

Paradigms Sometimes Fit: The Haredi Response to the Yom Kippur War

CHARLES S. LIEBMAN

This essay is an effort to understand Jewish ultra-orthodox *Haredi* reaction to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Attention is confined to the large central segment of Haredi society represented in the political arena by Agudat Israel – the only Haredi political party which existed in the period covered here.

The hypothesis which guided my research was that between 1973 and the elections of 1977, changes took place in Haredi conceptions of the state of Israel and the wider society which led Agudat Israel to join the government coalition. I have sought to explore this hypothesis by comparing Haredi responses to the Yom Kippur War with their reactions to the Six Day War of June 1967. I assumed that the striking victory of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the Six Day War would pose serious problems for Haredim. The Six Day War superficially, at least, seemed to be a vindication of Zionism, of secular Israel and the capacity of human design. The Yom Kippur War, on the other hand, seemed to reflect the tentative and insecure status of Israel, its isolation from the world and the folly of Israel's leaders. It, more than any of Israel's wars, might help narrow the sense of alienation that Haredim heretofore have felt. The tragedy and trauma of the war and the deep scars it left in Israeli society would serve, so I anticipated, to evoke in Haredi eyes the age-old experience of the Jewish people since the destruction of the Temple. It would make it easier for the ultra-orthodox to view Israeli society and even the State of Israel as being within the rhythms of Jewish history. This feeling ought to further reinforce a sympathetic attitude on the part of Haredim towards Israeli society. As will be seen, reality is not so simple.

There are several distinct themes in the Haredi literature dealing with Israel's wars of 1967 and 1973. For purposes of presentation I have divided them into three categories: the first portrays Israeli society in a generally positive light, emphasizing the shared condition of

Haredi and non-Haredi society. Themes in this category include the miracles of these wars, the new religious faith or a new potential for religious faith among secularists as a result of them, and other positive remarks about Israeli society. The second category includes items critical of Israeli society such as caution about raising redemptive hopes, doubts about the depth of religious renewal within Israeli society, criticism of Israeli leaders who refuse to recognize the miracles that G-d wrought in the wars and more general criticisms of Israeli society. The third category includes themes that, at least superficially, are neutral in assessing Israeli society. They include analyses or descriptions of the wars, their causes and lessons, their outcome and the feelings of depression which followed the Yom Kippur War.

THE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

Frequent allusions to the miracle through which G-d saved the Jews of Israel in general and the Israeli army in particular strengthen the Haredi sense of identity with society and the feeling that G-d cares for the Jewish state. Stressing G-d's miracles does not diminish the accomplishments of the army or the state in Haredi eyes. First of all, miracles are not inconsistent with human accomplishment. Second, miracles point to G-d's sympathy for an undertaking. In the Haredi mind, this has a more positive value than human achievement. By associating Israeli achievements with miracles, Haredim are able to celebrate Israel's victories because they are legitimated within a religious context.

The theme of miracles plays a major role in the reports of both wars. Thus, for example, a front page editorial in *Ha-modi'a* (editorials are normally printed on the second page), responded to the first reports of the Six Day War victory in the following manner:

A great miracle occurred here, that is the response on everyone's lips at this hour. There is no other explanation and there will not be any other explanation for the glorious victory of the IDF which is still taking place... this is no natural victory but a magnificent miraculous revelation as in the days of our exodus from Egypt.¹

Miracles may be alluded to in a general way or more specifically as, for example, in *Ha-modia's* reference to a miracle that all airplanes returned from a mission heavily damaged by enemy shells but without any being shot down.² However, recounting specific miracles which happened to named individuals is rare.

