

The Political-Demographic Environment of Canadian Jewry

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This paper will attempt to elucidate the concept of the political demography of Canadian Jews. With the help of the 1986 Canadian census, as well as other data, the demographic profile of Jews will be compared with that of other ethnic and racial groupings in Canada. Differences in these profiles, and their consequences for the successful attainment of Jewish communal objectives will be assessed.

Demography and Communal Political Behavior

Jews, like other minority groups, be they ethnic, racial or religious, can be understood and studied as a polity (Elazar, 1976). In a multi-cultural society such as Canada, the notion of ethnic politics has been gaining wider recognition (Breton, 1981). This recognition relates to the internal structure and functioning of the group, as well as to the external relations of the group to other groups and to the state.

Indeed, since the adoption of Canadian multicultural policy in 1971, government ministries have acted as catalysts in energizing ethnic organizations, giving them political clout operative in two spheres. The first, often called ethnic politics, refers to the role of ethnic organizations and groups in the electoral process, as voters, fundraisers and donors, party organizers and candidates. Activity here is tuned into the electoral cycle. The second refers to the role of ethnic politics as pressure or lobby groups, active in the normal routine of policy-making on issues which affect the interests of the group.

With the exception of traditional French-English rivalries, ethnic politics in general has been a recent arrival as a subject for systematic Canadian scholarship. This does not mean that ethnic groups, including Jews, have been inactive in mainstream politics, including the fielding of candidates. But until the 1980s it seems that mainstream parties were not sensitized to the existence and certainly the importance of the ethnic vote. Indeed, the federal elections of 1984, and particularly 1988, were characterized by an emergence in the public eye of ethnic issues and ethnic mobilizations in key ridings (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, forthcoming). Scientific studies of the political and voting behavior of Canadian minority groups and Jews in particular (again excepting the French and English) are of recent vintage (Black, 1987; Laponce, 1988; Waller and Weinfeld, 1987).

This was also true for the study of minority lobby or pressure groups and the governmental process. Analysts looking at data from the 1960s found minority groups to be relatively few and inactive. Presthus (1973) found only 4% of his sample of 640 Canadian interest groups identified as ethnic and 6% as religious, and these

ranked as the most underorganized and least effective. Another authoritative discussion of the behavior of Canadian pressure groups, indirectly corroborates this image of inactivity by its omission of any evaluation or examples of minority group activity (Pross, 1975).

More recent analyses have included minority groups as part of the growing segment of non-economic interest groups, whose influence is enhanced through the increasing levels of consultations with non-governmental organizations found in Ottawa (Thorburn, 1985, Jackson et al, 1986). But detailed studies of the actual working of ethnic organizations, and their relations with other groups and government, are few. One study dealt with organizations representing native people (Ponting and Gibbins, 1980). Another examined Ukrainian and Jewish community organizations and their opposing political efforts on the issue of policy regarding Nazi war criminals in Canada (Troper and Weinfeld, 1988).

Jews, because of the peculiar nature of their Diaspora experience, have a head start over comparable ethnic and racial groups in the development of communal organizations. This Diaspora experience includes not only self-governing institutions, but also—and here the record is more checked—experience in intercession between the community and the authorities (shtadlanut) trying to make the case for Jewish interests.

No other minority group in Canada is as institutionally complete as are Canadian Jews, nor does any other group have such a high degree of communal self-awareness, measured by knowledge of organizations and leaders, reading of the ethnic press, etc. (Breton, 1981; Isajiw, 1981). In part this is because Jews are at the same time a relatively identified, unassimilated group, while also being highly educated and well versed in the ins and outs of politics (Troper and Weinfeld, 1988). Indeed, some observers might claim that Jewish life may be over-organized, with battles for turf and duplication. Yet, despite the insider Jewish jokes about the foibles of their own community, Jewish community organization remains a model for aspiring ethnic groups.

The success of any minority group in advocating the interests of its constituents will depend on several variables. Charismatic, effective leaders are certainly important. But our concern is with the socio-demographic variables which distinguish groups from one another. These variables can be grouped into two categories. One can be termed quantitative, and refers to the absolute size of the group, its rate of growth and traditional demographic factors such as age structure, net migration, fertility rates and exogamy.

