

Intergroup Relations in a Diverse America

Data from the 2000 General Social Survey

Tom W. Smith

7424(73)1

SMI

JE 1211969

מכון המחקר
המרכז הלאומי
למחקר חברתי
באוניברסיטת
צ'יקגו

Dr. Tom W. Smith is director of the General Social Survey at the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

0424(73)7

Copyright © 2001 The American Jewish Committee
All Rights Reserved

Contents

Foreword	v
INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN A DIVERSE AMERICA	
Introduction	1
Intergroup Comparisons	3
<i>Perceived Contributions of Groups to American Society</i>	3
<i>Ethnic Images</i>	4
<i>Social Distance</i>	6
<i>Preferred Neighbors</i>	7
<i>Most/Least in Common With</i>	8
<i>Estimated Population Size of Groups</i>	9
<i>Assessments of Changes in Racial/Ethnic Composition</i>	11
<i>Intergroup Contacts</i>	12
Multiculturalism	14
<i>Language-Use Policies</i>	14
<i>Language Use and Exposure</i>	15
<i>Immigration</i>	16

Differences by Sociodemographic Groups	18
<i>Gender</i>	18
<i>Age Cohort</i>	18
<i>Education</i>	23
<i>Region</i>	27
<i>Community Type</i>	29
<i>Religion</i>	32
Trends	35
Summary	37
<i>Intergroup Comparisons</i>	37
<i>Multiculturalism</i>	39
<i>Sociodemographics</i>	39
<i>Trends</i>	40
Conclusion	41
References	41
Appendix: Measuring Ethnic Images	45
Tables	49

Foreword

Promoting positive intergroup relations has been a hallmark of the American Jewish Committee from its inception. As an aid to action in this area, the AJC has conducted pioneering research studies focused on relations between religious, racial, and ethnic groups. The classic of the genre is the five-volume *Studies in Prejudice* series, which triggered new approaches to combating bigotry.

Dr. Tom W. Smith's *Intergroup Relations in a Diverse America* is the newest volume in this line of AJC scholarly works crafted with an eye toward action in the intergroup relations arena. Smith, a preeminent social scientist, employs quantitative data to paint a vivid picture of a changing American society.

The United States today, Smith stresses, is characterized by extraordinary racial, religious, and ethnic diversity, and this makes "intergroup relations very complex and challenging." What this means in specific terms becomes clear as Smith, mining data from the 2000 General Social Survey, which he directed at the National Opinion Research Center, closely examines a broad range of issues, including the perceived contributions of various groups to American society; images of Whites, Blacks, Asians, Hispanics and Jews; desired social distance as measured in terms of neighborhood integration and intermarriage; language concerns, including bilingualism in the schools; and views about the impact of immigrants on American society. In focusing on these matters, Smith takes account of variation by subgroup—gender, age, education, race/religion/ethnicity, region, and community type—as well as trends over time.

Smith's overall conclusion is strikingly upbeat. "Virtually across the board," he observes, "Americans have become more tolerant in

their views on intergroup relations, more supportive of racial and ethnic equality, and more accepting of immigration.” Smith notes: “Support for explicit programs of racial discrimination and segregation have receded to small levels, negative images about group characteristics and the causes of intergroup disparities have diminished, and the desire to retain barriers between groups has declined.”

While documenting the “notable progress” that has been made in intergroup relations, Smith remains fully alert to the challenges that still exist in this area. Thus he stresses, based on the data under examination, the “clear social hierarchy” within the American mosaic, with Whites most advantaged, Blacks least socially accepted, and other minority groups occupying varying points in between. Smith observes in this context: “Negative ethnic images remain common, intergroup interaction is still limited, and concerns about multiculturalism in general and immigration in particular are still high.” For all the “real gains and achievements” in the intergroup relations sphere, Smith concludes, “there is still considerable ground to cover before our practices catch up with our principles.”

Intergroup Relations in a Diverse America, like Smith’s three previous studies prepared for the AJC (*What Do Americans Think About Jews?*, 1991; *Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America*, 1994; *A Survey of the Religious Right*, 1996) brims with data offering keen insights into the complexities of American life.

As a leading voice in advancing American pluralism, the AJC seeks to strengthen mutual understanding and respect among our country’s diverse racial, religious, and ethnic communities. Toward this end, we look forward to publishing additional policy-oriented studies and applying their findings in our wide-ranging intergroup relations activities. David Singer, AJC’s research director, deserves special thanks for his stewardship of this publication.

David A. Harris
Executive Director
The American Jewish Committee

INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN A DIVERSE AMERICA

Data from the 2000 General Social Survey

Introduction

As the results from the 2000 Census underscore, the United States is a diverse society. Nearly a third of the population is either Hispanic (13 percent) and/or non-White (19 percent) (Grieco and Cassidy, 2001). Religiously, America is even more varied, with hundreds of denominations representing all the world's faiths. Moreover, diversity is growing with the share of immigrants having doubled over the last generation and with ethnic and racial minorities making up an even larger proportion of children than they do of adults. This mosaic of groups and cultures makes intergroup relations very complex and challenging.

In assessing the complexity of contemporary intergroup relations, this report first examines how different groups are assessed by survey respondents. Specifically, the report considers (1) the perceived contributions of various groups to American society; (2) ethnic images of some major groups (Whites, Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and Jews) on the dimensions of wealth, industriousness, violence-proneness, intelligence, commitment to strong families, and commitment to intergroup tolerance and equality; (3) desired social distance from various groups regarding neighborhood integration and intermarriage; (4) preferred racial/ethnic composition of one's neighborhood; (5) ratings of groups that one has the most/least in common with; (6) estimated size of major groups in the United States and one's local community; (7) assessments of changes in the racial/ethnic composition of the population; and (8) contact with major groups in various

venues (at school, in the local community, as a relative, at work) and whether any contacts involve close relationships.

Second, this report examines two major components of the increasing multiculturalism of the United States: (1) the use of foreign languages and attitudes toward language issues such as making English the official language of the United States and bilingualism in the schools; and (2) attitudes toward the level and composition of immigration and the impact that immigrants have on American society.

Third, the report then looks at how the measures of intergroup relations and multiculturalism vary across sociodemographic groups. In addition to the basic differences across the racial and ethnic groups themselves, differences are considered by gender, age, education, region, community type, and religion.

Finally, changes in intergroup relations are followed over the last several decades. Trends tracked include the respondents' views on (1) intermarriage, (2) residential integration, (3) ethnic images, (4) perceived reasons for racial inequality, (5) relations between Blacks and Whites, (6) government policies to reduce racial inequality, and (7) immigration.

This report draws on the General Social Surveys (GSSs) of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. The GSSs are in-person, full-probability samples of adults living in households in the United States. They have been conducted twenty-three times between 1972 and 2000. Most analysis is based on the Multi-Ethnic United States (MEUS) module on the 2000 GSS. The 2000 GSS was fielded in February-May 2000 and 1,397 people received the MEUS items. For full technical details on the GSS see Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 2001.

Intergroup Comparisons

America is a large and complex society made up of people of many different races, nationalities, religions, and cultures. These myriad subgroups relate to and interact with each other in many different ways. Some groups, like Blacks and Whites, have a long, shared history together. Others are new immigrant groups that became part of American society only in recent years. Sometimes intergroup conflicts have been long and violent, like the struggle between the American Indians and White settlers. Other times groups have fought together, as in Black-White alliances during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Part of the story of intergroup relations is written in great historical events—the Emancipation Proclamation, the Johnson-Reid Immigration Act, the Montgomery bus boycott, the Los Angeles riots. Most is told in the everyday attitudes and actions of all Americans as they go about their daily lives. It is from the perspective of individual Americans that the contemporary state of intergroup relations is perhaps best understood.

Perceived Contributions of Groups to American Society

The many religious, racial, and ethnic groups that make up American society are not seen by survey respondents as having made equal contributions to the country (Table 1). At the top, 71 percent of respondents believe that the English have played an important role (most important + important). Next come several other European groups—Jews (53 percent important), Italians (48 percent), Irish (48 percent), and Blacks (48 percent). They are followed by Asian groups—Japanese (40 percent), Chinese (39 percent), and Vietnamese (18 percent). Then come Hispanic groups—Mexicans (28 percent), Puerto Ricans (18 percent), and Cubans (16 percent). Near the bottom are the Muslims (17 percent). Clearly, respondents give more credit to groups that have been in America for longer periods. For example, European groups are rated above Asian and Hispanic groups; within Asian

groups, the Japanese and Chinese are placed above the more recently arrived Vietnamese. It also appears that larger groups may sometimes be given an edge over smaller groups. This may explain why Mexicans, the largest Hispanic group, are rated above Puerto Ricans and Cubans.¹ Newer groups also score lower simply because respondents lack enough knowledge about them to assess their contributions—e.g., 19 percent don't know (DK) what role Muslims have played.

Members of each group rank the contributions of their own group higher than nongroup members do. For example, 88 percent of those of English ancestry rate the English contribution as important compared to only 70 percent of the non-English, while 58 percent of Blacks vs. 47 percent of non-Blacks consider Black contributions as important. However, since each group is only a small share of the whole, looking at just out-group ratings lowers ratings only slightly and has virtually no impact on the relative ranking of groups.

Ethnic Images

Respondents have decidedly different images of racial and ethnic groups in American society and generally have a much more negative view of many minorities than of the White majority.²

Overall, Blacks are viewed by respondents the most negatively (Table 2A). They are rated lower than Whites on all six dimensions and lower than other minority groups on four dimensions (industriousness, violence-proneness, commitment to strong families, and commitment to intergroup tolerance). For example, 10 percent of respondents rate Blacks as less violence-prone than Whites, 45 per-

¹Research on social distance going back seventy years also suggests that nationalities identified with countries that are enemies of the United States are rated less favorably (Smith and Dempsey, 1984). This might explain the low scores for Cubans, even though most Cubans in the United States do not support the Castro regime.

²See Appendix: Measuring Ethnic Images for a conceptual and technical discussion of these items.

cent as tied with Whites, and 45 percent as more violence-prone for an overall score of -0.65.

Hispanics are seen by respondents more negatively than Whites on five of the six dimensions—all except strong families (Table 2A). They have the most negative ratings of all groups on wealth and intelligence and are second lowest to Blacks on the other four dimensions. For example, 22 percent see Hispanics as more hardworking than Whites, 43 percent as the same as Whites, and 35 percent as less hardworking for an overall score of -0.29.

Asians are rated by respondents more negatively than Whites on wealth, intelligence, and intergroup tolerance, but more positively on industriousness, violence-proneness, and strong families (Table 2A). On industriousness they are rated more positively than any other group, and on the other dimensions they score above Blacks and Hispanics and below both Jews and Whites in general.

Jews are seen by respondents in more positive terms on all dimensions than Whites in general are (Table 2A). (However, on two dimensions—intelligence and intergroup tolerance—they are essentially tied with Whites.) On all dimensions except industriousness they have the most favorable rating overall. For example, 36 percent see Jews as less violence-prone than Whites, 55 percent as equal to Whites, and 10 percent as more violence-prone, for an overall score of +0.49.

Minority groups often rate themselves more positively than out-group members do (Table 2B and Table 20). For example, while non-Hispanics consider Hispanics less hardworking than Whites (-0.14), Hispanics rate themselves as more hardworking than Whites (+0.06). Hispanics evaluate themselves more favorably than non-Hispanics do on work and family, but the groups do not significantly differ on the other dimensions. Blacks rate themselves more positively on all dimensions except wealth, where no difference appears across groups. Asians score themselves higher on work and family than either Blacks or Whites rate Asians. No differences appear on wealth, violence-

proneness, intergroup tolerance, or intelligence. Jews consider themselves better in terms of group tolerance; no other differences are statistically significant.³

In-groups and out-groups never show statistically significant differences on judgments about wealth, but always disagree on evaluations of intergroup tolerance. In particular, Asians, Hispanics, and Jews all rate themselves more positively than they rate Whites on being committed to the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society, while Whites see themselves as more tolerant. Furthermore, Blacks see all minority groups as more for intergroup tolerance than Whites are, while Whites see other groups as less dedicated than they are. Minorities tend to see Whites as dominating others while they themselves support civil rights, but Whites tend to see minorities as favoring their special, subgroup interests over the general well-being.

Social Distance

Few non-White respondents object to close contact with Whites, but objections to associating with some minorities are much higher (Table 3). Only 9 percent of non-Whites object to a close relative marrying a White, and just 6 percent oppose living in a neighborhood with a White majority. Similarly, opposition among non-Jews to a relative marrying a Jew or living in a majority-Jewish neighborhood is also low (respectively 13 percent and 9 percent). Objection is higher among non-Asians to an Asian marriage (20 percent) or to living in a majority-Asian neighborhood (18 percent), higher still among non-Hispanics over a marriage with an Hispanic (21 percent) or living in a Hispanic neighborhood (27 percent), and highest among non-Blacks over a close relative marrying a Black (32 percent) or residing in a majority-Black area (30 percent). Thus, while a majority of respondents does not oppose these two forms of close contact, many

³Conclusions about the views of both Asians and Jews must be treated cautiously because of small sample sizes.

wish to keep a social distance from other groups, with objections greatest to Blacks, followed by Hispanics, Asians, Jews, and Whites.

Preferred Neighbors

For a more detailed measure of residential preferences, respondents were shown a neighborhood with fifteen houses in it (Table 4). Their home was shown in the middle, and they were asked to indicate which of the fourteen surrounding homes they would like to see occupied by Whites, Blacks, Asians, or Hispanics. These racial and ethnic preferences were then totaled to determine the desired composition of their neighborhoods. Respondents in general and members of each group on average opt for integrated neighborhoods with representation of all the specified groups. Among all respondents (excluding those who did not make selections), the desired neighborhood was 49 percent White, 19 percent Black, 14.5 percent Hispanic, 13 percent Asian, and 3.5 percent said it did not matter to them.

Each racial and ethnic group leans toward having a plurality of neighbors from its own group. Thus Whites want their neighborhood to be 54 percent White, Blacks want theirs 40 percent Black, Hispanics want theirs 33 percent Hispanic, and Asians want theirs 36 percent Asian.⁴ Whites are the most frequent second choice for all minority groups, but all groups, including Whites themselves, choose fewer Whites than Whites' actual share of the population. Blacks and Hispanics are then the next most frequently selected groups. Excluding self-selection, both groups are chosen to be about 13-17 percent of neighbors, a little higher than their actual share of the population. Asians make up the smallest share of the neighbors of each non-Asian group (13 percent for Whites, 12.5 percent for Blacks, and 16 percent

⁴This in-group preference shows up even more strongly in respondents' residential choices, which tend to be segregated along racial and ethnic lines (Farley and Frey, 1994; Harris, 2001; Massey and Denton, 1994; Yinger, 1995). Preliminary analysis of metropolitan areas based on the 2000 Census indicate that this pattern persists (El Nasser, 2001).

for Hispanics). However, this is about three to four times Asians' actual share of the population, so Asians are the most overselected compared to their actual numbers.

Most/Least in Common With

On another measure of closeness among groups, respondents were asked to identify the racial and ethnic group, other than their own, that they had the most and least in common with (Table 5). Many respondents found it hard to select a group, with 28 percent not choosing a most-in-common group and 24 percent not coming up with a least-in-common group. In addition, others mentioned their own group despite instructions to the contrary. Overall, Blacks, Jews, and Hispanics were selected as the most-compatible group by about the same proportion of nongroup members, 16-17 percent (Table 5B), and as the least-compatible group by a similar share, 13-16 percent (Table 5B). Whites were chosen least frequently as both the most-compatible group (8 percent) and the least-compatible group (2 percent). Asians were also rarely selected as the group respondents had the most in common with (8 percent), but they were by far the group most often mentioned as having the least in common (32 percent).

With self-nominations removed, Whites spread their selection of most-compatible group pretty evenly among Jews (17 percent), Blacks (15 percent), and Hispanics (13 percent), with Asians trailing (6 percent) (Table 5C). Whites mention Asians as the group they have the least in common with by a wide margin (32 percent), followed by Blacks (17.5 percent), Hispanics (14 percent), and Jews (11 percent). Blacks consider Whites their most-compatible group (33 percent), with Hispanics second (19 percent); few mention either Asians (3 percent) or Jews (3 percent). Blacks are most likely to name Asians as the least-compatible group (39 percent), followed by Jews (15 percent), Hispanics (11 percent), and Whites (11 percent). Hispanics see Whites as the group they have the most in common with (33 per-

cent), followed by Blacks (14 percent), Asians (8 percent), and then Jews (0.5 percent). Hispanics find they have least in common with Asians (28 percent), Jews (25 percent), Blacks (21 percent), and then Whites (8 percent).

These cross-group comparisons show that Jews are most favorably positioned among Whites (i.e., highest on most-in-common and lowest on least-in-common) and Asians are the least advantaged (i.e., lowest on most-in-common and highest among least-in-common). Among Blacks, Whites are seen most favorably and Asians least favorably. Among Hispanics, Whites are also seen as most compatible, and Jews and Asians are viewed as least compatible.

Estimated Population Size of Groups

Consistent with past studies (Highton and Wolfinger, 1992; Nadeau and Niemi, 1995; and Nadeau, Niemi, and Levine, 1993), respondents have poor understanding of the actual demographic composition of American society. They underestimate the White share of the national population and greatly overestimate the sizes of all minority groups (Table 6A). According to the 2000 Census (Grieco and Cassidy, 2001), Whites make up 75 percent of the U.S. population vs. the respondents' mean estimate of 59 percent; Blacks are 12.9 percent vs. an estimate of 31 percent; Hispanics are 12.5 percent vs. an estimate of 25 percent; Asians are 4.2 percent vs. an estimate of 18 percent, and American Indians are 1.5 percent vs. an estimate of 14 percent. Likewise, the GSS puts the Jewish share at 2.0 percent vs. the respondents' estimate of 18 percent. Thus minorities are overestimated by a factor of 2.0 for Hispanics, 2.4 for Blacks, 4.2 for Asians, 8.9 for Jews, and 9.5 for American Indians.⁵ The smaller the minority group, the larger the overestimate.

⁵These figures count multiple mentions for each racial group. Using a measure of ethnic origins rather than race, the GSS estimates the percentage of the adult U.S. population with at least some American Indian ancestry as 6.5 percent. Using this figure reduces the overestimate factor to 2.2 (Smith, forthcoming).

Respondents also have very high estimates of the proportion of the population that is racially mixed. The mean estimate is that 43 percent of the population has parents or ancestors from two or more of the major racial/ethnic groups. This is in stark contrast to the 2.4 percent of the population that identified themselves as mixed-race on the 2000 Census (Grieco and Cassidy, 2001) or the 5.5 percent of adults who did so on the 2000 GSS. It may be that people were thinking of ethnically blended ancestry (e.g., from two+ European or Asian nationalities), but the question did ask people to report on mixed-race backgrounds (Table 6A).

Hispanic and Black respondents see even larger minority populations than non-Hispanics, Whites, or Asians do (Table 6B). For example, Hispanics believe that Blacks make up 35 percent of the population; Blacks put the figure at 39 percent; and Whites estimate the Black share at 30 percent. Hispanics and Blacks also place the mixed-race share of the population somewhat higher than Whites do (49 percent and 47 percent vs. 42 percent).

Given the wide discrepancies between respondents' estimates of the racial and ethnic composition of the national population and authoritative figures from the Census and GSS, it is surprising that, in the aggregate, estimates of the profiles of local community populations are much more accurate (Table 7).⁶ Minorities are still overestimated, but the differences are much smaller. Whites are estimated as 68 percent (Census = 75 percent), Blacks as 20 percent (13 percent), Hispanics as 14 percent (13 percent), Asians as 7 percent (4 percent), American Indians as 5 percent (1.5 percent), and Jews as 7 percent (GSS = 2 percent).

Thus respondents systematically overestimate the sizes of minority groups, and the misestimates are much greater at the nation-

⁶Each respondent's estimate of the composition of the population in their local community of course reflects the very varied distribution of groups across communities. But in the aggregate the community estimates should match the national figures since communities are representative of the country as a whole.

al than at the local level. This indicates that the national estimates are not based on either a factual understanding of demographic realities or upon projections from respondents' direct observations of their local communities, but are based on impressions and perhaps anxieties that lead respondents to form greatly exaggerated ideas of the sizes of minority groups.

Assessments of Changes in Racial/Ethnic Composition

Respondents realize that most minority populations are likely to grow more rapidly than the White majority (Table 8A). Hispanics are seen as likely to experience the most growth over the next quarter century. Almost half of respondents (46 percent) believe that the Hispanic share of the population will increase by a lot and fully 84 percent think it will grow at least some. A quarter see the Black proportion of the population as expanding a lot, and 71 percent see at least some gain. Almost a fifth (19 percent) see the Asian share as growing a lot, and 65 percent see at least some increase. Only 8 percent feel that the White proportion will grow a lot, and 37 percent see some gain. Just 4 percent see Jews gaining ground a lot, and 28 percent believe there will be some increase. Except for underestimating the anticipated increase in the Asian population, this ranking of groups agrees with standard projections on the relative sizes of racial and ethnic groups.⁷

Respondents' expectations of population gains are fairly similar across racial and ethnic groups (Table 8B). Hispanics and non-Hispanics do not differ in these projections. Blacks estimate somewhat more White and Jewish growth and less growth among minorities than Whites foresee. Asians are distinctive in seeing more gains for their own group than others do.

