# MODERN
# JEWISH FERTILITY

EDITED BY

## PAUL RITTERBAND

LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1981

# WHY CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN JEWS
# WANT SMALL FAMILIES

*An Interreligious Comparison of*
*College Graduates*

## STEVEN MARTIN COHEN AND PAUL RITTERBAND

On the average, contemporary American Jews have smaller families than do their non-Jewish neighbors. There is evidence that small-family size has been characteristic of Jews since they entered the mainstream of the societies in which they have lived (Goldscheider, 1967). As Jews left the traditional order they began to have smaller and smaller families, leading to the current situation in which Jews may well be below replacement. In part, the decline in Jewish family size in America reflects and is part of the general decline in fertility in the American population at large (Coale and Zelnick, 1963). American fertility decline, in turn, is part of the demographic transition that has occurred among Westernized or industrialized nations over the past two centuries.

That contemporary Jews have and want to have fewer children than did their forebears in Europe is to be expected given the workings of the demographic transition. The greater decline of Jewish fertility as compared with that of their non-Jewish neighbors cannot be explained by reference to the demographic transition alone. What requires further analysis and explanation is the apparently greater effect of the demographic transition on Jewish populations. Although most of the major religious groups of the Western world have experienced a fertility decline, the rate and level of decline has been far greater for Jews. Data presented by Knodel (1974, p. 137) give some sense of the differential fertility decline for a Western Jewish population. Some of these data and additional calculations are presented in Table 1.

Part A of the table duplicates the findings presented in Knodel. To get at interreligious differentials across and within time periods, we have made some additional calculations presented in parts B and C of Table 1. In 1842-1844 the crude Jewish birthrate is just a bit lower than that of Protestants and Catholics. By 1924-1926 the Jewish birthrate is reduced to about two-thirds of that of Protestants and to only slightly more than one-half that of Catholics. Another way of approaching these data is to

*Table 1*

*Changes in Crude Birthrates in Prussia by Religion: 1842-1844 to 1924-1926*

| Part A. | Crude birthrates by female's religion by year | | |
|---------|------------|----------|------|
| Year | Protestant | Catholic | Jew |
| 1842-1844 | 39.2 | 41.0 | 37.2 |
| 1924-1926 | 19.7 | 24.6 | 13.3 |

| Part B. | Jewish crude birthrate as a proportion of Protestant and Catholic crude birthrates | |
|---------|-------------|-----------|
| Year | Protestants | Catholics |
| 1842-1844 | .95 | .91 |
| 1924-1926 | .68 | .54 |

| Part C. | 1924-1926 Crude birthrates as a proportion of 1842-1844 birthrates by female's religion | | |
|---------|------------|----------|------|
| | Protestant | Catholic | Jew |
| | .50 | .60 | .36 |

examine the 1924-1926 birthrates as a fraction of the 1842-1844 birthrates. These calculations then give us a sense of decline for the three religious groups. All three groups declined in their crude birthrates, but the Jewish decline is larger by far than that of Protestants and Catholics. The three religious groups all had high birthrates in the 1840s, and all three had declined substantially by the 1920s. What made Jews decline so much more than Protestants and Catholics? It would appear that the shift from traditionalism to modernity had greater impact on the fertility behavior of Jews than of non-Jews. What accounts for that differential is the focus of this paper.

We shall address two problems. First, we shall attempt to account for differences in desired family size by religion. Second, we shall examine the routes to group, mean, desired family size. The first of these problems has been the subject of a large body of research that we shall review in this paper. The second issue is, in a sense, derived from the first yet is distinct. Groups may well want the same family size (i.e. group mean fertility) but arrive at their result through different routes. Thus, we shall be examining: (1) religious group differences in family size desires and (2) religious group differences in determinants of family size desires.

Religious group differences in family size desires have been attributed by one or more authors to social characteristics, to ideology, to minority

group status, and to religion itself. The characteristics hypothesis shifts the problem focus from interreligious fertility differentials to differences that stem from social characteristics associated with the three major religious groups. In doing so, it does effectively eliminate Protestant-Jewish differences on outcomes in almost all elements in the fertility complex (Freedman *et al.*, 1961). Although it is useful, matching on social characteristics, however, creates a new set of problems and does not adequately resolve the initiating problems. First, matching on social characteristics increases the Catholic–non-Catholic differences. For example, fertility desire is negatively correlated with education for Protestants, whereas it is positively correlated with education for Catholics. Jews show a somewhat ambiguous relationship between education and family size desire.[1] Second, even though Protestant-Jewish differentials in outcomes are largely eliminated, possible differences in process or routes are not dealt with. As we shall show further on, group similarities in outcomes are unrelated to similarities in process.

Goldscheider (1967) offers a second explanation for low Jewish fertility. He writes:

> The long history of low Jewish fertility in many countries may be explained by the minority position of Jews and cross-culturally-shared Jewish values. ...The aspirations of Jews for social mobility, their desire for acceptance in American society, and the insecurity of their minority status tended to encourage small family size (p. 207).

When confronted with a variety of empirical findings, this argument appears to be ad hoc and unconvincing. First, with respect to American Jews alone, if insecurity resulting from minority status and low social status results in lower fertility, then one would expect Jewish fertility to have climbed steadily over the last few decades (which it did not). Several historical trends emerged. Overt anti-Semitism declined during this period (Stember, 1966); American Jews eventually attained upper-middle-class status in large numbers; and proportionately fewer Jews manifest a salient Jewish identification that is probably a precondition for feeling insecure as a minority-group member.

A second objection to the minority status theory is offered by Sklare (1971):

> If it were correct, Jews in Israel who are the sociological opposite-numbers of American Jews should have a considerably higher birth rate. But in spite of living in a country where Jews are the majority and thus need have no fear of suffering discrimination, the birth rate of such Israelis is not very different from that of their American cousins (p. 81).[2]

A third objection to the theory is that it fails to apply to Catholics, either here in the United States or internationally. Thus, if individuals lower their fertility in response to minority-group insecurity, then one would expect Catholics to do so whenever they are accorded low prestige as a group in a society.[3] In fact, American Catholics display higher-fertility complexes than non-Catholics. More significant is Day's (1968) comparison of Catholic birthrates in nineteen countries. Contrary to the minority status theory, he finds Catholic fertility is higher in countries where Catholics are in the minority and lower in nations where they are in the majority.

Finally, in support of the minority status theory, Goldscheider cites evidence of lower fertility among college-educated nonwhites (1967, p. 20). But this phenomenon may be peculiar to Blacks and not characterize American minority groups generally. We have evidence that Mexican-Americans (in a fashion unlike the Blacks but similar to other Catholic groups) fail to reduce their fertility substantially when they attain middle-class rank (Grebler et al., 1970). If one would wish to maintain the minority status argument, the findings cited in the foregoing would demand such extensive revision, modification, and qualification of the theory as to render it useless by virtue of its sheer complexity and multiple exceptions.