Haredi writers feel that both wars, in part because of the suffering

they engendered, in part for reasons unexplained, generated religious belief among the non-religious. "It is no exaggeration to say that the strengthening of faith in the hearts of the sons of Israel that had taken place is greater than that which has been seen for countless generations..."³ The Yom Kippur War, in particular, is viewed as leading to a loss of confidence by Israelis in their former leaders and their former values, a point to which I shall return. But the Six Day War also engendered religious enthusiasm among the non-religious. Almost two years after the Six Day War, an important ultra-orthodox scholar and ideologue wrote that:

A major transformation of values is taking place among the masses of people. Hatred for religion and the "religious" has disappeared. Of greater importance, here and there one confronts interest in the life of Torah and even open sympathy...⁴

He also wrote of the effect of both wars as follows:

I fully believe that the hand of G-d is guiding us [referring to Israeli society]; that the recent wars came to awaken, bring closer, turn [Israeli society] away from false values to the truth of the eternal people.⁵

Other kinds of articles and stories, also point, directly and indirectly, to the common bonds between Haredi and non-Haredi society. These include references to the hostile attitude of the world towards Israeli society,

the wars of the Jewish people did not begin with the establishment of the state of Israel. They have existed for longer than 21 years.⁶

to the common fate of all Israelis,

The forces of the invader in Sinai and in the Golan were not sent in order to liberate territories of occupied Palestine but to carry out genocide against the nation who resides in Zion. Like blood-thirsty animals they and their friends will rejoice in torturing and killing every Jew because he is a Jew...⁷

to the self-sacrifice of Israeli youth who were ready to give their lives for their country,

...the self-sacrifice that penetrated the hearts of the youth and adults...⁸

who went off to battle "with pure hearts",⁹

In order to defend and protect the millions of Jews living in our holy land from slaughter, their blood was spilled and... young lives surrendered because they are Jews and in order that the whole nation will remain alive.¹⁰

and to the courage that derives from basic Jewish commitment.

[The enemy] thought they were falling upon a nation immersed in its fast, a weak and powerless nation. They did not know that from this fast the nation derives its strength and inner fortitude...¹¹

NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

The first type of criticism I want to mention is not, strictly speaking, a negative assessment of Israeli society, but it is too significant to go unmentioned here. Haredim are cautioned that the outcome of the wars and the miracles that G-d wrought are not signals of imminent Redemption. I only found three such statements but all three were issued by very authoritative sources: the political head of Agudat Israel, I.M. Levin, an editorial in *Ha-modi'a*, Agudat Israel's daily newspaper, immediately following the Six Day War, and Rav Shach, the single most important spiritual personality among Haredim, following the Yom Kippur War.¹² All these statements were directed against ultra-nationalist elements within religious Zionism rather than against Israeli society at large. The fact that they were made by such authoritative voices hints at the presence of quasi-messianic currents, influenced without doubt by tendencies in religious Zionist circles, within the Haredi public as well.

A second type of criticism is directed at leaders of Israel rather than at society at large. Leaders are faulted for not acknowledging the miracles that took place in the wars. The periodical *Beth Jacob*, which tended to enthusiasm over the accomplishments of the Israeli army and was often sympathetic to Zionist leaders, nevertheless noted that whereas "secular idols" were destroyed in the Six Day War, some secular leaders lack the courage to admit that the victory was a miraculous one.¹³ Similar accusations were made following the Yom Kippur War.¹⁴

A third theme is an expression of doubt about the depth or permanence of the religious renewal resulting from the wars. Just as the phenomenon of religious renewal among secular Israelis strengthens Haredi ties to the society, so a slackening of the renewal weakens those ties. The doubts about the renewal never appear immediately after a war. In other words, the sceptical writers do not challenge those who immediately after the war describe the wave of faith, belief and reli-

gious renewal that is sweeping the society. Scepticism arises some time later. In the case of the Six Day War, I found the first such article a year after the war and in the case of the Yom Kippur War two years later. For example, an editorial in *Ha-modi'a* observed that:

... as we distance ourselves from that great historic day so we distance ourselves from the chance that it could have become a basic turning point.¹⁵