Overall, most respondents see the population changes they forecast as having a neutral impact on the country (Table 8C). Twenty-

⁷Respondents are unrealistic in believing that most groups can increase their *share* in the population. They seem to be thinking more in terms of increases in absolute size rather than in relative share.

five percent believe the changes are a good thing, 53 percent believe they are neither good nor bad, 18 percent believe they are bad, and 3 percent don't know. Minorities (Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians) are more likely to think the changes are good than Whites or non-Hispanics are (Table 8D).

Evaluations of the desirability of changes depends in large part on what group a respondent belongs to and how much change he or she expects. For example, among non-Black respondents who think that the Black share of the population will increase a lot, 34 percent think the expected increase is a bad thing; but among non-Black respondents who think that the Black population share will decrease a lot, 0.0 percent see the decrease as a bad thing. Among Black respondents, the pattern is reversed. Of Blacks who see their share as increasing a lot, only 8 percent say that the increase is a bad thing. But of Blacks who think their population share will decrease a lot, 38 percent see the decrease as a bad thing. Similarly, negative evaluations of future population growth increase among non-Hispanics and non-Asians when their expectations of Hispanic and Asian expansion is greater.

Intergroup Contacts

Respondents' reports of intergroup contacts vary a great deal depending on the groups involved and the nature or venue of the contacts (Table 9). Almost all (93 percent) non-White respondents personally know a White person. Contacts with minorities range considerably. Eighty-six percent of non-Blacks know a Black person, 73 percent of non-Hispanics know a Hispanic, 60 percent of non-Asians know an Asian, and 58 percent of non-Jews know a Jew. Contact with out-group members is largely a function of the size of a group in the general population. Contact in any particular venue is naturally smaller than overall contact.

Of the four areas asked about (school, community, family, and work), work is the most frequent area of contact among groups.

Among the employed, 87 percent of non-Whites know a White from work, 62 percent of non-Blacks know a Black, 53 percent of non-Hispanics know a Hispanic, 36 percent of non-Asians know an Asian, and 30 percent of non-Jews know a Jew. Next, respondents tend to know members of other groups from their local communities. Seventy-four percent of non-Whites know a White, 52 percent of non-Blacks know a Black, 42 percent of non-Hispanics know a Hispanic, 29 percent of non-Asians know an Asian, and 27 percent of non-Jews know a Jew. Next in frequency is contact from school. Fifty-nine percent of non-Whites know a White from school, 42 percent of non-Blacks know a Black, 32 percent of non-Hispanics know a Hispanic, 27 percent of non-Jews know a Jew, and 23 percent of non-Asians know an Asian. Finally, the least frequent area of minority contact is relatives. Forty-four percent of non-Whites have a White relative, 11 percent of non-Hispanics have a Hispanic relative, 9 percent of non-Jews have a Jewish relative, 9 percent of non-Blacks have a Black relative, and 7 percent of non-Asians have an Asian relative.

Of course, knowing members of other groups is only the first step in establishing meaningful and harmonious relations among groups (Ellison and Powers, 1994; Pettigrew, 1998; Powers and Ellison, 1995; Sigelman et al., 1996; Smith, 1999, 2000). Many respondents know people from other groups but do not feel close to them. Thus 93 percent of non-Whites know a White person, but only 67 percent “feel close to” a White. Similarly, 86 percent of non-Blacks know a Black person, but only 46 percent feel close to a Black; 73 percent of non-Hispanics know a Hispanic, but only 35 percent feel close to one; 60 percent of non-Asians know an Asian, but only 25 percent feel close to one; and 58 percent of non-Jews know a Jew, but only 28 percent feel close to one. About half to three-fifths of respondents who know a minority-group member do not feel close to any of these acquaintances.

In sum, intergroup contact is greater between minorities and the White majority than among minorities themselves. This pattern nat-

usually arises out the differences in the sizes of the groups and their dispersion across the country. Second, intergroup contact involves a majority of respondents at the broadest and least intimate level (i.e., just knowing a member of another group), but only a minority in closer relationships. Only 25-46 percent of nongroup members feel close to someone from that group, and only 7-11 percent have a relative from that group.

Multiculturalism

America is a world society with significant numbers from virtually all races, ethnicities, religions, and language groups. Moreover, it is an increasingly diversifying society with an expanding number of immigrants representing more nationalities, languages, and cultures than ever before. Thus the need to deal with the challenges of pluralism is a present and growing necessity for society.

Language-Use Policies

Americans have complex views on the role of English and other languages in the United States. Almost three-quarters of the respondents endorse the ideas that English should be the country's official language (73 percent) and that having English as our shared, national language "unites all Americans" (74 percent) (Table 10A). Most reject the ideas that English should be used exclusively and that the use of other languages should be suppressed. Only 34 percent feel that ballots should be only in English, 31 percent think that English is threatened if other languages are used among immigrants, and 22 percent want to eliminate bilingual education (Table 10A). Respondents see knowledge of foreign languages as an educational plus. Seventy-four percent believe that children should learn a second language before graduating from high school, and 62 percent think that learning a second language is as valuable as learning math and science (Table 10C).

Reflecting difference in language use, there are considerable differences across groups in their attitudes toward language issues. The major group of recent immigrants, Hispanics, is much less supportive of pro-English policies than others are (Table 10C). For example, 45 percent of Hispanic respondents vs. 76 percent of non-Hispanics favor English as the official language of the United States, and 12 percent of Hispanics vs. 25 percent of non-Hispanics oppose children learning a second language in school. Whites generally are the most pro-English. For example, 24 percent of White respondents want to abolish bilingual education compared to 16 percent of Black respondents, 10 percent of Hispanics, and 7 percent of Asians. Asians and Blacks typically take an intermediate position between Hispanics and Whites. They sometimes take relatively high pro-English positions (as on making English the official language of the United States) and other times line up with Hispanics (as on non-English ballots).

Language Use and Exposure

Foreign-language use is fairly common in the United States. Over a quarter (27 percent) of respondents speak a foreign language, 10 percent speak it very well, and 12 percent use it on a daily basis (Table 11A). Spanish is the most widely spoken foreign language (15 percent). It is followed by other European languages (9 percent), Asian languages (4 percent), and all other languages (e.g., African and Middle Eastern, 2 percent). Most respondents (50 percent) acquired their foreign language as their mother tongue in their childhood home, a third (33 percent) learned it in school, and 16 percent otherwise picked up the language (e.g., from a spouse, while living overseas, from work).

Two-thirds or more of respondents at least sometimes come across foreign languages being spoken at work (67 percent) and in their local communities (74 percent) (Table 11B). A third hear a foreign language being used on a daily basis at work, and a quarter hear it daily in their local communities. Looking at exposure to foreign

languages either at work or in one's local community, only 14 percent never hear a foreign language but almost half (47 percent) hear one daily.

Language use and exposure vary greatly among respondents across racial and ethnic groups. Hispanics and Asians are much more likely to use and hear foreign languages than Whites or Blacks are. Almost all Hispanic and Asian respondents knowing a foreign language learned it at home while growing up (Table 11C). More Whites know a foreign language than Blacks do, but few of either race are fluent or use a foreign language often. Whites are more likely than Blacks to at least sometimes hear a foreign language in their local communities (74 percent vs. 61 percent), but Blacks hear a foreign language at work more than Whites do (70 percent vs. 64 percent). Almost two-fifths of Whites (39 percent) and a quarter (26 percent) of Blacks learned their foreign language at home, but unlike Hispanics and Asians, most Blacks (52 percent) and a plurality of Whites (42 percent) learned it at school.

Immigration

Respondents are about evenly split between thinking that the overall level of immigration should be left at current levels (44 percent) or that it should be decreased (42 percent). Only 9 percent feel that it should be increased (Table 12A). Respondents' support for immigration varies little by the type of immigrants: 42 percent want immigration from Latin America reduced, 40 percent want Asian immigration decreased, and 33 percent want less immigration from Europe. The two major immigrant groups, Hispanics and Asians, are notably more pro-immigration than other groups. For example, only 29 percent of Hispanics favor a decrease vs. 43 percent of non-Hispanics (Table 12B). Asians are even more for immigration with only 11 percent backing decreases. Whites are generally the most anti-immigration. Blacks favor immigration more than Whites but much less than Asians and Hispanics.

While support for immigration among respondents does not vary notably by the origin of the immigrants overall, national origin sometimes makes a difference among racial and ethnic groups. Asians are less supportive of immigration from Latin America than from other areas. Whites are more for immigration from Europe than they are for immigration from other regions.

Respondents believe that immigrants have both positive and negative impacts on American society, but they see more downsides than upsides (Table 13A). On the upside, 73 percent feel that it is likely that immigrants will make the country “more open to new ideas and cultures.” On the downside, 70 percent think that crime rates will rise, 57 percent feel that native-born Americans will lose jobs, and 53 percent believe that immigrants will make it “harder to keep the country united.” Respondents are nearly evenly split on whether it is likely or unlikely that immigration will lead to more economic growth (48 percent likely, 47 percent unlikely, and 5 percent unsure).

Hispanic and Asian respondents are considerably more sanguine about the impact of immigration than others are (Table 13B). Hispanics see more gains in economic growth and new ideas and less increase in crime, unemployment, and disunity. Asians share this optimistic outlook. Whites and Blacks are much less optimistic about the impact of immigration. Except for Blacks being more positive about immigration promoting economic growth, Whites and Blacks differ little in their views.

Respondents are also evenly divided on the matter of pluralism vs. assimilation (Table 14A). Thirty percent lean toward racial and ethnic groups maintaining their distinct cultures, 34 percent favor their blending into the larger society, 32 percent back both pluralist and assimilationist positions, and 4 percent have no opinion. Hispanics are notably less favorable toward assimilation than non-Hispanics are (21 percent vs. 35 percent). Whites, Blacks, and Asians differ little in their preferences.

Differences by Sociodemographic Groups

Gender

Male and female respondents differ little in their support for good intergroup relations and for contact with members of other groups (Table 15). On most topics, there are few statistically significant differences, and those differences that do appear are often offsetting. For example, (1) men and women differ on only two of twenty-four ethnic images, and men hold more negative views toward the minority in one instance and women in the other; (2) no meaningful differences appear on immigration issues; (3) only four of thirty contact measures vary by gender; (4) men and women do not vary in their views on intermarriage; and (5) women are consistently, but modestly, more in favor of living in integrated neighborhoods than men are, but the genders agree on the preferred racial and ethnic composition of their neighborhoods.

Gender differences do show up, however, on the demographic estimates. First, women think that each minority group, except Jews but including the mixed-race group, makes up a larger share of the national and local population than men think. Since even men overestimate the sizes of minorities, this means that women are even less accurate than men are. Second, women are more likely than men to see Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians increasing their population share and less likely than men to believe that Whites and Jews will gain ground. In this women are probably more accurate than men are.

Age Cohort

Views about intergroup relations in general and about specific groups in particular differ considerably among respondents by age and cohort.⁸ In most instances the youngest cohort, those less than thirty

⁸From a single survey it is impossible to separate out age and cohort effects. We typically refer to the age-cohort differences as being due to cohort, since over

years old, report the greatest acceptance of racial and ethnic minorities and the most contact with them, while the oldest cohort, those sixty-five and over, are the least tolerant and have the least contact (Table 16).

The youngest respondent cohort usually gives the highest contributions scores to each non-European nationality or religion, while the oldest cohort typically gives the lowest ratings. For example, 59 percent of the young say that the contributions of Blacks have been important, while only 29 percent of those sixty-five and over think so. For European groups, the fifty-to-sixty-four and the sixty-five-and-over cohorts see the highest contributions, while the young usually see the lowest. For example, 55-56 percent of those over fifty think the Irish have made important contributions, but only 39 percent of the young share this evaluation. Thus the young are more positively oriented toward newer groups and non-European minorities, while the old favor long-term, European groups.

Those sixty-five and over have the most negative images of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians regarding industriousness, proclivity to violence, intelligence, family, and intergroup equality. The most positive images are usually held by the youngest cohort, but in several instances those forty to forty-nine have the most favorable view. Regarding Jews, the age-cohort differences are less meaningful and consistent. No meaningful variation appears on intergroup equality or families. The old are likely to believe that Jews are more intelligent and harder-working than Whites; the young are the least likely to believe this. Those under fifty are least likely to view Jews as violence-prone and those sixty-five and over are most likely.

In all but one case, the oldest cohort among respondents objects most to intermarriage and living in integrated neighborhoods with any minority—Blacks, Jews, Hispanics, or Asians. The under-thirty cohort and those thirty to thirty-nine object the least. For example,

time studies indicate that the differences are due to cohort not aging (Firebaugh and Davis, 1988; Schuman et al., 1997; Steeh and Schuman 1992).

57 percent of those sixty-five and over oppose a close relative marrying a Black person vs. 16 percent of those under thirty; and 26 percent of those sixty-five and over oppose Asian neighbors vs. 11 percent of those thirty to thirty-nine. The oldest cohort prefers the most White neighbors and the fewest minority group neighbors, while the youngest cohort is most accepting of minorities as neighbors.

Intergroup contact often varies with age. The oldest respondents usually report the least cross-racial/ethnic contacts and the youngest typically the most. For example, 61 percent of non-Blacks under thirty know a Black person in their local community, but only 43 percent of those sixty-five and over do. Likewise, 31 percent of non-Asians under thirty are close to an Asian, but only 11 percent of those sixty-five and over are. The differences are especially large on knowing people from school. Since schooling typically ends early in a person's adult life, asking about knowing people from school is essentially giving us a glimpse into the past, a view of the situation early in a person's adult years. Since several minorities (e.g., Asians and Hispanics) have greatly increased their share of the population in recent years and other groups used to be segregated by law in schools (e.g., Blacks and Whites), people in the older cohorts are much less likely to have come to know members of other groups while in school than those in younger cohorts are. For example, only 11 percent of non-Blacks sixty-five and over know a Black from school, while 69 percent of those under thirty do. Likewise, while 45 percent of non-Asians under thirty know an Asian person from school, only 6 percent of those sixty-five and over do.

There are two major exceptions to this general pattern. At work, intergroup contact is highest among middle-aged respondents and relatively low among the young (the old are excluded from the age-cohort comparisons since few sixty-five and over are still working). This is probably because the middle-aged are more likely to be in management positions and have contact with more coworkers in gen-

eral. Also, the old often have more contact with Jews than the young do. For example, 12 percent of non-Jews sixty-five and over have a Jewish relative while only 5 percent of those under thirty do.

Among White respondents, older cohorts see themselves as having more in common with Whites and Jews than younger cohorts do. The younger cohorts see stronger ties to Hispanics and Blacks, and views on Asians do not differ much across cohorts. For example, 24 percent of Whites under thirty say they have the most in common with Blacks compared to only 10 percent of those sixty-five and over. The middle cohort, ages forty to forty-nine, is distinctive in being most likely to volunteer that it relates to all groups equally. The older cohorts of Whites are also the most likely to say they have the least in common with Blacks and are least likely to report having little in common with Whites or Jews. The younger cohorts show the opposite pattern. An unanticipated result is that the youngest cohort has the highest level saying that they have the least in common with Hispanics, while those sixty-five and older report the lowest level having little in common with Hispanics. The oldest cohort also is the most likely to say they had nothing in common with any group and to say they did not know what group they had the least in common with.

Age groups among respondents differ little in their estimates of the racial and ethnic distribution of the U.S. population or that of their local community. The youngest cohort has the highest estimate of the percentage of the U.S. population that is racially mixed (50 percent) compared to estimates of 36-40 percent among those fifty and over.

Age groups basically agree on the relative rank of the growth rates of racial and ethnic groups. Those under thirty see somewhat more growth among Whites and Asians than older groups do, while older groups project more growth among Blacks. The cohorts differ in their assessment of future population changes. Almost a third (32 percent) of those sixty-five and over think that the changes are a bad thing, while less than a fifth of those under sixty-five and just 14 per-

cent of those under thirty believe the changes are bad.

The oldest cohort is the most pro-English and antibilingualism. Those under forty are the most approving of non-English-language use. For example, 87 percent of those sixty-five and over want English made the official language, but only 65 percent of those under thirty concur. Likewise, 36 percent of the oldest cohort wants to abolish bilingual education vs. 13 percent of the youngest cohort.

Immigration is generally most accepted by the youngest cohort. Those under thirty are least likely to want the number of immigrants reduced. For example, 34 percent want fewer immigrants from Latin America compared to 42-47 percent of older cohorts wanting reductions in the number of Hispanic immigrants. Younger cohorts are also less likely to believe that negative consequences come from immigration, while those sixty-five and over consistently have the most pessimistic view. For example, 67 percent of those sixty-five and older think it is likely that native-born Americans will lose jobs due to immigration vs. 51 percent of those under thirty. Likewise, 64 percent think economic growth is unlikely to result from immigration compared to 36 percent among those under thirty. However, all age groups agree that immigrants contribute to crime. The youngest cohort is also the least in favor of groups assimilating into the main culture (29 percent), while the oldest cohort most favors this course (47 percent).

In sum, intergroup attitudes and behaviors are sharply differentiated by age cohort. Across age groups, those sixty-five and over generally have the least positive view of racial and ethnic minorities, the lowest level of intergroup contact, and the lowest acceptance of multiculturalism. Those under sixty-five are less sharply divided, but the youngest cohort tends to be the most accepting of diversity and has the most interactions across racial and ethnic lines.

Education

As other studies have shown (Bobo and Kluegel, 1997; Jackman, 1994; Schuman et al., 1997; Smith, 2000), education promotes both intergroup contact and more positive relations among groups (Table 17).

Respondents with college educations are the most likely to believe that all groups make important contributions to American society, while those without a high school degree are generally the least likely to acknowledge contributions. The differences are large and fairly consistent across groups. For example, 62 percent of respondents with college degrees vs. 34 percent of those who did not finish high school think Jews have made important contributions, and 24 percent of the college educated vs. 11 percent of those not completing high school believe Muslims have made important contributions.

With one exception, college-educated respondents have the most positive images of all minority groups regarding industriousness, violence, intelligence, family, and intergroup relations.⁹ Those without a high school education typically have the most negative images of all minority groups.¹⁰ Often the differences in ethnic images by education are quite notable. In particular, the better educated have much more positive views of Asians than the least educated do. Those with less than a high school degree view Asians as less intelligent, less hardworking, and less committed to strong families than Whites are, but the college educated see them as more intelligent, harder-working, and more committed to families than Whites are. Among Hispanics and Blacks, all educational categories typically have negative

⁹Views on the violence proneness of Jews do not vary significantly with education. Those without a high school education have marginally the most positive image of Jews.

¹⁰The main exception is that those with a high school education have the most negative view of minorities on intergroup tolerance.

images of other groups, but the better educated are more moderate in their negative assessments than the less educated are. In one case, evaluating Hispanics on commitment to families, the better educated have an overall positive image, while the less educated view them in a negative light.

College-educated respondents are generally the least likely to object to intermarriage or living in the same neighborhood with minorities. Those with a high school education or less are the most likely to oppose these forms of contact. For example, 22 percent of the college educated object to a close relative marrying a Black vs. 40-41 percent of those with a high school education or less. Similarly, 12 percent of those with a college education oppose living with Asians, while 24 percent of those without a high school degree object.

Among White respondents, the college educated prefer the smallest number of White neighbors and the greatest number of Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics. Those without a high school degree want the most White neighbors and the fewest from each minority group.

Intergroup contact among respondents generally increases notably with level of education—that is, contact with out-group members rises with years of schooling. The college educated almost always report knowing more members of all minority groups, having the most contact with minorities at school, work, and in the local community, and feeling close to more members of other groups. For example, 83 percent of the college educated vs. 35 percent of those who did not finish high school know an Asian, 39 percent vs. 11 percent had contact at school, 52 percent vs. 16 percent at work, 43 percent vs. 14 percent from their local community; 40 percent of the college educated feel close to an Asian compared to 9 percent of the least educated. A similar pattern emerges for Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews. The one partial exception is on knowing a group member as a relative. Having contact with Black, Hispanic, and Asian relatives does not vary by educational level. However, consistent with the gen-

eral pattern, better educated non-Whites are the most likely to know a White as a relative and the same is true for non-Jews having a Jewish relative.

Among White respondents, the college educated generally feel they have more in common with most minority groups than the less educated do. An exception is that the college educated are the least likely to see themselves as having the most in common with Blacks, while those without a high school education most frequently mention Blacks. It is possible that these ties appear because of the similar class position of the two groups.

Educational differences in selecting the group with the least in common are rather scattered. The college educated are the most likely to say they have much in common with all groups, the least likely to indicate that they have nothing in common with any group, and the most likely to mention Hispanics. Those with no high school degree are the most likely to say they have nothing in common with any group and the least likely to mention Hispanics or Asians.

While still fairly far off the mark, college-educated respondents have the most accurate estimates of the racial and ethnic profile of the U.S. population. They think there are more Whites and fewer of each minority group than each of the less educated groups do. Conversely, those with less than a high school education are the most inaccurate, producing the highest overestimates of the size of each minority group. The college educated also give the lowest estimates of the share of the population racially mixed (40 percent) while the least educated give the highest figure (47 percent). The college educated report that their local communities have more Whites and Jews and fewer American Indians, Blacks, or Hispanics than the less educated report. The least educated generally report the highest share of American Indians, Blacks, and Hispanics. The share of Asians reported in local communities does not vary by educational level.

