RACDIN)*	Strongly object	Mildly object	No objection	
Jewish	2.9	6.2	90.9	(307)
White Protestant	13.8	15.9	70.3	(6726)
White Catholic	8.9	14.7	76.5	(2749)
White no religion	9.2	6.5	84.3	(753)
White other religion	5.8	11.6	82.6	(155)
Hispanic	5.6	9.0	85.4	(432)
Black	1.5	3.0	95.5	(532)

Try to integrate social club (RACCHGN)*	Would try	Would not try	Would quit (volunteered)	
Jewish	67.9	32.1	0.0	(112)
White Protestant	48.9	51.0	0.1	(2715)
White Catholic	56.2	43.7	0.2	(1120)
White no religion	66.3	33.3	0.3	(315)
White other religion	68.5	31.5	0.0	(73)
Hispanic	70.4	29.1	0.5	(213)
Black	82.6	17.4	0.0	(419)

Residential integration

**White right to
keep blacks out
of neighborhoods
(RACSEG)**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
Jewish	8.5	11.5	24.4	55.6	(270)
White Protestant	17.9	17.9	28.9	35.4	(6720)
White Catholic	13.7	16.5	28.8	41.0	(2757)
White no religion	8.7	10.3	20.8	60.3	(770)
White other religion	12.3	8.9	22.3	56.4	(179)
Hispanic	9.7	15.7	26.7	48.0	(465)
Black	4.6	7.6	12.8	75.1	(898)

**Community
open-housing
law (RACOPEN)**

	Oppose	Support	Neither	
Jewish	42.8	54.5	2.7	(297)
White Protestant	61.3	37.4	1.3	(7555)
White Catholic	53.9	44.8	1.2	(3122)
White no religion	42.7	54.3	3.0	(928)
White other religion	43.9	52.7	3.4	(205)
Hispanic	31.9	65.6	2.5	(526)
Black	21.1	76.2	2.6	(1080)

School integration

**Busing to
integrate schools
(Favor = 1, Oppose = 7)
(RACBUS)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	DK	
Jewish	3.9	4.8	6.2	9.7	9.2	12.6	49.3	4.3	(207)
White Protestant	1.5	1.1	1.2	4.3	3.9	9.8	70.0	8.1	(5342)
White Catholic	1.9	1.2	1.8	4.9	3.0	11.9	66.6	6.7	(1822)
White no religion	4.5	3.8	5.8	6.3	6.3	12.3	49.3	11.2	(446)
White other religion	5.0	4.1	3.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	56.2	6.6	(121)
Hispanic	5.5	3.2	3.2	6.4	4.1	12.8	44.7	20.1	(219)
Black	22.2	6.9	5.7	10.7	5.9	4.0	31.2	13.5	(884)

**Busing between school
districts (BUSING)**

	Favor	Oppose	
Jewish	20.9	79.1	(359)
White Protestant	14.8	85.2	(8328)
White Catholic	18.4	81.6	(3454)
White no religion	24.4	75.6	(974)
White other religion	28.7	71.3	(537)
Hispanic	40.0	60.0	(537)
Black	55.0	45.0	(1725)

Blacks and whites attend same schools (RACSCHOL)	Same schools			Separate schools	
Jewish	96.9			3.1	(346)
White Protestant	85.5			14.5	(5166)
White Catholic	91.4			8.6	(2099)
White no religion	92.7			7.3	(573)
White other religion	94.2			5.8	(121)
Hispanic	95.4			4.5	(327)
Black	95.8			4.3	(1066)

Objections to sending white child to integrated school (RACSCALE)	Object to few	Object to half	Object to more than half	No objection	
Jewish	4.6	16.2	33.9	39.3	(346)
White Protestnt	6.5	19.8	33.3	40.4	(7730)
White Catholic	4.3	18.0	34.5	43.1	(3275)
White no religion	4.5	13.0	26.6	56.0	(911)
White other religion	8.4	14.6	25.3	51.7	(178)
Hispanic	3.9	13.5	22.2	60.5	(519)
Black	2.5	3.6	7.9	86.0	(915)

Spending for blacks

Spending for programs that assist blacks (RACASST)	Too little	About right	Too much	
Jewish	35.2	53.4	11.4	(88)
White Protestant	15.6	60.0	24.5	(2672)
White Catholic	22.7	60.8	16.5	(994)
White no religion	22.9	53.1	24.0	(358)
White other religion	36.8	45.6	17.5	(57)
Hispanic	33.9	56.4	9.7	(236)
Black	74.8	22.2	3.0	(639)