The most serious criticism, however, one that recurs in virtually every evaluation of or reference to the wars, is the criticism of “my might and my power” (*“kohi v-otzem yadi”*), a phrase that comes from Deuteronomy, 8:17. In its original context, the phrase follows a description of the future condition of the children of Israel, who will cross the Jordan, settle the land of Israel, be freed of their enemies and prosper. G-d warns them against forgetting that He freed them from Egypt, guided them through the desert and bestowed these blessings upon them. The Bible cautions the Jews against declaring that “my might and my power has attained all this”. There is hardly a Haredi writer who does not mention that trust, faith and belief that Israelis had in themselves and in their army (and by implication not in G-d), constitutes a sin of enormous proportions. They are the root cause of Israel’s crises which the Deity himself evokes in order to teach the Jews that they have no source of security other than G-d. In one of the earliest responses to the Yom Kippur War, Rav Shach stated:

Wars always had reasons. They were always the result of the behaviour of the people. When the people of Israel did evil in the eyes of G-d, enemies came upon them and when they repented, the wars ceased – and the cycle, G-d forbid, recurs... What are our evil deeds? We are certainly not free of evil deeds, but the worst of all is the idolatrous belief in “my might and my power”. They (an unspecified “they”), accustomed the people to trust in the IDF, in the help of the United States and in the power of effective weapons... The present war came and totally uprooted this approach... We must know that only our prayers sustained us and only G-d saved us.¹⁶

NEUTRAL ASSESSMENTS OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

Under this category I have identified themes and articles that ostensibly undertake to explain or analyze phenomena associated with the Yom Kippur War. But these assessments and analyses also suggest certain assumptions or imply certain judgements concerning Israeli society and the proper relationship of Haredim to that society.

Most of *Ha-modi'a's* front page is normally devoted to general news stories whose source is an Israeli or foreign wire service. Hence there is nothing especially Haredi about them except, perhaps, in the matter of selection. During each of the wars, these stories, including some written by the paper's own correspondents, focused on the war's progress; they often occupied most of the second page as well. Although the stories were interspersed with an occasional mention of miracles or editorial comment, most of the coverage was as matter-of-fact as any war coverage can be. Immediately following both wars, a great deal of the front and second pages were devoted to Israel's international position. Both the war and the international coverage could not help strengthening the readers' sense of identification with the Israeli army or the Israeli state, its achievements and its problems.

This is particularly true since Haredi society is portrayed, by implication in the case of the Six Day War and explicitly in the Yom Kippur War, as participating in the war.¹⁷ It is true that three Haredi young men, serving in a small Haredi army unit (since disbanded) died in the Yom Kippur War and there probably were a number of ultra-orthodox soldiers who served in combat reserve units. But the tone of the Yom Kippur coverage rarely suggests that the vast majority of Haredi men of military age did not serve in the army or that most of those who served were religious functionaries or reservists in non-combatant roles in rear rather than front-line positions. For example, an article in *Ha-modi'a* urges teachers in Haredi schools to be particularly considerate of their pupils in this period, "especially when there is hardly a home without one of its members at the front".¹⁸ When allusions are made to Haredim who are not in the army, they indicate total identification of the home front with the combatants. An editorial in *Ha-modi'a*, under the heading "The Gates of Prayer are not Sealed", notes that alongside the soldiers at the front are tens of thousands of others, "praying continuously for peace and victory of the warriors".¹⁹

This sense of identity is reinforced by many of the reasons offered for the origins of the war, its lessons or its outcome. (I include all of them here even though some repeat themes already mentioned). All except items seven and eight recur frequently. They are as follows:

1. G-d is reminding us that He is in our midst.
2. Since the war demonstrated that the whole world is against us, we must become spiritually independent of foreign sources.
3. Only G-d can help us and we must therefore reject the notion of "my might and my power".
4. The war demolishes Zionist pretensions of independence and self-reliance (a lesson barely distinguishable from the previous one except in so far as it specifically mentions Zionism).