Much of the literature reports that religious Catholics (however religiosity is defined and measured) want and have more children than their more secular counterparts. One explanation for these findings could be that the Roman Catholic church effectively teaches its parishioners to have large families. However, official church doctrine per se does not explicitly encourage large families; rather, it forbids the use of mechanical and chemical means of contraception.[4] Second, a survey of Catholic women finds that such respondents, in the main, do not believe that the church wants them to have large families (Westoff et al., 1964, p. 133). Finally, even when couples defy the church's ban on "artificial" contraception (and thereby flout the church's explicit teachings regarding fertility and reproductive behavior), they, nevertheless, maintain higher levels of fertility and fertility desires than their non-Catholic counterparts. The explanation for the Catholic–non-Catholic fertility differential does not lie in the elite religion of the Catholic church, that is, in its doctrine as conveyed by the church as *magister*. Rather, we propose it lies in American Catholic folk religion, that is, the folk fertility norms of American Catholics.[5]

In America, as in other societies, there are norms concerning appropriate family size. In a recent review of the literature, Hass (1974a) offers this summary statement:

> In the U.S. the two-child family is currently the favorite family size, although tolerance also exists for larger families (up to four children). A variety of informal negative sanctions apply to deviant couples who remain childless or have only one child, and negative sanctions are secondarily applied to those who greatly exceed the appropriate family size (p. 4).

Couples are *relatively* free to violate these norms when they (a) are strongly committed to another set of norms and (b) their significant others accept the subgroups' norms and reinforce the actors' commitment to subgroup norms. We propose that for traditionally religious Catholics and Jews both these conditions exist, whereas they do not exist for traditionally religious Protestants.

Catholics, Protestants, and Jews all have a past history of high fertility. For Catholics and Jews religiosity serves to connect them to their past and to remove them from the current American cultural consensus, a consensus that is predicated largely on secular values and assumptions. For Protestants by contrast, religiosity does not remove them from the American consensus. In a sense, to be Protestant in America is to be quintessentially American. Religious Catholics and Jews live in two civilizations. Their religious civilization connects them with their high fertility past. Their "Americanness," on the other hand, tends to bring their fertility norms closer to those of the American ( = Protestant) consensus.

Second, for both Catholics and Jews, religiosity implies integration into a subcommunity with a set of relatively autonomous institutions paralleling those created and sustained by most Americans, including in the main, Protestant America. These institutions include schools, networks of kin and friendship, philanthropic bodies and the like that can totally dominate the nonwork time of traditional Catholics and Jews.

Thus for both religious Catholics and Jews, religiosity functions in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, it keeps the individual in touch with the values of his or her ancestral past. Second, it reinforces these values by surrounding him or her with individuals and institutions ("influentials") that are also tied to that past. Freedman, Whelpton, and Smit (1961, p. 613) suggest, too, "that distinctive Catholic fertility behavior tends to disappear when the barriers between the religious subcommunities are reduced." They recognize, as do we, that self-selection likely plays a role in the individual's choice to remain within the religious subcommunity. However, we propose that the individual's religiosity and his/her participation in the subcommunity of the religiously traditional are mutually reinforcing and reciprocally causal.

Religiosity is an individual experience for the Protestant and a communitarian experience for the pious Catholic or Jew. Protestants have largely viewed religion as a matter of individual conscience and faith, which is decidedly private in nature. For Jews and Catholics, though, traditional religious commitment entails involvement with a religious community and is associated with a responsibility to a religious society. Jewish and Catholic religiosity, moreover, requires performance of several visible and public rituals, acts of faith that bind the individual to the historically framed "people" or "church," respectively. Benjamin Halpern's (1956) discussion of the three religious communities is particularly helpful and we quote him at length:

> It is in Protestantism and its typical attitudes and patterns of social organiza-
> tion, even including the social framework of the private realm of religion, that
> we have the most authentic prototype of the American Way of Life. ... Accor-
> ding to the dominant Protestant and American conception, religion really
> resides in the individual, and in his direct confrontation of God and of God's
> Word. The church or the congregation is, at bottom, more of a social conve-
> nience, an instrument to help the individual realize religion than the actuality
> of religion. ...Catholics regard religion as inhering essentially in the whole be-
> lieving community, not the individual communicant, and... Jews... believe
> their religion to occur in the historic community, not to the isolated individual
> (pp. 38-40).

If Halpern's characterizations are correct, Catholic and Jewish (though not Protestant) religious commitment implies immersion in a more traditionally oriented subcommunity and, as a consequence, the greater likelihood of adopting its norms regarding a wide range of behaviors, even such private decisions as family size. Significantly, a few Protestant groups in the United States are extremely fertile. These are primarily rural sectarian communities such as the Hutterites. Their high fertility reflects in large measure their total traditionalism and withdrawal from the secular world. A more useful comparison might be found among Mormons or Latter Day Saints. Westoff and Potvin (1967, p. 131) found that Mormon college women wanted an average 4.7 children, as compared with 3.5 for Protestants. Although socially the Mormons are thought of as Protestants, they think of themselves as a distinct religious community unrelated to (unredeemed) Protestant America. To be a believing, practicing Mormon is to withdraw from the American cultural consensus even while participating fully in the American polity and economy. This, we argue, is true as well of pious Catholics and Jews and much less so for pious Protestants, whether main-line or evangelical.

In sum, then, for those for whom religiosity implies participation in a distinct subculture reinforced by contact with fellow believers, older norms persist and continue to influence fertility desires. For main-line Protestants, religiosity implies neither a living past nor a separate community to as marked a degree as it does for Catholics and Jews.

Although some of the reported research in the field has implied some of the elements in our theory, the theory itself has not been appropriately tested. First of all, some studies fail to use a measure of religiosity common to all three groups making it difficult to compare precisely the impact of religiosity from group to group. Second, even when a common measure of the independent variable was employed, researchers have tended to report correlations rather than unstandardized regression coefficients, the latter being the more appropriate statistic for across-group comparisons of impact. Third, the small number of Jews in the American population results in a small Jewish sample size even in some of the larger studies. As a result, interreligious comparisons of mean fertility scores involving Jews are somewhat unstable as are any intra-Jewish comparisons. Finally, we have reason to believe that some of the effects of "folk religion" have been distorted and/or masked by confounding interactive effects of educational attainment, age, marital duration, and generation in the United States. The sample we are exploiting (see the following) is considerably more homogeneous on these variables and, thus, in effect "controlling out" many of the possible complex interactions.