The second set of variables can be construed as qualitative (though the actual measurements are quantitative), in that they measure the human and material resources available for the group to act effectively in the public arena, and to sustain viable organizations should they so desire. These variables include linguistic abilities in the majority languages, familiarity with the host society as measured by native birth, and of course, data on education and socioeconomic status, which can provide the bases for effective political participation.

If we had to characterize a demographic survival strategy operative among North American Jews in the second half of the twentieth century, it would probably be qualitative, rather than quantitative. As is well known, Jews are effective

contraceptors, with among the lowest fertility rates on the continent (perhaps challenged only by the French Canadians). The age structure of North American Jews is advanced, and the period of mass Jewish migration is over. Inter-marriage rates of Jews move ever upward, though they remain much lower than those of comparable ethnic groups.

In contrast, the socioeconomic news is all good. Jews rank far above other groups on practically all measures of socioeconomic status, and have even begun to penetrate previously exclusive elite sectors typified by antisemitism, in the corporate, governmental and educational world. Jews have made it (Silberman, 1985).

One can contrast the Jewish patterns with those of an equally committed Canadian survivalist group, the Hutterites of Western Canada (comparable to the American Amish). This is a group whose fertility rate is perhaps the highest on the continent, and pursues a clearly quantitative demographic strategy. Hutterites live in farm colonies and pursue a devout brand of Christianity. While they are successful farmers, they avoid any contact with the institutions of the outside world, and certainly are in no way active in the social and political life of the broader community. There is no Hutterite agenda which requires pressure group activity, outside of the immediate economic concerns of each colony (Hostetler and Huntington, 1980).

This paper will not attempt to devise an optimal demographic strategy for the purposes of a group's survival. In fact, an optimal strategy depends on other social characteristics of the group, its communal agenda and general values and orientations. If all North American Jews became Hutterites—or Hassidim—some aspects of communal survival would be assured. But many other valued features of Jewish life would be eliminated. There would be no Jewish Nobel Prize winners, and neither *Commentary* nor *Moment* (Lieberman and Weinfeld, 1978).

The conventional wisdom about Jewish political success in North America is that sheer numbers have never loomed large. Indeed, the mystery of Jewish survival through the ages may lie in the emphasis on quality rather than numbers, despite high Jewish fertility levels historically. Jewish influence has been exercised in the United States through activity at the senior levels of the Democratic Party, through fundraising and donations, and through concentrations of the Jewish vote, with high registration and turnout in key sections of the urban North East. (The degree to which these American characteristics persist will not be discussed here.)

In Canada the Jewish proportion of the population has historically been about one half that of the United States. Like most immigrants and urban dwellers in Quebec and Ontario, Jews tended to favor the Liberal Party (La Ponce, 1988), despite recent gains by the Conservatives (Waller and Weinfeld, 1987).

Ethnic groups in Canada can be divided into two categories. On the one hand we have those which are primarily white, of European origin, second or third generation, and either affluent or on their way to socioeconomic success. The second grouping consists primarily of non-white and non-European groups (in large part with a non-Judeo-Christian heritage), which are more likely themselves to be immigrants and are still struggling with racial discrimination and lower socioeconomic status.

While, to be sure, there is variation and diversity within these groupings, the current ethnic political agenda in Canada, with the emphasis in policy-making circles on "visible minorities", highlights this dichotomy (Samuel, 1987).

While Canadian multicultural policy attempts to consider all non-English and non-French origin groups as sharing basic commonalities as Third Force Canadians, it has become apparent that the interests of the two ethnic groupings considered may differ. The former group is concerned largely with cultural survival and symbolic status issues; the second group is largely concerned with bread and butter issues and racial prejudice. The first group usually has more established and well-financed communal organizations, though members of the second group, spurred on by substantial growth in numbers, are developing rapidly.