5. A religious awakening is taking place in the wake of and as an outcome of the war.
6. Haredim are obliged to exploit this awakening by spreading their message among the non-religious.
7. It is possible that the return of the territories in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War is proof we do not deserve them (this theme only appears once and in a book by a Haredi author of secondary rank).²⁰
8. The peace agreement with Egypt is an outcome of the Yom Kippur War.

Another ostensibly neutral theme that attracted the attention of a number of Haredi authors involved observations about (sometimes accompanied by warnings against) a sense of depression after the Yom Kippur War. This and the last two reasons listed above are the only set of items peculiar to one war and not another. This depression is sometimes described as a malaise affecting all Israeli society, with no distinctions made between Haredim and non-Haredim. "We are tired of wars and deaths and tears and tragedies".²¹ Sometimes there is simply a call to fight the bitter mood that has infected so many people,²² and sometimes an author suggests that the despair leading to defeatism that pervades Israeli society is confined to the secular world.²³

Virtually all references to the two wars in the ultra-orthodox media and in the ideological-halakhic literature note (most often by implication but sometimes explicitly) the common history and destiny of Haredi and non-Haredi Jews. They underline the relationship between Haredim and the rest of society. Whereas non-Haredi society has many faults, it is certainly not beyond redemption. Furthermore, the most serious sin of which secular society stands accused, the sin of "my might and my power", is one that Haredi society stands accused of as well. A lengthy editorial in *Niv Ha-moreh* (the journal of the association of teachers in Agudat Israel elementary schools) notes explicitly that religious Jews in particular were punished for the sin of:

...being swept up ideologically by the general current of relying, to a greater or lesser extent on material forces other than G-d...²⁴

The most important ideological formulation of the Haredi response to the Yom Kippur War was an article by the leading ultra-orthodox ideologue, Moshe Schonfeld. Schonfeld's article, "The Twilight of the Gods", was first published in *Niv Ha-moreh* and reprinted twice in *Diglenu*, once in the Spring (Nisan) of 1974 and again in September (Tishrei) of 1975. Schonfeld notes that although the IDF is wonderful, Israeli opinion-makers were wrong to stress its courage in battle and its military feats instead of its spiritual virtues – its sense of fraternity,

its self-sacrifice and its humanitarian attitude to the enemy. He labels this "idol worship" and then adds that Haredim were guilty of this as well.

The themes identified in the category of negative assessments of Israeli society, therefore, do not necessarily include criticisms that distance the Haredi reader from non-Haredim. One group of articles was critical of a particular group of secularists, the leaders who failed to recognize the miracles of the war. This kind of criticism, by implication, vindicates the mass of Israelis who, at worst, were misled by the secular leaders of the society. A second criticism that does relate to the masses of Israelis is found in articles questioning the permanent nature or depth of their religious renewal. However, I identified only six such articles and they were very unequally distributed: five following the Six Day War and only one following the Yom Kippur War.

Almost all the neutral assessments, as is clear from the discussion above, reflect favourably on Israeli society and on relationships between Haredim and non-Haredim. In other words, two conclusions seem to me inescapable from studying the Haredi reaction to the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars. First, the response is one that strengthens their ties to Israeli society in general, including the fortunes of the state. Second, contrary to what I expected to find, there is little difference between responses to each of the wars except that Haredi authors were less likely to question the depth of religious renewal following the Yom Kippur War.