Nevertheless, the scant research findings previously reported offer suggestive, though clearly inconclusive, evidence in support of our hypothesis. Among Catholics, repeated studies report a direct association between religiosity and fertility. Thus, Wilson and Bumpass (1973) found that frequency of taking Holy Communion predicts number of children born. Westoff and Potvin (1966) found that attending Catholic high schools and colleges is a strong predictor of number of children desired. They later reported (1967, pp. 14-21) that selectivity (i.e., the selection of children with religious upbringing) is more important than college experience in determining the family belief system of Catholic women in denominational and nonsectarian colleges. Freedman and Whelpton (1950) found a direct association between Catholic church attendance and expected total births. In a later study, Freedman, Goldberg, and Bumpass (1965) show that regularity of church attendance predicts both number of children born and expected number of children. (Interestingly, and oddly enough, they do not present an analysis of their non-Catholic sample with respect to the effects of religiosity, if any.) Bumpass and Westoff (1969) find that "active" Catholics want more children.

Although the impact of religiosity upon fertility is clear among the Catholics, a much weaker (or no) relationship generally obtains in studies of Protestants. Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell (1959) find no relationship between Protestant church attendance and fertility. Freedman and Whelpton (1950) report little relationship between religious interest and Protestant fertility in Indianapolis. Bumpass and Westoff (1969) report very small differences in the number of children desired and completed parity between "active" and "other" Protestants in their national sample.

For reasons already noted, comparable data on the Jews are virtually lacking. In their study of the Jews of Providence, Goldstein and Goldscheider (1968) report mean fertility by "denomination" (i.e., Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform). They find that among first-generation Jews, those who identify themselves as Orthodox have the largest families, followed by Conservative and Reform Jews, in that order. In the second generation, the Orthodox have the smallest families, with Conservative and Reform families equal in size. In the "older" third generation (i.e., couples with largely completed fertility), the Conservative have the smallest families with Orthodox and Reform of equal size. Second- and third-generation differences are small ( = 0.2 child).

As Goldstein and Goldscheider note, denominational affiliation is confounded by other social characteristics (e.g., social class) that tend to obscure and confuse the relationship. With respect to other measures of Jewish religiocommunal involvement, they find no relationship with fertility. More significantly, their use of "denominational" affiliation or identification does not measure religiosity per se. Many Jews who call themselves Orthodox are, in fact, "non-observant Orthodox." Thus, insofar as they might attend synagogue services they attend an Orthodox synagogue, but in fact they attend infrequently and generally do not live up to the demands of Orthodox (or traditional) Judaism. Their self-designated Orthodoxy is an expression of sentiment or organizational loyalty, not religious commitment.

Westoff, Potter, Sagi, and Mishler (1961, p. 195) report weak *negative* correlation between attendance at services and number of children desired by Jewish wives ($r = -.13$) and an even weaker *positive* correlation for Jewish husbands ($r = .04$). However, they report positive correlations for Jewish husbands and wives between "informal religious orientation" and fertility desires. None of the correlations reported for Jews is significantly different from zero.

Pursuant to our hypothesis and derived in part from the previous research on religiosity and fertility, we would anticipate a significant impact (measured by the unstandardized regression coefficient) of religiosity upon the fertility desires of Catholics and Jews, but not of Protestants. In the following analysis, we test that hypothesis. Moreover, we consider whether the effect of religiosity, as an indicator of integration into a subcommunity with traditional, high-fertility norms, might not be confounded with other possible causes of high fertility. Notably, one could suggest that religious traditionalism might also be accompanied by a traditional orientation to the family; alternatively, religiosity may be serving as a proxy for the intergenerational transmission of large family norms. These alternative explanations are examined in the analysis to which we now turn.

*Data and Measures*

The research is based on a secondary analysis of data collected by the National Opinion Research Center in its study of approximately 35,000 spring 1961 graduates of American colleges and universities. Respondents filled out mail-back questionnaires in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1968. In the fifth and final wave, only a subsample of the respondents was used and, as a result, there are 4,868 respondents with data over each of the five waves. (For further sampling details, see Davis 1964.) Of these, 3,739 respondents were married by 1968 and they constituted the group upon which the analysis was performed. Since Jews attend college more frequently than non-Jews, whereas Catholics were somewhat less represented in the college population than in the general population, the proportions of the sample from each religious group differ from those found in the general American population. Specifically, and to the advantage of this study, there are a relatively large number of Jews available for analysis. The analysis focuses on the number of children desired at the two times in which that information was ascertained: 1964 and 1968.[6]

It would be useful to consider the merits and limitations of this variable. The most obvious objection is that fertility desires are a poor predictor of actual fertility and, therefore, analyses employing the fertility desires variable may bear little relationship to the processes affecting actual fertility. This objection may be answered in a variety of ways. First, although fertility desires are indeed a weak predictor of eventual completed parity on the individual level, there is strong evidence that fertility desires are an excellent predictor of fertility outcomes for aggregates. That is, we know

that fertility plans are subject to change and to measurement error. They are also subject to the vagaries of nature, that is, unplanned pregnancies ("accidents") and organic and/or functional infertility. Thus individuals' desires and their outcomes are often discrepant. However, it has been shown that the errors made by individuals tend to distribute randomly around a group mean: (see Westoff *et al.*, 1957, 1958; Goldberg *et al.*, 1959; Whelpton *et al.*, 1966; Bumpass and Westoff, 1970; Hass, 1974b). Second, as Hass (1974b) notes, the criticism of the fertility desires measure is most potent in the analysis of developing countries or societies undergoing rapid social change where fertility-related as well as other norms may be expected to be most unstable.

Researchers have devised a number of ways for defining and measuring religiosity [for example, see Lenski's (1961) four-dimensional schema]. However, for our purposes, attendance at religious services—the most straightforward and simplest indicator of religiosity—is also the most suitable. We have already argued that adherence to religious doctrine does not seem to be the critical aspect of religiosity for fertility behavior. Rather, participation in the traditional activities of the religious subsociety, as measured by service attendance, is probably the most suitable aspect of religiosity for our purposes. This contention is supported, in part, by a study of fertility orientation among Catholics. Potvin and Burch (1968) investigated the effects of attendance along with other measures (i.e., theology, subjective religious experience) and concluded that

> differences in religious practice [i.e., mass attendance, confession, communion] reveal significant differences in family-size preference and actual fertility. For the other religious factors either no differences or reduced differences appear.