Canadian Jews find themselves in a somewhat schizophrenic posture regarding these two groups. On the one hand, by most measures of socioeconomic status and integration in Canada, they resemble the first group—the "haves". Yet, the Jewish tradition as underdog, as victim of discrimination, viscerally ties many Jews, and particularly Jewish organization professionals, to the second group. For example, the Canadian Jewish Congress can be found making common cause with these groups on issues of affirmative action, and joining in the fight against racism.

In the concluding section of this paper we will raise questions about the viability of this dual coalition strategy. But we turn now to a detailed examination of the Jewish demographic profile, in comparative perspective.

The Comparative Demography of Canadian Jews

The data in Table 1 will just be highlighted here. In 1986 246,000 Canadians declared single Jewish origin, and 98,000, partial Jewish origin, for a total of 344,000 people claiming whole or partial Jewish ethnicity. While Jews might decry the seemingly large proportion of 28.5% who reported a shared Jewish ethnicity (e.g. Jewish-English or Polish-Jewish), the fact that 71.5% of the total claimed single identity compares very well with the other groupings presented, such as the culturally similar Eastern Europeans (Poles and Ukrainians primarily). Of course, this relatively high single identification of Jews also reflects the lack of past intermarriage.

In the following comparisons, each group consists of those who claimed either single or partial membership. The assumption is that even those who report a multiple ethnic origin still retain some tie to each group. This means that there is double counting of the 28% who indicated a multiple origin. By and large, groups with higher proportions of immigrants tended to have more single origin members. Use of the enlarged categories yields a fuller representation of the group, including perhaps some more marginal members.

Persons of recorded Jewish ancestry comprise 1.4% of the Canadian population. They are the most urbanized group, as measured by concentrations in Canada's three major metropolitan areas; 75% of Canadian Jews live there, and they comprise from 1.4% to 4.2% of the total CMA (metropolitan areas) population. This is important in terms of maximizing the socio-political impact and visibility of the group, relative

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B	Home Language %	English	96.3	27.7	95.3	91.0	49.7	83.6	84.7	84.2	74.5	42.3	33.6	32.7	48.7	28.8
		French	1.9	68.3	0.3	1.4	0.7	2.9	8.1	13.6	11.5	5.1	0.7	0.7	0.3	3.8
		Non-official Language	0.2	1.9	3.9	3.1	2.7	2.7	2.7	22.9	41.1	49.0	30.6	67.3	87.3	30.6
		Neither	1.6	3.9	2.5	4.0	6.6	6.5	5.0	6.2	23.1	20.1	17.4	20.4	13.5	33.5
C	Official Language	English	89.8	20.9	89.5	91.4	72.2	90.2	70.0	72.8	57.7	60.3	60.3	78.1	86.3	57.7
		French	0.1	46.1	0.1	0.7	3.8	0.4	1.2	14.8	8.7	13.7	2.6	0.3	3.8	3.8
		Both	0.2	33.0	6.1	7.6	17.7	8.4	28.0	11.5	12.3	33.7	6.7	7.6	30.8	30.8
		Neither	1.5	0.0	0.3	0.4	6.3	1.0	0.9	0.5	2.9	8.0	12.6	5.7	7.7	7.7
8	% Canadian Citizen		97.5	99.4	96.5	97.3	97.0	93.9	90.8	77.8	85.6	61.4	78.8	77.0	73.1	73.1
9	% Foreign Born		17.7	12.7	16.7	46.8	19.4	31.7	57.3	68.0	54.8	70.0	69.2	71.3	75.0	75.0
10	Numbers who immigrated in 1978-86, 000's		136	29	8	51	70	19	41	18	20	18	238	73	19	19
11	% of total group immigrated 1978-86		1.1	0.4	1.2	1.5	4.1	3.1	5.5	15.8	17.3	19.2	34.6	23.2	36.5	36.5
12	Immigraton 1978-86		18.7	4.0	1.0	7.0	9.6	8.0	2.6	5.6	2.8	2.5	32.8	30.1	2.6	2.6
13	Education	% 15+ without secondary certificate (high school degree)	42.6	44.5	37.5	40.1	53.0	41.5	29.3	38.8	40.3	32.4	38.7	35.3	33.3	33.3
		B % university with degree	10.0	6.0	11.7	10.0	7.4	11.8	28.9	8.7	8.8	20.3	19.0	21.3	15.4	15.4
14	Occupation	% in labour force, by age	69.3	65.5	71.7	73.0	71.1	72.5	62.4	59.5	62.6	62.6	61.3	61.7	58.0	58.0
		A 15-24	66.4	64.9	70.7	71.4	71.7	68.6	69.0	79.8	72.9	73.1	74.0	78.1	64.1	64.1
		C 15-24	16.1	19.8	15.6	13.4	14.2	16.9	21.9	20.4	19.2	21.2	14.4	18.2	22.2	22.2
		D 25+	7.9	10.3	7.7	6.4	7.1	5.7	10.4	9.6	9.6	14.9	7.3	10.7	11.4	11.4
		E % of labour force in managerial, administrative and professional occupations	27.8	26.8	29.5	26.9	18.9	28.4	49.7	24.4	36.0	23.8	29.2	26.0	32.0	32.0
15	Median income	of pop. 15+ with income	14,049	12,843	14,066	14,076	13,973	16,201	12,730	13,144	13,970	10,455	13,067	13,999	11,732	11,732
		B % > \$35,000+	13.8	10.6	15.1	13.6	13.7	25.1	7.8	8.3	15.7	7.2	9.8	13.3	12.5	12.5
		C % > \$3,000	12.5	12.3	13.4	13.4	12.8	4.7	10.1	16.2	13.1	17.0	14.3	14.4	15.6	15.6
		D	25.440	26,512	26,879	28,038	27,435	38,492	22,231	22,239	28,255	22,789	23,765	26,321	26,814	26,814