College-educated respondents believe that Whites, Blacks, and Jews will have the smallest population gains over the next twenty-five

years, while those without a high school degree see the smallest increases for Hispanics and Asians. The college educated are the least worried about population shifts. Only 12 percent think these represent a bad thing compared to 28 percent of the least educated.

Education has a complex relationship with language policies. The college educated see the most value in learning a second language, and those with a high school education are the least convinced that students should learn another language. (Analysis suggests that opposition is not highest among the least educated because of the number of immigrants in this educational level.) The college educated are also the least likely to believe that English unites all Americans and that English is threatened by the use of other languages. The most and least educated are less likely to favor English-only ballots (29 percent), while those with a high school degree and some college are more in favor of English-only ballots (37-38 percent). Those with no high school degree are the least likely to want English as the official language (64 percent), while among those with high school degrees or some college most back this idea (75-76 percent).

College-educated respondents are without exception the least worried about immigration. They are less in favor of decreasing the level of immigration than the less educated are (29 percent vs. 43-49 percent) and find immigrants creating fewer social and economic problems. For example, 56 percent of the college educated think immigrants cause more crime vs. 76-77 percent of those with no college, and 41 percent feel that national unity is harmed by immigrants vs. 61 percent of the least educated thinking this. However, support for assimilation vs. pluralism varies little by educational level with 33-35 percent of all groups favoring assimilation.

In sum, intergroup contact and tolerance are greatest among those with college degrees. The least interaction and acceptance are usually found among those without a high school degree, but on some dimensions such as language and immigration, high school graduates are the least positive (because immigrants and most minorities are

overrepresented among the least educated). Likewise, non-English use and immigration are most accepted by the college educated.

Region

Regions vary greatly in the size and mixture of the various racial and ethnic groups living in them and in the respondents' responses to these groups (Table 18).

Except regarding Whites and Blacks, Southern respondents report the lowest levels of contributions from all ethnoracial and religious groups. The highest levels of contributions are generally seen by respondents in regions where the groups are most concentrated. For example, Western respondents rate the three Asian groups, Mexicans, and Muslims the highest, while Northeastern respondents give more credit to Puerto Ricans, Italians, and (surprisingly) Cubans. Respondents in the Midwest rate the contributions of the Irish, Blacks, and Jews higher than respondents in other regions do.

Respondents' ethnic images do not notably vary across regions. When regional differences do occur, Westerners typically have the most positive images of minorities. They are relatively more likely to believe that all minorities have strong families, that Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are harder-working, that Blacks are not violence-prone, and that Asians are intelligent. The most negative judgments on these dimensions and groups come from the South and Northeast.

Respondents in the West and Northeast are most likely to accept intermarriage and residential integration with almost all minority groups; Southerners are least likely to accept such contact. For example, 23 percent of respondents in the Northeast object to Hispanic neighbors and 11 percent frown on a close relative marrying a Hispanic, but opposition in the South to Hispanic residential integration and intermarriage is 30-31 percent.

White respondents in the West want the most diversified neighborhoods, while those in the South select the fewest from each minority group.

There are no regional differences in level of minority contact with Whites, but contact among minorities differs by region. In general, the more members of a minority in an area, the more contact there is with that minority. Out-group members in the West have more contact of almost every type with both Asians and Hispanics than out-group members in other regions do. Those in the Northeast have the most contact with Jews. Except for relatives, where there are no regional variations, and school contacts, non-Blacks in the South have higher contact with Blacks than do non-Blacks in other regions.

White respondents in the West are more likely than those in other regions to feel they have the most in common with Hispanics and less likely to think they have the least in common with Hispanics. White respondents in the Northeast are more likely than those elsewhere to say they have the most in common with Jews and equal ties to all other minorities and the least likely to say that they have the least in common with Jews and Asians. White Midwesterners are more likely to mention Asians as the group they have both the most and the least in common with. White Southerners feel closer to Whites and Blacks and are also more likely to say that they have the least in common with Jews and Blacks than those in other regions say.

Respondents in the West estimate the highest national shares for Whites, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians; have the lowest estimates for Blacks; and are in the middle on estimates of Jews. Respondents in the Northeast have the highest national estimates for Jews and are in between for other groups. Midwestern respondents are intermediate on all population estimates. Southerners have the top estimate for Blacks, the lowest for Asians, Hispanics, and American Indians, and are in between on Whites. Estimates of the mixed-race population do not vary much by region, but the Northeast has the lowest and the Midwest the highest figure.

The West predicts the most Asian growth and the least growth for Whites and Blacks. The Northeast projects the least Hispanic increase and is intermediate for the other groups. The Midwest fore-

sees the most rapid growth for Whites, Jews, and Hispanics and is in between for Blacks and Asians. The South has the highest growth expectations for Blacks among the regions and the lowest for Asians and Jews. The South most rates future population changes as a bad thing (25 percent) compared to the smallest complaint in the Northeast (11 percent).

Respondents' attitudes toward language use do not change much across regions. The South is somewhat more for English being the official language, feeling that English unites the country, and disagreeing that learning a foreign language is as valuable as math and science. The West and Northeast lean more toward multilingualism.

Immigration is most suspect in the South and most approved of in the Northeast and West. For example, 47 percent of Southern respondents want to decrease immigration vs. 38.5 percent of respondents in the Northeast and West. Sixty-seven percent of Southern respondents think native-born Americans lose jobs to immigrants compared to 48 percent of Western respondents and 53 percent of Northeastern. The South also gives more support for minority groups assimilating into the majority culture than other regions do.

In sum, the South is consistently the least open to minority groups and pluralism. Usually the West is most accepting of ethnic and racial minorities and of changes associated with multiculturalism, but sometimes the Northeast leads in intergroup tolerance. The Midwest is almost always in the middle on these issues.

Community Type

Respondents who reside in large central cities, suburbs, small towns, and rural areas live in substantially different Americas. This was illustrated by the sharp geographic divisions in the 2000 presidential election and also shows up clearly regarding attitudes and behaviors relating to intergroup relations (Table 19).

Respondents living in suburbs of large cities on average see more contributions from more groups, while respondents in rural areas find

the least contributions overall. The only groups not ranked at or near the bottom by rural residents are two groups with long-term presence, the English and the Irish. Residents of the largest central cities have very mixed views on the relative contributions of groups. They report higher contributions by Blacks, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Muslims than other respondents do, lower contributions by the English, Italians, and Irish (the longest-term European groups), and are intermediate on Asians, Mexicans, and Jews.

Ethnic images are almost always most negative among respondents in rural areas. The most sanguine views of minorities typically come from those who live in large or medium central cities. In a few instances those in suburbs have the most favorable opinion of minorities (e.g., on Asian commitment to families and intelligence and on Jews' not being violence-prone).

Preferences about living and intermarrying with out-groups do not vary greatly by community type. The largest and most consistent difference is that respondents in rural areas are much more likely to object to a relative marrying a Black (42 percent) or a Hispanic (29 percent) than are respondents in large central cities (object to Black = 17 percent; to Hispanic = 12 percent).

White respondents in rural areas prefer fewer minority neighbors than do Whites in large central cities, who back the most of all minority groups (except for Asians, who are most favored by Whites in medium central cities). In addition, those in large central cities are the most likely to volunteer that ethnicity and race do not matter (7 percent), while no one from rural areas brought up this idea.

Respondents' intergroup contacts are usually least in rural areas and highest in medium central cities and suburbs. This pattern is always true for contact with Jews, always leans in this direction for Hispanics (but sometimes is not statistically significant), and occurs in several instances for Asians and Blacks. But for Asians and Blacks the relationship sometimes flips, and the lowest contact levels are found in large central cities. For example, non-Asians are least likely

to work with an Asian in rural areas, but least likely to feel close to or have an Asian relative in large central cities. On the one hand, the more diverse populations of large cities facilitates contact, but both ethnic and racial segregation within large cities and the anomie of urban life discourage contact. The highest contact is often in medium central cities or suburbs of large cities. Contact with Jews is always highest in suburbs of large cities. For other groups it is mostly split between the medium central cities and the suburbs.

Feelings of having the most/least in common with out-groups varies in complex ways by community type. White respondents in suburbs are more likely than those living elsewhere to say they have the most in common with Jews (32 percent); rural respondents are the least likely to feel this commonality (3 percent). Blacks are viewed as having the most in common by Whites in small cities and the least in common by Whites in large central cities. For Hispanics, the most in common is seen by Whites in medium central cities and the least by Whites in the suburbs of large cities. Asians are mentioned most by Whites in suburbs and least by Whites in large central cities.

Estimates of group sizes do not vary greatly by community type, and estimates of the mixed-race population show no statistically significant differences.

Respondents in rural areas believe that the White and Black populations will grow more than those in other areas do. Suburban respondents project the highest population growth for Jews, Hispanics, and Asians. Those in large central cities see the lowest growth for Whites, Blacks, Jews, and Hispanics. In evaluating the projected changes in population, rural respondents are more prone to see them as a bad thing (26 percent), while only 10 percent of those in large central cities consider the changes bad.

Respondents in rural areas are consistently the most pro-English. Support for the use of other languages is usually highest in central cities, but sometimes approval is greater in the suburbs.

Rural respondents are also the most opposed to immigration;

most support for immigration is almost always found in central cities. These differences are often quite large. For example, 61 percent of rural respondents want to reduce immigration from Latin America vs. only 32-33 percent of those in central cities. Likewise, 74 percent of rural respondents believe that the native-born will lose jobs to immigrants compared to just 46 percent of those in large central cities. On assimilation, the pattern is a little different, with support for blending greatest in large suburbs (41 percent) and rural areas (40 percent) and lowest in large central cities (23 percent).

In sum, rural respondents are the least open to accepting racial and ethnic minorities and the hallmarks of multiculturalism—non-English-language use, immigration, and cultural pluralism. Those in large central cities are generally most accepting, but in a number of cases the suburbs are the most open. In particular, intergroup contact is often greater in the suburbs, with the lowest contact either in large central cities or rural areas.

Religion

America is even more diverse in its religions than it is in race and ethnicity. Unfortunately, the faiths are so many and often so small that few can be individually examined. It is possible, however, to examine the intergroup views and behaviors of five major religious groups: Protestants, Catholics, Jews, those with no religion, and Others (those in other religions—e.g., Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, Hinduism) (Table 20).

Except for two of the heavily Catholic ethnicities (Italians and Mexicans), Catholic respondents are the least likely to see important contributions from all groups. Jews and Others are the most likely to see groups as making contributions. Jews generally have the highest rating of older immigrant groups (Europeans and Blacks), and Others lead in the evaluations of newer groups (Asians and Hispanics). Protestants and those with no religion are in the middle.

Jews uniformly have the most positive ethnic images of all

groups on all dimensions except that Others rate Asians more positively on the violence measure. Catholics have the most negative images of Blacks. No religion has a consistently negative view of Hispanics, with Protestants, Catholics, and Others being the least favorable on different dimensions. Evaluations of Jews vary little by religion. Protestants and Catholics have the lowest images of Asians.

Acceptance of intermarriage and residential integration is greatest among those with no religion, Jews, and Others and lowest among Protestants and Catholics. For example, 19 percent of Jews vs. 34 percent of Catholics object to having Black neighbors. Likewise, 13 percent of Others compared to 41 percent of Protestants are against a close relative marrying a Black.

Among Whites, those with no religion prefer the fewest White neighbors and the most of each minority race and ethnicity. They are virtually tied with Catholics in saying that the race and ethnicity of neighbors does not matter. However, most differences are small.

Intergroup contact does not vary much across religions. Those differences that do emerge form no general pattern across groups or venues. Among non-Whites, Protestants have more contact with Whites at work than other religions do. Among non-Blacks, Jews know more Blacks than those in other faiths do, and those in Other religions and Jews are more likely to feel close to a Black person. Among non-Jews, those with no religion are most likely to know a Jew from their local community, and those with no religion and Others are most prone to feel close to a Jew. Among non-Hispanics, Jews report the highest level of knowing and feeling close to an Hispanic. Among non-Asians, Others and Jews report the most familiarity.

Jews are the most likely to say they have much in common with all groups except Hispanics. Of all religions, Jews are the least likely to feel they have things in common with Hispanics. The Others are the most prone to see common bonds with Hispanics and the least with Blacks or Jews. Others and those with no religion see less in common with Asians than other religions do. Protestants and Catholics are in

the middle in evaluations of each group.

Jews are the most accurate in estimating the size of all groups in the United States and also have the lowest figure for those with mixed-race backgrounds. Protestants underestimate Whites the most and most overestimate the proportion Black. Catholics have the highest estimates for Jews, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians. Those with no religion give the highest figure for mixed race.

There are no statistically significant differences in future population growth of groups. Others are least likely to see changes as a bad thing (12 percent) and Jews the most likely to do so (25 percent). This in large part comes from concerns about Jewish population decline.

The Others and, to a lesser extent, those with no religion are the least pro-English, while the Protestants are almost always the most for English. For example, 64 percent of Others and 76 percent of Protestants believe that English unites America. Likewise, 78 percent of Protestants and 60 percent of those with no religion are for making English the official language.

Jews and Others are the most in favor of immigration and Protestants consistently the least in favor of it. Catholics and those without any religion are intermediate. For example, 74 percent of Protestants think that immigrants increase the crime rate vs. only 51-52 percent of Jews and Others. Likewise, 46 percent of Protestants want less immigration compared to 36 percent of Others. In addition, Protestants are more for assimilation (37 percent) than are Jews (26 percent) or Others (20 percent).

In sum, religion does not usually sharply differentiate people on ethnicity, race, and multiculturalism, and the various faiths do not consistently line up on intergroup contact and attitudes. Jews and Others are typically more accepting of minority groups and of non-English use, immigration, and cultural pluralism, but the greatest opposition is scattered across Protestants, Catholics, and nones and varies by dimension.

Trends

Virtually across the board Americans have become more tolerant in their views on intergroup relations, more supportive of racial and ethnic equality, and more accepting of immigration (Bobo and Kluegel, 1997; Schuman et al., 1997; Smith, 1993, 1994, 1996; Smith and Dempsey, 1984).

Opposition to intermarriage across various racial and ethnic lines fell by about half during the 1990s (Table 21). For example, while 64 percent of non-Blacks objected to a close relative marrying a Black in 1990, opposition dropped to 32 percent in 2000. Likewise, support among Whites for antimiscegenation laws declined from 36 percent in 1972 to just 11 percent in 2000 (Table 25).

Dislike of living in a neighborhood with majorities from various racial and ethnic minorities notably declined during the 1990s (Table 22). While 46 percent of non-Blacks objected to living with Blacks in 1990, only 28 percent did in 2000. Objections to Hispanic neighbors fell from 43 percent to 27 percent, Asian neighbors from 35 percent to 18 percent, and Jewish neighbors from 14 percent to 9 percent.

Negative ethnic images about Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians declined over the last decade (Table 23). The proportion seeing these groups as lazier, more violence-prone, and less intelligent than Whites all substantially decreased. For example, in 1990 59 percent of Americans thought that Blacks were less hardworking than Whites and this fell to 43 percent in 2000. Likewise, in 1990 50 percent believed that Hispanics were more violence-prone than Whites compared to 40 percent in 2000. Similarly, 39 percent considered Asians as less intelligent than Whites in 1990, but only 26 percent did so in 2000. There were also some modest declines in images of these groups as poorer than Whites.

Images of Jews changed relatively little during this period, but tended to become less positive. In at least one case, the decline in the

idea that Jews are richer than Whites (from 46 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2000) actually represents an improvement, since this image contributes to resentment of the “overly successful” Jews (Smith, 1994, 1996).

Over time, Whites have become less likely to give illiberal explanations for the socioeconomic disadvantages that Blacks suffer (Table 24). While 25 percent of Whites mentioned less in-born ability as a reason for the disparities in 1977, only 9-12 percent did so in 1996-2000. Likewise, White mentions of Blacks having less willpower or motivation declined from 61 percent in 1977 to 43-47 percent in 1998-2000. Whites also decreased their mentions of liberal explanations, but to a lesser degree than the drop in illiberal reasons (discrimination from 40 percent to 30-31 percent and less education from 50 percent to 41-42 percent). Blacks showed no clear trends in their mentions of illiberal explanations, but did mention both discrimination and lower education less frequently than they used to.

Whites and Blacks have increasingly rejected the idea that Blacks should not “push themselves where they’re not wanted” (Table 25). Throughout the 1970s, 70-72 percent agreed with that sentiment, but in 1996-2000 only 38-40 percent felt this way. Likewise, Black agreement dropped from 48 percent in 1980 to 33-35 percent in the 1990s.

Relatively few people want the government to take special steps like affirmative action or government spending targeting Blacks to address the problem of racial inequality. Three measures dealing with affirmative action currently show 16-19 percent of the public backing such policies; support has either remained stable or declined slightly over time (Table 26). Likewise, on two measures of government spending to help Blacks, 33-38 percent of the public presently want to see an increase in these efforts; here too public opinion has been pretty stable over the last several decades. Of eleven government spending areas asked about from 1973 to 2000, “improving the conditions of Blacks” almost always ranked seventh; of twenty spending

areas asked about from 1984 to 2000, “assistance to Blacks” consistently finished in fifteenth place (Smith, 2001).

Opposition to immigrants has moderated over the last decade (Table 27). In 1994, 62 percent wanted to decrease the number of immigrants, and this fell to 42 percent in 2000. Likewise, those believing that immigrants undermine national unity dropped from 69 percent in 1994 to 53 percent in 2000, and support for the idea that immigrants undermine economic growth declined from 64 percent in 1994 to 47 percent in 2000. There has also been a small decline in the idea that racial and ethnic groups should blend into the dominant culture (from 38 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 2000).

In sum, support for explicit programs of racial discrimination and segregation receded to small levels, negative images about group characteristics and the causes of intergroup disparities have diminished, and the desire to retain barriers between groups has declined. In addition, opposition to immigration and pessimistic judgments about the impact of immigrants on society have fallen sharply. However, not changed is support for policies to reduce socioeconomic gaps between Blacks and Whites.

Summary

Intergroup Comparisons

Among the ethnic and racial groups that this study focused on—Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Jews—there is a clear social hierarchy. The White majority is the advantaged group, not only because of their higher socioeconomic status and numerical superiority, but also because of their greater acceptance by nonmembers of their group. For example, White ethnic groups, especially the English, are rated as having made the most contributions to society; Whites in general and Jews are rated the most positively on most traits; few non-Whites and non-Jews object to Whites and Jews as

neighbors and relatives through marriage; and Whites are the most frequently mentioned by minorities as the group they have the most in common with.

While Jews are generally rated favorably along with other Whites, there are a few dimensions on which people do distinguish between the two groups. While Whites feel that they have more in common with Jews than with other minorities, few Blacks or Hispanics believe they have much in common with Jews. Moreover, less than a third of non-Jews report contact with Jews from school, the local community, or at work or feeling close to a Jew.

Blacks are on balance the least socially accepted group. On the positive side, many acknowledge that Blacks have made important contributions to America, and Blacks have more intergroup contact than other minorities have. But ethnic images of Blacks are generally more negative than those of other groups; fewer people want to accept Blacks as neighbors or as relatives; and intergroup contact as relatives is rare. In addition, non-Blacks who see the Black share of the future population as increasing a lot tend to view population shifts as a "bad thing."

Hispanics are seen as having made modest contributions to American society. People have negative ethnic images about Hispanics on all dimensions except commitment to strong families. They are viewed in the most negative light regarding intelligence, and are rated second to the bottom ahead of only Blacks in terms of industriousness, violence proneness, and commitment to strong families and fair and equal treatment of all groups. Likewise, objections to intermarriage and residential integration are second highest behind Blacks. Intergroup contact with Hispanics is limited, with only 35 percent of non-Hispanics feeling close to an Hispanic and just 11 percent knowing an Hispanic as a relative.

Asians are seen as having made more contributions to American society than Hispanics (but less than Whites or Blacks). Images of Asians are positive in regard to hard work, violence proneness, and

commitment to families, and Asians are rated above Blacks and Hispanics on all dimensions. Likewise, there is less objection to residential integration or intermarriage with Asians than with Blacks or Hispanics. But Asians are relatively isolated from non-Asians. Only 22-36 percent of non-Asians know an Asian from school, the local community, or work; only 25 percent feel close to an Asian; and just 7 percent have an Asian relative. This low level of interaction contributes to Asians being mentioned by Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics as the group they each have the least in common with.

Multiculturalism

Americans have very mixed views on multiculturalism. In terms of language use, large majorities back English being made the official language of the United States and see it as a unifying force, but only a third or less believe English is threatened by other languages or that non-English ballots and bilingual education should be prohibited. In addition, substantial majorities endorse the merit of foreign languages being taught in school. On immigration the public is evenly split between those who want the level of immigrants to remain at current levels vs. those favoring a reduction. People also tend to see more negative than positive consequences resulting from more immigration. On whether ethnic groups should maintain their own distinct cultures or blend into the larger society, public opinion is nearly evenly split into three groups with about a third favoring assimilation, pluralism, or both equally.