Westoff *et al.* (1961), on the other hand, raise a serious question about the use of attendance at services as a measure of religiosity:

> Frequency of church attendance is relevant for Catholics, and measures, as a minimum, their adherence to the formal requirements of the Catholic church. For non-Catholics, however, church attendance may have quite a different meaning (p. 194).

They note the much lower rate of attendance for Protestants, and lower yet for Jews, and conclude *not* that Protestants and Jews are less religious than are Catholics but the "institutional requirements of the three religions are different" (Westoff *et al.*, 1961, p. 194).

We cannot agree. Regular attendance at service (or at least thrice daily formal worship plus prayers on rising, retiring, before and after meals, and other occasions) is a requirement of traditional Judaism to the present

day. Such prayer obligations are recognized as normative and binding even by America's "modern" Orthodox and Conservative Jewry. Rather than viewing the very low rates of service attendance by Jews (reported for our sample as well) as a reflection of changing institutional requirements, we interpret such findings as evidence of an overwhelming secularity or religious indifference of Jews.

To facilitate the analysis, the religious service attendance item was transformed from an ordinal to interval level variable by substituting estimated, mean annual rates of service attendance for the verbal, categoric responses.[7] Although we treat service attendance as a linear variable in the analysis, we note that departure from the linearity assumption results in small, statistically significant (though not substantively interesting) increments in explained variance in the dependent variables.[8] In order to retain easily interpretable comparability across the religious groups, we decided to retain the linearity assumption fully aware that doing so tends to depress the explained variance by a small amount.

As we noted earlier, religiosity might be considered a proxy for a generalized notion of traditionalism. We, therefore, attempted to locate other measures of traditional social and political orientations that would have an impact on fertility desires and early outcomes. With one exception, the several indicators of traditional orientation we examined failed to predict the dependent variables. That exception is what we term traditional sex-role orientation. Respondents were asked to express their views (recorded on a five-point agree-disagree scale) with sixteen statements regarding the family and sex roles. Since our principal concern was to devise the most potent control variable, we decided to maximize predictive validity by selecting from these items the cluster of items that would best predict 1964 fertility desires. Using stepwise regression, we located five items which, after summing, comprise the sex-role scale.[9]

The introduction of sex-role orientation as a control variable is also suggested by the literature. Thus, in their discussion of interreligious variations in fertility desires and outcomes, Westoff et al. (1961, p. 168) suggest that those differences may well reflect degrees of assimilation to American cultural norms generally and fertility norms specifically. More specifically, they speculate about the sex role and family patterns characteristic to the major religious groups:

> One avenue of investigation to be pursued in attempting to shed further light on the reasons for family-size differences by religion deriving from these considerations is the pattern of authority relationships within the family. Does the Catholic family system conform to the image of the traditional pa-

triarchal structure presumably characteristic of some other minority group (including the rural farm family which can now be regarded at least statistically, if not sociologically, as a minority)?

Sklare (1971, pp. 83-85) suggests low Jewish fertility is a function of the Jewish woman's abandonment of her traditional sex role, "as a maternal figure whose status derived from her role as mother and homemaker." Developing the thesis further, Sklare (1971, p. 83) argues that "a new orientation to the role of motherhood was developed—to be the mother of a large family was to be a beast of burden, an animal yoked to the treadmill, a primitive."

The propositions suggested by Westoff et al. (1961) and Sklare (1971) are essentially mirror images of one another: one attempts to explain a high-fertility group; the other, a low-fertility group. Explaining one group implies an explanation of the other group. Both theses suggest a difference in sex-role orientation between the "experimental group" (Catholics and Jews, respectively) and the others.

Last, we also introduce size of family of orientation—measured by summing responses to questions asking for the number of older and younger siblings—as a control variable. Duncan et al. (1965, p. 515) noted that "the small minority of large families in the current generation will be produced disproportionately by those who came from large families themselves." They cite a United Nations study suggesting that "family size has a tendency to run in families" (Duncan et al., 1965, p. 508).

Some of the effect of size of family of orientation on family size desires is likely to come about as a consequence of the continuity of the social facts that influence fertility from generation to generation. Thus religion, education, and other significant determinants of fertility outcomes "run in families" and might underlie the "inheritance" of family size. On a worldwide level, the "inheritance of fertility" might well be a function of large differences in fertility norms and contraceptive usage among couples in different countries. Yet the Duncan paper does show consistent, even though small, effects of family size within the United States. These effects range from .061 to .111 child (depending on the sample used) without controls and are reduced to .021 to .070 controlling for duration of marriage and wife's education. The sample that we are employing is essentially homogeneous with respect to education with few respondents having a farm background.

## Findings

The family size desires means in 1964 and 1968 are given in Table 2, part A. At both points in time, Protestant and Jewish means are equal and

*Table 2*

*Number of Children Desired by Religion in 1964 and 1968*

|  | Protestants | Catholics | Jews |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Part A. Means | | |
| 1964 | 2.88 | 3.93 | 2.92 |
| | (2,453) | (842) | (379) |
| 1968 | 2.68 | 3.53 | 2.75 |
| | (2,386) | (819) | (367) |
| | Part B. Percentage distribution | | |
| 1964 | | | |
| 0-1 | 4% | 2% | 3% |
| 2-3 | 71 | 37 | 73 |
| 4 + | 25 | 62 | 25 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | (2,453) | (842) | (379) |
| 1968 | | | |
| 0-1 | 5% | 2% | 3% |
| 2-3 | 75 | 49 | 79 |
| 4 + | 19 | 49 | 17 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | (2,386) | (819) | (367) |

those of Catholics exceed both. All groups decline somewhat from 1964 to 1968 with the greatest decline shown by the Catholics. The general decline is, probably, in large part attributable to a "maturation effect," parallel-ing previous work that hypothesized a decline in fertility desires during the premarital and early marital years (Rainwater, 1960, pp. 24-25). The somewhat larger Catholic decline is, probably, in part due to the decline in the level of characteristics favoring high-fertility desires (particularly religiosity) and, in part, to other causes discussed elsewhere (Cohen and Ritterband, 1976).

The equality of Jewish and Protestant mean fertility desires is also con-sistent with previous research (cited in the foregoing, but particularly Freedman *et al.*, 1961). As noted, Jews and Protestants display the same mean fertility complex when controlling for social status. Since our sample consists exclusively of college graduates of the class of 1961, we have effec-tively controlled for a critical social status characteristic, perhaps more critical than at later times in life when occupational and income variations are likely to grow. We should note that we examined the influence of some parental status characteristics, that is, father's and mother's educational attainment and father's occupational prestige—and failed to account for

explained variance in the dependent variables (for all three religious groups) appreciably different from zero.