The image or paradigm of each war, as it emerges in the ultra-orthodox media, can be summarized as follows: wars, even one that ends as gloriously as the Six Day War and certainly the Yom Kippur War, are times of tears, trial and tragedy. They come as punishment for the sins of the Jews, the foremost being that of "my might and my power", namely, the excessive reliance on the state, the instruments of the state and human potential instead of belief and reliance on G-d. But if the sins of the Jews are the ultimate cause of wars, the immediate cause lies in the "eternal hatred" of Gentiles towards Jews and their desire to destroy them, whether or not they are Haredim. In the course of the wars, Israelis fought bravely, with pure heart and self-sacrifice against great odds. Special qualities are attributed to Israelis, to those who live in the Land of Israel.²⁵ But Israeli Jews emerged victorious because it was in accordance with G-d's wish. G-d saved the Jews through "revealed or open miracles" (*nisim niglim*). Many secular Jews saw these miracles. These and other experiences, including the insecurity of national existence revealed by Arab hostility and the wars against Israel, shattered their belief in Zionism understood as Jewish normalcy or hope for national independence. Hence these Jews are now open to the message of repentance and return. The wars and their

aftermath demonstrated that it was incumbent upon the Haredim to exploit the opportunity that this opening of the heart on the part of secular Jews affords them.

In a study of the attitudes of the Haredi press to secular Israelis, Amnon Levy noted that they perceive secular society in two distinct modes.²⁶ In one mode, secular Jews are perceived as a nation separate from the Haredim. Sometimes the former are labelled Israelis whereas Haredim are referred to as Jews. Levy cites an article in the weekly *Hamahaneh Ha-Haredi* (25 May 1988) contrasting the celebration of the holiday *Shavout* by different types of Israelis. The first are labelled “lost souls” who “wander around the polluted bathtub called the Sea of Galilee while Jews all over the country and all over the Jewish world sanctify the evening by study”. The newspaper article concludes that:

Two nations, foreign to one another and alienated from one another are emerging, one not even understanding the language of the other.

This mode of relationship stresses the deep and unbridgeable gulf separating the two communities.²⁷ However, another mode, more prevalent on some occasions, less prevalent on others, treats non-Haredim as brothers, innocent victims of their inadequate Jewish education: “children who were abducted” is the phrase most often employed.²⁸ Israel’s wars, whose very reality locates Haredim within the larger camp of Israeli Jews, tends to bring out the second mode and to minimize the first. The first mode never disappears, however. Indeed, as the memory of the war recedes there is no intrinsic reason why it should not reappear as forcefully and persuasively as it did before. For it, too, is anchored in major Haredi myths about the exile and the unredeemed nature of the Jewish people.

I have noted that the same paradigm or “mythos” was applied to both the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars. I have not explored Haredi responses to other wars, but my guess is that they are no different. I am fairly confident that an examination of Haredi responses to the Israeli War of Independence would reveal a virtually identical paradigm which seems to be imposed on events without regard to its accuracy. For example, the day before the outbreak of the Six Day War, *Ha-modi’a* warned its readers against the sin of “my might and my power”. According to the writer:

The nation must cure itself of all thoughts of “my might and my power” and turn its heart more to G-d. This tragedy of undue confidence in our power turns the hearts of many away from an expectation for G-d’s mercy. It is one of the great tragedies of our time...²⁹

The references to “my might and my power” and “undue confidence in our power” were without foundation. Almost all Jews in Israel, including Haredim, waited in trepidation for what they feared was an impending holocaust. But following the striking victory of the Six Day War, Israeli society engaged in an orgy of self-adulation celebrating the accomplishments of its military leaders in particular. None the less, a Haredi periodical reported that the war had destroyed “secular idols”.³⁰

AGUDAT ISRAEL'S ENTRY INTO THE GOVERNMENT COALITION

The difference between the Yom Kippur War and all other Israeli wars was that for once the myth did fit reality. This helps explain why, following the Yom Kippur War rather than the Six Day War, Haredim were psychologically prepared to reverse their policy and join the ruling government coalition. Between 1953 and 1977 Haredi policy had been clear. Agudat Israel was enjoined from participating in any Israeli government, since this would make it responsible for all government policies, some of which were inconsistent with Jewish law.