Spending for improving conditions of blacks (NATRACE/NATRACEY)	Too little	About right	Too much	
Jewish	33.7	53.3	13.0	(454)
White Protestant	19.0	54.9	26.1	(11164)
White Catholic	23.6	52.8	23.6	(4564)
White no religion	30.6	46.9	22.5	(1335)
White other religion	29.0	51.6	19.4	(279)
Hispanic	33.8	53.1	13.1	(795)
Black	77.8	20.9	1.3	(2278)

Special help

Government obligation to assist blacks
(Make every effort = 1, No special effort = 7)

(SPECEFF)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	DK	
Jewish	10.1	13.2	18.5	24.9	11.7	9.5	8.9	3.1	(325)
White Protestant	4.9	4.5	10.2	21.5	15.5	11.9	16.8	14.6	(7792)
White Catholic	5.4	9.0	12.2	24.8	13.4	10.6	14.5	10.1	(3083)
White no religion	9.0	9.6	13.6	19.3	13.9	10.7	14.6	9.3	(856)
White other religion	11.9	11.9	13.5	21.8	11.4	11.4	10.9	7.3	(193)
Hispanic	16.8	9.6	10.6	19.8	14.8	7.2	5.6	15.6	(500)
Black	37.5	9.5	7.9	16.4	6.2	3.4	4.6	14.5	(1519)

Goverment help for blacks
(Obligated to help = 1, No special treatment = 5)

(HELPBLK)	1	2	3	4	5	
Jewish	9.7	18.2	26.1	17.6	28.5	(165)
White Protestant	5.3	7.8	27.2	19.9	39.9	(2672)
White Catholic	4.9	7.8	28.3	19.7	39.2	(1785)
White no religion	10.9	14.8	24.8	17.4	32.2	(541)
White other religion	10.2	15.6	29.7	14.1	30.5	(128)
Hispanic	13.7	13.1	35.4	13.4	24.4	(336)
Black	41.7	16.7	28.6	4.6	8.4	(930)

Reasons for black disadvantages

Discrimination (RACDIF1)

	Yes	No	
Jewish	49.6	50.4	(115)
White Protestant	37.7	62.3	(2784)
White Catholic	40.6	59.4	(1159)
White no religion	53.8	46.2	(327)
White other religon	41.6	58.4	(77)
Hispanic	60.4	39.6	(217)
Black	76.9	23.1	(420)

Less inborn ability to learn (RACDIF2)

	Yes	No	
Jewish	14.5	85.5	(117)
White Protestant	24.1	75.9	(2758)
White Catholic	23.6	76.4	(1165)
White no religion	12.5	87.5	(327)
White other religion	19.2	80.8	(78)
Hispanic	15.6	84.4	(211)
Black	15.7	84.3	(439)

Lack of education

(RACDIF3)	Yes	No	
Jewish	64.7	35.3	(119)
White Protestant	48.6	51.4	(2816)
White Catholic	52.7	47.3	(1167)
White no religion	62.0	38.0	(329)
White other religon	64.1	35.9	(78)
Hispanic	53.9	46.1	(217)
Black	68.7	31.3	(434)

Lack of will power

(RACDIF4)	Yes	No	
Jewish	54.0	46.0	(113)
White Protestant	67.3	32.7	(2759)
White Catholic	59.5	40.1	(1145)
White no religion	48.6	51.4	(321)
White other religion	53.8	46.2	(78)
Hispanic	56.7	43.3	(215)
Black	36.0	64.0	(422)

Group feelings

Blacks

(BLKTEMP)	Mean temperature (degrees)	
Jewish	63.2	(213)
White Protestant	61.1	(5978)
White Catholic	62.2	(2198)
White no religion	59.0	(589)
White other religion	62.9	(137)
Hispanic	66.0	(341)
Black	85.8	(1173)

Black militants

(MILTEMP)	Mean temperature (degrees)	
Jewish	24.0	(220)
White Protestant	20.0	(5746)
White Catholic	23.2	(2158)
White no religion	28.1	(586)
White other religion	25.0	(135)
Hispanic	36.2	(308)
Black	46.3	(1042)

Civil rights leaders (CRLTEMP)