The differences in mean family size desires by religion (i.e., Catholics vs. Protestants and Jews) are a function of the significantly high proportion of Catholics at the upper end of the distribution. An approximately equally small proportion of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews want either no children or one child. About three-fourths of the Protestants and Jews want two or three children, whereas two or three children is the desired family size for less than half of the Catholic respondents. The higher Catholic mean is a result of Catholics wanting larger families (4 or more children) and *not* a desire for small families (0-1 child among Protestants and Jews (see Table 2, part B).

Table 3 presents information on some of the other characteristics of the three religious groups in the sample. Again, these findings conform to what one would expect on the basis of the pertinent literature and previously noted characteristics of this sample. Thus, Catholic religious service attendance far exceeds that of the Protestants who, in turn, greatly surpass that of the Jews. This rank order is true for both points in time. Interestingly, there is a slight drop in Catholic service attendance from 1962 to 1968, whereas the Jewish and Protestant means remain stable. Well-informed speculation concerning the reasons for the Catholic decline is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper.

Earlier in this paper we reported on the work of Westoff *et al.* (1961) and Sklare (1971) who suggested that interreligious differences in fertility behavior may be due in part to differences among the religious groups in

*Table 3*

*Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Characteristics by Religion*

| Characteristics | Protestants | | Catholics | | Jews | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | S.D. | Mean | S.D. | Mean | S.D. |
| 1962 Religious | 24.1 | 20.6 | 44.7 | 16.5 | 5.2 | 10.0 |
| service attendance | (2,465) | | (846) | | (378) | |
| 1968 Religious | 23.9 | 21.6 | 39.3 | 20.7 | 5.3 | 11.9 |
| service attendance | (2,461) | | (846) | | (377) | |
| Traditional sex-role | 0.00 | 2.69 | .86 | 2.64 | -.57 | 2.90 |
| orientation | (2,503) | | (854) | | (382) | |
| Siblings | 1.68 | 1.21 | 2.03 | 1.29 | 1.34 | .90 |
| | (2,501) | | (852) | | (382) | |
| Age in 1968 | 30.64 | 4.39 | 30.45 | 3.42 | 29.73 | 3.65 |
| | (2,503) | | (854) | | (382) | |
| No. years | 5.54 | 2.15 | 4.95 | 2.18 | 4.97 | 2.23 |
| married in 1968 | (2,503) | | (854) | | (382) | |

their views of the family and traditional sex roles. If those speculations are correct, then we should find differences in sex-role orientations in which the Catholics would be most traditional and the Jews least traditional. Table 3 shows that such is the case, with the Protestants at the mean for this standardized summary score, the Catholics almost a whole standard deviation unit above the mean, and the Jewish average slightly over half a standard deviation unit below the mean. Moreover, in computations not presented, we disaggregated the religious groups by sex and (1) found men to be slightly more patriarchal than women (by about a half a standard deviation unit); (2) found the male-female difference constant across the three religious groups; and (3) within sex groups, found Catholics again most traditional and Jews most egalitarian.

The number of siblings for the three religious groups shows Catholics coming from the largest families and Jews from the smallest, with Protestants approximately midway in between. The rank order and size of family of orientation by religion is the same as that found for actual fertility outcomes in prior studies.

As might be expected of this sample, there are only slight variations in age. Number of years married is reported for those who were married by 1968.[10] Although there is little variation across religious groups, the data are consistent with previous reports of later marriage of Catholics relative to Protestants (Bumpass and Westoff, 1969, p. 450).

The correlations among independent and dependent variables are presented in Table 4. Correlations for Protestants appear above the diagonal of matrix A, the Catholics below the diagonal, and data on the Jews are reported in matrix B. We will limit our observations concerning Table 4 to the relationships among the three independent variables: religious service attendance (measured in 1962 and 1968), sex-role orientation, and number of siblings. Since all three variables can be construed as very crude measures of traditionalism, one might expect the three measures to be related. Although, among all groups, correlations are all in the expected direction, their magnitudes are hardly substantial. Correlations between siblings and sex-role orientation barely exceed .03 in all three groups, whereas correlations between religiosity and siblings are all under .1. We would suggest that part of the reason for the association between religiosity and number of siblings is that religiosity is "inherited" via the socialization process (Greeley and Rossi, 1966; Cohen, 1974; Lazerwitz, 1973; Dashefsky and Shapiro, 1974). We have hypothesized that religiosity and fertility are related. If such a relationship is operative in the parents' generation, then we will have accounted for, at least in

*Table 4*

*Correlations Among Selected Characteristics by Religion*[a]

|  | D64 | D68 | M | A | R62 | R68 | T | S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part A. Protestants (above diagonal) and Catholics (below diagonal) | | | | | | | | |
| D64 | ... | .59 | -.08 | -.08 | .08 | .08 | .11 | .12 |
| D68 | .59 | ... | .02 | -.03 | .09 | .10 | .09 | .12 |
| M | -.04 | .04 | ... | .31 | .04 | .15 | .00 | .09 |
| A | -.09 | -.01 | .36 | ... | .03 | .02 | .00 | .15 |
| R62 | .26 | .23 | -.10 | -.12 | ... | .56 | .11 | .07 |
| R68 | .29 | .31 | -.06 | -.01 | .58 | ... | .13 | .07 |
| T | .27 | .22 | -.01 | -.03 | .18 | .23 | ... | .03 |
| S | .14 | .13 | .00 | .10 | .09 | .09 | .03 | ... |
| Part B. Jews | | | | | | | | |
| D64 | ... | .04 | .03 | .06 | .24 | .23 | .17 | .16 |
| D68 | | ... | .00 | .01 | .17 | .23 | .17 | .09 |
| M | | | ... | .34 | .07 | .10 | -.08 | .06 |
| A | | | | ... | .10 | .13 | .09 | .25 |
| R62 | | | | | ... | .65 | .01 | .24 |
| R68 | | | | | | ... | .17 | .23 |
| T | | | | | | | ... | .03 |

[a] $D64$ = number of children desired, 1964; $D68$ = number of children desired, 1968; $M$ = number of years married, 1968; $A$ = age, 1968; $R62$ = religious service attendance, 1962; $R68$ = religious service attendance, 1968; $T$ = traditional sex-role orientations; $S$ = number of siblings.

theory, part of the association between religiosity and size of family of orientation in the current generation.

The associations between religiosity and sex-role orientation are somewhat more substantial, especially among Catholics and Jews. These findings imply that, particularly for Catholics and Jews, religious traditionalism reinforces (and possibly is reinforced by—the causal direction is unclear) familial traditionalism, or that, as was earlier suggested, both forms of traditionalism derive from some underlying, unifying characteristic or world view. Whatever the case may be, correlations between religiosity and traditional sex-role orientation are just barely high enough to suggest some causal link between the two variables, but low enough to suggest that we are measuring two different characteristics.