Sociodemographics

Americans are not of one mind or one experience when it comes to intergroup relations and contacts. While men and women differ little in their views, sharp differences appear with age cohort, education, region, community type, and, to a lesser extent, religion. In general, acceptance of other groups and unease over multiculturalism is most

concentrated in segments of society that represent traditional America—those sixty-five and over, the less educated, rural residents, and Southerners—while acceptance is greatest among those oriented toward the emerging future—younger adults, the college educated, those in the West and Northeast, and residents of large metropolitan areas.

Trends

America has been undergoing some notable population shifts in its ethnoracial and religious composition and has seen major increases in the level of immigrants and in the use of languages other than English. Even more massive than the demographic diversification are the changes in intergroup tolerance. Antipathy among groups is declining as ethnic images become less negative and preference barriers to intergroup contact decline. Attitudes toward all minority groups have become more favorable in recent years.¹¹ Likewise, opposition to immigration and concerns about the consequences of more immigrants have moderated.

But these important changes do not mean that Americans have become committed to achieving intergroup equality. Support for policies such as affirmative action and for government spending that targets minorities is low and has not increased during the last generation. Policies that are based on the premise of group rights or that propose to compensate disadvantaged minorities are not popular and are not gaining ground.

Nor does the notable progress mean that intergroup intolerance has been eliminated. Negative ethnic images remain common, intergroup interaction is still limited, and concerns about multiculturalism in general and immigration in particular are still high. Moreover,

¹¹On trends toward Jews, see Smith, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996. On Blacks, see Bobo, 1997; Bobo and Kluegel, 1997; Schuman et al., 1997. On groups in general, see Smith, 1998, 2000.

minority groups are still quite disadvantaged compared to the White majority and frequently suffer from overt ethnic and racial discrimination (Feagin and Sikes, 1994; Sears and Jessor, 1996; Smith, 2000; St. Jean and Feagin, 1998, 1999).

Conclusion

America was founded on certain noble ideals. As Lincoln noted, the nation was “conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” But Lincoln spoke these words in 1863 on the battlefield of Gettysburg just nine months after his Emancipation Proclamation went into effect but eighty-seven years after Jefferson first penned the idea. And so down to the present America has struggled to live up to the ennobling principles on which the country was formed. It has been a long and slow process with periods of retrenchment and stagnation periodically broken by forward movement at “all deliberate speed.” But despite the tardiness and incompleteness of the progress, there have been real gains and achievements toward turning our ideals into realities.

As America has become a more diverse society, the goals of intergroup tolerance and equality have not got any easier to reach, but the need to reach them has become ever more necessary. As this report has revealed, there is still considerable ground to cover before our practices catch up with our principles.

References

- Allport, Gordon. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Apostle, Richard A., Charles Y. Glock, Thomas Piazza, and Marijean Suelzle. 1983. *The Anatomy of Racial Attitudes*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bettelheim, Bruno, and Morris Janowitz. 1964. *Social Change and Prejudice*. New York: The Free Press.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. 1997. “The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream—Race Relations in America at the Close of the 20th Century.” In *Civil Rights and*

- Social Wrongs: Black-White Relations Since World War II*, edited by John Higham. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Bobo, Lawrence, and James R. Kluegel. 1997. "Status, Ideology, and Dimensions of Whites' Racial Beliefs and Attitudes: Progress and Stagnation." In *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change*, edited by Steven A. Tuch and Jack R. Martin. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Press.
- Davis, James A., Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden. 2001. *General Social Survey, 1972-2000: Cumulative Codebook*. Chicago: NORC.
- Ellison, Christopher G., and Daniel A. Powers. 1994. "The Contact Hypothesis and Racial Attitudes among Black Americans." *Social Science Quarterly* 75: 385-400.
- El Nasser, Haya. 2001. "Segregation Still Touches Minorities Where They Live." *USA Today*, April 4, p. 2A.
- Farley, Reynolds, and William H. Frey. 1994. "Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks during the 1980s: Small Steps Towards a More Integrated Society." *American Sociological Review* 59: 23-45.
- Feagin, Joe R., and Melvin P. Sikes. 1994. *Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Firebaugh, Glenn, and Kenneth E. Davis. 1988. "Trends in Antiblack Prejudice, 1972-1984: Region and Cohort Effects," *American Journal of Sociology* 94: 251-272.
- Grieco, Elizabeth M., and Rachel C. Cassidy. 2001. "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin." *Census 2000 Brief*. Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, March.
- Harris, David R. 2001. "Why Are Whites and Blacks Averse to Black Neighbors?" *Social Science Research* 30: 100-116.
- Highton, Benjamin, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1992. "Estimating the Size of Minority Groups." *Report to National Election Studies Board of Overseers*, January 23.
- Jackman, Mary R. 1973. "Education and Prejudice or Education and Response-Set." *American Sociological Review* 38: 327-339.
- Jackman, Mary R. 1994. *The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jackman, Mary R., and Marie Crane. 1986. "'Some of My Best Friends Are Black...': Interracial Friendships and Whites' Racial Attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50: 459-486.
- Massey, Douglas, and Nancy A. Denton. 1994. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Matthews, Donald R., and James W. Prothro. 1966. *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
- Nadeau, Richard, and Richard G. Niemi. 1995. "Educated Guesses: The Processing of Answering Factual Knowledge Questions in Surveys." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59: 323-346.
- Nadeau, Richard, Richard G. Niemi, and Jeffrey Levine. 1993. "Immuneracy

- about Minority Populations." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57: 332-347.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998. "Intergroup Contact Theory." *Annual Review of Psychology* 49: 65-85.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1971. *Racially Separated or Together?* New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Powers, Daniel A., and Christopher G. Ellison. 1995. "Interracial Contact and Black Racial Attitudes: The Contact Hypothesis and Selectivity Bias." *Social Forces* 74: 205-226.
- Schuman, Howard, and John Harding. 1964. "Prejudice and the Norm of Rationality." *Sociometry* 27: 353-371.
- Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan. 1997. *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Sears, David O., and Tom Jessor. 1996. "Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes: The Role of White Racism." *Social Science Quarterly* 77: 751-759.
- Selznick, Gertrude J., and Stephen Steinberg. 1969. *The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Sigelman, Lee, Timothy Bledsoe, Susan Welch, and Michael W. Combs. 1996. "Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban Setting." *American Journal of Sociology* 101: 1306-1332.
- Smith, Tom W. 1991a. "Ethnic Images." *GSS Topical Report No. 19*. Chicago: NORC.
- Smith, Tom W. 1991b. *What Do Americans Think about Jews?*. New York: American Jewish Committee.
- Smith, Tom W. 1993. "Actual Trends or Measurement Artifacts? A Review of Three Studies of Anti-Semitism." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57: 380-393.
- Smith, Tom W. 1994. *Trends in Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America*. New York: American Jewish Committee.
- Smith, Tom W. 1996. "Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America: A Review." *Research in Micropolitics* 5: 125-178.
- Smith, Tom W. 1998. "Intergroup Relations in Contemporary America: An Overview of Survey Research." In *Intergroup Relations in the United States: Research Perspectives*, edited by Wayne Winborne and Renae Cohen. New York: The National Conference for Community and Justice.
- Smith, Tom W. 1999. "Measuring Inter-racial Friendships: Experimental Comparisons." *GSS Methodological Report No. 91*. Chicago: NORC.
- Smith, Tom W. 2000. *Taking America's Pulse: NCCJ's 2000 Survey of Intergroup Relations in the United States*. New York: National Conference for Community and Justice.
- Smith, Tom W. 2001. "Trends in National Spending Priorities, 1973-2000." Unpublished NORC report.
- Smith, Tom W. Forthcoming. "Aspects of Measuring Race: Race by Observation vs. Self-Reports and Multiple Mentions of Ethnicity and Race." *GSS Methodological Report No. 93*. Chicago: NORC.

- Smith, Tom W., and Glen Dempsey. 1984. "Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47: 584-600.
- Steeh, Charlotte, and Howard Schuman. 1992. "Young White Adults: Did Racial Attitudes Change in the 1980s?" *American Journal of Sociology* 98: 340-367.
- St. Jean, Yanick, and Joe R. Feagin. 1998. "The Family Cost of White Racism: The Case of African American Families." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 29: 297-312.
- St. Jean, Yanick, and Joe R. Feagin. 1999. *Double Burden: Black Women and Everyday Racism*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
- Yinger, John. 1995. *Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Cost of Housing Discrimination*. New York: Russell Sage.

Appendix: Measuring Ethnic Images

In our examination of ethnic images, we use "ethnic" as a general term to cover the five groups under examination (Whites, Jews, Blacks, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans), which are defined partly by race, religion, and nationality. We utilize "images" rather than stereotypes or prejudices since we wish to avoid some of the baggage that is frequently associated with one or both of these terms. For example, stereotypes and prejudice are often assumed to contain a component of irrationality, including such fallacies as causal misattribution, improper generalization, excessive categorization, and rejecting or ignoring counterevidence (Allport, 1953; Schuman and Harding, 1964; Jackman, 1973). These traits may well be part of the images we measure here, but we have no direct tests of that and therefore cannot assume that irrationality is a notable element in our measures. Furthermore, stereotypes are also sometimes seen as projections of psychological states (e.g., as either Id or Superego based) and we do not wish to adopt this formulation (Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1950; Pettigrew, 1971). Thus, ethnic images are beliefs that people have about cultural groups (and their members) in general and in particular beliefs about group characteristics and attributes.

To measure ethnic images we developed a question that (1) reduced the likelihood of giving offense, (2) facilitated the reporting of group characterizations, (3) permitted the expression of both positive and negative attributions, (4) allowed comparisons across various groups, and (5) included both in- and out-group evaluations of the reference groups. Both the general survey literature on social desirability and self-presentation effects and the specific literature on prejudice and stereotypes suggested that special care had to be taken in devising questions on ethnic images.

First, we avoided declarative statements of negative attributions as had often been used in the past (e.g., "The trouble with Jewish

businessmen is that they are so shrewd and tricky that other people don't have a fair chance in competition" and "Generally speaking, Negroes are lazy and don't like to work hard" [Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Smith, 1990]). The problem with using such statements is partly that their offensive nature may lead to a loss of rapport or even a breakoff. In addition, because of offensiveness such statements were frequently not asked of the in-group members themselves, thus losing the ability to compare in- and out-group images.

Second, declarative statements discourage the reporting of groups' differences because of their violation of norms of politeness and their often absolutist phrasing. Third, we wanted to allow the comparison of several groups on various image dimensions. Some formulations have avoided the problems of offensive declarations by asking whether Blacks or Whites were more likely to have some attribute (Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelzle, 1983; Matthews and Prothro, 1966), but this approach does not readily facilitate multigroup comparisons. Fourth, we wanted to allow people to express positive as well as negative feelings toward a group. Because of their apparent repercussions (discrimination, minority persecution, etc.), negative stereotypes have been given more attention than more general group depictions covering negative, neutral, and positive evaluations. This focus is clearly unbalanced and ignores that fact that many groups are rated positively on at least some dimensions.

To achieve these goals, we developed an instrument that asked people to rate whether people in the designated group were mostly closer to one or the other of two polar statements (e.g., Rich/Poor). (See Table 2 for the complete wordings.) The opposing images were fixed at points 1 and 7 with intermediate points at 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Point 4 is defined as meaning "you think that the group is not toward one end or another." This allowed people to place a group at any point along the continuum. It also allowed the study of the comparative positioning of groups by studying where people rated one group vs. other groups.

In our analysis of ethnic images, we took the rating that people gave Whites and subtracted from it the score they gave each of the other four groups. For example, if a person rated Whites as 3 on wealth and rated Jews as 2 and Blacks as 5, we calculated a Jewish wealth difference score of +1 and a Black score of -2. Scores could range from +6 to -6 (although because Whites were usually rated near the middle, few maximum difference scores actually occurred). For each characteristic, we coded the dimension so that a positive score meant that a group was rated closer to the positive image (Rich, Hardworking, Not Violence-Prone, Intelligent, Committed to Strong Families, Committed to Intergroup Tolerance) than Whites were and a negative score meant that a group was rated more toward the negative images than Whites were.

We chose to use difference scores between the ratings of Whites and the various other ethnic groups primarily because we were interested in the comparative positioning and advantages that groups were seen as having. In addition, while the difference scores and absolute ratings were substantially correlated, with correlations usually in the .5-.8 range, the difference scores seemed to perform somewhat better as predictors (Smith, 1990). When we correlated the absolute and difference scores with measures of racial interactions, racial attitudes, and national images, we found that the difference scores generally had slightly higher correlations than the absolute scores (higher in 63 of 95 correlations). For a similar use of a difference scale see Jackman and Crane, 1986. For more information on the ethnic images scale see Smith, 1990.

Table 1
Perceived Contributions of Groups to America

	Most important	Important	Some	Little	DK
English	29.5%	41.7%	19.2%	2.7%	6.9%
Jews	10.5	42.1	31.9	5.3	10.2
Blacks	8.1	40.1	34.9	10.5	6.4
Irish	7.7	40.0	35.7	7.2	9.5
Japanese	7.4	32.7	35.7	13.5	10.8
Italians	6.8	41.5	37.8	5.4	8.6
Chinese	6.6	32.0	39.7	12.1	9.6
Mexicans	3.7	24.3	42.2	19.9	9.9
Puerto Ricans	2.6	15.7	41.9	26.4	13.4
Vietnamese	2.3	15.8	38.6	29.7	13.6
Muslims	2.3	14.5	34.6	29.2	19.4
Cubans	2.2	14.0	36.3	34.0	13.5
			1384-1393		

Source: 2000 GSS

Wording: Since the beginning of our country, people of many different races, nationalities, and religions have come here and settled. As I name some of these groups, please tell me if the group has made one of the most important positive contributions to this country, an important contribution, some contribution, or little positive contribution to this country.

Table 2A
Ethnic Images^a

Groups	Images					
	Rich/ Poor	Hard work/ Lazy	Violent/ Not	Intelli- gent/ Not	Strong families/ Not	Fair & equal/ Not
Blacks						
Mean	-1.56	-0.82	-0.65	-0.69	-0.65	-0.47
+	4.8	8.9	10.3	2.9	15.3	18.4
0	18.0	44.9	44.6	59.0	41.0	43.2
-	77.3	46.3	45.1	38.1	43.7	38.4
DK	4.1	5.3	5.9	6.2	5.7	6.1
Jews						
Mean	+0.26	+0.22	+0.49	+0.03	+0.47	+0.01
+	40.4	31.2	35.9	18.7	39.1	4.6
0	40.6	52.4	54.6	67.4	49.2	52.2
-	19.0	16.4	9.6	13.9	11.7	23.2
DK	13.9	13.7	14.1	12.2	12.8	14.5
Asians						
Mean	-0.45	+0.23	+0.22	-0.07	+0.39	-0.16
+	22.0	34.4	26.8	21.6	37.3	22.1
0	33.2	46.6	54.9	56.9	44.3	49.4
-	44.9	9.0	18.2	21.5	18.4	28.4
DK	10.8	11.4	12.6	11.4	3.1	15.2

Hispanics	-1.57	-0.29	-0.41	-0.74	+0.16	-0.30
Mean	6.6	22.3	14.6	3.3	33.8	22.1
+	14.8	43.0	47.1	54.4	40.7	43.9
0	78.5	34.7	38.3	42.3	25.5	34.0
-	7.9	9.5	10.1	9.9	9.8	11.3
DK						

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Now I have some questions about what different racial and ethnic groups are like. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are "rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is "poor." A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not toward one end or the other and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

- Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?
- Blacks?
- Jews?
- Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- Asian Americans?

In the second statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are "hardworking." A score of 7 means that you think that almost everyone in the group is "lazy." A score of 4 means that you think the group is not toward one end or the other and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

- Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?
- Blacks?
- Jews?
- Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- Asian Americans?

In the next statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are "intelligent." A score of 7 means that you think that almost everyone in the group is "unintelligent." A score of 4 means that you think the group is not toward one end or the other and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

- a. Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?
- b. Blacks?
- c. Jews?
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- e. Asian Americans?

In the next statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are "prone to violence." A score of 7 means that you think that almost everyone in the group is "not violence-prone." A score of 4 means that you think the group is not toward one end or the other and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

- a. Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?
- b. Blacks?
- c. Jews?
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- e. Asian Americans?

In the next statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group have a "commitment to strong families." A score of 7 means that you think that almost everyone in the group "lacks a commitment to strong families." A score of 4 means that you think the group is not toward one end or the other and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

- a. Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?
- b. Blacks?
- c. Jews?
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- e. Asian Americans?

In the next statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group have a "commitment to the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society." A score of 7 means that you think that almost everyone in the group "lacks a commitment to the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society." A score of 4 means that you think the group is not toward one end or the other and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

- a. Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?
- b. Blacks?
- c. Jews?
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- e. Asian Americans?

*The scores are based on subtracting the rate assigned to Blacks, Jews, Hispanics, and Asians from the White rate. All scales are scored so that the negative means that the minority group is rated as closer to the unfavorable characterization (poor, lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, not committed to strong families, and not committed to fair and equal treatment). Thus, if Whites were scored 4 on Rich/Poor and Blacks 5 the score on the wealth scale for Blacks would be -1.0.

The +, 0, and - distributions collapse the full range of possible scores which range from -6 to +6. DKs are excluded from the scale means and these collapsed distributions. The DK levels are reported separately in the table.

Table 2B
Ethnic Images by Race and Ethnicity^a

Images	Mean Difference Scores				
	Not				
	Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian
Rich/Poor					
Blacks	-0.72	0.74	-0.74	-0.64	-0.73
Jews	0.24	-0.12*	0.26	0.14	0.13*
Hispanics	-0.72	0.71	-0.72	-0.67	-0.78
Asians	-0.24	-0.11	-0.21	-0.29	-0.27
Hardworking/Lazy					
Blacks	-0.36	-0.50*	-0.42	-0.08	-0.45*
Jews	0.16	0.01*	0.16	0.14	0.20
Hispanics	-0.14	0.06*	-0.16	0.07	-0.29*
Asians	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.43*
Violence-Prone/Not					
Blacks	-0.34	-0.43	-0.39	-0.03	-0.61*
Jews	0.28	0.08*	0.27	0.31	0.05*
Hispanics	-0.23	-0.30	-0.28	0.06	-0.30*
Asians	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.22	0.11
Intelligent/Not					
Blacks	-0.34	-0.52*	-0.38	-0.09	-0.56*
Jews	0.06	-0.06	0.05	0.10	-0.15

Hispanics	-0.39	-0.36	-0.40	-0.27	-0.56*
Asians	0.01	-0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.08
Committed to Strong Families/Not					
Blacks	-0.28	-0.34	-0.31	-0.09	-0.25*
Jews	0.27	0.35	0.27	0.26	0.47
Hispanics	0.07	0.23*	0.07	0.11	0.53*
Asians	0.19	0.23	0.19	0.12	0.59*
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not					
Blacks	-0.18	-0.36*	-0.26	0.24	-0.40*
Jews	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.22	-0.15*
Hispanics	-0.13	-0.02	-0.16	0.18	-0.31*
Asians	-0.07	0.03	-0.09	0.14	-0.15*

Source: 2000 GSS

*Not Hispanic/Hispanic is one variable in which all respondents are classified into one of these two categories. Race is a second variable that includes the three races listed here as well as other races (e.g., American Indian and Pacific Islander) that are not shown because of small sample sizes. On the race variables Hispanics can appear among any of the racial categories.

* =statistically significant at the .05 level or greater.

Table 3
Social Distance to Groups

Reference group	Nongroup Members	
	% objecting to close relative marrying	% objecting to living in neighborhood with
Whites	8.6	6.0
Blacks	32.0	29.7
Jews	12.6	9.1
Hispanics	20.9	26.5
Asians	20.4	18.1

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Now I'm going to ask you about different types of contact with various groups of people. In each situation would you please tell me whether you would be very much in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very much opposed to it happening?

- Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Whites?
- What about in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors are Blacks?
- Jews?
- Hispanics or Latin Americans?
- Asian Americans?

Now I'm going to ask you about another type of contact with various groups of people. What about having a close relative marry a White person? Would you be very much in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very much opposed to it happening?

- b. What about having a close relative marry a Blacks person?
- c. A Jewish person?
- d. A Hispanic or Latin American person?
- e. An Asian American person?

Table 4
Preferred Racial/Ethnic Composition of Neighborhood

Neighbors	% of Neighbors Selected from Each Group					
	All	All (Missing omitted)	Whites only	Asns. only	Blks. only	Hsps. only
Asian	11.6	13.4	12.7	35.6	12.5	15.8
Black	16.7	19.2	16.2	13.4	39.7	16.5
Hispanic	12.6	14.5	13.5	14.7	14.0	33.0
White	43.1	49.4	54.4	36.3	28.1	32.4
Doesn't matter (VOL.)	3.1	3.5	3.2	0.0	5.8	2.3
Other (VOL.) ^a	0.9	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Missing	12.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	1398	1239	986	33	161	96

Source: 2000 GSS

Wording: Now I'd like you to imagine a neighborhood that had an ethnic and racial mix you personally would feel most comfortable in. Here is a blank neighborhood card, which depicts some houses that surround your own. Using the letters A for Asian, B for Black, H for Hispanic or Latin American, and W for White, please put a letter in each of these houses to represent your preferred neighborhood where you would most like to live. Please be sure to fill in all of the houses.