	Mean temperature (degrees)	
Jewish	63.4	(189)
White Protestant	41.0	(4750)
White Catholic	47.8	(1776)
White no religion	52.5	(461)
White other religion	55.6	(212)
Hispanic	58.5	(121)
Black	77.4	(835)

Closeness to blacks (CLOSEBLK)	Close	Not Close	
Jewish	15.2	84.8	(158)
White Protestant	9.9	90.1	(4056)
White Catholic	10.3	89.7	(1516)
White no religion	13.1	86.9	(397)
White other religion	13.3	86.7	(105)
Hispanic	22.7	77.3	(220)
Black	84.6	15.4	(742)

Rate of change

Speed of civil rights (CRSPEED)	Too fast	Right speed	Too slow	
Jewish	31.2	53.7	15.1	(205)
White Protestant	47.7	47.5	4.9	(5229)
White Catholic	42.2	51.3	6.5	(1974)
White no religion	32.1	52.1	15.8	(480)
White other religion	33.3	46.0	20.6	(126)
Hispanic	22.8	63.0	14.2	(254)
Black	7.4	53.6	39.0	(1010)

Blacks shouldn't push (RACPUSH)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
Jewish	22.3	25.9	21.6	30.1	(282)
White Protestant	43.3	31.0	16.1	9.6	(6707)
White Catholic	34.0	31.7	21.3	13.1	(2710)
White no religion	24.8	22.7	17.7	30.7	(746)
White other religion	27.8	32.3	17.7	22.2	(158)
Hispanic	32.8	28.1	20.0	19.1	(409)
Black	16.6	21.1	19.1	43.1	(517)

Improvements in blacks' positions (CHANGE)	A lot	Some	Not much	
Jewish	55.9	36.2	7.9	(152)
White Protestant	57.8	33.9	8.3	(3854)
White Catholic	55.0	38.0	7.1	(1444)
White no religion	46.8	40.5	12.6	(333)
White other religion	52.4	35.7	11.9	(84)
Hispanic	41.8	42.1	5.2	(184)
Black	33.1	49.3	17.6	(743)

Politics

Influence of blacks (BLKINFLU)	Too much	Right amount	Too little	
Jewish	26.4	37.7	35.8	(106)
White Protestant	38.0	39.4	22.6	(3048)
White Catholic	31.3	43.7	25.0	(1122)
White no religion	27.0	42.6	30.4	(204)
White other religion	31.9	36.2	31.9	(69)
Hispanic	28.4	41.9	29.7	(74)
Black	2.3	12.4	85.4	(485)

Willing to vote for
black president

(RACPRES)	Would	Would not	
Jewish	89.2	10.8	(334)
White Protestant	78.3	21.7	(7368)
White Catholic	86.6	13.4	(3118)
White no religion	87.7	12.3	(884)
White other religion	86.6	13.4	(172)
Hispanic	89.2	10.8	(492)
Black	96.8	3.2	(1072)

Behaviors

Black neighbors

(RACNEAR)*	None	Some, not near	Some, near	Same block	
Jewish	39.6	3.6	24.0	32.9	(505)
White Protestant	62.2	3.3	19.3	15.1	(11959)
White Catholic	56.9	2.9	21.4	18.8	(4931)
White no religion	48.1	4.1	22.1	25.7	(1407)
White other religion	46.4	4.0	21.5	28.1	(302)
Hispanic	41.0	2.0	20.4	36.6	(830)
Black	22.3	1.0	20.1	56.6	(1467)

Black dinner guest

(RACHOME)*	Had	Had not	
Jewish	41.5	58.5	(306)
White Protestant	21.8	78.2	(7697)
White Catholic	24.9	75.1	(3069)
White no religion	39.3	39.3	(880)
White other religion	41.5	58.5	(193)
Hispanic	36.8	63.2	(557)
Black	53.2	46.8	(917)

Black attend your
church (RACCHURH)*

	Yes	No	
Jewish	19.4	80.6	(165)
White Protestant	35.0	65.0	(4615)
White Catholic	52.3	47.7	(1970)
White no religion	29.4	70.6	(214)
White other religion	29.2	70.8	(113)
Hispanic	45.8	54.2	(349)
Black	46.2	53.8	(1023)

*Asked in terms of opposite race of respondent. Non-blacks asked as indicated above.
 Blacks asked about whites.

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