Table 5 presents the results of bivariate and multivariate regression equations for fertility desires in 1964 (part A) and in 1968 (part B). Since we are principally concerned with comparisons across populations, we have presented unstandardized regression coefficients as is appropriate for such comparisons.

*Table 5*

*Unstandardized Regression Equations Predicting Number of Children Desired (1964 and 1968) by Religion*[a]

|  | Protestants | | | | Catholics | | | | Jews | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Part A. 1964 | | | | | | | |
| $R62$ | .004 | — | — | .003 | .023 | — | — | .018 | .023 | — | — | .021 |
| $T$ | — | .049 | — | .040 | — | .146 | — | .124 | — | .055 | — | .053 |
| $S$ | — | — | .105 | .098 | — | — | .151 | .123 | — | — | .173 | .112 |
| $a$ | 2.79 | 2.89 | 2.71 | 2.65 | 2.92 | 3.80 | 3.62 | 2.75 | 2.79 | 2.95 | 2.68 | 2.69 |
| $\bar{R}^2$ | .006 | .013 | .014 | .029 | .069 | .074 | .019 | .132 | .060 | .028 | .027 | .093 |
| | | | | | Part B. 1968 | | | | | | | |
| $R68$ | .005 | — | — | .004 | .022 | — | — | .018 | .018 | — | — | .016 |
| $T$ | — | .033 | — | .028 | — | .119 | — | .084 | — | .051 | — | .045 |
| $S$ | — | — | .102 | .095 | — | — | .141 | .108 | — | — | .091 | .039 |
| $a$ | 2.57 | 2.68 | 2.51 | 2.43 | 2.69 | 3.44 | 3.25 | 2.52 | 2.66 | 2.79 | 2.64 | 2.64 |
| $R^2$ | .009 | .007 | .014 | .026 | .097 | .048 | .016 | .128 | .054 | .028 | .008 | .071 |

[a] See Table 3 for names of variables; (—) variable not entered into equation.

Religious service attendance is critical only for the Catholics and Jews but not for the Protestants. Both in 1964 and in 1968, and both for Catholics and for Jews, and both without and with controls, for each unit of service attendance (equivalent to an increment of one appearance at weekly religious services per year), there is an increase of approximately 0.02 child in the number of children desired. Put differently, the difference in fertility desires between a weekly attender of services (provided that person is Catholic or Jewish) and the person who rarely attends religious services is about one child ($52 \times 0.02 = 1.04$). This relationship holds up under controls for sex-role orientation and size of family of orientation. The bivariate equations, where religiosity is the independent variable, make a similar point. The Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant intercepts are roughly equal (2.9, 2.8, and 2.8 in 1964, respectively) suggesting that when comparing nonattenders, we would predict similar fertility desires among the three religious groups. However, whereas the Jewish and Catholic groups display an increase in family size desires with increasing religiosity, the Protestant slope is essentially "flat."

The data presented in Table 2 show that Protestants and Jews are similar to one another in group, mean, family size desire. The data presented in Table 5 suggest that Protestants and Jews arrive at their common mean by different routes. The determinants of family size desires among Jews resemble those of Catholics, whereas the outcomes resemble those of Protestants. The critical difference between Jews and Catholics seems to lie in their vastly different degrees of religiosity.

In Table 6 we present some findings and calculations implied by the intergroup differences in results and process. We begin with the equality

$$\bar{y} = a + b_1\,\bar{x}_1 + b_2\,\bar{x}_2 + b_3\,\bar{x}_3$$

where $a$ = intercept; $\bar{y}$ = mean number of children desired; $b_1$ = slope of religious attendance; $\bar{x}_1$ = mean religious attendance; $b_2$ = slope of siblings; $\bar{x}_2$ = mean number of siblings; $b_3$ = slope of sex-role orientation; $\bar{x}_3$ = mean of sex-role orientation. The mean fertility score for each religious group is equal to the sum of the products of the respective slopes ( = $b$) and means of independent variables ( = $\bar{x}$), plus the intercept ( = $a$). In the first part of Table 5, we present the contribution of each element in the regression equation to the mean fertility value for each religious group.

The top row of each part of the table reports the intercept. The next three rows report the increments attributable to each predictor of fertility desires. Again, an increment is simply the product of the unstandardized regression coefficient and the appropriate mean. By adding the three elements to the intercepts, we can compute the actual and hypothesized (using Catholic means) fertility desires means.

The intercepts ( = $a$) for the three religious groups are remarkably similar *within* time periods. Thus, if each of the groups were equally

*Table 6*

*Actual and Hypothetical Means (Using Catholic Means) Fertility Desires in 1964 and 1968*

| | Protestants | | Catholics | Jews | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Actual | Hypothetical | Actual | Actual | Hypothetical |
| | | Part A. 1964 | | | |
| Intercept | 2.65 | 2.65 | 2.75 | 2.69 | 2.69 |
| Religious service attendance 1962 | .07 | .13 | .81 | .10 | .90 |
| Traditional sex-role orientation | .00 | .03 | .10 | −.03 | .05 |
| Siblings | .17 | .20 | .25 | .14 | .23 |
| Total | 2.89 | 3.01 | 3.91 | 2.90 | 3.87 |
| | | Part B. 1968 | | | |
| Intercept | 2.43 | 2.43 | 2.52 | 2.64 | 2.64 |
| Religious service attendance 1968 | .10 | .16 | .71 | .08 | .63 |
| Traditional sex-role orientation | .00 | .02 | .07 | −.03 | .04 |
| Siblings | .10 | .20 | .22 | .02 | .08 |
| Total[a] | 2.69 | 2.81 | 3.52 | 2.76 | 3.39 |

[a] Subject to minor rounding errors.

secular, equally committed to egalitarian sex-role norms, and came from families of equal size, their mean family size desire would be the same. At first this might sound a bit simplistic but, in fact, it is not. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews might remain vastly different on other issues (some of them relevant to the theories examined and discarded above) yet similar on the issue captured by the variables in Table 5 and yet their family size desires would not differ.

The second finding of note is that the group mean scores for Protestants and Jews are very close to the intercepts for the two groups. The three variables in the equation do not add appreciably to their group means. However, though the end point for Protestants and Jews is similar, their routes to that end point are vastly different. Taking the two elements in the religious attendance effect, we find, as noted earlier, that the small increment of Protestants is a function of the low value of the slope ( = $b_2$), whereas for Jews it is a function of the low value of mean attendance of religious services ( = $\bar{x}_2$). Again for Protestants, attendance at religious services has little impact on family size desires and, therefore, actual, mean family size desire is not much greater than the intercept. For Jews by contrast, religious service attendance has a considerable impact but few Jews attend services frequently. Thus the actual, Jewish, mean family size desire is not much greater than *its* intercept.