Menachem Friedman is correct to attribute this reversal of policy in 1977 to growing pressures within Haredi society for greater access to public funds.³¹ These pressures grew by virtue of their success in directing the male members of their community to spend more and more years in *yeshivot*. (Friedman estimates that most Haredim today remain in *yeshivot* until their late thirties). As a consequence, they leave the *yeshivot* without productive skills and are unable to earn more than a minimal wage. And by encouraging families of seven or eight children, the earning capacity of their wives is also restricted and the need for free or very low cost housing intensified. These pressures have brought Haredi society to the edge of a precipice, according to Friedman and only large-scale government funding can delay if not prevent its fall.

The political scientist, Ilan Greilsammer, rightly adds that the decision to join the government coalition in 1977 was connected to the overturning of the Labour party's hegemony. For the first time since the creation of the state, a centre-right party, led by Menachem Begin, ruled.³² The political Right in Israel, as in Europe, has traditionally harboured greater sympathy than the Left towards religious symbols and values.³³ This change eased the decision by Haredi leaders to join the government coalition.

But it seems to me that even this would not have been sufficient if the ideological and psychological ground had not been prepared. Haredi society is built on a religious ideology. It demands material sacrifices of its sons and daughters based upon its principle, and its fore-

most religious leaders (though not its political representatives) live exemplary lives of material simplicity if not actual poverty out of the same commitment. It is far-fetched to explain basic policy shifts solely in terms of economic forces. None the less, one cannot explain the Haredi willingness to join the government coalition in 1977 simply in terms of ideological or religious preferences for parties of the Right. This preference is only relevant if one assumes that Haredi parties feel a measure of responsibility for Israeli society and confidence in the importance of state policies in achieving religious goals. In other words, distinctions about whether secular parties of the Right are more suitable partners than those of the Left makes sense only if joining the government coalition and assuming some responsibility for the direction of Israeli society is viewed in a positive light. It is only meaningful if the Haredi community perceives itself as an integral part of Israeli society. This perception, never entirely dimmed, became immeasurably stronger in the wake of the Yom Kippur War for two reasons. Haredi responses to both wars portrayed the ultra-orthodox as part of Israeli society, sharing its fate in physical as well as metaphysical terms, as well as participating in the traumatic events themselves. If the Yom Kippur War led Agudat Israel to join the government coalition and the Six Day War did not – the reason may lie in the much more prolonged and deeper soul-searching within Israeli society at large provoked by the trauma of 1973.

But I believe that qualitative differences also distinguish the two wars. If the Yom Kippur War strengthened ultra-orthodox ties to Israeli society thereby evoking certain political consequences it is also because this time Haredi society really believed its own myths. The intensity of the response, the number of articles and the extended period over which they were written suggest to me that following the Yom Kippur War, Haredi authors not only proclaimed the standard paradigm but were convinced of its truth. The paradigm was confirmed because it reflected what Haredim thought they were experiencing (including the miracles) and because non-Haredim were repeating many if not all the components of the paradigm. In "The Twilight of the Gods", Schonfeld's major article explaining the Yom Kippur War, he insists that the Yom Kippur War demonstrated "that even in our sovereign state we are isolated, different, a nation that dwells alone, a ghetto among the nations... a ghetto in the framework of a state..."³⁴ In other words, the Yom Kippur War proved that the Haredi analyses of Zionism and the condition of Israel were correct. The result was to magnify Haredi self-confidence and this was certainly a precondition to the kind of co-operation with secular Jews that is required by a government coalition. Once Haredim truly believed that the secularists acknowledged the bankruptcy of Zionism, they had

much less to fear from them. Secularists could now be perceived as mistaken and misguided Jews who deserved to be shown the light, not opponents who were offering an alternative ideology.