Note: Respondents were given a card showing their home (X) in the center and 14 neighboring homes as indicated below:

```

1  2  3  4  5
6  7  X  8  9
10 11 12 13 14

```

^aIncludes various miscellaneous mentions such as preferring no neighbors and mentions of other groups.

Table 5
Group Most/Least in Common With*

	Most	Least
A. Everyone		
Whites	20.3%	2.7%
Blacks	15.6	16.0
Jews	13.9	12.6
Hispanics	14.6	13.3
Asians	7.4	31.9
Equal in common with all	16.3	11.2
Nothing in common with any	6.5	5.0
DK	5.4	7.3
	1371	1363
B. Everyone, Self-Mentions Removed		
Whites	7.8%	1.8%
Blacks	16.4	15.9
Jews	16.7	12.8
Hispanics	15.5	13.3
Asians	8.3	32.4
Equal in common with all	20.4	11.4
Nothing in common with any	8.2	5.1
DK	6.7	7.4
	1098	1340

C. By Race and Ethnicity

	Whites		Blacks		Hispanics	
	Most	Least	Most	Least	Most	Least
Whites	----%	----%	33.1%	10.8%	32.9%	7.6%
Blacks	15.4	17.5	-----	-----	15.9	21.3
Jews	17.0	10.8	3.1	15.1	0.5	25.1
Hispanics	13.4	14.3	19.0	11.0	-----	-----
Asians	7.4	32.3	3.1	38.5	7.5	27.9
Equal in common with all	16.2	10.9	13.8	10.8	13.6	10.9
Nothing in common with any	6.4	4.7	8.3	.4	2.3	0.9
DK, named own	24.3	9.4	19.6	6.5	27.2	6.2
	1081	1074	79	178	117	116

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Of these groups—Whites, Blacks, Jews, Hispanics or Latin Americans, Asian Americans—if you had to say, which one (other than your own) do you feel you have the most in common with?

Of these groups—Whites, Blacks, Jews, Hispanics or Latin Americans, Asian Americans—if you had to say, which one (other than your own) do you feel you have the least in common with?

*Some people named their own group despite the instructions.

Table 6
Estimated Composition of U.S. Population

A. Everyone	Mean % estimated as ^a	% DK
Whites	59.0	3.6
Blacks/African Americans	1.3	3.9
Hispanics/Latin Americans	24.6	5.9
Jews	17.7	1.0
Asian Americans	17.7	7.3
American Indians	14.2	8.1
Racially mixed	43.3	5.0

B. By Race and Ethnicity	Mean % estimated as ^a			
	Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black
White	59.1	58.2	59.1	57.7
Black	31.0	35.3*	30.1	39.1
Hispanic	17.3	21.8*	16.8	24.0
Jewish	17.3	21.8*	16.8	24.0
Asian	16.8	27.5*	16.6	22.0
American Indian	13.6	20.7*	13.4	17.9
Mixed	42.7	49.3*	42.2	46.8

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Just your best guess, what percentage of the United States population is each group?

PERCENTAGES DO NOT HAVE TO ADD TO 100 PERCENT AND THE LISTED GROUPS MAY OVERLAP. ENCOURAGE ESTIMATES FOR ALL GROUPS, BUT DISCOURAGE RESPONDENTS REVISING THEIR ESTIMATES.

- a. Whites
- b. Blacks/African Americans
- c. Jews
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans
- e. Asian Americans
- f. American Indians

People may come from one racial group such as being White, Black/African American, Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian or people may come from two or more of these groups. What percent of the people in the United States today do you think have parents or their ancestors from two or more racial groups?

*With DKs excluded.

Table 7
Estimated Composition of Local Population

	Mean % estimated as . . . ^a	% DK
Whites	67.5	2.4
Blacks/African Americans	19.5	3.0
Hispanics/Latin Americans	14.2	4.6
Jews	7.1	10.4
Asian Americans	7.3	5.5
American Indians	4.8	6.7

Source: 2000 GSS

Wording: Just your best guess, what percentage of the people who live in your local community is in each group?

- a. Whites
- b. Blacks/African Americans
- c. Jews
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans
- e. Asian Americans
- f. American Indians

^aWith DKs excluded.

Table 8
Perceptions about Changes in Population Composition

A. Expected Future Changes		Increase a lot	Increase a little	Stay the same	Decrease a little	Decrease a lot	DK
Hispanics		45.7%	38.5%	8.4%	2.0%	0.9%	4.5%
Blacks		24.8	45.8	21.8	4.1	0.8	2.6
Asians		19.4	45.3	24.3	2.6	1.0	7.4
Whites		7.8	29.1	33.7	21.6	5.5	2.3
Jews		3.6	24.7	49.8	11.4	1.7	8.7
B. Expected Future Changes by Race and Ethnicity, % Increasing		Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian	
Hispanics		83.8%	88.5%	85.6%	72.8%	88.6%*	
Blacks		70.8	68.5	72.3	67.4	65.7*	
Asians		64.7	65.8	65.0	58.7	85.7*	
Whites		37.1	35.2	36.3	42.3	34.3*	
Jews		28.3	27.8	27.3	38.1	20.0*	
C. Assessment of Desirability of Future Changes							
Very good		3.4%					
Good		21.8					
Neither good nor bad		53.0					
Bad		14.6					
Very bad		3.8					
DK		3.4					

**D. Desirability of Changes
by Race and Ethnicity**

	Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian
Good+	23.0%	44.5%	21.7%	32.7%	40.0%
Neutral	54.4	42.5*	54.4	51.5	50.0*
Bad+	18.6	9.3	20.4	9.6	1.4
DK	4.0	3.7	3.5	6.2	8.6

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: In the next 25 years, which of these groups do you think will increase their share of the population by a lot, which will increase by a little, which will stay the same, which will decrease by a little, and which will decrease by a lot?

- a. Whites
- b. Blacks
- c. Jews
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans
- e. Asian Americans

When you think of these changes in the racial and ethnic make-up of the country in the next 25 years, do you think they will be a very good thing for the country, a good thing, neither good nor bad, a bad thing, or a very bad thing?

Table 9
Knowing and Contact with Various Groups

	% knowing personally	Nongroup Members % knowing...				% feel close to
		From school	From commun.	As relative	From work ^a	
Whites	93.0	58.6	73.8	43.8	86.8	67.0
Blacks	86.3	41.7	52.0	9.1	62.2	46.0
Jews	58.3	27.0	26.7	9.4	29.8	27.7
Hispanics	73.0	31.9	41.5	11.3	52.7	35.3
Asians	59.7	22.9	29.0	7.0	36.0	24.6

Source: 2000 GSS

Wording: Do you personally know any ...

- a. Whites
- b. Blacks
- c. Jews
- d. Hispanics or Latin Americans
- e. Asian Americans

Note: Whites were asked parts b-e, Blacks were asked parts a, c-e, Jews were asked parts a, b, d, e, Hispanics were asked parts a-c, e, and Asians were asked parts a-d.

Now I'm going to ask some questions about these people you personally know.

- a. Do you know any of these Whites/Blacks/Jews/Hispanics/Asians from when you went to school or college?
- b. Do you know any of these Whites/Blacks/Jews/Hispanics/Asians from the community where you now live?
- c. Do you know any of these Whites/Blacks/Jews/Hispanics/Asians as a relative?
- d. IF EMPLOYED: Do you know any of these Whites/Blacks/Jews/Hispanics/Asians from the place where you work?
- e. Are any of these Whites/Blacks/Jews/Hispanics/Asians people you feel close to?

Note: People asked about groups they did not belong to as in screening question on knowing group members.

*Based on employed people only.

Table 10
Attitudes toward Language Use and Bilingualism of Those
Supporting Pro-English or Antibilingual Position

A. Language-Use Policies						
English unites Americans		73.6%				
For English as official language		73.2				
Ballots should not be in other languages		34.1				
English threatened if immigrants use other languages		31.2				
Abolish bilingual education		21.8				
B. Value of Knowing Second Language						
Children should learn second language in school		73.7%				
Learning foreign language as valuable as math or science		62.4				
				1389-1394		
C. Language Issues by Race and Ethnicity		Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian
English unites Americans		74.8%	60.2%*	73.6%	77.3%	91.6%*
For English as official language		75.8	44.8*	75.1	70.7	74.6*
Ballots should not be in other languages		35.3	21.3*	36.6	23.3	21.1*
English threatened if immigrants use other langs.		32.1	21.8*	32.9	30.9	8.4*
Abolish bilingual education		22.9	10.2*	24.0	15.5	7.0*

Value of Knowing Second Language

Children should learn second language in school (Disagree)	25.4	12.0*	26.1	20.0	18.3*
Learning foreign lang. as valuable as math or sci. (Disagree)	36.7	17.8*	38.1	28.7	18.3*
	1271	117	1092	184	39

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Do you favor or oppose making English the official language of the United States?

Now please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following:

- Children in the U.S. should learn a second language fluently before they finish high school.
- Bilingual education programs should be eliminated in American schools.
- Speaking English as the common national language is what unites all Americans.
- Learning a foreign language is as valuable as learning math and science in school.
- English will be threatened if other languages are frequently used in large immigrant communities in the U.S.
- Election ballots should be printed in other languages in areas where lots of people don't speak English.

Table 11
Foreign Language Use and Exposure

A. Use	
Speaks No Foreign Language	73.3%
Foreign Languages Spoken	
Spanish	14.9
Other European languages	9.4
Asian languages	3.7
Middle Eastern languages	1.2
Other languages	1.1
Not specified	0.6
Fluency in Foreign Language	
Doesn't speak foreign language	73.3
Poor/Hardly at all	3.0
Not well	6.4
Well	6.3
Very well	10.0
Missing	1.1
Use of Foreign Language	
Doesn't speak foreign language	73.3
Never	5.4
Less than weekly	5.0
Once a week	1.7
Several times a week	2.4
Once a day	1.6

Several times a day 9.9
 Missing 0.7

Source of Foreign Language (Speakers Only)

Childhood home 50.4
 School 32.6
 Elsewhere 15.7
 Missing 1.3
 367

B. Exposure to Foreign Language

	Local Community	At Work
Never	26.5%	33.1%
Less than once a week	18.3	9.9
Once a week	10.5	8.6
Several times a week	18.8	13.4
Once a day	6.4	11.6
Several times a day	18.7	22.6
DK	0.8	0.8
	1383	936

Workers Only

	Community/Work Combined
Both never	13.6
Less than once a week	12.2
Once a week	10.4
Several times a week	16.8
Once a day	13.0
Several times a day	33.9
	940

C. Language-Use by Race and Ethnicity	Not	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian
	Hisp.	14.4%*	77.1%	87.5%	9.9%*
Speaks No Foreign Language	78.7%				
Foreign Languages Spoken					
Spanish	7.3	75.9	10.7	6.3	2.8
Other European languages	9.1	2.8	9.5	4.7	1.4
Asian languages	2.5	7.0*	0.5	0.0	83.1*
Middle Eastern languages	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.0
Other languages	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.9	1.4
Not specified	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.4
Fluency in Foreign Language					
Doesn't speak foreign language	78.7	14.4	77.1	87.5	9.9
Poor/Hardly at all	3.1	2.3	3.5	0.9	0.0
Not well	6.7	3.2*	6.9	2.7	0.0*
Well	5.2	18.5	5.8	4.8	15.5
Very well	5.5	59.3	5.5	3.2	71.8
Missing	0.9	2.3	1.1	0.9	2.8
Use of Foreign Language					
Doesn't speak foreign language	78.7	14.4	77.1	87.5	9.9
Never	5.6	3.2	5.9	3.3	1.4
Less than weekly	5.1	3.6	5.5	2.7	0.0
Once a week	1.5	3.7*	1.8	0.9	0.0
Several times a week	1.8	8.8	1.7	2.4	23.9
Once a day	1.3	4.6	1.8	0.0	0.0

Several times a day 9.9
 Missing 0.7

Source of Foreign Language (Speakers Only)

Childhood home 50.4
 School 32.6
 Elsewhere 15.7
 Missing 1.3
 367

B. Exposure to Foreign Language

	Local Community	At Work
Never	26.5%	33.1%
Less than once a week	18.3	9.9
Once a week	10.5	8.6
Several times a week	18.8	13.4
Once a day	6.4	11.6
Several times a day	18.7	22.6
DK	0.8	0.8
	1383	936

Workers Only

	Community/Work Combined
Both never	13.6
Less than once a week	12.2
Once a week	10.4
Several times a week	16.8
Once a day	13.0
Several times a day	33.9
	940

C. Language-Use by Race and Ethnicity	Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian
	78.7%	14.4%*	77.1%	87.5%	9.9%*
Speaks No Foreign Language					
Foreign Languages Spoken					
Spanish	7.3	75.9	10.7	6.3	2.8
Other European languages	9.1	2.8	9.5	4.7	1.4
Asian languages	2.5	7.0*	0.5	0.0	83.1*
Middle Eastern languages	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.0
Other languages	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.9	1.4
Not specified	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.4
Fluency in Foreign Language					
Doesn't speak foreign language	78.7	14.4	77.1	87.5	9.9
Poor/Hardly at all	3.1	2.3	3.5	0.9	0.0
Not well	6.7	3.2*	6.9	2.7	0.0*
Well	5.2	18.5	5.8	4.8	15.5
Very well	5.5	59.3	5.5	3.2	71.8
Missing	0.9	2.3	1.1	0.9	2.8
Use of Foreign Language					
Doesn't speak foreign language	78.7	14.4	77.1	87.5	9.9
Never	5.6	3.2	5.9	3.3	1.4
Less than weekly	5.1	3.6	5.5	2.7	0.0
Once a week	1.5	3.7*	1.8	0.9	0.0
Several times a week	1.8	8.8	1.7	2.4	23.9
Once a day	1.3	4.6	1.8	0.0	0.0

Several times a day	5.1	61.6	5.1	3.2	64.8
Missing	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0
Source of Foreign Language (Speakers Only)					
Childhood home	36.0	89.7	39.3	26.3	90.6
School	44.4	3.8*	41.7	52.2	9.4
Elsewhere	19.6	6.5	19.0	21.5	0.0
Exposure to Foreign Language in Local community					
Never	28.2	8.3	26.3	39.4	12.7
Less than once a week	19.3	7.4	20.9	10.2	8.5
Once a week	10.7	8.3	11.2	7.5	11.3
Several times a week	19.1	16.2*	19.1	17.4	29.6*
Once a day	6.6	4.6	6.5	5.4	12.7
Several times a day	15.3	55.1	15.4	17.7	25.4
DK	0.9	0.0	0.6	2.4	0.0
At Work					
Never	35.3	12.7	36.3	29.6	3.3
Less than once a week	10.4	5.2	11.2	4.9	8.2
Once a week	9.0	5.2	8.1	11.2	16.4
Several times a week	12.9	17.9*	12.0	14.1	16.4*
Once a day	11.8	9.8	12.0	13.5	4.9
Several times a day	19.6	49.1	19.5	26.2	50.8
DK	0.9	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.0

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Can you speak a language other than English?
If "YES":

What other languages do you speak?

How well do you speak that language? Very well, Well, Not Well, Poorly, Hardly at All.

IF SPEAKS 2 OR MORE, ASK ONLY OF THE MOST FLUENT LANGUAGE.

How often do you use that language in everyday life? Never, Less than Once a Week, Once a Week, Several Times a Week, Once a Day, Several Times a Day

Is that a language that you first learned as a child at home, in school, or is it one you learned elsewhere?

How often do you hear languages other than English spoken in the local community where you live? Never, Less Than Once a Week, Once a Week, Several Times a Week, Once a Day, Several Times a Day

IF WORKING:

How often do you hear languages other than English spoken in the place you work? Never, Less Than Once a Week, Once a Week, Several Times a Week, Once a Day, Several Times a Day

*Totals more than 26.7% because some people speak more than one foreign language.

Table 12
Support for Level of Immigration

A. Level of Immigration						
	Incr. a lot	Incr. a little	Left same as now	Decr. a little	Decr. a lot	DK
Total Level of Immigration	3.8%	5.3%	43.8%	20.8%	21.3%	5.0%
Level from...						
Latin America	3.0	5.6	44.3	20.7	21.1	5.3
Asia	2.5	5.6	45.4	19.4	20.7	6.4
Europe	2.9	6.4	51.4	17.1	16.1	6.1
			1393			
B. Level by Race and Ethnicity						
	Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian	
Total level of immigration (Decrease)	43.4%	29.2%*	44.6%	37.0%	11.3%*	
Level from...						
Latin America	43.3	26.4*	44.2	37.0	29.6*	
Asia	41.3	26.9*	42.3	38.5	11.2*	
Europe	34.4	20.8*	34.7	34.3	5.6*	

Source: 2000 GSS

Wordings: Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who get permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

What about the number of immigrants from Latin America (that is, Spanish-speaking countries in the Americas) (should it be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?)

What about the number of immigrants from Asia (should it be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?)

What about the number of immigrants from Europe (should it be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?)

Table 13
Perceived Impact of Immigrants on Country

A. Overall Perceived Impact	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not too likely	Not likely at all	DK
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures	26.2%	47.2%	17.7%	5.5%	3.3%
Higher crime rates	23.8	46.3	21.8	3.6	4.5
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs	24.7	32.5	29.8	10.0	3.0
Making it harder to keep the country united	18.4	34.9	33.4	9.6	3.6
Higher economic growth	11.1	36.8	36.4	10.3	5.4
			1389-1391		

B. Perceived Impact by Race and Ethnicity	Not Hisp.	Hisp.	White	Black	Asian
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures (Not Likely)	23.7%	17.0%*	23.9%	20.4%	12.7%*
Higher crime rates (Likely)	71.2	58.5*	71.7	68.1	82.4*
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely)	58.9	39.6*	59.0	59.5	29.5*
Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely)	54.5	40.0*	54.7	54.7	18.3*
Higher economic growth (Not Likely)	49.3	18.6*	50.2	41.1	15.5*

Source: 2000 GSS

Wording: What do you think will happen as a result of more immigrants coming to this country? Is each of the following possible results very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not likely at all?

- Higher economic growth
- Higher crime rates
- Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures
- Making it harder to keep the country united
- People born in the US losing their jobs

Table 14
Support for Pluralism vs. Assimilation
 A. Overall Support for Pluralism vs. Assimilation

1 - Groups maintain distinct cultures	8.2%
2 -	9.3
3 -	12.7
4 -	31.8
5 -	13.8
6 -	10.7
7 - Blend into larger society	9.5
DK	4.1
	1387

B. Support by Race and Ethnicity	Not		White	Black	Asian
	Hisp.	Hisp.			
Groups should blend in	35.2%	21.2%*	35.1%	32.7%	30.9%*

Source: 2000 GSS

Wording: Some people say that it is better for America if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others say that it is better if groups change so that they blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that racial and ethnic groups should maintain their distinct cultures and a score of 7 as meaning that groups should change so that they blend into the larger society. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?