[1] Unless otherwise specified, all percentages are for single and multiple origins combined. As a result, double counting exists; someone claiming just Polish and Italian origins would be listed twice. For specific origins included in the groupings, see Annex to Table 1.

Source: Canadian Census 1986, 2000 samples. From *Profile of Ethnic Groups*. Census Canada 1986, Statistics Canada 93-154, February 1989

to its numbers, and approximates earlier American Jewish population concentrations in the North East.

The difference in age structure between Jews and all other groups is stark. While 15.2% of the Jewish population is over 65, all other ethnic groupings are so in single digit percentages.

Almost one third of the Canadian Jewish population is foreign born, a figure much higher than American estimates for Jews and which places Jews in some respects midway between the older white European groups (e.g. the Eastern, Western and Northern Europeans) and the non-European immigrant groups. Jewish immigration continues steadily. Between 1978 and 1986 (up to the month of May inclusive), at least 19,000 Jews immigrated to Canada. (The actual total is higher, but because of re-migration, return migration and deaths, the number presented in 1986 was 19,000.) 5.5% of Canadian Jewry consisted of these most recent immigrants and these in turn comprised 2.6% of the total 1978-86 immigrant cohort, above the total Jewish population proportion of 1.4%. Thus, migration not only replenishes but augments the Jewish proportion of the Canadian population.

This augmenting of the group proportion via immigration is just barely true for the South and East European groups. But it is dramatically the case for the newer non-white groups, where recent immigrants comprise a far greater proportion of the total group in Canada, from four to eight times the percentage among Jews.

With regard to socio-demographics, Jews are found to have the highest educational, occupational and income attainments of any of the groups identified here (Table 1). If anything, these data understate the Jewish position in that they do not assess the role of wealthy Jewish business families at the top of the Canadian income distribution. Some points should be made. First, the reported educational qualifications of the non-European groups are in general higher than those of the older European groups. Canadians of Arab and South Asian origin both reveal over 20% with completed university degrees, with the Jewish group at almost 29%.

Second, the degree of economic inequality between the non-white groupings and the European groupings is much smaller than the degree of inequality between whites and non-whites observed in the United States. For example, among American males in 1985 who received any income, black median income was 63% that of whites. In Canada, the comparable percentage is 77.3%, for black male income as a percentage of British origin male income. Racial gaps in other indicators, such as unemployment rates, are even smaller in Canada (Farley and Allen, 1987, Ch. 9 and 10). And Canadian gaps between whites and other non-black but "visible minority" immigrant groups are smaller still. This is important to the extent that narrow socioeconomic differentials will limit the degree of inter-racial social and political friction, a cross-fire in which Canadian Jews would prefer not to be caught.