The belief of the Haredim in their own mythos and their self-confidence was further reinforced by the growth in the number of *ba'alei t'shuva* (penitents or "born again" Jews). Their presence confirmed the justice of Haredi proclamations about the bankruptcy of Zionist ideology. Yoel Schwartz compared the Six Day and the Yom Kippur War and observed that whereas the Six Day War had mixed effects – *aliya* from the Soviet Union, a religious return and the creation of *yeshivot* for *ba'alei t'shuva* from abroad, it also led to "an intoxication with victory and success which blinded the leaders and the general public..."³⁵ The Yom Kippur War, on the other hand,

...opened a new period among our people, the war shattered various idols dominant in the Jewish street such as "my might and my power" and faith in the leaders ceased. Secular society was shaken...

All this awakened in the public's heart the question of why all the suffering? Why does the Jew always suffer? What is the purpose of suffering? Little by little these thoughts led to the search for the [correct] path and [they] began, little by little to return to Judaism...³⁶

An article on the new wave of *ba'alei t'shuva* published in 1976 notes that they are usually individuals of high status, well educated and materially comfortable.³⁷ In short, the word of G-d was now penetrating the highest reaches of Israeli society. In addition, the author notes, the Yom Kippur War brought a change of attitudes among Israelis towards "students of Torah" (*b'nei Torah*), that is, to the Haredim themselves.

But it did more than that. For the final conclusion of the paradigm, as noted earlier, is to impose obligations upon the Haredim themselves to spread Torah among the non-religious now that they are open to the message. The phenomenon of *ba'alei t'shuva* reinforced the belief that the paradigm was accurate and that a massive reawakening was possible. It led at least some writers to look to the state as a possible vehicle for the Haredi message. Calls to spread Torah among the secular Jews were also issued following the Six Day War. The difference is that within two or three years of that war, a number of writers were already expressing reservations about the depth or permanence of the renewal. Although similar reservations were expressed following the Yom Kippur War, they were far less frequent. More significantly, the charge to Haredim to intensify their efforts to spread Torah or Judaism

among the secular were now accompanied by calls to utilize the state for this purpose. One such call was issued on the pages of *Diglenu* in an article titled, "Let Us All Mobilise to Impose the Torah in Our Holy Land".

Sometimes one begins to think, why did the Holy One Blessed Be He create the state, for what purpose, what does the State add to His honour, may He be blessed? Perhaps the Holy One Blessed Be He created the state in order to provide us with the opportunity to impose the Torah on the state and through it on all Jews.³⁸

It was clear by 1976 that the issue of Haredi attitudes towards the state was on the agenda of ultra-orthodox concerns.³⁹ Articles on the topic reflected the sense of a new relationship towards the Israeli State, of new sentiments that had penetrated both the Haredi at street level and the attitudes of many Haredi leaders. This was a necessary though by no means sufficient condition, for the reversal of policy in 1977 which permitted Agudat Israel to join the government coalition.

NOTES

1. *Ha-modi'a*, 7 June 1967, p. 1.
2. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1967, pp. 2, 5.
3. *Ibid.*, 23 November 1973, p. 2.
4. *Ibid.*, 22 April 1969. Reprinted in Shlomo Volva, *Between the Sixth and the Tenth: Lectures and Articles Between Two Wars*, Jerusalem, 1976, p. 148 (Hebrew).
5. *Ha-modi'a*, 22 April 1969, p. 9.
6. *Ibid.*, 12 September 1969, pp. 3,4.
7. *Diglenu*, Heshvan, 1973, p. 4.
8. *Ha-modi'a*, 21 July, 1967, p. 2.
9. *Diglenu*, Heshvan, 1973, p. 4.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
11. *Ha-modi'a*, 12 October 1973, p. 3.
12. *Ibid.*, 23 June 1967, p. 1 and 4 October 1967, p.2, and *Diglenu*. Rav Shach's statement which is first reported in *Diglenu* is repeated and its implications are elaborated upon in an article in *Yated Ne'eman*, 10 March 1990, p. 3. *Yated Ne'eman*, a daily newspaper totally faithful to Shach, did not begin publication until the 1980s.
13. *Beth Jacob*, Vol. 8, No. 97 (July 1967), p. 2.
14. See, for example, *Ha-modi'a*, 26 October 1973, p. 2.
15. *Ibid.*, 26 May 1968, p. 2.
16. *Diglenu*, Heshvan, 1973, p. 2.
17. Thus, for example, the leader of the Aguda stated, without explaining himself, that his party had an important role in the victory of the Six Day War. He also observed that every third soldier was religious. Perhaps he was suggesting that his movement encouraged religious soldiers to serve in the army. His figure is without foundation nor did the Aguda encourage religious soldiers to serve. *Ha-modi'a*, 23 June, 1967, pp. 1, 2.
18. *Ibid.*, 2 November 1973, p. 2.
19. *Ibid.*, 12 October 1973, p. 2.
20. Yosef Schwartz, *Yemot Olam*, Jerusalem, 1980, p. 126.
21. *Ha-modi'a*, 2 November 1973, p. 3.
22. *Ibid.*, 30 November 1973, p. 2.
23. *Niv Ha-moreh*, No. 46 (Kislev, 1974), pp. 3, 17.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
25. Thus, for example, in his article "The Twilight of the Gods", Moshe Schonfeld says that the surprise attack by the Arabs even fooled "the sons of Eretz Yisrael, who by