Table 15
Intergroup Attitudes and Contact by Gender

	Men	Women
A. Made Important Contributions		
English	74.4%	68.7%*
Italians	51.7	45.6*
Chinese	37.8	39.2*
Jews	55.2	50.6*
Blacks	49.3	47.3*
Mexicans	27.9	28.1*
Vietnamese	16.7	19.3*
Cubans	14.6	17.5*
Irish	51.7	44.3*
Puerto Ricans	15.8	20.4*
Japanese	44.1	36.9*
Muslims	16.0	17.4*
B. Language-Use Policies		
English unites Americans	73.7%	73.5%
For English as official language	73.0	73.4
Ballots should not be in other languages	36.1	32.4
English threatened if immigrants use other languages	34.6	28.5*
Abolish bilingual education	25.7	18.6*

Value of Knowing Second Language

Children should learn second language in school (Disagree) 27.6 21.7*

Learning foreign language as valuable as math or science (Disagree) 36.4 34.3

C. Immigration and Assimilation

Total level of immigration (Decrease Level from...) 43.0% 41.4%

Latin America 42.8 41.0

Asia 40.1 40.2

Europe 33.2 33.2

Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures (Not Likely) 23.8 22.8

Higher crime rates (Likely) 70.9 69.4

People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely) 56.0 58.1

Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely) 52.1 54.3

Higher economic growth (Not Likely) 45.8 47.4

Groups should blend in 35.7 32.5

	Men	Women
D. Changes in Population		
Group's population shares will increase		
Whites	35.0%	38.4%*
Blacks	74.2	67.8*
Jews	30.1	26.9*
Hispanics	88.0	81.1*
Asians	69.6	60.9*
Population change is bad thing	20.8	16.7*
E. Population Share Estimates		
United States		
White	59.2%	58.8%
Black	27.3	34.7*
Hispanic	19.5	28.8*
Jewish	13.9	21.0*
Asian	13.3	21.5*
American Indian	10.5	17.4*
Mixed	39.6	46.3*
Local community		
White	69.4	65.9*
Black	17.1	21.4*
Hispanic	12.7	15.4*
Jewish	6.2	7.8*
Asian	5.6	8.6*
American Indian	3.5	6.0*

F. Ethnic Images

Rich/Poor		
Blacks	-1.60	-1.53
Jews	0.34	0.20
Hispanics	-1.57	-1.57
Asians	-0.48	-0.42
Hardworking/Lazy		
Blacks	-0.85	-0.80
Jews	0.20	0.23
Hispanics	-0.15	-0.40*
Asians	0.29	0.19
Violence-Prone/Not		
Blacks	-0.72	-0.59
Jews	0.54	0.45
Hispanics	-0.45	-0.37
Asians	0.20	0.23
Intelligent/Not		
Blacks	-0.71	-0.68
Jews	0.04	0.03
Hispanics	-0.75	-0.72
Asians	-0.07	-0.07
Committed to Strong Families/Not		
Blacks	-0.86	-0.49*
Jews	0.43	0.50
Hispanics	0.07	0.23
Asians	0.37	0.41

	Men	Women
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not		
Blacks	-0.42	-0.52
Jews	0.05	-0.02
Hispanics	-0.25	-0.33
Asians	-0.15	-0.17
G. Social Distance		
Whites		
Object to neighbors	6.8%	5.4%*
Object to rel. marrying	10.8	7.1
Blacks		
Object to neighbors	30.8	28.7*
Object to rel. marrying	32.7	31.4
Jews		
Object to neighbors	12.2	7.5*
Object to rel. marrying	9.0	9.5
Hispanics		
Object to neighbors	29.5	24.1*
Object to rel. marrying	22.3	19.8
Asians		
Object to neighbors	20.5	16.3*
Object to rel. marrying	21.1	19.9

H. Preferred Neighborhood

All		
Whites	51.0%	48.2%
Blacks	18.4	19.9
Hispanics	14.2	14.7
Asians	13.0	13.8
Doesn't matter	3.4	3.5
Whites only		
Whites	55.6	53.4
Blacks	15.8	16.5
Hispanics	13.3	13.7
Asians	12.2	13.1
Doesn't matter	3.1	3.3

I. Most/Least in Common With (Whites Only)

Most in common		
Whites	15.9%	19.5%
Blacks	16.2	14.7
Jews	17.7	16.4
Hispanics	13.3	13.4
Asians	9.6	5.6
Equal in common with all	13.0	18.8
Nothing in common with any	7.2	5.8
DK	7.2	5.9

*

	Men	Women
Least in common		
Whites	0.7	1.8
Blacks	19.6	15.8
Jews	11.2	10.5
Hispanics	15.4	13.3
Asians	32.9	31.8
Equal in common with all	9.1	12.5
Nothing in common with any	4.3	5.0
DK	6.8	9.2
J. Intergroup Contact		
Out-Group Members Knowing...		
Whites	94.3%	92.1%
Blacks	89.9	83.4*
Jews	61.1	56.1
Hispanics	78.8	68.3*
Asians	62.5	57.4
Out-Group Members Knowing from School		
Whites	54.9	61.2
Blacks	43.7	39.9
Jews	29.2	25.3
Hispanics	31.8	31.9
Asians	25.8	20.6

**Out-Group Members Knowing
from Local Community**

Whites	78.2	70.8
Blacks	57.0	47.8*
Jews	28.8	25.1
Hispanics	44.9	38.7
Asians	29.3	28.8

**Out-Group Members Knowing
as Relative**

Whites	44.4	43.4
Blacks	6.4	11.4*
Jews	9.1	9.7
Hispanics	11.4	11.2
Asians	7.6	6.4

**Out-Group Members Knowing
from Work**

Whites	83.0	90.0
Blacks	62.2	62.2
Jews	28.3	31.3
Hispanics	54.1	51.2
Asians	35.6	36.4

Out-Group Members Close to...

Whites	71.5	63.9
Blacks	46.6	45.5
Jews	27.2	28.1
Hispanics	36.2	34.5
Asians	25.4	24.0

Table 16
Intergroup Attitudes and Contact by Age

A. Made Important Contributions	17-30	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+
English	71.5%	72.7%	69.3%	73.2%	69.1%
Italians	40.4	45.0	50.6	56.2	50.9*
Chinese	41.6	40.6	38.1	42.5	25.3*
Jews	40.4	50.1	56.1	60.6	59.5*
Blacks	59.4	50.5	47.4	47.1	28.8*
Mexicans	37.1	29.9	28.0	27.2	11.8*
Vietnamese	20.9	19.3	18.8	18.1	10.5*
Cubans	17.3	16.5	17.6	18.4	8.9*
Irish	38.6	44.3	48.5	55.6	54.2*
Puerto Ricans	20.7	19.2	19.5	19.3	9.8*
Japanese	47.3	43.9	41.4	36.5	25.3*
Muslims	21.6	18.9	17.1	15.2	7.5*
B. Language-Use Policies					
English unites Americans	66.2%	71.5%	73.7%	76.3%	85.0%*
For English as official language	65.1	69.7	76.9	72.3	86.8*
Ballots should not be in other languages	32.5	27.0	36.9	32.2	44.7*
English threatened if immigrants use other languages	27.6	26.1	29.8	30.9	47.7*
Abolish bilingual education	12.5	20.1	23.5	22.6	35.9*

Value of Knowing Second Language

Children should learn second language in school (Disagree)	27.4	23.0	23.6	22.3	25.0
Learning foreign language as valuable as math or science (Disagree)	32.7	34.9	32.7	36.6	42.1*
C. Immigration and Assimilation					
Total level of immigration (Decrease)	35.0%	46.6%	42.6%	42.1%	45.5%*
Level from...					
Latin America	34.1	44.8	42.2	43.1	47.3*
Asia	31.2	43.5	41.0	41.8	45.6*
Europe	26.6	36.4	33.3	36.3	34.7
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures (Not Likely)	21.2	24.2	18.2	25.2	30.7*
Higher crime rates (Likely)	72.3	73.1	65.6	66.3	73.8
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely)	51.1	56.7	56.4	58.4	66.6*
Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely)	49.8	53.5	52.5	52.1	61.3*
Higher economic growth (Not Likely)	35.7	42.1	48.5	49.4	64.4*
Groups should blend in	28.6	33.4	31.7	34.6	46.6*

D. Changes in Population		LT 30	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+
Group's population share will increase						
Whites		40.5%	37.9%	35.3%	39.7%	28.5%*
Blacks		67.4	66.4	69.7	76.9	75.2*
Jews		29.6	27.7	27.0	30.4	26.8
Hispanics		85.3	84.4	86.1	85.4	77.0*
Asians		63.3	64.3	69.4	68.3	54.7*
Population change is bad thing		14.3	17.0	16.2	19.4	32.2*
E. Population Share Estimates						
United States						
White		56.1%	58.8%	60.0%	59.5%	61.9%*
Black		31.6	33.1	30.8	29.4	31.2
Hispanic		24.7	26.1	24.3	22.9	24.3
Jewish		16.2	18.2	17.6	17.3	20.1
Asian		18.1	19.0	16.8	16.3	18.3
American Indian		14.4	14.5	14.4	13.1	14.8
Mixed		49.6	45.4	42.9	35.7	39.9*
Local community						
White		63.9	64.0	68.7	69.2	74.5*
Black		21.6	21.1	18.7	18.4	16.1
Hispanic		17.0	16.1	13.7	11.6	10.3*
Jewish		8.0	6.6	6.6	7.3	6.8
Asian		8.5	8.6	6.7	6.1	5.6*
American Indian		7.6	4.6	4.9	2.8	3.2*

F. Ethnic Images

Rich/Poor							
Blacks	-1.44	-1.51	-1.76	-1.58	-1.46		
Jews	-0.13	0.25	0.24	0.48	0.67*		
Hispanics	-1.62	-1.52	-1.71	-1.54	-1.31		
Asians	-0.38	-0.36	-0.47	-0.48	-0.63		
Hardworking/Lazy							
Blacks	-0.54	-0.79	-0.83	-0.77	-1.39*		
Jews	0.12	0.13	0.19	0.31	0.45*		
Hispanics	0.04	-0.25	-0.28	-0.31	-0.95*		
Asians	0.27	0.19	0.30	0.37	-0.13*		
Violence-Prone/Not							
Blacks	-0.76	-0.51	-0.46	-0.67	-0.96*		
Jews	0.52	0.58	0.59	0.44	0.19*		
Hispanics	-0.49	-0.34	-0.27	-0.41	-0.65*		
Asians	0.34	0.30	0.22	0.24	-0.26*		
Intelligent/Not							
Blacks	-0.50	-0.68	-0.54	-0.76	-1.22*		
Jews	-0.11	-0.03	0.00	0.18	0.20*		
Hispanics	-0.73	-0.75	-0.55	-0.75	-1.04*		
Asians	0.03	-0.06	0.06	-0.12	-0.46*		
Committed to Strong Families/Not							
Blacks	-0.29	-0.47	-0.66	-0.83	-1.27*		
Jews	0.45	0.47	0.50	0.51	0.38		
Hispanics	0.47	0.29	0.17	0.02	-0.50*		
Asians	0.51	0.35	0.51	0.36	0.04*		

	LT 30	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not					
Blacks	-0.26	-0.38	-0.49	-0.56	-0.83*
Jews	0.08	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.02
Hispanics	-0.13	-0.21	-0.30	-0.36	-0.65*
Asians	-0.03	-0.06	-0.18	-0.24	-0.43
G. Social Distance					
Whites					
Object to neighbors	7.9%	4.0%	5.3%	7.4%	4.4%
Object to rel. marrying	6.6	7.2	8.7	12.7	8.8
Blacks					
Object to neighbors	23.2	24.3	26.5	35.3	44.1*
Object to rel. marrying	15.9	23.7	27.6	46.3	57.1*
Jews					
Object to neighbors	10.3	6.5	7.5	13.1	11.0
Object to rel. marrying	8.8	11.0	12.3	15.6	17.6*
Hispanics					
Object to neighbors	26.4	23.1	23.5	30.6	30.7*
Object to rel. marrying	13.6	15.1	16.3	31.7	32.8*
Asians					
Object to neighbors	17.7	11.1	17.0	21.8	26.1*
Object to rel. marrying	14.0	15.3	16.8	28.9	33.3*

H. Preferred Neighborhood

All	43.7%	47.0%	47.4%	51.3%	63.6%*
Whites	22.9	19.8	19.2	18.1	14.1*
Blacks	17.2	16.1	15.4	12.4	8.6*
Hispanics	14.6	14.6	14.1	13.3	8.9*
Asians	1.5	2.5	4.0	5.0	4.9
Doesn't matter					
Whites only					
Whites	48.0	51.5	52.1	56.5	69.2*
Blacks	20.1	16.9	16.6	15.0	10.3*
Hispanics	15.5	14.8	14.8	11.6	9.0*
Asians	14.4	13.6	13.6	12.2	8.2*
Doesn't matter	2.1	3.1	2.8	4.8	3.4

I. Most/Least in Common With (Whites Only)

Most in common					
Whites	15.6%	20.1%	14.7%	17.5%	23.4%
Blacks	24.4	14.7	13.7	13.3	9.5
Jews	11.0	16.2	17.9	21.5	18.6
Hispanics	15.2	17.4	13.7	12.2	6.1
Asians	9.3	6.3	6.8	6.9	8.1
Equal in common with all	16.6	13.1	20.9	15.4	12.9
Nothing in common with any	3.2	5.3	6.8	5.3	13.2
DK	4.6	6.8	5.3	8.0	8.1

*

	LT 30	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+
Least in common					
Whites	2.0	2.0	0.6	1.2	0.3
Blacks	15.5	11.7	17.1	21.1	25.3
Jews	16.0	13.2	11.5	4.8	7.3
Hispanics	18.2	14.7	13.6	17.1	5.2
Asians	32.7	31.5	34.3	34.9	26.6
Equal in common with all	8.6	12.2	14.3	9.9	7.6
Nothing in common with all	1.7	5.6	2.8	4.5	10.7
DK	5.4	9.1	5.8	6.4	17.0

*

J. Intergroup Contact

Out-group members knowing

Whites	93.0%	94.0%	96.7%	90.6%	86.4%
Blacks	91.8	89.7	93.0	83.5	65.7*
Jews	51.9	49.8	66.1	65.6	59.1*
Hispanics	78.5	79.7	77.7	71.5	50.4*
Asians	66.4	59.4	65.0	60.9	37.7*

Out-group members knowing from school

Whites	73.8	61.0	56.6	45.0	26.8*
Blacks	68.9	49.4	43.7	22.1	10.6*
Jews	35.2	25.6	27.7	21.1	22.4*
Hispanics	55.9	40.4	32.1	14.8	8.2*
Asians	44.5	22.5	22.4	11.5	5.7*

Out-group members knowing from local community						
Whites	71.9	78.4	77.9	68.0	68.3	
Blacks	60.8	51.4	54.1	46.8	42.9*	
Jews	20.3	22.7	29.3	32.5	31.2*	
Hispanics	48.3	42.0	45.1	38.5	28.7*	
Asians	33.5	26.8	33.5	28.5	18.1*	
Out-group members knowing as relative						
Whites	49.1	44.4	38.5	48.0	26.8	
Blacks	11.2	10.8	7.3	10.5	4.8	
Jews	5.4	7.9	11.3	11.7	12.2	
Hispanics	9.5	16.2	12.4	11.1	6.0*	
Asians	6.1	9.4	6.3	7.8	3.9	
Out-group members knowing from work						
Whites	82.0	85.2	96.7	90.5	45.5*	
Blacks	61.0	67.0	64.8	57.7	38.9	
Jews	23.6	21.1	36.9	40.6	11.1*	
Hispanics	49.9	56.8	52.8	55.8	23.6*	
Asians	32.4	32.3	40.9	39.6	16.7	
Out-group members close to...						
Whites	56.5	70.4	74.1	72.3	63.4	
Blacks	52.2	47.4	49.3	47.9	25.5*	
Jews	23.6	20.9	35.7	33.1	23.4*	
Hispanics	37.5	43.5	39.3	36.1	12.4*	
Asians	31.0	25.4	28.9	19.7	11.0*	

Table 17
Intergroup Attitudes and Contact by Education

	Not high school grad.	High school grad.	Some col.	Col. grad.
A. Made Important Contributions				
English	58.3%	65.3%	73.5%	83.1%*
Italians	32.0	42.3	50.9	61.7*
Chinese	24.0	33.4	41.1	50.0*
Jews	33.8	47.5	52.9	69.8*
Blacks	30.8	41.2	53.9	59.8*
Mexicans	18.0	21.9	30.5	37.9*
Vietnamese	13.2	13.7	18.1	26.2*
Cubans	11.7	11.4	15.2	26.0*
Irish	36.5	41.0	48.9	60.5*
Puerto Ricans	16.3	14.8	17.5	24.3*
Japanese	28.0	33.1	43.8	50.7*
Muslims	11.3	13.7	16.5	23.7*
B. Language-Use Policies				
English unites Americans	73.6%	79.2%	73.9%	65.8%*
For English as official language	64.3	75.4	75.6	72.9*
Ballots should not be in other languages	29.2	36.6	37.7	29.3*
English threatened if immigrants use other languages	33.2	39.8	29.7	21.5*
Abolish bilingual education	26.5	20.6	20.2	22.1*

Value of Knowing Second Language

Children should learn second language in school (Disagree)	23.9	28.7	25.2	17.9*
Learning foreign language as valuable as math or science (Disagree)	36.3	41.0	33.9	28.3*

C. Immigration and Assimilation

Total level of immigration (Decrease)	47.2%	49.2%	42.7%	29.3%*
Level from...				
Latin America	47.2	48.7	41.7	29.9*
Asia	45.4	49.7	38.8	26.2*
Europe	36.0	40.4	32.7	22.9*
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures (Not Likely)	28.2	25.9	26.3	12.9*
Higher crime rates (Likely)	75.7	77.3	71.5	56.4*
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely)	66.0	69.2	55.5	39.8*
Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely)	60.5	59.0	53.9	41.4*
Higher economic growth (Not Likely)	49.0	51.6	47.1	39.5*
Groups should blend in	34.4	33.4	35.3	32.8*

	Not high school grad.	High school grad.	Some col.	Col. grad.
D. Changes in Population				
Group's population share will increase				
Whites	39.1%	45.2%	39.4%	22.8%*
Blacks	70.1	73.8	72.0	65.4*
Jews	27.4	34.4	30.0	19.8*
Hispanics	71.8	83.5	84.8	92.0*
Asians	46.5	64.4	66.2	74.6*
Population change is bad thing	27.8	21.3	16.8	12.0*
E. Population Share Estimates				
United States				
White	58.3%	58.6%	58.0%	61.1%*
Black	37.9	34.0	31.0	24.7*
Hispanic	30.7	25.2	24.2	20.8*
Jewish	22.2	19.8	17.3	13.6*
Asian	22.0	19.8	17.5	13.3*
American Indian	22.1	16.0	13.1	9.5*
Mixed	47.3	43.5	44.3	39.8*
Local community				
White	60.5	67.5	66.4	73.0*
Black	28.4	19.5	19.5	14.2*
Hispanic	16.5	13.9	15.2	12.0*

Jewish	6.1	6.1	6.6	9.3*
Asian	6.6	7.2	7.5	7.4
American Indian	6.1	5.2	4.9	3.7

F. Ethnic Images

Rich/Poor				
Blacks	-1.37	-1.50	-1.66	-1.62
Jews	0.10	0.33	0.22	0.31
Hispanics	-1.22	-1.51	-1.74	-1.61*
Asians	-0.47	-0.39	-0.59	-0.32

Hardworking/Lazy

Blacks	-1.23	-0.91	-0.72	-0.57*
Jews	0.01	0.09	0.21	0.47*
Hispanics	-0.42	-0.43	-0.25	-0.10*
Asians	-0.10	0.05	0.22	0.63*

Violence-Prone/Not

Blacks	-0.91	-0.55	-0.77	-0.46*
Jews	0.56	0.45	0.54	0.45
Hispanics	-0.55	-0.38	-0.52	-0.24*
Asians	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.29

Intelligent/Not

Blacks	-1.06	-0.75	-0.61	-0.50*
Jews	-0.08	-0.01	0.02	0.15*
Hispanics	-0.85	-0.88	-0.77	-0.46*
Asians	-0.52	-0.22	0.02	0.22*

	Not high school grad.	High school grad.	Some col.	Col. grad.
Committed to Strong Families/Not				
Blacks	-1.01	-0.68	-0.61	-0.47*
Jews	0.15	0.39	0.48	0.71*
Hispanics	-0.33	-0.08	0.30	0.50*
Asians	-0.13	0.16	0.51	0.77*
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not				
Blacks	-0.48	-0.67	-0.38	-0.32
Jews	0.08	-0.17	0.05	0.15*
Hispanics	-0.49	-0.52	-0.17	-0.06*
Asians	-0.14	-0.35	-0.13	+0.04*
G. Social Distance				
Whites				
Object to neighbors	7.5%	6.3%	7.6%	10.8%
Object to rel. marrying	9.1	9.0	7.1	11.8
Blacks				
Object to neighbors	30.9	35.9	28.0	23.8*
Object to rel. marrying	39.9	40.9	28.3	22.0*
Jews				
Object to neighbors	15.5	14.4	7.5	3.9*
Object to rel. marrying	16.1	14.6	9.8	11.1*

Hispanics						
Object to neighbors	27.4	31.4	26.8	19.6*		
Object to rel. marrying	29.6	26.8	18.1	12.2*		
Asians						
Object to neighbors	23.9	22.2	16.1	11.9*		
Object to rel. marrying	24.5	27.4	17.5	12.6*		
H. Preferred Neighborhood						
All						
Whites	50.5%	53.5%	48.3%	45.3%*		
Blacks	20.7	18.8	20.1	18.0		
Hispanics	2.7	13.9	15.0	15.8		
Asians	10.3	11.6	14.4	16.7*		
Doesn't matter	5.8	2.3	2.2	4.2		
Whites only						
Whites	59.9	58.9	53.3	47.3*		
Blacks	13.6	15.0	17.3	17.6*		
Hispanics	11.3	12.6	13.9	15.3*		
Asians	8.5	11.3	13.6	15.6*		
Doesn't matter	6.8	2.2	1.9	4.2*		

I. Most/Least in common With
(Whites Only)

	Not high school grad.	High school grad.	Some col.	Col. grad.
Most in common				
Whites	21.3%	17.5%	17.2%	16.7%
Blacks	20.6	16.7	14.4	12.5
Jews	6.7	15.5	17.5	23.3
Hispanics	9.9	15.2	15.1	11.0
Asians	3.6	7.2	6.6	10.8
Equal in common with all	15.0	12.9	18.3	17.9
Nothing in common with any	12.6	8.3	5.5	2.2
DK	10.3	6.6	5.5	5.6
Least in common				
Whites	2.4	1.5	1.0	0.8
Blacks	18.8	19.4	14.8	18.3
Jews	10.8	12.9	8.2	11.8
Hispanics	8.4	12.0	15.5	18.5
Asians	24.0	33.3	39.4	26.7
Equal in common with all	11.2	8.2	10.8	14.3
Nothing in common with any	10.0	5.7	3.7	1.4
DK	14.4	7.0	6.6	8.2

*

J. Intergroup Contact

Out-group members knowing

Whites	85.8%	91.3%	96.2%	100.0%*
Blacks	78.6	79.7	89.9	93.9*
Jews	36.6	49.1	64.0	78.6*
Hispanics	54.9	65.5	77.6	86.8*
Asians	34.9	46.3	67.4	83.1*