Finally, it should be noted that other studies have found that, depending on measures, at most half of the Jewish income advantage can be explained by factors such as age, immigration, educational attainment, language ability and full time vs. part time work. The residual advantage, a mysterious "bonus" associated with Jewish origin, is difficult to explain (hard work, connections, inherited wealth) but indicates that existing levels of antisemitism are unlikely factors affecting income

earning potentials of Jews. However, racism does continue to affect non-white groups, who earn below what can be expected (Balakrishnan, 1988).

Additional data are available on the long term demographic future of Canadian Jewry. Brym has estimated the Canadian mixed marriage rates as of 1984 to have risen to about 25%, compared to 15% in 1971. Moreover, he cites Gallup poll data which indicate that opposition to Jewish and non-Jewish intermarriage has declined in Canada from 28% in 1968 to 10% in 1983 (Brym, 1989).

Census data from 1981, also cited by Brym, confirm that Jewish fertility rates stand well below those of other groups. Per 1,000 ever-married women fifteen and over in Canada, the number of children is: total, 1,781; Jewish women, 1,596. The gap is even larger for completed fertility for women 45 and over: total, 3,304; Jewish women 2,236.

All this means that the likelihood for Jewish natural increase in Canada—given these fertility data, attitudes on intermarriage, and the prevailing age structure—is very low.

One analyst has projected the Jewish population in Canada's 25 Census Metropolitan Areas, to the year 2001. (Table 2; these projections are for single origin Canadians as reported in the 1986 census.) We note that while the Jewish proportion would increase, barely, from 1.60 to 1.64%, the changes projected for the non-white minority groupings are far more substantial, at the expense of the British and French

TABLE 2. PROJECTED POPULATION IN THE 25 CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS OF CANADA, BY ETHNIC ORIGIN 1986-2001 (PERCENTAGES)

Ethnic origin	Census 1986		Projection 2	
	1986	1991	1996	2001
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
British (all eng. and mult.) ^a	40.13	39.65	39.23	38.85
French (all eng. and mult.) ^a	23.77	23.34	22.97	22.63
British and French ^b	6.40	6.29	6.20	6.11
Dutch, German, other West and North Europe	5.32	5.27	5.23	5.19
Polish and Ukrainian	2.87	2.89	2.90	2.92
Greek, Portuguese, other East and South Europe	4.45	4.56	4.66	4.75
Italian	4.28	4.23	4.18	4.14
Jewish	1.60	1.61	1.62	1.64
South Asian	1.56	1.72	1.87	2.00
Chinese	2.24	2.53	2.80	3.03
Filipino, other Asia, Arab, Pacific Islands	2.20	2.53	2.82	3.08
Black, African, Caribbean	1.44	1.56	1.66	1.76
Latin, Central, South American	0.20	0.24	0.27	0.30
Aboriginal	0.55	0.54	0.53	0.52
Other single origins	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28
Other multiple origins	2.71	2.75	2.77	2.80
Visible minorities ^c	8.19	9.12	9.95	10.69

a. Includes "British only" multiple and "British and other" multiple.

b. Includes "French only" multiple and "French and other" multiple.

c. Includes British and French and other. d. Includes South Asians, Chinese, Filipino, other Asia/Arab/Pacific Islands, Black/African/Caribbean, Latin/Central South American and Aboriginal.

Source: Balakrishnan (1988).

origin groups. A similar pattern is obtained from projections limited only to Metropolitan Toronto (Balakrishnan, 1988).

The data suggest that ethnic politics in the future will become more demanding for Jews, as the political demographic environment changes. Non-white groups are new players in Canadian ethnic politics. Traditionally, and even up to the very founding of the policy of multiculturalism in 1971, the most effective ethnic groups were those who were of European extraction, including of course Jews. Many of these groups, like Germans, Poles and Ukrainians, had a long tradition of antisemitism, rooted in the old country. Yet in Canada, Jews were largely able to find common cause with these groups on policy matters like support for ethnic languages and cultures, equal opportunity and non-discrimination. Moreover, these groups all shared the European experience, which meant specifically they were familiar with the horrors of the Holocaust and espoused generalized support for the State of Israel.