nature are much cleverer than the Jews of the diaspora...”.

26. Amnon Levy,
27. In addition to Levy see Charles S. Liebman, “Relations Between Orthodox and Non-Orthodox in Israel”, in Jonathan Sachs (ed.), *Orthodoxy Confronts Modernity*, New York, 1991, pp. 109-122.
28. On the use of this term (*tinokot she-nishbu*) see Tamar Elor, “The Perception of Secular Jews in the Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel”, *Megamot*, 34 (October 1991), pp. 104-121.
29. *Ha-modi'a*, 5 June 1967, p. 2.
30. *Beth Jacob*, Vol. 8, No. 97 (July 1967), p. 2.
31. Menachem Friedman, *The Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) Society: Sources, Trends and Processes*, Jerusalem, 1991, p. 188 (Hebrew).
32. See Ilan Greilsammer, *Israel: Les Hommes En Noir*, Paris, 1990, p. 36.
33. On the historical antagonism of the Israeli Left to the religious tradition in comparison to parties of the Right, see Charles S. Leibman and Elizer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel*, Berkeley, 1983.
34. This particular quote is from page six of the Nisan 1974 reprint that appeared in *Diglenu*.
35. Schwartz, *Yemot Olam*, p.90.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ha-modi'a*, 1 October 1976, p. 3.
38. *Diglenu*, Sivan/Tamuz, 1975, p. 3.
39. Nothing is ever totally new, least of all in Haredi society. It is true that following the Six Day War a similar debate took place but its terms of reference were unlike those following the Yom Kippur War. In the 22 April 1969 issue of *Ha-modi'a*, the issue that preceded Israel's Independence Day, the paper's editor, Yisrael Spiegel, printed an essay of his titled “The State of Israel Demonstrates Anew: A People that Dwelleth Alone”. The author, adopting a strategy that characterizes Haredi writers sympathetic to the state, distinguished between Zionism and the Israeli State. He then argued that whereas Zionism is to be condemned, it has already proved itself bankrupt and therefore by implication non-threatening. In so far as the state is concerned, whereas the great spiritual leaders of the generation (*g'dolei ha-dor*) objected to its establishment *ab initio* (*mila-thila*) they do not object to it *a posteriori* (*b'diavad*). Spiegel suggests that the State should be exploited as an instrument for the spread of Torah. However, alongside his own article, *Ha-modi'a* published a very critical rebuttal by the important Haredi scholar and ideologue, Shlomo Volva, “Is There a Distinction Between Zionism and the State?”. (Each of the authors subsequently reprinted his article: Yisrael Spiegel, *Be-derekh Ha-melekh*, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 234-240 and Shlomo Volva *Between the Sixth and the Tenth*, pp. 145-148).