Out-group members knowing from school

Whites	48.9	53.6	60.2	80.6*
Blacks	33.8	30.7	50.7	46.7*
Jews	1.3	18.0	30.1	45.9*
Hispanics	19.5	27.2	39.4	34.6*
Asians	10.5	10.5	29.0	38.8*

Out-group members knowing from local community

Whites	66.7	70.2	76.1	85.8
Blacks	46.0	45.9	54.9	58.5*
Jews	8.3	21.0	28.9	44.2*
Hispanics	27.8	38.7	44.7	49.0*
Asians	14.4	21.3	33.5	42.7*

	Not high school grad.	High school grad.	Some col.	Col. grad.
Out-group members knowing as relative				
Whites	35.6	36.9	50.5	56.8*
Blacks	11.7	7.0	9.1	10.1
Jews	4.2	9.4	8.4	14.5*
Hispanics	14.1	12.0	8.9	12.2
Asians	4.2	6.9	6.7	9.3
Out-group members knowing from work				
Whites	82.0	87.7	85.8	90.2
Blacks	53.1	54.5	67.2	66.7*
Jews	15.0	21.0	34.1	40.2*
Hispanics	28.6	47.8	57.2	59.6*
Asians	16.3	27.7	36.8	51.6*
Out-group members close to...				
Whites	59.3	64.4	68.9	80.4
Blacks	32.2	39.7	51.3	53.5*
Jews	9.7	22.4	31.3	42.4*
Hispanics	24.2	28.6	37.0	48.1*
Asians	8.8	18.7	27.0	39.8*

Table 18
Intergroup Attitudes and Contact by Region

	North- east	Mid- west	South	West
A. Made Important Contributions				
English	64.5%	72.8%	72.8%	72.9%
Italians	51.2	51.2	43.3	50.6*
Chinese	40.0	38.2	34.9	43.9
Jews	53.8	58.1	47.5	54.2*
Blacks	46.0	50.8	46.5	50.1
Mexicans	25.6	31.1	21.7	37.4*
Vietnamese	19.1	18.5	14.8	22.4*
Cubans	19.3	16.5	13.3	17.9
Irish	45.8	54.8	43.4	48.3*
Puerto Ricans	23.6	18.0	13.1	22.4*
Japanese	39.7	39.3	36.8	46.7
Muslims	19.7	19.5	10.9	21.0*
B. Language-Use Policies				
English unites Americans	70.9%	72.8%	76.9%	71.2%*
For English as official language	73.5	72.6	76.1	69.1*
Ballots should not be in other languages	29.5	36.0	33.4	37.2
English threatened if immigrants use other languages	30.5	29.2	34.3	28.9
Abolish bilingual education	19.2	20.9	21.1	26.2

	North-east	Mid-west	South	West
Value of Knowing Second Language				
Children should learn second language in school (Disagree)	20.2	28.4	24.3	24.0
Learning foreign language as valuable as math or science (Disagree)	31.6	38.3	39.2	28.6*
C. Immigration and Assimilation				
Total level of immigration (Decrease)	38.5%	40.9%	47.2%	38.5%*
Level from...				
Latin America	5.2	38.8	49.5	38.6*
Asia	35.4	38.3	46.1	36.6*
Europe	30.4	30.3	39.4	28.9*
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures (Not Likely)	25.8	23.3	25.0	18.1*
Higher crime rates (Likely)	60.0	69.7	76.5	69.2*
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely)	53.0	54.7	66.6	48.1*
Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely)	48.8	51.8	57.9	51.3
Higher economic growth (Not Likely)	49.0	47.8	49.5	38.8*
Groups should blend in	27.6	35.2	37.0	33.6*

D. Changes in Population Group's population share will increase				
Whites	36.4%	44.3%	34.1%	34.2%*
Blacks	67.9	75.4	75.9	59.2*
Jews	29.8	33.4	24.1	28.7*
Hispanics	81.7	85.5	84.3	85.0*
Asians	67.6	66.5	60.0	68.0*
Population change is bad thing	10.8	14.4	25.1	19.6*

E. Population Share Estimate				
United States				
White	58.5%	58.2%	58.4%	61.3%*
Black	31.3	31.4	33.0	28.7*
Hispanic	25.0	23.7	23.3	27.1*
Jewish	20.4	17.4	16.4	17.6*
Asian	18.9	17.5	15.6	20.1*
American Indian	13.4	15.1	13.1	15.7
Mixed	40.4	47.2	41.2	45.0*
Local community				
White	67.9	76.8	63.0	64.2*
Black	20.6	16.9	25.5	11.4*
Hispanic	13.3	8.9	13.1	22.0*
Jewish	9.5	6.7	5.3	8.2*
Asian	6.7	5.8	4.6	13.5*
American Indian	4.5	4.3	3.3	8.0*

	North- east	Mid- west	South	West
F. Ethnic Images				
Rich/Poor				
Blacks	-1.69	-1.48	-1.48	-1.66
Jews	0.46	0.23	0.20	0.21
Hispanics	-1.72	-1.52	-1.54	-1.54
Asians	-0.48	-0.52	-0.47	-0.30
Hardworking/Lazy				
Blacks	-0.96	-0.75	-0.84	-0.75
Jews	0.19	0.13	0.20	0.36
Hispanics	-0.77	-0.26	-0.16	-0.10*
Asians	0.05	0.18	0.23	0.45*
Violence-Prone/Not				
Blacks	-0.50	-0.64	-0.81	-0.50*
Jews	0.63	0.54	0.44	0.40
Hispanics	-0.26	-0.40	-0.52	-0.38
Asians	0.37	0.24	0.12	0.21
Intelligent/Not				
Blacks	-0.76	-0.57	-0.73	-0.72
Jews	0.10	0.02	0.01	0.01
Hispanics	-0.82	-0.61	-0.79	-0.72
Asians	-0.19	-0.05	-0.11	0.08*

Committed to Strong Families/Not					
Blacks	-0.69	-0.46	-0.88	-0.46*	
Jews	0.36	0.55	0.34	0.66*	
Hispanics	-0.06	0.30	-0.12	0.60*	
Asians	0.25	0.44	0.12	0.84*	
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not					
Blacks	-0.39	-0.45	-0.54	-0.46	
Jews	-0.05	0.11	0.04	-0.08	
Hispanics	-0.44	-0.19	-0.33	-0.24	
Asians	-0.19	-0.05	-0.23	-0.15	
G. Social Distance					
Whites					
Object to neighbors	12.3%	12.2%	3.8%	0.9%*	
Object to rel. marrying	11.3	4.9	10.1	6.1	
Blacks					
Object to neighbors	23.2	26.8	34.6	31.5	
Object to rel. marrying	24.6	32.6	42.6	23.0*	
Jews					
Object to neighbors	9.6	8.0	12.2	7.4	
Object to rel. marrying	7.7	13.9	16.6	8.7*	
Hispanics					
Object to neighbors	22.8	23.9	30.2	27.0*	
Object to rel. marrying	14.5	20.0	30.6	10.8*	

	North-east	Mid-west	South	West
Asians				
Object to neighbors	18.5	14.8	19.7	19.0*
Object to rel. marrying	17.8	18.6	27.6	12.4*
H. Preferred Neighborhood				
All				
Whites	49.8%	50.5%	52.2%	43.3%*
Blacks	17.4	19.1	21.4	17.4*
Hispanics	13.7	13.8	12.8	18.7*
Asians	11.6	14.0	11.7	17.3*
Doesn't matter	7.5	2.6	2.1	3.4*
Whites only				
Whites	55.0	53.8	59.9	46.3*
Blacks	14.7	16.8	16.1	16.8
Hispanics	12.3	13.5	11.4	17.7*
Asians	11.4	13.7	11.0	15.1*
Doesn't matter	6.7	2.1	1.7	4.1*
I. Most/Least in Common with (Whites Only)				
Most in common				
Whites	17.9%	12.9%	22.2%	16.9%
Blacks	13.6	18.0	19.5	7.5
Jews	25.4	17.8	10.3	18.4

Hispanics	6.0	14.9	9.4	24.9
Asians	5.3	9.9	6.9	7.2
Equal in common with all	18.4	12.9	16.6	17.4
Nothing in common with any	4.3	6.5	9.1	4.1
DK	9.1	7.1	6.1	3.6
Least in common				
Whites	2.0	0.0	2.0	1.0
Blacks	20.9	15.2	14.3	22.3
Jew	6.9	11.8	10.8	13.6
Hispanics	13.0	15.4	17.3	9.4
Asians	27.0	39.9	28.2	34.6
Equal in common with all	14.0	6.6	13.9	8.7
Nothing in common with any	3.6	4.2	7.1	2.4
DK	12.5	7.0	6.5	8.0

J. Intergroup Contact

Out-group members knowing

Whites	90.6%	89.4%	93.7%	95.8%
Blacks	81.8	85.1	91.2	84.8*
Jews	70.6	58.6	50.4	60.7*
Hispanics	67.9	69.7	67.1	92.4*
Asians	57.5	62.0	49.6	76.8*

	North-east	Mid-west	South	West
Out-group members knowing from school				
Whites	50.9	60.7	59.6	61.3
Blacks	39.2	48.3	43.8	33.9*
Jews	33.5	29.8	21.0	28.7*
Hispanics	28.3	37.0	26.3	39.4*
Asians	20.2	25.7	16.8	33.1*
Out-group members knowing from local community				
Whites	69.6	64.0	77.1	77.4
Blacks	47.5	42.9	60.5	53.4*
Jews	34.9	23.8	22.4	30.3*
Hispanics	32.6	37.8	34.5	67.7*
Asians	27.2	28.4	20.3	46.9*
Out-group members knowing as relative				
Whites	42.2	50.6	37.3	52.6
Blacks	9.6	9.5	9.1	8.2
Jews	11.7	10.1	6.8	11.2
Hispanics	9.3	9.8	10.4	16.9*
Asians	5.5	6.4	6.1	10.5

**Out-group members knowing
from work**

Whites	79.9	78.1	89.1	93.3
Blacks	56.7	54.1	74.8	58.2*
Jews	37.7	28.1	24.4	33.9*
Hispanics	45.3	46.5	53.2	66.3*
Asians	36.4	34.9	28.4	50.1*

Out-group members close to...

Whites	57.8	57.9	68.5	76.6
Blacks	39.6	44.2	53.3	43.1*
Jews	37.4	25.7	23.2	29.1*
Hispanics	28.7	30.7	32.0	54.7*
Asians	19.7	27.8	20.2	33.5*

Table 19
Intergroup Attitudes and Contact by Community Type

A. Made Important Contributions	Large cent. city	Oth. cent. city	Large sub-urb	Oth. sub-urb	Oth. urban	Rural
English	58.6%	70.9%	76.3%	65.7%	74.1%	69.4%*
Italians	44.2	46.3	57.7	46.2	48.3	44.8*
Chinese	37.0	42.2	47.6	38.0	37.0	31.3*
Jews	51.4	50.1	60.1	57.4	53.0	40.9*
Blacks	53.6	53.3	50.4	45.6	48.5	37.4*
Mexicans	32.6	33.7	25.1	26.3	29.2	18.5*
Vietnamese	19.4	19.1	20.0	17.9	19.1	10.3*
Cubans	22.6	18.0	16.3	17.7	16.4	7.2*
Irish	40.3	45.0	52.1	45.3	50.2	43.5*
Puerto Ricans	27.9	19.1	20.6	16.4	18.2	11.4*
Japanese	42.6	40.4	52.1	39.5	38.5	30.6*
Muslims	22.1	19.6	15.4	15.9	17.1	11.4*
B. Language-Use Policies						
English unites Americans	76.1%	68.4%	76.7%	68.0%	74.2%	79.3%
For English as official language	72.6	66.0	76.2	75.2	73.2	77.3
Ballots should not be in other languages	25.2	29.7	31.8	37.4	36.0	59.7*
English threatened if immigrants use languages	33.1	25.9	21.9	31.1	31.5	35.2
Abolish bilingual education	14.4	18.8	23.7	23.3	22.1	24.9*

Value of Knowing Second Language

Children should learn	16.7	16.6	22.0	20.2	28.3	32.0*
2nd language in school (Disagree)						
Learning foreign language	25.8	31.4	32.3	29.0	37.1	49.8*
as valuable as math or science (Disagree)						
C. Immigration and Assimilation						
Total level of immigration (Decrease)	31.0%	30.5%	47.7%	46.5%	40.8%	57.6%*
Level from...						
Latin America	32.6	31.9	45.9	43.8	39.9	61.3*
Asia	29.8	27.3	38.4	47.2	40.9	54.4*
Europe	24.3	23.4	34.3	36.5	32.9	47.7*
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures(Not Likely)	24.5	18.3	17.7	26.3	23.0	32.8*
Higher crime rates (Likely)	49.1	64.7	64.8	68.0	73.8	85.0*
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely)	45.8	52.1	52.7	48.9	60.4	74.1*
Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely)	47.4	49.6	49.3	54.0	54.5	61.3*
Higher economic growth (Not Likely)	40.7	37.1	51.6	42.0	47.2	60.8*
Groups should blend in	22.8	29.7	40.8	32.3	34.1	40.2*

	Large cent. city	Oth. cent. city	Large sub-urb	Oth. sub-urb	Oth. urban	Rural
D. Changes in Population						
Group's population share will increase						
Whites	28.1%	35.8%	34.8%	34.5%	38.5%	43.4%
Blacks	60.1	67.4	70.8	69.2	72.6	75.6*
Jews	25.3	27.1	32.4	29.3	28.0	27.6*
Hispanics	76.4	81.5	89.2	86.6	84.4	84.1*
Asians	65.2	63.4	69.4	69.8	64.3	56.3*
Population change is a bad thing	10.4	15.6	16.0	20.1	19.3	26.1*

E. Population Share Estimates

United States						
White	56.2%	60.9%	61.2%	59.5%	57.9%	59.0%*
Black	33.9	33.7	31.1	28.6	30.4	34.1*
Hispanic	27.3	25.1	27.6	22.8	23.5	24.5
Jewish	20.5	18.3	21.7	16.6	16.1	17.6*
Asian	19.0	19.3	20.4	17.4	16.1	17.9*
American Indian	13.9	15.9	15.2	12.4	13.3	16.6
Mixed	42.6	42.1	44.0	40.9	44.1	44.4
Local community						
White	38.6	51.2	64.7	67.4	74.3	83.8*
Black	38.7	33.0	21.4	16.3	14.4	10.6*

Hispanic	17.2	18.1	14.7	14.3	13.4	8.9*
Jewish	10.5	7.5	11.8	9.6	5.6	0.9*
Asian	7.5	10.5	9.4	10.1	5.9	1.9*
American Indian	2.9	5.1	3.0	3.0	6.2	5.2*
F. Ethnic Images						
Rich/Poor						
Blacks	-1.94	-1.50	-1.74	-1.71	-1.48	-1.33*
Jews	0.51	0.22	0.42	0.34	0.20	0.06
Hispanics	-2.00	-1.40	-1.65	-1.58	-1.54	-1.56
Asians	-0.56	-0.46	-0.26	-0.27	-0.52	-0.57
Hardworking/Lazy						
Blacks	-0.70	-0.56	-0.94	-1.13	-0.74	-1.02*
Jews	0.61	0.25	0.29	0.24	0.19	-0.12*
Hispanics	-0.15	-0.08	-0.24	-0.56	-0.23	-0.56*
Asians	0.83	0.37	0.29	0.41	0.10	-0.14*
Violence-Prone/Not						
Blacks	-0.26	-0.57	-0.68	-0.73	-0.71	-0.60
Jews	0.50	0.45	0.72	0.63	0.39	0.44*
Hispanics	-0.08	-0.30	-0.41	-0.54	-0.41	-0.61
Asians	0.65	0.18	0.39	0.33	0.11	0.04*
Intelligent/Not						
Blacks	-0.60	-0.54	-0.73	-0.77	-0.70	-0.80
Jews	0.22	0.03	0.14	0.08	-0.01	-0.12*
Hispanics	-0.96	-0.50	-0.75	-0.77	-0.72	-0.97*
Asians	-0.01	0.05	0.14	0.04	-0.17	-0.29*

	Large cent. city	Oth. cent. city	Large sub-urb	Oth. sub-urb	Oth. ur-ban	Rural
Committed to Strong Families/Not						
Blacks	-0.33	-0.43	-0.91	-0.69	-0.66	-0.76*
Jews	0.76	0.49	0.61	0.58	0.38	0.26*
Hispanics	0.33	0.16	0.17	0.33	0.16	-0.23
Asians	0.50	0.46	0.53	0.69	0.28	0.09*
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not						
Blacks	0.52	-0.31	-0.52	-0.68	-0.53	-0.80*
Jews	0.40	0.06	-0.02	-0.14	0.05	-0.18
Hispanics	0.28	-0.17	-0.29	-0.43	-0.31	-0.61*
Asians	0.34	-0.02	-0.18	-0.28	-0.20	-0.35*
G. Social Distance						
Whites						
Object to neighbors	12.9%	3.0%	4.2%	10.1%	2.1%	12.1%*
Object to rel. marrying	8.2	7.4	13.9	4.3	8.6	12.1
Blacks						
Object to neighbors	26.0	28.2	28.6	38.5	28.4	28.7*
Object to rel. marrying	16.8	32.7	25.9	24.9	35.0	41.7*
Jews						
Object to neighbors	13.0	8.2	6.0	10.5	10.5	8.9*
Object to rel. marrying	8.4	11.7	9.9	12.4	13.8	15.1

Hispanics									
Object to neighbors	23.9	16.9	29.4	28.7	28.0	28.7			
Object to rel. marrying	11.9	19.2	13.5	13.8	24.9	29.4*			
Asians									
Object to neighbors	25.2	13.5	14.2	20.6	19.1	17.5			
Object to rel. marrying	18.3	21.6	11.3	16.9	22.6	26.2			
H. Preferred Neighborhood									
All									
Whites	34.8%	39.6%	50.1%	47.0%	52.2%	60.6%*			
Blacks	29.5	22.3	15.8	17.6	18.9	17.0*			
Hispanics	18.4	16.2	13.6	15.1	14.3	11.3*			
Asians	13.6	16.1	14.0	14.9	12.6	11.2*			
Doesn't matter	3.7	5.9	6.5	5.5	2.1	0.0*			
Whites only									
Whites	44.3	46.6	54.2	52.3	55.0	64.5*			
Blacks	18.3	18.4	14.4	15.8	16.7	13.8*			
Hispanics	16.8	15.5	12.3	14.2	13.5	11.1*			
Asians	4.0	15.2	13.3	11.8	12.7	10.7*			
Doesn't matter	6.7	4.4	5.8	5.8	2.2	0.0*			

*

	Large cent. city	Oth. cent. city	Large sub-urb	Oth. sub-urb	Oth. urban	Rural
I. Most/Least in Common with (Whites Only)						
Most in common						
Whites	31.9%	20.1%	16.2%	29.5%	13.1%	17.4%
Blacks	4.3	14.7	14.6	8.8	19.4	13.0
Jews	8.5	21.9	32.4	16.7	16.1	3.2
Hispanics	12.8	16.1	8.7	14.3	13.2	15.4
Asians	2.1	4.9	8.7	11.6	6.8	8.5
Equal in common with all	18.1	12.1	12.6	12.4	17.2	22.7
Nothing in common with any	8.5	4.9	2.4	1.6	7.6	11.7
DK	3.8	5.4	4.3	5.2	6.5	8.1
Least in common:						
Whites	3.2	0.9	3.5	1.6	0.2	2.1
Blacks	16.0	15.7	16.5	28.1	14.1	22.6
Jews	6.4	9.4	5.5	4.7	14.4	13.0
Hispanics	10.6	15.2	16.9	14.2	14.7	10.5
Asians	28.7	30.0	40.6	34.0	31.4	28.9
Equal in common with all	14.9	11.7	9.4	11.5	11.4	7.9
Nothing in common with any	2.1	6.3	2.8	0.4	4.9	9.6
DK	18.1	10.8	4.7	5.5	8.9	5.4

*

J. Intergroup Contact						
Out-group members knowing						
Whites	85.2%	94.4%	97.5%	92.7%	95.3%	84.4%
Blacks	75.2	90.5	88.6	90.8	86.0	80.4*
Jews	58.3	62.6	80.5	63.3	54.0	39.2*
Hispanics	80.0	78.3	80.5	79.1	68.7	63.8*
Asians	59.8	64.6	68.9	70.4	55.3	47.7*
Out-group members knowing						
from school						
Whites	49.4	62.7	53.7	59.2	61.9	59.4
Blacks	34.8	47.4	45.1	34.5	43.5	36.0
Jews	24.5	28.3	39.3	23.8	27.7	14.8*
Hispanics	31.8	37.4	35.3	30.8	30.0	29.7
Asians	20.7	31.3	19.6	30.2	21.4	15.4*
Out-group members knowing						
from local community						
Whites	49.4	76.1	82.0	63.2	85.2	78.1*
Blacks	52.2	58.8	50.2	47.8	55.5	38.0*
Jews	23.3	30.7	42.4	27.5	26.3	8.0*
Hispanics	46.4	38.7	42.3	42.2	43.7	33.0
Asians	20.9	30.4	31.4	30.8	30.1	23.6