The new and growing non-white or non-European ethnic groups do not carry the same sort of cultural baggage as do the Europeans. Many of their home countries may routinely cast anti-Israel votes at the United Nations. Their historical and cultural matrix is one where the Holocaust, antisemitism and, with the exception of Arab Canadians, Israel, do not play a role. In the United States the political antagonism between blacks and Jews has been marked for at least twenty years and shows no signs of abating. It thus becomes a legitimate question to ask whether tensions among "have" groups in Canada, notably Jews, and other groups, more recently victimized by current racism, will not ensue.

If the other European groups begin to catch up to the Jewish community in terms of numbers and political sophistication; if "visible minorities" come to dominate in public discussion of prejudice and racism; and if they may develop different domestic and foreign priorities for their communal agendas, then the Jewish position may become delicate indeed. In fact many of these groups already exceed the estimated 344,000 Jews, and there already are expansions in the scope of affirmative action.

There is already evidence of some political marginalization of the Jewish community. One Conservative government insider, when commenting on the respective positions of the Jewish and Ukrainian communities in Canada over the Nazi war criminal issue, confessed that the government was well aware of the smaller current and future size of Canadian Jewry, compared to Ukrainians and indeed other groups (Troper and Weinfeld, 1988, pp. 268-269). Moreover, conservative strategists had identified twenty ridings in which Ukrainian Canadian voters comprised at least 5% of the electorate. The Canadian census, with its detailed breakdown of the population by ethnic origin, religion, language and birth place, becomes an unusual tool available for skillful politicians. It can be used to mobilize or appeal to ethnic voters, and indeed for the deciding of policy outcomes partly on the basis of an electoral calculus of ethnic gains and losses.

With these developments the Jewish position might well weaken compared to that of other groups seeking their place in the ethno-political sun. In a published review of ethnic politics during the 1988 federal election, the key theme is the new energy displayed by Italian, Portuguese, Sikh as well as other non-white communities, in

terms of organizing in ridings and encouraging candidates. Little mention is made of the much touted Jewish political power (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, forthcoming).

Conclusion

The demographic future of Canadian Jewry seems uncertain. This is due primarily to the low fertility rate, advanced age structure and likelihood of high and increasing levels of outmarriage. This shortfall will be offset only in part through net migration, barring a major upswing in the pool of Jewish migrants to Canada.

Other minority groups in Canada, particularly the so-called "visible minority" groups, can be expected to grow in absolute terms, and relatively more than the Jews. This is due to their younger age structure, higher fertility and preponderance in recent immigration cohorts.

This shift in the demographic ethnic balance may well pose challenges for Canadian Jewish political leadership. Up to this point the Jewish political leadership has been relatively skillful in maintaining a central position within Canada's multicultural umbrella, and has been seen as a major political force. But some evidence suggests that this may be changing as a result of the new demographic realities. Moreover, as "visible minorities" increase their numbers in Canada's major urban centers vis-a-vis Jews, it remains to be seen whether the respective communal agendas can remain compatible. The fact that the black-Jewish coalition in American politics has been badly shaken (though Jews and blacks continue to vote for the Democratic Party) suggests the potential for such confrontation.

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ANNEX TO TABLE 1. COMPOSITION OF MAJOR ETHNIC CATEGORIES, 1986 CENSUS