What would fertility desires look like if Protestants and Jews were to equal the Catholic rate of attendance at religious services (and by implication the proportion of Catholics who remain within the traditional Catholic subculture) as well as Catholic sex-role orientation and size of family of origin? Duncan (1968) suggests an empirical procedure for the thought experiment. In the equations for Protestants and Jews for 1964 and 1968, we substitute the Catholic means for the three independent variables for the respective Protestant and Jewish means. Thus Protestants and Jews maintain their own process ( = $b$) but are given the Catholic means for all variables ( = $\bar{x}$). The hypothetical, mean fertility desires, assuming Catholic mean scores for independent variables, are presented in the columns labeled "hypothetical" in Table 6. The 1964 Catholic-Jewish differential is reduced by 90 percent and the 1968 differential by 70 percent. The hypothetical, Protestant, mean family size desired is the same as the actual mean. Of the three independent variables, attendance at religious services alone has an appreciable impact on Catholic-Jewish differences. Size of family of origin and sex-role orientation have little or no effect.

*Summary and Conclusions*

Previously offered theories designed to explain interreligious fertility differentials generally fail to explain these differentials. More significantly, they fail to consider seriously and to incorporate the possibility that different processes among different religious groups may give rise to fertility desires and outcomes.

In the foregoing analysis, we have shown that religious service attendance is an important predictor of Catholic and Jewish fertility desires but not of Protestant fertility desires. We suggested the following explanation for these findings:

1. There is in America, as in other societies, a normative consensus regarding the size of families.

2. Insofar as Americans participate in that consensus, they adopt the American normative family size.

3. For Catholics and Jews, participation in their traditional religious culture removes them somewhat from the American consensus and opens them to the influence of their own high-fertility cultural past.

Finally, we note that our research has been limited in several ways that restrict the generalizability of our findings. First, and most critically, our sample consists of college graduates of the class of 1961, and there is a possibility, of course, that other groups in the population would fail to manifest the same pattern of findings. However, we would suggest that, if anything, the ability of religiosity to differentiate individuals should be less marked in an elite population—such as college graduates—than in the general population.

Second, we were unable to investigate the full range of measures of religiosity. On the basis of preliminary analysis of alternate religiosity measures and their impact on fertility desires and outcomes, we are willing to suggest that no measures of Catholic and Jewish religiosity will evidence influence on fertility behavior except insofar as such measures tap the extent of involvement with the traditional religious culture or subsociety. Involvement with more modern aspects of the religious groups, such as membership in religiously based fraternal groups, we believe would have much more limited impact upon Catholic or Jewish fertility.

As a summary statement of our findings, we offer the following. Jews and Protestants resemble one another when comparing mean fertility levels. Jews and Catholics manifest similar processes giving rise to their fertility behaviors; that is, Jews and Catholics display a direct relationship between religiosity and fertility behavior, whereas the Protestants fail to

manifest such a relationship. Thus, low Jewish fertility (roughly equal to that of the Protestants) arises from their high level of secularism. Similarly, high Catholic fertility arises from their high level of religiosity.

## References

Bumpass, Larry L., and Charles F. Westoff. 1969. "The prediction of completed fertility," *Demography* 6, 445-54.

1970. *The Later Years of Childbearing.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Coale, Ansley J., and Melvin Zelnick. 1963. *New Estimates of Fertility and Population in the United States.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cohen, Jacob. 1968. "Multiple regression as a general data-analytic system." *Psychological Bulletin,* 426-443.

Cohen, Steven Martin. 1974. "The impact of Jewish education on religious identification and practice." *Jewish Social Studies,* 36, 316-26.

and Paul Ritterband. 1976. "Change in Fertility Desires of American College Graduates, 1964-1968: An Interreligious Comparison." Unpublished manuscript.

Dashefsky, Arnold, and Howard Shapiro. 1974. *Ethnic Identification Among American Jews.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Davis, James A. 1964. *Great Aspirations: The Graduate School Plans of America's College Seniors.* Chicago: Aldine.

Day, Lincoln H. 1968. "Natality and ethnocentrism: Some relationships suggested by an analysis of Catholic-Protestant differentials."*Population Studies,* 22, 27-50.

Duncan, Otis Dudley. 1968. "Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race," in *On Understanding Poverty,* ed. Daniel P. Moynihan. New York: Basic Books.

P. K. Whelpton, and A. A. Campbell. 1959. *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ronald Freedman, J. Michael Coble and Doris P. Slesinger. 1965. "Marital fertility and size of family of orientation," *Demography,* 2, 508-515.

Freedman, Ronald, and Pascal K. Whelpton. 1950. "Fertility planning and fertility rates by religious interest and denomination." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 28, 294-343.

Pascal K. Whelpton, and John W. Smit. 1961. "Socioeconomic factors in religious differentials in fertility." *American Sociological Review,* 26, 608-614.

David Goldberg, and Larry L. Bumpass. 1965. "Current fertility expectations of married couples in the United States: 1963." *Population Index,* 31, 3-20.

Gabriel, K. R. 1960. "Nuptiality and fertility of origin groups in Israel." *The Jewish Journal of Sociology,* 2, 74-97.

Goldberg, David, Harry Sharp, and Ronald Freedman. 1959. "The stability and reliability of expected family size." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 37, 369-385.

Goldscheider, Calvin. 1965. "Nativity, generation and Jewish fertility," *Sociological Analysis,* XXVI, 137-147.

1966. "Trends in Jewish fertility." *Sociology and Social Research,* L, 173-186.

1967 "Fertility of the Jews," *Demography,* 4, 196-209.

Goldstein, Sidney, and Calvin Goldscheider. 1968. *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community.* Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Grebler, Leo, Joan W. Moore, and Ralph C. Guzman. 1970. *The Mexican-American People, the Nation's Second Largest Minority.* New York: The Free Press.

Greeley, Andrew, and Peter Rossi. 1966. *The Education of Catholic Americans.* Chicago: Aldine.

Halpern, Benjamin. 1956. *The American Jew.* New York: Theodore Herzl Foundation.