*

	Large cent. city	Oth. cent. city	Large sub-urb	Oth. sub-urb	Oth. urban	Rural
Out-group members knowing as relative						
Whites	37.6	39.4	39.8	55.3	49.9	31.3
Blacks	13.0	9.2	8.4	7.6	9.6	8.0
Jews	10.3	9.0	16.6	12.1	8.0	4.4*
Hispanics	10.6	15.2	11.5	12.9	10.2	9.3
Asians	3.1	8.6	8.5	11.1	6.3	3.6*
Out-group members knowing from work						
Whites	81.8	92.0	88.7	84.6	91.4	47.4*
Blacks	56.9	74.1	71.9	72.4	54.7	51.7*
Jews	37.2	31.6	54.1	37.4	22.0	12.3*
Hispanics	62.5	52.6	59.6	57.1	50.0	42.3*
Asians	38.8	44.9	46.2	49.2	29.9	14.0*
Out-group members close to...						
Whites	36.0	70.1	68.1	81.7	76.8	46.9*
Blacks	29.7	54.5	55.3	49.0	44.7	35.3*
Jews	21.8	29.4	50.4	31.2	24.6	12.4*
Hispanics	37.6	38.6	45.8	34.4	33.0	28.3*
Asians	14.7	31.2	31.1	30.0	22.4	17.2*

Table 20
Intergroup Attitudes and Contact by Religion

A. Made Important Contributions	Prot.	Cath.	Jews	None	Other
English	73.0%	64.4%	80.0%	75.7%	68.6%
Italians	46.5	47.4	69.2	52.7	46.9
Chinese	36.1	34.7	50.7	45.6	54.6*
Jews	52.2	49.3	83.1	53.9	55.3*
Blacks	47.9	40.0	60.0	57.7	57.4*
Mexicans	25.4	25.9	30.8	34.8	40.6
Vietnamese	16.0	15.1	20.0	23.5	35.7*
Cubans	14.8	11.5	23.1	22.0	31.5*
Irish	46.0	45.5	63.1	53.9	47.6
Puerto Ricans	16.7	14.8	20.0	23.5	34.3*
Japanese	37.8	37.4	53.8	43.1	58.8*
Muslims	14.7	12.8	21.5	24.2	31.5*
B. Language-Use Policies					
English unites Americans	76.2%	71.4%	74.6%	72.2%	63.7%*
For English as official language	78.1	72.5	75.4	60.2	67.6*
Ballots should not be in other languages	36.3	33.2	31.7	27.3	38.5*
English threatened if immigrants use other languages	34.7	31.0	30.1	23.8	21.7*
Abolish bilingual education	23.8	19.5	20.6	20.8	16.8

	Prot.	Cath.	Jews	None	Other
Value of Knowing Second Language					
Children should learn second language in school (Disagree)	27.3	22.3	10.8	22.3	20.3*
Learning foreign language as valuable as math or science (Disagree)	39.6	30.0	41.3	30.9	28.7*
C. Immigration and Assimilation					
Total level of immigration (Decrease)	45.5%	39.2%	41.5%	39.1%	35.7%*
Level from...					
Latin America	46.4	36.4	35.4	38.9	37.1*
Asia	43.6	38.0	32.3	36.8	32.2*
Europe	37.6	29.0	20.0	30.2	28.0*
Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures (Not Likely)	24.2	21.7	29.2	23.4	19.6*
Higher crime rates (Likely)	73.7	71.1	50.8	66.7	51.8*
People born in the U.S. losing their jobs (Likely)	60.8	56.1	47.7	53.8	45.1
Making it harder to keep the country united (Likely)	56.2	52.8	43.1	49.1	46.2*
Higher econ. growth (Not Likely)	50.5	44.1	40.0	44.7	32.2
Groups should blend in	36.6	33.3	26.2	33.2	20.4

D. Changes in Population

Group's Population Share

Will Increase

Whites	39.1%	39.9%	29.3%	28.5%	30.8%
Blacks	73.8	69.8	69.3	61.1	74.2
Jews	29.4	31.6	15.3	25.5	17.5
Hispanics	83.9	82.9	89.2	84.5	90.3
Asians	62.9	66.8	75.4	63.9	69.3
Population change is bad thing	21.5	14.5	24.6	17.1	12.3*

E. Population Share Estimates

United States

White	58.0	60.4	62.5	59.0	60.1
Black	32.6	30.8	25.2	29.4	30.9*
Hispanic	23.1	27.4	23.3	24.4	25.9*
Jewish	17.9	19.6	10.1	16.1	14.9*
Asian	17.5	19.4	16.1	16.1	16.8
American Indian	14.3	16.2	8.2	12.6	11.9*
Mixed	43.7	41.6	37.3	46.3	41.8

Local community

White	68.4	67.1	70.8	65.0	65.9
Black	21.1	16.9	14.1	20.1	17.9*
Hispanic	12.3	16.9	12.8	15.7	15.1*
Jewish	6.0	8.4	18.9	6.6	6.7*
Asian	6.3	8.5	8.6	6.8	10.8*
American Indian	4.3	5.1	1.5	5.7	8.0*

F Ethnic Images.	Prot.	Cath.	Jews	None	Other
Rich/Poor					
Blacks	-1.45	-1.81	-1.53	-1.47	-1.69*
Jews	0.28	0.29	0.47	0.10	0.33
Hispanics	-1.49	-1.75	-1.55	-1.51	-1.71
Asians	-0.46	-0.49	-0.26	-0.39	-0.38
Hardworking/Lazy					
Blacks	-0.82	-1.02	-0.33	-0.56	-0.94*
Jews	0.17	0.28	0.62	0.16	0.32
Hispanics	-0.32	-0.28	0.12	-0.25	-0.34
Asians	0.16	0.18	0.74	0.41	0.39*
Violence-Prone/Not					
Blacks	-0.64	-0.76	-0.37	-0.50	-0.73
Jews	0.43	0.51	0.74	0.63	0.48
Hispanics	-0.42	-0.49	-0.23	-0.25	-0.49
Asians	0.13	0.26	0.45	0.30	0.47
Intelligent/Not					
Blacks	-0.68	-0.96	-0.10	-0.47	-0.55*
Jews	0.03	0.02	0.32	0.02	0.02
Hispanics	-0.74	-0.87	-0.17	-0.61	-0.81*
Asians	-0.14	-0.10	0.42	0.02	0.19*

Committed to Strong Families/Not						
Blacks	-0.64	-0.84	-0.21	-0.49	-0.56	
Jews	0.45	0.38	0.73	0.56	0.66	
Hispanics	-0.01	0.20	0.70	0.43	0.40*	
Asians	0.30	0.29	0.78	0.66	0.73*	
Committed to Fair & Equal Treatment/Not						
Blacks	-0.50	-0.76	0.15	-0.18	0.01*	
Jews	0.05	-0.23	0.60	0.19	-0.01*	
Hispanics	-0.37	-0.44	0.25	-0.04	0.07*	
Asians	-0.21	-0.25	0.18	0.02	0.09	
G. Social Distance						
Whites						
Object to neighbors	5.8%	4.9%	-----%	9.5%	4.3%	
Object to rel. marrying	8.6	5.0	-----	16.3	4.3*	
Blacks						
Object to neighbors	31.5	33.7	19.0	23.1	20.5	
Object to rel. marrying	40.5	29.0	20.3	21.8	12.6*	
Jews						
Object to neighbors	9.1	11.5	-----	9.8	5.0	
Object to rel. marrying	15.7	11.3	-----	6.1	9.2*	
Hispanics						
Object to neighbors	28.3	25.9	16.9	22.8	28.2	
Object to rel. marrying	25.0	18.7	15.3	14.1	13.0*	

	Prot.	Cath.	Jews	None	Other
Asians					
Object to neighbors	19.3	17.3	18.4	16.7	16.5*
Object to rel. marrying	24.1	19.3	20.0	12.2	13.4*
H. Preferred Neighborhood					
All					
Whites	51.9%	46.8%	54.4%	45.5%	46.4%*
Blacks	20.8	16.2	18.3	18.7	19.9*
Hispanics	12.5	17.2	14.0	16.6	14.5*
Asians	12.7	14.1	13.3	13.9	16.5
Doesn't matter	2.1	5.6	0.0	5.4	2.6*
Whites only					
Whites	58.5	50.5	55.5	48.3	52.2*
Blacks	16.1	15.6	16.7	16.9	17.7
Hispanics	12.1	15.1	14.3	15.0	13.6*
Asians	12.5	12.4	13.6	13.6	12.6
Doesn't matter	0.9	6.4	0.0	6.3	3.9*
I. Most/Least in Common With (Whites Only)					
Most in common					
Whites	16.1%	17.7%	25.4%	20.3%	24.2%
Blacks	17.0	14.2	19.0	13.6	8.8
Jews	15.8	21.0	23.8	14.9	9.9
Hispanics	13.1	16.2	0.0	11.1	16.5

Asians	9.3	6.8	11.1	3.2	3.3
Equal in common with all	15.1	14.6	17.5	20.3	19.8
Nothing in common with any	8.4	2.5	3.2	8.5	2.2
DK	5.2	7.0	0.0	8.2	15.4
			*		
Least in common					
Whites	0.6	2.7	0.0	1.0	2.2
Blacks	17.2	18.9	17.5	15.8	19.8
Jews	11.1	11.5	0.0	12.3	7.7
Hispanics	15.6	10.7	28.6	13.5	13.2
Asians	32.0	35.3	34.9	29.0	29.7
Equal in common with all	10.5	8.6	17.5	13.9	13.2
Nothing in common with any	5.4	3.9	0.0	4.2	5.5
DK	7.6	8.4	1.6	10.3	8.8
			*		

J. Intergroup Contact

Out-group members knowing					
Whites	93.7%	92.5%	--- %	92.2%	91.1%
Blacks	88.1	80.8	98.4	90.5	81.9*
Jews	55.2	62.4	---	59.7	65.0
Hispanics	69.9	70.1	86.2	82.0	82.4*
Asians	56.3	60.1	75.4	62.7	75.6*

	Prot.	Cath.	Jews	None	Other
Out-group members knowing from school					
Whites	60.9	57.4	-----	56.2	51.1
Blacks	41.4	37.6	44.3	45.9	51.2
Jews	22.5	30.2	-----	32.8	38.0
Hispanics	28.6	34.7	35.4	35.6	41.5
Asians	20.3	22.5	20.3	29.2	33.6*
Out-group members knowing from local community					
Whites	74.1	69.7	-----	77.8	80.0
Blacks	54.0	49.6	50.8	53.3	46.0
Jews	24.6	29.1	-----	31.2	24.1*
Hispanics	39.8	40.1	38.5	48.6	45.1
Asians	28.5	27.6	32.8	30.5	35.5*
Out-group members knowing as relative					
Whites	42.7	46.2	-----	44.4	42.2
Blacks	9.3	8.5	6.6	10.5	7.9
Jews	9.3	9.5	-----	8.9	11.7
Hispanics	10.9	12.1	6.2	12.9	9.8
Asians	6.8	7.9	12.5	5.3	6.5

Out-group members knowing from work					
Whites	92.2	86.5	----	65.9	84.4*
Blacks	63.5	60.7	68.2	61.7	59.1
Jews	26.8	34.6	----	31.1	31.0
Hispanics	52.7	49.5	56.3	53.8	58.2
Asians	33.9	38.1	39.6	38.6	35.4
Out-group members close to...					
Whites	66.7	74.0	----	54.0	64.1
Blacks	46.6	41.1	53.4	54.3	36.3*
Jews	24.8	30.4	----	31.2	32.3*
Hispanics	34.6	29.9	61.3	40.9	33.3*
Asians	24.3	24.7	21.3	23.8	32.0

Table 21
Trends in Acceptance of Intermarriage

	Nongroup Members			
	1990	1996	1998	2000
Close relative marrying person who is ...				
Black				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	63.6%	40.6%	38.4%	31.9%
Hispanic				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	41.2	-----	-----	20.9
Asian				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	41.2	-----	-----	20.4
Jewish				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	16.0	-----	-----	12.6

Source: 1990-2000 GSS

Table 22
Trends in Acceptance of Neighborhood Integration

Living in a neighborhood that is half ...	Nongroup Members			
	1990	1996	1998	2000
Black				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	46.3%	29.2%	30.5%	27.8%
Hispanic				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	42.9	-----	-----	26.5
Asian				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	35.0	-----	-----	18.1
Jewish				
Oppose/Strongly oppose	13.6	-----	-----	9.1

Source: 1990-2000 GSS

Table 23
Trends in Ethnic Images

		Position of Groups Compared to Whites					
		1990	1994	1996	1998	2000	
Rich/Poor							
Blacks							
+		3.4	4.2	9.6	8.1	6.9	
0		14.9	14.8	17.7	19.6	20.2	
-		81.6	80.8	72.6	72.3	72.9	
Hispanics							
+		5.1	4.7	-----	-----	6.3	
0		12.3	13.8	-----	-----	16.3	
-		82.5	81.5	-----	-----	77.4	
Asians							
+		14.8	16.4	-----	-----	20.1	
0		31.8	30.0	-----	-----	32.1	
-		53.4	53.6	-----	-----	47.8	
Jews							
+		45.6	-----	-----	-----	35.4	

0	37.0	----	----	----	----	37.6
-	17.4	----	----	----	----	26.9
Hardworking/Lazy						
Blacks						
+	6.3	7.9	12.2	10.5	9.4	9.4
0	34.2	37.1	47.8	49.9	47.2	47.2
-	59.4	54.9	39.9	39.5	43.4	43.4
Hispanics						
+	7.7	13.4	----	----	20.6	20.6
0	38.2	32.6	----	----	42.2	42.2
-	54.1	54.1	----	----	37.2	37.2
Asians						
+	27.7	39.2	----	----	31.0	31.0
0	35.3	30.0	----	----	44.6	44.6
-	36.9	30.8	----	----	24.3	24.3
Jews						
+	37.0	----	----	----	27.3	27.3
0	47.3	----	----	----	48.7	48.7
-	15.7	----	----	----	24.0	24.0
Violence-Prone/Not						
Blacks						
+	13.4	----	----	----	0.1	0.1
0	32.1	----	----	----	46.2	46.2
-	54.5	----	----	----	43.7	43.7

Position of Groups Compared to Whites

	1990	1994	1996	1998	2000
Hispanics					
+	15.4	-----	-----	-----	13.4
0	34.3	-----	-----	-----	46.7
-	50.3	-----	-----	-----	39.8
Asians					
+	22.9	-----	-----	-----	23.9
0	44.0	-----	-----	-----	52.3
-	33.1	-----	-----	-----	23.7
Jews					
+	30.3	-----	-----	-----	31.4
0	54.5	-----	-----	-----	51.2
-	15.1	-----	-----	-----	17.4
Intelligent/Not					
Blacks					
+	5.9	-----	9.1	8.6	5.1
0	42.5	-----	61.2	65.9	61.0
-	51.8	-----	29.8	25.5	34.0
Hispanics					
+	5.9	-----	-----	-----	3.1
0	39.9	-----	-----	-----	53.5
-	54.2	-----	-----	-----	43.5

Asians							
+	17.0	---	---	---	---	---	19.3
0	43.6	---	---	---	---	---	55.0
-	39.4	---	---	---	---	---	25.7
Jews							
+	21.7	---	---	---	---	---	16.6
0	64.0	---	---	---	---	---	63.8
-	14.3	---	---	---	---	---	19.6

Source: 1990-2000 GSS

Table 24
Trends in Perceived Reasons for Racial Inequality

	% Mentioning Reason for Disparities							
	Whites				Blacks			
	Discrim-ination	Less ability	Less educ.	Less motiv.	Discrim-ination	Less ability	Less educ.	Less motiv.
1977	39.5	24.5	49.5	61.3	-----	-----	-----	-----
1985	40.1	20.1	51.1	57.1	73.5	16.2	72.0	31.3
1986	39.1	19.2	49.0	61.8	69.5	17.5	60.0	35.9
1988	37.1	19.2	50.5	58.8	76.4	9.2	69.9	34.9
1989	36.3	15.9	52.0	57.6	75.4	16.6	66.8	30.3
1990	36.0	18.0	50.4	60.5	65.8	13.4	69.0	37.2
1991	33.2	15.5	50.6	57.1	79.9	9.8	57.0	46.3
1993	34.7	10.6	50.1	49.4	81.1	18.6	70.9	39.8
1994	33.4	12.6	46.3	52.5	77.4	9.3	58.2	27.8
1996	32.0	8.6	41.4	49.3	60.2	8.3	52.3	38.3
1998	29.6	9.4	40.7	43.4	55.2	8.4	53.9	34.1
2000	30.8	11.5	42.0	46.9	60.0	12.9	55.9	38.8

Source: 1977-2000 GSS

Wording: On average Blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are...

- a. Mainly due to discrimination?
- b. Because Blacks have less in-born ability to learn?
- c. Because most Blacks don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty?
- d. Because most Blacks just don't have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty?

Table 25
Trends in Various Racial Attitudes

	For anti- miscegena- tion laws	Blacks shouldn't push	Not close to Blacks	Not close to Whites
Whites				
1972	35.8%	69.7%	-----%	-----%
1973	37.0	72.4	-----	-----
1974	32.7	-----	-----	-----
1975	37.6	72.1	-----	-----
1976	31.9	69.8	-----	-----
1977	26.8	70.9	-----	-----
1978	-----	-----	-----	-----
1980	29.5	66.7	-----	-----
1982	31.9	59.9	-----	-----
1983	-----	-----	-----	-----
1984	25.4	57.5	-----	-----
1985	27.5	60.9	-----	-----
1986	-----	-----	-----	-----
1987	25.4	-----	-----	-----
1988	24.9	-----	-----	-----
1989	21.5	-----	-----	-----
1990	19.1	-----	-----	-----
1991	18.5	-----	-----	-----
1993	17.2	-----	-----	-----

	For anti- miscegena- tion laws	Blacks shouldn't push	Not close to Blacks	Not close to Whites
1994	14.8	-----	-----	-----
1996	11.7	39.2	20.5	3.5
1998	12.1	40.3	22.1	3.3
2000	10.7	38.4	20.9	2.7
Blacks				
1972	----- %	----- %	----- %	----- %
1973	-----	-----	-----	-----
1974	-----	-----	-----	-----
1975	-----	-----	-----	-----
1976	-----	-----	-----	-----
1977	-----	-----	-----	-----
1978	-----	-----	-----	-----
1980	18.0	48.3	-----	-----
1982	7.4	24.9	-----	-----
1983	-----	-----	-----	-----
1984	5.5	37.5	-----	-----
1985	8.6	44.3	-----	-----
1986	-----	-----	-----	-----
1987	4.7	-----	-----	-----
1988	4.2	-----	-----	-----
1989	5.7	-----	-----	-----
1990	7.2	-----	-----	-----
1991	6.3	-----	-----	-----

1993	4.3	-----	-----	-----
1994	3.1	32.2	-----	-----
1996	3.9	34.9	6.7	16.8
1998	3.3	32.8	8.1	15.6
2000	3.8	35.4	3.2	15.7

Source: 1972-2000 GSS

Wordings: Do you think there should be laws against marriages between Blacks and Whites?

Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with Black-White relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself feel? (Agree Strongly; Agree; Disagree Slightly; Disagree) Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted. In general how close do you feel to Blacks/Whites? Nine point scale going from 1 - Not at All Close to 5 - Neither one Feeling Nor the Other to 9 - Very Close.

Table 26
Trends in Support for Government Policies to Help Blacks

	% gov't. help blacks	% for affirma- tive action	% against blacks working way up W/O spec. favors	% for more gov't. spending for blacks' living conditions	% for more gov't. spending for blacks' assistance
1973	--	--	--	35.3	--
1974	--	--	--	33.4	--
1975	24.7	--	--	29.4	--
1976	--	--	--	29.6	--
1977	--	--	--	27.5	--
1978	--	--	--	26.3	--
1980	--	--	--	26.7	--
1982	--	--	--	30.2	--
1983	16.6	--	--	31.7	--
1984	18.4	--	--	37.3	26.5
1985	--	--	--	32.1	28.8
1986	17.7	--	--	37.2	23.5
1987	20.5	--	--	37.4	28.2
1988	16.7	--	--	38.0	29.0
1989	19.2	--	--	37.3	31.3
1990	20.5	--	--	41.1	31.1
1991	21.7	--	--	39.0	34.5
1993	17.0	--	--	39.4	27.2
1994	15.6	16.3	14.7	34.0	26.5

1996	15.8	15.8	14.4	35.4	25.4
1998	15.8	13.8	13.8	36.9	29.3
2000	18.8	18.0	16.0	38.1	33.4

Source: 1973-2000 GSS

Wordings: Some people think that Blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to Blacks. Where do you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?

Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given preferences in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of Blacks is wrong because it discriminates against Whites. What about your opinion — are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?

Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement: Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors.

We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or the right amount.

- Improving the conditions of Blacks
- Assistance for Blacks

Table 27
Trends in Attitudes on Immigration/Multiculturalism

	1994	2000
For decreasing number of immigrants	62.0%	42.1%
Immigrants somewhat or very likely to hurt national unity	69.1	53.3
Immigrants not too likely or not at all likely to lead to high economic growth	63.5	46.7
Different racial/ethnic groups should		
Maintain own cultures (1-3)	31.6	30.2
In between (4)	28.8	31.8
Blend into main culture (5-7)	37.8	34.0
DK	1.9	4.1

Source: 1994-2000 GSS