Jewish origin	Single origins	Multiple origins
	246,000	98,000
British origins	6,332,725	6,038,760*
English	4,742,040	4,561,910
Irish	699,685	2,922,605
Scottish	865,450	3,052,605
Welsh	23,395	126,890
British, n.i.e.	800	1,880
Other British	1,360	3,920
French origins	6,093,160	2,030,200*
French	6,087,310	2,027,945
Acadian	3,040	5,325
French Canadian	1,025	1,520
Quebecois	1,790	2,345
Northern European origins	212,280	478,645*
Danish	39,950	79,105
Finnish	40,565	50,770
Icelandic	14,470	39,285
Norwegian	61,580	182,100
Swedish	43,340	160,535
Scandinavian, n.i.e.	12,375	19,445
Western European origins	1,321,465	2,013,615*
Austrian	24,900	49,740
Belgian	28,395	46,395
Dutch (Netherlands)	351,760	530,170
German	895,715	1,570,340
Luxembourg	555	1,320
Swiss	19,135	41,145
Southern European origins	1,242,170	463,000*
Albanian	875	560
Bulgar	2,465	3,460
Croatian	35,120	9,055
Greek	143,780	33,530
Italian	709,590	297,325
Macedonian	11,355	5,920
Maltese	15,345	8,925
Portuguese	198,595	37,590
Serbian	9,510	3,460
Slovenian	5,895	2,235
Spanish	57,125	56,045
Yugoslav, n.i.e.	51,200	33,375
Eastern European origins	888,195	998,395*
Byelorussian	970	1,060
Czech	20,380	19,255
Czechoslovakian	18,835	24,605
Estonian	13,200	7,330
Hungarian (Magyar)	97,845	91,145
Latvian	12,620	7,380
Lithuanian	14,725	12,225
Polish	222,260	389,845
Romanian	18,745	32,590
Russian	32,080	71,585
Slovak	16,320	11,385
Ukrainian	420,210	541,100

ANNEX TO TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Single origins	Multiple origins
Arab origins	72,315	31,230*
Egyptian	11,580	4,135
Lebanese	29,345	15,685
Palestinian	1,070	525
Syrian	3,045	4,135
Arab, n.i.e.	27,275	10,230
West Asian origins	41,305	10,285*
Armenian	22,525	4,865
Iranian	13,325	2,430
Israeli	390	735
Turk	5,065	2,495
South Asian origins	266,800	47,235*
Bengali	390	200
Gujarati	690	555
Punjabi	10,865	4,680
Sinhalese	745	335
Tamil	1,275	925
Bangladeshi, n.i.e.	1,480	185
East Indian, n.i.e.	220,630	40,805
Pakistani, n.i.e.	24,880	6,775
Sri Lankan, n.i.e.	5,830	1,455
East/South East Asian origins	600,530	87,960*
Burmese	600	810
Cambodian	10,365	1,430
Chinese	360,320	53,720
Filipino	93,280	13,775
Indonesian	1,265	2,265
Japanese	40,245	14,260
Korean	27,680	2,020
Laotian	9,575	1,510
Malay	815	1,565
Thai	1,230	1,700
Vietnamese	53,015	9,980
Other Asian, n.i.e.	2,145	935
Pacific Islands origins	6,620	3,725*
Fijian	6,035	2,000
Polynesian	230	500
Other Pacific Islanders	360	1,335
Latin, Central South American origins	32,240	17,795*
Argentinian	1,275	1,295
Brazilian	1,365	1,670
Chilean	8,075	2,305
Ecuadorian	1,240	320
Mexican	3,000	5,130
Peruvian	2,620	1,600
Other Latin/Central/ South American origins	14,660	6,025
Caribbean origins	48,475	32,685*
Cuban	410	775
Haitian	10,865	6,140
Jamaican	11,210	8,510
Puerto Rican	375	720
Other Caribbean, n.i.e.	950	1,380
Other West Indian	24,670	15,620

ANNEX TO TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Single origins	Multiple origins
Black origins	174,970	85,340*
Black	170,340	83,775
African black	4,630	4,120
Aboriginal peoples	373,260	338,460
Inuit	27,295	9,175
Metis	59,745	91,865
American Indian	286,230	262,730

a. The multiple response count for each major ethnic category does not equal sum of the component ethnic groups. For example, a respondent giving the ethnic origin combination of English and Irish will be counted once in the multiple response for the major ethnic category "British origins" (6,038,760), but will be counted in both the English multiple (4,561,910) and in the Irish multiple (2,922,605).

N.i.e. = not included elsewhere.