Hass, Paula Hollenbach. 1974a. "Reproductive Attitudes." Unpublished manuscript.
     1974b. "Fertility Ideals, Desires, and Intentions, and Unwanted Pregnancies: Tradi-
     tional Measures and Alternative Approaches." Unpublished manuscript.
Hodge, Robert W., and Paul Siegel. Forthcoming. *Prestige and the Theory of Occupational Strati-
     fication.* Chicago: Markham.
Knodel, John E. 1974. *The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871-1939.* Princeton: Princeton
     University Press.
Laumann, Edward O. 1973. *Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Net-
     works.* New York: Wiley.
Lazerwitz, Bernard. 1973. "Religious identification and its ethnic correlates: A multi-
     variate model." *Social Forces,* 52,2, 204-20.
Liebman, Charles S. 1973. *The Ambivalent American Jew.* Philadelphia: The Jewish Publi-
     cation Society of America.
Lenski, Gerhard. 1961. *The Religious Factor.* New York: Doubleday.
Potvin, Raymond H., and Charles F. Westoff. 1967. "Higher education and the family
     normative beliefs of Catholic women," *Sociological Analysis,* 28, 14-21.
Potvin, Raymond H., and Thomas K. Burch. 1968. "Fertility, ideal family size and
     religious orientation among U.S. Catholics." *Sociological Analysis,* 29, 28-34.
Rainwater, Lee. 1960. *And the Poor Get Children: Sex, Contraception and Family Planning in the
     Working Class.* Chicago: Quadrangle.
Ryder, Norman B., and Charles F. Westoff. 1967. "The trend of expected parity in the
     United States." *Population Index,* 33, 153-68.
Schmelz, O. 1966. "The Israel population census of 1961 as a source of demographic data
     on the Jews in the Diaspora." *The Jewish Journal of Sociology,* 8, 49-63.
Sklare, Marshall. 1971. *America's Jews.* New York: Random House.
Stember, Charles H. 1966. *Jews in the Mind of America.* New York: Basic Books.
Westoff, Charles F., and Raymond H. Potvin. 1966. "Higher education, religion and
     women's family size orientations." *American Sociological Review,* 31, 489-96.
     and Raymond H. Potvin. 1967. *College Women and Fertility Values.* Princeton: Princeton
     University Press.
     and Norman B. Ryder. 1969. "Recent Trends in Attitudes toward Fertility Control and
     in the Practice of Contraception in the United States," in *Fertility and Family Planning,*
     eds. S. J. Behrman *et al.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pp. 388-412.
Elliot G. Mishler, and E. Lowell Kelly. 1957. "Preferences in size of family and eventual
     fertility twenty years after." *American Journal of Sociology,* 62, 491-497.
Phillip C. Sagi, and E. Lowell Kelly. 1958. "Fertility through twenty years of marriage:
     A study in predictive possibilities." *American Sociological Review,* 23, 549-556.
Robert G. Potter, Jr., Phillip C. Sagi, and Elliot G. Mishler. 1961. *Family Growth in
     Metropolitan America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Robert G. Potter, and Phillip C. Sagi. 1964. "Some selected findings of the Princeton
     Fertility Study." *Demography,* 1, 130-35.
Whelpton, Pascal K., Arthur A. Campbell, and John Patterson. 1966. *Fertility and Family
     Planning in the United States.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wilson, Franklin, and Larry Bumpass. 1973. "Prediction of fertility among Catholics: A
     longitudinal analysis." *Demography,* 10,4, 591-597.

## NOTES

[1] Goldscheider (1965, 1967) reports on somewhat inconsistent findings of other resear-
chers concerning the relationship between social status and fertility among the Jews. His
own results, drawn from a survey of Providence, Rhode Island Jewry, indicate an inverse
relationship among first-generation (immigrant) Jews and direct relationships between
social status and fertility among second-, third- or later-generation Jews.

[2] See Gabriel (1960) and Schmelz (1966) for analysis of Israeli fertility patterns.

[3] Laumann (1973, p. 182) derives an ethnoreligious status scale from data on the friendship choices of Detroit area men. He finds all seven Protestant groups rank higher than all seven Catholic groups with the Jews ranking fifteenth and last (nonwhites and Spanish-surnamed groups were not included). Results parallel those of Hodge and Siegel (forthcoming) reported in Laumann (1973, p. 46). Hodge and Siegel's results are drawn from a national survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in which 445 respondents were "asked to sort thirty-eight groups into ten categories, ranging from low to high social standing" (Laumann, 1973, p. 70). Although the thirty-eight groups were solely nationality groups, the lower social standing of Catholics may be inferred from the lower social standing of Southern and Eastern European nationality groups, that is, of countries from which most of the Catholic immigration to the United States originated. Northern and Western European groups almost uniformly exceed all other groups on the Hodge and Siegel social standing measure.

[4] For a discussion of official church attitudes toward birth control and fertility, see Westoff and Ryder (1969).

[5] For further discussion of the distinction between elite and folk religion, see Liebman (1973, pp. 45-49).

[6] In 1964, respondents were asked, "How many children would you like to have?" and instructed to circle one answer ranging from 0 to 8 + . In 1968, they were asked to "Please write in the number of children: (A) *you* would like to have... A. I would like to have ___ children."

[7] Estimated mean annual service attendance rates replaced the verbal responses according to the following schema (replacement values are in parentheses): "Weekly, almost without exception" (52); "Several times a month" (30); "Once a month" (12); "Two or three times a year" (13); "Once a year" (1); and "Never" (0).

[8] Comparison of the multiple $R^2$ with the correlation ratio squared (or eta squared) reveal the extent to which prediction of 1968 fertility desires is improved when the linearity assumption is relaxed. The figures, respectively, are given as follows: Protestants (.009; .018); Catholics (.097; .112); and Jews (.054; .079). With 1964 fertility desires as the dependent variable, the analogous figures are comparable: Protestants (.006; .013); Catholics (.069; .074); and Jews (.060; .068). Using the F-test for statistical significance (see, for example, Cohen, 1968), departure from linearity is statistically significant ($p < .05$) for all groups using the 1968 variable and for Protestants and Catholics using the 1964 measure of fertility desires.

[9] The five items, with the direction of agreement contributing positive scores to the scale shown in parentheses, are as follows: "A wife should respond to her husband's sexual overtures even when she is not interested" (agree); "Even if a woman has the ability and interest, she should not choose a career field that will be difficult to combine with child-rearing" (agree); "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (disagree); "Women should stop expecting special privileges because of their sex" (disagree); and "It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself" (agree).

[10] The number of years married as of 1968 was estimated using the following procedure. In each of the five questionnaires, respondents were asked to report their marital status. Respondents who were married in 1961 were assigned the value 8 since these respondents were married seven or more years in 1968. Respondents who first indicated they were married in 1962, 1963, and 1964 were assigned the values 6, 5, and 4, respectively. Respondents who first reported having been married in 1968 range in length of marriage from zero to four years. As a result, we assigned the value 2 to this group, fully appreciative of the extent of measurement error this entails for the most recently married group.